

Post/Modernity? How to Separate the Stereo from the Styrofoam

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Sometimes we have difficulty unpacking things, even in this technological age – especially when it comes to unpacking the meaning of the age itself. But is there a more commonly (and often polemically) misunderstood philosophical term in wide circulation today than “postmodernism”?¹ (“Liberalism,” perhaps, though I argue that these two controversial concepts can be most charitably and so compellingly understood when connected, as Liakos intimates.)² Liakos’s eloquent and attractive presentation of Gadamer’s “rehabilitation” of *modernity* as an “alternative” to Heidegger’s *postmodernism* is important and insightful, especially in its more sympathetic portrayal of Gadamer’s views. Liakos nicely justifies his preference for Gadamer, but Gadamer’s own principle of hermeneutic charity teaches that our interpretations tend to become less plausible as our sympathies wane. Indeed, despite finding myself mostly in agreement with Liakos’s impressively thoughtful essay, a few small but crucial details from Liakos’s most critical conclusions led me to think that even the best students of Heidegger’s thought might benefit from a brief unpacking of Heidegger’s own endeavor to envision a genuinely meaningful *postmodernity*, so that shall be my focus here.³ (While this brief response is not likely to be mistaken for one of those “quick unboxing” video reviews popular on YouTube, it does share one of their guiding motivations, namely, the conviction that there is something wonderful

to be discovered herein, if we can just free it from the entanglements hiding it from view.)⁴

To unpack Heidegger's mature thinking of a genuinely *postmodern* "other beginning" beyond modernity, we need first to explain what he means by "modern," so that we can understand what "twisting-free" of *that* really entails. Here the first crucial thing to recognize is that for Heidegger "the modern age" as a whole is actually made up of two different "epochs," which he calls *early-modern* "subjectivism" and *late-modern* "enframing," respectively.⁵ These early-modern and late-modern epochs interconnect philosophically and overlap historically to form *modernity*, or "the modern age" as a whole. So, if we want to understand what it is that Heidegger's *postmodern* "other beginning" seeks to move *beyond* (and so also what Heideggerian postmodernity would or could preserve from modernity), then we need to understand how he understands modernity's early- and late-modern epochs. That is necessary because, as Liakos so convincingly shows, the mature Heidegger is no *reactionary antimodernist*, rejecting modernity as a whole; instead, Heidegger's critique of modernity is much more specific. Indeed, I shall suggest that it is even more specific than Liakos recognizes, and that acknowledging this specificity allows for a more sympathetic and plausible understanding of Heidegger's critique of modernity and his linked vision of a more meaningful postmodernity.

Heidegger's critiques of modernity focus specifically on its *metaphysical* foundations. The reason his critiques seem so broad is that these metaphysical foundations have a much larger and more pervasive historical impact than we usually notice. Far beyond idle "ivory tower" speculation disconnected from everyday life, "metaphysics" articulates the conceptual core of "the history that we *are*" (GA 47 28/N3 20).⁶ When it is truly "great," metaphysics can spread a new "understanding of being" far and wide until it has settled into taken-for-granted common sense, owing to what I've called Heidegger's *ontological holism*. Everything intelligible "is" in some sense, so when metaphysics successfully stabilizes a realignment in humanity's understanding of what it means to *be* (which is what metaphysical

ontotheologies do), this new understanding of being can catalyze a broad-spectrum historical transformation that ripples throughout numerous other interconnected ideas and practices until it has stabilized into a new historical “constellation of intelligibility.”⁷

In early works like *Being and Time*, Heidegger’s deconstructive critiques of modern metaphysics focus almost exclusively on what is usually called “the early modern” period, the ontological tradition running from Descartes to Kant. *The definitive trait of early modernity is its ontological divide between subjects and objects*, a metaphysical dichotomy Descartes institutes by convincing us that cognition’s immediate access to itself makes its existence indubitably certain in a way not shared by any of the objects “external” to such *subjectivity*. In Heidegger’s terms, *Kant thinks Descartes’ unthought*, staying within the basic metaphysical horizon established by Descartes’s privileging of subjectivity as foundational but developing its previously unrecognized implications for morality, politics, and aesthetics.⁸

To some “modernists” that probably sounds like a narrative of unidirectional progress, but the big problem for Western humanity here is that, as Heidegger already argues in *Being and Time* (1927),

taking this modern subject/object dichotomy as our point of departure leads us to fundamentally mischaracterize the way we experience the everyday world in which we are usually unreflectively immersed, the world of our practical engagements. By failing to recognize and do justice to the integral entwinement of self and world that is basic to our experiential navigation of our lived environments, modern philosophy lays the conceptual groundwork for [the “early-modern” epoch that Heidegger calls] *subjectivism*, the “worldview” in which an intrinsically-meaningless objective realm (“nature”) is separated epistemically from isolated, value-bestowing, self-certain subjects, and so needs to be mastered through the relentless epistemological, normative, and practical activities of these subjects.

Heidegger suggests that this problem is not merely theoretical, because the subjectivism of the modern worldview functions historically like a self-fulfilling prophecy. Its progressive historical realization generates not only the political freedoms and scientific advances we cherish, but also unwanted downstream consequences such as our escalating environmental crisis and less predictable side-effects like the aestheticization of art.⁹

First emerging with Cartesian early-modernity, “subjectivism” is Heidegger’s term for humanity’s *ongoing*, broad-spectrum attempt to establish “mastery over the totality of what-is” (GA 5 92/QCT 132).¹⁰ (The early modern “object [*Gegenstand*]” