Gatherings

THE HEIDEGGER CIRCLE ANNUAL

2024

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VOLUME 14, 2024

Gatherings is a publication of the Heidegger Circle, a group of scholars who have been meeting annually in North America since 1966 to discuss the work of Martin Heidegger.

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SUBMISSION GUIDELINES

All submissions other than letters and brief responses to articles (under 1000 words) should be formatted for blind review and include a title page with paper title, author name, and affiliation (if applicable). Papers should be submitted single space, Times New Roman font, 12 point, under one of the following file formats: PDF, RTF, DOC, or DOCX. Any Greek words or text should be entered as Unicode characters. Papers should adhere to *The Chicago Manual of Style* and follow the citation scheme provided at the end of each issue. The same paper may be submitted to the yearly meeting of the Heidegger Circle and to *Gatherings*. All papers should be sent as an attachment to gatherings@heidegger-circle.org.

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GATHERINGS

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Letter from the Editor

Scott M. Campbell

The 58th Annual Meeting of the Heidegger Circle conference took place May 2–5, 2024 at Trinity College in Hartford, CT, with Shane Ewegen as the Convenor. The 59th Annual Meeting of the Heidegger Circle is scheduled to take place at Duquesne University in Pittsburgh, PA in the spring of 2025, and the Convener will be Doug Peduti.

In this issue of *Gatherings*, I am pleased to present seven original and thought-provoking essays. The first essay, by Tom Sheehan, discusses the core matter of Heidegger's thinking. The next four essays all take up Heidegger's early work. Robert Scharff looks at destruction and formal indication in order to develop an improved understanding of phenomenology. Francesco Scagliusi argues that we need to understand the destruction of the history of ontology in terms of the destruction of factical life. Walter Brogan returns to Heidegger's course on Aristotle's *Rhetoric* to explore the relation between affection and virtue. In a close analysis of Heidegger's 1921–22 lecture course *Phenomenological Interpretations of Aristotle: Initiation into Phenomenological Research*, Sean Kirkland interprets central ideas from that course, such as formal indication, ruinance, and counter-ruinance, as responding to the challenges posed by late-stage historicism. The sixth essay, by Avery Dawson, is on the later Heidegger and aims to offer a new interpretation of *Ereignis*. In the final essay, Elena Bartolini provides an analysis of the relation between Heidegger's philosophy and his philosophical practice and teaching.

This issue also includes a new feature, namely a Book Forum, devoted to a discussion of Charles Bambach's *Of an Alien Homecoming: Reading Heidegger's Hölderlin*. Ian Alexander Moore and Krzysztof Ziarek comment on the book, and then Bambach responds to their commentaries.

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In this issue, I am also pleased to offer reviews for two books: David Farrell Krell reviews *Dialogue on the Threshold: Heidegger and Trakl* by Ian Alexander Moore, and Daniel M. Herskowitz reviews *Kabale: Hebräischer Humanismus im Lichte von Heideggers Denken* by Michael Chighel.

As always, I would like to thank the Editorial Board of *Gatherings*. Each year, the journal receives numerous essays, and I call upon the Editorial Board regularly to read and review essays. I am grateful for their commitment to *Gatherings*. I would also like to extend my deep gratitude to Ben Brewer, our Documents Editor, who does fantastic work for the journal, as well as to our Book Review Editor, David Abergel.

This will be my final issue as Editor of *Gatherings*. It has been an honor for me to serve in this role the past four years, and I am pleased to continue to work on the journal in the role of Associate Editor. The Editorial Board has selected Kevin Aho as the new Editor of *Gatherings*. He is Professor of Philosophy and Chair of the Department of Communication and Philosophy at Florida Gulf Coast University. He has published widely on Heidegger, existentialism, phenomenology, hermeneutics, and phenomenological psychopathology. He is the author of *One Beat More: Existentialism and the Gift of Mortality* (Polity, 2022), *Existentialism: An Introduction* (Polity, 2014, 2nd ed. 2020), *Contexts of Suffering: A Heideggerian Approach to Psychopathology* (Rowman & Littlefield, 2019), *Heidegger's Neglect of the Body* (SUNY Press, 2009), and *Body Matters: A Phenomenology of Sickness, Illness, and Disease*, with James Aho (Lexington Books, 2008). He edited *Existential Medicine: Essays on Health and Illness* (Rowman & Littlefield, 2018) and co-edited *The Routledge Handbook of Contemporary Existentialism* (Routledge, 2024). His work on Heidegger has appeared in numerous journals, and he has also served as an Associate Editor of *Gatherings*. He co-hosted the 48th Annual Meeting of The Heidegger Circle with the late Charles Guignon.

I wish Kevin all the best in his new role as Editor of *Gatherings*.

Rewriting Heidegger

Thomas Sheehan

ABSTRACT: (1) Heidegger worked exclusively within the phenomenological correlation (2) where *Bewegung* is responsible for *Bedeutung* and (3) where "the thing itself" is not *Sein* but *Existenz* thrown open as (aka appropriated to be) the source of all intelligibility. (4) Ex-sistential *Bewegung/Zeitlichkeit* is bivalent, not trivalent, and (5) *das Gewesen* does not mean "what-is-as-having-been" but rather is the retrieved meaning of τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι. (6) Heidegger's focus on individual authenticity elided the pressing issue of social authenticity in the economic and political spheres. (7) The Appendix discusses a claim made by Prof. Richard Capobianco.

KEY WORDS: phenomenological correlation; *Zeitlichkeit*; *Gewesen; Sinn von Sein*

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There is a double crisis threatening Heidegger scholarship today, one coming from outside the Heidegger guild and the other from within. Symptomatic of attacks on Heidegger from without are the works of Emmanuel Faye and Richard Wolin. Faye's work is so incompetent that it hardly passes the laugh test. Wolin, for his part, knows that Heidegger was an antisemite and a Nazi – and he's right: Heidegger was. But that's *all* Wolin knows. In his role as village explainer, Wolin uses potted versions of Heidegger as a weapon to reduce the philosophy to crowd-shocking headlines in his relentless thirty-year crusade to shut down job opportunities for younger philosophers who actually *do* understand the work.

But the crisis from within is far more troubling: the deepening uncertainty among Heidegger scholars themselves regarding what his work was about and why it should matter. I would like to address that internal crisis by asking a "what" question and a "so what" question.

- What was the core of Heidegger's work?
- What difference does his work make?

The internal crisis takes many forms, and I will begin by mentioning two snares that Anglophone Heidegger scholarship is caught in: the language trap and the being trap.

1. THE LANGUAGE TRAP

Your experience of teaching Heidegger may be like mine. Students read the texts mostly in English, and the first wall they crash into is Heidegger's language, where virtually every key term has a different meaning from ordinary and even philosophical German. For example,

Sein	does not mean	being
Zeit	does not mean	time
Dasein	does not mean	existence
Wahrheit	does not mean	truth
Ereignis	does not mean	event
Verstehen	does not mean	understanding

Sorge	does not mean	care
das Da	does not mean	the there

…and the list goes on.

Moreover, the English translations themselves pose a host of problems. Either they leave Heidegger's two key terms, *Dasein* and *Ereignis*, in the German because he claimed, improbably, that they cannot be translated;[1] or they flagrantly ignore his objections to translating *Ereignis* as any form of "event" and *Dasein* as "being-here" or "being-there";[2] or they hue so closely to Heidegger's German that they produce calques and neologisms that are simply not English (e.g., de-severance, de-distancing) or that suffer from acute hyphenitis (ready-to-hand, present-to-hand, being-in-the-world, being-towards-death) without adequately explaining what those stuttering terms mean. All this not to mention the way the English deals with complex German syntax, including compound sentences with long embedded modifying clauses. Consider, for example:

> Apart from the fact that in the question just formulated, the 'standpoint' – which is again not demonstrated phenomenally but is rather constructivist – makes its appearance…

which might remind one of Mark Twain's parody in "The Awful German Language":

> But when he, upon the street the in-satin-and-silk-covered-now-very-unconstrainedly-after-the-newest-fashion-dressed government counsellor's wife met….[3]

In addition, the literalistic, word-for-word accuracy of the English translations can be a serious disadvantage insofar as Heidegger's key terms often bring Aristotle's Greek lexicon into German while giving it a phenomenological rather than a metaphysical sense. Translations that are ignorant of that can go wide of the mark, for example by rendering *Gestell* as "enframing" (missing its roots in μορφή) or *Riß* as "rift-design" (ditto regarding πέρας) or *Umschlag* as "overturning" (ditto regarding μεταβολή).[4]

The result is that Anglophone scholarship is hamstrung by its proprietary Pidgin, which is understood only by paid-up initiates. Heidegger had good reasons for crafting his unique terminology, but its rhapsodic repetition by generations of disciples is getting a bit old. Even more bizarre is that this strange idiolect is not even Heidegger's but instead the one invented by John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson some sixty years ago. To be sure, Macquarrie and Robinson did yeoman's service in quarrying their groundbreaking translation out of the hard granite of *Sein und Zeit*. But they did so in ignorance of the Greek that underlies many of the German terms and with a lapidary literalism that has produced a cryptolect that to this day remains only semi-understood and has long since outlived its usefulness.

2. THE BEING TRAP

Worse yet, Heidegger scholars are caught in the "being" trap, convinced that "the thing itself," the core of Heidegger's thought, is *Sein* – in spite of Heidegger's clear insistence that it was not. It took him a while, but he finally got around to saying so.

- In 1951 he said that "Sein" was only a preliminary and provisional term (*das vorläufige Wort*), a mere formal indication of what he was after (GA 7: 234.13–14/78.21).
- In 1955, in his homage to Ernst Jünger, he took to crossing the word out (~~Sein~~) (GA 9: 385.6/291.7).
- In 1959 he acknowledged that his use of *Sein* had been the occasion of immense confusion (*Anlaß einer großen Verwirrung*: GA 12: 103.24–25/19.28–29).
- In 1962 he announced that *Sein* is no longer the proper object of thought (*nicht mehr das eigens zu Denkende*: GA 14: 50.2–3/41.4–5).
- In 1962 he also declared that, when it comes to the thing itself, there is no longer room for even the word "being"

(*ist sogar für den Namen Sein kein Raum mehr*: GA 15: 365.17–18/60.9–10).

- In 1967 he said, "I do not like to use the word [*Sein*] any more" (*ich dieses Wort nicht mehr gern gebrauche*: GA 15: 20.8–9/8.34–35).

These *retractationes* show that *Sein* was not what Heidegger was finally after; however, the issue is not merely that the later Heidegger came to substitute the phenomenological term *Anwesen* for the metaphysical term *Sein*. Rather, the crucial issue – and a source of major confusion in Heidegger scholarship – is the hair-pulling fact that throughout his career he used "*Sein*" in two quite different senses. In the earlier work it means *das Anwesen des Anwesenden*, the meaningful presence of something. But in the later work, "*Sein*" can mean either

1. *das Anwesen des Anwesenden* (aka *das Sein des Seienden*): the intelligibility/meaningful presence/significance of things[5] or
2. *das Anwesenlassen* (aka *Seyn*): what *brings about* the intelligibility/meaningful presence/significance of things (GA 14: 45.28–30/37.4–6).[6]

Only that second sense is what Heidegger called *die Sache selbst*, the ultimate issue he was after. He argued that "the thing itself" is *Existenz*, the unique form of being that we alone have, whereby we are thrown open as *die Lichtung*, the dynamic field of primary intelligibility and the source of the secondary intelligibility of everything we encounter.[7] As a priori, *Existenz* is not our own doing but rather is "done unto" us (*factum est*). It is the Urfaktum, the ultimate "fact" that constitutes our facticity.

Most of Heidegger's six statements above were still unpublished in 1962–63 when William J. Richardson and Otto Pöggeler were moving Heidegger scholarship out of its post-war existentialist paradigm and into the classical "being" paradigm that has dominated the scholarship ever sense. However, with Heidegger's clarifications of *Ereignis* in GA 65 (1989), the tectonic plates under the classical paradigm began to

shift.[8] Now some thirty-five years later the question presses to the fore: If Heidegger's focal topic was not *Sein* (and if *Ereignis* is not just another name for *Sein*), what *was* Heidegger's central issue? And where should we start in order to find out?

A few years back, Gregory Fried and Richard Polt published the important collection *After Heidegger?*[9] The question mark in the title is significant, signaling that in order to project an "after Heidegger," one first has to know what Heidegger was after. Like Socrates, Heidegger held that questions are determined by the answers they are searching for (GA 2: 7.3–4/SZ 5.6–7).[10] So, if Heidegger was not searching for being, what *was* he after?

3. 1971: HEIDEGGER'S ADVICE

In the spring of 1971, through the good offices of my teacher, William J. Richardson, I spent the better part of an afternoon with Heidegger at his home in Freiburg-Zähringen. I was teaching in Europe at the time, and Heidegger invited me to submit some questions and then visit him on May 21. I was just a year out of graduate school, and admittedly the questions I forwarded were somewhat naïve. Heidegger saw that, and as he poured a glass of wine in his second-floor study, he cut to the chase. If you want to understand my work, he said, you first have to understand two things:

- the categorial intuition in *Logical Investigations* and
- Aristotle's doctrine of κίνησις in the *Physics*.

The first text led him to revise his understanding of the second. Once he saw that Husserl's breakthrough regarding the categorial intuition had already been anticipated by Aristotle in *Metaphysics* IX, 10,[11] Heidegger had an insight that launched him on his lifelong pursuit of "the thing itself." He saw that *Bewegung* makes possible *Bedeutung*, ex-sistential movement is what makes meaning possible.

Aristotle said that a small error in the beginning gets multiplied ten-thousandfold down the road.[12] In approaching Heidegger, it is crucial to get off on the right foot from the very start by understanding the

presuppositions that underlie his work, one of the most fundamental of which is κίνησις as ontological movement, something that both Aristotle and Heidegger acknowledge is difficult to understand.[13] Aristotle says that if one does not understand κίνησις one will never understand φύσις, to which Heidegger would add: and if you don't understand κίνησις, you will never understand *Existenz*.[14] Heidegger agrees formally with Aristotle that movement is ability-as-enacted, but enacted only insofar as the ability is still ability and has not yet reached the goal and been transformed into a further actuality.[15]

Like any fundamental presupposition, this one operates in the background of everything Heidegger taught and wrote. But if movement is the hidden presupposition of Heidegger's work, it is hiding in plain sight. It massively informs his early courses on Aristotle as well as his famous 1922 "Natorp Bericht," his first major text on Aristotle, where the term *Bewegung* is mentioned fifty-two times in a fifty-one-page manuscript.[16] In a 1928 seminar he declared that human beings are movement in its most basic and original form (*Urbewegung*) and, as such, can understand the being of things only as a form of movement (GA 83: 256.23). To state this in terms of SZ: insofar as we are existential movement (*Zeitlichkeit*/temporality), we necessarily understand being in terms of movement (*Zeit*/time). Indeed, the bond between human being and being is itself kinetic ("transzendental-kinetisch," GA 83: 20.2–3). This is the fundamental fact underlying Heidegger's discussions of *Ereignis* throughout the last forty years of his career.

The argument I lay out in what follows takes Heidegger's 1971 suggestion seriously. It is focused on meaning and movement, with emphasis on the "and" that binds them together.

4. THE PHENOMENOLOGICAL CORRELATION

Hölderlin famously said that where you begin is where you remain, and T.S. Eliot wrote that the end of all exploring is to arrive back where you started and know the place for the first time.[17] True to both maxims, Heidegger remained when he began and kept coming back to where he started, and that place was the phenomenological correlation.



Figure 1

His first course as a Privatdozent (winter semester, 1915) was dedicated to Parmenides' formulation of the correlation, where *noein* and *einai*, minding and being, are *auto*, inseparably correlative. Heidegger interpreted *noein* in terms of ex-sistence and *einai* in terms of being, with ex-sistence as the enactment (*Vollzug*), and being as the enacted (*Gehalt*). Heidegger took that as the bedrock of human being as such and of all Western philosophy, and for the next sixty years he did all his work within the phenomenological correlation of

- ex-sistence as enacting the being of things and
- the various forms of being that get enacted.

However, "the thing itself," *die Sache selbst* of all Heidegger's work, was neither *Dasein* nor *Sein* by themselves but rather the relation (*Bezug*) that renders them correlative. In 1927 Heidegger read that relation in terms of *Faktizität/Geworfenheit*, whereas in 1934 he began reading *Geworfenheit* as *Ereignis*.[18]

Another presupposition that Heidegger brings to his work (and it is a fundamental one insofar as denying it actually instantiates it)[19] is that human beings are a priori embedded in meaningfulness (*Bedeutsamkeit*). He holds that we are not in possession of λόγος, as per Aristotle's "the living entity that has *logos*," so much as we are *possessed by* λόγος, as in Heidegger's rewrite of Aristotle: λόγος ἄνθρωπον ἔχων.[20] Heidegger interprets λόγος as referring primarily to "gathering into meaning" rather than to the consequences of that, such as the ability to interpret, speak, and reason (GA 9: 279.1–7/213.10–15). As possessed by λόγος, we cannot *not* be making sense of whatever we encounter.

Before it is anything else, phenomenology *is* the correlation because that correlation is our fate. Lacking a God-like point of view, we are locked into the relation between the enactment and the enacted. We cannot experience anything without experiencing it, and we cannot understand being without understanding it. As Heidegger puts it, the philosophizing person belongs together with the matters being investigated (GA 9: 42.25–26/36.35–36).[21] Everything else in phenomenology – whether intentionality, the things themselves, the reductions, or even hermeneutics – is located within and is secondary to the correlation. The correlation structures all three divisions of Part One of SZ (= SZ I) as originally projected, just as it also structures the first Division of Part One (= SZ I.1).



Figure 2

Parmenides may have been the first to articulate the correlation of minding and being, but according to Heidegger, the reason for the inevitability of the correlation eluded Parmenides and everyone else in Western philosophy until Heidegger discovered ex-sistence. Philosophers failed to probe the very correlation – the *Bezug* – that unites the minding-of-being and being-as-the-minded, and as Heidegger said in 1929, that relation is what he was finally after (GA 3: 242.28–29/170.15–16).

Given the centrality of the correlation, it's amazing that books on Heidegger's phenomenology can still be published today without so much as mentioning the correlation.[22] Even more amazing is the claim that Heidegger gave up phenomenology in the 1930s. We know he surrendered the *title* "phenomenology" just as he surrendered the titles "fundamental ontology" and "hermeneutics," but he never surrendered what those titles refer to. Heidegger never gave up phenomenology, and he couldn't without ceasing to be Heidegger.[23]

5. NOT "BEING"

If phenomenology is first and foremost about the correlation, it is first and foremost about meaning, intelligibility, and significance, and not at all about "being" as that word is understood in everyday speech and in philosophy. The term "being" is catnip for Heideggerians, sending them into paroxysms of ecstasy; nonetheless, in none of its forms – εἶναι, *ousia*, *esse*, *entitas*, and even Heidegger's *Sein* – was it ever "the thing itself." *Sein* is the first of those technical terms in Heidegger that do not have their usual philosophical meanings. Here we reach the *pons asinorum* of Heidegger scholarship, with the attendant difficulties the scholarship has had in spurring Balaam's ass over that bridge.

Ever since (as he said) "Husserl put phenomenological eyes in my head" (GA 63: 5.22–23/4.20),[24] Heidegger saw that phenomenology was about an immediate first-person engagement with what is given in experience (*das Was*) in terms of the way it is given (*das Wie*) (GA 2: 37.13–16/SZ 27.28–31). To use ontological terms, phenomenological experiences are of beings (*das Seiende*) in their being (*das Sein*). Such a formulation can be misleading if, as Heideggerians often do, one were to take "being" as referring to the intrinsic existence and/or essence of a thing apart from the person relating to the thing. That would be in-itself-ness in Aristotle's metaphysical sense, where what we encounter is considered apart from and independent of thinking.[25]

Since short of death there is no escape from meaning, Heidegger understands the in-itself-ness of a thing phenomenologically as

- the meaningful presence (*Anwesen, Bedeutung*)
- of a thing (*das Seiende*)
- to the person or persons relating to that thing (*das Wem*)[26]
- within a meaning-giving context or world of meaning (*Welt*)
- shaped by the reason why the person or persons is relating to that thing (*Woraufhin*).

Sein stands for *Anwesen*, presence, but not in the physical or chronological sense. Instead, it means presence-to-mind, just as Parmenides' *noein*

means having *einai* present to mind.[27] For Heidegger, however, "mind" refers to mind*ing*, whether that consists in caring about something (as in "Do you mind if I smoke?") or caring for a person or thing ("Mind your little brother while I'm out") or being attentive to a situation (as in "Mind the gap" in the London Tube). In short, *Sein* is Heidegger's stand-in for the significance of something to someone within a correlation that structures the specific meaning-giving context. *Sein* is about how things matter to us. In fact, it *is* such mattering.[28]

That's why Heideggerians should bite the bullet, take the pledge, and swear off the *Sein*-sauce once and for all, the way Heidegger himself finally did. It's time to follow his good example and hit the pause button on what he called *Seinsgerede*, being-babble (GA 5: 335.17/252.33), if for no other reason than that all that banging on about being is the greatest obstacle to understanding Heidegger's work and to making any progress beyond it. — Nonetheless, since "being" is the term Heideggerians insist on employing, I will (reluctantly) use the word in what follows, but with the understanding that

- "being" bespeaks how entities *matter* to someone, i.e., their significance or meaningful presence (*Anwesen*), and
- "being" (*Anwesen*) is not *die Sache selbst.*

I call these remarks "Rewriting Heidegger," but the final goal is to move *beyond* Heidegger to an "after Heidegger" that gets to the tasks he left undone. The thread guiding this text's trajectory will be Heidegger's 1971 remarks on ex-sistential movement as what makes meaning possible.

6. DER SINN VON SEIN

The first issue is *der Sinn von Sein*, which is usually translated as "the meaning (or sense) of being." That German phrase in SZ has two distinct meanings, one of them enactive and the other semantic.

- The enactive sense (*Vollzugsinn*) is about how we must be structured and what we have to do in order to enact an

understanding of being. That is the material covered in SZ I.1–2.

- The semantic sense (*Gehaltssinn*) is about what we understand being *as*. That is the material which was to be covered in the unpublished SZ I.3.

On two different occasions in 1962 Heidegger spelled out what the enactment does. In his April letter to William J. Richardson he said it brings about (*erbringt*) being as the meaningful presence of things (GA 11: 151.27/xx.3).[29] And in a private seminar in September of that year he said that it allows for – i.e., is responsible for – being as meaningful presence; in a word, it is *das Anwesen*-lassen (GA 14: 45.28–30/37.4–6). Here "*lassen*" does not mean letting presence occur "out there" in the world as something we might or might not run across.[30] *Anwesen* occurs only in the enactment of *Anwesen*, and Heidegger's fundamental question was what brings about that *Anwesen*.

Throughout his career, Heidegger said that what brings about *Anwesen* is *die Lichtung*, the thrown-open clearing. In turn he identified that clearing with ex-sistence as enacting *Anwesen*.[31] However, the static image of an open space in the forest fails to capture the dynamic sense of the clearing as a kinetic field of intelligibility, as per the gerundive sense of *Lichtung*: ex-sistence as "clearing the way" for the meaning of whatever one encounters (see Figure 3).[32]

SZ was published without SZ I.3, that is, without getting to the semantic side of *der Sinn von Sein*, what "being" means when it is enacted. But even though the book remained a torso, in 1939 Heidegger said that what SZ I.3 *would* have worked out is already foreshadowed in the enactive moment of SZ I.1–2 (GA 66: 414.9–13/367.15–16). Hence, to discover the semantic content of "being" we have to work with what we've got: Heidegger's analysis of ex-sistence as enacting the understanding of being. That analysis reaches a climax in SZ §65, which brings us to the second issue – in fact the key issue.


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THAT GIVE MEANING TO
THE THINGS WITHIN THEM
etc

Figure 3

7. TEMPORALITY AND ITS PROBLEMS

SZ §65, devoted to *Zeitlichkeit* and *Zeit*, is one of the least understood sections of the entire treatise and the worst translated. What I will call the "received interpretation" of §65 has two problems, the first regarding the *terminology* for temporality and the second regarding its *structure*. Underlying both problems is an issue I mentioned earlier: Heidegger's retrieval of an ex-sistential-phenomenological meaning from one of Aristotle's Greek metaphysical terms.

7.1 THE TERMINOLOGY FOR *ZEITLICHKEIT*

The traditional model of time (χρόνος) sees it as composed of three moments: past, present, and future. The received interpretation of §65 claims that the very same holds for temporality in SZ, so that those three *chronological* moments give their names to the very different *ex-sistential* moments of temporality. Thus, in the received interpretation, *Gewesen*, *Gegenwart*, and *Zukunft* get translated as, respectively,

- the past (in the sense of "what is as having been")
- the present
- the future.

But that is egregiously wrong. For starters, *Zeitlichkeit* does not mean "temporality" and *Zeit* does not mean "time" in either the everyday or the philosophical sense of measuring the duration of a movement or an event. Heidegger said that *Zeitlichkeit and Zeit* were only provisional names for ex-sistence as the clearing, and he finally shelved the term *Zeit* in favor of *Lichtung*.[33] Here we meet the full impact of Heidegger's 1971 remarks about κίνησις.

Heidegger lifted the issue of time out of Aristotle's chronological model and relocated it (provisionally) in Plotinus' ontological model of the "distention of life" (διάστασις ζωῆς),[34] which Augustine interpreted as the "distention of the spirit" (*distentio animi*)[35] and which Heidegger reread as ex-sistence stretched out ahead of itself (*die Erstreckung des Daseins*) (GA 2: 491.21/SZ 371.32). In that context, what Heidegger calls *Zukunft* does not refer to the "future," all those experiences that are

yet to come. Rather, it is his term for *becoming yourself*, asymptotically and mortally, as in *das Auf-sich-Zukommen*, "coming to oneself" (GA 2: 437.4–5/SZ 330.18).

Then what about *Gewesen*? We know this term does not refer to the by-gone past, *das Vergangene*. However, the received interpretation insists that it means "what is as having been" in the present-perfect tense (e.g., Jones, *having been* born some thirty years ago, *still is* the child of her parents). While that chronological sense *does* operate in SZ §74 (re historicity), in §65 *das Gewesen* and *die Gewesenheit* emphatically do *not* have that meaning. Rather, Heidegger retrieved those German terms from an unsaid possibility in Aristotle's phrase for "essence," τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι.

When that Greek phrase refers to the essence of human being (τὸ τί ἦν ἀνθρώπῳ εἶναι), Heidegger interprets it as *das Gewesen*. But there's a problem here. In his definition Aristotle uses ἦν, the imperfect verb form (third person singular) of εἶναι. If we were to (incorrectly) translate the ἦν in τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι as "was," Aristotle's phrase would locate the essence of human being in the chronological past. That is what the medieval scholastics did by mistranslating the Greek phase as *quod quid erat esse*: what it *was* to be this or that thing. If we were to do the same, *Existenz* would come out as "what it *was* to be a human being," thereby reducing ontology to chronology and locating our essence somewhere in the past.

Here things get a bit complicated, and we will take it in three steps. First, we consider what Aristotle's phrase for essence does *not* mean.

Only in 1976, the last year of his life, did Heidegger clarify the issue. Von Herrmann asked him about Aristotle's use of "was" (ἦν) in defining essence, and Heidegger wrote out a note that he inserted in the copy of *Sein und Zeit* that he kept in his Todtnauberg cabin. That handwritten note eventually became the marginal gloss that appears in the *Gesamtausgabe* edition at GA 2: 114.6, corresponding to SZ 85.17 (M-R 117.30).[36] Heidegger's gloss explains that the Greek verb for "to be" (εἶναι) does not have a grammatical form for the present perfect ("has been"). To express that tense, Aristotle resorted to a work-around

and invented the phrase ἦν εἶναι, which literally – and incorrectly – might seem to refer to "what it was to be a human being." However, Heidegger's gloss explains:

> Das griechische Verbum εἶναι kennt keine Perfektform; dieses wird hier im ἦν εἶναι genannt. Nicht ein ontisch Vergangenes, sondern das jeweils Frühere.
>
> The Greek verb εἶναι has no form for the perfect, which here [in *Metaphysics* VI 1, 1025b28–29] is expressed as ἦν εἶναι. That is not an ontic past tense but rather refers to what is always and in each case [ontologically] prior.

The ἦν εἶναι in Aristotle's phrase refers not to the chronological present-perfect, a fact that is disastrously obscured by mistranslating *Gewesen/Gewesenheit* in §65 in terms of "is as having been." If we were to do that, i.e., ascribe to the essence of a human being the temporal status of the present-perfect, we would reduce ontology to chronology while merely switching from the imperfect tense ("was") to the present perfect ("has been"). That Heidegger refuses to do. *Gewesen/Gewesenheit* in §65 does not refer to what a human being is-as-having-been in a chronological sense.

Second, what Aristotle's phrase for essence *does* mean. The Todtnauberg note makes it clear that τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι (and implicitly Heidegger's *das Gewesen*) refers to ontology rather than to the chronological present perfect tense. The note calls *das Gewesen* the "a priori perfect" (*apriorisches Perfekt*) or the "ontological perfect" (*ontologisches Perfekt*), using *Perfekt* in the etymological sense of the Latin *perfectum*: what is "done unto" human beings (*factum*) and done "thoroughly" (*per-*), i.e., a priori. That is, *das Gewesen*, which the gloss reads as *das jeweils schon voraus Wesende*, refers to what is

- a priori (= *schon voraus*)
- ontologically operative in and determinate of … (= *das Wesende*)
- each one of us at each moment of our lives (= *jeweils*).

In §65 Heidegger fills in the content of that formal designation. He argues that this non-chronological structure bespeaks the dynamic, ex-sistential fact that at each moment of my life and as long as I live, I am asymptotically becoming my mortal self.[37] Far from having the chronological sense of what I am-as-having-been, *das Gewesen* designates the ontological becoming that is my very way of being: never just present but always pres-abs-ent, stretched ahead beyond whatever actuality I may have achieved or could achieve. *Der Mensch ist ein Wesen der Ferne* (GA 26: 284.18/221.17). I am stretched into the distance, living mortally ahead of myself.

Third, what all this means for the terminology of *Zeitlichkeit*. It is clear that *das Gewesen* and *die Zukunft* are not two "time zones," one in the past or present-perfect and the other in the future (GA 38: 118.6–8/98.19–21). On the contrary, *Zukunft* names my essential, on-going ex-sistential becoming. Moreover, when in §65 Heidegger has the adjective *gewesen* modify *Zukunft* (GA 2: 432.1–2/SZ 326.19), he is indicating the *kind* of becoming that ex-sistence is. Far from *Zukunft* referring to my chronological future (next year, the year after that, and so on), it is my essence, my ontological "fate," the ever-operative becoming that I cannot not be as long as I live. This cashes out what Heidegger means by *Seinkönnen* as *Zu-sein*, viz. the fact that *ex-sistence*, at its most fundamental, is *ability*, the finite, mortal ability to keep on keeping on.[38] *Zukunft* is ex-sistential δύναμις, which is *das Entheben in das Mögliche* (GA 29/30: 528.4/363.19), my a priori condition of being thrown into the ability to keep on becoming myself until I no longer can.

Die gewesene/gewesende Zukunft of §65 is not at all chronological and does not mean "the future that has been" (as the English translations have it). Rather, it names the ontological-ex-sistential structure underlying and making possible all chronological moments, whether past, present, or future. Heidegger found such an a priori condition implicit in what Augustine called *vivere moriendo*, the human condition of mortal becoming.[39] And in the spirit of Augustine, Heidegger introduced a new, non-chronological "tense" into ex-sistential movement: the *praesens de futuris*,[40] the present-future, where "future" bespeaks the fact that I am

ever becoming. For Heidegger there are not three distinct chronological tenses to ex-sistential becoming but an undivided continuum. Speaking in chronological terms he will say that the past is already folded into the present (GA 2: 27.14–15/SZ 20.4–5),[41] and the present, as embodying the past, is always stretched into the future. In that sense, as he says, my past "always goes ahead of me" (GA 2: 27.29/SZ 20.17).

7.2 THE STRUCTURE OF *ZEITLICHKEIT*

We move now from the terminology for ex-sistential "temporality" to the question of its structure. Recall that *Sorge* is grounded in *Zeitlichkeit* and that the two ex-sistential structures map on to one another.[42] The received interpretation tries to carry out such mapping by claiming that both *Sorge* and *Zeitlichkeit* are *tri*valent, supposedly composed of three moments, which in the case of *Zeitlichkeit* are alleged to be the past, present, and future. But in fact both *Sorge* and *Zeitlichkeit* are not trivalent but *bi*valent, composed of only two ontological moments. As regards *Sorge*, the two a priori moments are:

1. being-ahead-of-oneself-in-the-meaning-giving world, and
2. being meaningfully present to whatever one encounters (GA 2: 256.3–5/192.36–37).

Note that Heidegger uses hyphens in phrase no. 1 (*Sich-vorweg-schon-sein-in*) in order to hold together the first moment of the bivalence as a unity of being both ahead of oneself *and* always already in the world of meaning – that is, not two moments but *one single moment*. That single moment is ex-sistence as a thrown-ahead-of-itself-as-the-world-of-meaning. In the bivalence that is *Sorge*, that first moment makes possible the second moment: our meaningful presence to whatever we encounter. Thus, the bivalent structure of *Sorge* consists of our being

1. thrown open and ahead as the clearing, the dynamic sphere of intelligibility,
2. such that we make sense of whatever we encounter.

In turn, the bivalence of *Sorge* is based on and made possible by the underlying bivalence of *Zeitlichkeit*. The two moments that structure

Sorge cannot be artificially stretched to fit the "three" moments that supposedly make up *Zeitlichkeit*, the alleged chronological past, present and future. But the bivalence of *Sorge* maps perfectly onto *Zeitlichkeit* when we see that ex-sistential temporality is likewise composed of only two moments, not three:

1. a priori becoming oneself (*die gewesende Zukunft*) and
2. thereby making sense of all that one encounters (*gegenwärtigend*).[43]

The adjective *gewesen* indicates that ex-sistential becoming is what we a priori are. When Heidegger replaces *gewesen* with the invented participle *gewesend*, he is emphasizing that our ex-sistential becoming is never chronologically past or present-perfect but rather is *always ontologically operative*.

7.3 EXCURSUS: "COMING BACK TO YOURSELF"

What are we to make of a phrase in §65 that describes a person as *zukünftig auf sich zurückkommend* (GA 2: 431.34/SZ 326.17)? The English translations make a hash of it, rendering the phrase as "[Dasein,] coming back to itself futurally" (M-R) or even worse "[Dasein,] coming back to itself from the future" (S-S). There is no way to make any sense of the English – or for that matter, of Heidegger's German – unless one sees Aristotle's τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι hovering in the background.

Recall that §65 is defining *Zeitlichkeit* not as just a neutral ex-sistential structure but rather as the *authentic* becoming that you personally enact when you take over your mortality in an act of resolve. That is certainly not "returning to yourself from the future" (whatever that is supposed to mean). Instead, you return to yourself (to use Heidegger's German adverb) "*zukünftig*-ly," where *zukünftig* has an ex-sistentiel-personal sense rather than an ex-sistential-structural one. You *personally return* to your *structural becoming* and take over your mortality, making it your own (*zu eigen machen*) and making yourself personally responsible for it (*eigentlich*).

In personally taking over your own way of being, you do not take over some generic human essence or species-being. Your mortal existence is always yours alone and yours-to-become (cf. *jemeinig*), and in an act of resolve you take over *your own personal* mortal becoming – not his or hers, and certainly not "human being in general." You recognize and embrace the hard fact that inhabits all you have been, are, and always will be, namely that the moment you were born you were able to die, and in fact you are dying *now* (GA 2: 326.25–26/SZ 245.26–27). That resolute recognition is what SZ calls "taking over your thrownness" (*Übernahme der Geworfenheit*: GA 2: 431.13/SZ 325.37), which GA 65 rewrites as "taking over your appropriation" (*Über-nahme der Ereignung:* GA 65: 322.7–8/254.36–37). It is a matter of ex-sistentielly becoming your ex-sistential becoming, which is what Heidegger means in SZ §31 when he cites Pindar's γένοι' οἷος ἐσσί: "Become what you are."[44]

7.4 EXCURSUS: "MAKING SENSE OF"

A brief note on the phrase "making sense of," since I use it to paraphrase both *Sein bei* in *Sorge* and *Gegenwärtigen* in *Zeitlichkeit*. Etymologically it comes from the Latin *sentire*, which has two distinct connotations: kinetic-directional and epistemic-semantic. When you are driving in Paris and the sign says *sens unique*, or in Rome where it says *senso unico*, that sign is indicating a one-way street, employing the kinetic-directional sense. On the other hand, when you speak of "making sense" of something, you're employing the epistemic-semantic sense. For Heidegger, the two senses are intimately related: the kinetic-directional sense underlies the semantic-epistemic one: movement makes possible meaning. In ex-sistentially making your way forward, you open up a sphere of meaning within which you can understand things as this or that.

7.3 THE SEMANTIC SENSE OF "BEING"

I am arguing that SZ cashes out Heidegger's 1971 suggestion about movement and meaning. In §41 he argues that the movement-moment (being thrown ahead as the clearing) makes possible the meaning-moment

(making sense of things), just as in §65 the movement-moment (a priori becoming) accounts for the meaning-moment (rendering things meaningfully present). In making our way (*bewegen*), we make sense of things (*bedeuten*): our mortal movement makes for meaning. But how exactly does ex-sistential movement determine what "being" means?

§65 works out two distinct modes of ex-sistential "time," viz., *Zeitlichkeit* and *Zeit*, both of which are the same thing, namely ex-sistence.[45] The sameness and the distinction are important, and the mediating term that Heidegger uses is *sich zeitigen*: ex-sistential temporality *unfolds* as the field of time. *Sich zeitigen* is Heidegger's translation of φύειν, to emerge and unfold (cf. φύσις), something the English translations garble by rendering the phrase as "temporality temporalizes itself as time," a sentence that says nothing and obscures everything.[46]

From the get-go, Heidegger had a *field*-theory of ex-sistence. To express that, he often used the image of a horizon, which fails to adequately capture what he means. A horizon is an imaginary line up ahead where earth and sky seem to meet, whereas Heidegger is referring to what lies *on this side* of the horizon: ex-sistence as the sphere of meaningfulness. That field, formed by ex- sistential becoming, is what Heidegger calls the clearing.



Figure 4

This clearing is not static. It is a *Kraftfeld*, a charged field of force that determines whatever appears within it. Think of a magnetic field exerting a directional force on the metal filings that fall within its scope.



Figure 5

Analogously, ex-sistential time – the "field of force" into which and as which ex-sistence unfolds – is what determines the "directionality" (i.e., significance) of whatever falls within its scope.

§65 is the culmination of SZ in its published form. It establishes the thesis that is the core of SZ 1.1–2 and that was to be further spelled out in SZ 1.3, namely that we understand the significance of things in terms of our ex-sistential becoming – or in SZ's terminology, "being" in terms of "time." In §65 the picture that SZ had been drawing for some 300 pages finally becomes clear, and as it does, we see the *utter radicalness* of what Heidegger was driving at. At this point in the book – not even a third of the way through SZ as originally projected and long before SZ II, which was to take on the history of being – Heidegger has already destroyed traditional ontology. He has dismantled being as it was imagined at the origins of Western philosophy: static, solidly grounded, identical to itself – all the characteristics (other than its correlation with minding) that Parmenides had asserted.[47] He has shown that we understand everything we encounter in terms of our groundless, asymptotic becoming. This is an ab-surd fact: there is no discernible reason underlying it, we are simply thrown into it. In a way that is analogous (but only analogous) to Nietzsche, Heidegger has stamped becoming with the characteristics that traditionally accrued to being. He has done Nietzsche's homework for him.[48]

Heraclitus famously said that you cannot step into the same river twice. Some fifty years later Cratylus did him one better by saying you cannot step into the same river once.[49] Heidegger agrees with Cratylus: you cannot step into the same river once because there is no bank from which to step into the river. You *are* the river.

To speak of Heidegger's work as a "topology" is to use far too static a term. It would be more accurate to call it a "potamology." (Only half-kidding.) The same goes for *die Lichtung* as a cleared space in the woods, an image that is much too static for what Heidegger has in mind. He saw that problem and pointed out that the verb "lichten" has a dynamic sense (GA 14: 80.16–17/65.12–13). In SZ it means "clearing the way," which Heidegger later expressed by the verb "wëgen," a Swabian dialect word for "to make one's way."[50] By ex-sistentially making our way, we open up and clear a space that makes meaning possible.

Nonetheless, it is extraordinary that once Heidegger has arrived at this utterly radical thesis, he showed little interest in cashing out the details of the content-side side of the correlation, i.e., the semantic-lexical question of what we understand the being of things *as*. It's true that two months after publishing SZ, on Saturday, July 16, 1927, during the very last hour of the last meeting of his course on "Basic Problems of Phenomenology," Heidegger did make a stab at working out what "being" means in at least one of its moments.[51]

ONE MOMENT OF THE
TEMPORALITY OF BEING



Figure 6

That glancing blow would be his sole attempt to work out the temporality of being, at least until the equally unsatisfying effort thirty-five years later in his lecture "Time and Being" (January 31, 1962). Moreover, in that lecture, and in the seminar he conducted on it a few months later in Todtnauberg (September 11–13, 1962), he was less interested in the enacted content of *Sein* than in further elaborating the enact*ment* under the rubric of *Es gibt Sein*, i.e., how there is an understanding of being at all. In the end, he seemed satisfied with clarifying the *Es* of *Es gibt Sein* by simply saying that the clearing – *Existenz* as the kinetic field of ex-sistential temporality – brings about meaningful presence" (*erbringt Anwesen*). That is: ex-sistential movement accounts for all forms of meaning (GA 11: 151.26–28/xx.31–33).

9. AND THE *KEHRE*?

But didn't all that change with the so-called *Kehre* in the 1930s? The short answer is no. The later work confirms what SZ had already argued, namely that ex-sistence is what "gives" all forms of being.

In 1929 Heidegger said that the key issue of all his work lay hidden in the relation (*Bezug*) between ex-sistence and being, the "and" that holds together time and being (GA 3: 242.28–29/170.15–16). That relation is the *Lassen* of *Anwesenlassen*, and it comes down to *Existenz* thrown open as (aka appropriated to be) the clearing. A couple years before drafting the "Letter on Humanism," Heidegger wrote a note on what he called the *Wahr-heit des Seyns*, the "disclosed-ness of beyng" – i.e., the openness of the clearing – which he said is the most important thing we are given to contemplate (*das Höchste dessen, was den Menschen zu denken gegeben*). Within that issue, the richest mystery (*das Geheimnisreichste*) is the relation of beyng to human being (*der Bezug des Seyns zum Menschen*). He goes on:

> Der Bezug ist jedoch nicht zwischen das Seyn und den Menschen eingespannt als seien beide vordem bezuglos Seyn und Mensch. Der Bezug ist das Seyn selbst, und das Menschenwesen ist der selbe Bezug: der entgegnende zum Gegenden des Seyns. (GA 73.1: 790.2–8)

> However, the relation is not something stretched between human being and beyng as if beforehand beyng and the human essence were two elements unrelated to each other. On the contrary, that relation is beyng itself [i.e., the clearing], and the essence of human being is that very relation, the reciprocal encounter with beyng as encountering.

Hence, he can affirm unambiguously that

> das Dasein ist das je vereinzelte "es", das gibt; das ermöglicht und ist das "es gibt." (GA 73, 1: 642.28–29)
>
> Ex-sistence is the always individualized "it" [in the phrase "it gives being"]; it makes possible and is the "it gives."

So yes, we can see how Heidegger could use *Seyn* as a cipher for the thing itself; however, it is only a formal indication of that issue. Once we work out the content of that formal indication, it becomes clear that beyng is ex-sistence as thrown/appropriated into the asymptotic and mortal movement that we are and cannot not be.

Because we are ever teetering at the edge of death (*Sein-zum-Tode*), all mattering-to-us – that is, all *Sein* read phenomenologically – is suffused with nothingness, both with relative nothingness (because we are finite) and with absolute nothingness (because at every moment we can become nothing). But paradoxically this nothingness that we are ever able to become is fundamentally *positive* insofar as, in Heidegger's anthropomorphic image, it "pushes us back" into ex-sistence (GA 9: 114.5–16/90.15–24).[52] As we live at the chiaroscuro border between our ex-sistence and our nothingness, we are not just *able* to make sense of whatever we encounter, we *have* to. Nonetheless, all such sense is suffused with both relative and absolute meaninglessness: relative, insofar as some things just do not make sense, even though they once

may have, and still might in the future; and absolute meaninglessness insofar as my ex-sistence is ab-surd – not meaningless but rather deaf (*surdus*) to all attempts to find an ultimate explanation for why I ex-sist. I spend most of my time trying to ignore the absolute absurdity of my ex-sistence, but sometimes it catches up with me in moments of dread.[53]

Even without SZ 1.3 we can see the radical outcome Heidegger was driving at. He pulled out every vestige of ground from under our feet and left only the *nunc fluens* of becoming: human being as a question to which there is no answer.

10. BEYOND HEIDEGGER

Heidegger did not want more Heideggerians. He thought one Heideggerian was quite enough, thank you. What he wanted were people who would learn from him and then think beyond him. In fact, Heidegger himself wanted to think beyond Heidegger. What do I mean by that?

At first blush it might seem that Heidegger's program in the late 1920s was twofold: fundamental ontology and the dismantling of metaphysics, the two Parts of SZ as projected. However, on July 12, 1928, as he was leaving Marburg to assume Husserl's chair at Freiburg, he laid out a different plan that included a post-SZ project. In the 1920s the word "metaphysics" still had a positive sense for Heidegger (properly understood, it described his own project), and Heidegger sketched out what he saw as its full structure (GA 26: 196–202/154–59) (see Figure 7).

With meta-ontology, he said, fundamental ontology becomes radical; it returns to its roots in the ex-sistentiel and the ontic (GA 26: 197.34/155.34–35, 199.2/156.26). Ariadne's thread guides us out of the cave of the temporality of being, back to ourselves where, as Heidegger famously said, the only way the question of ex-sistence gets straightened out is by ex-sisting (GA 2: 17.9–11/SZ 12.30–31). The analyses in SZ are not an end in themselves. They issue in a protreptic to self-transformation (GA 45: 214.18/181.7–8), a call not only to personal authenticity but to social authenticity as well. Didn't Heidegger tell Richard Wisser in a 1969 interview that metaphysics had only interpreted the world, whereas the point is to change it (GA 16: 703.12–14)?[54]

Meta-ontology was to be a step in that direction. It would make the transition from a fundamental ontology of becoming to the concrete metaphysics of human being (including ethics) and to regional ontologies of non-ex-sistential entities, all of that in the name of fulfilling what he said philosophy is ultimately about: the concretion of what it means to be human (GA 26: 202.9–10/158.33–34). Meta-ontology brings us back from the depths of fundamental ontology and lands us in the economic, social, and political worlds where we live our daily lives.



Figure 7

11. NON-CONCLUDING, VERY UNSCIENTIFIC POSTSCRIPT

To return to where we started, the two questions of "what" and "so what." Surely we can assume that after a century of scholarship replete with thousands of articles, books, and conferences, Heideggerians *do* know what Heidegger was after. Certainly Heideggerians have mastered the "what" question and can now ask the "so what" question about what difference all of that makes.

You remember the nineteenth-century parable about the famous German professor who wanted to save people from drowning. He was convinced that people sank beneath the waves because they had the idea of gravity in their heads. Therefore, he dedicated his whole career to driving that notion out of people's minds and replacing it with the idea of levity. Nonetheless, he died in despair because, his best efforts notwithstanding, people continued to drown.[55]

Surely none of us wants to repeat that feckless gesture, hoping to save civilization (or at least philosophy) by driving the idea of metaphysics out of people's minds and replacing it with the thought of *Ereignis*. Nor do we want to reenact the *trahison des clercs* of those German philosophers in the 1930s who never looked up from their copies of Diel's *Die Fragmente der Vorsokratiker* as the world was going to hell in a handbasket. Nonetheless I wonder what Heideggerians will be discussing some twenty years from now, or even just two years from now at the one-hundredth anniversary of the publication of SZ. Will they still be picking over the bones and parsing out paragraphs of the 102 volumes of Heidegger's *Gesamtausgabe*, while training up scores of graduate students to continue the grind after they're gone? Will they be embalming Heidegger or weaponizing him?

Whatever one thinks of his efforts, Heidegger wanted to be transformational, even revolutionary. He shook the congealed tradition of ontology down to its foundations in hopes of retrieving its explosive potential – only to have his would-be revolution end up as its own congealed tradition, comfortably ensconced behind the walls of the academy where it is meticulously curated by hundreds of *bien-pensants* professors dedicated to filling the minds of the young with the ideas of

Seyn-with-a-y. One might be reminded of Chief Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes's remark in 1908 that "philosophers are hired by the comfortable class to prove that everything is all right."[56]

The call to personal and even social transformation is a constant drumbeat in Heidegger's work. One way of getting in step with that would be to work out the ethics Heidegger projected in 1928. But that would require first working out the social ontology that lies buried in SZ, especially in chapter four, where Heidegger makes such radical statements as that ex-sistence is essentially for the sake of social ex-sistence ("Das Dasein ist wesenhaft umwillen Anderen": GA 2: 164.27–28/SZ 123.20–21). Heidegger's meta-ontology was supposed to investigate the "concretization" of ex-sistence-qua-ability. In the world in which we actually live, ability gets concretized in forms of power. In the economic order, for example, it takes the form of money as power, which develops into social power, which in turn becomes the political power to make sure, as Holmes said, that the established economic and social hierarchies are not disturbed. Does Heidegger's philosophy offer any insights on that? Finding out would require pushing past his work on Aristotle's *Nicomachean Ethics* and into the *Politics* with its analyses of exchange value (χρῆσις μεταβλητική) and its strong interest in the common good.[57]

* * *

In 1971 Heidegger directed a young scholar's attention to movement, which SZ interprets as ex-sistential time. Some fifty years earlier, in 1924, he had ended a lecture on time with a set of questions that still hangs over our heads if we want to take Heidegger beyond Heidegger. He asked:

> What is time?
>
> Or better: Who is time?
>
> Or better yet: Are we *our* time?

With that last question, he said, ex-sistence begins to get interesting ("Dann wäre Dasein Fraglichsein": GA 64: 125.1–7/213.30–31).

APPENDIX

RE: "DASEIN IS NOT THE WHOLE OF THE CLEARING."

Prof. Richard Capobianco has claimed that the Lichtung is neither the same as Dasein nor exhausted in Dasein, this based on a passage in *Zollikoner Seminare*, 223.13–15/178.4–5 that reads: "Er [der Mensch] ist nicht die Lichtung selber, ist nicht die ganze Lichtung, ist nicht identisch mit der ganzen Lichtung als solcher."

In a private communication (June 26, 2018) Friedrich-Wilhelm von Herrmann clarified that passage. He wrote:

> Wenn also das Sein selbst, die Wahrheit des Seyns, sich in einer geschichtlichen Lichtungs- oder Entbergungsweise bekundet und verbirgt, gewährt und entzieht, dann *„erschöpft sich"* das Sein selbst, die Wahrheit oder Lichtung des Seyns, *nicht* in der jeweiligen Gelichtetheitsweise des Da, sondern bleibt seinem Wesen nach das *Unerschöpfliche* für alle endlichen Lichtungs- oder Entbergungsweisen. Auf derselben Ebene des Denkens hält sich die von Ihnen angezogene Textstelle aus GA 97: 175.12–19.

That is:

> Being itself, the disclosedness of beyng, both shows and conceals itself, gives and withdraws itself, in this or that historical clearing and manner of disclosure; thus being itself, the disclosedness or clearing of beyng, is *not* "*exhausted*" in any particular way that the clearing is cleared. Rather, by its very nature it remains *inexhaustible* as regards all finite forms of the clearing and disclosure. The text you referenced – GA 97: 175.12–19 – is in the same train of thought.

The passage in question at GA 97: 175.18–20 (not .12–19) reads:

> es [= Dasein] lichtet und hält die Lichtung des Seins aus, was es, das Dasein, nur vermag, insofern es als Lichtung ("Da") des Seins west und so "das Da" "ist", d. h. Da-*sein*.

That is:

> [Dasein] clears and sustains the clearing of being, which Dasein can do only insofar as it is present as the clearing/Da of being and thus "is" "the Da," i.e., Da-*sein*.

NOTES

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1 Re Dasein: GA 65: 300.13/237.6–7; GA 49: 62.1/48.18. Re Ereignis: GA 11: 45.17–19/36.16–17. Note: The references to the *Gesamtausgabe* and its translations as well as the spelling of existence follow the pattern in Thomas Sheehan, *Making Sense of Heidegger* (Rowman and Littlefield International, 2015). "M-R" abbreviates "Macquarrie-Robinson," and "S-S" abbreviates "Stambaugh-Schmidt." For all texts by Aquinas, see https://www.corpusthomisticum.org/oee.html. The present text was first delivered as a lecture and retains its spoken style.

2 Re "event": GA 11: 45.19–20/36.18–19; GA 12: 247.9–10/127.25–7; GA 14: 25.33–26.1/20.29–33; cf. GA 70: 17.19–22/9.22–24. Re "being-there/being-here": GA 15: 204.7/126.16; GA 71: 211.2–5/180.20; Heidegger, *Lettre sur l'humanisme*, trans. Roger Munier, new, revised edition (Paris: Aubier, 1964), 182.29–184.3 (in the 1957 edition, 178.29–180.3).

3 Mark Twain, "The Awful German Language," in *A Tramp Abroad* (London: Chatto and Windus, 1880), 603.39–604.2, translating "…wenn er aber auf der Straße der in Sammt und Seide gehüllten, jetzt [sehr] ungeniert nach der neuesten Mode gekleideten Regierungsrätin begegnet…." from Eugenie Marlitt (= Eugenie John), *Das Geheimnis der alten Mamsell*, 2nd edition (Stuttgart/Berlin/Leipzig: Union Deutsche Verlagsgesellschaft), 1890, 303.21–23 (originally, Leibniz: Gartenlauben-Verlag, 1868).

4 Respectively, GA 9: 273.8/208.35; GA 5: 71.16/53.24; GA 26: 199.27/157.7 and 196.12/154.21.

5 On *Sein* as intelligibility: GA 19: 205.13–14/141.33–34 and SZ 12.14–15 vs. GA 2: 16.23.

6 However, his use of "Seyn" is notoriously ambiguous in the later work.

7 See GA 73.1: 642.28–29 and 790.2–8. On primary and secondary intelligibility: GA 2: 201.22–30/SZ 151.31–38. – After the publication of Karl Jaspers' *Philosophie* in late 1931, Heidegger generally stopped using "Existenz" lest it be confused with Jaspers' sense of the term, and in its place began using "Inständigkeit." Cf. Friedrich-Wilhelm von Herrmann, *Hermeneutische Phänomenologie des Daseins. Ein Kommentar zu "Sein und Zeit"* (Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 2008), III, 265.29–33.

8 See GA 65: 34.9/29.7; 239.5–6/188.25; 252.23–25/199.3–4; 304.5–9/240.16; 322.7–8/254.36–37 (the last text to be compared with GA 2: 431.13/SZ 325.37), and also, GA 9: 377 note d/286 note d.

9 Richard Polt and Gregory Fried, eds., *After Heidegger?* (London: Rowman & Littlefield International, 2018).

10 "Jedes Suchen…aus dem Gesuchten her"; cf. Plato, *Meno*, 80d5–8.

11 See GA 21: 170–181/143–154.

12 Aristotle, *De coelo et mundo* I 5, 271b8–9. See also Plato, *Cratylus*, 436d2–4 and Aquinas, *De ente et essentia*, Proemium, ad initium.

13 Respectively, Aristotle, *Physics*, III 2, 201b33–202a3: χαλεπόν, and GA 9: 283.23–27/216.27: *das Schwierigste*.

14 Aristotle, *Physics* III 1, 200b12–15: ἀγνοουμένης αὐτῆς ἀγνοεῖσθαι καὶ τὴν φύσιν. Cf. Aquinas: "ignoto motu, ignoratur natura," *In Octo Libros Physicorum*, n. 276.

15 Aristotle, *Physics* III 201a10–11, 201b4–5, etc.

16 GA 62: 343–400/155–74; originally edited by Hans Lipps, *Dilthey-Jahrbuch für Philosophie und Geschichte der Geisteswissenschaften*, VI (1989) 235–274.

17 "Wie du anfingst, wirdst du bleiben." Friedrich Hölderlin, "Der Rhein," in *Selected Poems and Fragments*, trans. Michael Hamburger, ed. Jeremy Adler (London: Penguin, 1994), 48. T.S. Eliot, "Little Gidding" V, in *The Complete Poems and Plays of T.S. Eliot*, ed. Valerie Eliot (London: Faber and Faber, 1969).

18 See note 8. Re 1934 cf. Heidegger's letter to von Herrmann, February 20, 1964, *Heidegger Studies* 39 (2023), 284.1–3

19 For argument by retorsion (περιτροπὴ τοῦ λόγου) see Sextus Empiricus, Πυρρωνειῶν ὑποτυπωσεῶν (*Outlines of Pyrrhonism*) in *Sexti Empirici Opera*, ed. Hermann Mutschmann and Jürgen Mau (Leipzig, Teubner: 1912), II, 128.

20 Aristotle, *De Anima*, III 9, 432a31, etc. Heidegger's rewrite: GA 40: 184.11/195.11. Cf. also GA 12: 230.2/112.7–8.

21 "zu den Sachen der Philosophie der Philosophierende selbst… mitgehört"; GA 9: 103.20/82.16: "der Fragende – als ein solcher – in der Frage mit da."

22 See William McNeill, *The Fate of Phenomenology: Heidegger's Legacy* (Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield, 2020).

23 Heidegger's polemics against "phenomenology" in GA 82 (e.g., 37f., 43, 45, 82, 146, 189, etc.) are directed against a certain way of doing phenomenology, not against Heidegger's own hermeneutical phenomenology.

24 Cf. also GA 14: 147.31–32/201.14–15.

25 Aristotle, *Metaphysics* XI 8, 1065a24: τὸ ἔξω ὂν καὶ χωριστόν. Cf. ἔξω [τῆς διανοίας] "outside" [i.e., independent] of thinking: ibid., VI 4, 1028a2, taken with 1027b34–1028a1.

26 GA 87: 101.4: "wem zeigt sich das 'Sich'-zeigende."

27 Cf. Aquinas, "praesens intelligibile," *Scriptum super sententia*s, lib. 1, d. 3 q. 4 a. 5; and Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, A249: "coram intuitu intellectuali."

28 Cf. Robert B. Pippin, *The Culmination: Heidegger, German Idealism, and the Fate of Philosophy* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2024), 14–15, 25.14, etc.

29 "Lichtung des Sichverbergens (Zeit) erbringt Anwesen (Sein)."

30 As at *Zollikoner Seminare* 223.1–4/177.30–31: "Es gibt Anwesen, das den Menschen nicht braucht" – but that is not the Anwesen that Heidegger studies in his work.

31 A far from exhaustive list (I cite only the German pages and lines) would include GA 2:87.2–4/64.22–24, 177.7–8/133.5, 503.13–14/380.27–28 (etc.); GA 3: 229.10–11; GA 6.2: 323.14–15; GA 9: 325.20–21; GA 14: 35.23–24; GA 15: 380.11–12 and 415.10–13; GA 45: 213.1–4;

GA 66: 129.5, 321.12, and 328.1–2; GA 69: 101.12–13; GA 70: 125.12; GA 731: 450.13 and 642.27–28; *Zollikoner Seminare*, 351.14–17; etc. On Prof. Capobianco's contrary claim, see the Appendix to this text.

32 Cf. GA 12: 249–250, esp. 249.19–25/129–30: *wëgen*, *Be-wëgung*, *Bewegen*, *Wëg*; also GA 74: 46.6 and .11; and GA 9: 291.19–20/222.32: "ein Weg *führt* durch einen Bereich, öffnet sich selbst und eröffnet diesen."

33 Re provisional names: GA 9: 159 note a/123 note a, and 376.11/285.26–28; GA 54: 113.25–33/77.10–15; GA 65: 74.10–12/59.26–28; GA 66: 145.25/124.6; 146.8/124.25; 300.13–23/268.5–25; etc. On shelving "Zeit" in favor of "Lichtung" see GA 11: 151. 27/xx.33.

34 Plotinus, *Ennead* III 7, 11.42

35 Augustine, *Confessions,* XI 26, 33. *Patrologia latina* (PL), 32, 822.47–49.

36 Heidegger is glossing the phrase "ein *apriorisches Perfekt*, das die Seinsart des Daseins selbst charakterisiert." See von Herrmann, *Hermeneutische Phänomenologie des Daseins*, II, 175–76. In the S-S version of SZ, GA 2: 114, note "a," is translated (and partially mistranslated) at p. 83, note.

37 The asymptotic nature of this becoming is what Heidegger finds in Heraclitus' hapax legomenon from the *Suda*: Ἀγχιβασίη (fragment 122): approaching without ever arriving (see GA 77: 2.1/1.1). Compare Stephen Dedalus' "almosting it." James Joyce, *Ulysses*, ed. Hans Walter Gabler, (New York: Vintage Books, 1986), 39.360.

38 GA 2: 56.11/sz 42.4 and GA 2: 115.25/sz 86.16. That is also what Heidegger means by *Möglichkeit* when used in the singular for *Existenz*. *Seinkönnen* is usually mistranslated as "potentiality for being" as if it indicated what we *could* be. On the contrary, it names what we cannot not be: the self-enacting ontological ability to keep on ex-sisting mortally. Imperfect translations in other languages include: French, *pouvoir-être*; Italian, *poter-essere*; Portuguese: *poder ser*; Spanish: *poder-ser*; Greek, δυνατότητα, possibility; Chinese: 能存在 (*néng cúnzài*): able to exist; etc.

39 Augustine, *Epistula* 95, no. 2. PL, 33, 352.38.

40 Augustine, *Confessions* XI 20, 26. PL, 32, 819.24.

41 As William Faulkner's Temple Stevens puts it, "The past is never dead. It's not even past." William Faulkner, *Requiem for a Nun* (London: Vintage, 2015), 85.15.

42 "Sorge" does not refer to "care" as a personal, psychological concern for someone or something. As SZ §41 shows, it means being a priori "given over" (cf. *Hingabe*) to making sense of things. See GA 2: 264.3/SZ 199.8 and Heidegger's footnote thereto. Further on *Hingabe* see GA 20: 420.2–4/303.19, and GA 60: 204.17/151.5 re *Confessions* X 27 (38). To emphasize that *Sorge* is structural-ex-sistential and not psychological-ex-sistentiel, the later Heidegger speaks of this a priori condition as "thrown unto us": *Zuwurf*, GA 66: 224.13/198.21. Cf. GA 97: 117.2: *Zuruf*.

43 Cf. GA 2: 432.3/SZ 326.20–21: "Dies dergestalt als gewesend-gegenwärtigende Zukunft einheitliche Phänomen nennen wir die *Zeitlichkeit*."

44 Pindar, "Pythian Odes," II, 72, in *The Works of Pindar*; ed. Lewis Richard Farnell (London: Macmillan, 1932), III, 56; GA 2: 194.3/SZ 145.41. See also GA 56/57: 5.35/5.14: "Mensch, werde wesentlich!"

45 Among other examples, see GA 24: 388.26/274.24: "die Zeit als Zeitlichkeit."

46 *Zollikoner Seminare* 203.7–8/158.10–11: "Zeitigung als Sichzeitigen ist Sich-entfalten, aufgehen und so erscheinen," that is: "Sich zeitigen" = "to unfold of itself, to emerge and show-up-as…." The verb is mistranslated at M-R 377.1 352.2, 377.1, 378.33, etc.; S-S 314.3, 291.16, 31518, etc.

47 Parmenides, fragment 8: motionless (ἀτρεμές), unending (ἀτέλε–στον), ungenerated (ἀγένητον), indestructible (ἀνώλεθρον), now, always the same, one, and continuous (νῦν, ὁμοῦ πᾶν, ἕν, συνεχές). Instead of the everlasting (αἰώνιος), Heidegger leaves us with the sudden (ἐξαίφνης). In place of a beatific vision of being, we are left with the rare moment of insight (καιρός). Parmenides' well-rounded circle (cf. εὐκυκλής, I, 29) has been broken. All that is solid has melted into air.

48 Cf. *Wille zur Macht*, no. 617: "Dem Werden den Charakter des Seins aufzuprägen." Friedrich Nietzsche, *Sämtliche Werke:*

Kritische Studienausgabe, new edition, ed. Giorgio Colli and Mazzino Montinari (Berlin: De Gruyter, 1999), XII, 312.

49 Heraclitus, Fragment 91: ποταμῷ γὰρ οὐκ ἔστιν ἐμβῆναι δὶς τῷ αὐτῷ. Cf. Plato, *Cratylus* 402a9–10 and Aristotle, *Metaphysics* IV 5, 1010a15.

50 See footnote 32 above.

51 See GA 24: 431–445 and Sheehan, *Making Sense of Heidegger*, 201–06.

52 GA 9: 114.5–16/90.15–24. This *Abweisung* is what Heidegger glosses as "Nichtung" in the sense of "Das Nichts selbst nichtet," which the English translation ("nihilation" and "nihilates") fails to capture. Nothingness is the radical alternative to ex-sisting. Hence as long as we are not dead/nothing, we are thrown into ("pushed back into") ex-sisting.

53 Cf. Eugenio Montale's "Forse un mattino," in *Ossi di seppia*: *Tutte le poesie,* ed. Giorgio Zampa (Milan: Mondadori, 1984), I, 42: "il nulla alle mie spalle, il vuoto dietro / di me."

54 Not exactly, although he should have.

55 "Vorrede [Entwurf]" to *Deutsche Ideologie. Manuskripte und Drucke*, ed. Ulrich Pagel et al. in *Marx Engels Gesamtausgabe* (MEGA), (Berlin: De Gruyter, 2017), I, 5: 3.27–34.

56 Oliver Wendell Holmes to Frederick Pollock, June 17, 1908, in *Holmes-Pollock Letters,* ed. Mark DeWolfe Howe (Boston: Harvard University Press, 1942), I, 139.16–17.

57 Aristotle, *Politics,* I 9, 1257a9–10 and III 7, 1282b17–18; and *Nicomachean Ethics*, IX 2, 1160a11–12. Heidegger's neuralgia towards anything like a democratic polity is reflected in his cathexis on the words Homer places in Odysseus' mouth: "Governance by the many is not good. Let there be only one leader": *Iliad* II, 204–05; cf. *Metaphysics* XII 12, 1076a7. In the 1930s Heidegger apparently got his wish.

Taking History to Heart: On Making Use of Heidegger's Early Lectures

Robert C. Scharff

ABSTRACT: Almost from the beginning, Heidegger tends to see the hermeneutic explication and clarification of our existential condition – *and only this ontological condition considered as such* – as the first consideration for any aspiring phenomenologist. Why not cultivate such a radical self-awareness for the sake of becoming phenomenological "ontically" and everywhere? Perhaps this question is already being answered without our specifically asking it? Either way, this (maybe not so merely "preparatory" hermeneutic phenomenology) is surely worth inquiring about.

KEY WORDS: Heidegger; young Heidegger/early Freiburg lectures; phenomenology; hermeneutic phenomenology; Dilthey, Husserl; formal indication; lived experience; Cartesianism; postpositivism.

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Over a century has passed since Husserl published his famous broadside against philosophical naturalism and historicism and proposed in their place a rigorous, science-like, foundational phenomenological philosophy. And soon after, Heidegger became known as his teacher's most famous revisionist, if not his "existentialist" opponent. In my view, the young Heidegger was in fact already neither. Both revising and opposing start by silently letting someone else set the basic terms for discussion, thus pushing any revisionist or opponent toward understanding themselves as obliged either to defend "another" view or to just say "No." Of course, both moves offer lots of opportunity to clarify and argue about intellectual differences, but they also leave everyone simply "positioned" where they began – each standing outside the work of another, learning nothing new that might prompt them to critically examine their own stance. Conceptually clarifying and justifying positions and principles is often treated as the very essence of "doing philosophy," but this is certainly not Socratic[1]...or phenomenological.

The young Heidegger was of course very familiar with un-Socratic philosophizing. It was all around him, in various displays of "the theoretical attitude" that seemed to make everyone science-minded and Cartesian. Even theologians seemed more interested in defending doctrines and formalizing arguments than in the experience of faith. More importantly, however, he also felt this same theoretical attitude already functioning as a kind of default outlook *in his own thinking* – an outlook that seemed to be informing his life with a pinched and narrowed overall sense of things that was repeatedly failing to do justice to his current experiencing of lifeworld concerns. Yet Heidegger does not respond to this situation primarily by criticizing the theoretical attitude; he is more interested in understanding the "philosophical motive" that might lead someone to enact it, which might shed some light on how one could go about establishing a more open and pluralistically responsive one.

It is ultimately with this issue in mind that Heidegger develops his famous contrast between the "actual" phenomenology of Husserl and the "possible" hermeneutic phenomenology Heidegger wants to

pursue instead.[2] What makes Husserl especially interesting is that in his case, a very tradition-bound insistence on philosophical strictness or rigor (*Strenge*) seems driven by a pluralistic and non-reductive desire to be ontologically inclusive and responsive rather than judgmental regarding the really real and our relations with it. In other words, his work seems to be full of phenomenologically inspired "intuitions" that are nevertheless being betrayed by his fundamentally "transcendental" (i.e., Cartesian) account of them; and the central element in this betrayal seems to be his unquestioned commitment to establishing a phenomenological method that somehow, unlike all the previous modern epistemologies, will actually succeed in being ahistorical, de-situated, and thus finally capable of explicating the essences of "the things themselves" as actually "given."[3]

For Heidegger, it is due to this commitment to method that, in spite of himself, Husserl continues to think and speak as an inheritor of the modern (Western, Cartesian) tradition of philosophies of (theoretically concerned) consciousness. Hence, regarding the possibility of retrieving and carrying forward the phenomenological promise of Husserl's original intentions, Heidegger proposes a kind of triple interpretation. First, Husserl's silent adherence to an excessively influential, theory-minded tradition must be undercut and "destructively" loosened up to let phenomena to which no theoretical account can do justice more fully appear. Second, the resulting possibility of retrieving and carrying forward Husserl's phenomenological intentions must be articulated in an appropriate (i.e., "formally indicative," not theoretically representative) language. And third, the whole project of destruction and retrieval must be conducted and critically monitored in an atmosphere of studied self-awareness (*Selbstbesinnung*) that is conscientiously attuned to the unavoidably historical character of any articulation of factical life. In what follows, Section 1 focuses on destruction (in relation to Husserl); Section 2, on formal indication (in relation to Heidegger); and Sections 3–4, on how current philosophizing might benefit from reconsidering Husserl destructively and Heidegger through his formal indications, in order to retrieve from them, under the changed conditions of our own historicity, a better sense of how to be phenomenological.

1. TAKING HISTORICITY PERSONALLY

In Husserl's writings, "being-historical" is for the most part interpreted in the traditional way as analogous to phrases that speak of our being part of nature, namely, as referring to our empirical condition – our being placed in that big object, the past, something to be studied by the historical-human and natural sciences. For this reason, he argues, a phenomenological philosophy cannot start with either idea. Just because in fact we start our lives as natural and historical creatures and usually understand our lifeworld experience in these terms does not mean that phenomenological philosophers must stay in this natural-historical condition and adopt its standpoint in order to properly account for it. Indeed, he says, philosophers have always rightly resisted defining their task in such empirical terms. Hence, when Husserl reads that Heidegger has decided to "remain immersed in the historical" like Dilthey, he takes this to mean that Heidegger is "*forcing* [himself] to stay *mired* in mere historico-critical research" and is therefore doomed to fall forever short of achieving the proper standpoint for phenomenological science.[4] In other words, like the typical modern philosopher Husserl takes it for granted that direct, authoritative appeals to lived experience or to any alleged "facts" about it are hopelessly corrupted by an attachment to either the reductive methods of empirical science or to feelings, prejudices, cultural preferences, and murky unclarity. The philosophical "naturalism" that results from philosophers aping the standpoint of natural science is already being widely criticized, he notes, but the "historicism" that has more recently arisen with the development of the human sciences must now be undercut in the same way. As he writes to Georg Misch in 1930, to be a true phenomenologist, he simply had to become "the 'ahistorical Husserl' at times" and "distance himself from history… to come far enough methodologically to be able to pose scientific questions in regard to it."[5] Ridding phenomenologists of their historicity is one of the aims of the transcendental-phenomenological method.

The fact that Husserl speaks of himself here in the third person says everything. By the time he has embraced an outlook that views Heidegger as "*forcing* himself" to "*remain*" immersed in the historical, all hope of his understanding phenomenologically what it is to "be historical" is lost. The fact that Husserl comes back later (in the *Crisis*) to consider "history" (ontological status not clarified) is irrelevant. For it was not the historical determinateness of phenomenological thinking itself that he was unwilling to consider earlier but now acknowledges. Phenomenologists still cannot have "historical consciousnesses." As far as "who" the phenomenologists are that ask about "history," nothing has changed. They are still methodologically purified, ahistorical Minds, now turning to more phenomena, no doubt in part encouraged to do so by the then-current crises in the empirical world where phenomenological thinking is taking place.[6]

Heidegger's alternative to this ahistorical line of reasoning is early, pointed, and well-known. Nearly a decade before the appearance of *Being and Time*, he was already depicting human beings as "factically existent" in a way that is fundamental and unavoidable even for phenomenological philosophers who wish to study it. "Being historical," he says, is shorthand for how, in the widest possible sense, I meaningfully "am" already living through life. We might say that young Heidegger reminds every aspiring ahistorical thinker that they have a history problem. Having-been and already projectively understanding everything in a certain inherited and determinate way is not optional. Hence, to be human is to always find myself *both* in the process of reenacting an inherited sense of who I am, what is real, and what one does with it – a default sense, as Heidegger puts it, that is already "coming back at us from our future" – *and* currently living-through this default sense in a way that only fits imperfectly together with the global sense of one's relatedness to everything that is actually emerging experientially with it.[7] As Heidegger will eventually put it at the beginning of *Being and Time*, we are always inclined to be

> caught up in the world of ordinary affairs so that we fall into interpreting ourselves in its reflected light; *at the same time* we also fall in with a tradition that we have more or less explicitly taken up—a tradition that deprives us of providing our own guidance in asking questions and making choices. This is especially true when it comes to…developing an ontological understanding of our ownmost being. (GA 2: 28–29/SZ 21 tm, em)

Today, media-saturated common sense and a science-minded tradition together encourage objectivism in thought and consequentialism in action—even when our current experience is giving us a strong sense that this "guidance" is radically insufficient for 21st-century life.

In criticizing Husserl's ahistorical response to this situation, Heidegger does not start by considering Husserl's transcendental/constitutive "standpoint." He has a preliminary question: What goes on in Husserl's philosophy before he "has" one, that is, before he actually takes a position (GA 63: 46/59)? This question, Heidegger argues, is about his basic tendency in thinking, that is, his philosophical concern. To understand someone "in their own terms," as Dilthey puts it, this basic tendency must be thought through as a concern which may or may not be done justice by the transcendental, empirical, scientific, pragmatic, theological, etc. account that is given of it. In Dilthey's phrasing, it must be considered from "the standpoint of life itself" and in terms of how it is lived-through such that possible modes of expression arise from and out of it.[8] People intellectually "have" positions; but they are already "living" the motivations upon which their formulation depends.

Seen in this light, Husserl's "theoretical attitude" need not be immediately subjected to conceptual critique (e.g., for its scientistic distrust of lifeworld experience and its overheated commitment to transcendental philosophy), for it is more illuminating (and brings him into closer conversation with our own concerns) to begin hermeneutically, that is, as possessing a very obviously historically determinate, experience-based concern for "the things themselves" whose general manifestation (*Lebensäußerung*) is his projected, methodologically prepared

phenomenological "system." Understood in this hermeneutical way, everything he says about "theorizing" the "essentials" of things by means of an objectivizing "method" facilitates one *but only one* possible (albeit immensely important and powerful) line of experiential "intensification," namely, a life-induced concern for the possibility of acquiring and using a certain kind of logically or empirically predictive "knowledge." Husserl's philosophical attitude is thus perfectly suited for phenomenologically illuminating the development of the hard sciences and their technologies; but it seems ontologically tin-eared when it comes to the things themselves in the human sciences, and it is still less appropriate for moral and socio-political engagement, the arts, spiritual inquiry… in short, all non-scientific life-concerns.[9] Hermeneutically understood, it articulates *only one life-inspired line of intensified concern*. It is thus unsurprising that its specific epistemological commitments make it ontologically an unsuitable model for something like an ur-science (*Urwissenschaft*). Its dogmatic assertiveness about object-being cannot hide the fact that both the differences among the sciences and between all of them and the rest of life "give themselves" to us in ontological ways too rich to be classified under the heading "different kinds of objects."

For the young Heidegger, then, the fundamental weakness of Husserl's phenomenology is that it fails to acknowledge that it cannot begin by leaping out of its own historical-factical skin. Like other human beings, phenomenologists live through life from "hermeneutic situations" they must make "their own" rather than deny having. To be sure, a theoretical attitude can be simply enacted, its philosophical value affirmed by reference to the ideal of Reason, and then embraced along with the method that marks out this direction of thought on the grounds of its empirical usefulness. In this respect, notes Heidegger, Dilthey gets us no further, insofar as he, too, fails to *make a philosophical problem* out of the "prephilosophical" condition of "actual Dasein."

Yet there is in Dilthey's work, if not his self-descriptions, a philosophical tendency that points in the right direction.[10] For he distinguishes natural and human science, not just methodologically or by assigning their "objects" to different regional ontologies but in terms of what sort of relatedness to the world one must be living through in order to engage in

either sort of science. To be sure, in regards to *subject matter*, the natural sciences "explain" objects and the human sciences "understand" people; yet at the same time, this means that *researchers* must be related to and interact with their respective subject matters differently – that is, either objectively or hermeneutically. This is an ontological, not a psychological point. Explaining and understanding are not just something that goes on in the head of a scientist; they involve different ways of engaging with what is experienced – they are methodologically and ontologically expressive of different life concerns that arise in the living-through of life, and they are existentially both different from each other (i.e., everything about what it means to do "research" is different) and very different from, say, considering beauty, formulating an ethics, or developing a worldview.

But what sort of differences are these and who says so? Here a new line of questioning opens up that cuts across the usual boundaries, explicit methods, informal procedures, and standard practices set implicitly or explicitly by each individual sort of life manifestation. It will have to be a "very general" inquiry, indeed one whose results would apparently be somehow "universal," which implies the presence of some sort of "unity" among numerous diverse life-concerns and their expressions. In other words, it will somehow have to be a "philosophical" inquiry, but one in which none of the terms in quotes have their traditional meaning. At first, Dilthey is too busy defending the "scientific" status of the human sciences against the "unified science" position of classical positivism to ask about the relation of established types of science to the ones he is defending. But once satisfied that the legitimacy of understanding (*Verstehen*) as well as explaining (*Erklären*) have both been established, Dilthey began to see that much larger issues now loomed: How should we relate these two sets of science (or maybe more?) to each other? In an atmosphere where the "unity of the sciences" meant following the lead of the hard sciences, how do we handle the differences that now appear to be forced upon us, such that science, epistemology, and warranted knowledge are fundamentally plural nouns – and "from where" is this to be philosophically addressed?

Dilthey himself manages only to identify this task as a "general *epistemological*" one – but without addressing this task itself; without noticing how this designation destabilizes the very idea of an epistemology (in the same way as Husserl's labeling phenomenology the Ur-science does); and thus finally, without recognizing how this strange new task can no longer be understood as an issue for philosophers of science alone. In order to understand experience and all of its possible articulations "in their own terms," Dilthey says, one must take up the "standpoint of life" itself[11] – that is, start from within and cultivate an awareness (*Selbstbesinnung*) of how it is for us historical beings to engage in explaining or interpreting understandingly. But the idea of thinking and speaking "from there" – from out of life itself – suggests the possibility of a radically altered, not-yet-science-concerned orientation that would allow us to treat directly and with ontological fairness *any possible life-concerns and their expressions*, not just "scientific" ones.[12]

To pursue this opening, says Heidegger, means considering *what Dilthey's inquiries actually appear to be getting at* and trying to retrieve this from the unsatisfactory state in which he left it. In seeking the epistemological foundations of natural and human science, in his work as a historian, in his concern for ethics, as a worldview theorist – in all these activities, we can see him "on the way to the question of life." All of his discordant analyses, theoretical changes, displays of uncertainty, haphazard efforts at "trying things out" in his efforts to simultaneously do justice to natural scientific explanation and establish an epistemologically separate but scientifically equal status for historical interpretation – all of this is not just a sign that he failed to appreciate the "systematic" nature of good philosophy. Through all of it, there runs an elemental restiveness (*Unruhe*) regarding the possibility of understanding, for the sake of doing justice to any of its possible modes of expression, "the whole fact of being human" (GA 2: 526; 499/SZ 398; 377).

What is there for us to retrieve, then, is not Dilthey's epistemological questions formulated in Dilthey's way. Rather, it is the issue of "how philosophical experience explicates *itself*" phenomenologically, such that explaining, interpreting, poetizing, worshipping, responding to

art, searching for happiness and justice…can all be understood in their own terms.[13] Moreover, until the later days of positivism, philosophy had always been expected to address more than the task of grounding the sciences. How then, as *Being and Time* puts it, does one develop a hermeneutics of the whole of Dasein? Dilthey's work has shown us that there are two main problems facing such a hermeneutics: The first is how to "go back down into" life experience from all the currently preferred "theoretical" accounts of it, in order to make it an ontological problem in its own right. How, in other words, do we make Dilthey's "standpoint of life" philosophical? The second problem is finding a way to conceptualize and speak about this experienced place such that a responsive phenomenological orientation is sustainable – but again, to do so in a tradition-bound atmosphere that already encourages us to distrust experience.[14] I turn to the second problem first.

2. SPEAKING PHENOMENOLOGICALLY: FORMALIZING VS. FORMAL INDICATION

As with much of Heidegger's vocabulary, formal indication is often discussed with tight-lipped seriousness, but if one focuses mainly on *what he is trying to accomplish* by distinguishing it from other ways that language works meaningfully, this is really neither mysterious nor technical. To see how it works, consider how Heidegger analyzes "generalization."

At first, everything may appear to be obvious. Generalizations are everywhere; the problem starts when they are interpreted in an essentialist way. But it then seems to follow – especially if you have just been reading Husserl – that for phenomenology to respect phenomena as they are concretely disclosed in the living-through of life, it cannot be a "generalizing" activity at all. Generalizations, as everyone knows, "classify according to genus" (GA 60: 58/40), even if this is largely an informal affair in everyday life. Here as virtually everywhere, however, Heidegger finds matters less obvious than they seem. Generalizations don't just happen, as if they were events in Nature; they are (Dilthey again) manifestations or articulations of life. For there to be generalizations, there

must be general*izing*. And this is an ontological, not a psychological point. Whether we just consciously trace its inner logic or actually perform it, generalizing "is" always a movement of transition, say, "from 'red' *to* 'color,' or *from* 'color" to 'sensuous quality.' In Heidegger's words, there is always a "motivation" for the generalization, a concrete sense of "attitudinal enactment," where the movement from specific to general or general to specific is "bound to a certain material domain," perhaps a genus, perhaps a larger or smaller region, but in any case, *there is* a "determination of the dimension [*Anmessung*]" – that is, the creation of an atmospheric specification of the "what-content [*Wasgehalt*]" of the region that guides the transition from individual entities to a specific grouping – say, that of material object, mental object, living object, creature, etc.

Much less obviously, however, there is also another way to understand generality that involves no what-content – a generality, says Heidegger, that is free of all determination by regions, stages, or hierarchies, in which one "need not have passed through any lower generalities, in order to rise directly "to the 'highest generality' of 'object as such.'" In this sort of generalization, one "looks away from any what-content and attends only to the fact that the object is a given, attitudinally grasped one." To understand *this* sort of generalization, we must look to "the *relational meaning* of the pure attitudinal relation itself" rather than any what-content; and when we do, we find this meaning simply in the fact that "the object is given…and attitudinally found meaningful [*einstellungsmäßig erfaßter ist*]." Heidegger calls the enactment of this unregionalized understanding of generality, *formalization*, not generalization; and he gives two examples: "Something is an object (which can be said of anything and everything)," and "Experience as such, thing as such, are essences (which cannot be said of each [individual] object)" (GA 60: 59/41).

In everyday life this distinction, if noticed at all, seems unimportant. Both senses of generalization "stand within the meaning of 'general,'" and most of the time there is no apparent reason to recognize separately a generalization emptied of any reference to different domains. A generalization is a generalization. Period. Yet this is precisely why it is necessary

for an aspiring phenomenologist to make explicit both this distinction *and the usual disregard for it.* When we single out a phenomenon for investigation, Heidegger often repeats in these Diltheyan years, it is always for historically pre-given motives. Hence here, what is normally missed is the fact that formulations like "something is an object" are never ontologically innocent. It is certainly true that lots of philosophers have employed or criticized the traditional generalizing dualisms of genus/species, substance/attribute, thing/property; but one can feel comfortable or uncomfortable about these pairs without ever recognizing that even without any further specification into regions, formalization *usually already enacts the theoretical attitude* that sets the mood for regionalization; and as long as this attitude remains in place, no matter how one tries to tweak or critique these dualisms,[15] everything will continue to be "theoretically" pre-understood—"formed-out," as Heidegger says—with the "relational meaning" of "possible object present to a generalizing consciousness" standing ready for further classification as a specific sort of "what."[16]

In any case, Heidegger's unsurprising conclusion is that "Formal indication…has *nothing* to do with any of this…and falls [entirely] outside of the attitudinally theoretical." In this phrase, "formal" does not mean theoretically "formalized"; nor does it even concern generality (in the sense of not theoretically formalized…yet). It involves, he says, something much "more original" (GA 60: 59/40–41). "The formal" in his sense "indicates" a very different sort of "approach toward" possible determinations, of which theoretical formalization is only one. Phenomenological explication has its distinctive "approach [*Ansatz*]" or "enactment character [*Vollzugsmäßige*]," insofar as *its* "form" of explication "brings no preconceived opinion" about determinations with it, precisely because its guidance includes a "warning against" having any.[17] (And as we will see in a moment, the only way to secure the possibility of such explication is if we treat all explications at their point of origination in the living-through of life.)

Heidegger's purpose in analyzing the two sorts of generalization, then, is not just to distinguish them, relate them to each other, or criticize others for having mishandled them. It is to distance his conception of

formal indication from both of them, first, by uncovering their shared allegiance to a "theoretical attitude" – the former by embracing it, the latter by defining its intended departure from it, but in the former's terms – and second by explaining how, as formally indicated, we can keep phenomenology free from forming such allegiances. What Heidegger calls theoretical formalization in 1920 obviously has Husserl in mind as its most immediate critical target, but the idea of formalizing that lies behind this discussion will eventually be made explicit and transformed into the formal indication that guides his idea of the phenomenological destruction of the history of Western metaphysics. This "global" destruction, however, is a decade away. Here, the young Heidegger is still dealing with the necessary preliminaries.

The first question is not "what" to philosophize about but "who" philosophizes, and of those who philosophize, who does so phenomenologically. To philosophize as an objective thinker insures that one will encounter only objects and regions containing (various sorts of) objects. Phenomena, that is, matters given to us as they are encountered and lived-through, are only disclosed to phenomenologists – and then only sometimes, and up to now, more or less without proper awareness of how this is possible at all. Hence, "We are standing before the question of the new basic experience of life in and for itself and how a possible theory of life in and for itself prefigures itself out from it"[18] (GA 58: 228/171). As he puts it in *Being and Time*, how does one engage in phenomenology phenomenologically? By 1920, Heidegger has come far enough to explain how to think the problem of "actual Dasein" by "singling it out" while existing in a fundamentally objectivist culture with a largely "representational" linguistic tradition, nevertheless learning to use this language in a formally indicative way, while taking equally to heart the fact that phenomenology can never obtain an ahistorical outlook (GA 59: 169/129–130).

Against the objection that "singling out," like any other line of reasoning, must ultimately be understood in terms of the method used when engaged in it, perhaps all that is necessary to take the sting out of this question is to consider an analogy: What "method" did Socrates employ in his dialogues? If he didn't want to write anything down, shouldn't he

at least have included, as one of his topics, "Rules for the Direction of the Mind in Dialogues"? On the contrary, because ordinary conversation, Socratic dialogues, and hermeneutic phenomenology all come from and are always immediately responsive to lived experience itself, the very idea of delaying one's response until one gets advice about what to do is self-ridiculing. Responses in all three cases take their cues from what there is to respond to, not from pre-established procedural rules of the road. Heidegger likes Dilthey's way of putting this: Behind life, one cannot (theoretically/methodologically) go.

Nevertheless, one wants to say that one certainly does *something* – something which, when one continues to speak *from* the experience of doing it instead of relying on pat concepts imported from the outside, certainly is discussible at length and sharable in many ways. Phenomenological articulation, says Heidegger, needs to be like this – in other words, formally indicated, engaged in, discussed at length, but not theorized. Unfortunately, philosophers usually just begin, already theoretically predisposed toward absolutely everything – even toward those things that admittedly don't theorize very well. This means there is always the tendency to "consign ordinary factical life experience to secondary importance" and this, says Heidegger, "despite the fact that philosophy arises precisely *from* factical life experience and *returns* to it in a reversal that is entirely essential" (GA 60: 15/11, em).[19] Whether acknowledged or not, philosophizing repeatedly draws sustenance from life, and never more obviously than when it denies doing so, usually in the name of some objective formalization under which most philosophers are already thinking.[20] What a formally indicative account of this typical situation can do is facilitate a *phenomenological* return to factical life experience that acknowledges but does not bring theoretical "prejudice" and ontological compromise with it.

Let us be clear about just what Heidegger is criticizing. In separating formal indication from generalization and formalization, he is not just intent on exposing the fact that Western philosophy has "long been moving in the ontological direction" of generality-oriented theorizing and the objective classification of "the whole of Being into regions." Nor does he want all philosophizing to cease being objective. Especially

at the beginning, he wants to know why it has taken so long to feel the pinch of this orientation. Only recently, he says, has an "opposing consideration" arisen – in the form of the question, namely, of "how is the experienced experienced *in the manner of consciousness* [*bewußtseinsmäßig*]?" (GA 60: 60/41, em). One needs to hear this question in the right way. It is not asked theoretically and/or ahistorically, and Heidegger does not try to answer it with a "…because" that we can put in textbooks. In fact, he does not actively "pose" the question at all. It has, he says, simply "arisen." Like any disruption in the common course of life, it has emerged out of experience itself, not as an artifact of a previously adopted philosophical framework.[21] Is all experienced meaningfulness really to be so strictly correlated with "consciousness" – especially when consciousness is defined and judged in terms of how close or far away it is from the trained, sciened-minded consciousness operating in mathematics and in empirical research?

Of course, the defining framework he has specifically in mind is Husserl's version of the Cartesian one. "Bracketing" and moving to a "transcendental" standpoint are Husserl's version of the modern epistemological idea of cognitively "stepping back" from lived experience – in other words, they are his way of enacting a theoretical attunement, his specific way of ontologically formalizing how it "is" with everything that makes sense; and thus they are the basis of his interpreting Heidegger's "stay" with historical life as a refusal to become *phenomenologically* "conscious." But this, warns Heidegger, is only how Husserl's thinking looks from the outside. If instead, one stays with life in order to "experience the experiencing" of how it factically is with us, we can see "how" an "intensification" of our existential concerns *can but need not* move in Husserl's theorizing direction. The problem with Husserl's thinking is not that he characterizes objects as disclosed to an intentional consciousness. It is that in doing so, he remains entirely "oriented to a previously given discipline" – something like an objectivist natural science – and as a result, he cannot loosen himself up "from handed down possibilities and traditional types of determining and classifying." As a result, he cannot fully accomplish what his own principle of principles calls for, namely, to "make existence itself the theme of an inquiry that is determined by

existence itself" and not determined by one of its possible articulations (GA 17: 112/81). Like any "scientist," Husserl the rigorous ur-scientist understands himself as needing no history to secure his proper tools and achieve success.

Some commentators – rightly noting that Heidegger's target is usually Husserl even when he doesn't mention him by name – have objected as follows. Yes, yes, Husserl's original idea of a transcendental phenomenology is still too much influenced by the imagery of modern natural science; but read his later work. See how his image of "rigorous science" gets broadened and deepened, so that much of the early imagery is gone and a more sophisticated defense of being presuppositionless emerges. But this response misses Heidegger's point. His worry is not Husserl's reliance on the imagery of mathematical natural science or even his excessive use of it. It is not even Husserl's unbending adherence to a theoretical attitude and his accompanying dream of developing a phenomenological system (which he anyway sustains throughout his many reconceptualizations of phenomenology itself). Heidegger's main concern is why Husserl tends not to see this commitment, or to see its limitations.[22]

What Husserl misses is that there are two senses of "prejudice" at work in his thought. For it is precisely in being "unprejudiced" regarding the regionalization of being that he retains a prejudice toward the theoretical. In Heidegger's language, this is the "form" of Husserl's thinking – conceived as a "formal determination of the objective" – and being unprejudiced toward possible regions of being is its "content." What is "hidden" is the *relationship of objectivity* that undergirds this form-content distinction. Heidegger calls this relationship the "enactment character" of Husserl's phenomenological attitude, the attunement toward the "whole of Being," in terms of which he "turns one-sidedly toward [regionally anticipated] content" (GA 60: 63/43). As long as one looks *down* the path marked out by Husserl's formal determination, and in the *direction* of the intentional objects of various regions, being "unprejudiced" merely means not privileging any possible region. It is at least arguable that the things themselves *considered as objects* are pretty well-served in this way. But if one reflects *back* on this theorizing

attunement itself, one can see how this determination of sense itself operates as a prejudice against other possible attunements, but at the same time does so as a possible attunement that is ontologically no more or less expressive of life-experience and its concerns than the possibilities it devalues. As Heidegger notes, the problem is ontological hegemony. Even "a glance at the history of philosophy shows that [Husserl's sort of] formal determination of the objective entirely dominates philosophy" (GA 60: 63/43).

3. FORMALLY INDICATING PAST HUSSERL

It seems, then, that Husserl's way of criticizing philosophical naturalism catches his own phenomenology in the same net. Theoretical generosity towards the non-theoretical is still theoretical hegemony. Yet this criticism will remain ineffectual unless it is offered by someone whose thinking is grounded in a self-awareness of "being-historical," so that one makes sure that it does not give the impression that it is mathematical natural science itself that is being challenged but only the claim that its model of thinking is philosophically basic. To say, in a formally indicative mood, that we are always existing, living through life, being-in-the-world, temporalizing temporality, all in many possible modes, is not to make a counterclaim, at the same level of epistemic analysis, to Husserl's transcendental one. To "formally indicate" is precisely to prevent this kind of battle of assertions in the first place by speaking directly from the experience of life, ontologically turned toward the open space of possible relationships "where," but only among other possibilities, there is a theoretically formalizable mode of existential concern in which assertions are made and warrant sought. When it comes to how something can be meaningful, formal indication does not play ontological favorites. In Heidegger's words, it "stays away from any classification; everything is precisely kept open [and]…has meaning only in relation to…initially setting out [*Ansetzen*] the task of phenomenological explication" *from* lived experience itself (GA 60: 64/44). And we can see that this setting-out is possible when we understand that, as Heidegger says repeatedly in the early 1920s, formal indications find their ultimate actualization

or "fulfillment" only in and from the speaker's own temporal-historical situation. Their point is to speak of all phenomena phenomenologically, such that every phenomenon is interpreted in light of its existentially analyzed lived-through origin.

So, in the usual theoretical sense, generalization and formalization do indeed mark out something determinative, something intended to remain conceptually fixed in its basic meaning – something characteristic, respectively, either of every item coming under its "what" or of every conceptualizable "object" whatever. But together, as Heidegger says, they thus close off other non-theoretical paths of meaning as they guide the "move down" from a universalized standard of meaningfulness toward everything "objectively" cognized. By contrast, to formally indicate is to *see precisely what I just said* – but not as further formalizing in any particular downward-specifying way, but as opening thinking up toward the possibility of speaking *from*, not *about*, factical experience, "coming along this path from the theoretical while freeing ourselves more and more from it," seeing the "basic bearing" of such a phenomenological thinking, and following it with an increasingly phenomenological understanding of this possibility in terms of *our inherited tendency not to take it up* (GA 56/57: 110/92–93).

This sort of talk may be unfamiliar to many philosophers, but the actual everyday practice of speaking from experience from which it draws is not. In one place, Heidegger remarks that people routinely discuss "common, shared life-experiences and mutually *relate* everything to one another. . .[i.e.,] they don't lecture each other" as if they were conceptually representing "the what-character of objectivity" and describing in technical terms the sort of thing one sees through a microscope (GA 58: 11/88). Lecturing is something one does *to* another; it is thus a very specifically one-sided being-with-others. But "relating" our experiences to others need not involve a professional or social-psychological agenda. On such occasions, the language we use can look from the outside as if it were just plain sloppy, excessively flexible, and incapable of eventually being nailed down in more precise terms – in that familiar 20th century epithet, it appears Vague. But from the speakers' standpoints, all this apparent

imprecision is really motivated by a concern to be very responsive to and carefully guided by how something is actually being experienced.[25] In this sort of relating situation, says Heidegger, the "factically experienced contexts of meaningfulness will indeed be explicated, but still left in their facticity…and explicated…*in the style of factical experience*, of fully going along with life." In a footnote, he adds that "life is 'mightier' than theoretical cognition and its concepts" (GA 58: 111/216 n.2 em)!

That this way of speaking is common in life but infrequent and distrusted in philosophy prompts Heidegger to add that phenomenological explication always needs to proceed under a "warning" – that is, move with special mindfulness of the fact that a theoretical formalization of experience already tends to control the field. "Factical life gives itself in a particular deformation," namely, as a "formation into an object-thing" (GA 58: 240/181). It is this tendency to move toward the objective and materially present that Heidegger has in mind when he describes phenomenology's formally indicative "turning toward" experience as involving the opposite of following a properly trained consciousnesses in taking a "step back" from the living-through of life in order to correct or explain it. From the usual epistemological distance taken by modern philosophies of consciousness, lived experience always tends to be regarded as a kind of "puzzling presence of determinacy prior to all theoretical description…for which one invents the convenient title of 'the irrational," and then uses rational categories, either to domesticate or dismiss this puzzling disclosure" (GA 56/57: 117/99; cf., 218/187). Hence, phenomenological philosophizing must involve a "sinking *back down* into" existence, so that it can "experientially go along with the living-through of life" and thus keep itself in the position to describe life's "intensifications" pluralistically (GA 58: 254/192; cf., GA 56/57: 116–17/98–99, 220/188).

Something like formally indicative speech that routinely deals with factically unruly and theoretically elusive disclosures is in fact already common in our everyday lives. Yet as *Being and Time* recounts, in life as in modern philosophy, "just speaking" responsively (i.e., fulfilling formally indicative meaningfulness "in life" instead of with the guidance

of an epistemically sanctioned theory) tends to yield eventually to the search for something more conceptually "precise" whenever unsatisfactory situations (e.g., confronting disobedient hammers or suffering bouts of loneliness) come to explicit attention. And at this point, our default position is conceptually placing the matter objectively before us and theorizing what to do about it. In contrast, the aim of formal indication is to speak *in life's name* by declining to become objective and instead letting lived experience be and following out its own sense, both as initially disclosed and in the way(s) it might be taken up and intensified, practically, theoretically, artistically, and so on.

4. CONCLUSION: BECOMING HERMENEUTICAL PHENOMENOLOGICAL EVERYWHERE

Finally, however, I ask readers a favor. Reread the last few paragraphs. In them, I try to characterize the young Heidegger's first efforts to respond to something that seemed philosophically oppressive everywhere in his surroundings and that haunted him as he jumped through all the hoops necessary to secure a position in the German university system of his time: Sometimes silently, sometimes out loud, virtually everyone who claimed to be doing philosophy – of whatever type, on whatever subject, embracing every shade of outlook from intolerantly ahistorical to nothing-but-historical – seemed to be some sort of Kantian, or more inclusively some sort of philosopher of consciousness, most recently, in some sort of transcendental, naturalistic, or historicist form. Yet in sketching some of the features of the young Heidegger's effort to become genuinely phenomenological, I have seen no need to associate these remarks with any preparations for raising the Being question again. There are plenty of references to the way every epistemology presupposes an ontology, of course. But judging from what he does in those early Freiburg lecture courses, it appears that a great deal of good phenomenology is being done by those who have "prepared" themselves hermeneutically and "sunk back down into the living through of life," not as preparation for the Being-question but for the sake of speaking "from out of factual existing" *on behalf of specific life-concerns* that are currently encountering

interpretive difficulties that their established procedures appear powerless to fix. Is it not possible to conduct a running battle with the ending of the Western metaphysical tradition in technoscience, for example, while phenomenologically focusing specifically on the ontological challenges of quantum mechanics? Or must this concern be incorporated into something more explicitly like Heidegger's more ontologically ambitious project?

In the end, I leave this matter in the form of a question. Suppose that it is indeed possible to cultivate a phenomenologically determinate openness that might lead us off in every direction from whatever life concerns call for "intensification." How should we understand these opportunities in relation to Heidegger's own project – which, after all, starting with the last few lectures of KNS 1919, provided the original setting within which the notions of factical life, hermeneutical inquiry, historically bound motivation, formal indication, and so on, were initially worked out? It does seem as if the Anglo-American (and Northern European?) philosophical world in which Continental philosophers and other sympathizers currently study Heidegger is still as widely populated with late modern metaphysical and anti-metaphysical philosophers (i.e., Cartesians) as Heidegger's was. More recent waves of analytic philosophy and three generations of phenomenologists have changed the topical landscape much more than it has changed the landscapers. The end of the era of philosophical positivism has everywhere been announced. Metaphysics has been rejected, or naturalized. Everything is contextualized. The sciences are all equally interpretive practices, not variations on the one true form of rationality. Technologies are concretely studied, not just abstractly theorized; and the modern subject is dead. Yet "who" is doing all of this?

The fact is that many philosophers still tend to treat postpositivist and postmodern *topics* as if they were modern *subjects*, choosing their positions, making claims, and being as science-like as possible – even when they are talking about things and people that they happily contextualize and assure us are not just scientific objects. Like Heidegger, I think this issue is endemic and ontological, something to which psychological,

cultural, and socio-historical accounts merely testify and from which they then say we must "twist free" and achieve "emancipation." At first, the young Heidegger traced "the primacy of the theoretical [and its accompanying concept of Will]" in our thinking to the inherited dominance of Cartesianism; but fairly quickly, he came to regard it instead as expressive of Dasein's own basic ontological tendency to "fall away" from any phenomenological sense of its own being. In later work he comes to see even this tendency as something set up by the very manner in which everything "eventuates" for us. In any case, Heidegger argues throughout that this tendency to privilege theory (and simultaneously reduce Dasein to subject-being) "must be broken, not in order to proclaim the primacy of the practical, nor to…display [traditional] problems from some new angle, but because the theoretical itself…refers back to something pre-theoretical," namely, to what goes on in lived-experience before philosophy becomes what it is (GA 56/57: 59/50).[24] Formally indicated, the first task of phenomenological explication is to become attuned to and "live in" this historical-temporal condition. The trouble with *Being and Time* is that this task, though central and present at least by implication on every page, tends to get obscured by the sheer bulk of systematic analyses, a very misleading overall characterization of ek-sistence as "transcendental," and now a readership of confident philosophers who are often just looking in Heidegger for some good ideas to help them with their own "theoretical" issues.

Among today's philosophers, Husserl's 1911 description of the philosophical life still seems to fit "actual Dasein" all too well and all too often. Philosophers, he says, need "theoretical talent," not nobility and profundity.[25] Period. And so it is that today's Socrates does a lot of arguing; but he is no lover of wisdom.[26] Hence, I find myself "experientially" in a "Heideggerian" cultural atmosphere. I want to know how to proceed once I realize that "being historical" is not an optional condition from which it is possible to *existentially* "step back," even if *theoretically* doing so is all too easy. Temporally regarded from within rather than chronologically measured from without, the future that is currently coming back at me

to pre-determine "how everything is" seems just as "theoretico-logical" in its dominant and discomforting form as Heidegger described it in 1919.

So, I feel quite at home with the infelicities of Heidegger's early language – both regarding what he wants to do and in the unsatisfactoriness of his attempts to do it. That is what one would expect from anyone trying to speak from experience about troubling practices. By following his awkward, sometimes overly dramatic, still somewhat tradition-bound phrasings (e.g., about attitudes, postures, intuitive understanding, sciences (*Wissenschaften*) and an ur-science (*Urwissenschaft*), a phenomenological method that is not a method), I believe one can learn to read Heidegger himself in a formally indicative spirit. What he is getting at, rather than what "position" he is taking or what "theories" he holds, can thus be made the central issue and lines of thought he opened up can be made our own. Why, for example, is it formal indication, not scientific jargon that has to be called a "special" sort of conceptualization, when we use language routinely to tell each other in formally indicative ways what "really matters" to us in our lives, whereas facility with the language of science requires years of high-level instruction? Are deep misgivings about the technoscientific condition of our current global surroundings really best interpreted through theories of the "Anthropocene" – a geologically uncertified new age defined by us, conceived in terms of human characteristics and behaviors, and delivered with the instrumentalist conclusion that we caused it so we must cure it? Yet critiques of these moves are easier than securing better ways to understand coming to terms with their "motivations." Opposition again, not a path forward….

From the usual "methodologically prepared" distance of all those philosophies still based on the belief that philosophers must first become epistemological, every reference to lived-experience will seem like a counter-productive appeal to "subjectivity," mere opinion, and the irrational – perhaps even a display of weak-minded refusal to go where truth is found and transhumanism can take us (GA 58: 110–20/87–94, 161/123–24).[27] "Techniques" are introduced to assure that everyone takes their distance from experience along the same lines; and becoming educated means learning these techniques. Specific techniques change,

but not what they accomplish; and every appeal to them seems to reaffirm the idea that to "be" educated is to think and act according to the rules – which, as "objective," are also considered "neutral" (and so also silently reinforcing the views of the socio-politically powerful and the philosophical mainstream). What Heidegger retrieved from Husserl is the breakthrough idea that the phenomena of experienced life are never simply given to us; they must always be *won from* the hegemony of the double heritage of ordinary common sense and tradition (GA 58: 29/24). Husserl himself thought phenomenological "winning" meant securing some sort of advance *theoretical* guidance; hence, life *as lived* ultimately proved elusive for him. Yet his own repeatedly revised accounts of how to implement his principle of all principles already strongly suggest that the very idea of a method-guided phenomenology is fundamentally unphenomenological; indeed, it is "a sin against its ownmost spirit" (GA 56/57: 110/84)!

To picture – even as an unreachable ideal – a thinking that throws off its everyday and traditional impediments, assumes a proper posture with a proper set of directives, and communes with the things themselves is to dream precisely the old dream of somehow *not* being historical. But human circumstances are otherwise. Any philosophy that wishes to be phenomenological for more than an abstract minute must stay as engaged by life's social conventions and dominant tradition – that is, remain as mindful of our "being-historical *fallingly*" – as of our potential for "authentic" phenomenological openness. There is no methodological substitute for what must of necessity be a continuous, provisional, and repetitious process of "winning" a phenomenological attitude. Thanks to Dilthey, Heidegger could formulate an intention to "stay with life" and understand this to mean *dwelling in the tension* between Husserl's disappointingly tradition-bound self-descriptions and his enormously promising phenomenological notion of responding to the things themselves.[28] To "be there," making our own necessary ontic adjustments, seems to me still a most viable option.[29]

NOTES

1 I discuss this point at length in *How History Matters to Philosophy: Reconsidering Philosophy's Past After Positivism* (New York: Routledge, 2015), 33–62.

2 Fifty years later, citing the passage in SZ about phenomenology as having a "higher possibility" than becoming an "actual school" (GA 2: 51–52/SZ 38), Heidegger is still making this distinction and affirming – in the spirit of what "matters," if not in the same terms – his continuing concern for "what is most its own" in phenomenology, viz., "*corresponding to the claim* of what is to be thought" (GA 14: 101–102/82, em). As I have argued elsewhere, Heidegger's hermeneutic interpretation of Husserl is in no way oppositional or revisionist because he is already approaching him in light of what he has learned from Dilthey, as this is "corroborated and strengthened by the ideas of Count Yorck" (GA 2: 525/SZ 397). See Robert C. Scharff, *Heidegger Becoming Phenomenological: Interpreting Husserl through Dilthey, 1916–1925* (London: Rowman and Littlefield International, 2019), esp. Ch. 5.

3 The full passage reads: "No conceivable theory [or argument] can make us stray from the principle of all principles: that each intuition giving [something] in an original way is a legitimate source of cognition, that whatever presents itself to us in "Intuition" in an originary way (so to speak, in its incarnate realness) is to be accepted simply as what it gives itself as being, but also only within the limits in which it gives itself there" (Edmund Husserl, *Collected Works, vol. 2: Ideas Pertaining to a Pure Phenomenology and to a Phenomenological Philosophy. First Book: General Introduction to a Pure Phenomenology*, trans. Fred Kersten [Dordrecht: Nijhoff, 1983], 44, tm). Translation modified to highlight Husserl's reflexive use of variants of *geben*. See GA 56/57: 109–10; cf., GA 20: 103–11/75–80. Also, Scharff, *How History Matters*, 99–104, 138–140.

4 Edmund Husserl, "Philosophy as Rigorous Science," in *Husserl: Shorter Works*, eds. Peter McCormick and Frederick A. Elliston

(Notre Dame, IN: Notre Dame University Press, 1981), 196. Husserl initially directed this critique at Dilthey and his alleged historicism, but it is ultimately redirected and intensified in the direction of Heidegger. Though he eventually modified his view of Dilthey after the two corresponded, there is to my knowledge no evidence that Husserl ever stopped worrying about the threat of relativism that he thought lay even in Dilthey's kind of appeal to immediate experience, nor that he changed his mind about Dilthey's failing to distinguish clearly between empirical and phenomenological "psychology," nor finally that Dilthey's idea of philosophy as worldview theory escapes his criticism that worldviews "teach the way wisdom does" – by offering philosophically worthless, culture-bound "profundities" about "lofty practical interests" expressed by "noble personalities" (Husserl, *Rigorous Science*, 194–96). And to the extent that Heidegger, too, admits Dilthey's sort of fuzziness into phenomenology, he is interpreted as corrupting it in the same ways. I agree with Donn Welton that to find Husserl's substantive response to Dilthey's objections to the account of him in the *Logos* article, with the exception of the so-called Kaizo essays delivered in Japan (1922–23) that were available only much later, one has to go all the way to Husserl's *Crisis* volume, where "constitutive" phenomenology plays a much more tenuous role in his thought than it did in the years when Heidegger was working out his own understanding of the differences between Husserl's "actual" phenomenology and his "possible" one. See Donn Welton, *The Other Husserl: The Horizons of Transcendental Phenomenology* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2000), 457n.78). As to what it means to say that Husserl speaks for "our" tradition, I leave for another day.

5 Letter to Georg Misch, Nov. 27, 1930, cited in Bob Sandmeyer, *Husserl's Constitutive Phenomenology: Its Problem and Promise* (New York: Routledge, 2009), 169. Cf., Husserl, *Rigorous Science*, 196.

6 "The historical is not merely something of which we have knowledge and about which we write books; rather, we ourselves are the historical and are tasked by it. . . .[But given our "tendency to fall

away into more objective kinds of meaningfulness"] the motives for returning to the historical by way of our own history remain inactive and hidden from us" (GA 9: 33–34/29). Hence although it is true that continental Europeans were "doing" substantially more *Historie* in Heidegger's time than North Americans, they too were typically inspired by the same ahistorical model. Indeed, it is to such science-minded "linguistic" historians (i.e., "philologists," in the German sense) that Nietzsche addressed the second of his *Untimely Meditations*. See Babette Babich, "Nietzsche's Philology and Nietzsche's Science: On the 'Problem of Science' and '*fröhliche Wissenschaft*,'" in *Metaphilology: Histories and Languages of Philology*, ed. Pascale Hummel (Paris: Philologicum, 2009), 155–201; and William Arrowsmith, "Nietzsche: Notes for 'We Philologists,'" *Arion: A Journal of Humanities and the Classics*, New Series 1 (2): 1973/74: 279–380.

7 Heidegger could see, for example, how Dilthey the historian lives through his empirical practice with an awareness that he is engaged in a kind of research that is illuminating, sharable, and would clearly profit from detailed "epistemological" articulation; but when he tries to do so, he finds himself doing traditional epistemology in spite of himself, i.e., framing his concerns in naturalistic-Kantian terms and defensively assuring everyone that he really is being "scientific," even if his research has little to do with external observation, quantifiable data, laboratories, instruments, and law-like explanations.

8 As here (100–104), I sometimes draw in what follows on my *Heidegger Becoming Phenomenological*. A quick study of the language of the early lecture courses – with all its references to life, to its unified pre-theoretical togetherness/connectedness, to living things through (*er-leben*), to starting with experience as a temporal process, and so on (above all in GA 56/57 and GA 58) – shows Heidegger's explicit incorporation of Dilthey's approach to *Erlebnis* into his thinking nearly a decade before the appearance of *Being and Time*. See Scott M. Campbell, "The Intensity

of Lived-Experience in Martin Heidegger's *Basic Problems of Phenomenology (WS 1919/1920)*: A Comparison to *Being and Time*," *Human Studies* 42 (3): 2019: 581–99. To see how Heidegger ultimately comes to terms with him, see GA 59: 149–74/115–33; and esp. the Kassel lectures (GA 80.1: 103–58/SUP 147–76).

9 Of course, this is not to say that physical science literally cannot be involved here. It's just that its "coverage" of them is ontologically thin. In Heidegger's phrasing, "everything that crosses the path of this [predominant mode of] care is cared for in such a way that what is not cared for is not just 'merely not there' but instead is cared for as something that does not have to be there" (GA 17: 85/62). For example, medicine's interpretation of illness undoubtedly needs to include patient experience, but that experience is phenomenologically distorted when conceived in terms of "subjective reports." Here as elsewhere humans do indeed process information; but is this the phenomenological truth about "life as it is lived through" that should then be immediately linked to "objectively" understood causes? Cognitive neuroscience has much to say about the mechanics and material conditions of thinking; but is this enough to tell us what thinking "is"? Theologians do indeed make arguments; but are these arguments expected to produce faith when they are well-formed? And so on. I ignore here all the recent questions – raised especially by developments in quantum mechanics and in the human and life sciences – about whether the traditional conception of knowledge modeled after "physics" as it has been understood since the days of Newton and Galileo is still a good model for the epistemology of any "sciences" at all.

10 Among the important early writings that already assume this imbalance of promise between Husserl and Dilthey, there is what amounts to "the very first draft," as Kisiel calls it, of what will later become *Being and Time*, whereas no documents with similar promise can be found in the case of Husserl (GA 64: 3–103/1–88). The essay started life as an ever-expanding (and ultimately unpublishable) review article of the Dilthey-Yorck correspondence,

a small part of which actually found its way verbatim into §77 of SZ's final typescript (GA 64: 9–14/6–10; GA 2: 527–33/SZ 399–403). See Theodore Kisiel, *The Genesis of Heidegger's 'Being and Time'* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1995), 321–57; and "Why the First Draft of *Being and Time* Was Never Published," *Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology* 20 (1): 1989: 3–22.

11 …where "standpoint" is clearly not the appropriate term. Since mathematics and the empirical sciences both begin, as Descartes hoped, with explicit procedures that keep all researchers on the same ontological page, it makes sense to say they have, over against their objects, a separately established "place from which" thinking starts. On the other hand, as Dilthey notes, to understand the lives of other human beings, initially taking such a standpoint would be the very opposite of establishing an appropriate interpretive relation. For more on Dilthey's standpoint of life, see Scharff, *Heidegger Becoming*, 31–36. See also n.9.

12 Heidegger sometimes characterizes this as speaking to phenomenology's need to cultivate a pre-methodological "absolute sympathy with life," rather than follow the usual epistemological path of taking distance from one's situation so that "every living experience can be turned into something looked at" (GA 56/57: 109–110/92–93). Removing any such observation-like distance allows us to "directly join in [*mitmachen*] personal life-experience with the greatest vitality and inwardness" (GA 58: 254/192; cf., GA 56/57: 116–17/98–99). Again, the basic problem is not Husserl's *preference* for "the theoretical attitude." Indeed, given our inheritance, most of us display a simple and ordinary fondness for theorizing everything. That is part of the point of SZ's famous analysis of the broken hammer. When just living through life is somehow disrupted, informal distance-taking and objectification – rather than, say, worshipfully dropping to one's knees – is the modern West's default response. The problem is that, encouraged by this traditionally reinforced preference, when Husserl raises the question of the proper "approach" of a phenomenological philosophy,

like other modern philosophers (Heidegger cites Natorp), he "turn[s] himself toward his experiences in an act of reflection [*Reflexion*]" and thus carries the theoretical attitude along with him (GA 56/57: 109–110; 216; cf. GA 58: 254–55/192; also Scharff, *Heidegger Becoming*, 109 n.27).

13 Here "phenomenologically" is my quick hand-waving placeholder for Heidegger's lifelong efforts to find adjectives to "properly" characterize the sort of inquiry in which a hermeneutic phenomenologist (ontological questioner, destructive retriever, thanker, thinker, developer of free relations with technology…) engages. The full passage reads: "It is the question about the how of philosophical experience and about the how in which philosophical experience explicates itself, about the motive and the [motivational] tendency of philosophical experience itself. From this arises the task to secure the employed means and ways in which we approach the origin; in this the particular characteristic of philosophical concepts is expressed" (GA 59: 171/131, em).

14 A lead question in a number of Heidegger's early lecture courses is how to respond to his culture's scientistic assault on the minds of aspiring philosophers – a question, he says, that Husserl never asked and that is made all the more urgent because the tendency to privilege "theorizing" and "objectification" seems to come so naturally to us (GA 56/57: 112–14/94–96). What, e.g., could be more obvious than the need for a STEM-centered education in a technoscientific world? There are, of course, good reasons for the young Heidegger to be a little judicious in print about how to present his disagreements with Husserl. Often he approaches the problem by criticizing someone else (e.g., Natorp) with the implication that Husserl falls under the same criticism; and sometimes he lets someone be his mouthpiece (e.g., Yorck): "When philosophy is conceived as a manifestation of life [*Lebensmanifestion*] and not as the expectoration of a groundless kind of thinking (groundless because one's glance gets turned away from the ground of consciousness), then one's task is as meagre in its results as it is complicated and

arduous in the obtaining of them." Cited in GA 2: 531/SZ 402; GA 64: 14/9–10, from Wilhelm Dilthey, *Briefwechsel zwischen Wilhelm Dilthey und dem Grafen Paul Yorck von Wartenburg, 1877–1897*, ed. Erich Rothacker (Halle: Niemeyer, 1923), 250–251. For phenomenological theorizing, think of Husserl's treatise on time consciousness, where a perceptive phenomenological account of the experience of lived time is presented in diagrams about primal intentions, retention, protention, etc., that have taken on a "conceptual" life of their own in the secondary literature in ways far removed from anything one might actually live through and directly describe.

15 In Heidegger's day, as in our own, perhaps the most familiar opposition is now launched in the name of "the concrete vs. empty, merely logical considerations and vs. formalistic compulsions… inasmuch as it is in the concrete that actual work takes place" (GA 61: 27/22). As he already understands from Dilthey, there is something to this, but until we learn how to express this hermeneutically rather than in modern terms, we will have to settle for a deliberately formulated "fiction [!!]," namely that "this concrete work is in fact what it is claimed to be, and thus in some [yet to be properly determined] way it furthers the issue" (GA 61: 27/22). Are "two red spots" more "concretely" experienced than "the red ball"?

16 Hence, analytic philosophers cannot become less positivistic in the "formalized" sense just by rejecting the specific methodological and theoretical generalizations of logical empiricism.

17 GA 60: 55/38; 63/43–44. [*Aside*: Merleau-Ponty does a lot of formal indicating – in a manner that drives some of his readers crazy. He will go on for several pages, following out a line of thought or a sense of how "one" approaches this or that phenomenon, only then to stop, refer back to what he's just done and say, See, this is the trouble we get into if we assume that X….]

18 For more on Heidegger's initial conception of a "pre-theoretical science," see, e.g., Sophie-Jan Arrien, "The Hermeneutical Turn of Phenomenology in the Young Heidegger's Thought," in Saulius Geniusas and Paul Fairfield, eds., *Hermeneutics and Phenomenology: Figures and Themes* (New York: Bloomsbury, 2018), 138–148.

19 The sentiment is repeated in SZ, in the famous passage about the hermeneutic of Dasein being "the point at which philosophy arises and to which it [always] returns" (GA 2: 51/SZ 38). The phenomenological problem is never which sorts of thinking should remain dependent upon experience and which should not. Because late 19th century discussions of the necessities of the human sciences stress the experiential "closeness" of understanding (*Verstehen*) and the theoretical remoteness of *Erklären*, the hermeneutic importance of the fact that natural science, *as much as human science*, is a complex manifestation of life is often underappreciated. This is what Yorck encouraged Dilthey to say more about. The "ocularity" of natural science is not a *product* of theorizing and constituting; it is a *manifestation* of a "theoretical attitude," expressive of life in a powerful way that nevertheless, precisely because it is only one possible attitude, cannot serve as a philosophically basic model for all life-manifestations or "intensifications." In fact, because of its dominant cultural/philosophical status, promoting this theorizing model as being ontologically basic obscures the fact that no "model" can be "basic" for a phenomenological philosophy.

20 In this context, think of Rorty's account of the "red-faced snortings" regarding what is and what is "not philosophy" evoked among his analytic colleagues in the 1960s whenever their sense of philosophy as a natural kind feels violated. See, e.g., "Introduction," in Richard Rorty, Jerome Schneewind, and Quentin Skinner, eds., *Philosophy in History: Essays on the Historiography of Philosophy* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984), 8.

21 The implications of this idea of how "problems" arise in philosophy and "values" get challenged are wide and deep. How many philosophical inquiries actually begin "experientially" and with this recognition in mind? "Who" is most likely to begin in this way? When one "picks a topic" on which to write a philosophical essay, how does this "picking" function and what "motivates" it? Is the development of the essay guided by an originating experience, or by "the logic of inquiry," or "what everyone knows," or "what recent studies have shown," or…?

22 I cannot discuss here the general question of the "later" Husserl's possible immunity from criticisms of the period of the *Logos* article and *Ideas I*. I agree in general with Sebastian Luft that through all his changes, new starts, planned and abandoned introductions, and drafts for "my system," Husserl remains an Enlightenment thinker and therefore that his notion of phenomenological reflection, which he defends against the (allegedly) far too historical *Selbstbesinnung* of Dilthey and Heidegger, determines a fundamentally different trajectory of thought from theirs – a trajectory in which the traditional ideas of system, method, rational clarity, science, and transcendental subjectivity are not abandoned but at most *somewhat modified* for genuinely phenomenological purposes. See Sebastian Luft, *Subjectivity and Lifeworld in Transcendental Phenomenology* (Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 2011), 12–22. Husserl's displays of greater concern for historical science and the meaning of history in his later years are still a topic addressed by a transcendental consciousness.

23 Consider the matter this way: If you're relating something you understand deeply and you're stopped in mid-sentence by someone saying, "There. Now I think I really see what you mean. Say it again," you can't. If you have been speaking from experience, you can find other words, but there is no guarantee they will be the same words, because your focus has been on relating the understanding you are living through, and on speaking from it, and not on a set of concepts that try to get it right once and for all. Even thus trying to be definitive tends to leave the speaker with a renewed sense that there is still a better way to say it. In short, the main problem is not that speaking from experience is unfamiliar, or that words are rarely used and understood to be used in a formally indicative way; it's that in a technoscientific culture, one tends to get trained to distrust experience-expressive articulations and to aim at something more precise, something conceptually clear that represents what really matters, and something you or a machine can say quickly.

24 "Even unbiased seeing is a seeing and as such has its position of looking and indeed has it in a distinctive manner, that is, by having explicitly appropriated it so that it has been critically [i.e., epistemologically] purged"; hence, the very idea of a position defined as "freedom from all standpoints…is itself something historical…not a chimerical in itself [that really is] outside of time" (GA 63: 83/64).

25 Edmund Husserl, "Philosophy as Rigorous Science," 195.

26 And so today, the APA web site identifies philosophy's many topics, questions, and critical skills. It speaks of the diversity and pluralism that it hopes for in its membership; and it praises its ability to make us better problem-solvers and to introduce us to unfamiliar topics (e.g., the arts, other cultures). But there is not a word about how philosophizing "attunes" itself to all these topics and questions, or how to establish one's sense of "becoming" a philosopher, or about the sort of self-understanding and self-critique that might problematize rather than just "clarify" the idea of acquiring "useful information" and useful tools to employ against skepticism and relativism. See e.g., "Philosophy: A Brief Guide for Undergraduates," American Philosophical Association. (last revised, 2017) <http://www.apaonline.org/?page=undergraduates>, accessed May 9, 2024.

27 "[E]ven when theorizing, I myself originate in and come out from lived experiencing, *and something experienceable is brought along from this experiencing*, with which one now does not know what to do, and for which the convenient title of the irrational has been invented" (GA 56/57: 117/99).

28 "Staying with life," "understanding life out of its own origin," "going along with factical life" are common expressions in the early lecture courses (e.g., GA 58: 137/106, 157/120–21). Careful readers of Heidegger's *Being and Time* will recognize that I am ignoring here a crucial question that is only finally addressed fully and directly in Division II, §§74–77, viz., the fact that achieving such a grounded interpretive focus requires nothing less than *one's own*

practiced refusal to regard "history" as a research topic and instead to mindfully re-experience being-historical as the very condition *one already lives through in the process of trying to ask about it.*

29 At the very end of the summary of a seminar held from September 11–13, 1962, in Todtnauberg, after Heidegger has explained that what the *Kantbuch* calls the "finitude of Being" is no longer to be contrasted with infinity but thought in itself (i.e., in terms of *Ereignis*) and thus "made secure in one's own" being, he cites this line from Hans Erich Nossack's novel, *Impossible Trial* [*Unmögliche Beweisaufnahme*] (Frankfurt a.M.: Suhrkamp, 1956; reissue, 1970); Eng., *The Impossible Proof*, trans. Michael Lebeck (New York: Farrar, Straus, and Giroux, 1968), 29: "But the accused declined. One had to be there, he said, if one is called upon, *but to call oneself* was the greatest error that one could make" (GA 14: 64/54 tm, em). (Lebeck's rendering of *abwinken* as "refused" rather than "declined" or "waved off" misses precisely Heidegger's point.)

Destruction, History of Ontology, and Factical Life: A Reconstruction of the Phenomenological Function of Heidegger's "Destruction" (1919–1927)

Francesco Scagliusi

ABSTRACT: In this article, I argue that Heidegger's destruction of the history of ontology must be understood based on the task of the destruction of factical life. To do so, I will first reconstruct Heidegger's method of destruction with the help of the early Freiburg lecture courses: In this "phase" of Heidegger's thought, destruction not only arises from a phenomenological necessity, that is, from the fallenness of life or of Dasein, but also has the phenomenological function of de-objectifying the objectified phenomena of life by tracing them back to their primordial enacted experiences. Second, I will show that Heidegger maintains the same function of destruction in both *Being and Time* and the Marburg lecture courses. Thus, the destruction of the history of ontology can only be achieved through the destruction of factical life.

KEYWORDS: Heidegger, destruction, history of ontology, factical life, phenomenology

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INTRODUCTION

Before the publication of Heidegger's early lecture courses, destruction was read based on Heidegger's discussion of it in §6 of *Being and Time*, where destruction is related to the history of ontology.[1] Consequently, destruction was understood as Heidegger's way of interpreting the history of ontology, and its reference to the fundamental problems of the phenomenology of life, namely as a pre-theoretical yet philosophical analysis of life,[2] remained obscure. Because of this, Benjamin Crowe denounced the "*deficiency*" of a detailed account of "destruction,"[3] which was also lamented by Robert Bernasconi, who traced the "confusion surrounding the notion of destructuring" (that is, "destruction") back to the fact that "Heidegger's readers have drawn solely on the programmatic statements located at the outset of *Being and Time*."[4]

The need for a more comprehensive understanding of "destruction" was addressed after the publication of Heidegger's early lecture courses.[5] Jeffrey Barash[6] provided a comprehensive illustration of how Heidegger's ideas on the sense of history, and therefore his concept of destruction, were rooted in debates from the late 19th and early 20th centuries. John van Buren[7] and Crowe[8] highlighted the Christian roots of destruction, which can be traced back to Luther's "*destruere*" and Heidegger's appropriation of it. Another decisive aspect of destruction, emphasized especially by Jean Grondin[9] and István Fehér,[10] is the connection between destruction and the hermeneutics of facticity. As Heidegger himself stated: "hermeneutics is destruction!" (GA 63: 105/81; cf. GA 63: 48/38–39). Finally, in Charles Bambach's[11] and Robert Scharff's[12] studies on the importance of Dilthey's philosophy in the development of Heidegger's thought, destruction was connected to Heidegger's appropriation of Dilthey's idea of understanding life in its own terms.

However, Heidegger's conceptual framework underwent a transformation around 1923, shifting from a life-oriented language to an ontological one. Consequently, Heidegger seems, at least at first glance, to have modified his account of destruction. Destruction is not directed

toward factical life anymore, as the early lecture courses stated; rather, it has the "history of ontology" as its object. As Theodore Kisiel aptly summarizes: "Heidegger's project of historical destruction assumes a less religious orientation by 1925. [...] The destruction becomes more purely ontological and less anthropological, replete with historical figures other than Paul, Augustine, and Luther."[13]

The interpretations of Heidegger's destruction mirror this shift in his conceptuality and can, therefore, be divided into two main categories: On the one hand, destruction, although enriched by Heidegger's early lecture courses, is said to be directed toward the "history of ontology."[14] On the other hand, destruction is a movement toward factical life.[15] Although these aspects may intersect in some studies, no previous study has directly addressed their relation. In other words, what is missing in Heideggerian studies is a clear explanation of the relationship between Heidegger's "first" account of destruction, where its focus is on factical life, and his "second" account, where the object of destruction shifts to the history of ontology.

This study addresses this issue and clarifies the development of the concept of destruction from 1919 to 1927, which – to my knowledge – has not as yet been carefully examined. I argue that there is essential continuity between these two accounts of destruction, since Heidegger's destruction of the history of ontology must be understood on the basis of the task of the destruction of factical life. My aim here is not to suggest that reading destruction as a way of interpreting the history of ontology is false, but rather that the *sense* of this Heideggerian task must be specified using his early lecture courses, where he discusses the method of destruction much more extensively. I hold that during both the early Freiburg and the Marburg periods, Heidegger kept the essential feature of destruction unaltered. This is the phenomenological movement of going back to Dasein's enactment.

Therefore, the destruction of the history of ontology is an attempt to retrieve its fundamental experiences – not primarily to open new perspectives on the interpretation of the history of ontology. Destruction is not the subjective imposition of a content (e.g., that of *Being and Time*)

on another content (e.g., Kant's first *Critique* or Paul's letters); rather, it traces the ontological concepts back to the enactment of Dasein so that Dasein itself – and not the content one is interpreting – ends up being radically transformed.

In the first section of the paper, with the help of Heidegger's early Freiburg lecture courses, I will illustrate that the method of destruction has a phenomenological motivation, that is, the fallenness of factical life, and a phenomenological function, that is, tracing words and concepts back to their origin in life experience, a truly Husserlian task, which Heidegger deepened and understood in a new way. Subsequently, in the second section, I will argue that this phenomenological task of destruction remains substantially the same in *Being and Time* and in some of his Marburg lecture courses, where Heidegger – albeit using different language – expresses the same idea with concepts like "appropriation" and "retrieval."

DESTRUCTION IN HEIDEGGER'S EARLY LECTURE COURSES IN FREIBURG

In *Phenomenology of Intuition and Expression* in particular, Heidegger examines the method of destruction in depth. In this lecture course there are even two characterizations of destruction. First, destruction is defined as "word explanation [*Worterklärung*]" (GA 59: 30/21–22, 33/23–24, 178/138). Second, Heidegger characterizes destruction as essentially connected to "factical life experience [*faktische Lebenserfahrung*]" (GA 59: 35–36/25–26, 39/28, 180–181/139–40, 187/144). At first glance, these two accounts of destruction seem to contradict each other, because it is not evident why explaining the meaning of a word should relate to concrete life. This is not the case, however, and in this lecture course Heidegger illustrates why destruction as word explanation is essentially related to factical life.

To do this, Heidegger is first concerned with excluding what destruction as word explanation is not. Having emphasized the importance of destruction for philosophy,[16] he notes that "from the outside" destruction could "at first look like a critical poking-around at individual concepts

and word meanings" and, "if performed in isolation [. . .] it easily gives the impression that phenomenology is word explanation, detection and elimination of equivocations, determination and marking-off [*Ausgrenzen*] of fixed meanings" (GA 59: 30/21–22). In other words, Heidegger draws attention to the fact that destruction is not a matter of explaining word meanings by clarifying individual terms through their etymology or other concepts.

As is often the case with Heidegger's arguments, after clarifying how the word explanation should not be understood, Heidegger turns to its positive meaning. Word explanation is directed to the "ambiguity [*Vieldeutigkeit*]" of words, that is, to their "multiplicity of directions of meaning" or "meaning-complexes" (GA 59: 33/24). The "multiplicity of directions of meaning" of a word is not simply the fact that a word can have two or more meanings. According to Heidegger, the "multiplicity of directions of meaning" of words, which constitutes their ambiguity, is the fact that words "carry within them an expressive sense-relation [*Sinnbezug*] to object areas" (GA 59: 33/24), that is, that a word presents not only a content but also a relation of the subject to that content. This difference between a word's content and the relation of the subject to that content grounds the ambiguity of a word.

This point can be further clarified with Heidegger's distinction between "content [*Gehalt*]," "relation [*Bezug*]," and "enactment [*Vollzug*]," which in the lecture course on Paul's letters he uses to define the "phenomenon" of phenomenology (GA 60: 63/43). Heidegger explains that every phenomenon has an experienced content, a relation of the subject to that content, that is, the "'how' in which it is experienced," and an enactment, that is, the "'how' in which the relational meaning is enacted" (GA 60: 63/43). These "directions of sense [*Sinnesrichtungen*]" do not simply "stay next to each other," since the phenomenon "is the totality of sense in these three directions" (GA 60: 63/43, tm). According to Heidegger, however, ontology was "entirely dominate[d]" by the formal-logical determination of the phenomenon, thus prescribing a "theoretical relational meaning" to the phenomenon and hiding the "*enactment*-character [*das* Vollzugs*mäßige*]" (GA 60: 63/43). In other words, while a

concrete experience is enacted in a particular situation[17] – for instance, in a historical context and mood – the process of concept formation conceals this situation by examining the content of that experience. This concealment is what Heidegger in these lecture courses calls the "objectification" or, alternatively, "reification" (GA 56/57: 53/63) of an experience.[18]

As illustrated by various scholars such as Dan Zahavi, Jean-François Courtine, and Jonathan O'Rourke,[19] what motivates Heidegger's analyses of the nature of objectification is Natorp's position on the method for the investigation of subjectivity. According to Natorp, to describe what subjectivity is, one must use language; however, by doing so, a conceptual mediation occurs and the concrete life of subjectivity is lost.[20] Therefore, investigating the concrete life of subjectivity can only be done through what Natorp calls the method of "reconstruction."[21]

Heidegger took Natorp's arguments as a serious challenge for phenomenology, stating that "Natorp is the only person to have brought scientifically noteworthy objections against phenomenology" (GA 56/57: 101/85).[22] According to Heidegger, however, Natorp's objection rests on the "undemonstrated prejudice" that "all language is itself already objectifying, i.e., that living in meaning implies a theoretical grasping of what is meant" (GA 56/57: 111/93–94).[23] Against Natorp, Heidegger maintains that it is possible to scientifically account for the concrete phenomenon of life without objectifying it, but only through methodological tools – destruction and formal indication – that reverse the process of objectification by focusing on the enactment of the subject and not on the content.[24]

Accordingly, in Heidegger's early lecture courses, destruction is described as a movement against the constitutive decaying (*abfallend*) or falling (*verfallend*) tendency of life from which the theoretical attitude of philosophy and science arises. As Heidegger states in GA 58, destruction is a destruction "of the objectifications" (GA 58: 248/187; cf. also GA 58: 164/126, 240/181). In GA 59, Heidegger also calls this objectifying tendency a "*fading* of meaningfulness [Verblassen *der Bedeutsamkeit*]" (GA 59: 182/141), which consists in "the transition of the experience [...] into the mode of non-primordiality where the genuineness of the enactment and of the renewal of the enactment [*Vollzugserneuerung*] drops out"

(GA 59: 182/141). This happens in concrete life as well as in theoretical life, where "scientific theories, propositions and concepts just like philosophical explicata (in the mode of usability) of the no longer primordially experienced are taken up, handed down, and further formed" (GA 59: 183/141–42).[25] Tradition thereby perpetrates a fading of meaningfulness by transmitting concepts without referring them to their living origin, that is, by handing down the content of concepts without referring to the enactment of factical life.

Heidegger characterizes the fading of meaningfulness as a "primordial character of factical life" that "prove[s] the primordial necessity of phenomenological destruction" (GA 59: 182/141).[26] Because this character is primordial, it is not something that can be overcome; therefore, destruction is not a task that can be performed once and for all.[27] Heidegger stresses, however, that "fading" does not mean "disappearing"[28] but rather "distance from the origin" (GA 59: 183/141). The primordial relation to a meaning is turned into an objectified non-primordial content. Nonetheless, this relation and its enactment remain in factical life, even if faded.[29] As Heidegger states, "there is a more primordial conceptuality already in factical life experience, from out of which the material conceptuality that is common to us first derives" (GA 60: 85/59).

To regain the faded meaning of a word, a "reversal in conceptuality must be enacted" (GA 60: 85/59). This reversal, which in GA 59 is performed by destruction as a word explanation, is called in GA 60 the true "concept formation" (*Begriffsbildung*), a task that, so understood, "has not been posed since Socrates" (GA 60: 85/59, 89/62). Tracing a word or concept back to life's enactment is the authentic phenomenological function of destruction. As Heidegger affirms:

> In the clarification of such words is thus implied, provided that it is genuinely enacted, the unitary over-viewing and co-viewing having-present of the directions of meaning. It means at the same time the having-present of different situations from which the directions of meaning depart and in which they become genuinely pursuable. From this still entirely initial understanding of the sense of

> the clarification we have to go back to the philosophically primordial basis of enactment [*Vollzugsbasis*] from which such clarifying and determining must grow. (GA 59: 33–34/24, tm)[30]

By performing a word explanation, destruction leads back to the totality of the directions of meaning, that is, not only to the content of a concept, but also to the enactment of the primordial experience from which that concept was formed. Only by going back to this "basis of enactment" can destruction achieve its de-objectifying task. Thus, destruction can be defined as follows: *Destruction is a movement against objectified and objectifying sense-relations because it traces a word back to its primordial enacted experience.* This unitary movement could be broken down into two different "moments": (1) a movement against fallenness (that is, against the objectifying tendency of life) and (2) a movement toward life in its enactment. As Crowe correctly points out, however, this distinction between a "negative" and a "positive" moment of destruction "runs the risk of oversimplification."[31] Indeed, it must be emphasized that the movement of destruction is not a negative *and* a positive but only a positive one since it goes against the objectified meanings of words only by means of going back to the enactment. This separation is therefore just there to assist with explanation.

In this positive sense of word explanation, destruction is "not secondarily, but necessarily belonging to phenomenology" (GA 59: 186/144).[32] In order for the explication of philosophy to be determined "as primordially enactmentally understanding [...], this explication necessarily always starts with the destruction" (GA 59: 183/142). Heidegger insists on the permeating nature of destruction by excluding the fact that it is a method that can be applied to some phenomena (e.g., the history of ontology) but not to others. Destruction is "no contingent means, to be employed in isolation for itself" and "dispensable from case to case, but rather it also belongs to its [philosophizing's] enactment once one has understood that philosophizing moves within the field of factical life experience" (GA 59: 181/140, tm). Therefore, the task of destruction is, according to Heidegger, the final phenomenological task: "the reduction [*Zurückführung*] to the

genuine sense-complexes and the articulation of the genuine sense directions comprised in them is what is final in the phenomenological task [*das Endgültige der phänomenologischen Aufgabe*]" (GA 59: 74/56).[33]

For anyone familiar with the genetic developments of Husserl's phenomenology, it should be clear why Heidegger calls his destruction "phenomenological." After World War I, Husserl began to deepen his own phenomenology through the concept of "genesis," and although this is not the place to reconstruct these developments, the fundamental motif of Husserl's new discoveries was precisely that of tracing logical concepts (e.g., that of logical negation) back to pre-predicative transcendental experience (perception of transcendental subjectivity).

Although some clarifications of Heidegger's debt to Husserl should be made here, it seems evident that Heidegger takes the main idea of destruction from Husserl's project of genetic phenomenology that wants to explain how theories that "become objective" have their origin in "living and streaming life."[34] As Husserl states: "all theoretical knowledge in general ultimately leads back to an experience."[35] Various scholars have accordingly stressed the continuity between Heidegger's concept of destruction and Husserl's phenomenology. For instance, O'Rourke notes that Heidegger's endeavor to trace ontological concepts back to enacted factical experiences "is decidedly Husserlian."[36] Renato Cristin also emphasizes the phenomenological roots of Heidegger's destruction by defending the thesis that Heidegger's destructive movement runs parallel to Husserl's reduction.[37]

However, the reference both to genetic phenomenology and to Husserl's reduction should be taken with caution. Putting aside the problem that Husserlian studies still debate how to understand the sense of the transcendental reduction, Heidegger's destruction does not lead back to the perception of transcendental subjectivity, but rather to Dasein's enactment, which is always historically performed. Thus, destruction remains a critique of Husserl's phenomenology, not in the form of a mere opposition, but instead in the form of a development with and against Husserl. As Heidegger states, "The radicalism of phenomenology needs to operate in the most radical way *against phenomenology itself*" (GA 58: 6/5).

Returning to our interpretation of *Phenomenology of Intuition and Expression*, we have seen why destruction as a word explanation is essentially directed to factical life. As Heidegger clearly states, word explanation does not consist in "securing a strict and unambiguously available conceptuality" (GA 59: 178/138) but is directed toward the sense-relation that is enacted in factical life and from which the meaning of a word arises. Destruction is word explanation because it refers to the covering meanings of a word in order to destroy them, that is, to regain the primordial enactmental situation that underlies the formation of the meaning of a word.

Still, one central problem remains unclear. It could be that a concrete enacted situation would not be sufficient to counter the objectifying tendency of life, because the way in which that situation understands itself could be objectifying. One needs an enacted experience that is capable of countering the fallenness, and in this sense, one needs a direction toward precise experiences. Because of this problem, Heidegger specifies that destruction is not directionless but rather a "directed deconstruction [*Abbau*]"[38] (GA 59: 181/139) since it is "bounded to a pre-grasping[39] [*vorgriffsgebunden*]" (GA 59: 34–35/24–25, 180/139, 187/144).[40]

This central character of destruction clarifies the boundedness of destruction with factical life and with another crucial concept in Heidegger's thought, namely that of formal indication. For Heidegger, "bounded to a pre-grasping" means that destruction is "not ultimately primordial and ultimately decisive" but rather "presupposes philosophical fundamental experiences" (GA 59: 35/25, 187/144). In other words: "the so-called 'mere word explanation' [...] is a task and an aim that presupposes a rich and only quite specifically accessible situation" (GA 59: 34/24).

The "boundedness to a pre-grasping" of destruction is shown by the fact that destruction should refer itself to experiences in order to fulfill its task (for it must trace concepts back to their primordial experiences), but it must refer words not to "uncritical" experiences but to "philosophical" ones, i.e., to experiences that have already been appropriated in a certain way, "so that the entire philosophical problematic

intensifies towards the evidence of this fundamental experience and its genuine origin-character" (GA 59: 187/144) – in other words, so that the entire philosophical problematic can be guided by this fundamental appropriation of an experience. This preliminary grasp (*Vorgriff*) is crucial for destruction to be conceived not as a negative but as a positive function: Destruction must be understood through the "structure of the guiding pre-grasping" in order to "apprehend the *negative motives of understanding* [*Verstehensmotive*], which also are to be attained in the destruction, as *positive motives of understanding*" (GA 59: 192/148).[41]

GA 59 sees the use of the concept of "dijudication," which should be such an appropriation of factical life experience. Dijudication "is the decision about the genealogical position which is assigned to the sense-complex seen from the origin [*Diese Diiudication ist die Entscheidung über die genealogische Stelle, die dem Sinnzusammenhang vom Ursprung her gesehen zukommt*]" (GA 59: 74/57, tm). In other words, dijudication is the decision to appropriate an ontic content that is then presupposed as a philosophically fundamental experience. In this sense, as Heidegger says, "the primordiality or non-primordiality" of the preliminary grasps "can be dijudicated [*steht zur Diiudication*]" (GA 59: 180/139).

Now, according to Heidegger, dijudication and destruction are in a certain continuity because destruction "runs out [*läuft aus*] into [. . .] the phenomenological dijudication" (GA 59: 74/57). If Heidegger explains this continuity on the basis that the Latin term "dijudication" should correspond to the term "destruction" (*de-struere*),[42] the continuity between the two concepts is clearer if we remember that destruction is bounded to a pre-grasping. Destruction presupposes an experience that is already viewed from a certain perspective. Dijudication is the appropriation of that experience and, therefore, the decision on the "perspective" – primordial or not – of that experience.

Simultaneously, Heidegger connects dijudication with formal indication by placing dijudication under its methodological functions. First, dijudication remains undiscussed and undetermined in its "scope and type of validity."[43] This function belongs to formal indication because it ensures that certain meanings (e.g., theoretical ones) are not attributed to a phenomenon at the beginning of a phenomenological analysis (GA

60: 63–64/43–44; GA 61: 141–42/105–6). Second, the decision requires a criterion by which the enactment can be characterized as "primordial" or "non-primordial,"[44] and this criterion cannot be taken from "the outside" but from a familiarity with the phenomena.[45] It is thus through formal indication that a "preliminary grasp" (*Vorgriff*) – or, which is the same thing, a criterion or a "starting point" (*Ansatz*)[46] – are given for the decision.

The relations among formal indication, dijudication, and destruction cannot be fully discussed in this paper. Here, it is sufficient to point out that dijudication stands under the functions of formal indication as a warning function through which pre-grasping arises and that formal indication and destruction are therefore essentially connected if destruction and dijudication are so interdependent, that is, if destruction is bounded to a pre-grasping (which, again, must be formally indicated and not assumed uncritically). By presupposing a preliminary grasp (*Vorgriff*), destruction must also presuppose formal indication.[47]

The analysis elaborated in this section can be summarized as follows. First, destruction, as a phenomenological method, is a necessary movement against the falling tendency of life. Second, destruction is directed primarily to life – that is, to Dasein[48]– because its word explanatory task consists in tracing the objectified content of a word back to factical experience so that words can be understood in their primordial enactment, a function that is Heidegger's appropriation of the genetic developments of Husserl's phenomenology. Third, destruction is always bounded to a preliminary grasp, meaning that it presupposes a formally indicated criterion through which the primordiality or non-primordiality of an enactment can be decided.

DESTRUCTION IN THE MARBURG LECTURE COURSES AND IN *BEING AND TIME*

Between Heidegger's "early Freiburg period" and his "Marburg period," there is a shift in his conceptuality from a life-oriented one to an ontological one. But as Heidegger himself writes in a letter to Löwith dated August 20, 1927: "the problems of facticity persist for me with the same

intensity as they did in my Freiburg beginnings, only much more radically now, and still in the perspectives that were guiding me even in Freiburg."[49] As I will illustrate in this section, this essential continuity between these two "phases" of Heidegger's thought is also valid for the concept of destruction. Thus, I argue that the connection between destruction and the history of ontology should be understood in light of the connection between destruction and life (or Dasein).

Both "moments" of destruction that we analyzed in the first section are to be found in Heidegger's Marburg lecture courses and in *Being and Time*. First, the reference of destruction to fallenness (*Verfallen*) is still present and central, and here as well is fallenness, which makes the method of destruction necessary. In GA 17, Heidegger connects fallenness with the historicity (*Geschichtlichkeit*) of Dasein: Fallenness always takes place historically through a tradition and a "conceptual overgrowth" that Dasein "itself has developed" (GA 17: 117/85). The same motif can be found in *Being and Time*. In §6 of this work, the "existential" (*Existenzial*) of fallenness is related to the historicity of Dasein. Dasein falls (*verfällt*) because it interprets itself on the basis of a mode of being that is not its own, that is, it understands itself on the basis of the present-at-hand (*Vorhandenheit*) and not of existence (*Existenz*).[50] This falling movement is concretized both in the "taking care of" (*Besorgen*) and in relation to a tradition that relieves Dasein of its "own guidance, questioning and choosing" (GA 2: 28–29/SZ 21).

In *Being and Time*, tradition makes what has been handed down (*das Überlieferte*) something self-evident, and by doing so it "bars access to those primordial sources out of which the traditional categories and concepts were in part genuinely drawn. The tradition even makes us forget such a provenance altogether" (GA 2: 29/SZ 21). In other words, tradition hinders Dasein from reappropriating the experiences (i.e., the "primordial sources") at the basis of ontological concepts because tradition hands over the ontological concepts as self-evident propositions, which, according to Heidegger, have constitutively already veiled the reference to living experience – a dynamic that we have already seen with the "fading of meaningfulness." This is also evident in Heidegger's analysis

of "assertion" (*Aussage*) in *Being and Time*. According to Heidegger, through assertion, an experience is uprooted from the existential relation and becomes "self-evident" (*selbstverständlich*) because Dasein "believes itself exempt from a primordial re-enactment [*Nachvollzug*] of the act of discovering" (GA 2: 296/SZ 224, tm).[51]

Second, in this "phase" of Heidegger's thought as well, destruction is a movement that leads back to primordial experiences. In GA 17 Heidegger says:

> Dasein has obstructed itself from itself in the entire sphere of its being. Freeing Dasein up by way of deconstructing [*Abbauen*], of a destruction, occurs by tracing concepts back to their distinctive origin. What is accomplished at the same time on this path is the elucidation of the inadequacy of the concepts for Dasein, an elucidation of how Dasein's self-obstructing is enacted in history. (GA 17: 117–18/85, tm)

This function of destruction is also present in the famous §6 of *Being and Time*. Destruction must dissolve the concealments produced by the "sclerotic tradition" (GA 2: 30/SZ 22). This task, however, "is based upon the primordial experiences in which the first and subsequently guiding determinations of Being were gained," and Heidegger adds that "this demonstration [*Nachweis*] of the origin of the fundamental ontological concepts, as the investigation that displays their 'birth certificate,' has nothing to do with a pernicious relativizing of ontological standpoints" (GA 2: 30/SZ 22). In other words, destruction as "productive" or "positive appropriation" (GA 2: 29/SZ 21) is not a mere analysis of the history of ontology on the basis of a theory (for example that of *Being and Time*, if one were to take its results objectively), but the concrete attempt to retrieve the experiences at the basis of ontological concepts, thereby showing the "birth certificate" of these concepts.

The emphasis on showing the "birth certificate" of ontological concepts can also be found in GA 24, particularly in Heidegger's destructive analysis of *essentia* and *existentia*. Heidegger wants to "obtain a clue to

the *origin* of these *concepts* of *essentia* and *existentia*," that is "what their birth certificate is and whether it is genuine [*echt*]" (GA 24: 140/100). Moreover, Heidegger calls his analysis of *existentia* a "word explanation [*Worterklärung*]" (GA 24: 143/101), establishing thereby a continuity between his analysis of destruction and phenomenology as word explanation in GA 59. In GA 24, as in GA 59, destruction is not a mere philological analysis of words or a more accurate reading of the history of ontology, but an appropriation of it through a retrieval of the conduct of Dasein, that is, "*by going back* [Rückgang] *to the producing* [herstellend] *conduct* [Verhalten] *of Dasein*" (GA 24: 143/102, tm). As Heidegger also explains: "we wish to revive neither Aristotle nor the ontology of the Middle Ages, neither Kant nor Hegel, but only ourselves" (GA 24: 142/101).[52]

If one understands the destruction of the history of ontology on the basis of the destruction of factical life in the earlier lecture courses, one can better grasp some of Heidegger's remarks about destruction, which have often been misunderstood in Heideggerian studies. According to Heidegger, destruction is a critique not of the past but of the present (GA 17: 119/86, 122/88; GA 2: 31/SZ 22–23). The critique of the present, however, is not primarily a critique of the present interpretations of the history of ontology but of the present Dasein itself. As Heidegger clearly states in GA 17:

> What is criticized is not the past that is opened up by the destruction, but the *present*, our *present-day* Dasein [heutiges *Dasein*], as long as it is covered up by a *past that has become inauthentic*. It is not Aristotle or Augustine who is criticized, but the *present*. Far from dismissing the past, the critique has precisely the opposite tendency of bringing the object of the critique to light in its *primordial* past. (GA 17: 119/86, tm)

For Heidegger, the "primordial past" is nothing other than Dasein's appropriation and retrieval of the primordial experiences that motivated Aristotle and Augustine, and not "what they really said" in contrast to the present interpretations of them. It is true that on some

occasions Heidegger criticizes present interpretations,[53] but he does so only in the context of tracing traditional concepts back to Dasein's experiences. In other words, destruction is destruction of the present since it is destruction of the "*heutiges Dasein*" in its fallenness, and a destruction of fallenness means at the same time (but only as a consequence of that) a destruction of the present interpretations of tradition, as long as these interpretations objectify philosophical ontological concepts.[54]

Therefore, destruction is not a way to read a theory (that of Aristotle) through another theory (that of *Being and Time*)[55] but a method that must be performatively enacted. Heidegger expresses the performative enactment of destruction as a "battle with the past" through which "this past itself is brought to its *own Being*" (GA 17: 122/88). Heidegger also adds that reaching back into the past's "own" or "genuine Being" is a "redound [*Rückstoß*] on the present," that is, on Dasein or on "the situation of the interpretation" (GA 17: 122/88). In my view, such statements can only be properly understood through Heidegger's early account of destruction, where the task of destruction "is tantamount to explicating the primordial motive-giving [*motivgebend*] situations in which the fundamental experiences of philosophy have arisen" (GA 9: 3–4/3, tm).[56] From this perspective, only Dasein is the "own Being" of history, since a history of ontology is only possible on the basis of the historicity of Dasein – a position that Heidegger will criticize later.

As pointed out by scholars such as Friedrich-Wilhelm von Herrmann and Bernasconi, the concept of "historicity" thematized in Chapter 5 of the second Division of *Being and Time* is fundamental to understanding the method of destruction.[57] Indeed, in this chapter, Heidegger expresses the phenomenological function of destruction through the concept of "retrieval" (*Wiederholung*). The concept of retrieval appears from the very beginning of *Being and Time* (§1) because of the "necessity of an explicit retrieval of the question of Being" (GA 2: 3/SZ 1), and in §6 of *Being and Time*, Heidegger says that the sense of the "retrieval of the question of Being" will be clear "only when we carry out the destruction of the ontological tradition" (GA 2: 36/SZ 26).

Only in §74, however, does Heidegger give us more precise insights into what "retrieval" really means: "*Retrieval is explicit handing down* [Überlieferung], that is, going back [*Rückgang*] to the possibilities of Dasein that has been there" (GA 2: 509/SZ 385). This "going back to the possibilities of Dasein" is the same movement of destruction that goes back to philosophical fundamental experiences, that is, experiences that have to be appropriated – it is "the possibility of fetching the existentiell potentiality-of-being [*Seinkönnen*] upon which it [Dasein] projects itself *explicitly* from the traditional understanding of Dasein [*aus dem überlieferten Daseinsverständnis*]" (GA 2: 509/SZ 385). Retrieval is, then, the authentical appropriation of an existentiell possibility of the past, the decision (dijudication) for a possibility through which Dasein will authentically understand itself, and not a mere repetition of the experience from which a concept arose: "the retrieval of what is possible neither brings back 'what is past', nor does it bind the 'present' back to what is 'outdated'" (GA 2: 509–10/SZ 385–86).

The continuity of this problematic with Heidegger's early thought is evident if one looks at Heidegger's destructive interpretation of Paul's letters, which attempts to appropriate Paul's fundamental experience of distress (*Bedrängnis*). In §23 ("*Methodological Difficulties*"), Heidegger explains that one difficulty of the phenomenological interpretation (which, as we saw, is fundamentally both destructive and formally indicating) is that "one could say it is impossible – or possible only in a limited way – to transport oneself into Paul's exact situation" (GA 60: 88/61). In other words, how can we put ourselves in Paul's shoes and retrieve his experiences if Paul lived in a completely different historical context with different values? More deeply, one could say that retrieval appears impossible because of the problem of intersubjectivity: Ultimately, one cannot retrieve Paul's experience because of the essential mineness (*Jemeinigkeit*) of Dasein.

Heidegger specifies, however, that the problem of retrieving Paul's situation is not one of a mere repetition or reconstruction of his "environment" (*Umwelt*): "we cannot at all [. . .] put ourselves in Paul's place" (GA 60: 89/62). Such an attempt "is misguided because what is crucial

is not the material character of Paul's environment [*Umwelt*], but rather only his own situation" (GA 60: 89/62). Heidegger shifts the problem of retrieval "from the object-historical complex" of Paul to his "enactment-historical *situation*," but even here only through a "return to the original-historical" (GA 60: 90/63), that is, through one's own historical Dasein. In other words, Paul's enactment can only be understood from one's own Dasein; therefore, the retrieval of his experiences is not a mere repetition of what Paul did, but an appropriation of his situation on the basis of one's own Dasein.[58]

With the concept of retrieval, one might finally fully appreciate what "reaching back to the enactment" means. Retrieval as "going back" to the possibilities of Dasein or its situation neither means mere repetition of, for instance, Paul's experience, nor that one's own situation is projected onto the past. As Gail Soffer rightly notes, "Heidegger frequently rejects the idea that history is to be interpreted by projecting one's own private or local *Weltanschauung* onto the past, characterizing this as willfulness and subjectivism"[59] – but how then do we understand retrieval concretely?

Again, I would suggest that Heidegger's early account of "destruction" can help us in answering this question. Retrieval is not a top-down determination of a content (Paul's letters) through a theory (temporality in *Being and Time*), but rather the opposite: The ontological project of *Being and Time* is only possible on the basis of the appropriation of an ontic ideal that transforms Dasein.[60] In other words, the fact that Dasein must enact Paul's primordial experience implies that Dasein is encountering Paul's experience through its pre-given historical situation; however, it is not Dasein that projects its situation onto Paul's experience. Rather, it is Dasein's life that has been transformed after such an encounter. To be more precise on this relevant point, Dasein's encounter with Paul's experience (or with other ontic content) is lived through Dasein's situation, but by doing so, if Dasein approaches Paul's situation non-objectively, it is Dasein's situation that ends up being radically transformed and not Paul's letters.

This reconstruction shows a profound continuity with the characterization of destruction in the earlier Freiburg lecture courses: There, dijudication was the decision on a sense or criterion (given through formal indication) according to which the basic experiences of faded words were then interpreted or brought into new light. Appropriation or retrieval seems to reflect this dynamic: Just as in *Being and Time* appropriation involves tracing ontological concepts back to the existence of Dasein, dijudication in GA 59 means that this tracing-back presupposes a decision on the sense of an ontic content that has to guide the whole analysis and then be confirmed by the phenomenological analysis itself. Only in this sense, if authenticity means going back to Dasein's existence (to one's own enactment), is the "real sense" of destruction an attempt to "foster authentic life," as suggested by Crowe.[61]

Thus, destruction as a destruction of the history of ontology is a destruction of traditional ontological concepts in the sense of the "word explanation" of GA 59. The traditional concept of Being is de-objectified from the coverings of tradition by tracing it back to Dasein's temporal experience. Now, as there was no contradiction in GA 59 between Heidegger's account of destruction as word explanation and his account of destruction as leading back to the enactment of the primordial experience – for word explanation in Heidegger's positive sense entails the phenomenological function of destruction – there is also continuity and no opposition between destruction as destruction of the history of ontology and the early account of destruction as destruction of factical life. More precisely, the destruction of the history of ontology can be fully understood only on the basis of its phenomenological functions.

CONCLUDING REMARKS

In the present paper, Heidegger's method of destruction has been reconstructed with the help of the early Freiburg lecture courses, and its basic phenomenological function has been emphasized: Destruction not only arises from a phenomenological necessity, that is, from the fallenness of life or of Dasein, but also has the phenomenological function of de-objectifying the objectified phenomena of life by tracing them back

to their primordial enacted experiences. Moreover, it has been shown that Heidegger maintains the same fundamental function of destruction in both *Being and Time* and the Marburg lecture courses. Thus, Heidegger's destruction of the history of ontology must be understood on the basis of the task of the destruction of factical life.

NOTES

1 In three other passages of *Being and Time* in which the word "destruction" occurs, it is always related to the history of ontology (GA 2: 53, 120, 518/SZ 39, 89, 392).

2 In GA 59 Heidegger calls this problem "das Erlebnisproblem" (GA 59: 25/18).

3 Benjamin D. Crowe, *Heidegger's Religious Origins: Destruction and Authenticity* (Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 2006), 232.

4 Robert Bernasconi, "Repetition and Tradition: Heidegger's Destructuring of the Distinction Between Essence and Existence in *Basic Problems of Phenomenology*," in: *Reading Heidegger from the Start: Essays in His Earliest Thought*, ed. by Theodore Kisiel and John Van Buren (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1994), 133. In his contribution, however, Bernasconi limits himself to a discussion of "historicity" in *Being and Time* and GA 24. Although he associates destruction constantly with the history of ontology, he also sees that destruction goes back to the possibilities of Dasein and its historicity (Bernasconi, "Repetition and Tradition," see especially p. 134). From our perspective, his contribution should be deepened through a reconstruction of the phenomenological function of destruction that Heidegger discusses extensively in his early lecture courses.

5 For a reconstruction of Heidegger's philosophy before *Being and Time*, see Theodore Kisiel, *The Genesis of Heidegger's* Being and Time (Berkeley/Los Angeles/London: University of California Press, 1993), and John van Buren, *The Young Heidegger: Rumor of the Hidden King* (Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1994).

6 Jeffrey A. Barash, "Heidegger's Ontological 'Destruction' of Western Intellectual Traditions," in: *Reading Heidegger from the Start: Essays in His Earliest Thought*, ed. by Theodore Kisiel and John van Buren (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1994),

111–21. Jeffrey A. Barash, *Martin Heidegger and the Problem of Historical Meaning* (New York: Fordham University Press, 2003).

7 Van Buren, *The Young Heidegger*.

8 Crowe, *Heidegger's Religious Origins*.

9 Jean Grondin, "Die Hermeneutik der Faktizität als ontologische Destruktion und Ideologiekritik," in: *Zur philosophischen Aktualität Heideggers*, Bd. 2, ed. by Dietrich Papenfuss and Otto Pöggeler (Berlin/Boston: De Gruyter, 1990), 163–78. Although he does not thematize destruction in its phenomenological function, Grondin sees the connection between Dasein and destruction because he highlights that for Heidegger destruction is hermeneutics, and the task of the latter is the destruction of the ordinary interpretation of human being (Grondin, "Die Hermeneutik der Faktizität," 169).

10 István M. Fehér, "Heidegger's Postwar Turn. The Emergence of the Hermeneutic Viewpoint of his Philosophy and the Idea of 'Destruktion' on the Way to *Being and Time*," *Philosophy Today* 40:1 (1996): 9–35.

11 Charles R. Bambach, "Phenomenological Research as *Destruktion*. The Early Heidegger's Reading of Dilthey," *Philosophy Today* 37:2 (1993): 115–32. Charles R. Bambach, *Heidegger, Dilthey, and the Crisis of Historicism* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1995).

12 Robert C. Scharff, "Heidegger's 'Appropriation' of Dilthey before *Being and Time*," *Journal of the History of Philosophy* 35.1 (1997): 105–128. Robert C. Scharff, *Heidegger Becoming Phenomenological: Interpreting Husserl through Dilthey, 1916–1925* (London: Rowman and Littlefield, 2019).

13 Kisiel, *The Genesis*, 322. Cf. also Scharff, "Heidegger's 'Appropriation,'" 106, 124, 127.

14 Among others: Friedrich-Wilhelm von Herrmann, *Hermeneutische Phänomenologie des Daseins: eine Erläuterung von Sein und Zeit*. Bd. 1. (Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1987), 202–12; Dermot Moran, "Die Destruktion der Destruktion: Heideggers Versionen der Geschichte der Philosophie," in: *Martin Heidegger. Kunst—Politik—Technik*, ed. Christoph Jamme and Karsten

Harries (Munich: Wilhelm Fink, 1992), 295–318; Bambach, "Phenomenological Research as *Destruktion*," 127; Bambach, *Heidegger, Dilthey*, e.g., 17, 31, 181, 197, 217, 248; van Buren, *The Young Heidegger*, e.g., 137, 143 f., 147, 151, 157, 166, 189, 199, 201 f. 224, 226, 238; Bernasconi, "Repetition and Tradition"; William McNeill, "From *Destruktion* to the History of Being," *Gatherings: The Heidegger Circle Annual* 2 (2012): 28; Francesco V. Tommasi, "Heidegger e la distruzione della storia della filosofia nei Quaderni Neri," in: *I Quaderni Neri di Heidegger*, ed. by Donatella Di Cesare (Milano: Mimesis, 2016), 21–39.

15 Grondin, "Die Hermeneutik der Faktizität"; Fehér, "Heidegger's Postwar Turn"; Scharff, "Heidegger's 'Appropriation'"; Crowe, *Heidegger's Religious Origins*, 231–65; Scott M. Campbell, *The Early Heidegger's Philosophy of Life: Facticity, Being and Language* (New York: Fordham University Press, 2012), 211–65; Hans Ruin, "Thinking in Ruins: Life, Death, and Destruction in Heidegger's Early Writings," *Comparative and Continental Philosophy* 4.1 (2012): 15–33; Antonio Cimino, *Phänomenologie und Vollzug. Heideggers performative Philosophie des faktischen Lebens* (Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 2013), 178–83; Jonathan O'Rourke, "Heidegger on Expression. Formal Indication and Destruction in the Early Freiburg Lectures," *Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology* 49.2 (2018): 109–25; Hongjian Wang, "Destruktion und formale Anzeige. Zur Erläuterung der methodischen Grundlage des frühen Heidegger am Beispiel der Bestimmungen von Geschichte und Philosophie," *Studia Phaenomenologica* XVIII (2018): 255–75.

16 "The phenomenological-critical destruction" belongs "to the sense of philosophizing" (GA 59: 30/21).

17 The importance of the situation for phenomenological destruction and explication is clear in Heidegger's interpretation of Paul. The "distress [*Bedrängnis*] articulates the authentic situation of Paul. It determines each moment of his life" and the philosophical-phenomenological explication of Paul "must proceed from his

distress" (GA 60: 98/67–69). With this example one has a concrete Heideggerian execution of destruction: The phenomenological destructive interpretation of Paul traces any interpretation of Paul's historical-objective context back to his primordial situation of "distress." On this topic, see also GA 9: 34/30.

18 It is important to stress that the adjectives "objectified" and "de-objectified" do not correspond to "theoretical" and "pre-theoretical." The distinction between theoretical and pre-theoretical is not sufficient since, according to Heidegger, the objectifying tendency is a constitutive tendency of pre-theoretical life itself (and, only because of that and secondarily, a tendency of theoretical attitude). Therefore, there is, so to speak, a "degree" of objectification in a sense-relation: see, for example, Heidegger's analysis of the different meanings of "history" in GA 59 (starting from p. 43/33), where the different meanings correspond to different degrees of enactment of the sense of history.

19 Dan Zahavi, *Subjectivity and Selfhood. Investigating the First-Person Perspective* (Cambridge, London: The MIT Press, 2005), 73–85; Jean-François Courtine, "Réduction, construction, destruction. D'un dialogue à trois: Natorp, Husserl, Heidegger," *Philosophiques* 36.2 (2009): 559–77; O'Rourke, "Heidegger on Expression," 110–11 On this, cf. also Steven G. Crowell, *Husserl, Heidegger, and the Space of Meaning. Paths toward Transcendental Phenomenology* (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 2001), 122–25, 136–37.

20 Cf. for instance: "If one were oneself to try, if it were at all possible, to somehow grasp the content of immediate experience purely as it is in itself [...] would one not be forced to articifially still and interrupt the continuous stream of becoming [...] to sterilize it, like the anatomist does with his specimen? [...] In the end, one apparently never grasps the subjective, as such, in itself. On the contrary, in order to grasp it scientifically, one is forced to strip it of its subjective character," Paul Natorp, *Allgemeine Psychologie nach kritischer Methode* (Tübingen: J. C. B. Mohr), 102–3 (I have used the translation of Zahavi, *Subjectivity and Selfhood*, 75).

21 On Natorp's method of reconstruction, see Zahavi, *Subjectivity and Selfhood*, 73–76; Sebastian Luft, "Reconstruction and Reduction: Natorp and Husserl on Method and the Question of Subjectivity," *META. Research in Hermeneutics, Phenomenology, and Practical Philosophy*, 8.2 (2016): 326–70.

22 Moreover, in GA 59, Heidegger dedicates an entire section of his lecture course to a discussion of Natorp's position (cf. GA 59: 92–148/73–114).

23 On this, see also Heidegger's remarks in GA 58: 224–226/169–70.

24 Nonetheless, as Zahavi notes, Heidegger to some extent "seemed to accept" Natorp's criticism of Husserl's phenomenology (Zahavi, *Subjectivity and Selfhood*, 76–77). Indeed, according to Heidegger, Husserl's "theoretical attitude" cannot overcome Natorp's objections: "also in phenomenology, the concept of description is still determined merely negatively [...]. Also here there is the danger of reifying consciousness, of dissolving it into thought-things and relationship connections" (GA 59: 194/149–50; cf. also GA 56/57: 111–12/94).

25 On this point, see also GA 59: 37/27: "Scientific and philosophical concepts, propositions and ways of consideration permeate factical life experience more or less comprehensively, however, they do not compose it; in fact, they permeate it in the character of the faded, i.e. they have fallen away from the primordial existence relation."

26 On this necessity, see also GA 60: 252/189.

27 On this point I do not agree with McNeill, "From *Destruktion* to the History of Being," 28, who holds that the concealment of tradition "is something that nevertheless both can and must be undone and dissolved." According to McNeill, the concealment of tradition is not the concealment of Dasein's fallenness – which "would not be something that could be overcome"– but instead is "due to the force of tradition." In this way, McNeill separates destruction and the objectifying tendency of life, directing destruction only toward ontological tradition. As I will illustrate in the

second section, the concealment of tradition is not something that can be separated from fallenness but is instead an aspect of it; therefore, they are essentially intertwined. On this point, I agree with Ruin, "Thinking in Ruins," 29, who emphasizes the always persisting and inescapable "ruinance" of life and, therefore, the fact that the task of destruction must be a continuous one.

28 "Fading does not mean to say that the experienced disappears from memory, is forgotten or receives no more attention. On the contrary, the faded absorbs the entire interest and pulls this into alienation and non-primordiality" (GA 59: 183/141).

29 On this point, see also GA 59: 37/26–27.

30 On this point, see also GA 58: 257/194.

31 Crowe, *Heidegger's Religious Origins*, 256.

32 The reason for this identification is that destruction is a counter movement to the fallenness (*Verfallen*) of life and that, for Heidegger, philosophy itself must be a "counter-ruinant movedness" (GA 61: 153/113) to tackle its fundamental question (later the *Seinsfrage*).

33 This formulation means the same as this: "philosophy has the task of preserving the facticity of life and strengthening the facticity of Dasein" (GA 59: 174/133). On this point, see also *Being and Time*: "in the end it is the business of philosophy to protect the *power of the most elemental words* in which Dasein expresses itself from being flattened by the common understanding to the point of unintelligibility" (GA 2: 291/SZ 220).

34 Edmund Husserl, *Formale und transzendentale Logik. Versuch einer Kritik der logischen Vernunft*. In *Husserliana*, Bd. XVII, ed. by Paul Janssen (Leiden: Martinus Nijhoff, 1974), 373.

35 Edmund Husserl, *Formale und transzendentale Logik*, 373. The project of genetic phenomenology as tracing "logical categories" back to the "pre-predicative synthesis" (Edmund Husserl, *Erfahrung und Urteil. Untersuchungen zur Genealogie der Logik*, ed. by Ludwig Landgrebe, (Berlin: Claassen Verlag, 1964), 127) is described most importantly in *Erfahrung und Urteil* and in the

lessons on the passive synthesis (see Volume XI of *Husserliana*, which contains material dated from 1918 to 1926).

36 O'Rourke, "Heidegger on Expression," 217. Crowell does not refer to genetic phenomenology but to Husserl's dynamic between signitive act and intuitive act of the *Logical Investigations*. Although he does not discuss the concept of destruction, he notes that the difference between the objectifying relation to a content and the enactment of that relation "corresponds to Husserl's distinction between intending something emptily and in an intuitively 'fulfilled' manner" (Crowell, *Husserl, Heidegger, and the Space of Meaning*, 126).

37 Renato Cristin, "Reduktion und Konstruktion bei Heidegger," in: *Epoché und Reduktion*, ed. by Rolf Kühn and Michael Staudigl (Würzburg: Verlag Königshausen & Neumann, 2003), 51–63.

38 The concept of deconstruction sometimes appears as the right way to understand the method of destruction (for example, in GA 17: 117–18/85; GA 24: 31/23), which should not be understood as an "annihilation [*Vernichtung*]" (GA 60: 51/34), as an "*Abschüttelung*" (GA 2: 31/SZ 22) of the past, or as a "smashing and shattering" (GA 59: 181/139). It is quite the opposite: Destruction "does not wish to bury the past in nullity, it has a *positive* intent" (GA 2: 31/SZ 23; see also GA 24: 31/23). On this point, see Tommasi, "Heidegger e la distruzione," who also analyzes destruction in the *Schwarze Hefte*.

39 I do not like the English translation of *Vorgriff* as "preconception" because a preconception is something that is normally negatively understood as unconscious. In other words, a preconception is something that we already have passively and that determines our behavior to something. By contrast, the Heideggerian *Vorgriff* is a phenomenological operation that actively places an ontic content at the basis of the investigation and that therefore determines the analysis itself. As in the case of preconceptions, here, too, is the aspect of pre-determination of something. It seems to me, however, that the *Vorgriff* (which Heidegger will identify with the *Ansatz*, see footnote 46) is not at all something unconscious but a real choice. For these reasons, I provisionally translate the term as "pre-grasping."

40 In GA 60, destruction is connected to a "guiding preliminary grasp [*der leitende Vorgriff*]" (GA 60: 78/54, cf. also GA 60: 269/202).

41 The passage here is complicated, and I modified the translation. The German version is: "um die in der Destruktion mitzugewinnenden negativen als positive Verstehensmotive zu erfassen."

42 "The Latin term is selected in order to have it correspond to destruction" (GA 59: 74/57). Moran, "Die Destruktion der Destruktion," 297–99, 307, traces the philosophical use of the concept of destruction back to Ghazali, although Heidegger took the word "destruction" from Luther (Dermot Moran, "Destruction (*Destruktion, Zerstörung*) and Deconstruction (*Abbau*)," in: *The Cambridge Heidegger Lexicon*, ed. by Mark A. Wrathall (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2021), 224). On Luther's concept of destruction and its relevance to Heidegger, see van Buren, *The Young Heidegger*, 157–202, and Crowe, *Heidegger's Religious Origins*, 44–66.

43 "The scope and type of validity as well as the form of evidence and conditions of evidence of such dijudication are left initially undiscussed" (GA 59: 74/57, tm).

44 "Formally, it must be said that this decision always requires a criterion (measure). In our concrete question of the *characterization of enactment*, a criterion must be provided compared to which the enactment can be characterized as primordial or non-primordial; in fact, this can now only be carried out by way of formally indicating and in the necessarily limited way of achievement of formally indicating" (GA 59: 74/54).

45 "The criterion can obviously not be taken from the outside but must co-result from the ultimate tendencies of the phenomenological problematic itself" (GA 59: 74–75/57). On this, see also GA 60: 82/57.

46 In GA 60: 82/57, "starting point" (*Ansatz*) and "preliminary grasp" (*Vorgriff*) are the same for Heidegger. This is already clear in GA 59: 39/28.

47 On the connection between destruction and formal indication, see also GA 58: 248/187, as well as GA 59: 190/147. Even more

relevant is GA 61: 141/105: "concretely, formal indication is to be clarified partially where it comes into play in each case but more fundamentally in connection with phenomenological destruction as a basic element of the interpretation of the history of the spirit from a phenomenological standpoint)."

48 The identification of Dasein and factical life is clear in particular in GA 63: 80/62. See also *Being and Time*, GA 2: 317/238.

49 Cited in Campbell, *The Early Heidegger's Philosophy of Life*, 211.

50 On this, see GA 2, 78–79/SZ 58.

51 See Daniel O. Dahlstrom, *Heidegger's Concept of Truth* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 200–22, for a reconstruction of the notion of assertion through Heidegger's lecture courses. On the concealing power of *logos* in GA 17, see Scott M. Campbell, "Revelation and Concealment in the Early Heidegger's Conception of Λόγος," *Heidegger Studies* 3 (2007): 47–69.

52 In this lecture course Heidegger points out that even traditional ontology goes back to Dasein, since it presupposes a theoretical conduct toward concepts. But without having carried out the "fundamental ontology" (*Fundamentalontologie*), its interpretation of Dasein "does not get beyond a common conception of Dasein" (GA 24: 156/110): "ontology goes back to Dasein's conducts in the same way in which it is acquainted with Dasein's everyday and natural self-understanding" (GA 24: 156/110, tm). In this sense, ontology can be carried out only "if the ontology of Dasein is made secure" (GA 24: 165/117).

53 "Negatively, destruction is not even related to the past: its criticism concerns 'today' and the dominant way we treat the history of ontology" (GA 2: 31/SZ 22–23). On this, see also the similar point in GA 24: 142/101. Although this passage could be read as if destruction would be a critique of today *as* the dominant way to treat the history of ontology, I want to point out that it could also be read in another way if we take the "and" as a separation of two different (but interconnected) things. In this way, the passage would mean: Destruction is a critique of the present-day Dasein and – as

a consequence of that – of the dominant way of treating the history of ontology.

54 This point is clear in the *Natorp-Bericht*, where the present interpretations are criticized only by means of the phenomenological function of destruction: "the phenomenological hermeneutics of facticity sees itself [...] called upon to loosen up today's prevalent traditional interpretation in its hidden motives, its unexpressed tendencies and ways of interpretating, and, by way of a *deconstructive regress* [abbauender Rückgang], to press toward the original motive sources of the explication" (GA 62: 368/165; I have used the translation in *Becoming Heidegger. On the Trail of his Early Occasional Writings, 1910–1917*, ed. Theodore Kisiel and Thomas Sheehan [Evanston, Ill: Northwestern University Press, 2007],).

55 "Destruction is not a consideration of history in the usual sense, above all, not in the sense of the history of a problem" (GA 17: 122/88).

56 On this point, see also GA 60: 124–25/89.

57 Von Herrmann, *Hermeneutische Phänomenologie des Daseins*, 202–12; Bernasconi, "Repetition and Tradition," 133–36. According to McNeill, "From *Destruktion* to the History of Being," 31, the historicity of Dasein is the key concept for understanding "the path that leads from the Destruktion to a precursory insight into the destining of the Being."

58 The connection between retrieval and life is particularly clear in a passage of GA 61: "'Retrieval': everything depends on its sense. Philosophy is a basic mode [*Grundwie*] of life itself, in such a way that it authentically retrieves [*wieder-holt*], brings life back from its decaying [*Abfall*], and this bringing back [*Zurücknahme*], as radical research [*Forschen*], is life itself" (GA 61: 80/62, tm).

59 Gail Soffer, "Heidegger, Humanism, and the Destruction of History," *The Review of Metaphysics* 49.3 (1996): 570–71.

60 On this, see *Being and Time*, §63, and the end of §62.

61 Crowe, *Heidegger's Religious Origins*, 232–33. In his outstanding study, Crowe defends the thesis according to which the concept of

destruction must be understood based on the concept of authenticity. Because of this, Crowe thinks that destruction "achieves full maturity in the years after 1920" (Crowe, *Heidegger's Religious Origins*, 248). In my account, destruction is a phenomenological method that makes up the argumentative structure of Heidegger's arguments and his own way of doing philosophy, and this crucial function of destruction is already described in detail in SS 1920. Now, one could say that authenticity is nothing other than going back to the enactment of Dasein and that this is exactly the function that I assign to destruction. If this is true, then Crowe is right in underlining the connection between destruction and authenticity. However, if destruction is not an extrinsic method that can be applied to some topics and not to others, but the "form" of Heidegger's phenomenology, then it seems to me to be incorrect to say that destruction presupposes historicity and authenticity (Crowe, *Heidegger's Religious Origins*, 250–56) because authenticity *is* this destructive movement of going back to Dasein's existence. In this case, there would be a much deeper connection between destruction and authenticity, and authenticity would then not be something which is "after" (as Barash, "Heidegger's Ontological 'Destruction,'" and Bambach, *Heidegger, Dilthey*, want) or "before" destruction (as Crowe wants). Moreover, Crowe's account of authenticity could be problematic, as Campbell, *The Early Heidegger's Philosophy of Life*, 211–24, points out: The decision for authenticity does not imply that Dasein is then "outside" of inauthenticity since there is no "binary opposition" between these two possibilities; inauthenticity remains a constitutive moment of Dasein in the decision for authenticity. Consequently, I agree with Campbell on the point that destruction does not destroy inauthenticity to grasp authenticity: The de-objectification achieved through destruction cannot reach a pure manifestation.

Pathos and *Logos*: Martin Heidegger on the Primacy of Affection in Aristotle's Ontology of Human Being

Walter Brogan

ABSTRACT: Based on Martin Heidegger's reading of Aristotle's practical philosophy, I argue that virtuous disposition (*hexis*) occupies the space between potentiality and the actualizing of potentiality (*energeia*) and makes it possible for the virtuous person to be fully engaged with the whole of her being in her choices and actions. It is this double movement of retrieval of oneself back from experience and, in turn, this authentic return to experience that I think is the central insight that Heidegger draws from Aristotle's practical philosophy.

KEY WORDS: Heidegger, Aristotle, potentiality, habituated character, affect

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Martin Heidegger's 1924 Marburg course entitled *Basic Concepts of Aristotelian Philosophy* (GA 18) offers an extensive analysis of Aristotle's concept of *pathos*. It becomes clear in the course of the analysis that Aristotle's *Rhetoric* is a primary source for Heidegger's concepts of attunement (*Stimmung*) and disposition (*Befindlichkeit*) in *Being and Time*. Drawing primarily on Aristotle's *Rhetoric* and *Nicomachean Ethics*, but also on *De Anima*, Heidegger shows a close connection between *pathos* and two other pivotal and closely intertwined notions in Aristotle's practical philosophy, namely *hexis* and *aretē*, two words which thought together might be translated as "virtuous comportment" or "the disposition towards excellence." In this essay, following Heidegger, I will try to show that in Aristotle's practical philosophy, virtuous life is made possible on the basis of a reclaiming and drawing back into oneself one's ownmost potentiality (*dunamis*), a return movement made possible by the formation of character (*ēthos*). This argument presupposes that habit (*hexis*) – the active readiness-for and cultivated disposition that one in advance brings to one's engagement with the world, and which for Aristotle forms the basis for authentic action – can be understood as a kind of *dunamis*, a potentiality that for Aristotle is retrieved from and secured through practice, and thus arises out of experience, but in turn makes possible an authentic factical life for the human being. As Heidegger says in reference to Aristotle: "Dasein must, *for itself*, take up the opportunity to cultivate this *hexis*, this being-composed, as a possibility" (GA 18: 180/122).

It is of course true that in his discussion of *hexis* in the *Nicomachean Ethics*, and of why virtue (*aretē*) needs to be understood as a *hexis*,[1] Aristotle clearly states that *hexis* and virtue need to be distinguished from *dunamis*. The capacity to do something does indeed have to be present in order to form dispositions,[2] but *hexeis* are not simply there naturally or innately in the way capacities are; they need to be inculcated. And it is this being-responsible for one's disposition towards the world that distinguishes one's virtuous *hexeis* from one's natural *dunameis*. This is what I mean by "ownmost" potentiality; that is, not a *dunamis* that one possesses passively by nature and that can be automatically exercised, but a potentiality that one has taken up and made one's own. In a sense, virtuous disposition occupies the space between

potentiality and the actualizing of potentiality (*energeia*) and makes it possible for the virtuous person to be fully engaged with the whole of her being in her choices and actions. It is this double movement of retrieval of oneself back from experience and, in turn, this authentic return to experience that I think is the central insight that Heidegger draws from Aristotle's practical philosophy.

According to Heidegger, Aristotle defines the human being in *Politics* 1.2 as *zōon logon echon,* as the animal whose fundamental disposition is to engage in thoughtful discussion for its own sake and whose very being is essentially determined by this capacity for discourse (GA 18: 45/32). The human being is there said to be a political animal precisely because "man alone among the animals has speech."[3] We moderns who often see living in political community – with deliberation and discussion as the guiding forces that determine action – as an unfortunate but necessary infringement on an intrinsically better life in the state of nature; or we who agree to this "unnatural" or "merely conventional" condition in return for the prospects of economic prosperity, protection from harm, and convenience, can hardly fathom the decision of Socrates to accept death rather than ostracism from the city. But this decision is easier to comprehend if we see the extent to which, for him and for his philosophical descendent, Aristotle, freedom and equality are also not merely natural, innate qualities of human beings, but possibilities whose emergence and flourishing depend upon the prior actualization of a community of free individuals. Participation in such a community – especially the practice of free speech which is the most fundamental political activity according to Aristotle – is what allows us to fully flourish and achieve excellence as human beings. Thus, Aristotle says, the political is the highest good for human beings, that is, the end that governs and fulfills us, and that we choose for its own sake.[4]

Heidegger translates the verb *echein*, to have, in the phrase *zōon logon echein* as "holding oneself in relation." He says: "This standing-out (*Sich-ausnehmen*) of the human being, this 'comporting-oneself' (*Sichhalten*), this 'comportment' (*Haltung*), is *to ēthos*, character" (GA 18: 68/48). To have a virtue is not like having something stored up that we can appeal to in times that call for risk. Having courage, for example, is a way of

being in the world, an approach to life. *Echein* in this sense is not so much a possession or property of the human being as it is a stance (*Haltung*), a comportment or way of holding oneself that allows the human being to be held out towards and ready for and thus to have the power and capacity for; and in connection with *logos* this means having the potentiality for discourse. Inasmuch as for Aristotle *logos* constitutes human being in a fundamental way, the human being is essentially in communication and in *koinonia*. Thus, *logos*, in Heidegger's analysis, means being-with-one-another in a conversant way. Heidegger says in GA 18:

> So, you see that, in this determination (*logon echon*), a fundamental character of the being-there of human beings becomes visible: *being-with-one-another*. This is not being-with-one-another in the sense of being-situated-alongside-one-another, but rather in the sense of being-as-speaking-with-one-another through communicating, refuting, confronting. (GA 18: 47/34)

For Heidegger, being-with-others is an existential and ontological characteristic of our being as human, what constitutes the human being as such. But it is not just a character (*ēthos)* we "possess" by virtue of being human. It is a characteristic that places us outside ourselves and towards others. We are already, by virtue of who we are, empowered to be with others; we dwell in advance in an attunement to the beings that address us in our concrete relationships, an address that emerges out of this prior attentiveness (GA 2 /SZ 160–166). But this is no less true for Aristotle and is central to Aristotle's notion of character and virtue.

Because of the power to speak, the human being is always already beyond itself and in relation. The central meaning of *logos* and *legein* for the ancient Greeks is this holding in relation. For Aristotle and for Heidegger, human beings do not have their being as a solipsistic possession; rather, self-realization, the realization of our being as *logos*, involves holding ourselves in relation to not being ourselves and thus to what is other than ourselves. In Heidegger's work, this is what he means by being-in-the-world. In GA 18, he says:

> The world's character of being-there is such that the relationality of its there is precisely toward several that are with one another. This world that is initially being there for several that live with one another we designate as *surrounding world* (*Umwelt*), the world in which I am involved initially and for the most part. (GA 18: 47–48/34)

The human being is the being who has its *Dasein*, its being-there, in conversation and discourse. This is why Aristotle discusses the importance of the role of the orator, who has the power to persuade and influence others in the way they are with one another. Heidegger comments: "One must take fully into account that the Greeks lived in discourse and one must note that if discourse is the genuine possibility of being-there, in which it plays itself out, that is, concretely and for the most part, then precisely this speaking is also the possibility in which Dasein is *ensnared*" (GA 18: 108/74).

Heidegger calls this possibility and even tendency to become absorbed in the concreticity of everydayness the "*basic danger of their being-there*" (GA 18: 108/74). It is precisely because of this drift towards idle talk that Aristotle focused on the seriousness of speaking and understood the need to provide a scientific and philosophical grounding for *logos*, in order to return it to its genuine place as the site wherein the *Sache* of what is can be attended to in a genuine way. Thus, Heidegger claims: "…rhetoric is nothing other than the discipline in which the self-interpretation of being-there is explicitly fulfilled. *Rhetoric is nothing other than the interpretation of concrete being-there* (*Dasein), the hermeneutic of being-there itself*" (GA 18: 110/75).

Virtues are dispositions toward acting and feeling in a certain way, namely, in an excellent way. They constitute the general way in which we comport ourselves rather than determine specific actions or feelings.[5] Heidegger warns against the usual understanding of ethical virtue in terms of traditional notions of morality. In particular, he has in mind the false idea that ethical virtue in Aristotle has to do with conformity to external standards, even if these standards bear the gravitas of universal validity. Ethical virtue in Aristotle is not first of all about normative

values. In fact, it would be truer to say that virtuous dispositions protect us from having our *pathē*, our passions (*Leidenschaften*) and affects, determined by outside forces. This is especially true with regard to the tendency to fall prey in our everyday dealings to the ordinary *doxa*[6] that is promulgated oftentimes by the persuasive rhetoric of those whom Plato and Aristotle called the sophists and whom they accused of speaking without owning what they say and without listening to how they are addressed by that about which they are speaking. So here Aristotle is taking a step in the direction of showing how it is possible to retrieve a human being from an inauthentic involvement with beings. His explanation centers around a capability for being-affected that is prior to the actual coming to be of these affections. We have passions because we are capable of being passionate, of being-affected by what is around us. Becoming virtuous is a matter of taking charge of those capacities, turning them from possibilities for ourselves to actualities that allow us to own our being in the situations we face. Being receptive and able to be affected by the world around us and thus having passions – hatred, anger, fear, contrariness, shame, joy and the others Aristotle mentions – is possible because we already stand in relation to the world around us. It is because we are capable of being-affected that we can respond in anger or joy to our situation and our involvement with the things around us. Being virtuous does not exclude this capacity of being-passionate or being-affected by these forces that come upon us. It is rather a matter of how we are in relation to what is, whether we stand in the right way in relation to what matters to us and is of concern to us. Aristotle says:

> It is possible to be afraid or be confident or to desire or be angry or feel pity, or in general to feel pleasure or feel pain both more and less, and on both sides not in the right way; but to feel them when one ought, and in cases in which, and towards the people whom, and for the reasons for the sake of which, and in the manner one ought is both a mean and the best thing, which is what belongs to virtue.[7]

The virtuous person holds her affective life as her own and concretizes it in a way that allows her to stand out in relation to her involvements rather than simply being there in a way that is taken over by what is encountered in experience. But more than this authentic relationship to oneself is achieved by the acquisition of virtue. This awareness of what we are doing and this listening to ourselves is precisely what makes possible a genuine attunement to the other as other than ourselves. Thus, virtue also makes possible the stance towards other human beings and towards things that allows us to be genuinely receptive; it allows us not only to address the things around us but also to be addressed by them, to encounter them in terms of *their* own being. Heidegger remarks that "every concern has *tendency* in itself; it is *after something*, directed at an *agathon* that is always there as *legomenon*, as 'something addressed.' This *being-after* listens to what is spoken" (GA 18: 105/72). In becoming a virtuous being, the movement is from an actual entanglement with one's surroundings to a return to oneself, and this distancing of oneself from the immediacy of one's involvement opens up a horizon of possibilities for being oneself in the situation. The return to oneself, in Heidegger's reading, is a return to oneself as possibility to be. As capable of being in a certain way, the virtuous person is also capable of not being in that way and so free to decide how to be. Virtues are in this sense capacities to both be and not be and this is the ground for what Aristotle calls *prohairesis* or choice. Aristotle says: "Each person stops searching for how he will act when he traces the source back to himself, and to the part of himself that leads the way, for this is what he chooses."[8] The virtuous person is able to be afraid and also not be afraid. Such a person is free to choose how to be in the situation and in response to the situation. Aristotle's discussion of the mean in relation to virtue indicates again the broader context for an understanding of human *praxis* toward which Aristotle is aiming. The virtuous person is able to see the context of the situation in which action is called for, to measure the excess and deficiency, and choose what to do in the moment (*kairos*) within this broader context of understanding. This ability to choose (*prohairesis*) in turn requires openness to options, a lack of immediate compulsion, a certain distance from the occasion, which for the good person heightens rather than weakens the intensity of

the moment. Virtue requires deliberation as well as decision about what can be done. Thus, Aristotle defines virtue in Book II, Chapter 6 as *hexis prohairetikē, en mesotēti ousa tē pros hēmas*, "the active condition (*hexis*) that makes one apt at choosing, consisting in a mean condition in relation to us."[9] Heidegger translates *hexis prohairetikē* as "being-composed in the ability-to-resolve-oneself" and he understands the "mean" as "the way the world itself stands to us, or how we are in it" (GA 18: 192/129–130). Virtue gives us the ability to stand resolutely in the moment.

In his discussion of *pathos* in GA 18, Heidegger shows through a remarkable reading of passage after passage in Aristotle's corpus that the affects and emotions we have are not incidental properties that are imposed on living beings from outside but belong to the very constitution of their being. Heidegger identifies three primary senses of *pathos* from Book Δ of the *Metaphysics*. Together they manifest a being that is capable of being affected and thus moved. But in Heidegger's reading, being-moved, being able-to-be-moved, belongs to the very being of such beings. Living beings are beings that can be touched. The capacity to be touched, he argues, is not a passive state, nor a mere effect of an outside cause that has nothing to do with the constitution of the being that is affected.

The first meaning of *pathos* that Aristotle lists is the ordinary everyday meaning of *pathos* in the sense of alteration, the capability of changing and becoming otherwise (*alloiōsis*). The living being can be affected because its being is susceptible to change. It is at risk and exposed in its very being.

The second and related sense of passion that Aristotle lists is *pathos* in the sense of *paschein*, the suffering that occurs when this capability of being moved is actualized (*energeia*), set into work and at work. Heidegger says: "Occurring itself [what happens to one], is taken as *pathos* in its being-there itself. *Energeia*: the 'being-there' of such a shifting-occurring-to-one (*umschlagenden Mit-einem-Geschehens*)" (GA 18: 195/131). In Heidegger's reading, the first two senses of *pathos* – the one defining *pathos* as a *dunamis* and the other as an *energeia* – are interconnected. The capacity to be affected is a way of being disposed towards what can affect it, a being already in the world in advance such that one is open to

what is around it and exposed to it. And, in turn, *energeia,* the being at work and actualization, is such that when something happens to a being that alters it, this alteration presupposes that the power to change and be affected belongs to its being. The capability to change always exists in the face of the being's being-situated, the basic attunement to others that characterizes living beings. *Metabolē*, the exchange from something to something, relationality, is a defining characteristic of the being of living beings.

Aristotle identifies a third, narrower or more specific, sense of *pathos*, *pathos* in the sense of something unpleasant or harmful (*blaberon*), something that causes one to suffer, or to have the experience of pain (*lupē*). The living being is attuned to the world in such a way that it can be taken down by the things around it; its being-there in the midst of things is such that something can befall it and it can find itself in submission to what threatens its being.

The fourth and final sense of *pathos* designates "the 'size,' the 'measure,' of that which occurs to me in a harmful way" (GA 18: 195/132). Something happens to me that strikes me down or hits me with a ton of bricks, as we say. This definition of *pathos* carries the sense that my being is always subject to the possibility of destruction, of something catastrophic befalling it (*phthora*). The third and fourth senses are clearly related in that the destruction and privation to which my being is exposed, even the terrifying exposure to an overwhelming force that would utterly destroy me, is dependent upon the fact that my being has fallen into and found itself submitted to the world around it.

But rather than end with this exposition of the four meanings of *pathos* listed in *Metaphysics* Δ, Heidegger retrieves from *De Anima* II.2 yet another meaning of *pathos.* Aristotle says there that there are two senses of *paschein*, one that connotes destructive change (such as Aristotle mentions in *Metaphysics* Δ), but the other that does not destroy but rather promotes the being that is affected *and* actualizes it. Something happens to me, I encounter or undergo something that does not threaten to annihilate me but to the contrary rescues and preserves my being such that the possibilities within me become genuinely real. Here again there is a movement but not one that is enervating or exhausts my being but one

that intensifies it in its being such that I do not become otherwise through alteration but remain in my being. For Aristotle and for Heidegger, holding oneself in one's being and continuing to be does not preclude but presupposes the change and undergoing that belongs to beings whose being *is* to be situated with and alongside others. Engagement is a way of being. Heidegger uses an example from Aristotle: "For it is not the case that a builder becomes another through building, when he builds a new house. Rather, he becomes precisely that which he is" (GA 18: 192/132). *Pathos*, then, can be both a *sterēsis*, a being-deprived, as well as a being-realized; and for Heidegger these two fundamental but opposite movements belong together in the constitution of living beings; together they characterize the fundamental disposition of the being-there of Dasein. The withdrawal of one's being in the face of pain and loss that shakes one from one's steadfast composure in relation to the world is counteracted by a counter-movement of pleasure in reaching out and striving to be in which one finds fulfillment and completion of one's potentiality.

One of the most interesting aspects of Heidegger's treatment of *pathos* in Aristotle's works is his discussion of embodiment, a discussion that it seems to me is sorely needed but neglected when Heidegger deals with *Befindlichkeit* and *Stimmung*, disposition and attunement, in *Being and Time*. Heidegger insists emphatically in this text that "the *pathē* are not 'psychic experiences,' are not 'in consciousness,' but are a being-taken up of human beings in their full being-in-the-world" (GA 18: 197/133). In an analysis of Book I, chapter 1, of *De Anima*, Heidegger argues that *psuchē* in these passages is not understood as a mental or spiritual state but as the *ousia*, the way of being-there and being-present, of living beings. In that sense, the discussion of the *pathē* that belong to the soul does not preclude its bodily character. The body belongs to living beings and bodiliness is constitutive of such beings in the fullness of their being. Even in the analysis of thinking, *nous*, Aristotle is not referring to a brain process. *Nous* is akin to *aisthēsis* and is a way of making the world present to an individual even when the beings with which it is involved are absent but present in memory. Heidegger says:

> Insofar as *noēsis* is the highest possibility for the being of human beings, the entire being of human beings is determined so that it must be apprehended as the *bodily being-in-the-world of human beings*.
>
> What was, here, provided by Aristotle, is still not taken advantage of today. Only in *phenomenology* has this begun. No division between "psychic" and "bodily acts"! This is seen practically, for example, in the way that I move my hand, the way that I make a movement with it. *One must note that the primary being-there-function of bodiliness secures the ground for the full being of human beings*. (GA 18: 199/134)

In GA 18, Heidegger insists that when Aristotle refers to ethical virtue and *hexis* or habit as *alogos*, without *logos*, he cannot mean that they are devoid of a relationship to *logos*, since they can listen to *logos*. Listening and hearing are an essential, albeit opposite, dimension of dialogical *logos*. In the primary sense of *logos*, *logos* means speaking to and addressing others with whom we exist, or in some cases simply speaking to ourselves, which also requires listening. Heidegger says: "The human being is a being that says something to others and therefore *lets something be said*. This is the fully primary meaning of speaking in the sense of letting-something-be-said-by-others" (GA 18: 111/76). Aristotle associates hearing the other speak with *orexis*, the desire to be affected and in that way to be-there-with the other who speaks. In that sense, listening to the other is *alogos* – in the sense that the listener is not speaking but, in reaching out for and anticipating the voice of the other, is opening the space that makes conversation possible. All *logos* requires and is co-constituted by this *alogos*, even when one is speaking to oneself.

Aristotle indicates by his notion of *orexis*, desireful striving, that our way of being related to our end, our way of having our end, is in the mode of being-towards. The end is the good life (*eu zēn*); this is the end that Aristotle calls *haplos*, in itself simple and unqualified and never a means to something else. Deliberation, Aristotle says, considers what

is *pros to telos*, the means in the sense of what is in relation to or in accordance with the end and intrinsic to it. Through deliberation, the end is articulated and specified and made actual for action. Human action is not like *poiēsis*, with its means-end formula, where the end is outside of the being who acts. *Praxis* has to arise out of oneself and be done for its own sake because of its intrinsic nobility. The goodness of the agent determines the quality of the action. What counts for action is that action manifests the excellence of the person in the fullness of her being. So the end of human action is not outside the human person who acts, except inasmuch as the excellent person is outside himself or herself.

Aristotle says that all knowledge presupposes a certain kinship between the knower and the known. He calls this kinship *alētheia*. *Theōria* is the activity of knowing the being of that which is other than ourselves. It implies a kind of thinking that transcends mere thinking and opens up a kinship between thinking and being. Following Aristotle, Heidegger calls *thēoria* or the *logos* of *thēoria* the genuine sense of *logos* (GA 18: 217/148). *Logos* is fulfilled in many ways, as Aristotle shows in Book VI of the *Nicomachean Ethics*, but in each of these ways it finds its proper fulfillment in the addressing of the world and in the discussing of it. Heidegger says:

> In *legein*, beings in the world that are there, and Dasein itself as living, come to interpretation to the degree that beings move themselves in the world. Speaking is the constitutive mode of fulfillment for concernful dealing. For the being-there of human beings, there remains a possibility of that determinate *legein* in this concernful dealing looking away from concern in the sense of *poiēsis*, of directed having-to-do…it does not also need to have the character of acting. It can take on the character of the mere treating of something in the sense of debating it. The *logos* becomes independent; it itself becomes *praxis*. This mode of dealing is *theōria*, no longer looking around with the purpose of…, but rather looking to grasp things in their being and being-there. (GA 18: 217–218/146, tm)

Aristotle says that *eudaimonia*, happiness, as the end of human life, requires self-sufficiency and a complete life. In his discussion of *phronēsis* he says that this end can never be chosen because it is always already there as that towards which the action is ultimately directed. Aristotle wonders whether happiness can be attained before death and answers that being in one's end in this way is possible as an *energeia*, a being at work, that in its choices and actions chooses to choose and thus to disclose itself as fully and humanly present in the situation. Aristotle says: "what is always chosen as an end and never as a means to something else is called final in an unqualified sense. This description seems to apply to happiness above all else."[10] Happiness is not a good among others that we can choose. Happiness is the kind of human activity that takes up for itself its own end as a possibility for being. In happy actions we choose ourselves.

Heidegger cautions that we not take this *autarkēs* to mean that the happy person leads a solitary life. The human being is by nature a being with others. But being-there authentically with others requires that we hold ourselves as resolutely there in our being with others. In his discussion of practical wisdom, Aristotle says: "To someone disabled by pleasure or pain, the source immediately ceases to be apparent, and it does not seem to him that he needs to choose and do everything for the sake of this end, since vice is destructive of the source."[11] In such cases, we wander to and fro and lose ourselves in the dissipation of being with others and allow ourselves to be determined by others in an indiscriminate way. Practical wisdom is the capacity to hear the call of our end as the source of human action and the capacity to call ourselves back resolutely to stand by this guiding force. Aristotle contrasts such a person with the morally weak person who cannot abide by the choice he has made. In Heidegger's own work, he discusses, in similar ways to Aristotle, losing oneself in the publicness of *das Man* and thus failing to hear one's ownmost self while listening to the they-self.

NOTES

1 Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics*, trans. Joe Sachs (Newburyport, MA: Focus Publishing, 2002), 1106a 6–12.
2 *Nicomachean* Ethics, 1103a 23–25.
3 Aristotle, *Politics*, trans. Carnes Lord (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1984), 1278 b20.
4 *Nicomachean Ethics*, 1094a 19–b 11.
5 See Heidegger's discussion of *ēthos* in relationship to oratory in GA 18: 165–7/111–113.
6 See GA 18, Chapter 3, section 15 for an extensive discussion of *doxa* in relationship to the average everydayness of being-there and the power of rhetoric.
7 Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics*, 1106b 19–24.
8 Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics*, 1113a 7–9.
9 Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics*, 1106b 36.
10 Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics*, 1097a 35.
11 Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics*, 1140b 17–20.

The History of Historicism, Formal Indication, and Ruinance

Sean D. Kirkland

ABSTRACT: This essay focuses on Heidegger's 1921–22 lecture course *Phenomenological Interpretations of Aristotle: Initiation into Phenomenological Research* and attempts to re-frame the fascinating methodological innovations introduced here by the young Heidegger, specifically formal indication, life as ruinance, and ontological phenomenology as counter-ruinance. Rather than approaching these simply or even primarily as supplements to or departures from Husserlian phenomenology, I suggest that we view them first and foremost as strategies necessitated in response to the challenge of late-stage historicism – that is, in light of the challenge of carrying out the task of philosophizing, seeking the truth about "what is," in a mode emphatically and insuperably immanent to the condition of exhaustively historically determined consciousness.

KEYWORDS: historicism; philosophical method; phenomenology; history of philosophy

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Heidegger's fascinating 1921–22 Freiburg lecture course, *Phenomenological Interpretations of Aristotle*, never really arrives at the project its title announces, though it does deliver on its subtitle: an *Initiation into Phenomenological Research* (GA 61). If we were to ask why Heidegger never manages to address Aristotle directly in the course, one somewhat tongue-in-cheek answer would be that the students in this course did not complain to the administration about the extensive preliminary methodological meditation. By contrast, the students one year prior, in Heidegger's *Introduction to the Phenomenology of Religion*, *did* officially object when, already past mid-term, they had yet to address any theological content whatsoever.[1] Heidegger, in response, abruptly shifted course and, in the remaining sessions, presented close readings of Paul's Letters to the Galatians and Thessalonians. The students the following winter term were simply less anxious to meet the Stagirite, it would seem, and so Heidegger was free to embark on an unencumbered and utterly original meditation on what he refers to here as both "phenomenological ontology" and "ontological phenomenology" (GA 61: 60/46). Indeed, we see the young Heidegger pushing the method of Husserl, with its positing of the foundational role of subjectivity and its purified quasi-scientific search for eidetic structures, into some wholly unfamiliar territory.

I stress this particular feature of these courses, their slowness in getting around to their announced subject matter, because I take it to be indicative of where Heidegger's philosophical curiosity was predominantly directed at the time. Although he surely intended to offer readings of Aristotle and of Paul's letters, respectively, in accord with the titles announced for these two courses, once he had begun his reflection on philosophical method, once he had raised the questions about the "how" of philosophizing in the phenomenological mode, he found that discussion utterly consuming. Indeed, philosophical method seems to function at this point as something like an *idée fixe*, a compulsion Heidegger cannot but follow.

To be clear, I have no interest in a psychologicalizing account of Heidegger's project here. I am not suggesting a merely psychological motivation, but rather a sort of historico-philosophical compulsion, a *Not* or a 'necessity' arising from the historical moment in which Heidegger

is taking up the task of thinking philosophically. Now, one prominent Heidegger researcher describes the 1921–22 lecture course, which has been the subject of a number of in-depth studies, as "verbose, baroque, and turgid."[2] There are two frames within which the course is usually approached. On the one hand, Heidegger's discussion of phenomenological method is seen as kind of supplement to and transformation of *Lebensphilosophie* or "philosophy of life," where philosophizing is presented not as a meditation on life as an object, but as itself a radically immanent activity within life, a modification of the activity of living. David Farrell Krell's discussion of the course in his *Daimon Life: Heidegger and Life-Philosophy* certainly foregrounds this aspect of Heidegger's discussion, remarking that "the overarching theme of the course" is "the imbrication of phenomenology and factical life."[3] On the other hand, this course is often approached as a particularly revealing glimpse into the laboratory in which Heidegger is at work radicalizing Husserlian phenomenology, and it is viewed then with an eye to 1927's *Being and Time*. Indeed, this is surely how this text is read in the first chapter of Will McNeill's recent study, *The Fate of Phenomenology: Heidegger's Legacy*, in a chapter entitled "To the Things Themselves! Heidegger's Early Confrontation with Husserl's Phenomenology," and the 1921–22 course is central to McNeill's discussion on this point for very good reason.[4] And while there have been other illuminating treatments of this particular text, none of these have been as tightly focused on one aspect as I would like to be here[5] – namely, in the following, I offer an alternative framing for considering the meditation on philosophical method that Heidegger provides here, and I believe this sheds a revealing light on the text.

To this end, I will argue that it is the position articulated by the philosophical school or approach of late-stage "historicism" that provides the pressing necessitation for Heidegger's repurposing of Husserl's method. I will show that the innovations introduced or further developed here – such as conceptual formal indication, everyday pre-philosophical life as ruinance, and philosophy as counter-ruinance – can be helpfully understood as concerted responses to the specific challenge of late-stage historicism. Indeed, one might even argue that we find here Heidegger's *most* pointed, strategic, and potent articulation of the task late-stage

historicism faces, that of thinking from an exhaustively historically determined starting point, precisely because Heidegger does not in this lecture course become preoccupied with demonstrating the existence of different fundamental modes of being, the ready-to-hand (*Zuhandenheit*) and the present-at-hand (*Vorhandenheit*), and revealing the latter as secondary, a project that initially draws Heidegger's phenomenological gaze in the analytic of Dasein in *Being and Time*. The task of this essay, consequently, is simply to read the 1921–22 lecture course, *Phenomenological Interpretations of Aristotle: Initiation into Phenomenological Research*, extremely carefully within this alternative late-historicist framing.

PHILOSOPHIZING IN THE MODE OF "HISTORIOLOGICAL CONSCIOUSNESS"

In this course, Heidegger opens by suggesting to his students that, before turning to Aristotle directly, it is necessary to pose the general question, "What are studies in the history of philosophy?" (GA 61: 1/3). Studies in this area usually approach their subject matter, philosophy's past, as something "pre-conceptually determined in regard to its content [*vorgrifflich gehaltlich bestimmt*]," namely "as part of objective history, as having objective and object-like relations and properties [*geschichtlich objektiv, mit objektiven und objektmässigen Beziehungen und Eigenschaften*]" (GA 61: 1/3). But what we should really be asking about, Heidegger suggests, is the historiological *as it participates in philosophizing*, which is not as an object or as a set of objects located somewhere long ago, back in past time. Rather, this historiological aspect of our thinking can only come to light when it is glimpsed "in philosophizing itself":

> It is graspable only as existence, accessible out of pure factical life, thus with and through history [*Es ist nur wie Existenz ergreifbar, zugänglich aus dem rein faktischen Leben, also mit und durch Geschichte*]. (GA 61: 1/3, tm)

What one wishes to grasp or access, Heidegger insists, is not past events or elements as they once were, but rather the historical determining activity now in effect, which is exerting itself upon our consciousness

in our concrete experience of living in the world. Indeed, philosophizing will prove to be nothing but a certain modification of that activity of living. And if "taking seriously the task of studying the history of philosophy…is accomplished in philosophizing," then "philosophy is a historiological discerning of factical life (i.e., a discerning that accomplishes itself understandingly as actualizing history) [*Philosophie ist historisches* (*d. h. vollzugsgeschichtlich verstehendes*) *Erkennen des faktischen Lebens*]" (GA 61: 2/3, tm).

This fact, that we can only hope to catch site of the historical determining influence on our life and our thinking as we live out our lives in this world, leads Heidegger to suggest in Part II of the course that he and his students must first begin philosophizing, in order then to catch sight of the *vollzugsgeschichtliches Verstehen* or "historically actualizing understanding" that is happening there. This, however, obviously requires that they pose the preliminary question "What is philosophy?" Thus, the entirety of Part II is an adamantly first-person or immanent account of what appears in the experience of asking after the being of philosophy.

Heidegger notes that this question, "What is philosophy?" tends to be either underestimated or overestimated in our historical moment, and each of these occurs from two distinct perspectives.

1) *The Underestimation of the Question of Philosophy*: On the one hand, the importance of the question is *underestimated*, first, when it is suggested that philosophy should behave more like the sciences, which for their part set aside any "extensive reflection on their own concept" (i.e., science); Philosophy too, it seems to one who approaches with this attitude, should just "begin straightaway" and "set to concrete work." Second, from another perspective, the importance of the question is underestimated as well when it is suggested that philosophy should set aside any laborious self-definition because it is something "deeper" and "higher" than the sciences, something which ultimately "cannot and ought not be defined" (GA 61: 14–15/12–13).

2) *The Overestimation of the Question of Philosophy*: On the other hand, the importance of the question is sometimes *overestimated*, Heidegger tells his students, for instance when, first, we demand at the outset the most general, all-encompassing, universal definition, which is tasked with doing justice to every mode of philosophy in the tradition and every philosophical sub-discipline, as well. Second, it is also overestimated from another perspective, when we demand that philosophy provide a maximally proper and rigorous definition, assuming here that this must "satisfy the requirements fixed by scholastic logic" (GA 61: 15/13, tm). This would amount to an uncritical adoption of the classic Aristotelian model of definition, as put forward by medieval Scholasticism under the formula, "definition is made by proximate genus and specific difference [*definitio fit per genus proximum et differentiam specificam*]" (GA 61: 17/14).

Even if we are convinced of the need to resist these four common errors in approaching the question of "What is philosophy?", Heidegger insists that these errors nevertheless "announce something of a genuine intention toward the meaning of philosophy and toward its possible ways of being appropriated [*etwas von einer echten Intention auf den Sinn der Philosophie und seine mögliche Aneignungsweise bekunden müssen*]" (GA 61: 15/13, tm). That is, these deficient ways of proceeding suggest, precisely *as deficient*, that whatever philosophy is, it will be properly accessed only in the concrete activity of philosophizing, not in some predetermined or received notion of philosophy, *and* they suggest that philosophizing must be directed in its activity toward the register of apparently relevant principles, with respect to whatever subject matter it is investigating. From this set of observations about the initially deficient appearing of philosophy, Heidegger will proceed toward an illuminating determination, to which we will return in the last section.

For now, we simply note here Heidegger's observation that, "as an object [*Gegenstand*] philosophy, like every object, has its way of *becoming genuinely possessed* [*des* genuinen Gehabtwerdens]" (GA 61: 18/15, tm).

Even in our initial questioning about philosophy, as with any object of inquiry, in our explicitly deficient or impoverished grasp, there is already indicated a mode in which we would know or have the object of inquiry properly. It is indicated as a mode of knowing or having to which we do not yet have access, but indicated nonetheless as the means by which the deficiency of our initial grasp would be overcome.

As Heidegger observes, "this question ["What is philosophy?"], in this formulation and with this occasioning, i.e., posed at the initiation and as the initiation of a philosophical investigation itself, gives rise above all to a manifold vexation [*entsteht zumeist eine vielfältige Quälerei*]" (GA 61: 13/12, tm). We find ourselves in an initial condition of *Quälerei* or "vexation, torment, disturbance," with regard to what we wish to think, what we wish to understand about our world and ourselves at this historical moment. Heidegger writes,

> Now, insofar as ruinance and questionability are experienced, but philosophy decisively sets itself [*Philosophie aber sich entscheidet*] to explicating radically that which is factical for it each time [*dieses ihr je Faktische radikal zu explizieren*], it renounces the possibility of having recourse to revelation, recourse to any sort of certification of its possessions and its possibility of possession, and not as though it [philosophy] wished to be presuppositionless, but rather because it stands in a pre-possession [*Voraushabe*] – the factical. Questionworthiness and questioning sharpen the comportment toward history [*schärft das Verhalten zur Geschichte*] – the "how" of the historiological [*das Wie der Historischen*]. (GA 61: 2/3–4, tm)

This is a dense and elliptical passage. Philosophical thinking, Heidegger tells us, starts today from an initial condition of ruinance, from the Latin *ruina*, which Heidegger defines by reference to a *Sturz* or a "collapse, downfall, decline," and the troubling or vexing questionworthiness of what it wishes to clarify and understand.[6] This is our factical relation

to the object of philosophical inquiry, but even this indeterminacy and distance is itself a relation and, thus, a "pre-possession." And indeed, this will be the key to Heidegger's response to our condition of exhaustively historically determined consciousness, the path along which questioning will proceed by "sharpening the comportment toward history." Fascinating here is that, by way of philosophical questioning, we apparently do not transcend our historically determined condition, we do not arrive at some revelation or at some pure and secured presuppositionless intellectual grasp. Rather, we proceed philosophically by "sharpening" our relation to *the history we are already inheriting*.

The problem, Heidegger observes, in responding to this questionworthiness in our present historical moment is that,

> The *situation* that belongs to the understanding of philosophy is not being appropriated [*die der Philosophie zugehörige* Situation *des Verstehens nicht zugeeignet wird*], or more precisely: the opinion that this [situation] is there, without further ado; the blindness over against our own spiritual situation [*geistige Situation*], which is distinguished from every other previous blindness in the history of spirit [*Geistesgeschichte*] precisely by its being more distanced than ever from the situation of understanding, but in just such a way that, it has alive in itself indeed a specific direction of determination [*so zwar aber daß sie in sich selbst gerade eine spezifische Bestimmungsrichtung*], or rather it [our spiritual situation] has been roused up into the genuine superficiality that is decisive for the appropriation of the situation of the understanding [*für die Aneignung der Verstehenssituation*]. This "falling away" ["*Abfall*"] is characteristic of leveled-down apprehension and experience, of "the historiological consciousness" [*das nivellierte Auffassen und Erfahren, «das historische Bewußtsein»*]. (GA 61: 38/30, tm)

This "tendency toward being carried away," this turning away from and taking for granted the situation of living in which we might come to understand our object here, presents a peculiar challenge to thinking *today*. Even if there may well be a certain blindness that belongs to everyday pre-philosophical human life as such, in any and every period, Heidegger suggests here quite clearly that our particular historical moment, our present historical context, is subject to the most extreme blindness. We stand at a greater distance from the situation of life and understanding than individuals in other historical epochs, apparently because of a certain *Abfall*, "falling away" into the world. This is what Heidegger a few lines later calls "a tendency toward being-carried-away…the ruinous flight into the world; away from the object [*eine Tendenz zum Wegbringen…die ruinante Flucht in die Welt; weg vom Gegenstand*]" (GA 61: 39/31, tm).

This extreme initial blindness, superficiality, distraction, and falling away, which belong to everyone in our historical moment, would present little more than an inconvenience, or at most a practical problem in the project of disseminating one's philosophical results broadly, *were Heidegger not a thinker firmly situated in the philosophical school of historicism*. We will, in the next section, turn to a discussion of what precisely characterizes thinkers within this historicist "school." For now, let us note simply that it would be possible, in principle, to climb out of that initial everyday benightedness, if one could, for instance, presume to arrive at one's philosophical concepts in an *a priori* fashion, with reason simply reflecting on and clarifying its own innate contents and determining what it can deduce about reality on that basis. Or, alternatively, *a posteriori*, if thought could secure pure, uninterpreted sense data and determine what can be legitimately derived from that content about the nature of the reality being perceived. For a historicist thinker in the period to which Heidegger belongs, however, both these paths are blocked. We have only the concepts that our historical inheritance has provided us, only the structures of intelligibility imposed upon us by our tradition, which are always already at work organizing our experience and our thinking more or less exhaustively – there is no hope of suspending this influence

as *rationalist* or *empiricist* thinkers may have hoped to do throughout the modern philosophical period. And, as Heidegger observes our situation, the concepts we inherit at present appear insufficient for the task. Before we turn to the precise manner in which the formal indication of our concepts will allow Heidegger's ontological phenomenology to bring about a "counter ruinance" and to succeed in philosophizing even while remaining entirely immanent to our uniquely impoverished historical moment, let us briefly sketch the development of the philosophical school of historicism up to and including Heidegger.

THE HISTORY OF HISTORICISM – FROM HISTORY AS SCIENCE TO HISTORY AS PROBLEM

Historicism is difficult to discuss as a philosophical school or movement for two reasons. First, many of those thinkers who might be seen as central to its development, both early and late, never use the term "historicism" to describe their philosophical standpoint or approach. Second, although a complex continuity can be discerned in that development, from the late 18th century all the way through the 19th and 20th centuries and beyond, there is a profound *reorientation* of historicist thought that occurs at the end of the 19th century, which divides the movement into an early- and late-stage and, indeed, transforms the school's basic project to such an extent that its aims and motivations come to seem utterly at odds with one another. Nonetheless, even given this peculiar *volte face* in its development, I am inclined to agree with Friedrich Meinecke, author of *Historism*: *The Rise of a New Historical Outlook*, when he approaches the school as a kind of complex whole and writes of it, "the rise of historicism was one of the greatest intellectual revolutions that has ever taken place in Western thought."[7]

We cannot do justice here in this essay to the richness and complexity of this philosophical school, but we can offer at least what I think is a helpful developmental schematic. That is, we can organize this intellectual movement into, on the one hand, a first stage in which the study of history is being championed as vital to human life and then pursued as a scientific discipline and, on the other hand, a second stage in which

history and historical determination are being recognized and then critiqued as a problem. Let us turn to the earlier stage before tracing the through line to the later.

In the early modern period, as the impressive accomplishments of the scientific study of nature began to accumulate, there remained a certain acknowledged limit to its reach, indeed what Lessing refers to as a "broad and ugly ditch" between the natural world and the human world.[8]

The realm of nature presented a proper object of science insofar as it obeyed universal, necessary, and rationally, indeed mathematically, renderable laws of causation. The realm of human activity and its historical unfolding, by contrast, seemed subject to all manner of accident, contingency, whim, and all the idiosyncrasies and even perversions of human desire, at both the individual and collective registers.

Opposing this long-standing prejudice against the study of history, stretching back as far as Aristotle's dismissal of *historia* as less philosophical and less serious even than *poiēsis*,[9] historicism takes shape as an insistence on the possibility of studying human history *scientifically*. These historians granted that the study of the human past cannot simply employ the *same* method as the natural sciences, but it can nonetheless arrive at a secured and scientifically legitimate knowledge of its subject matter through the employment of a strict, consistent, and self-conscious method of interpretation and through the critical assessment of the reliability of its sources. As Frederick Beiser remarks about the early-stage practitioners of historicism,

> In their view, history had its own special standards and methods of knowledge, which are no less demanding and exacting than those of the natural sciences. While the methodology of the natural sciences is mathematical and mechanical, the methodology of history is holistic and interpretive. The natural scientist attempts to discover through reason laws that hold in all times and places, whereas the historian attempts to fathom through intuition the unique and individual.[10]

The hermeneutic approach of the early historicists secured its results by insisting on a *holistic* and *detailed* approach to the accumulation of data about the period being studied. The method could be more assured of the scientific validity of its understanding of the meaning or value of a given historical occurrence, the more data it had amassed, the more exhaustive and totalizing its view of the context, and so long as its data could be trusted as sound. This foundation it secured by what was called "source criticism."

To be sure, something like this had been a component of historical method stretching all the way back to the invention of the discipline by Herodotus,[11] but it was employed with ever greater rigor by early historicist thinkers. And one hears this early commitment still voiced in a remark by one of the greatest late-stage historicist thinkers, Michel Foucault, in discussing the historicist method he claims to inherit from Nietzsche,

> Genealogy is gray, meticulous, and patiently documentary…Genealogy, consequently, requires patience and a knowledge of details and it depends on a vast accumulation of source material…[It] demands relentless erudition. Genealogy does not oppose itself to history as the lofty and profound gaze of the philosopher might compare to the molelike perspective of the scholar; on the contrary, it rejects the meta-historical deployment of ideal significations and indefinite teleologies.[12]

Here Foucault thematizes the methodological commitment to accumulating and evaluating a mass of historical sources, building thereby an extraordinarily complex portrait of all the factual details of a given period in order to explain a given historical occurrence or act. He then suggests negatively the need for an utterly immanent hermeneutic, the holistic approach to interpretation mentioned above by Beiser.

The historicist interprets historical events, identifying patterns and dynamics at work in a given historical moment, while insisting on the *absolute autonomy of the historical world*. That is, every historical

occurrence can and must be explained exclusively by those forces at work within history itself, at that moment in that place, rejecting any extra-historical *metaphysical* reference (e.g., to the providential plan of God, the logic of the unfolding of *Geist*, the sure hand of universal Reason) as well as any *naturalistic* reduction (e.g., to the laws of causation that order and explain the material world).

Rather, the early historicist approach often distinguishes between a general and an individual level *within history*, insisting on a distinction between the spiritual and the practical, the state and the citizen, a higher and a lower register, but always within the given historical epoch. Here, for instance, in a sort of eulogy for his mentor Leopold von Ranke, often thought of as the inaugurator of the modern "source-based" discipline, Friedrich Meinecke remarks that von Ranke had insisted on the necessity of recognizing the thorough-going relatedness and interpenetration of these two levels in approaching any given historical phenomenon. For example, Meinecke writes that, for von Ranke, in the course of interpreting certain specific actions undertaken by politicians during the 16th century Protestant Reformation,

> however clearly the practical basis of these interests may be depicted, they immediately become endowed with a certain spirituality, and the men representing them act with a certain distinguished assurance, as though sustained by an invisible power still at work in and behind those interests. The practical and the spiritual are seen to be inseparably interwoven.[13]

The task of the historicist interpreter is to explain every event and every act against the backdrop of that spiritual register, understanding, vitally, that spiritual register as never outside the historical, but rather as utterly immanent to it. Meinecke again, quoting Ranke:

> "The spiritual reality which suddenly rises up before you [the historian] in all its unsuspected originality cannot be deduced from any higher principle." The unseen spiritual power working itself out in practical

> interests and sustaining those who are led by it, is thus (according to Ranke) none other than the particular State involved…As such, and in spite of all points of comparison and all points of connection with a higher level, this State is inwardly marked off from all other States, because a particular spiritual principle is at work in it, expressing itself outwardly in its constitution and politics. "By the principle of the State," he says, "we must understand not some abstraction, but its very inner life."[14]

Already here we see the beginnings of the shift toward the perspective from which history becomes a problem. From the scientific commitment to the autonomy of history, i.e., the necessity of interpreting every historical occurrence exclusively according to the general, spiritual, state- or culture-level determining dynamics and forces, historicism begins to draw two uncomfortable consequences. On the one hand, it seems that there is a simple relativism of value implied, whereby every historical cultural context is utterly *sui generis*, no general comparisons or evaluations being possible across historical periods. On the other hand, this contextual relativism can then be reflexively applied *to the perspective of the historicist students of history themselves* – is it not the case, the historicist interpreter must ask themselves, that my own interpretive work in reading and criticizing the past events of the tradition I inherit would also be exhaustively determined by the "unseen spiritual power" already at work on me in my own present historical moment? Not just the set of terms, concepts, values, arguments, and associations that provide the structures of intelligibility according to which I experience the world, think critically about it, and then decide to act, but also all the biases, exclusions, marginalizations, myopias, and generally regrettable or even condemnable prejudices that are spiritual threads, as it were, completely woven through those terms, concepts, values, etc.

How then are we to take up the traditional task of philosophy or science today, i.e., arriving at the truth about "what is," given what historicism seems to be revealing as our condition of *exhaustively historically*

determined consciousness. This is, to my mind, the most fundamental philosophical question of our age, for every other philosophical question is interrupted and paralyzed by its implications. If every thought, every opinion, every action of every human being is historically determined so radically, how is science, how is philosophy even possible? How can we access truth? What does truth now even mean?

My central contention is that this historicist problematic is the motivating impulse for Heidegger's brilliant radicalization of phenomenology in the 1921–22 *Phenomenological Interpretations of Aristotle* lecture course. Indeed, it is precisely this inheritance that Heidegger has in mind when he remarks,

> We are today, in our existence, different from all previous generations simply by the fact . . . that we are the successors of forbears in a way no previous generation was. We are such [successors] in a quite peculiar sense, insofar as we possess a marked *historiological consciousness* (with the corresponding methodological possibilities) of our relation to the past, live in this consciousness, see ourselves in it, and see (await) the future with it and out of it. (GA 61: 74/55–56)

It is this condition and its unique "methodological possibilities" that interest us here.

After observing this contemporary hyper-awareness of our relation to the past, in a subsection entitled "Tradition," Heidegger undertakes a fairly extensive discussion of Oswald Spengler's *Decline of the West*, the first volume of which had appeared just three years prior in 1918, and this engagement with Spengler is extremely revealing as concerns our focus here, namely the significance of the challenge of late-stage historicism in occasioning the philosophical methodological innovations introduced in this course. To be sure, here in the 1921–22 course, in the 1920–21 "Introduction to the Phenomenology of Religion" course mentioned above, and elsewhere,[15] Heidegger is deeply ambivalent about the value of Spengler's study. But what is especially revealing here, and perhaps quite

unexpected, is what precisely Heidegger praises and what he criticizes. In his massively popular work, Spengler had opposed many common pre-war liberal attitudes in Germany, both scholarly and popular, by insisting that Western European culture was not enjoying a long period of general progress and advancement, but had actually entered a phase of broad, inexorable, and indeed entirely natural decay.[16] One might expect that Heidegger would focus on the resonance between this diagnosis of historical decline and his own critique of Western metaphysical thinking, but this is in fact *not* where Heidegger directs his attention. Indeed, he generally sees this aspect of Spengler's project as merely a popularized, philosophically unsophisticated regurgitation of Nietzsche's critique of the nihilism of post-Platonic Western civilization.[17] What Heidegger appreciates most in Spengler, by contrast, is that he is "the most consistent and reliable spokesman for historiological consciousness" (GA 61: 74/56), or what Heidegger refers to in the 1920–21 course as "[Spengler's] *radical self-deliverance* to the historical process" (GA 60: 38/27, tm). This is nothing other than what we have presented here as late-stage historicism's emerging philosophical problem, the question of how to proceed philosophically given the exhaustive historical determination of consciousness. As Jeffrey Andrew Barash remarks, for Heidegger "the challenge of Spengler. . .lay in his disbelief in the conception of science founded in ideal continuity, transcending the purely relative elements of culture."[18] But what Heidegger criticizes in Spengler is the latter's attempt, despite his criticisms of the scientific aspirations of his contemporary historical theorists and despite his acknowledgement of the challenged condition of "historiological consciousness," to establish nonetheless a ground for historical thinking that will allow a quasi-scientific understanding of the past and even a predictability as history continues to unfold; to be sure, Spengler grounds this understanding in a novel way, rejecting that "ideal continuity" posited as an almost Platonic or Kantian transcendent source of understanding, but rather seeing a "periodicity," a "polarity," and a "tension,"[19] which organizes all cosmic processes, including all cultures in their historical development, such that that they can all be understood *a priori* to be involved in a process of maturation and decline.

Ultimately here, Heidegger insists that any scientific or quasi-scientific attitude toward the past, studying it as an object or as object-like and presuming to unveil there an intelligible overarching order, is merely the *Zeitigung* or the "temporalizing, bringing to maturity or fulfillment" of our contemporary, historically situated consciousness, i.e., that pre-relation to the past or the fact of our consciousness having been already determined by the past and by the tradition we inherit in factical life. He goes on,

> The question of the sense and the right of the tradition – itself a phenomenon within the basic phenomenon of the historical – is reassumed into the problematic of the historical itself, and the sense of the historical is, in turn, rooted in the facticity of factical life. The problem of the relation of Objective history to the historical is included in the aforementioned problematic. Yet, insofar as the historical receives its sense from *facticity*, it is appropriate to bring this latter itself into sharper focus and make it the focus of our discussion. (GA 61: 75/57)

It is in service of this project of bringing the historical aspect of factical life into sharper focus that Heidegger employs the elements that will be taken up in the final section of this essay. There, I would like to lay out the innovations introduced by Heidegger, specifically insofar as they are motivated by the historicist challenges of that project, namely the approach to concepts defined in a "formally indicative" manner and the relation of philosophy to everyday life understood as counter-ruinance.

CONCEPTS AS FORMAL INDICATIONS AND PHILOSOPHY AS COUNTER-RUINANCE

In this lecture course, the question of the meaning of Being seems to exist alongside other fundamental philosophical questions. Indeed, from its opening, various queries are introduced as taking center stage in the investigation: "what is history?," "what is philosophy?," "what is a definition?," "what is a principle?," "what is life?" (GA 61: 1–2/3–4, 12/11,

17–18/14–15, 21/18, 84/64). However, at one point in the discussion of the basic project of philosophizing, the question of the meaning of Being does emerge with what seems its familiar centrality for Heidegger's thinking.

Having begun from the initially indeterminate and troublingly insufficient appearance of "what philosophy is," Heidegger arrives at the insight that philosophy is appearing as a "comportment toward beings that is discerning in principle (*prinzipiell erekennendes Verhalten zu Seienden*)" (GA 61: 57/44), but he then asks, "what is the principle for beings in themselves" (GA 61: 44/57)?

> What is ultimately at issue in beings as such? Being or, more determinately, in respect to the way such "Being" is graspable, the meaning of Being, is, philosophically, the principle of every being. Being is not, however, the "universal" of all beings, the highest genus, that which beings would fall under as particular instances. (GA 61: 57/44, tm)

Here Heidegger is encouraging us to think Being *not* as the universal concept under which beings are ordered as instantiations of a given essential character, but as a kind of *archē*, a "principle, source, and origin," which he defines elsewhere as "that on the basis of which something "is" in its own proper way, that on which everything depends" (GA 61: 21/18). Although, as we saw above, there is an unprecedented blindness and presumption of transparency that belong to our contemporary situation, nonetheless even our impoverished historical understanding of beings relates us to Being, the source of their being as they are. And yet, already here the young Heidegger is insisting on an unorthodox discerning relation toward Being. He writes,

> The object of philosophy, beings in their Being, co-determines from out of itself (function of principle) the [philosophical] comportment…The discerning comportment [of philosophizing] has an original and radical sort of relation in-principle toward beings in their Being (not a being-in-position and grasping, not a discussing [*nicht Einstellung und Erfassen, Besprechen*]…). (GA 61: 60–1/46)

The question is how philosophy, in this early iteration of Heidegger's thinking, can dig down into the ground of what is initially appearing to us in our historically determined condition, and nevertheless define and know beings in their Being in such a mode that Being is not reduced to a being, not grasped and discursively delimited according to a predetermined and unreflective understanding. This is what our contemporary historical moment requires of us. And the tool that Heidegger hits upon here in order to accomplish this task is the employment of the "formally indicative" definition of our concepts. He writes,

> It is characteristic of a definition as indicative, that it precisely does not give fully and properly [*gerade nicht voll und eigentlich gibt*] the object being determined. Indeed, it merely indicates, but as genuinely indicative it does give directly the principle of the object… The positive reference [*positive Anweisung*] is provided by the further character of the definition, namely, that it is "formally" indicative (From the point of view of what is genuine, that which is initially given is precisely *of a genuine origin* [*gerade einen genuinen Ursprungs*]; explicitly, however, it is first and necessarily already declined [*abgefallen*], though indeed genuinely held fast in the decline [*im Abfall*]). "Formally indicated" does not mean merely represented, meant, or intimated in some way or other, such that it would remain completely open how and where we are to gain possession of the object itself. "Indicated" here means that that which is said is of the character of the "formal," improperly [*uneigentlich*], but precisely in this "im-" there resides at the same time positively the referring [*positive die Anweisung*]. The being empty with respect to content in its sense-structure [*Das leer Gehaltliche in seiner Sinnstruktur*] is at the same time that which provides the direction of actualization [*die Vollzugsichtung*]. (GA 61: 32–33/26)

This is a long and complex passage, but what I want to draw out is the way in which formally indicative philosophical definition is presented as a means of proceeding philosophically in a condition in which we explicitly experience our "declined" and "improper" initial relation to the object of definition, to beings in their Being. And this is possible, for Heidegger here, "insofar as ruinance and questionability are now experienced [*Sofern als nun die Ruinanz und Fraglichkeit erfahren wird*]" (GA 61: 2/3) over against beings in their Being as an unsatisfactory initial grasp of beings. But precisely in that experience of decline and impropriety, there is entailed a direction toward what is not yet adequately or properly grasped, not yet possessed, the principle of what is being investigated, the Being of beings. Fascinating is the idea that we are able to indicate that ground of beings, i.e., draw it into the definition of beings indicatively, even as we allow it to remain ungrasped, unmastered, by withholding positive content, leaving the definition merely formal, or empty.[20]

And thus, it is insofar as philosophy begins today from the sense of having fallen away from the Being of beings, insofar as we experience our condition as one of ruinance, that we have a directionality suggested, a movement by which we might approach Being, though apparently without aspiring to grasp or master it as an Object, as a being. This is the sense in which philosophy, in the mode of historicist ontological phenomenology, is essentially a movement of counter-ruinance. Heidegger writes,

> Phenomenological interpretation, as existentiell, manifests itself by its very essence as a "*counter*"*-movedness*...We can determine something about the (ruinant) "against" or (formally) the "against-which," as a genuine factical property of life, only insofar as we take seriously the phenomenological task of encountering the ruinant counter-movedness and the "against-which" in the factical modes of access to their actualization. This encounter is possible only if factical ways of access, i.e., ways of movedness in facticity, have been appropriated interpretively...(GA 61: 132–33/99)

Simply tracing back in the direction indicated by the dissatisfaction and impropriety of our initial relation to beings, we can be confident that we are moving toward reversing the exceptionally fallen condition of our historical present.

CONCLUSION

I hope to have indicated the perhaps surprising way in which Heidegger at this early stage inherits the late-historicist challenge and the way in which his innovations here (formal indication, life as ruinance, and ontological phenomenology as counter-ruinance) should be seen specifically as strategies carrying out the project of philosophizing in a mode utterly immanent to that historically determined condition.

NOTES

1 This lecture course appears along with other topically related materials in *Phenomenology of Religious Life* (GA 60).

2 Theodore Kisiel, *The Genesis of Heidegger's* Being and Time (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993), 233. (Hereafter, *GBT*.)

3 David Farrell Krell, in the introduction to his *Daimon Life: Heidegger and Life-Philosophy* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1992), 37. Indeed, Krell treats this lecture course at some length, detailing its "extraordinary contents" and insisting that the text "would amply repay the most meticulous reading" (Krell, 37) – this is precisely what I propose to do here, at least with respect to the question of history and its determining influence on human experience and thought. He sees Heidegger here as taking up the challenge of philosophizing from within and about the "movement," "movedness," and "process" of "life," "life" being a concept that Heidegger will eventually exchange in *Being and Time* for *Dasein* and *existence*. Krell does not, however, develop the relation between Heidegger's engagement with "life-philosophy" here and the passages where Heidegger takes up the philosophical challenges of historically determined consciousness.

4 William McNeill, *The Fate of Phenomenology: Heidegger's Legacy* (Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield, 2020).

5 Ted Kisiel offers a helpful summary of the course contents, situating it meticulously in the context of Heidegger's early development, in Kisiel, *GBT*, 232–7. He remarks that, although the course's most important element may *appear* to be a "change in Heidegger's 'fundamental definition of philosophy' in the direction of a 'phenomenological ontology,'" the course's "deeper goal," "further accentuating its counter-Husserlian direction, is to develop the intrinsically historical character of such ontological research, in keeping with the fundamentally historical movement of life itself. Ultimately, therefore, there is no difference between the ontological and the historical – this is clearly not Aristotle or Husserl" (Kisiel, *GBT*, 233). See also Kisiel, "Heidegger (1920–21) on Becoming a

Christian: A Conceptual Picture Show," in eds. T. Kisiel and J. van Buren, *Reading Heidegger from the Start: Essays in His Earliest Thought* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1994), 175–94. Charles Bambach, in his *Heidegger, Dilthey, and the Crisis of Historicism* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1995), traces the history of German historicism from Wilhelm Windelband to Heinrich Rickert to Wilhelm Dilthey, and closes with a final chapter on Heidegger. For Bambach, Heidegger's encounter with what we will discuss here as the late-stage challenge of historicism, his consideration of the fact that "the historicist faith in the meaning and coherence of human history had been shattered" (Bambach, 188), takes place in the context *both* of a certain crisis in contemporary theology *and* of a crisis in Heidegger's personal faith. Indeed, Bambach writes that Heidegger's "turn toward historicity and hermeneutics must not…be understood as a turning away from theology or from theological questioning…[It amounts to a] radicalization of his original mode of questioning rather than a rejection of it. His turn toward Paul, Luther, Overbeck, and Schleiermacher paralleled his phenomenological investigations by focusing on the *historical* context of self-disclosure and intentionality" (Bambach, 204). Scott Campbell as well, in his extensive and illuminating treatment of this course in chapters three and four of his *The Early Heidegger's Philosophy of Life: Facticity, Being, and Language* (New York: Fordham University Press, 2012), focuses on Heidegger's appeals to early Christian thought, the immediacy of lived temporal experience and the inevitability of self-alienation there, and Campbell places front and center the historicity of human life, as Heidegger treats it. About the courses of the 1920's, Campbell writes, "Heidegger's project…can be described as an attempt first to take account of life's temporal-historical constitution and, with that, an endeavor to recover or retrieve temporal-historical motivations. Facticity allows for the retrieval of the various ways in which history affects human existence" (Campbell, 6). Finally, Jeffrey Andrew Barash takes up this course and its

significance for Heidegger's philosophy of history, or for his thinking of the essentially historically situated character of human life, in the third chapter of his *Martin Heidegger and the Problem of Historical Meaning* (New York: Fordham University Press, 2003), a chapter entitled "Existence and History: Heidegger's Radical Turning Point between 1918 and 1923." Barash, tracing the problem of historically determined thinking, notes that, in the series of lectures from 1920–21, "Heidegger rarely mentioned the thought of Husserl. Instead, he focused on the thinking of those he considered to be the major historical theorists among his contemporaries" (Barash, 113), including often, and perhaps somewhat surprisingly, as we shall see, Oswald Spengler.

6 *Ruinanz* is a term Heidegger introduces in this lecture course and subsequently abandons. It is usually understood to have been replaced with the term *Verfallenheit* or "fallenness," which will be central to *Being and Time*. Hans Ruin has argued compellingly in "Thinking in Ruins: Life, Death, and Destruction in Heidegger's Early Writings," *Comparative Continental Philosophy* 4.1 (2012): 15–33, that we should take up the notion not merely as an abandoned alternative terminology, in the context of Heidegger's own development, but rather as a forceful and rich concept on its own terms. He writes, "In the end, this particular term invites us to think deeper about the connection between the fallenness of life and the practice of philosophical destruction or deconstruction. And as such it actualizes the question of the legacy of Heidegger's thinking as a whole. Through the lens of ruinance, he comes forth as a thinker animated by a profound sense of loss, of the trace, and of irretrievable origins, in the vicinity of both Benjamin and Derrida" (Ruin, 16). I agree with this entirely and would add only that I think the historicist framing of Heidegger's introduction of the notion of *Ruinanz* that I am sketching here allows the term to present itself in its real force and richness.

7 Friedrich Meinecke, *Historism: The Rise of a New Historical Outlook*, trans. J.E. Anderson (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1959/1972), liv.

8 Gotthold Ephraim Lessing, "*Beweis des Geistes und der Kraft*," in *Werke und Briefe* (Frankfurt: Deutsche Klassiker Verlag, 1989), viii.441). Cited by Beisner.

9 Aristotle, *Poetics*, 1451a36–b14.

10 Frederick Beiser, "Historicism," in eds. B. Leiter and M. Rosen, *The Oxford Handbook of Continental Philosophy* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), 160–1.

11 At the very least, Herodotus suggests that he is abiding by the methodological principles of transparency and maximum inclusivity. He tells us that he will explicitly identify his sources, promising to relate what others apparently actually believe: "So far the Egyptians themselves have been my authority; but in what follows I shall relate what other people, too, are willing to accept in the history of this country, with a few points added from my own observation" (*Hist.* II.147). He also mentions his commitment to exhaustive reporting, or conveying every opinion or explanation he has encountered, even those about which he himself is skeptical: "I am bound to tell what I am told, but not in every case to believe it" (*Hist.* VII.152). Herodotus, *The Histories*, trans. David Grene (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1987).

12 Michel Foucault, "Nietzsche, Genealogy, History," in ed. D. F. Bouchard, *Language, Counter-Memory, Practice: Selected Essays and Interviews*, trans. D.F. Bouchard and S. Simon (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1971/1977), 139–40.

13 Meinecke, *Historism*, 499.

14 Meinecke, *Historism*, 499–500.

15 See Barash's extensive discussion of Heidegger's engagement with Spengler, in his third chapter, entitled "Existence and History: Heidegger's Radical Turning Point between 1918 and 1923" (Barash, *Historical Meaning*, 113–125).

16 As Charles Bambach observes about Spengler's study, "the book's real point was often missed. What characterized Spengler's work was not its theory of numbers, its morphology of history, or its Faustian grasp of space and time, but its cultural pessimism.

Spengler's book was a clear sign of the collapse and destruction of the old, worn values of the prewar world. Spengler, or rather 'the Spengler phenomenon,' revealed that German culture was experiencing a 'crisis' concerning its own fundamental history and identity, a crisis that threatened the meaning and continuity of the historicist tradition" (Bambach, *Crisis*, 188–9).

17 In "The Anaximander Fragment," composed in 1946 and published in the collection *Holzwege* in 1963, Heidegger remarks that it is Nietzsche "from whose philosophy (all too coarsely understood) Spengler predicted the decline of the West – in the sense of the Western historical world" (GA 5: 326/EGT 17). Indeed, it is here that Heidegger remarks, "Historicism has today not only not been overcome, but is only now entering the stage of its expansion and entrenchment" (GA 5: 326/EGT 17).

18 Barash, *Historical Meaning*, 118.

19 Oswald Spengler, *The Decline of the West*, vol. 2: *Perspectives of World History*, trans. C.F. Atkinson (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1922/1928), 4. See also Spengler, *The Decline of the West. Volume I: Form and Actuality*, trans. C.F. Atkinson (London: George Allen and Unwin, 1918/1926).

20 Ted Kisiel characterizes the peculiar features of this course's presentation of "formal indication" in the following, very helpful way: "...formal indication [here in the 1921–22 course], which seeks a middle ground between abstractly strict universal definition (its overestimation) and concrete experience (underestimation of definition), is now charged with the skepticism of radical questioning" (Kisiel, *GBT*, 233).

Heidegger's Philosophy of the Event: *Ereignis* as Being's Ruptured Unfolding (from *Beiträge* to *die Kehre*)

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ABSTRACT: Heidegger's *Ereignis* is hotly contested, yet foundational for contemporary philosophies of the event. I propose it is "the event of being's ruptured unfolding." I do so by analyzing three concepts through key passages between *Contributions to Philosophy (of the Event)* and "The Turning": 1) the shift from essence (*Wesen*) to essences (*west*) in the phrase "Be-ing essences as the event" in relation to time-space; 2) the retention of both historical and homonymous etymological meanings of *Ereignis* in the phrase "The event is appropriatingly brought into view (*Ereignis ist eignende Eräugnis*)" in relation to truth; and 3) the nuance of "rupture" in the phrase "fissure…is the splitting open of the essential unfolding of be-ing" in relation to decision. Analyzing these concepts and passages distills the historical and ontological senses of *Ereignis*: the founding of epochs, on the one hand, and original determinations out of the essencing of be-ing, on the other.

KEYWORDS: history of being; time-space; truth of being; rupture; event ontology

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> Future thinking is a *course* of thought, on which the hitherto altogether concealed realm of the essencing of be-ing is traversed and so is first cleared and attained in its most proper character as an *event*
>
> (GA 65: 3/5, tm)

Heidegger's *Ereignis* has been a topic of dissension among Heidegger scholars since *Contributions to Philosophy (Of the Event)*'s publication in 1989. Is it, perhaps, an "*a priori* opening" as Thomas Sheehan contends or, maybe, "an event of appropriation" as Joan Stambaugh and others have suggested?[1] In this article, I offer an alternative interpretation of Heidegger's *Ereignis* between *Contributions* and his 1949 lecture "The Turning." I propose it is the event of be-ing's ruptured unfolding. I do so by analyzing the semantic and etymological play of three concepts in key passages between *Contributions* and "The Turning." The "Event," I ultimately argue, characterizes an epochal unfolding of be-ing, a "history of be-ing" that decisively grounds beings anew.[2] I show this in three sections.

First, I analyze the phrase "Be-ing essences as the Event [*Ereignis*]" in *Contributions*. I that argue attending to the reformulation of "essence" (*Wesen*) as a verb, "essences" (*west*), illustrates how the event poses the question of being dynamically and epochally through Heidegger's concept of time-space.

Second, in "The Turning," I analyze *Ereignis*' etymological ancestor *Eräugnis* in the statement, "The Event is appropriatingly brought into view [*Ereignis ist eignende Eräugnis*]." I argue this reveals the dynamic meaning of the event as lighting up epochs anew through "the truth of be-ing," which Heidegger depicts through the imagery of a "lightning-flash" (*Einblitz*). Doing so, I firstly contend the appeal to *Eräugnis* illustrates how beings show up differently in epochs of be-ing's unfolding. I secondly frame the debate on interpretive disputes of *Ereignis* surrounding the privileging of either the historical etymology of appearing (*äugnen*) or the homonymous meaning of owning (*eignen*). As opposed to privileging one over the other, as other commentators do, I emphasize the importance of retaining both the etymological and homonymous meanings of *Ereignis* equally to better

capture the epochal transformation that "the turn into the truth of be-ing" entails, which the analyzed passage emphasizes.

Third, I return to *Contributions* to argue that Heidegger's use of fissure (*Zerklüftung*) nuances the meaning of *Ereignis* as evental *rupture*. Demonstrating that *Ereignis* is the event of be-ing's ruptured unfolding, I finally contend that thinking through these ruptures as "de-cisions" permits us to see the historical and ontological senses of *Ereignis*: epochs of be-ing, on the one hand, and original determinations out of the essencing of be-ing, on the other. Distilled is a "history of be-ing" where different names (e.g., *phusis*, *ousia*, *substantia*, spirit, will to power) decisively describe the relationship between be-ing and beings. This, I conclude, further highlights Heidegger's careful distinction between thinking be-ing as evental (being-historical thinking) and thinking be-ing *from* the event in preparation for the other beginning (inventive or inceptive thinking). Both, I suggest, are necessary for future analyses of Heidegger's philosophy of the event.

In my analysis, I mostly choose to leave the term *Ereignis* untranslated. Nevertheless, when I do translate it, I follow Daniela Vallega-Neu and Richard Rojcewicz by using the standard English translation "event."

I. *EREIGNIS*: TIME-SPACE

Heidegger writes in *Contributions* that "be-ing 'is' not a being," "be-ing is not something. . .in itself [and] for itself," and "be-ing is not, as in metaphysics, the 'highest'" (GA 65: 13, 299/13, 236). Insofar as be-ing cannot be understood in these terms, we must no longer understand it as "essence" or any other variation given by the history of Western metaphysics, i.e., *ousia*, substance, idea, etc. (GA 69: 26–7/24–5). Heidegger instead writes, "Be-ing *essences* as the event [*Das Seyn* west *als das Ereignis*]" (GA 65: 30/25, em). It is Heidegger's use of essence as a verb that illustrates a shift to understanding be-ing as evental (GA 65: 287–8/225–6). It first implies a kind of emergence: a coming forth (GA 40: 122–3/126).[5] From essence to essenc*ing*, Heidegger poses the question of be-ing dynamically, a happening rather than a halting determination. That be-ing "essence*s*" eliminates the idea that be-ing could be some essential entity,

and is rather an occurrence, something that happens, an *event*. Yet, as an "event" (*Ereignis*), it is not merely temporal; neither is it meant to be understood linearly nor dialectically. Instead, by shifting the usual noun to the unusual verb, he emphasizes a different kind of *movement*. As Vallega-Neu points out, the movement is unique in that it is neither active nor passive. In this way, the verb form closely resembles the Greek "middle voice," where the subject of the sentence is fundamentally tied to – implies – its verb and predicate, and vice–versa.[4] As opposed to "Being" performing the action of "Event," be-ing is underway as the event – much like, as Vallega-Neu indicates, in the sentence "It is raining," where there is no subject.[5] There is, in fact, no "it" that "is raining"; *rain is what is raining*.[6] Similarly, there is no being that is event; rather, be-ing unfolds as the event. The grammatical reformulation is meant to illustrate be-ing as a happening, irreducible to any essential entity, quality, or action performed by some subject. Rather, posing the question of be-ing dynamically, Heidegger emphasizes be-ing's emergence, its happening *there*. That be-ing happens as an event speaks to its unpredictability. It is not already present "there," but happens in the moment of its occurrence. He further elaborates on the framework of this happening in *Contributions*:

> The basic framework of this happening is the time-space arising from it. The time-space is what juts out for measuring the fissure of be-ing. As the juncture of truth, time-space is originally the site of the moment of the event [*Augenblicks-Stätte des Ereignisses*]. (GA 65: 30/26)

As the essencing or, as Gregory Fried and Richard Polt translate, the *essential unfolding* of be-ing,[7] *Ereignis* is further characterized as a happening through and by which "time-space" arises. This indicates that it is neither a representational event within time and space nor some *a priori* event preceding time and space. On the contrary, it is the eventuating of time-space itself.

This immediately diverges from a traditional Euclidean understanding of time and space. Time-space is not meant to suggest the events

where time and space intersect as if the two were entities in a vacuum playing on a dimensional plane. This "happening" is not positioned and measured via the points where time and space intersect. Rather, Heidegger emphasizes the dynamic simultaneity of time-space as tim*ing* and spac*ing*. Just as with the noun "essence," Heidegger shifts these words into verbs to illustrate the relational movement inherent in them: time-space is always already involved with the emergence of things. It is a fluid web of relations coming together to build a site where some "thing" occurs. For example, in "Building, Dwelling, Thinking," Heidegger describes this site-making through a bridge: "the banks emerge as banks only as the bridge crosses them…it brings stream and bank and land into each other's neighborhood" such that the stream, bank, and land become what they are through being gathered together in the bridge (GA 7: 154 /PLT 150).[8] The emergence of things always occurs in the midst of other things, and it is through this site that they are opened to be what they are within that web of relationships. Similarly, time and space are not containers in which these sites are made but are instead building the site along with everything else. More accurately, they are like simultaneous interstices through which things emerge. It is thus the openings, not the Euclidean points, which define the emergence of things. These open sites are the basic framework of this happening, where time-space arises, giving a structure to the dynamic relationships of a situation ever anew. The eventuating of time-space itself suggests that *Ereignis* just is the unfolding of that happening where "truth," which is the "disclosure of…what and how [something] is," bursts forth or "juts out" (GA 5: 21/ PLT 35). Further clarifying how time-space functions may help unravel what this means.

Heidegger gives us a further clue when he describes time-space as "the site of the moment of the event [*Augenblicks-Stätte des Ereignisses*]," which recalls the ecstatic temporality of "the moment" (*Augenblick*) in *Being and Time*. There "the moment" (*Augenblick*) signaled the critical juncture where *Dasein* steps out into the open and projects itself into the future amidst a world in which it already finds itself and against a backdrop that already claims it. Heidegger describes the temporality of

the moment as *ecstatic*, from *ek-stasis*: "outside-itself." In the moment, then, *Dasein* is not pinned down to a particular instant in time, but stands outside of any localizable instant, constantly carried away into: 1) a world into which we have already been thrown—an embodied history; 2) the possibilities we project, i.e., where we are heading next: the next choice, place, or situation; and 3) the very midst of things in which we find ourselves (GA 2: 429–37/SZ 325–31). The ecstatic temporality of the moment signifies the fact that *Dasein* is always more than it is and "must be understood in terms of the world it inhabits and the possibilities it pursues."[9] If the moment is the ecstatic site of being exposed to the open for *Dasein*, then time-space, as the site of the moment of *Ereignis*, is similarly the open site out of which be-ing essentially unfolds as the event. The "site of the moment of the event" thus illustrates that time-space breaks out into the "open," where *be-ing* is always more than it is.[10] This notion, in fact, is emphasized by Heidegger's choice to use "beyng/be-ing" over "being" (*Seyn* over *Sein*) to "indicate that being is here no longer thought metaphysically" and is instead, Heidegger continues, "the thinking of the historicality of be-ing" (GA 65: 436/344).

As such, time-space is both the site out of which be-ing as event can be thought in its historical unfolding and the happening of that unfolding. Heidegger explains that as the open site, time-space "juts out" in "junctures of truth," which we understand as the "fissure of be-ing." We understand and measure these fissures historically as epochs of be-ing's essential unfolding or as Vallega-Neu succinctly explains, "as the event of appropriation [*Ereignis*] out of which epochs of being occur."[11] The unfolding of these epochs is further discussed in Heidegger's *The History of Beyng*.

In §75 of *The History of Beyng*, Heidegger indicates that be-ing's essencing must not be viewed in terms of a pre-given process or progressive movement, "but rather [as] suddenness – sheer and precipitous – of grounding from out of *the event*" and again in §76 as "the sudden moments of foundering and precipitous collapse" (GA 69: 93/79). Thus, be-ing's unfolding must be understood as a ruptured unfolding where

these epochs are neither fixed positions on the line of history nor necessary stops along "Being's" progress (as if "Being" as "Event" is merely historicism or teleology). Rather, it is unpredictably transformative and always more than the precise moments (*Augenblicks-Stätte*) of its epochal configurations. It unfolds through precipitous gatherings – grounding arrangements of things – and sudden collapses – abrupt breaks in those arrangements. Rupture is used to describe this "unfolding" to account for these sudden gatherings and breaks appropriate to be-ing's emergence. This means, as indicated above, that (1) be-ing *appears* differently in each epoch and (2) be-ing could have unfolded differently at each fissure "point" (de-cision). Both guide the next two sections in answering the questions: What does it mean for be-ing to emerge in junctures of truth? And how can the essential unfolding of be-ing rupture?

II. *ERÄUGNIS*: JUNCTURES OF TRUTH

Truth was described above in terms of disclosure. Importantly, the excerpt from *Contributions*, in describing time-space as the site of the moment, also indicates that it occurs "as the juncture of truth." As such, truth is not only disclosive, but also eruptive. Truth *breaks forth* out into the open. This additionally characterized time-space. Time-space, Heidegger states, is in fact the happening of truth (GA 65: 386/305). These terms used to describe this eruptive activity – breaking forth, jutting out in different junctures, happening, and disclosing – all depict truth as something that *alights* and *appears*. In this section, I first contend that "junctures of truth" can be understood through the imagery Heidegger uses in his lecture "The Turning." Second, through an analysis of the etymology at play, I emphasize this imagery entails two otherwise contested meanings of *Ereignis*. Intimately tying truth to the notion of "lighting up" clarifies the essential unfolding of be-ing in terms of both "appearance" and "appropriation."[12]

Just as the imagery of *Augen-blick*, translated literally as "blink of the eye," helped the reader of *Being and Time* understand *Dasein*'s ecstatic activity, Heidegger similarly helps us understand "be-ing essentially

unfolds as the event" using *Ereignis*'s etymological ancestor *Eräugnis*. Using *er-äugnen*, the verb form meaning "bringing before the eye" or "to strike the eye" (GA 71: 184–5/156–7), Heidegger captures the "sudden and precipitous" character of be-ing's ruptured unfolding through the imagery of a lightning bolt's emergence and disappearance.[13] One of the clearest passages where he gives this imagery is in his 1949 lecture "The Turning." He states:

> This sudden self-lighting is the lightning-flash. It [be-ing] brings itself into its own brightness, which it itself brings along and brings in. When…the truth of being flashes, the [essencing] of being clears and lights itself up. Then the truth of the [essencing]…of being turns and enters…into that which now is the epoch of being. (GA 11: 120/QCT 44, tm)

And later:

> In-flashing [this sudden self-lighting] is 'the disclosing coming-to-pass' [or simply] the event within being itself. The Event *is bringing to sight that brings into its own*. [*Einblitz ist Ereignis im Sein selbst. Ereignis* ist eignende Eräugnis.] (GA 11: 121/QCT 45, tm, em)

The junctures of truth, in be-ing's essencing, flash. This means the "truth of be-ing" is what is brought to sight at each juncture. Heidegger describes this as flashing, where the "flashing" signals be-ing's emergence or "turn into an epoch." In other words, truth, as a juncture in be-ing's essencing, lights up differently in different epochs. Importantly, when Heidegger writes "truth of be-ing" or "junctures of truth" he does not mean what counts as "right" or "correct" in some juncture, but rather simply what is being disclosed. Indeed, in keeping with the imagery Heidegger provides, "truth" is "unconcealment" or is "that which is brought before the eye" (*er-äugnen*).[14]

In the above passage, Heidegger paints the picture of a sudden flash, inviting us to imagine the lightening flash of a lightning bolt. A lightning bolt gathers positive and negative charges and breaks clear with a sudden flash, bringing the surrounding area to light. Using this imagery, be-ing gathers and enables a configuration of beings only to break clear disruptively, flashing and bringing them to light anew, such that, as Richard Polt writes, "one can survey one's current world, acting in light of what has been and may be."[15] Yet, as said above, this flashing (the truth of be-ing) and what is illuminated (beings) differs from epoch to epoch, which is to say that the relationship between be-ing and beings differs from epoch to epoch.[16] *Eräugnis* illustrates this in the sense of what is seen in the flashing light. For, how things light up "before the eye" indicates the epoch.[17] Just as a lightning bolt breaks forth when the difference in charges overflows, be-ing perhaps breaks forth when the difference between be-ing and beings overflows. To clarify, it is because the site of the moment (*Augenblicks-Stätte*) always indicates that be-ing is more than it is in a current configuration that it breaks forth out of this ineluctable difference anew. The motor of this site is always transformative then because be-ing is never wholly captured but properly *eventual*, which is to say driven by a process of gathering and breaking forth that is never calculable or complete.[18]

This process, the differencing between be-ing and beings through each epoch (described through the imagery of *eräugnen* as "lighting up before the eye"), is the "turning" which titles the lecture. The turning then is another way of describing time-space as the site of the moment of *Ereignis*. Where does the turning occur in *Ereignis*? Heidegger answers in Section 255: "the turning in the event" of *Contributions*: "the *moment*, i.e., from the flashing up of be-ing out of the enduring of the simple and always incalculable event…these moments, and they alone, can become the preparations in which the turning of the event unfolds into truth…" (GA 65: 409/324). The site of the moment is instantaneous, "when the truth of being flashes," as quoted above, and it is in this flash where be-ing "turns and enters" into a new epoch of its unfolding. We call these junctures of truth, which emerge from such moments, the event.

The second passage above explicitly shows that the *Eräugnis* imagery reveals the meaning of *Ereignis*. Crucially, Heidegger notes that this *Einblitz*, the self-lighting of be-ing, is the event in be-ing itself. *Ereignis* just is the activity described or, as Albert Hofstadter writes, "the very process by which the emergence into light and clearing occurs."[19] William Lovitt provides the English translation, "the event is the bringing to sight into its own," of "*Ereignis ist eignende Eräugnis*" (GA 11: 121/QCT 45). This sentence indicates, perhaps, that *Eräugnis* just is what is proper to *Ereignis*, implying that *Eräugnis* provides the imagery to understand the meaning and "activity" of *Ereignis*: the event is properly what is brought into view. Indeed, William McNeill confirms this when he examines this exact sentence. He writes, "*Ereignis*...announces itself...as the 'lightning flash' of being itself that strikes our eye."[20] As such, *Ereignis* does not just describe be-ing but is the ruptured unfolding of be-ing – what be-ing "is."[21] But this is just to say what Heidegger himself already tells us, "Be-ing essentially unfolds as the event" (GA 65: 30/25).[22]

The sentence "*Ereignis ist eignende Eräugnis*," in particular, is also crucial for demonstrating the key semantic and etymological connotations Heidegger wishes to highlight with the word *Ereignis* and its ancestor *Eräugnis*. In the sentence "*Ereignis ist eignende Eräugnis*" we see the crucial wordplay that characterizes the German term "event" on full display, which is regrettably lost in English. It is this etymological move which not only allows Heidegger to illustrate how be-ing essentially unfolds as the event by "the truth of be-ing lighting up anew," but also to analyze the event as an appropriating activity which "takes up" and "grounds" beings anew through the turn into an epoch. Breaking down the German terms into their prefix–root–suffix form shows this more clearly. In the move from *Er–äug–nis* to *Er–eig–nis*, Heidegger wants us to see the semantic play between the two roots. Thus, we see a play between *appearing* or more literally *sight/eyes* (*–äug–*) and *appropriating*, or more literally *own* (*–eig–*), even if, as Heidegger accepts, the root *eigen* (own) and its infinitives, eig*nen* and *an*eig*nen* / *zu*eig*nen* (to appropriate), are not actually part of its historical etymology (GA 71: 184–5/156–7).[23] He keeps this false etymology at play with the historical to maintain the

complementary meanings through his deployment of the term. Both, I argue, are necessary for understanding how be-ing essentially unfolds as the event with the sentence above precisely preserving both meanings: "*Ereignis ist* eignende *Eräugnis*."

This is importantly at the heart of disputes concerning the English translations of *Ereignis*, from Parvis Emad and Kenneth Maly's early English neologism "enowning" and Joan Stambaugh's "event of appropriation"[24] to Thomas Sheehan's "*a priori* opening event." Emad and Maly defend their translation choice in their lengthy "Translator's Foreword" to the first translation of *Contributions*. They explain that the *er-* prefix in *Er-eignis* indicates "achieving, enhancing, and carrying forth" – what we might refer to in English as "enabling." Enabling has the function of "putting forth the movement" of *-eignis*, which they translate as "owning," while insisting that this "owning" does not entail possession. Thus, *Er-eignis*, they contend, names an enabling "owning movement" that does not possess, but instead reveals, this ongoing movement's relationship to things: a gathering and releasing without coming to rest in a particular "possession."[25] The problem with "enowning," as many authors have already pointed out, is that it further complicates the problems of translation rather than alleviates them.[26] No average English reader understands what "enowning" means any more than they do *Ereignis*. This leads others, following Stambaugh instead, to render it more clearly as the "event of appropriation," which retains the connotations of "to own" (*eigen*) without having to create a new English word.

On the opposite side of this debate, Sheehan's emphasis on the primary meaning of the reflexive verb *sich ereignen* as "to come into view, to appear, to be brought forth and revealed," leads him to oppose the notion of the "event of appropriation" in favor of an "*a priori* event of the opening up of the open."[27] Indeed, he even goes so far as to suggest that "appropriation," while not eliminated from reference to the event, should be subordinated to the understanding of the event as an *a priori* opening. But this unfairly deprivileges the dynamic, appropriating character which is explicit in both the sentence I analyze above and the sentence Matthew King analyzes from *Identity and Difference*:

"*Er-eignen* originally means: to take in with the eyes, i.e., to catch sight of, in the glance toward what calls, *to ap-propriate*" (GA 11: 45/100–1).[28] Moreover, similar to Jean Cavaillès' critique of Edmund Husserl's historical *a priori*, Sheehan's "*a priori* opening" gives a primordial "before" which halts dynamic movement rather than generates it by reducing it to something that has always already occurred (rather than always already *occurring*), "the regular manifestation of a permanent essence."[29] In other words, conceiving of *Ereignis* as an *a priori* event of opening, a primordial happening which allows the "open" to occur, similarly runs into the problem of halting its essential unfolding.[30] As shown in section one, it runs the risk of depicting *Ereignis* as some event preceding space and time rather than the eventuation of time-space and truth. Despite this, Sheehan's careful etymological analysis and emphasis on "appearing in the open" remain crucial for the present argument; namely, that both meanings are primary to understanding the event's unfolding.

Placing the arguments for these translations within the context of the above sentence "*Ereignis ist eignende Erägunis*," allows us to understand *Ereignis* both as what is "brought into view" (i.e., the juncture of truth), which Sheehan privileges in his work, *and* the "enabling appropriation" (i.e., the turning) from epoch to epoch, which Emad, Maly, and Stambaugh privilege in theirs.[31] Both, I contend, are crucial for understanding the full (ontological and historical) sense(s) of what Heidegger means by the "event." Their meanings are co-extensive, because as the passages from "The Turning" illustrate above, the "lighting up" of beings anew is a "turn" into a new epoch. In short, there is a deliberate play on both "lighting up" and "taking up/grounding" in the turning.[32] When the truth *flashes*, bringing the surrounding area to light, the difference in the way things appear both indicates what is appropriate to an epoch and appropriates what lights up to that epoch. We could therefore also render the above sentence as: "The event is appropriately [or appropriating-ly] brought into view." At each juncture, what is proper to an epoch is what lights up as the truth of be-ing. We are thereby talking about the structures of be-ing in each epoch, how things appear and are grounded, which requires

both "appearing" (*-äug-*) and "appropriating" (*-eig-*). It is the former, which emphasizes the imagery of "lighting up" or "appearing," and the latter, which emphasizes the differentiation between the imagery of each flashing (*Einblitz*), "belonging," "fitting," and "appropriating" (i.e., transformation from epoch to epoch).

In the former case, the etymological ancestor also gives us further insight into what is meant in *Contributions* when Heidegger states, "As the juncture of truth, time-space is originally the site of the moment of the event" (GA 65: 30/26). This site is the site of the lightning-flash; the truth of be-ing erupting out of its difference in perpetual revision (by gathering and breaking forth). Heidegger confirms in *Contributions*, "Time-space as the essential occurrence of truth…[and] the *site of the moment*:…the where and the when of the history of be-ing as self-clearing and self-concealing" (GA 65: 375/296). The self-clearing and self-concealing, understood in terms of the passage from "The Turning," are the self-lighting of be-ing (i.e., the truth of be-ing). The "where and the when" are then distinguished by the epoch, which the truth of be-ing provides.

This makes the "site of the moment of the event," perhaps, as Eric Nelson describes, the point of "[seeing] differently out of the difference" of these epochal breaks.[35] But the lightning-flash is sudden. Given this, nothing guarantees the way one "sees" in an epoch; it is unpredictable. What is seen is not the result of a linear, logical (deductive), dialectical, or progressive unfolding. It is instead the result of fissure, a sudden rupture within be-ing, which mortals experience as the truth of be-ing (see GA 40: 174–83/183–94). This fissure is not merely a transition but a disruption and emergence. Whereas *Eräugnis* helped demonstrate how be-ing alights and appears as the event, fissure demonstrates how be-ing appropriates (beings) through original determinations from out of the event, the "rupture" of its ruptured unfolding.

III. *ZER-KLÜFTUNG* AND *ENT-SCHEIDUNG*: RUPTURE AS FISSURE AND DECISION

Just as *Eräugnis* illustrated *Ereignis* as a flashing that allows things to appear, fissure, as the disruption from epoch to epoch, is the activity of *Ereignis* whereby they appear ("light up") differently.[34] In this section, I contend that a close examination of the German terms fissure (*Zerkluftüng*) and decision (*Entscheidung*) from *Contributions* demonstrates how rupture is the best way to conceive of be-ing's unfolding as the event.

The truth of be-ing juts out from the fissure; this is the event of be-ing's ruptured unfolding. The very word *Zer-klüftung* (fissure) attests to this as *-klüftung* ("cleaving between") is further nuanced by *Zer-*, which implies the dissolution of prior continuity. *Zer-*, in fact, is often translated as *dis-* in English to capture this schematic meaning.[35] Fissure, then, should also be understood as dis-ruption.[36] Indeed, fissure is what is meant by "ruptured unfolding," the dis-continuity or, literally, dis-rupture, that defines the event. Thus, the essencing of be-ing ruptures precisely because that is what it means for be-ing to essentially unfold *as Ereignis*. Heidegger states this in §157 of *Contributions*: "The fissure [*Zerflüftung*] is the inner, incalculable splitting open of the ap-propriation [*Er-eignung*], i.e., the splitting open of the essential occurrence of be-ing" (GA 65: 279–80/220). If be-ing essentially occurs as *Ereignis,* fissure is the incalculable activity of its occurrence.

Incalculable, the breaks of be-ing's ruptured unfolding do not pre-exist their occurrence and, as such, are not pre-determined. Since they are not pre-determined, Heidegger explains the breaks are instead the result of a *de-cision*. De-cision implies that these epochal arrangements could have been otherwise. But, if be-ing has no agency, how can be-ing "make a decision"?

Heidegger clarifies in §43 of *Contributions* that while we are inclined to think of de-cision in terms of human action or "something that occurs in an either/or," this is not what the de-cision of be-ing implies. Instead, "de-cision is [simply] an original determination of beings as such out of the essence of be-ing" (GA 65: 89/71) and again

in §9 of *Mindfulness*, "This de-cision is not made as an 'act' of an individual person; it is the thrust of be-ing itself…wherein the *fundamental* transformation…historically unfolds as the event [*geschichtlich ereignen*]" (GA 66: 24/18, tm).[37] This rupture, described in terms of both *fissure* and *de-cision*, is thereby an ontological *and* historical occurrence; it indicates a turn into a new epoch *as* an original determination, a fundamental transformation, since "decision…is never [simply] an 'historical' critique which would always have to remain within its epoch" (GA 66: 24/18). In other words, de-cision must imply more than mere historical critique, dictated by everyday contingency. It concerns the *essencing* of be-ing. It is no surprise, then, that de-cision (*Ent-scheidung*) implies a cut or breaking off and into the essencing of be-ing, an *incision*. This incision, as Vallega-Neu explains, "articulates both…a closure and an opening."[38] As an original determination, the de-cision is about the relationship between be-ing and beings (i.e., how they come to sight). Each cut originarily determines and thereby fundamentally transforms beings anew, but on the condition that be-ing exceeds itself in the site of this incisional moment. To recall the imagery of section two, the eye closes on the previous way of seeing and opens to the possibilities of be-ing anew.[39] Yet, the original determination is not infinitely open ended, but decisively closed and opened in moments of different determinations. Hence the importance of retaining the sense of "appropriation" in translating *Ereignis* above. What is appropriate(d) to an epoch is the original determination, an essential de-cision about the relationship between be-ing and beings which defines an epoch.

As such, be-ing's de-cision "is not made but *occurs* in such a way that it can be intimated" through thinking.[40] In the history of Western metaphysics, be-ing has had several names (e.g., *physis*, *ousia*, *energia*, will to power), each of which has unfolded from an essential de-cision, what Heidegger calls "the first beginning" (GA 69: 26–7/24–5). It is this rupture, explored in terms of both fissure and de-cision, that allows us to think differently out of these different epochal arrangements. That is, thinking the de-cision of the first beginning allows us to think otherwise

than what occurred. In this way, *Ereignis* is simultaneously 1) the event of be-ing's ruptured unfolding and 2) the thinking of this ruptured unfolding historically. Both contribute to overcoming Western metaphysics in preparation for what Heidegger calls the other beginning.

IV. CONCLUSION

> What are we then supposed to expect from our first gropings…?
> (GA 65: 278–9/219)

Heidegger's *Ereignis*, I have argued, is the event of be-ing's ruptured unfolding. I showed this above by attending to three specific concepts through key passages between Heidegger's *Contributions* and "The Turning": 1) essences (*west*) and time-space, 2) appearing/unconcealing (*Eräugnis*) and truth, and 3) fissure (*Zerklüftung*) and decision. By considering the shift from using essence as a noun (*Wesen*) to a verb (*west*), I argued that the phrase "Be-ing essentially unfolds as the event" (*Das Seyn west als das Ereignis*) illustrates the move to understanding be-ing dynamically and epochally, framing my overall argument. Analyzing time-space showed this unfolding as epochal and historical. Yet, time-space, as the "site of the moment of the event" (*Aügenblicks-Stätte des Ereignisses*), also revealed that be-ing can never thereby be tied completely to any particular historical configuration. Much like the moment (*Aügenblick*) for *Dasein*, the site of the moment of the event (*Aügenblicks-Stätte des Ereignisses*) reveals that be-ing is always ecstatic, always more than the particular historical epochs in which it unfolds. This led to an analysis of *Eräugnis* – the etymological ancestor of *Ereignis* – in its relation to truth to highlight a) the way be-ing is said to "light up as the truth of be-ing" differently from epoch to epoch, b) Heidegger's purposeful semantic play between the historic etymon *-aüg-* (sight) and the homonymous etymon *-eig-* (own), which illustrates both the *appearing* and *appropriating* character of *Ereignis*, and c) to differentiate my argument from other scholars by showing that both are required to fully capture what Heidegger means by the turning in *Ereignis*. Finally, to close my argument I analyzed the term "fissure" in relation to de-cision,

illustrating how this epochal unfolding must be nuanced by the term *rupture*. Fissure, my analysis showed, is *disruption*, the incalculable and unprecedented breaks that characterize epochs of be-ing's unfolding. Decision clarified these breaks as original determinations and fundamental transformations, revealing that *Ereignis* is not merely historical, but ontological insofar as each determination grounds beings anew.

Yet, this has only been a preliminary and preparatory analysis – and by no means an exhaustive one. The scope of this article was to propose an interpretation and clarify the semantic novelty of Heidegger's *Ereignis* in key passages between *Contributions* and "The Turning." Specifically, it was to understand it as the event of be-ing's ruptured unfolding or simply to "think being as and in its historical happening."[41] As such, I do not presume to offer a complete and definitive depiction of *Ereignis*, only one that synthesizes existing scholarship and stresses key, relevant passages that are central to Heidegger's use of the term between the texts I analyze. What is especially important, I contend, is his emphasis on understanding the notion of "event" as dynamic and ecstatic, appearing and appropriating, and, ultimately, an historical rupture and decisive ontological determination.

In doing so, the most important issue my analysis contributes to is undoubtedly the disputed import and meaning of "the Event" (*Ereignis*) in Heidegger's work. While not offering an essentially new understanding of the event, my analysis contributes to scholarly debate in two main ways. First, it emphasizes the event as the founding of new epochs through a ruptured unfolding, specifying the three senses that define its "evental structure" (dynamic/ecstatic, appearing/appropriating, and historical/ontological). Second, it offers a way to think *Ereignis* from its dual historical and homonymous etymological meanings of appearing *and* appropriating without prioritizing one over the other (as the "event of appropriation" in the first case and Sheehan's "*a priori* event" in the second). Given my analysis, I especially oppose Sheehan's proposal for the role and meaning of *Ereignis* in Heidegger's work. Where Sheehan privileges "appearing" to show

that the event is both the *a priori* source of "meaning giving" for humans and the way the appropriation of the human being occurs to sustain this *a priori* "meaning giving" activity,[42] I synthesize the two meanings of the etymological roots to suggest that appearing and appropriation are immanent to be-ing's autonomous unfolding, both historically (through the appearance of the epochs of its unfolding) and ontologically (through the original determination of beings via their appropriation within such epochs). Thus, my argument rests on a fundamentally different supposition. Namely, *Ereignis* does not depend on the essential relationship between human beings and meaning, but, as the event of be-ing's ruptured unfolding, on history and ontology.[43] As such, I agree more with James Bahoh and Daniela Vallega-Neu, insofar as Heidegger's *Ereignis* concerns both a differential relationship between its historical and ontological senses and an (auto)poietic thinking from out of its occurrence, i.e., being-historical thinking.[44]

Future work, therefore, may pose the question of why we must think from *Ereignis* to overcome what Heidegger calls the "first beginning" of Western metaphysics, the first original determination from out of the essential unfolding of being (cf. GA 65: 172–7/135–9). *Ereignis* is neither merely a historical, nor solely an ontological concept. It is perhaps by thinking through this history in terms of its ruptures and original determinations that we can creatively think anew. For as Heidegger writes, "The other beginning, on the basis of a genuine originality…becomes fruitful only in the historical dialogue of thinkers" (GA 65: 187/147). As historical and ontological, we must perhaps engage in what Heidegger in *Being and Time* termed destructuring (*Destruktion*) and, perhaps at the same time, what in *Contributions* he termed inventive/inceptual thinking (*erdenken/anfängliches Denken*).[45] In elucidating these ideas, future works may find that overcoming the first beginning requires both these genealogical and creative methods. Perhaps what is key about the *event* is precisely the historical necessity and inceptive novelty in experimentally thinking be-ing's ruptured unfolding.

As such, the full expanse of this project would require exploring the relationship between "thinking *Ereignis*" as being-historical thinking (*seynsgeschichtliches Denken*) and thinking *from Ereignis* as inventive or inceptual thinking (*erdenken/anfängliches Denken*). Nonetheless, this preliminary interpretation of *Ereignis* may permit us to begin thinking be-ing anew or, at the very least, to better understand Heidegger's philosophy of the event.

NOTES

1 Thomas Sheehan, "A Paradigm Shift in Heidegger Research," *Continental Philosophy Review* 34 (2001): 1253–9. Joan Stambaugh, "Introduction," *Identity and Difference* by Martin Heidegger, trans. Joan Stambaugh (New York: Harper & Row, Publishers, 1969), 14. The debate is neither limited to these two interpretations nor are they the two definitive positions of the interpretive dispute, but I do believe they are the most fruitful to discuss for my argument.

2 Gregory Fried and Richard Polt, "Translators' Introduction" to Martin Heidegger, *Introduction to Metaphysics,* 2nd ed. (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2014), x. The word "be-ing" is an English translation of Heidegger's use of the old German spelling of being, *das Seyn*. The hyphenated English translation is meant to emphasize the verbal resonances of the term "*das Seyn*." I use it over the now standard English translation of "beyng" because, in agreement with Fried and Polt, I believe it emphasizes the "verbal, temporal meaning of Being" better than the archaic English equivalent "beyng."

3 On how the *Er-* in *Ereignis* indicates emergence (thus appropriating emerging), see Robert B. Dewell, *The Semantics of German Verb Prefixes* (Philadelphia: John Benjamins Publishing Co., 2015), 127.

4 Daniela Vallega-Neu, *Heidegger's Poietic Writings* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2018), 4.

5 Ibid., 4–5.

6 Cf. Beth Levin and Bonnie Krejci, "Talking about the Weather: Two Construals of Precipitation Events in English," *Glossa: A Journal of General Linguistics* 4: 1 (2019): 14–16. This is a contentious topic in linguistics. Some linguists argue that there is no entity that serves as a referent for "it" in this sentence, whereas Levin and Krejci recently argue that this sentence is a subset of "substance emission events," which imply an emission that is particular to some entity (e.g., blood or oil). This, of course, still cannot apply to "be-ing" since there is no determinate "substance–as–subject"

(like blood or oil), which performs "the event." Nevertheless, the above sentence is useful to illustrate the point of Heidegger's grammatical reformulation.

7 Outside of emphasizing the unusual shift from *Wesen* to *west* as "essencing," I follow Fried and Polt in translating *west* as "essentially unfolds." Compare especially their translation of "Sein west *als* Erscheinen" as "Being essentially unfolds *as* appearing" (GA 40: 108/111).

8 Cf. Gail Stenstad, *Transformations: Thinking After Heidegger* (Wisconsin: University of Wisconsin Press, 2006), 92.

9 Richard Polt, *Time and Trauma: Thinking Through Heidegger in the Thirties* (London: Rowman & Littlefield International, 2019), 14.

10 Cf. James Bahoh, *Heidegger's Ontology of Events* (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2021), 63. Bahoh goes further and emphasizes that the heart of the ontological sense of the event is characterized by a structural instability that generates time. His and my interpretation of *Ereignis* agree, I think, though our arguments take different routes to get there.

11 Daniela Vallega-Neu, "Ereignis," in *The Bloomsbury to Heidegger*, ed. François Raffoul and Eric Nelson (New York: Bloomsbury Publishing, 2016), 288.

12 Graeme Nicholson, *Heidegger on Truth: Its Essence and Its Fate* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2019), 154–59. For an excellent treatment of "truth" in Heidegger, I refer readers to Nicholson's book.

13 Albert Hofstadter, "Introduction," in Martin Heidegger, *Poetry, Language, and Thought*, trans. Albert Hofstadter (New York: Harper Perennial Modern Thought, 2013), xix. See also Thomas Sheehan, "A Paradigm Shift in Heidegger Research," *Continental Philosophy Review* 34 (2001): 196–98 and Richard Polt, *The Emergency of Being: On Heidegger's Contributions to Philosophy* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2006), 5 and 87. Polt briefly takes this imagery up in direct relation to the formula: "*Das Seyn west als das Ereignis*."

14 Daniela Vallega-Neu, *Heidegger's Poietic Writings: From Contributions to Philosophy to The Event* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2018), 5–6.

15 Polt, *Time and Trauma*, 17.

16 To ask about this relationship is to thus ask how it stands with be-ing, what Heidegger calls "The Grounding Question" (GA 40: 4–5/3). It is important to note that be-ing and beings are not separate entities which relate to each other, but, in the very sense of the imagery provided in this section, are simultaneous. He writes in *Contributions*, "Yet, be-ing is not something 'earlier' – existing in itself, for itself. Instead, the event [*Ereignis*] is the temporal-spatial simultaneity for be-ing and beings" (GA 65: 13/13).

17 For more on this imagery in terms of the question of truth and grounding in *Contributions*, see GA 65: 239/188, 307–8/243–4, 331–3/263–4, 338–41/268–70, and especially 343–4/272 and 356–7/281–2.

18 To be "evental" in this case means to constantly reveal and conceal. No moment fully "reveals" or "unconceals," otherwise being would once again be thought of as an essence [*Wesen*], and the event, "[in] the manner of an idea, [would] be established and represented" rather than essentially unfolding [*west*] (GA 71: 184/156).

19 Hofstadter, "Introduction," xx.

20 William McNeill, "On the Essence and Concept of *Ereignis*: From *Technē* to Technicity," in *After Heidegger?*, ed. Richard Polt and Gregory Fried, 251–62 (New York: Rowman & Littlefield International, 2018), 259.

21 Richard Capobianco, *Engaging Heidegger* (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2010), 34–5.

22 Sheehan, "A Paradigm Shift in Heidegger Research," 196–98.

23 Ibid., 197. See also Matthew King, "Heidegger's Etymological Method," *Philosophy Today* 51: 3 (2007): 286.

24 Stambaugh, "Introduction," 14.

25 Parvis Emad and Kenneth Maly, "Translator's Foreword," in Martin Heidegger, *Contributions to Philosophy (From Enowning)* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1989), xix-xxii.

26 Cf. Eric Nelson, "History as Decision and Event in Heidegger," *Arche* IV: 8 (2007): 97–115 and Bahoh, *Heidegger's Ontology of Events*, 11.

27 Sheehan, "A Paradigm Shift in Heidegger Research," 198.

28 King, "Heidegger's Etymological Method," 286. This is King's own translation of "*Er-eignen heißt ursprünglich: er-äugen, d.h., er-blicken, im Blicken zu sich rufen, an-eignen.*" Emphasis added.

29 Jean Cavaillès, *On Logic and the Theory of Science*, trans. Knox Peden and Robin Mackay (New York: Sequence Press, 2021), 123. Cavaillès is referring to Husserl's desire to ground a theory of science in the intentional structure of consciousness (i.e., sedimentation and the historical *a priori*) particularly in his *Formal and Transcendental Logic*. Cavaillès also critiques Immanuel Kant's *a priori* concepts of space and time for similarly primordially presupposing a definition of infinity that later is problematized by mathematical experience (Ibid., 42). In reference to Sheehan, if the temptation to use *a priori* is in the hopes of avoiding historicism, then Cavaillès has much to offer Heidegger scholarship on this account. There is a demand in Heidegger, I think, to avoid the *a priori* as much as mere historicism. The happening of the event, even in moving from the first beginning to the other beginning, is always already underway, not always already done.

30 This is not remedied in Sheehan's later *Making Sense of Heidegger*. In fact, even when he incorporates appropriation into the meaning of *Ereignis*, he still only does so on the supposition that it, in accordance with the event as an *a priori* opening of the open, "is a *fact*, that which is always already *done* (*factum*) and thus always already operative." See Thomas Sheehan, *Making Sense of Heidegger: A Paradigm Shift* (London: Rowman & Littlefield International, 2015), 234.

31 It should be emphasized again that Sheehan does not exclude the latter meaning from *Ereignis* but reserves it for an activity that takes place within *Ereignis* as the turn. Controversially, he argues that the turn essentially describes the relationship between being and *Dasein* in his overall argument that Heidegger's work is not about being, but human meaning making, which my argument opposes. Cf. Thomas Sheehan, "The Turn," in *Martin Heidegger: Key Concepts*, ed. Bret W. Davis (Durham: Acumen Publishing, 2010), 82–5 and 93–5. For an excellent critique of Sheehan's position here, see Bahoh, *Heidegger's Ontology of Events*, 147–52.

32 See GA 65: 352/278. Heidegger notes that this "taking up" should *not* be understood as Hegelian sublation (*Aufhebung*) but as grounding from out of the event. See also Bahoh, *Heidegger's Ontology of Events*, 85: As Bahoh suggests, this entails that "beyng as event is essentially self-problematizing and structurally incomplete – it is not objectively present, fully determined [at a higher level in the case of sublation], or exhaustively representable."

33 Eric Nelson, "History as Decision and Event in Heidegger," 108.

34 Polt, *The Emergency of Being*, 151. Calling to mind the imagery of §2, Polt describes fissure as "flashpoints, rifts that emerge as the volcanic event of be-ing deploys itself." Compare also with "Being essentially unfolds as appearing" in *Introduction to Metaphysics* (GA 40: 108/111).

35 Dewell, *The Semantics of German Verb Prefixes*, 169. Emad and Maly, "Translators' Preface" in Martin Heidegger, *Contributions to Philosophy (From Enowning)* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1999), xxxvi. Because *-kluft* is how the English "cleft" or the verb "to cleave" is derived, Emad and Maly translate *Zerklüftung*, *Erklüftung*, etc., as cleavage.

36 Polt, *The Emergency of Being*, 151. Polt's account of fissure as a "volcanic eruption" and the way the truth of be-ing "juts out" from fissure entices me to amend dis-ruption to dis-(e)ruption to account for the full activity. This is in line with what Heidegger writes in *Contributions*: "decision is the erupting fissure of be-ing itself" (GA 65: 103/81).

37 Heidegger also discusses the notion of "undecidability" (*Unentscheidbarkeit*) in GA 66. Undecidability refers to the space of preparation for the moment of decision. It is how Heidegger characterizes his thought, according to Vallega-Neu, as a "historical meditation [*Besinnung*] on the truth of beyng." It concerns the preparation of the de-cision which has yet to occur. Heidegger thus often refers to it in terms of "leaping ahead." In relation to how I use de-cision in this essay, it can be thought of as the thinking of the event in preparation for its occurrence as the other beginning, which I briefly discuss as inceptual thinking. Vallega-Neu, *Heidegger's Poietic Writings*, 65–7.

38 Vallega-Neu, "Thinking in Decision," 248. The etymology of the verb form *scheiden*, in fact, means to separate or divide. See Jacob und Wilhelm Grimm, *Deutsches Wörterbuch* (Leipzig, 1854–1960), Bd. 14, Sp. 2403.

39 Ibid. Vallega-Neu explains being in de-cision as be-ing's shift underneath one. One must respond to this decision even if one did not make it. She provides ample examples including the birth of a child, the diagnosis of a terminal illness, and falling in love.

40 Nelson, "History as Decision and Event in Heidegger," 101.

41 Vallega-Neu, *Heidegger's Poietic Writings*, 1.

42 Sheehan, "The Turn," 85.

43 This is not to say that the human being plays no role, only not an essential one. *Ereignis* is not, I contend, an activity that describes the relationship between being and the human being, but the unfolding of be-ing. Humans may be taken up by or belong to this essential unfolding, but we do not thereby play a central role in *making it happen*. Even less so, then, should *Ereignis* be thought of as an *a priori* of or for *Dasein*. My suggestion that be-ing is an "autonomous unfolding" similarly does not eliminate the role played by beings, it only emphasizes that they immanently belong to this unfolding.

44 Bahoh, *Heidegger's Ontology of Events*, 13–4, 68–70, and esp. 161–82. Vallega-Neu, *Heidegger's Poietic Writings*, 2. I am committed

to Vallega-Neu's idea that being-historical thinking is itself a poietic process, a way of "getting in the flow" of be-ing's own autopoietic unfolding.

45 GA 2: 29–35/SZ 21–26 and 517/SZ 391–2; GA 65: 56/45–6, 205–6/160–1, 228–30/180–2, 409–17/324–30, and especially 456–65/359–66.

On the Way to Thought: Heidegger's Philosophical Practice

Elena Bartolini

ABSTRACT: Much has been said about Martin Heidegger's revolution within the history of Western philosophy: he intensely confronted the works of ancient philosophers, modern thinkers, and colleagues contemporary to him, challenging each one of them with his sharp questioning. Shall we deduce that Heidegger wanted to formulate the ultimate philosophical system, i.e., a philosophy that aims at gaining the most sophisticated, erudite knowledge *only*? Indeed, Heidegger's style seems to be uniquely focused on the theoretical side of wisdom. However, Heidegger's philosophy speaks at length about his training in thinking and his practice of meditating. Motivating for this consideration, how should we understand his teachings and philosophical suggestions? With this paper, I want to propose a reading of Heidegger that goes beyond *theoresis* alone and that shows how he urges each of us to undertake our philosophical path.

KEYWORDS: Heidegger, ontology, philosophical practices, ethics, meditation.

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1. INTRODUCTION

Heidegger's theoretical focus on being is well attested by his entire philosophical production: while other philosophical movements were, on the one side, interested in the gnosiological analysis of the human or, on the other, in "returning to the things themselves" as promoted by his mentor Husserl, Heidegger insisted on the questioning around being as a fundamental, pivotal concern. Already at an early stage, although presented in the fashion of a methodological way of proceeding, Heidegger proposes the questioning around being as a philosophical practice: he suggests that whoever is interested in taking up a serious philosophical investigation, besides reading and studying, should learn to *formulate appropriate questions*, therefore being disposed of such an attitude that permits thought to arise appropriately. In other words, Heidegger points out that, at that time, the philosophical reflection was still moving from concepts taken from previous traditions, stratified by centuries of interpretation: because being busy with each of those considerations concerning the many entities of the world, no one paid proper attention to the very source of those entities. Even worse: no one was even *aware* of the need for reflection on such a source.[1] Therefore, philosophy has transformed itself into an elaboration of theoretical bridges between separated concepts, gradually departing from actual lived experience.[2]

Differently from the scholars who try to deduce ethical values from Heidegger's pages or who attempt to establish connections between Heidegger's elaborations and current moral discussions,[3] here the aim is to go in the other direction. Moving from Heidegger's claims on the right disposition to achieve the experience of thought, as well as from the reports given by students who shared some time with him, it will be possible to trace his very own philosophical practice.[4] Not only through words and works, then, but through his way of coming to philosophy and embodying his philosophical commitment, Heidegger proposes a path for philosophy itself. In the next paragraphs, we will consider some eloquent passages that prove Heidegger's peculiar engagement with philosophy – an engagement that is both worth studying and still inspiring for today's philosophical research.

2. SOME INITIAL TESTIMONIES

In the biography of Heidegger written by Rüdiger Safranski,[5] the author reports the words of Arnold von Buggenhagen, who claims:

> Heidegger spoke in a medium-loud voice, without notes, and into his speech flowed an exceptional intellect, but even more so a force of will that determined the direction his speech would take, especially when the subject became dangerous. In the role of a speaker on ontological matters, he presented not so much the image of a professor as that of a captain-commodore on the bridge of an ocean giant in an age when drifting icebergs could still mean the sinking of even a Titanic craft.[6]

Considering the performative aspects of Heidegger's mode of lecturing together with the subjects he presented, it is compelling to notice von Buggenhagen's opinion: resembling the behavior of other young students, yearning to find a master who could indoctrinate them with the ultimate truth, the teacher they found in front of them instead presented a new way of philosophizing. According to them, Heidegger paid no interest in assuring or comforting his young audience with a philosophical scheme that could be applied to whatever scope of knowledge. From Buggenhagen's words, besides the fascination of a student for his charismatic teacher, it is possible to verify how Heidegger approached his philosophical work thanks to someone who stood in his vivid presence. It is quite striking to learn that Heidegger displayed a medium tone of voice and that he willingly and bravely engaged with philosophy, facing important questions. According to this report, Heidegger seemed quiet and deeply involved in the discussion, without the need for notes. Interestingly enough, since the beginning, the German philosopher preferred to ground his philosophy on different terms than those belonging to traditional metaphysics, in fact, he rather tried to challenge and re-define metaphysical terms. This is not at all surprising considering the entirety of his philosophical project, ultimately coming to a *poietic* understanding of language in his later work;[7] at the same time, however,

it shows the urgency of his task to go beyond terminology even while it is nevertheless necessary to employ a philosophical lexicon. Hence, Heidegger not only taught his students a university course, but he personified a way of embodying his philosophical commitment. Adopting a metaphor, Buggenhagen compares his teacher to a captain who leads the students through the dangers of thinking, where it is common to deal with important, or even deadly, difficulties. Although Buggenhagen does not disclose expressly what would be the actual fatal risk in thinking according to his allegory, it may be possible to understand it in terms of the danger of grounding one's system of thought in the wrong fundament or, also, to cease questioning that which should be the most questionable. Thus, Heidegger led the students with his example of fearless confrontation, challenging every concept usually taken for granted by metaphysics.

In other words, Buggenhagen's statement describes how the "philosophy of existence" began from the dialogue between teachers and students on the puzzling questions inherited from the late 19th-century philosophy, especially about the relation between human beings and the knowledge of the world.[8] As a consequence of this new behavior toward philosophy, they took "an encouragement to bring oneself into play 'somehow,'" where "its charm was in the very vagueness of this 'somehow.'"[9] The way Heidegger presented himself to the audience showed a personal implication with the questions at issue: it was clear to the students that the ontological problems brought to their attention were to be considered more than just theoretical concerns, even more than inquiries needed to be solved schematically or to be mechanically applied later. Therefore, the core of the entire reflection, which is about how human beings can deal with such open possibilities, stands undefined: no answers are assured, only more questions are posed. It is precisely such an ambiguity, i.e., this aporetic indistinctness raised by increasingly refined questioning, that causes a feeling of disorientation and bewilderment among them. Using Heideggerian terminology we could claim that Dasein's thrownness (*Geworfenheit*), described by Heidegger in *Being and Time*, is already at play here, in his access to philosophy, in what we could call his philosophical practice. To clarify the matter, Safranski concludes: "it soon

became obvious that Heidegger's philosophizing was not concerned with personal confessions, with expressionism";[10] and: "Heidegger's students soon realized that his philosophy course could not simply be 'crammed for' like traditional university subjects."[11]

In Heidegger's classes, therefore, philosophy was put to the test of life, challenged by every question, and provoked by each reflection that emerged. Methodologically, the attitude suggested is to apprehend philosophy moving away from the strict dichotomy between theory and practice, where the first has to be passively undergone while the second actively follows as if it were a contingent application of more general principles. Consequently, anyone who attempts their way on this path must experience a solitary confrontation with doubt and the shivers coming from the lack of a solid foundation. Some years later, in *Contributions to Philosophy (Of the Event)*, Heidegger presents a reflection on the importance of questioning to underlying the fundamental role of this kind of attitude for the philosophical inquiry. In his words,

> and yet, in the driving onset of questioning, there is affirmation of what is not yet accomplished, and there is the widening of questioning into what is still not weighed out and needs to be considered. What reigns here is going beyond ourselves into what raises us above ourselves. Questioning is becoming free for what is compelling, though sheltered. In what is seldom experienced as its ownmost, questioning is quite different from the semblance of what is precisely not its ownmost. This often robs the disencouraged of their last reserve of fortitude. (GA 65: 10/8)

Concerning Heidegger's posture, in the book dedicated to Hannah Arendt's life,[12] Alois Prinz attests to similar evidence, confirming that:

> Many students in Marburg expect Heidegger to create a new worldview that they can then choose. But that's a misunderstanding. Heidegger refuses to say what this determination should cling to. [...] However, Heidegger

> is not further away from supplying rules of life or giving comforting orientation.[13]

Prinz validates once more that Heidegger's way of teaching, and therefore also of doing his philosophical work, showed a systematic resistance to pre-established rules, against applicable lines of behavior that disable any kind of reflexive stimulus. To overcome such "consoling guidelines" there is only one thing to do: go back to "actual life." Husserl's motto "to the things themselves" was not enough for Heidegger: this latter pushes his efforts further, up to *factual life*. Facticity is, in fact, one of Heidegger's main interests since the early beginning of his career: instead of paying attention to things, according to his perspective, philosophy should devote its curiosity to the very fact of existence in the developmental unfolding of life. Deriving this position from the work of Dilthey, Theodore Kisiel underlines the point of view of Heidegger, saying that:

> the young Heidegger thus sharply juxtaposes the historically situated I over against any sort of theoretical I or transcendental ego abstracted in Cartesian fashion from its vital context, thereby denuded of its world, dehistoricized and devitalized.[14]

If Heidegger's proposal is willing to remain as close as possible to how life appears and how human beings live it, then transcendental egos, detached from their peculiar historical connotations, are no longer useful. The definition of a theoretical "I" immune from its proper horizon, i.e., from the circumstances in which human beings live and act, is not the ambition of a proper philosophical project. Paying attention to historical context means acknowledging the unicity that is on display before any sort of theoretical reflection, ahead of any conceptualized appropriation, when we simply live – when we openly are. The phenomenological interest of the young Heidegger aims towards an investigation of the philosophical terms used to consider, interpret, and provide a meaning to this pre-theoretical or proto-scientifical experience.

3. THE PRACTICE OF HEARING AND SILENCE

Hermann Mörchen, one of Heidegger's early students, describes the meaningful silences of Heidegger's thinking when he was together with them in the classroom. Words did matter greatly in the philosophical approach perpetuated by the German thinker, but the quiet lack of words played a crucial role as well. Already in *Being and Time,* we read about the power of silence, i.e., the incitement to interrupt small talks or chats.[15] And, again, already in the same text, silence is connected to *Dasein's* capacity to listen (GA 2: 214/SZ 161).[16] The exercise of listening, as the awareness of the true function of discourse, is a trait that remains in Heidegger's later work, acquiring even more value. In the summer semester course of 1944, for instance, he discusses Heraclitus' Fragment 50, for which he provides the following translation:

> If you have listened not merely to me, but rather have listened to the Logos (in obedience to it, hearkening to it), then knowledge (which subsists therein) is to say the same as the Logos: one is all. (GA 55: 243/187)[17]

In this initial interpretation, the elements acknowledged in such a statement concern knowledge; however, no erudite acquaintance is mentioned – rather only hearing, and therefore saying, are indicated. In particular, it is told that λόγος – which indeed turns out to represent an expressive way for being to be displayed – is something we hear (*hören*), i.e., it is audible. Nevertheless, according to Heraclitus' phrase, it cannot be something that leads back to whoever speaks in the fragment. At the same time, as we know, to listen "means to apprehend something by means of the ear" (GA 55: 244/187). However, Heidegger claims, there is a certain difference between simple hearing with our ears, which he calls "effortless and will-less" hearing (GA 55: 244/187), and a more attentive one (*hinhören*), as we actually do when we are "all ears" (GA 55: 244/188). In effect, as Heidegger suggests, the human being's tendency to hear is rooted in our very own nature, to the extent that we in fact have ears because of it and not the other way around (GA 55: 247/189).[18]

Therefore, according to Heidegger's provocative account, here he attests that our physiological structure is due to a more essential disposition that characterizes our being since its very origin. In this perspective, even if we hear because of our ears, this is not the most fundamental way of hearing, but rather a more superficial experience of it. With a sharp gesture, Heidegger suggests that language itself, with the expression "all ears," says in a very enigmatic way that, indeed, we "have forgotten about our actual ears" (GA 55: 244/188). This means, perhaps, that what is essential is no longer the particular hearing that happens through our physical ears – or, at least, not only; rather, "that which we are apprehending takes us along with it and accepts us. Attending-to does not depend upon what is presently in the ear" (GA 55: 244/188). Heidegger indicates that actual hearing happens when no-thing is audible, and therefore listening is actually "hearkening" (*horchen*) (GA 55: 245/188). Hence, the proper hearkening of which Dasein is capable of does not happen when we pay attention to single elements, to discrete entities, but to what comes to us as in its meaningful togetherness – being as Λόγος. If we can hearken to it, that is because we are somehow already obedient to what comes forward to meet us, then an encounter occurs, and such an encounter is an attunement. Attunement is the unique possibility that precedes knowledge, and it represents a disposition of openness. Heidegger then suggests that when we say what Λόγος says, this is real σοφία, real wisdom. The ὁμολογεῖν mentioned in Heraclitus' fragment, in fact, attests that Dasein can recognize and express the same that Λόγος says. The kind of behavior implied in Heidegger's above considerations is an all-encompassing approach that invites us to engage with what happens around and with the world in a receptive disposition. The openness just described is to all intents and purposes a philosophical practice that, according to the thinker, represents the actual philosophical knowledge. In other words, Heidegger is reporting a way of being for the human being, a methodological attitude that includes but doesn't stop at the level of a textual search. Although the German philosopher eludes a detailed delineation of effective practical exercises, he indeed indicates modes of existence and a proper meditative disposition to philosophize. Not

enough proper attention is given to the difference that Heidegger tries constantly to make between reasoning and thinking, that is, between a sophisticated logical argumentation and actual thought. Heidegger's suggestion shows his intention to follow this second direction in a poietic way that is inspired by being itself (GA 50).

Considering Heidegger's account in the *Zollikon Seminars* (GA 89) as well as what was affirmed in that context, we can deduce some further considerations about the involvement of our physical dimension in hearing. Whereas, previously, Heidegger seems not to emphasize the physical dimension of hearing, now we will examine a passage where this physical aspect is instead enhanced. Unsurprisingly, in doing so he mentions the same phrase – "I am all ears" – employed in the analysis of Heraclitus' Fragment 50. Here Heidegger speaks of "bodily participation," stating:

> Hearing and speaking, and thus language in general, are *also* always *phenomena of the body*. Hearing is a being-with-the-theme in a bodily way. To hear something in itself involves the relation of bodying forth to what is heard. Bodying forth [*Leiben*] always belongs to being-in-the-world. *It always codetermines being-in-the-world, openness, and the having of a world.* (GA 89: 126/ZS 96–97, em)

About these lines, I would like to stress the explicit bond between hearing and the body that Heidegger expresses. Language in general, he says, is always a phenomenon of the body: this signifies that, independently from our willingness, our body is entailed in Λόγος, our body is affected by and affects Λόγος – that is, being. But there is more: language is a phenomenon of the body not only when we speak, that is, when we actively engage with the linguistic dimension; it is always a phenomenon of the body, starting from the very moment of hearing. Our bodily sphere, whose confines are not identifiable with the borders of our skin,[19] is part of the attunement that characterizes our being-in-the-world. This attunement is twofold, as Daniela Vallega-Neu points

out: on the one hand, it says the way we are "addressed and claimed by something or a sense of being";[20] on the other, it tells the way "this being claimed and being attuned configures our lived bodies, orients, and directs them, opens them up and lets them stay concealed."[21] Most importantly, the attunement in which we are involved concerns "how the dispositions of our bodies may allow us to listen and be open to what calls to be thought."[22] When solicited to give precise indications about which one of the two dimensions of hearing – physical or not – is the most important, Heidegger always addresses both, showing their complex interwovenness. Hence, we have ears because we hear, and yet such hearkening is not at all just a bodily activity. And yet, physiological hearing is an essential part of the human being's attunement.

Hearing is a practice of connection: it links us to others, to the community we were born and raised in, and to the meaning that structures the world in which we dwell. Such a bond tells our orientation in this world, says our being situated, that is, provides the framework so that everything involved here is meaningful. The hearing Heidegger talks about calls us, asks us to respond to this same being that questions us, and, in doing so, immediately grasps us in a hiatus that, looking better, is the same one characterizing our existence since the very beginning. When we pay attention to what is, if we hearken to what presents itself in its wholeness – as one –, we never fail to understand the meaning of our existence. It comes to us by itself.

Following the reasonings presented in Heidegger's *The End of Philosophy*, Claudia Baracchi draws some consequences about the future of thought we should try to bring forth. According to her reading, from now on the task of philosophy should be the care of sensibility. Baracchi recognizes the reticence showed by Heidegger concerning the employment of the term "sensation," probably due to his striving to not reduce the human being to one's bodily borders. Nevertheless, she attests that

> his reflection on the end is a constellation of references to the phenomenological turning point, to the return to "things themselves" (which is in itself a motif of Platonic-Aristotelian thought). Turning to things, to

> their sensible splendor, implies a further sensitization [...]. Where Heidegger crosses paths with the unthinkable in Aristotle, we could try to say: the end of philosophy *is* the task of thought, *and this task is sensitivity*. That is to say: the task glimpsed in this end involves the care of feeling, since in such cultivation and refinement one can perhaps find access to what remains to be thought.[23]

Hence, the scholar makes explicit some hints that otherwise would remain unexpressed through Heidegger's words, and she does so by a quite provocative – however well-grounded – proposal: if as human beings who should devote their highest capability to the active engagement with thought – not to philosophy understood as an enclosed system of propositions – we need to come back to things themselves and then see beyond things themselves, therefore we are required to take care of the way we have primary access to them, i.e., sensibility. Her invitation is to shed light on the very modality thanks to which the world comes to us: it is not at all a passive undergoing, but an attuned awareness of presence. Through simple, meditative exercises, it is possible to increase this sensibility. Taking care of it means also paying attention to the situations we put ourselves into, to the circumstances through which we decide to situate ourselves or in which we are placed. Paying attention to our sensibility is a secure, even though quite difficult, practice to perfect our way of thinking, to avoid falling back into theories, into conceptual frameworks that, instead of expressing what occurs, curb it into inappropriate forms. As we have seen, it is Heidegger himself who suggests this methodological approach.

4. THE GOAL IS THE VERY SEEKING ITSELF

Other examples of Heidegger's way of taking up his philosophical task can be drawn from the intimate letters he wrote to the people close to him. In particular, it is interesting to read how he described to Hannah Arendt and to his wife Elfride how he preferred to do research work, especially the kind of mood Heidegger tried to get into or recreate when

he wanted to access a certain state of mind. In this sense, Heidegger preferred the solitude of the mountains and the company of farmers in Todtnauberg, where Elfride had a cabin built in the summer of 1922. The simple life of the countryside, a very essential existence, contributed to helping him focus on important ontological themes. As we have seen, however, the disposition toward thinking is not a matter of thought only or, to be more precise, it is a practice that is not possible to distinguish from an actual concrete engagement. In other words, Heidegger shows that the intellectual work he was busy with needs to become a habit, an ἕξις, that must be trained in order to bear the weight of such an effort. The philosopher was reluctant to formulate theories to this extent; nevertheless, these teachings permeate the description of his philosophical work. In a letter to Arendt, he says: "But the most overwhelming thing is that only a few manage to imagine that thinking is a rigorous profession, even if the calloused hands and all the corresponding equipment are not exhibited."[24]

Because of the specific features of philosophical labor, which is mostly a matter of inner conversion, it becomes difficult to show to others the results of such work. Or, better, there is apparently no physical change, according to Heidegger, that can be exhibited to demonstrate the effort, the struggle, the confrontation. Philosophy leaves invisible teachings and undetectable scars. Nevertheless, the intimate modification shines through the way in which whoever does that work lives, especially in a tension towards a relentless questioning that seems to never be satisfied. A first evident testimony in this sense is traceable at the very beginning of *Basic Questions of Philosophy. Selected "Problems" of "Logic"* (GA 45). Here, Heidegger claims:

> Only one who throws himself into the all-consuming fire of the questioning of what is most worthy of questioning has the right to say more of the basic disposition than its allusive name. Yet once he has wrested for himself this right, he will not employ it but will keep silent. For all the more reason, the basic disposition should never become an object of mere talk, for

> example in the popular and rash claim that what we are now teaching is a philosophy of restraint. (GA 45: 2/4)[25]

The reflection concerning the preliminary disposition that prepares to think points out the overall involvement of those who devote themselves to the philosophical spirit.[26] Heidegger underlines the need to expose oneself firsthand to this kind of experience before speaking of philosophical or ontological matters. Moreover, once touched, what remains of that very matter is *silence*. One could understand this silence in terms of a passive withstanding ruled by being, in which the human remains mute and unexpressed. I think, though, that this silence represents the awareness of the impossibility of grasping being with our vocal or written signs, not even by employing an archaic term or by crossing out a noun. When being reclaims the attention of human beings, they cannot properly speak, and so they wander or keep searching. Heidegger further specifies:

> For *our goal is the very seeking itself*. What is the seeking but the most constant being-in-proximity to what conceals itself, out of which each need happens to come to us and every jubilation fills us with enthusiasm. The very seeking is the goal and at the same time what is found. (GA 45: 3/6)[27]

This last quotation is particularly significant to understand Heidegger's approach to philosophy. It stimulates a continuous attentiveness to what comes to us, to what is revealed in front of our eyes. Interestingly enough, such a way of enduring the philosophical work does lead to seeking itself: no solid ground or arrival is assured for who does philosophy and so does not stop caring.[28] It is indeed a solicitation to keep wondering, to never settle, and to do philosophy in our everydayness.

5. CONCLUSION

Through this paper, I attempted to display some of the indications provided by Heidegger's behavior and works, aiming to encourage everyone interested in philosophy to begin their own path – an incitement to be open, but especially attentive, to what comes to us and to what has yet to be, what has not yet been said. Far from being a school subject separated from life, detached from everydayness or from the occurrences and the deep turbulences of this existence, philosophy shows itself to be the most sincere way, thanks to which we can live meaningfully. If we pay attention to the words and the example he embodied, Heidegger indeed showed a way to do so.

NOTES

1 This point can be illuminated by the quotation taken from Plato's *Sophist* employed as exergue, attesting that we should be more aware of the philosophical background usually taken for granted, that is, the very consideration of what is understood as being. At the very beginning of his most known work, Heidegger clarifies the issues surrounding the very word 'being' – i.e., the universality of the concept, its indefinability, its self-evidence – and then frames the ontological questions of which he intends to provide his contribution in the following pages. In Heidegger's words: "...δῆλον γὰρ ὡς ὑμεῖς μὲν ταῦτα (τί ποτε βούλελεσθε σημαίνειν ὁπόταν ὄν φθέγγησθε) πάλαι γιγνώσκετε, ἡμεῖς δὲ πρὸ τοῦ μὲν ᾠόμεθα, νῦν δ' ἠπορήκαμεν... [Plato, *Sophist* 244a] "For manifestly you have long been aware of what you mean when you use the expression '*being*.' We, however, who used to think we understood it, have now become perplexed." Do we in our time have an answer to the question of what we really mean by the word 'being'? Not at all. So it is fitting that we should raise anew t*he question of the meaning of being*. But are we nowadays even perplexed at our inability to understand the expression 'being'? Not at all. So first of all we must reawaken an understanding for the meaning of this question. Our aim in the following treatise is to work out the question of the meaning of *being* and to do so concretely" (GA 2: SV/SZ 1). Also see some pages later (GA 2: 4–5/ SZ 3–4).

2 For an understanding of the historical origin of philosophy as a way of living see the work of Pierre Hadot, especially *What is Ancient Philosophy?*, trans. M. Chase (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2002).

3 Reading the volume by François Raffoul and David Pettigrew, eds., *Heidegger and Practical Philosophy* (Albany: SUNY Press, 2002) has been particularly encouraging in this sense, especially the essays authored by Jean-Luc Nancy, Jean Greisch, Miguel de Beistegui, Charles E. Scott, Peg Birmingham, Lawrence J. Hatab,

Pierre Jacerme, Andrew Mitchell, and William J. Richardson. I refer also to the volume edited by Gregory Fried and Richard Polt, *After Heidegger?* (London: Rowman & Littlefield International, 2017), with special attention to the essays of Dennis J. Schmidt, Arun Iyer, Daniela Vallega-Neu, Andrew J. Mitchell, and Iain Thomson.

4 The specific claims proposed by Heidegger as well as the names of the scholars who gave accounts of Heidegger's attitude will be provided in the following sections.

5 Rüdiger Safranski, *Martin Heidegger: Between Good and Evil*, trans. E. Osers (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1999).

6 Safranski, *Martin Heidegger: Between Good and Evil*, 132.

7 On this topic, see Daniela Vallega-Neu, *Heidegger's Poietic Writings. From* Contributions to Philosophy *to* The Event (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2018).

8 Safranski, *Martin Heidegger: Between Good and Evil*, 132: "Buggenhagen describes the effect of this new tone of philosophizing, which was christened 'existential philosophy' only after the publication of Jaspers's principal philosophical work in 1932. It was a relief from the demands of a seemingly shallow rational universalism and an encouragement to bring oneself into play 'somehow.'"

9 Safranski, *Martin Heidegger: Between Good and Evil*, 132.

10 Safranski, *Martin Heidegger: Between Good and Evil*, 132.

11 Safranski, *Martin Heidegger: Between Good and Evil*, 133.

12 Alois Prinz, *Beruf Philosophin oder die Liebe zur Welt. Die Lebensgeschichte der Hannah Arendt* (Weinheim: Gulliver, 2002).

13 Prinz, *Beruf Philosophin oder die Liebe zur Welt. Die Lebensgeschichte der Hannah Arendt*, 52–53: "Viele Studenten in Marburg erwarten, dass Heidegger eine neue Weltanschauung entwirft, für die sie sich dann entscheiden können. Aber das ist ein Missverständnis. Heidegger weigert sich, Auskunft zu geben darüber, woran sich diese Entschlossenheit festhalten soll. [...] Nicht liegt jedoch Heidegger ferner, als Lebensregeln zu liefern oder tröstliche Orientierungen zu geben" (my translation).

14 Theodore Kisiel, "Hermeneutics of Facticity," in *Martin Heidegger: Key Concepts*, ed. B. W. Davis (Durham: Acumen Publishing Limited, 2010), 19.

15 For the inspiring exchange we had on this topic, I would like to acknowledge Zack Sievers, PhD.

16 "As the existential constitution of the disclosedness of Da-sein, discourse is constitutive for the existence of Da-sein. *Hearing* and *keeping silent* are possibilities belonging to discoursing speech. The constitutive function of discourse for the existentiality of existence first becomes completely clear in these phenomena. First of all, we must develop the structure of discourse as such." And again (GA 2: 218–9/SZ 164–5): "Another essential possibility of discourse has the same existential foundation, *keeping silent*. In talking with one another the person who is silent 'lets something be understood,' that is, he can develop an understanding more authentically than the person who never runs out of words. [...] Authentic silence is possible only in genuine discourse. In order to be silent, Da-sein must have something to say, that is, must be in command of an authentic and rich disclosedness of itself. Then reticence makes manifest and puts down 'idle talk.' As a mode of discourse, reticence articulates the intelligibility of Dasein so primordially that it gives rise to a genuine potentiality for hearing and to be a being-with-one-another that is transparent."

17 οὐκ ἐμοῦ ἀλλὰ τοῦ λόγου ἀκούσαντας ὁμολογεῖν σοφόν ἐστιν Ἓν Πάντα" (DK 22B50).

18 "We do not listen because we have ears: rather, we have and can have ears because we listen" (GA 55: 247/189).

19 Daniela Vallega-Neu, "Thinking Bodily Time-Spaces with and Beyond Heidegger," in *After Heidegger?*, ed. G. Fried and R. Polt (London: Rowman & Littlefield International, 2017), 300: "This bodying-forth is fundamentally ecstatic, in Heidegger's account. The limit of bodying-forth is not the skin, not even what lies within the scope of our senses, but rather the horizon of being in which I dwell" (ZS 87).

20 Vallega-Neu, "Thinking Bodily Time-Spaces with and Beyond Heidegger," 300.

21 Vallega-Neu, "Thinking Bodily Time-Spaces with and Beyond Heidegger," 300.

22 Vallega-Neu, "Thinking Bodily Time-Spaces with and Beyond Heidegger," 300–1.

23 Claudia Baracchi, *Filosofia Antica e Vita Effimera. Migrazioni, trasmigrazioni e laboratori della psiche* (Pistoia: petite plaisance, 2020), 33. Here is the entire passage, which I think is worth reading in its entirety: "his reflection on the end is a constellation of references to the phenomenological turning point, to the return to 'things themselves' (which is in itself a motif of Platonic-Aristotelian thought). Turning to things, to their sensible splendor, implies a further sensitization: since, in turn, the radiant manifestation of things evokes the open, expansive opening of the world that is always already at stake, albeit inconspicuous, in the unfolding of the manifestation. So this turning point (to the things themselves) keeps philosophy at the limit, in a confrontation with the other than itself, the other that can only be received and affirmed starting from this passivity. The end of philosophy is always signaled in the reference to things, and it is in this call (to things and to the open which is the condition of their manifest becoming) that the task of thinking is given, what is yet to be thought. Where Heidegger crosses paths with the unthinkable in Aristotle, we could try to say: the end of philosophy is the task of thought, and this task is sensitivity. That is to say: the task glimpsed in this end involves the care of feeling, since in such cultivation and refinement one can perhaps find access to what remains to be thought" (my translation).

See also Claudia Baracchi, "A Vibrant Silence: Heidegger and the End of Philosophy," in *Being Shaken: Ontology and the Event*, ed. Michael Marder and Santiago Zabala (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2014), 92–121.

24 Massimo Bonola and Ursula Ludz, *Hannah Arendt Martin Heidegger Lettere 1925–1975 e altre testimonianze* (Torino: Edizioni di Comunità, 2001), 82 (my translation).

25 Just before, Heidegger had spoken of restraint in terms of the basic disposition to achieve to be introduced to philosophical thinking (GA 45: 1/3): "The task of this brief preliminary interpretation of the essence of philosophy will simply be to attune [*abzustimmen*] our questioning attitude to the right basic disposition [*Grundstimmung*] or, to put it more prudently, to allow this basic disposition a first resonance. But, then, philosophy, the most rigorous work of abstract thought, and – disposition? Can these two really go together, philosophy and disposition? To be sure; for precisely when, and because, philosophy is the most rigorous thinking in the purest dispassion, it originates from and remains within a very high disposition. Pure dispassion is not nothing, certainly not the absence of disposition, and not the sheer coldness of the stark concept. On the contrary, the pure dispassion of thought is at bottom only the most rigorous maintenance of the highest disposition, the one open to the uniquely uncanny fact: that there *are* beings, rather than not."

26 Here I intend "spirit" and "spiritual" in the sense of Pierre Hadot, that is, according to a connotation not necessarily connected with a religious or divine dimension, rather indicating the human being in its existential complexity.

27 He follows: "Yet we maintain that seeking brings into existence the highest constancy and equanimity – though only when this seeking *genuinely* seeks, i.e., extends into the farthest reaches of what is most concealed and thereby leaves behind all mere curiosity. And what is more concealed than the ground of what is so uncanny, namely that beings are rather than are not? What withdraws from us more than the essence of Being, i.e., the essence of that which, in all the fabricated and disposed beings holding sway around us and bearing us on, is the closest but at the same time the most worn out (through constant handling) and therefore the most ungraspable?

To posit the very seeking as a goal means to anchor the beginning and the end of all reflection in the question of the truth – not of this or that being or even of all beings, but of Being itself. The grandeur of man is measured according to what he seeks and according to the urgency by which he remains a seeker. Such questioning of the truth of Being is sovereign knowledge, philosophy. Here questioning already counts as knowing, because no matter how essential and decisive an answer might be, the answer cannot be other than the penultimate step in the long series of steps of a questioning founded in itself. In the domain of genuine seeking, to find does not mean to cease seeking but is the highest intensity of seeking. This preliminary interpretation of the essence of philosophy will, to be sure, have meaning for us only when we experience such knowledge in the labour of questioning [...]" (GA 45: 5–6/6–7).

28 Laurel A. Madison, "Have We Been Careless with Socrates' Last Words? A Rereading of the *Phaedo*," *Journal of the History of Philosophy* 40, no. 4 (October 2002): 421–36.

BOOK FORUM

Of an Alien Homecoming: Reading Heidegger's "Hölderlin"

by Charles Bambach

COMMENTERS:
Ian Alexander Moore
Krzysztof Ziarek

INTRODUCTION: SCOTT CAMPBELL

In this issue of *Gatherings*, we are inaugurating what may become a new feature of the journal, namely a *Book Forum*. In October of 2022, the Heidegger Circle held a session at the Society for Phenomenology and Existential Philosophy (SPEP) on Charles Bambach's book *Of an Alien Homecoming: Reading Heidegger's "Hölderlin"* (SUNY Press, 2022). That session led to the idea that the journal could host a *Book Forum* so that book authors might respond directly and immediately to their critics. Hence, this *Book Forum*. Ian Alexander Moore and Krzysztof Ziarek comment on the book. Following those comments, Charles Bambach highlights features of his book and has an opportunity to respond to their comments.

Gatherings: The Heidegger Circle Annual 14 (2024): 191–226

A Tale of Two Heideggers – and Two Hölderlins?

Ian Alexander Moore

Wurzel alles Übels.
Einig zu seyn, ist göttlich und gut; woher ist die Sucht denn
Unter den Menschen, dass nur Einer und Eines nur sei?

The Root of All Evil.
Being at one is godly and good; yet whence this obsession
Shared among men that there be One and just one thing alone?
– Hölderlin[1]

In early 1976, aware of his impending demise, Heidegger copied out excerpts from five of Hölderlin's late poems and requested that they be read aloud, "slowly and straightforwardly," at his funeral (GA 16: 749). Included in his directive were references to the volume from which Heidegger was citing as well as to its editor. This was the fourth volume of Norbert von Hellingrath's edition of Hölderlin, which was officially published in 1916, the same year in which Hellingrath, as Heidegger would often remember, fell on the frontline at the battle of Verdun.[2] Heidegger's request may seem a minor detail. It is, in any case, easy to miss. Yet, as Charles Bambach shows in his magisterial study *Of an Alien Homecoming*, behind the name "Hellingrath" lies the tale of Heidegger's lifelong fascination with Hölderlin as the sole mouthpiece of German and hence Occidental salvation. The filmmaker Hans-Jürgen Syberberg has suggested that we in the twenty-first century are not in a good position to understand what Heidegger had in mind when he was lecturing on Hölderlin during the period of National Socialism. Like no other, Bambach's historical, political, and philosophical contextualization of

Heidegger's interpretation of Hölderlin puts readers in that position or at least brings them much closer to it.

Of an Alien Homecoming: Reading Heidegger's "Hölderlin" has many merits. It traces Hölderlin's influence on key terms of Heidegger's later corpus: homecoming and dwelling above all, but also remembrance, the poetic, the holy, and the fourfold, to name just a few. It persuasively shows how Hölderlin became "the decisive figure" (xxiii)[3] for Heidegger after his failed Nazi Rectorate. And it situates Heidegger's engagement with Hölderlin during the traumatic and tempestuous years of 1934–1948 in the context of cultural shifts and political events, including the profound effects of the Great War and the Treaty of Versailles on German identity and its revanchist resentment, the invasion of the Soviet Union and the concomitant mass production of wartime editions of Hölderlin's poetry, the founding of the Goebbels-endorsed Hölderlin Society in 1943, the Zero Hour in which Germans presumed to start fresh after their Nazi ambitions had been laid waste or "felled" (the so-called *Kahlschlag*), the Allied occupation and denazification proceedings, and postwar revelations about and responses to the Shoah. Heidegger's "Hölderlin," often untimely, is nevertheless always responding to the philosopher's times.

In what follows, I will focus on three issues that arose for me as I was studying Bambach's book: (1) why read Heidegger's interpretation of Hölderlin, (2) the extent to which there are conflicting forces not only in the philosopher but also in the poet, and (3) the relationship between myth and philosophy.

1. A TALE OF TWO HEIDEGGERS, OR, WHY WE SHOULD READ HEIDEGGER'S "HÖLDERLIN"

Of an Alien Homecoming exposes conflicting tendencies within what Bambach calls Heidegger's "use and abuse of Hölderlin" (104), thereby indirectly offering a lesson for today. On the positive side is Heidegger's insight into ethical dwelling, which is less a matter of conformity to principles regulating the behavior of subjects than a matter of thoughtful openness and responsiveness to the mystery of being itself. On the negative side, Heidegger never gives up on Hellingrath's nationalist version

of a "*secret* Germany" and "Reich" (cited on 47) that is accessible only to those Germans with ears to hear the prophetic voice of Hölderlin – or rather of a certain Hölderlin: not, to be sure, the Hölderlin of the Nazi Party, but one nevertheless cleansed of any Jacobin and Asiatic sympathies. In Bambach's estimation, it is Hellingrath's version of Hölderlin as savior of the Germans that motivates Heidegger's interest in the poet. "Ultimately," Bambach writes,

> what matters for Heidegger is Hölderlin's status as the herald of a future Germany, one whose authentic identity remains concealed to all but the few who know how to attend to the poet's call. It is this commitment to Germany's future – and its sense of a national mission to save the West from the nihilism of the world's night – that will fundamentally shape Heidegger's whole approach to the poet. Heidegger was hardly the first to co-opt Hölderlin's poetry for the sake of the German national mission, but the way he was able to conscript Hölderlin's unique language for his own philosophical vision of German exceptionalism has been unparalleled in the history of the Hölderlin reception. (xxiv)

If the elucidations offered by Heidegger *the man* are nationalist, exclusionist, and – especially in the wake of the *Black Notebooks* – racist (not to say, with Adorno, "fascistic to [their] innermost core" [cited on xxvii]), there is nevertheless another Heidegger, a Heidegger who recognizes constitutive uncanniness and alterity and "the profound experience of separation, scission, and alienation that lies at the heart of all homecoming" (5). Throughout his study, Bambach is careful to give voice to both "Heideggers," but it should be asked whether, when one of these Heideggers is caught up in "racialist exclusion and condemnation" and "deadly political uses/misuses" (xxix), it is enough to speak of the other Heidegger's "insight into the revolutionary power of Hölderlin's poetic language" (xxxi), of an "intensity" and "disclosive power" unparalleled "since Hellingrath" (Gadamer, quoted on xxxii),

or even of a unique contribution to ethics to motivate the risk of reading him. Perhaps Bambach does not wish to go this far, but a more pressing reason suggests itself: we should read the "monstrous site" of Heidegger's Hölderlin as one to which we, too, "are riveted" (to borrow a phrase from Reiner Schürmann).[4] The tensions embodied by the two Heideggers or by "Heidegger" in inverted commas (to mark this site of tensions) are not bygone problems to be studied for the sake of the historiographic record but tensions pulling us – and pulling us apart. We should read "Heidegger," then, and his fraught confrontation with Hölderlin in particular, because "we" are more like "Heidegger" than many of us might like to admit.[5]

2. A TALE OF TWO HÖLDERLINS? ON ALIEN HOMECOMING AND NOMADISM

It should also be asked whether there are not merely two opposed ways of reading Hölderlin within Heidegger's oeuvre but two "Hölderlins" in the body of work signed "Friedrich Hölderlin": not only the Hölderlin who gives the lie to nationalist cooptation, but also the Hölderlin who lends himself to and even invites it. This question can be approached by way of an extended reflection on homecoming.

Bambach is clear from the outset that homecoming cannot be directed toward "a factical entity waiting there to be possessed" (xxi). We never return exactly to what we leave behind, since place, and not just our perception of it, changes with time. But how are we to understand homecoming in relation not to a demarcated region of the earth but to something putatively more essential, namely, what it means to *be* German? (Other questions, which cannot be treated in detail here, arise as to what counts as German and whether a non-German is able to answer this. Let me just note that, for all their talk of the primacy of the German *language,* it is hard to image Hellingrath and Heidegger including among the ranks of Germans – and hence as capable of hearing Hölderlin's fateful word – those living outside predominantly German-speaking territories, however fluent in the language they may be, or even Germans of foreign ancestry "assimilated" within the mainland. It is

hard to imagine them agreeing with Karl Wolfskehl, a Jewish member of the George Circle who had fled Germany in 1933, when he claimed *Wo ich bin ist Deutscher Geist*, "German spirit is where I am," even though it was Wolfskehl who had coined the phrase "secret Germany" many years prior. The same might be said of the German of Walter Benjamin and Paul Celan, despite Heidegger's late, albeit blinkered, admiration for the latter.)

There seem to be three answers to the question concerning the meaning of homecoming in Bambach's book. The first stresses *return*, even if it is to something never possessed but only long "kept in store" (GA 12: 37/165). It involves coming *back* home *by way of* the alien. Here a certain reading of Hölderlin's famous letter to Böhlendorff is pivotal. Just as the Greeks were able to come into their own only by mastering an element foreign to them, namely, "Hesperian" or "Junonian sobriety," so the Germans can become who they are only when they expose themselves to "sacred pathos" and "heavenly fire" (cited on 96). Whether this fire will come from the Near East or even the Americas (as Hölderlin suggests in the poem "Remembrance") or whether it can be found solely in Hellenic antiquity (as Heidegger insists), the journey or voyage does not begin blindly but foresees a return. This focus on return, which threatens to exploit if not enslave the foreign for its own ends, is largely – although not exclusively – characteristic of Heidegger's engagement with Hölderlin, his protestations to the contrary notwithstanding (see 204 and 217 citing GA 53: 179/143).

The second sense of "alien homecoming" emphasizes the adjective as constitutive. Although Hölderlin bequeaths to Heidegger the tripartite historio-geographic model of origin, departure, and return, Bambach identifies several moments in Hölderlin's poetry and correspondence that privilege departure. For example, in Hölderlin's "Bread and Wine" fragment, the "colony" that "spirit loves" need not be read, with Heidegger, as the colony of the German motherland, thus in the sense of colonialist expansion, but rather – and despite Hölderlin's use of the Latinate *Kolonie* (from *colo*, "I cultivate") – in the Greek sense of *apoikia*, emigration without expectation of return (171–72). Or perhaps it would be better to

say: "*should* not be so read with Heidegger." For, Bambach also uses the terms "contorted," "transgressive," "tendentious," and "exclusionary" (169, 152) to characterize Heidegger's reading, which shifts the conflictually intimate balance between native and foreign toward autochthony and which, in conjunction with the interpretation of "Remembrance," fails to heed Hölderlin's affirmative allusions to the French Revolution and cannot imagine, by "brown women," anything other than tanned Greeks.

And yet, there are times in his book when Bambach hesitates in his assessment of Hölderlin himself. Bambach not only acknowledges that "Hölderlin did unquestionably embrace the mystery of the Graeco-German bond" (156) but parenthetically raises the possibility that Hölderlin's well-intentioned appropriations of the foreign might be less benign or pacific than they appear. Rather than acts in which one comes into one's own through dialogical encounter with the other, these appropriations might instead be arrogations or unjustified expropriations, even if not as violent or myopic as Heidegger's. Bambach writes:

> If for Hölderlin the very name and topos of "Greece" represents a contested space of appropriative engagement (and arrogation) of Near Eastern, Jewish, Christian, Asiatic, and "Oriental" influences, for Heidegger this will appear otherwise. "Greece" and its Ionian legacy will be cleaved off from Asia minor and will stand as the self-generated, autochthonous flowering of pure Hellenic genius, the inception of a Western history in which "Jerusalem" will stand as the Other to "Athens." (220)

Elsewhere in the book, Bambach uses the word "arrogation" to describe three things: Heidegger's misuse of Hölderlin for the sake of German regeneration (321 and 323, where Bambach gives *Vereinnahmung* as the German equivalent and offers "expropriation" and "takeover" as additional translations); Heidegger's arrogation of the status of an exile in a corrupt modernity (325); and the "arrogation and arrogance" that characterize one pole of Heidegger's interpretation of Hölderlin, the other

being "an ethical attunement to the hiddenness of being" (13). Thus, with his parenthetical, Bambach seems to locate not only Heidegger but also Hölderlin within the first sense of "alien homecoming," that is, homecoming by way of the alien. Even if Bambach means to refer to the way the Greeks arrogated to themselves foreign elements, this could still hold for Hölderlin to the extent that he is taking the Greeks as guides.

Should we not therefore exercise a similar caution when reading Hölderlin as Bambach teaches us to exercise when reading Heidegger on Hölderlin? Are there not two Hölderlins here, too? Were not Derrida and Levinas justified in their suspicion of the Swabian poet? Was not Paul Celan, however much he learned from him, justified – at least in some small way – when he declared in French, in conjunction with the bicentennial celebration of Hölderlin's birth, *il y a quelque chose de pourri dans la poésie de Hölderlin*, "there is something rotten in Hölderlin's poetry"?[6]

Suspicion can be healthy and should not entail dismissal. But we should distinguish whether a given idea in an author we are interpreting is at the center or on the margin of their thought, especially when this idea stands in tension with another idea animating that author's work. Bambach persuasively shows how Heidegger's reading of Hölderlin is moved by both centripetal and centrifugal forces, by an exclusionary myth of a hidden Germany – or even more narrowly of a hidden Swabia – and by a manner of a dwelling that is open to alterity and to self-transformation, although the movement toward the center no doubt predominates. Can we not say that the same forces are at work in Hölderlin himself, albeit in inverse proportionality? If so, then Hölderlin's vision does not look so "vastly different" from Heidegger's, as Bambach claims (123). There is instead only a difference in force or emphasis.

Bambach might reply at this point by drawing attention to a third, oxymoronic sense of "alien homecoming" in his monograph, namely, the "nomadology of the self" (166) that he maintains is present in Hölderlin's poetry (173, 217, 302). Yet would not the affirmation of nomadism, a term used for those without permanent abode or wanderers

without destination, necessitate relinquishing not only terms such as rootedness and autochthony (*Bodenständigkeit*), but also notions such as homecoming and perhaps even dwelling – and hence ethics as *ēthos*? There may be "hints and allusions" (170, 204) in Hölderlin or even in Heidegger that point in a nomadic direction (see, for example, GA 10: 57–58/PR 38), but it is questionable whether nomadology represents the core of Hölderlin's thinking. At any rate, more work needs to be done on whether and how it can be made compatible with the other senses of alien homecoming outlined above.

Derrida would be helpful in this endeavor. Bambach records Derrida's suspicion of Hölderlin (106) but later adduces a citation from *Geschlecht III* in support of the nomadological reading of the poet: "Derrida," writes Bambach,

> points to a different kind of "journey, the path open toward adventure, path-breaking, what strikes open a new *via rupta*, a new route for a new dwelling, and there, in the dependency or movement of this other line, we have, instead of nostalgic withdrawal toward the original dwelling, colonial expansion, the future as the adventure of culture or of colonization, of the dwelling that is cultivated and colonized starting from new routes." (Cited on 320)

Yet for Derrida colonial expansion "isn't contradictory" to but rather compatible with the "nationalist circle."[7] Aeneas is thus essentially no different from Odysseus.

3. MYTH AND PHILOSOPHY

Further, if, to speak with Deleuze and Guattari, Hölderlinian nomadology entails deterritorialization without reterritorialization, does it not also, to speak with Rudolf Bultmann, entail demythologization? If it is "mythic time that gives both Hellingrath and Heidegger license to de-historicize Hölderlin and to make him the voice for their own political/philosophical visions of the German future" (62), it is not as though

Hölderlin's own poetry did not operate according to such a conception of time, however influenced it may also be by the progressive time of the French Revolution. During Bultmann's heyday, it was commonplace to ask, "What will be left of the Gospel when its mythological language is subtracted?" We might ask the same of Hölderlin and Heidegger. What remains when "the law of homecoming and return" (xxviii), "the law of being un-homely as a law of becoming homely" (cited on 4), and "the essential law of Western and German humankind" (cited on 5) are stripped of their mythological garb? What is Hölderlin without Germania? What is Heidegger without a *geheimes Deutschland*?

One might attempt, with Károly Kerényi and Furio Jesi, to distinguish between genuine and technified/deformed myth. Bambach himself moves in this direction at the end of his introduction, where he associates "the promulgation of a new *mythos*, a revolutionary call [. . .] following the tradition of the George Circle with its embrace of the *poeta vates* (the poet as prophet)" not with nationalist arrogation but with "abiding poetically in being" and "finding our home upon the earth in an epoch of homelessness and deracination" (29; cf. 35, 37). But how extricable are these two takes on the Hellingrathian *mythos*? And if myth itself is not the problem, how to prevent being duped by the deformed versions and falling victim to images that become "all-too-timely" as Heidegger fell "victim to the all-too-timely German image of Hölderlin bandied about by his contemporaries" (55–56)?

At this point, philosophy might be summoned, not to banish the poets and their supposedly deceitful *mythoi*, but to reclaim its voice in the old quarrel and draw some distinctions. Yet, despite the metaphor of the poet and philosopher as standing on separate mountain peaks, Heidegger does not simply grant poetry a place alongside philosophy or thinking; he defers to the figure of the *poeta vates* or *Dichter als Führer* (as one influential work of the George Circle from 1928 was titled),[8] or at least to his own idiosyncratic reading thereof. This brings us to another set of questions, which concern the status of philosophy or thinking (Bambach does not rigorously distinguish the two) in Bambach's assessment of Heidegger's dialogue with Hölderlin.

Earlier, I quoted a passage from the preface to *Of an Alien Homecoming* in which Bambach speaks of Heidegger's "unparalleled" "*philosophical* vision of German exceptionalism" (xxiv; emphasis added). On the same page, however, Bambach contends that the chauvinist scope of Heidegger's readings of the poet – in other words, precisely that which is dazzled by the vision of German exceptionalism – derives from prejudices inherited "before Heidegger learned how to think philosophically"; it is these "nonphilosophical assumptions that implicitly betray the task of thinking that Heidegger sets for himself" (xxiv). This ambiguity concerning the status of philosophy runs throughout Bambach's book (see 10, 41, 91, 99, 135, 172, 251, 277, 309). It is unclear whether, on his view, the myth of the secret Germany is simply unphilosophical and, if so, what this would entail regarding the status of Heidegger's history of being. Is the latter so bound up with this myth that it, too, must be declared unphilosophical, or can it be sufficiently purged of prejudicial storytelling? Heidegger, for his part, critiques the separation of *mythos* and *logos* (GA 8: 12/10).

In either case, how should we understand Heidegger's claim, cited affirmatively by Bambach, that "he who thinks greatly, must err greatly" (cited on 29, but cf. 309, where Bambach deems it "dismissive self-aggrandizement")? One possibility opened up by Bambach, especially toward the end of the book, is that a philosophy worthy of the name would privilege alterity, which is presumably why Bambach can call Hölderlin's motifs of "wandering, migrating, traveling, wayfaring, journeying, and setting sail" "fundamental *philosophemes*" (173; emphasis added; see also 158: "philosopheme of the Other"). Accordingly, Heidegger would not have committed errors *of* thought; he would have erred *from* thought. The movement of Heidegger's *thought*, then, would be centrifugal or, to use a Hölderlinian word, eccentric, even if Heidegger *the man* never stopped centering it around *one* people, *one* land, and *one* language (a centering that could be called, following Hölderlin's epigram cited above, the "root of all evil").[9] Our task would be to read the thinker against the man.

NOTES

1 Friedrich Hölderlin, *Sämtliche Werke*, vol. 4: *Gedichte 1800–1806*, ed. Norbert v. Hellingrath (Munich: Georg Müller, 1916), 3 (my translation).

2 In his final months, Heidegger always had the second edition of this volume (Berlin: Propyläen, 1923), "the only printing worthy of the poet," to hand. See Martin Heidegger and Imma von Bodmershof, *Briefwechsel 1959–1976*, ed. Bruno Pieger (Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta, 2000), 143, 153, as well as GA 16: 823.

3 Charles Bambach, *Of an Alien Homecoming: Reading Heidegger's "Hölderlin"* (Albany, NY: SUNY Press, 2022). In-line references, when not preceded by "GA," refer to this book.

4 Reiner Schürmann, *Broken Hegemonies*, trans. Reginald Lilly (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2003), 515. Bambach speaks of Heidegger's "monstrous contradictions" (222) and, like Schürmann, compares him to Oedipus.

5 See Francesco Guercio and Ian Alexander Moore, "Heidegger, Our Monstrous Site: On Reiner Schürmann's Reading of the *Beiträge*," *Graduate Faculty Philosophy Journal* 42, no. 1 (2021): 93–114.

6 As reported by André de Bouchet in a later article: "Tübingen, le 22 Mai 1986," *Hölderlin-Jahrbuch* 26 (1988–1989): 353.

7 Jacques Derrida, *Geschlecht III: Sex, Race, Nation, Humanity*, trans. Katie Chenoweth and Rodrigo Therezo (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2020), 132.

8 Max Kommerell, *Der Dichter als Führer in der deutschen Klassik* (Frankfurt: Klostermann, 1928).

9 Interestingly, the distich appears on the first page of Hölderlin-text in volume 4 of Hellingrath's edition, which today reads like an unheeded warning in plain sight.

The Futural Arc of Poetic Homecoming

Krzysztof Ziarek

Before reading Bambach's book, my engagement with Heidegger's "Hölderlin" had been limited to the question of poetry in his late essays. I never felt enticed to plunge into Heidegger's lecture courses on Hölderlin, suspecting that I would find the discussion of the national and the German likely less than inspiring, principally because of my interest in the transformative task of thinking. Still, it is clear that at least partially the impetus of the preparatory thinking of meditative thinking (*Besinnung*), especially the critique of power and violence underlying the opening toward releasement (*Gelassenheit*), comes from the 1935–45 decade, including the Hölderlin courses. In this context, Bambach's book is unique and indispensable, as it treats carefully and comprehensively the four Hölderlin courses, "The Western Conversation," and the later essays, interlacing their themes with remarks from the *Black Notebooks* and letters, and placing them in conversation with the cultural and political climate of the times. The book follows the historical sequence of Heidegger's texts on Hölderlin, which is crucial for two reasons: rapidly and significantly changing historical circumstances and the evolving contours of Heidegger's idiomatic reading of Hölderlin. Bambach's writing is not only cogent and lucid, but also thorough and accessible, allowing even non-specialists to follow his line of thinking. Putting the name "Hölderlin" in quotation marks signals Bambach's approach to two contested issues: 1) Heidegger's departure from literary interpretation, 2) the emphasis on Hölderlin's "unthought" in elaborating poetic dwelling. This is now *the* study to go to for engaging with Heidegger's "Hölderlin" and an indispensable reading for all those wanting to continue the conversation about the importance (including the pitfalls) of Heidegger's "Hölderlin."

This short response will focus on the arc of Bambach's argument: "an alien homecoming" as the relation between homecoming, poetic dwelling, and foreignness. This is in part because Bambach uses this constellation of terms to mark Heidegger's departure from Hölderlin's more welcoming attitude toward otherness. The detailed delineation of the proximities and differences from Hölderlin is perhaps the most noteworthy contribution of Bambach's study. Agreeing with this approach, I situate it with regard to parallel developments in Heidegger's thought: the critique of power and its relevance for understanding metaphysics as ontotheology and for preparing a futural poetic mode of dwelling. One can discern five related tracks in Heidegger's texts from the relevant time period: Hölderlin, Nietzsche, early Greek thinking, the *Ereignis*-manuscripts, and now also the *Black Notebooks*. While these attempts are most radical and exploratory in the *Ereignis*-manuscripts, they are also in evidence in the other four tracks. The courses on Nietzsche and Hölderlin stage a complicated and conflicted confrontation with their appropriations by the Nazi regime, with a view to the potential for a Germany not based on the "new" or "racial" science. The lectures on Anaximander, Heraclitus, and Parmenides in turn aim at exploring the possibility of the other beginning for thinking, one not overdetermined by the Platonic-Aristotelian articulation of Greek thought into metaphysical philosophy (ontotheology), and especially by its post-Hellenistic development.

Bambach's comprehensive and nuanced analysis of "alien homecoming" focuses on the relation between homecoming, poetic dwelling, and foreignness, in part to demonstrate Heidegger's departure from Hölderlin's more welcoming attitude toward otherness. As part of this discussion, Bambach negotiates between the transformative direction of poetic dwelling, the role of alienness, and German exceptionalism analyzed specifically in the context of Heidegger's comments on National Socialism and remarks on *Judentum*[1] – which is left untranslated here for reasons that should become apparent soon – and Jews. Since the remarks on *Judentum*, analyzed in the context of Nazi Germany, become the litmus test in Bambach's diagnosis of the role

of foreignness and the overall direction of Heidegger's vision of homecoming, especially in its difference from Hölderlin's, it is important to draw attention here to their relation to Heidegger's twin critique of power and of Christianness (*Christentum*) crucial to his confrontation with the ontotheological underpinnings of Western thought. Though not always directly stated, those underpinnings are also in play in Heidegger's remarks on the national, the German, National Socialism, and the Occident (*Abendland*).

Heidegger's remarks on *Judentum* are few, mostly brief, and relatively undeveloped. Nonetheless, they make clear the stereotypes of Jewishness Heidegger resorts to. Considering their philosophical import within Heidegger's corpus is, however, harder, precisely because these are infrequent and rudimentary notes, confined to the years 1939–1946. Keeping to the context of the *Black Notebooks*, Heidegger's remarks on *Judentum*, without ignoring their anti-Judaic prejudice, could be considered jointly with and in light of his more extensive account of Christianness (*Christentum*), whose brunt Heidegger provocatively names "*Anti-Christentum*" (GA 97: 199). To my knowledge, Heidegger never uses the term *Anti-Judentum*, and the term "anti-Semitism" appears once in the *Black Notebooks*, when Heidegger describes it as foolish and condemnable (GA 97: 159). In the first volume of the *Black Notebooks* (1931–1938), there are no mentions of *Judentum*, while there are over fifty references to *Christentum*, with frequent scathingly critical, even sarcastic remarks directed at it as well as at National Socialism and German society. Many remarks point to Heidegger's critical stance on race and "racial science." In toto, the first four volumes of the *Black Notebooks* contain numerous remarks on *Christentum*, which Heidegger distinguishes from Christianity (*Christlichkeit*). *Christentum* does not designate religion, a community of believers, or the Christian worldview. Instead, *Christentum* names the domain in which being is determined in its manifestation by Christian, or more broadly, monotheistic thought:[2] the domain which Heidegger sees as part of onto-theo-logy. Grounding being through the idea of creation, *Christentum*, instead of keeping being in question, produces its decisive metaphysical determination. This

critique of *Christentum*, clearly in evidence in Heidegger's lecture course "The Ister," may help contextualize the function of gods, Greekness, and Christianity in Heidegger's "Hölderlin."

Heidegger's attempt at non-metaphysical thought proceeds through a critique of metaphysics, as a kind of anti-metaphysics, understood not as destruction or abolition but as a critical encounter in the manner of a confrontation (*Auseinandersetzung*). In this context, Christianness (*Christentum*) names the domain, the -ness or *-tum*, i.e., the home (from the Proto-Indo-European root of *dom*), in which the question of being comes as it were pre-answered, grounded through the notions of creation and an all-powerful transcendent divinity, as well as by the operations of power (power (*Macht*), violence (*Gewalt*), machination (*Machenschaft*), later enframing (*Gestell*)) stemming from it. This foreclosure of the question of being into *Christentum* allows power not only to hold sway but to continue overpowering itself toward a planetary reach. This singular casting of Christianness (*Christentum*) specifically with regard to being – as it were prior to questions of culture or religion – suggests correlation with terms like Greekness, Germanness, Russianness, Jewishness and Americanism (*Griechentum*, *Deutschtum*, *Russentum*, *Judentum*, and *Amerikanismus*). Although these overgeneralized, even stereotyped terms remain difficult to judge, they can be approached – perhaps thinking beyond Heidegger – through the prism of the remarks Heidegger makes about the domain of what is proper (*Eigentum*) in *Das Ereignis*. If we treat the early *Black Notebooks* as philosophical or at least quasi-philosophical commentary, then GA 71 provides a perspective that may help us understand Heidegger's insistence on distinguishing between Christianness (*Christentum*) and Christianity. *Eigentum* is translated perceptively by Rojcewicz as the *domain* of what is proper, a kind of event's "proper-dom" or "own-dom," an opening of and from the event.[5] "Properdom" names the possibility of the event's opening being into its ownmost sway (*Walten*). The remarks on *Eigentum* from 1941–1942 suggest that *Christentum*, and perhaps the other *-tums* Heidegger deploys in the 30s and 40s, can be considered with regard to how they decide, ground, or foreclose the question of being.

The sway of Christianness (*Christentum*), beyond religious belief and the cultural-political domain of Christendom's institutions, signifies in Heidegger's often caustic comments the collapse, the ruination, of the question of being. That is perhaps why most of Heidegger's acrimony in the *Black Notebooks* is directed at Christianness (*Christentum*) and in the second order at National Socialism for its failure to open to questioning the metaphysically foreclosed understanding of being. This does not mean that the assignation of Russianness (*Russentum*), Americanism (*Amerikanismus*), and above all *Judentum* to the "same" foreclosure of being is not marked by stereotyping. As Michael Marder writes, "the problem with Heidegger's anti-Semitism is his failure 1. to turn the figure of the Jew, let alone 'international Jewry,' which he parades on the pages of the *Black Notebooks*, into a question and, worse still, 2. to interrogate the very logic and necessity of coming up with a concrete figuration of a clandestine 'agency,' if you will, for the nihilistic completion of metaphysics."[4] Heidegger indeed never directly questions the relation between Christianness (*Christentum*) and *Judentum* from the perspective of being, or interrogates the differences not only between but also within Christian and Judaic cultures. With regard to the question of being he treats them as a monotheistic monolith – onto(mono)theology? – basically employing what looks like the stereotypical Christian cultural appropriation of the Judaic. That said, there are multiple "agencies" Heidegger designates as responsible for the nihilistic completion of metaphysics: the primary one, with the most power and influence, is Christianness (*Christentum*), and its offshoots: the capitalistic one named *Amerikanismus* or the Christian-Bolshevik one designated sometimes as Russianness (*Russentum*).[5] I can only point here to the drift of Heidegger's questioning on the hinge between the event's *Eigentum* and the various incarnations of the *tum/dom/* house where being is no longer in question: *Christentum*, *Judentum*, *Amerikanismus*, *Russentum*, and also *Deutschtum* – which is why, as Bambach illustrates convincingly through analyzing Heidegger's forceful readings of Hölderlin, at issue is a futural secret Germania, to which a turn (*Kehre*) or a coming (*Kunft*) might be possible.

Reflecting on Heidegger's vision of homecoming and poetic dwelling, Bambach writes, "...Heidegger never properly acknowledges the full otherness of the foreign. Rather, for him, the foreign presents a way station on the path of spirit's journey to self-recognition" (300). Yet, although Heidegger does not place sufficient emphasis on the otherness of the foreign, what he accentuates already in *Being and Time* is the recognition of the constitutive un-homing in Dasein. Heidegger's focus is the un-home (*Un-heim*) as the abyss (*Abgrund*), the abyss pervading the home with nothingness. In this context, should we perhaps interrogate the distinction between the uncanny (*das Unheimliche*) and the foreign (*das Fremde*), as well as the possibility of openness to the un-home (*Un-heim*) at the core of home (*Heim*) and homeland (*Heimat*)? In one version of several statements about the un/homely, Heidegger remarks that "The Ister satisfies the law of becoming homely as the law of being unhomely" (GA 53: 202/164). The homecoming (*Heimkehr*) Heidegger ends up pursuing through Hölderlin and beyond is not only futural but also pervaded by the uncanniness (*Unheimlichkeit*) intrinsic to language in its spatio-temporal saying. Language—I believe Bambach agrees—not land or people (*Volk*), ends up being the main determinant of the national for Heidegger. The homecoming (*Heimkehr*) is thus not only *to* home but *of* home and *within* home: it does not eliminate the unhomely but hinges on it. Travel through the foreign does not return us to what was before or let us gain what is properly familiar but rather inaugurates the familiar *properly* as the abode of the un/homely. "Such [poetic] dwelling springs from a becoming homely in being unhomely [*Unheimischsein*], from the journeying of locality [*Ortschaft*]" (GA 53: 173/139). That is why

> this poetry demands of us a transformation in our ways of thinking and experiencing, one that concerns being in its entirety. We must first dismiss our allegedly "natural" representations of allegedly geographically "actual" rivers and allegedly historiographically actual poets and human beings; we must first altogether let go of the actuality of such actual things [*die Wirklichkeit dieses Wirklichen*] as providing our supposed measure of truth,

> so as to enter that free realm in which the poetic is. (GA 53: 205/166–67)

Citing Heidegger's remark that thinking needs to think "the first beginning of the Greeks – a beginning that remained outside of Judaism and that means outside of Christianity" (GA 97: 20), Bambach reads it as confirmation of Heidegger's exclusion of Jews from the consideration of such a future abode. At the same time, in the context of "The Western Conversation" he points out that "Heidegger stresses a homecoming to the West as origin rather than to a narrowly drawn 'German' homeland" (289), as there homecoming concerns the entire Occident (*Abendland*). In the "Postscript" Bambach observes that "Journeying and being *unterwegs* [underway] – the hallmarks of Heideggerian thinking – are reserved for the German elect" (324). Without downplaying Heidegger's nationalism, if we follow the quotation from the *Black Notebooks*, the first beginning is not only beyond *Judentum* but also beyond *Christentum*. This is confirmed by Heidegger's remarks on metaphysical Christianity in "The Ister" course. What does this mean for Heidegger's consideration of Germania? Are there any Germans, or any *Abendland*, outside the sway of Christianness (*Christentum*) and its power-laced cast of being? Would those "Germans" perhaps be the elect few Heidegger mentions in *Contributions*? And what about the fact that the very notion of *unterwegs* is explicitly laced with Daoist thinking, perhaps breaking open the Western-centric perspective and bringing the Asiatic emphatically into the play of distinct beginnings? If the West is sometimes described as spanning Athens and Jerusalem, then what can be mapped out in Heidegger's thought is a very distinct topography, different from Jaspers's – still "metaphysical"? – revival of the axial age. It eschews centers and weaves its ways through "peripheries": Ephesus, Miletus, Eleia, Basel, Donaueschingen...and then the road branches off to Luyi in Chinese Henan, the presumptive birthplace of Laotse, perhaps even to something like "mental Russianness" ("*geistiges Russentum*"): intellectual, spiritual Russian-dom, which may still remain, Heidegger hopes, in reserve beyond the imperialism of Russian Bolshevism or Sovietism. And we should not forget that the wanderings of the locale of thinking

in Heidegger trace the paths of the demi-god rivers, non-human but also non-monotheistic. While thinking always unfolds in its "locality" (*Ortschaft*), this site is ever underway (*unterwegs*), its poetic fluidity is river-like, and in this sense non-territorial, its traversal half-divine.

Another context important to consider for Heidegger's "Hölderlin" is the critique of power, violence, and sovereignty (*Macht*, *Gewalt*, and *Herrschaft*) in the *Ereignis*-manuscripts from 1936–1944. What indications are there of Heidegger's critique of power in his Hölderlin lectures?[6] In *Mindfulness* Heidegger critiques the operations of power as imperial, total, planetary, and operating through a planetary operation (*Einsatz*) (GA 66: 18). In the section of GA 69 entitled "The Essence of Power" he writes about power's tendency to empower itself and to continue to overpower any level it attains, to "the exclusion of every outside that is not itself. Alone determining the essence of beings" (GA 69: 55). Power is without goals and "needs no bearers." Even powerlessness or impotence (*Ohnmacht*) is borne by power. In this context, Heidegger ventures perhaps his most radical thought of the power-free (*das Macht-lose*), marking freedom from the dialectic of power and powerlessness. At stake in poetic dwelling is freeing a beyond to power, which Heidegger sometimes describes as gentleness (*Milde*). Is this sense of the letting free of power – despite the rhetoric of the national and German exceptionalism in the Hölderlin lectures – not guiding Heidegger's interest in the poetic from 1936 onward? What happens to the sense of the mission and exceptionalism when Heidegger's critique of power, violence, and sovereignty (*Macht*, *Gewalt*, and *Herrschaft*) as well as of the planetary power of capital from the *Ereignis*-manuscripts is considered?

Bambach's study makes a valuable contribution also to understanding Heidegger's "late" works, especially their explorations of the role of language and poetic thinking in Heidegger's critique of the essence of technology. From this perspective, one issue that emerges is the potential impetus that Heidegger's thinking receives from Hölderlin's poetry, not only in terms of ideas about the relation between poetry and philosophy, language, homecoming, or dwelling, but also in shaping Heidegger's language for the new, "poetic" thinking. How much does Heidegger's

mode of thinking and writing bear the imprint of his engagement with poetry more broadly, and with Hölderlin's poetic work in particular? For example, there are the quasi-tautological or paratactic phrases, the hyphenation of key terms, and the mobilization of the polysemous momentum of German prefixes as language forces marking the paths for a thinking that is an alternative to philosophy and its predilection for propositional statements. And there is the approach to translation as thinking underway, which revisits, rephrases, and recharges the old and well-known texts, and, in the same gesture, modifies the path of Heidegger's own thinking. In other words, what is the debt to Hölderlin of the poetic idiom of thought under development in Heidegger at least since the mid-1930s?

NOTES

1 *Judentum* can be translated, depending on the context, as Judaism, Jewishness, Jews, or Jewry. Since my supposition here is that Heidegger uses and coins various substantives with the suffix "-tum" in order to indicate not human beings but an ontological dimension, that is, the domain of a certain way of being, one could render *Judentum* as "Jewishness," so that it corresponds to other similarly formed terms: Christianness, Greekness, Russianness, etc.

2 See Christoph Schmidt, "Monotheism as a Metapolitical Problem: Heidegger's War Against Jewish Christian Monotheism," in *Heidegger's Black Notebooks and the Future of Theology*, ed. Mårten Björk and Jayne Svenungsson (Cham, Switzerland: Palgrave Macmillan, 2017), 131–57. See also Heidegger's remark on the influence exerted by "the Jewish doctrine of creation" and the "Jewish 'mindset,'" in *Die Stege des Anfangs* (forthcoming; passage available in Ian Alexander Moore, "On the History and Future of Heidegger's Literary Estate, with Newly Published Passages on Nazism and Judaism: Klaus Held's *Marbach-Bericht*," *Gatherings: The Heidegger Circle Annual* 10 (2020): 226–27.

3 Martin Heidegger, *The Event*, trans. Richard Rojcewicz (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2013), passim.

4 Michael Marder, "The Other Jewish Question," in *Heidegger's Black Notebooks*, ed. Andrew J. Mitchell and Peter Trawny (New York: Columbia University Press, 2017), 98.

5 Seen from the perspective of the question of being, the terms with the suffix *-tum* become an array, which opens the possibility that such terms do not refer directly to (human) beings, but rather to the modes in which being comes to be revealed in these domains. That is why these terms might perhaps be rendered into English as Greekness, Germanness, Russianness, Christianness, Jewishness, etc., designating, however problematically or even uncritically, ways in which being comes to light and gets enmeshed with power in these particular domains.

6 In this context, GA 66, 69, 70, 71 and 78 are of particular import. For a discussion of nonviolent force in Heidegger's undelivered 1942 lecture course on Anaximander (GA 78), see Krzysztof Ziarek, "The Nonviolent Enjunction of Being: Heidegger on *Gewalt*," *CR: The New Centennial Review*, 14.2. (2014): 73–77.

Heidegger, Hölderlin, and Homecoming: A Response to Moore and Ziarek

Charles Bambach

I wish to thank both Ian Moore and Krzysztof Ziarek for thoughtfully engaging my book, *Of an Alien Homecoming: Reading Heidegger's "Hölderlin."* I appreciate the seriousness of their questions, especially their focus on the multiple senses of "alien homecoming" that shape the book. Part of the problem of trying to understand Heidegger's complex relation to Hölderlin involves understanding Hölderlin's own interpretation of homecoming as he explains it in the Böhlendorff letter:

> We learn nothing with greater difficulty than to freely use the national…. It sounds paradoxical. But I will say it yet again and submit it to your test and your free employment, that in the progress of culture, the truly national becomes of limited advantage.… But the own-most [*das Eigene*] must be learned as well as the foreign [*das Fremde*]. That is why the Greeks are unavoidable for us. Only we will not follow them in our own [*das Eigene*], our national, since, as said, the *free* use of *one's own* is most difficult.[1]

To understand the differences between Greeks and Germans, and the reversal that Hölderlin deems so essential for each to achieve its proper identity, requires that we first come to grasp what is foreign. In the Greeks, Hölderlin wants to say, Germans confront their own proper origin – but, through the logic of reversal, this proper origin is experienced as something foreign, strange, or alien. The path to one's own identity requires a turning that needs to be experienced both as

a reversal and a return. One needs to journey abroad to understand the national so that the return homeward can provide a perspective of distance from the nearness and propinquity of the proper. In this act of distantiation lies the possibility and hope of poetic freedom. To freely use the national, then, means to traverse the boundaries of nations in an effort to come to a sense of how what is native within us can only become native through a journey into what is foreign. This logic of return – which serves as the basis of Hölderlinian homecoming – becomes essential to understanding Heidegger's own relation to Hölderlin. On this reading, homecoming is then *alien* by virtue of its need to confront something foreign that appears as a risk to one's nativity, nationality, and native identity. And yet for Heidegger there is a profound contradiction at the heart of his understanding of alien homecoming. On the one hand, Heidegger's own rendering of the law of becoming homely indicates the need for an other who is foreign, alien, strange, different, multiple, and unfamiliar. As he reflects on "the mysterious concealment of the intertwining relations toward the foreign and one's own," he offers something like an ethical insight into the heart of human dwelling. In a remark from the "Ister" lectures from SS 1942 that appears as if it were written by Levinas, Heidegger claims: "The relation to the foreign is never a mere taking over of the Other" (GA 53: 179/143). Moreover, as he puts it in these same lectures: "The essence of one's own is so mysterious [*geheimnisvoll*] that it unfolds its ownmost essential wealth only from out of a supremely thoughtful acknowledgment of the foreign" (GA 53: 69/55). Here we find an ethical attunement to that which is not our own that serves as the basis for a Hölderlinian ethos of poetic dwelling. On the other hand, in Heidegger's Hölderlin lectures we find another form of alien homecoming that privileges the German *Volk* as the sole hope for recovery (*Verwindung*) from the machinational destiny of Western metaphysics and technology. On this reading, we find such rebarbative comments as these that Heidegger wrote to his brother Fritz in the postwar era: "I find the changing of street signs and a Heinrich Heine Street wholly uncalled for because it is senseless in Meßkirch."[2]

Moreover, we cannot help but notice these kinds of overdetermined readings in his attempt to relate spirit to the foreign "colony" from Hölderlin's famous "*Brod und Wein*" fragment (stanza 9).[3] Here Heidegger invariably privileges the ownmost over the alien even as he defines the foreign only in relation to the native homeland. Hence, he can think of the foreign as "the still unappropriated homeland," the other whose alterity is thought only and ever in terms of the proper, the native, the homely, and the selfsame. Within such a configuration, remembrance will be thought of as "a thinking ahead [*Vordenken*] to the other of the foreign. That is one's own" (GA 52: 193/164). Heidegger reinforced this privileging of the proper throughout his Hölderlin lectures.

But Moore asks whether we should exercise a similar caution about alien homecoming not only when we read Heidegger on Hölderlin, but when we read Hölderlin himself. Moore questions whether perhaps "the same forces are at work in Hölderlin himself" as in Heidegger – namely the tension between the forces that pull towards the homeland and those that move towards "a way of dwelling that is open to alterity and self-transformation"? To put it simply, "what is Hölderlin without Germania?" As Moore puts it: "were not Derrida and Levinas justified in their suspicion of the Swabian poet? Was not Paul Celan, however much he learned from him, justified – at least in some small way – when he declared in conjunction with the bicentennial celebration of Hölderlin's birth that 'there is something rotten in Hölderlin's poetry'?" Moore pursues this because he sees something "oxymoronic" about Hölderlin's discourse of "the nomadology" of the self. Let me try to address these issues. First of all, I would agree with Moore that there are at least two Hölderlins; indeed, there are a proliferation of different Hölderlin masks and incarnations within the reception of the 20th century. What it would mean to find two Hölderlins within the poet's own corpus raises all sorts of interpretive questions. I have tried to pursue these in my own work on the relationship between Hölderlin and Paul Celan. Celan, like Heidegger, seizes upon the Hölderlinian trope of remembrance (*Andenken*) and its call to properly mourn the absent dead who perished without a hopeful possibility of future homecoming.

Hence, Heidegger can write: "*Remembrance* does not think back to personal experiences; rather, it thinks ahead toward the essential destiny of the poet" (GA 4: 86/111, tm). For him, "*Remembrance* is the poetic abiding in the essence of the poet's fateful vocation which, in the festive destiny of Germany's future history, festively shows the ground of its founding" (GA 4: 150/171, tm). But Celan will not follow Heidegger here. Nor will he grant him the historical privilege of appropriating Hölderlin for the purposes of sanctifying Germany's future "destiny." On Celan's reading, Hölderlin's own language remains dangerous, so dangerous that when he cites it in poems such as "Tübingen, Jänner," "I drink wine," and "Ars Poetica 62," he remains profoundly suspicious of its use and deployment.

What Celan's oblique style of textual reference/citation in these poems shows is how fraught with danger Hölderlin's poetic oeuvre remains. And yet, in the face of such danger, Celan continues to engage him. He does so, however, in concealed and indirect ways. Hence, where Heidegger weaves a narrative of futural hopes sprung from originary sources, Celan challenges this precarious discourse by concentrating on what lies before him in the present. In Celan's verse we find caesurae, enjambments, hard jointure, and disruption such that everything appears fragmented, disjointed, in need of suture – much like Celan's relation to Hölderlin himself. Hence, when it comes to Moore's question about "the two Hölderlins," I would follow a different track. Such an intervention does not deny the difficulties involved in reading Hölderlin through the lens of German history, but it also does not confine his writings to the same politically toxic vision of German national destiny as those of his right-wing followers.

We find, of course, in the Hölderlin-reception of the 1930s a crude and perilous misuse of the poet's oeuvre for an ideological imperative to German national ascendancy. Here Hölderlin's language, which means of course the German language, will be deployed in coded locutions to assert the racial-linguistic supremacy of the German *Volk* over other peoples and nations. For Jewish poets such as Celan, this linguistic derogation would culminate in what he termed "the thousand darknesses of

death-bringing speech."[4] In crucial and multiform ways, Hölderlin would come to occupy a central place in Celan's own work, not merely as a poet, but as the symbol for a certain kind of German national identity and vocation raised in the name of "Hölderlin." That is, for Celan (as well as for those Jews such as Derrida and Levinas) there was indeed "something rotten" in Hölderlin's poetry. And yet Celan did not dismiss Hölderlin's poetic insights or relegate them to the dustbin of German literary history. Instead, Celan took up the challenge of engaging Hölderlin's language in a profound and abiding way, never forgetting how it was co-opted by his brown-shirted admirers, even as Celan himself was also attuned to its poetic power and mystery. For him, Hölderlin's own descent into madness came to serve as a cipher for the long history of racial-historical madness that beset the German *Volk*. Celan's reaction to Hölderlin was certainly marked by ambiguity and bifurcation. On the one hand, he knew all too well that Heidegger's way of approaching Hölderlin's poetic diction was saturated in the brine of National Socialist homeland (*Heimat*)-discourse. On the other hand, Hölderlin's excursions into the possibilities of poetic language – especially its way of challenging the technical language that has come to define modern culture – led him to embrace the project of thinking the relation of poetry and philosophy in an essential way that came to him through Heidegger's readings of Hölderlin.

Celan was well aware of the dangers to thinking posed by Heidegger's emphasis on homeland (*Heimat*), returning home (*Heimkehr*), and homecoming (*Heimkunft*), but he never abandoned his engagement with Hölderlin. Rather, his ties to the poet are marked by a nuanced admiration and an awareness of Hölderlin's unyielding influence, not only on the German poetic tradition, but on his own work. If even Celan never abandons his ties to Hölderlin, I think the suspicion that there are "two Hölderlins" at work here proves dangerously hyperbolic. There is no denying that the palimpsest of the Hölderlin-reception in Germany is marked by a ruinous malignancy of national insanity (*Wahnsinn*). But the work of Hölderlin also harbors many lessons for those attuned to the anti-fascist impulses within German thinking. These are, most poignantly, questions that each of us needs to raise as we confront the difficulties of reading both Hölderlin and Heidegger's "Hölderlin."

Yes, of course, we must acknowledge the difficulties of reading Hölderlin through the palimpsest of 20th-century interpretation, especially in the Jewish reception of Levinas and Derrida. Hölderlin's poetry lends itself to such wildly contested readings. And yet I would not wish to place the egregious political errors of 20th-century German interpretation at the feet of Hölderlin. If, during and after the First World War and then inevitably in the war that followed, Hölderlin became a symbol of German national destiny at the expense of other nations and peoples, we can also find a different Hölderlin in the revolutionary student movement in Germany during the late 1960s.

Following the left-wing work of figures such as Theodor Adorno, Ernst Bloch, Pierre Bertaux, Robert Minder, and Peter Weiss, Hölderlin became the symbol of a new German self-reflection that demanded accountability, for the sins of the father, as it were. Nonetheless, I do not wish to present a "pristine" and flawless (*fehlerfrei*) version of Hölderlin's work here. There have been many figures within the Hölderlin reception (*Hölderlinrezeption*) who have voiced their worries about the later uses of the poet for their own purposes. But here I want to underline one striking difference between Heidegger and Hölderlin, one that I locate in a reading of poems such as "Die Wanderung," "Andenken," "Tinian," "Kolomb," and "Heimkunft," where Hölderlin expresses his deep love of travel and wandering, especially of journeying to Asia, the Americas, the Arctic, and Africa. This deep and abiding preoccupation with travel was combined with Hölderlin's interest in geology, cartography, topography, astronomy, climatology, and geopolitics, so much so that the Hölderlin scholar Helmut Mottel has come to speak of "Hölderlin's Nomadology" as an important element within his poetic corpus.[5] Hence, while acknowledging Heidegger's emphasis on Hölderlin as the poet of returning home (*Heimkehr*) and return, I want also to recognize Hölderlin as the *nomadic* poet of wayfaring and exploration, of a nomadology of wandering that looks to the open sea and to the life of mariners as the proper sphere for poetic journeying – and for poetic remembrance (*Andenken*). Here *remembrance* is understood not simply as what we do in an act of remembering. It is, rather, grasped as an indication of what happens to

us when we open ourselves to the temporal displacement and dislocation that time effects upon us when we turn back to the locus of memory.

I would also like to address Krzysztof Ziarek's comment concerning the unhomely (*das Unheimliche*), a question that preoccupies Heidegger, especially in the "Ister" lectures. As Ziarek suggests, this question about uncanniness proves crucial for Heidegger. Uncanniness pervades the human being's journey upon the earth, so much so that Dasein's very way of being is confronted by the abyssal character of its sojourn. For Heidegger, there is something unhomely (*unheimlich*) at the core of homeland (*Heimat*) and the homely (*das Heimliche*). That which is un-homely (*das Unheimliche*) does not stand over against the homely (*das Heimliche*) as its other; rather, uncanniness emerges from out of the very center of the homely as something intimately pervading it. This is precisely what Heidegger interrogates in his SS 1942 "Ister" lectures with his discussion of the first choral ode from Sophocles's *Antigone*. On Heidegger's reading, Antigone (far more than Creon) steps out of the site of the unhomely of her own power. And unlike her father Oedipus, she *knowingly* "takes it upon herself to be unhomely" (GA 53: 136–137/109). Such a decision, if it is to be authentic, "must spring from a belonging to the hearth and thus stem from a kind of being homely" (GA 53: 132/106). What matters here above all, for Heidegger, is Antigone's authentic resolve to embrace her fate as the one who embodies "the supreme uncanny" (GA 53: 129/104). If, like Creon, her uncanny expulsion from the hearth of being (*Hestia*) were occasioned by a mere presumptuousness (*Vermessenheit*) that measured all beings from the horizon of subjective volition and self-assertion, then such a movement would merely result in the forgetting and forfeiture of being. But because her unhomeliness emerges out of "a 'thoughtful remembrance' [*Andenken*] of being" that thinks of this unhomeliness as but a preparatory passageway to a homecoming at the hearth of being, Antigone succeeds in fulfilling the fundamental law of human history as "becoming homely in being unhomely." As Heidegger expresses it: "Antigone *is* the poem of being unhomely in the proper and supreme sense" (GA 53: 151/121).

Because what is one's own lies all too near, properly dwelling in such nearness (*Nähe*) is the most difficult precisely because its proximity unthinkingly inures us to what is genuinely our own within it. For this reason we first need to journey into the foreign in order to come into what is our own since this very movement away from the proper brings with it a "thoughtful remembrance" or *Andenken* of the proper. According to Heidegger, the dramatic action within the play *Antigone* by the character Antigone brings about just such a movement since it confronts us with the decision of dwelling authentically within the uncanny, and indeed doubly so, since the uncanny here appears as what is foreign to the Germans – namely, as the *Greek* form of being unhomely precisely as a way of (authentically) becoming homely.

For Heidegger, it is this sense of the uncanniness of human existence that marks the very appearance of Dasein as tragic since "human beings themselves in their own essence are a *katastrophe*: a reversal that turns them away from their own essence" (GA 53: 94/77, tm). This sense of not-being-at-home even – and precisely when – we are at home will come to mark Heidegger's own interpretation of *Antigone*.

In *Of an Alien Homecoming*, I have tried to show that this discourse about the proper way of human dwelling is yet another way for Heidegger to raise the question of "originary ethics." Such a question involves both tarrying/abiding in a native abode as well as journeying outward into the foreign. It involves an awareness that to be able to dwell in the proper, native, and homely, we must first abide in the abode of the unhomely, the uncanny, the improper. This is what distinguishes us as the exception among beings, that we both inhabit and are inhabited by an inescapable uncanniness that pervades our *ethos*.

So, yes, I would certainly welcome Ziarek's suggestion that the possibility of openness to the unhomely (*unheimlich*) lies at the core of what is homely (*heimlich*) and of homeland (*Heimat*). But we also need to remember that for Heidegger, few of us are like Antigone. That is, few of us *knowingly* embrace the unhomeliness (*Unheimlichkeit*) at the center of our existence. Instead, we find strategies of evasion and comfort that inure us to the uncanniness that pervades our way of being.

All of Heidegger's efforts here are aimed at opening this relation to our notice, of attempting to make us ever more mindful of our need to address the uncanny essence of our own canny attempts to evade that which cannot be evaded: the abyss at the heart of being, the *Abgrund* that, as the ungrounded ground of all that is, pervades every human venture to ground its own home. We see this in the way Heidegger ends his "Ister" lectures (SS 1942) when he writes of Hölderlin's poetry: "This poetry demands of us a transformation in our ways of thinking and experiencing, one that concerns being in its entirety" (GA 53: 205/166). As part of this transformation, Heidegger enjoins us to "let go of…our presumptive measure of truth, so as to enter that free realm in which the poetic is" (GA 53: 205/167). He then raises a question which Hölderlin famously posed in one of his late poems, "In lovely blueness": "Is there a measure on earth?" and he reminds us that Hölderlin answered this question by avowing "There is none" (GA 53: 205/167). As we confront this lack of earthly measure as the "token of hopelessness and despair," Heidegger asks us to think a different measure, perhaps even a poetic measure, that might shelter the truth of the poetic word (GA 53: 205/167). In turning to such a word, Heidegger's thinking holds forth the hope that in intimate nearness to this word "we might suddenly be struck by it[s]" unrelenting power (GA 53: 205/167). To live in nearness to this word would then open the possibility of what it might mean were we to live commensurately with the promise of poetic dwelling.

Now let me turn to Ziarek's thoughtful questions about two other themes in the Heidegger of the 1930s–40s: Christianity (*Christentum*) and power. Ziarek is right to emphasize the fuller context of Heidegger's remarks on Judaism (*Judentum*) without ignoring their anti-Judaic prejudice. Heidegger is so strongly opposed to *Christentum* because it is so powerfully tied to the idea of "creation," which instead of keeping the dynamics of being open and free, closes off the sense of being's unfolding through what Ziarek terms "its decisive metaphysical determination." I couldn't agree more. Such an understanding of being as something "created" leads to the forgetting of being. Heidegger goes so far as to read this tradition's notion of monotheism as providing the basis for

"modern systems of total tyranny" (GA 97: 438). And here is where I should acknowledge the insightfulness of Ziarek's commentary.

As Ziarek notes, Heidegger's animus toward *Christentum* and its creation doctrine lies in its failure to embrace the very question of being, instead foreclosing this question in advance of such questioning by supplying pregiven answers to the questions posed. Again, Ziarek is right to show that Heidegger "never directly questions the relation between *Christentum* and *Judentum* from the perspective of being." His notion of monotheism forestalls such an approach. For both *Christentum* and *Judentum* are tied to Heidegger's planetary understanding of machinational dominion that renders all beings as standing reserve. Hence, I find Ziarek's playful suggestion that Heidegger's ontotheology can be grasped as an onto(mono)theology a helpful one. Against this background, we should remember that not only Jews and Christians serve as the artificers of machination. America, England, and the West will serve this function as well, as will Bolshevism and Fascism, and, by the end of the 1930s, even National Socialism. Even here, however, we find the traces of Heidegger's own national-regional predilections, for in the *Black Notebooks* he remarks: "In its essential sense 'Catholicism' [*'das Katholische'*] is in its historical provenance Roman-Spanish, utterly un-Nordic and completely un-German" (GA 95: 326/254, tm).

Ziarek also emphasizes what he calls "the twin critiques of power and of *Christentum*." As Ziarek shows, what pervades Heidegger's texts much more than a latent anti-Semitism is the direct and frontal attack on *Christentum*. For Heidegger, *Christentum* becomes the focus of critique precisely insofar as it comes to be synonymous with the reign of machination within the history of beyng. With this mono-theological drive to ground being in the idea of creation (*ens creatum*), *Christentum* forecloses the question of being by grounding it in the idea of a creator-god who functions as a meta-subject imbued with the power to determine beings. The death of god proclaimed by Nietzsche bespeaks for Heidegger not a crisis of faith in a divine being as much as it does a shift in the history of beyng towards oblivion of being (*Seinsvergessenheit*) and/as abandonment by being (*Seinsverlassenheit*). The idea of a creator god

becomes transformed here through the machinations of the Cartesian subject bent on calculation, planning, production, control, and dominion (GA 69: 36–44/33–40). In this way, the Christian metaphysical conception of power that yields its fruit in the epoch of positionality (*Gestell*), *Christentum* "goes forward by means of the unleashing of the essence of power into machination" (GA 69: 80/68, tm). Heidegger's critique ignores the many differences between Judaic and Christian conceptions of the godhead, however, and simply collapses them into what Ziarek terms "a monotheistic monolith." This Judeo-Christian god reigns supreme over the natural world in a way that adumbrates the calculative rationality of the human being whose sovereign power lies in controlling the world as an object there for a subject. Against this metaphysical imperative towards the power of subjectivity, Heidegger invokes Hölderlin's gods as the heralds of another beginning of Western thinking on the other side of power and violence. As Heidegger expresses it in *Mindfulness*, or *Besinnung*: "Beyng – the *powerless*, *beyond power and lack of power*, better, what is outside of power and lack of power, and essentially unrelated to such" (GA 66: 187–188/166, tm).

As Ziarek points out, the discourse about power and machination belongs squarely in any discussion about Heidegger's discourse on *Christentum*, especially since he does not truly distinguish between Christian-Jewish traditions in any direct way, but simply links both to their shared belief in monotheism. As he traces the consequences of power in Heidegger's own work, Ziarek shows how *Christentum* holds sway over more than the realm of faith or religion. It does so in tandem with the technics of positionality (*Gestell*), "bringing the human to reveal itself as a being intrinsically capable of being a resource." In other words, *Christentum* both sets up and carries out the technical disposition of our lives in such a powerful way that it contributes to the functional calculus of positing, positioning, placing, and proposing that come to dominion in the epoch of positionality (*Gestell*). It is as a response to this centuries-long narrative within the history of being towards dominion and power that Hölderlin's poetic language offers us an opening towards another beginning of thinking.

So yes, Hölderlin does serve Heidegger here as the poet who poetizes the power of the powerless, the power of *physis* that is free from the power imperatives of human command.[6] Ziarek asks pointedly: how are we to situate this Heideggerian reflection on "letting free of power" with Heidegger's emphasis on "mission and exceptionalism" in the Hölderlin lectures? I might add this question – how are we to reconcile the moments in Heidegger that express the deepest sense of poetic attunement to the earth with Rector Heidegger's insistence on the self-assertion of the German university? More crudely stated, how are we to think together Hölderlin and Hitler? There are few easy answers to these questions since Heidegger himself never poses them in this way. Instead, he thinks them through his discourse about the native and the foreign that plays itself out in his reading of Sophocles's *Antigone* and Hölderlin's "Ister" hymn.

If the question of authentic dwelling is, as I believe, at the heart not only of the "Ister" lectures but of all Heidegger's late work, then perhaps we need to read these lectures in at least two counterturning ways. That is, on the one hand, we need to read them as offering genuinely profound philosophical insights about dwelling and homecoming in the face of the uncanny homelessness that threatens the human being at its very core. On the other hand, we also need to read them as advancing a racialist ontology of national self-identity that problematizes Heidegger's whole relation to the history of Western thought. This is Heidegger's legacy to us. I believe we need to confront this uncanny paradox that lies at the heart of Heidegger's thinking. Such an insight renders our relation to him and his work ever more difficult, ever more precarious. Here the very fact of our relation to Heidegger is suffused with ever greater risk and danger, perhaps even a "danger" that does not let itself be rescued or overcome by any "saving power" – not even that of Hölderlin or his gods.[7]

NOTES

1 Friedrich Hölderlin, "Letter to Böhlendorff," trans. Dennis Schmidt, *On Germans and Other Greeks: Tragedy and Ethical Life* (Bloomington, Indiana: Indiana University Press, 2001), 165/ *Sämtliche Werke und Briefe in drei Bänden*, III, ed. Jochen Schmidt (Frankfurt: Deutscher Klassiker Verlag, 204), 460.

2 Martin Heidegger's letter to his brother Fritz in *Heidegger und der Antisemitismus*, eds. Walter Homolka and Arnulf Heidegger (Freiburg: Herder, 2016), 127–128. Heidegger's implication here is that renaming Meßkirch streets to honor Jews seems hardly commensurate with the world historical crisis facing the Germans.

3 Friedrich Hölderlin, DKV, I: 747 and Martin Heidegger, GA 4: 89–90/114; GA 52: 189/161–162; GA 53: 157/126; GA 75: 140, 191.

4 Paul Celan, *Selected Prose and Poetry*, trans. John Felstiner (New York: Norton, 2001), 395/*Gesammelte Werke* III (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1986), 186.

5 For the range of Hölderlin's interest in these various scientific disciplines related to travel and wandering, cf. Alexander Honold, *Hölderlins Kalender: Astronomie und Revolution um 1800* (Berlin: Vorwerk 8, 2005); David Constantine, *The Significance of Locality in the Poetry of Friedrich Hölderlin* (London: Modern Humanities Research Association, 1979); Helmut Mottel, "*Apoll envers Terre*": *Hölderlins mythopoetische Weltentwürfe* (Würzburg: Ergon, 1998), 115–179. See also Martin Anderle, *Die Landschaft in den Gedichten Hölderlins* (Bonn: Bouvier, 1986) and Jürgen Link, *Hölderlins Fluchtlinie Griechenland* (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 2020).

6 Cf. for example, Hölderlin's verses in "Die Wanderung," vv.72–78 that speak of "himmlische Milde."

7 Charles Bambach, *Of an Alien Homecoming* (Albany, New York: SUNY Press, 2022), 226.

BOOK REVIEW

Ian Alexander Moore's *Dialogue on the Threshold: Heidegger and Trakl*

David Farrell Krell

Ian Alexander Moore, *Dialogue on the Threshold: Heidegger and Trakl*. Albany: State University Press of New York (SUNY), 2022. 420 pages.

Early one winter morning, after a night of heavy snowfall, I was walking (or skiing, I no longer remember which) along a familiar path in the woods. The morning was foggy, the prevailing colors (or noncolors) of white and gray were interrupted only by the black branches of the trees. Suddenly something caught my eye at the side of the path, where the snow lay in deep drifts. A hole. And at the bottom of the hole, a bloodred stain, the only true color on the entire scene. A hare had dug frantically to escape the fox, but the fox had seized it, throttled it, and carted it off to its den. Only some scattered clumps of fur and that shocking red remained. There were no words for it. It was not the flag of the rising sun, although that crossed my mind, but merely the emblem of shed blood. That intense red was like the words of a poem, like all the words of Georg Trakl's poems. No words can be brought to bear on the words of a poem without doing harm, if only the harm of muffling or dulling those original words.

Even so, a philosopher cannot resist the temptation to write about the intensity of what she or he has seen and heard in a poem. Hardly anything else seems worth writing about. One does not dream of doing

justice: there is no justice in the tribunals of literary criticism, even when a philosopher claims the right to speak as the critic. Even in the absence of justice, however, it seems important to attempt a dialogue on the threshold of poetry. It seemed important to Heidegger, especially on the thresholds we know as "Hölderlin" and "Trakl," and it seems important to Ian Moore. Also to this reviewer.

In a brief review it will be difficult to offer even a mere summary of Moore's fine work, much less to offer any suggestions or criticisms. The criticisms, in any case, would be no more than expressions of gratitude to the author of the work, gratitude for the immense effort that has gone into this work on the threshold.

Moore's book has seven chapters, four detailed appendices, and copious endnotes. The four appendices, all of them genuine contributions to the theme of Heidegger and Trakl, present (1) Heidegger's Trakl marginalia, (2) Heidegger's "occasional" references to Trakl, (3) a key to Heidegger's references to Trakl in his principal essay on the poet, "Die Sprache im Gedicht," and (4), particularly laudable, a selection of Trakl's poems in German and in English translation.

Chapter 1, "'The Poet of Our Generation'," reflects on the apparent oddity of Heidegger's fascination with Trakl – the "incest-ridden expressionist" (1), the "drug-addicted Austrian expressionist" (11). Moore provides excellent background material on the occasions for Heidegger's two principal published encounters with Trakl during the early 1950s, "Language" and "Language in the Poem," in *Unterwegs zur Sprache* (1959). Especially useful is Moore's account of Heidegger's response to the Germanist Max Kommerell. Less convincing is Moore's account of the Carl Dallago episode involving Trakl's relation to Christianity: Moore takes Trakl's replies straightforwardly as evidence of Christian faith, but when the exasperating Dallago peppers the reticent poet with personal questions, or so it seems to me, it is best to take Trakl's replies as efforts to exasperate even further his obnoxious inquisitor. Likewise, when the wonderful poet Else Lasker-Schüler says of Trakl, *Er war wohl Martin Luther*, "Surely he was Martin Luther," one has to wonder about the smile that may have accompanied the word *wohl* (surely). In any

case, it seems to me that questions concerning Trakl's "Christianity" are less compelling than the indisputable fact that with Trakl everything seems different and sounds unheard-of. No traditional saint or apostate seems like him. Even if Heidegger's claim that both Trakl and his poetry can be declared non-Christian is unsustainable – and Derrida has demonstrated quite convincingly that this is so – it seems futile to argue the reverse. In any case, it seems to me now that Heidegger's denial of Trakl's "Christianity" is actually meant to conceal the source of his own chiliastic "placement" of Trakl's poetry. There is good reason to say that Heidegger is descended from a long line of medieval Millenarians and Millennialists. Eschatology is one of his favorite words.

Chapter 2, "Language of Bread and Wine," continues to take this Hölderlinian and Traklian locution as quintessentially Christian and sacramental, "symbols (or substances) of Christ's body and blood" (47). This seems to me overhasty and ill-advised in the cases of both poets. Moore does concede that in Trakl's poetry "there are also pagan" references to bread and wine, and he calls these "sinister" (46). That seems very strange to me. Consider the "sinister" line, *In reinen Händen trägt der Landmann Brot und Wein / Und friedlich reifen die Früchte in sonniger Kammer*, "In pure hands the peasant carries bread and wine / And the fruits ripen peacefully in the sunny chamber." Nothing sinister there; indeed, nothing "pagan." This last word, an odd malapropism and anachronism, causes Moore some trouble. At one point he does not hesitate to cite "the pagan Pindar" (57), at another point the "pagan" Virgil (91). Now, both Pindar and Virgil were many things in their lifetimes, and there were even more things that they were not. For example, neither Pindar nor Virgil was a *fin-de-siècle* dandy in Paris or a Mayan high priest at Copan during the Classical Age. But far less than either of these was Pindar or Virgil ever a "pagan." More seriously, it can be demonstrated quite convincingly that "bread" and "wine," whether taken together or separately, in both Hölderlin and Trakl have as much to do with country life and with Demeter and Dionysos as they do with the Last Supper. And, to repeat, neither of those two gods nor the country people of Swabia or Austria who bake bread and consume wine is "pagan." I have written about this elsewhere at some length, so I won't go on about it here.[1]

I think again of that red stain in the snow. Trakl's language is like that. Moore quotes Kommerell as saying, so beautifully, "The words have something startled about them, so freshly have they been broken from the quarry of stillness" (quoted at 48–49). The problem is that when you line up words from other traditions and contexts alongside them, such as words from religious traditions and texts, the result is seldom what you want it to be. When Moore lines up some words from the Book of Revelation, even those *bizarreries* fall flat beside Trakl's poems.

Moore does pose the question, "What, moreover, if Heidegger's own discourse, which mimics many of the characteristic gestures of Christianity, were itself inseparable from it?" (65). He is more than right to pose the question. For it is the only way to account for the very odd way in which Heidegger tries to "rescue" Trakl from the "degenerate *Geschlecht*" of humankind, as though Trakl shares with Heidegger his enthusiasm for the overcoming of Platonism and "the other beginning." Heidegger's monstrous claim that Trakl would have to have "jubilated" over the deaths of his fellow soldiers in World War I, since, after all, they were merely members of the paltry human race, good riddance to them, can be explained only by Heidegger's participation in a kind of quasi-Christian Millenarianism – the Second Coming now understood as the *Ereignis* (event) of an utterly new commencement, a seismic shift in the history of beyng promised by the earliest Greek thinkers but now, with Trakl, at hand. Derrida has seen quite clearly the chiliasm of this "promise," and has effectively shown its messianicity without Messianism. And Moore, as his final chapters demonstrate, has understood this quite well.

What remains are unbridgeable differences of interpretation. For example, in the remarkable line that closes Trakl's "Psalm," *Schweigsam über der Schädelstätte öffnen sich Gottes goldene Augen*, "Silently over Golgotha open the golden eyes of God," Moore sees "a glimmer of religious hope." A more skeptical reader of "Psalm" will wonder about those jaundiced eyes, the eyes of a black cat, opening over the disastrous scene of a Son being sacrificed by his Father. Religious traditions are a very mixed bag.

Chapter 3, "For the Love of Detachment," interprets Heidegger's declared "place" for Trakl's single and singular poem as *Abgeschiedenheit*, "apartness," "departedness." Moore relates this word – in Meister Eckhart's vocabulary – to *Gelassenheit*, or "releasement." It is in this chapter that Moore most effectively challenges Heidegger's insistence that Trakl wants to leave the degenerate race of humankind behind in order to instaurate a new *Geschlecht* and an "other" history of beyng. Moore counters that "there is much in Trakl's poetry to suggest deep sorrow and sympathy for the degenerate *Geschlecht*" (95). Not only "much," one may add, but just about everything.

Chapter 4, "Pain is Being Itself," offers a reading of Heidegger's pronouncements on *Schmerz* (pain), that most German of all German words, meaning both physical and spiritual pain or even agony. I have paid special attention to this chapter of Moore's book, remembering that in my discussions with Derrida during the 1980s I often insisted that his *Geschlecht* series had to devote itself to that theme. No doubt I did so because of the amount of agony that is palpable in so many of Trakl's poems. Yet Moore shares my doubts about the abstract and anodyne way Heidegger ontologizes pain:

> Heidegger's treatment, at least in the material available to scholars at present, fails to heed and account for the profound significance of irreparable ontic pain – the pain, for example, that rends the body asunder, not the pain that mends all wounds; the pain of personal loss and alienation, not the pain that gathers into community. Heidegger, for his part, dismisses this searing pain of particularity as derivative, as the product of a failure to heed the gentle call of being. (134)

I have always found it useful – and even refreshing – to contrast Freud's accounts of pain in primary narcissism and in love life with Heidegger's pieties. Particularly distressing for both Moore and the reviewer is Heidegger's treatment of the *gewaltiger Schmerz* (tremendous pain, overwhelming agony) of "Grodek," the pain of the "unborn

grandchildren" experienced by the fallen soldiers or by one who witnesses their slaughter – as Trakl did. Moore is right to say that Heidegger's reading is "monstrously tone deaf" (137) and that "Trakl is not looking forward to a new birth for the West here, as Heidegger claims" (140). Yet Moore himself does not shy from writing, "However, as I have been arguing throughout the book, this pain is mediated by the passion of the tortured Christ, whom Trakl follows in faith as he takes up his own cross" (136). I am not sure how much one may presume about another's agony. Trust the red stain in the snow, nothing else.

Chapter 5, "Poetic Colors of the Holy," attempts to glean from Trakl's poems the colors gold and blue in an effort to test Heidegger's claim that these are the colors of *das Heilige*, "the holy." Especially the blue of *ein blaues Wild* (a blue wild animal) is Heidegger's quarry. Moore finds, correctly and by contrast, that Trakl's blues are eminently "bivalent." Yet it is not a question of chromatics; it is a question of Heidegger's discourse on "the holy." Moore seems to fear, as I certainly do, that Heidegger's desire to pontificate on the holy is hardly justified either by his fundamental ontology or by his responses to the poetry of Hölderlin and Trakl. When Schelling labors on the questions of evil and the holy, as he does from 1809 onward, there is an intensity that will not stop with half-way measures or vague abstractions. That intensity is simply not there in Heidegger's efforts. And, whatever one may think of Heidegger's musings, how could one assert that they have nothing to do with the discourses of Christianity and Platonism?

Chapter 6, "*Geschlecht*," thinks through both Heidegger's and Derrida's efforts to confront sexuality and sexual difference in Trakl's poetry. Moore sees quite clearly that Heidegger is least prepared to think these particular issues through and that this lack is remarkable, since Heidegger's postulated overcoming or setting-aside of both Platonism and Christianity requires him here above all to respond. As Derrida demonstrates, it remains impossible for Heidegger to distinguish meaningfully between the two "blows" that in Heidegger's "placement" coin the human race, namely, (1) the "neutral" or perhaps even benign division into female and male *Geschlechter*; and (2) the blow that strikes discord

into the twofold and even into the sibling relationship. The "salvific holiness" of "blue wild game," observes Moore, remains ineffectual (195). Furthermore, Heidegger's anxiety in the face of the abyssal relation of humankind to animality, his deafness to the lunar voice of the sister, and above all his inability to confront the important role of the lovers in Trakl's poetry – precisely at the instant of the o n e *Geschlecht* in that poetry – and in the lives of the humans we know Ian Moore effectively demonstrates.

By the time the reader reaches chapter 7, "Spirit in Tatters," and the brief "Postscript," it is clear that Moore's book has undergone a significant development. If he has chosen for his cover image Trakl's caricature of himself as a frowning cowled monk, it is clear by the end of the book that the monk in question is a Robert Browning monk, if not "Fra Lippo Lippi" then a troubled brother from "Soliloquy of the Spanish Cloister," whose final two lines are:

> Plena gratia
> Ave, Virgo! Gr-r-r – you swine!

If Heidegger can characterize his own path of thinking as the attempt to bring Nietzsche's task to a full unfolding, and if he can interpret the Anaximander fragment in terms of a history of being that is essentially *tragic*, he can also invoke the holy and the all-gathering *logos* of being, which, as Moore observes (201), makes of that history a *comedy*, if not a *divine* comedy. Moore writes:

> Heidegger attempts to isolate his interpretation against the metaphysics of Platonism and Christianity, but his annotation compels us to ask whether there is not something metaphysical about his aspirations for a purified homeland and a purified *Geschlecht*. How much gathering can there be before the incalculable freedom of being is rendered null? The quelling of its rage and the softening of its pain may sound appealing, but is this not ultimately a fantasy on a par with the grandest of the metaphysical tradition? Do not such fantasies blind us

> to indominable malice and thereby only fuel its flames? (209)

Moore is wise to close by citing Reiner Schürmann, whose *Broken Hegemonies* reflects on the *distressed* site of Heidegger's texts from the late 1930s to the end. "The distress of the site and the pathos of thinking indicate one and the same epochal monstrosity," writes Schürmann (quoted at 214).

There are aspects of Heidegger's confrontation with Trakl and of the Trakl-world itself that one wishes Moore had shed greater light on. What is one to make of Trakl's obsession with Elis, Sebastian, Helian – all the haunting brothers who are the early dead? What is one to make of the fearful alliance that Georg and his younger sister Gretl form against their chilly mother? What is one to make of the Catholic governess who gives the children their second language (Alsatian French) and some version of her intensely ascetic religiosity? What is one to make of the flow of identities between brother and sister, inasmuch as the shibboleth of "incest" tells us nothing about that flow? Does not Heidegger's fervor to become a brother to "the stranger" of Trakl's poetry, and thus a brother to the sister he never had, reflect some sort of phantasm stemming from what Freud calls the period of latency in human emotional development, and would that not make the history of being, at least in certain of its aspects, something like a dream of puberty? And is not Luce Irigaray – the one important interpreter of Heidegger's Trakl essays whom Moore does not cite – correct when she wonders whether the "gentleness of the onefold twofold" that Heidegger envisages for the mortals can really come from those dead boys? or whether there can be but one source of *Sanftmut*, the only source of tenderness there ever was? Would a "Christian" reading of Trakl's poems help us with any of those questions? or virtually any others? Are we not left to stand astonished in the face of the bloodred stain in the blindingly white snow of Trakl's poems?[2]

NOTES

1 See Krell, "From Candlelight to Kerosene Lamp: Heidegger and Gadamer on Trakl's 'A Winter Eve'," in *The Journal of Continental Philosophy* (3:1/2, 2022), 87–104. Section 3 of the paper, "In the Lamplight: Bread and Wine," shows how varied both Hölderlin's and Trakl's uses of these words are, whether taken together or separately, so that it seems impossible to me to reduce them to a familiar sacramental figure. Certainly in Hölderlins's case, the prevailing references are demonstrably to Demeter and Dionysos. Trakl's usages pose a more difficult question. Yet there is a good chance that Gadamer is right: bread and wine may be found on the tables of a country inn, lit by a kerosene lamp, rather than on the altar in Heidegger's candle-lit church.

2 The book is admirably researched and written, and also beautifully produced. I spotted only one typo, and one possible omission: on p. 64, line 4: "spiriual." On pp. 20–21, "This articulation [of the fourfold] allows for a difference that does abolish intimacy." Question: Is the word "not" missing between "does" and "abolish"? I am uncertain what would hang on this, but I pose the question. One regret is that the illustrations are often difficult to make out.

BOOK REVIEW

Michael Chighel's *Kabale: Hebräischer Humanismus im Lichte von Heideggers Denken*

Daniel M. Herskowitz

Michael Chighel, *Kabale: Hebräischer Humanismus im Lichte von Heideggers Denken*. Translated by Peter Trawny. Frankfurt am Main: Klostermann, 2020. 294 pages.

Anyone familiar with the small but intriguing and hopefully growing scholarly field dealing with Heidegger and Jewish thought is bound to come across the analogy between Heidegger and Balaam, the non-Jewish Moabite prophet who wished to curse but ended up blessing biblical Israel. While Heidegger's oracle-like rhetoric has something to do with it, putting these two figures together is surprising, provocative, and somewhat peculiar. For some, the link between the two is intended to signal toward the unusual, paradoxical "insider-outsider" character of the German philosopher, whose well-known tainted relationship with Jews comes together with some surprising affinities with various ideas within Jewish tradition. This is not the case for Chighel. The reader of this rich and thought-provoking book will encounter the Balaam-Heidegger analogy on its very first pages, but here, the analogy is not meant to suggest some kind of hidden similarity or correspondence between Heidegger and Judaism, but the opposite. The analogy is based on Chighel's sense that like the ancient prophet, Heidegger too is an enemy of Judaism, but whose attack on the Jews can likewise end up being an unintended

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blessing; the calamity of Heidegger can illuminate important light on the true nature and vocation of Israel. A serious Jewish engagement with Heidegger therefore should not simply involve a defence against his accusations, but should be taken as an opportunity to articulate Judaism's own teachings in a more precise and direct way – and in so doing to illustrate their radical difference from his philosophical world.

It should be already clear that this book differs greatly from most of the publications on the topic of Heidegger and the Jews. While it touches on his ties to the Nazi party and the question of his antisemitism, its main focus lies elsewhere, namely, in enacting a critical confrontation with Heidegger's philosophy from the (or a) point of view of Judaism. Chighel states explicitly that the negative, anti-Jewish statements found in Heidegger's writings are much less important – and less interesting – than the anti-Jewish stance that his overarching philosophical project represents. Indeed, the endless debate over his antisemitism serves as a distraction from the more pressing question that is at stake. Exhibiting the originality of thinking exhibited in the book, Chighel mimics Heidegger's claim that the essence of technology is not technological to state that the essence of antisemitism is not antisemitic but rather a question concerning revealing and truth. Reaching the bottom of the essence of Heidegger's antisemitism would thus require a different kind of analysis than commonly employed.

For Chighel, Heidegger's philosophy is corrupted to the core, beyond repair – not so much because it harbours problematic statements about Jews, but because it constructs an entire conceptual and religious world that is in diametrical opposition to that of Judaism. Over against what can be termed, rather inappropriately, a "harmonizing approach" – developed in a remarkable albeit different way in the works of Elliot Wolfson, Marlène Zarader, Michael Fagenblat, Elad Lapidot, Allan Scult, and others – according to which similarities, parallels, or areas of interaction between Heidegger and Jewish traditions are highlighted, Chighel posits a clear and unambiguous oppositional relation between Heidegger and Judaism.[1] The anti-Judaism animating Heidegger's philosophy is what Chighel calls anti-Adamism. Heidegger's philosophy is developed in the

name of a *Deutsche Menschentümlichkeit* (German humanity), which actively counterposes the "Hebrew Humanism" of Judaism. There is, indeed, a fundamental difference between Judaism and Heidegger, which can be boiled down to whether *das Seiende* (beings) or *das Sein* (Being) is prioritized and considered superior. This difference, in Chighel's framework, encompasses the difference between presence and transcendence, verticality and horizontality, the ontological and the ontic, solipsistic immanence and openness to an Other. Heidegger's philosophy is far worse than antisemitism – it is pagan, anti-humanistic, anti-creation, anti-God, anti-Sinai, anti-Adam.

The central intervention of the book is to demonstrate the opposition staked out above. It does so by setting out a confrontational analysis, a *Kampf*, of key organizing concepts in Heidegger's philosophy and opposing them to parallel Jewish concepts, a juxtaposition that co-illuminates each side in its radical distinction vis-à-vis the other. Such a *Gegensetzung* (opposition) is posited between the following concepts: "Welt" and "Od," "Boden" and "Eretz," "Erde" and "Adama," "Ethos" and "Tzelem," "Poiesis" and "Avoda," "Alētheia" and "Emet" (other oppositions pop up in passing throughout the book, like the opposition between Heidegger's *Bund* and the Jewish *B'rit*, as well as between *Angst* and love, *Sein* and creation, among others). It is difficult to do justice to the sophisticated way in which these parallel notions are probed to reveal their unreconciliatory character, or to the remarkable array of sources drawn upon in the process of doing so. In the context of this short review, it is sufficient to say that unlike a lot of what is published on the topic of Heidegger and the Jews, there is little that is banal about the analyses in this book. Indeed, few are as fluent in the breadth and width of Jewish tradition and as familiar with the long arc of Heidegger's writing and the European philosophical tradition as Chighel, and few could accomplish such an informed and exciting confrontation. For this achievement alone, this book should be commended.

In addition to Peter Trawny's notion of Heidegger's "being historical-thinking," developed in his *Heidegger and the Myth of a Jewish World Conspiracy* (2016) – Trawny is the translator of this book from English

into German – the mark of Emmanuel Levinas is clearly felt in this work. In the assertion that Judaism is not a particularistic identity but a universal teaching about humanity, in the assumption that there is a fundamental and irreconcilable hostility between Heideggerian philosophy and Judaism, in defining Heidegger as a pagan bound to *Bodenständigkeit* (rootedness) and Judaism as an uprooted existence of sorts, and in approaching Heidegger through the prism of the (im)possibility of encountering an (ethical, religious) Other – a Levinasian line runs through its pages. The Hasidic background of the author is clearly palpable, as well. In fact, this work is in general continuity with some major twentieth century Jewish engagements with Heidegger in that it, too, perceives Heidegger as in some way representing the most pristine manifestation of some fundamental flaw within Western philosophy, and in seeing Judaism, or a philosophical rendition thereof, as the much-needed remedy and alternative to it.

Heidegger occupies an interestingly dual position in Chighel's scheme. Both put up on a pedestal as representing the height and heart of European philosophy and said to be flawed to the very core, Heidegger is attributed with the grandeur and disgrace of being the archenemy of Judaism. As Chighel states explicitly, insofar as Heidegger and Judaism are opposing and non-reconcilable frameworks, it stands to reason that a Jewish reading of Heidegger is necessary for anyone seeking to arrive at a conclusion as to the truth of his views. According to the same logic, a Heideggerian reading of Judaism must be necessary as well. Can one fully grasp what Judaism and "Hebrew Humanism" are about without considering their contrast with Heidegger? It is also important to note that arch-rivalry implies a unique relation of intimacy and dependence in opposition. According to this logic, Heidegger's philosophy belongs "closer" to Judaism precisely *because* it is its diametrically opposite and great enemy. Other philosophical systems do not hold the same intimate relationship of utter negation. Chighel is aware of the dialectic implicit in this dynamic, which makes his analysis more interesting than a facile "good guys" versus "bad guys" story (though at times it comes close to succumbing to this paradigm).

I wish to raise one point about how the oppositional positioning between Judaism and Heidegger is set up. It seems to me that the basic structure grounding the book's arguments, that is, the relatively neat Heidegger/Judaism distinction – paralleling, from Chighel's perspective, a clear "us"/"them" distinction, with its implicit or not-so-implicit evaluative overtones – can only be defended if it is assumed from the outset. In this work, both Heidegger and Judaism are presented in a de-contextualized and ossified manner, like two a-historical Platonic ideas that are the mirror image of the other. The unity of the position attributed to Heidegger is obvious. But what is the basis for the unity of the latter position, attributed to "Judaism"? After all, "Judaism" in this work is represented by a long list of Jewish thinkers and texts that may be separated from each other by centuries and also at times in open disagreement with each other. The claim here is not the trivial point that Jewish thinkers and texts do not speak in a single voice about every topic. It is, rather, a methodological claim. Chighel's approach is a-historical. When the same thinkers and texts are approached from a historical-contextual perspective, it is difficult to deny that some of them actually operated under similar or closely related philosophical assumptions, shared a conceptual nexus and horizon as, and were even nourished directly from, Heidegger. Take Martin Buber or Levinas, for example. Surely these thinkers strongly disagreed with Heidegger on basic matters and even mounted against him fiery, devastating critiques. But presenting them as positioned in diametrical opposition to Heidegger obscures the fact that there are also important moments of continuity, commonality, and interface between them. This is not a "harmonizing" point but, again, a methodological one: the drama of contrasts, radical distinctions, and diametrical oppositions is made possible by the a-historical methodology, but somewhat mellowed down when a historical-contextual perspective is taken. Now, it is certainly true that readers of this book, as a constructive work of Jewish philosophy or theology that perceives itself as speaking in the name of Jewish tradition and making normative claims about it, must adjust their expectations to its methodology and aims. This is not a book *about* Jewish engagements with Heidegger but a book that *is itself*

a Jewish engagement with Heidegger. But it is important to see that here the methodology determines the argument. In the context of the present book, this means that the argument regarding the oppositional distinction between Heidegger and Judaism only holds if we presuppose it, together with Chighel, from the outset.

In my own work I have argued that "no other philosopher has had more impact on twentieth century Jewish European thought than Martin Heidegger."[2] It is yet to be determined whether Heidegger's philosophy will remain a fruitful interlocutor for twenty-first century constructive Jewish thought to think with and against. But the erudition, sophistication, and originality exhibited in this book give the impression that it is off to a very promising start.

NOTES

1 On these readings, see Daniel M. Herskowitz, "Heidegger and Judaism: Variations on a Theme," *The Journal of Jewish Thought and Philosophy* 32 (2024): 8–34.

2 Daniel M. Herskowitz, *Heidegger and his Jewish Reception* (Cambridge University Press, 2021), xii.

TEXTS OF HEIDEGGER CITED AND ABBREVIATIONS USED

References to the works of Martin Heidegger are provided parenthetically in the text by the volume of *Gesamtausgabe* (Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1975–, abbreviated "GA"), followed by the German pagination, a slash, and the English pagination of published translations where extant. The relevant translations are listed following the information for the corresponding GA volume. There is one exception to this practice. No references to the pages of English translations are provided in the case of *Being and Time* (GA 2); instead the GA pagination is followed by "SZ," referring to the single edition, re-issued several times: *Sein und Zeit*, 11th ed. (Tübingen: Max Niemeyer Verlag, 1967), since the pagination of SZ is contained in all three of the English translations of *Sein und Zeit*. Modifications to published translations are noted by "tm"; modifications to emphasis by "em."

FROM THE *GESAMTAUSGABE*

GA 2 — *Sein und Zeit*. Ed. Friedrich-Wilhelm von Herrmann. 1977. English translation: *Being and Time*. Trans. Joan Stambaugh, rev. Dennis J. Schmidt. Albany: State University of New York Press, 2010; trans. John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson. New York: Harper & Row, 1962.

GA 3 — *Kant und das Problem der Metaphysik*. Ed. Friedrich-Wilhelm von Herrmann. 1991. English translation: *Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics*. 5th ed. Trans. Richard Taft. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2009.

GA 4 — *Erläuterungen zu Hölderlins Dichtung*. 2nd ed. Ed. Friedrich-Wilhelm von Herrmann. 1991. English translation: *Elucidations of Hölderlin's Poetry*. Trans. Keith Hoeller. Amherst, NY: Humanity Books, 2000.

GA 5 — *Holzwege*. 7th ed. Ed. Friedrich-Wilhelm von Herrmann. 1994. English translation: *Off the Beaten Track*. Ed. and

trans. Julian Young and Kenneth Haynes. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002.

GA 6.2 *Nietzsche II*. Ed. Brigitte Schillbach. 1997.

GA 7 *Vorträge und Aufsätze*. Ed. Friedrich-Wilhelm von Herrmann. 2000.

GA 8 *Was heißt Denken?* Ed. Paolo-Ludovika Coriando. 2002. English translation: *What Is Called Thinking?* Trans. Fred D. Wieck and J. Glenn Gray. New York: Harper & Row, 1968.

GA 9 *Wegmarken*. 3rd ed. Ed. Friedrich-Wilhelm von Herrmann. 1996. English translation: *Pathmarks*. Ed. William McNeill. Various trans. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998.

GA 10 *Der Satz vom Grund*. Ed. Petra Jaeger. 1997.

GA 11 *Identität und Differenz*. Ed. Friedrich-Wilhelm von Herrmann. 2006. English translation: *Identity and Difference*. Trans. Joan Stambaugh. New York: Harper & Row, 1969.

GA 12 *Unterwegs zur Sprache*. Ed. Friedrich-Wilhelm von Herrmann. 1985.

GA 13 *Aus der Erfahrung des Denkens*. Ed. Hermann Heidegger. 1983.

GA 14 *Zur Sache des Denkens*. Ed. Friedrich-Wilhelm von Herrmann. 2007. English translation: *On Time and Being*. Trans. Joan Stambaugh. New York: Harper & Row, 1972.

GA 15 *Seminare*. Ed. Curd Ochwadt. 1986.

GA 16 *Reden und andere Zeugnisse eines Lebensweges* Ed. Herrmann Heidegger. 2000.

GA 17 *Einführung in die phänomenologische Forschung*. 2nd ed. Ed. Friedrich-Wilhelm von Herrmann. 2006. English translation: *Introduction to Phenomenological Research*. Trans. Daniel O. Dahlstrom. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2005.

GA 19 *Platon: Sophistes*. Ed. Ingeborg Schüßler. 1992. English translation: *Plato's "Sophist."* Trans. Richard Rojcewicz and André Schuwer. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1997.

GA 20 *Prolegomena zur Geschichte des Zeitbegriffs*. Ed. Petra Jaeger. 1979. English translation: *History of the Concept of Time: Prolegomena*. Trans. Theodore Kisiel. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1985.

GA 21 *Logik. Die Frage nach der Wahrheit*. Ed. Walter Biemel. 1976. English translation: *Logic: The Question of Truth*. Trans. Thomas Sheehan. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2010.

GA 24 *Die Grundprobleme der Phänomenologie*. 2nd ed. Ed. Friedrich-Wilhelm von Herrmann. 1989. English translation: *The Basic Problems of Phenomenology*. Revised ed. Trans. Albert Hofstadter. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1982.

GA 25 *Phänomenologische Interpretation von Kants Kritik der reinen Vernunft*. 3rd ed. Ed. Ingtraud Görland. 1995. English translation: *Phenomenological Interpretations of Kant's "Critique of Pure Reason."* Trans. Parvis Emad and Kenneth Maly. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1997.

GA 26 *Metaphysische Anfangsgründe der Logik im Ausgang von Leibniz*. 3rd ed. Ed. Klaus Held. 1978. English translation: *Metaphysical Foundations of Logic*. Trans. Michael Heim. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1984.

GA 29/30 *Die Grundbegriffe der Metaphysik: Welt – Endlichkeit – Einsamkeit*. 2nd ed. Ed. Friedrich-Wilhelm von Herrmann. 1992. English translation: *The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics: World, Finitude, Solitude*. Trans. William McNeill and Nicholas Walker. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1995.

GA 31 *Vom Wesen der menschlichen Freiheit: Einleitung in die Philosophie*. 2nd ed. Ed. Harmut Tietjen. 1994. English translation: *The Essence of Human Freedom: An Introduction to Philosophy*. Trans. Ted Sadler. London: Contiuum, 2005.

GA 36/37 *Sein und Wahrheit*. Ed. Hartmut Tietjen. 2001. English translation: *Being and Truth*. Trans. Gregory Fried and Richard Polt. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2010.

GA 38 *Logik als die Frage nach dem Wesen der Sprache*. Ed. Günter Seubold. 1998. English translation: *Logic as the Question Concerning the Essence of Language*. Trans. Wanda Torres Gregory and Yvonne Unna. Albany: SUNY Press, 2009.

GA 39 *Hölderlins Hymnen "Germanien" und "Der Rhein."* 2nd ed. Ed. Susanne Ziegler. 1989. English Translation: *Hölderlin's Hymns "Germania" and "The Rhine."* Trans. William McNeill and Julia Ireland. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2014.

GA 40 *Einführung in die Metaphysik*. Ed. Petra Jaeger. 1983. English translation: *Introduction to Metaphysics*. 2nd ed. Trans. Gregory Fried and Richard Polt. New Haven: Yale University Press, 2014.

GA 45 *Grundfragen der Philosophie: Ausgewählte "Probleme" der "Logik."* 1992. English translation: *Basic Questions of Philosophy: Selected "Problems" of "Logic."* Trans. Richard Rojcewicz and André Schuwer. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1994.

GA 49 *Die Metaphysik des deutschen Idealismus (Schelling)*. Ed. Günter Seubold. 2006.

GA 52 *Hölderlins Hymne "Andenken."* Ed. Curd Ochwadt. 1982. English Translation: *Hölderlin's Hymns "Remembrance."* Trans. William McNeill and Julia Ireland. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2018.

GA 53 *Hölderlins Hymne "Der Ister."* Ed. Walter Biemel. 1984. English translation: *Hölderlin's Hymn "The Ister."* Trans. William McNeill and Julia Davis. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1996.

GA 54 *Parmenides.* 3rd ed. Ed. Manfred S. Frings. 2018. English translation: *Parmenides.* 2nd ed. Trans. André Schuwer and Richard Rojcewiz. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1998.

GA 55 *Heraklit.* 3rd ed. Ed. Manfred S. Frings. 1994. English translation: *Heraclitus.* Trans. Julia Goesser Assaiante and S. Montgomery Ewegen. London: Bloomsbury, 2018.

GA 56/57 *Zur Bestimmung der Philosophie.* 2nd ed. Ed. Bernd Heimbüchel. 1999. English translation: *Towards the Definition of Philosophy.* Trans. Ted Sadler. New York: Continuum, 2008.

GA 58 *Grundprobleme der Phänomenologie.* Ed. Hans-Helmuth Gander. 1993. English Translation: *Basic Problems of Phenomenology: Winter Semester 1919/1920.* Trans. Scott M. Campbell. London: Bloomsbury, 2013.

GA 59 *Phänomenologie der Anschauung und des Ausdrucks: Theorie der philosophischen Begriffsbildung.* Ed. Claudius Strube. 1993. English translation: *Phenomenology of Intuition and Expression: Theory of Philosophical Concept Formation.* Trans. Tracy Colony. New York: Continuum, 2010.

GA 60 *Phänomenologie des religiösen Lebens.* Ed. Matthias Jung, Thomas Regehly, Claudius STrube. 1995. English translation: *The Phenomenology of Religious Life.* Trans. Matthias Fritsch and Jennifer Anna Gosetti-Ferencei. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2004.

GA 61 *Phänomenologische Interpretationen zu Aristoteles. Einführung in die phänomenologische Forschung.* 2nd ed. Ed. Walter Bröcker and Käte Bröcker-Oltmanns. 1994.

GA 62 *Phänomenologische Interpretation ausgewählter Abhandlungen des Aristoteles zu Ontologie und Logik*. Ed. Günther Neumann. 2005.

GA 63 *Ontologie – Hermeneutik der Faktizität*. Ed. Käte Bröcker-Oltmanns. 1988. English translation: *Ontology – The Hermeneutics of Facticity*. Trans. John van Buren. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2008.

GA 64 *Der Begriff der Zeit*. Ed. Friedrich-Wilhelm von Herrmann. 2004. English translation: *The Concept of Time: the First Draft of "Being and Time."* Trans. Ingo Farin. New York: Continuum, 2011.

GA 65 *Beiträge zur Philosophie (Vom Ereignis)*. 2nd ed. Ed. Friedrich-Wilhelm von Herrmann. 1994. English translation: *Contributions to Philosophy (Of the Event)*. Trans. Richard Rojcewicz and Daniela Vallega-Neu. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2012.

GA 66 *Besinnung*. Ed. Friedrich-Wilhelm von Herrmann. 1997. English translation: *Mindfulness*. Trans. Parvis Emad and Thomas Kalary. New York: Continuum, 2006.

GA 67 *Metaphysik und Nihilismus*. 2nd ed. Ed. Hans-Joachim Friedrich. 2018.

GA 69 *Die Geschichte des Seyns*. Ed. Peter Trawny. 1998. English translation: *The History of Beyng*. Trans. William McNeill and Jeffrey Powell. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2015.

GA 70 *Über den Anfang*. Ed. Paola-Ludovika Coriando. 2005. English translation: *On Inception*. Trans. Peter Hanly. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2023.

GA 71 *Das Ereignis*. Frankfurt am Main: Klostermann, 2009. English translation: *The Event*. Trans. Richard Rojcewicz. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2013.

GA 73.1 *Zum Ereignis-Denken*. Ed. Peter Trawny. 2013.

GA 74 *Zum Wesen der Sprache und Zur Frage nach der Kunst.* Ed. Thomas Regehly. 2010.

GA 75 *Zu Hölderlin – Griechenlandreisen.* Ed. Curd Ochwadt. 2000.

GA 77 *Feldweg-Gespräche.* 2nd ed. Ed. Ingeborg Schüßler. 2007. English translation: *Country Path Conversations.* Trans. Bret W. Davis. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2010.

GA 78 *Der Spruch des Anaximanders.* Ed. Ingrid Schüssler. 2010.

GA 79 *Bremer und Freiburger Vorträge.* 2nd ed. Ed. Petra Jaeger. 2005. English translation: *Bremen and Freiburg Lectures.* Trans. Andrew J. Mitchell. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2012.

GA 80.1 *Vorträge.* Ed. Günther Neumann. 2016.

GA 82 *Zu eigenen Veröfftenlichungen.* Ed. Friedrich-Wilhelm von Herrmann. 2018.

GA 83 *Seminare: Platon – Aristotles – Augustinus.* Ed. Mark Michalski. 2012.

GA 87 *Nietzsche: Seminare 1937 und 1944.* Ed. Peter Ruckteschell. 2004.

GA 89 *Zollikoner Seminare.* Ed. Peter. Trawny. 2017.

GA 94 *Überlegungen II–VI (Schwarze Hefte 1931–1938).* Ed. Peter Trawny. 2014. English translation: *Ponderings II–VI.* Trans. Richard Rojcewicz. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2016.

GA 97 *Anmerkungen I–V (Schwarze Hefte 1942–1948).* Ed. Peter Trawny. 2015.

GA 98 *Anmerkungen VI–IX (Schwarze Hefte 1948/49–1951).* Ed. Peter Trawny. 2018.

FROM OTHER ENGLISH TRANSLATIONS

EGT *Early Greek Thinking: The Dawn of Western Philosophy*. Trans. David Farrell Krell and Frank A. Capuzzi. New York: Harper & Row, Publishers, 1975.

PLT *Poetry, Language, Thought*. Ed. and trans. Albert Hofstadter. New York: Harper & Row, 2001.

QCT *The Question Concerning Technology and Other Essays*. Ed and trans. William Lovitt. New York: Harper & Row, 1977.

SUP *Supplements: From the Earliest Essays to "Being and Time" and Beyond*. Ed. John van Buren. Trans. John van Buren et al. Albany: SUNY Press, 2002.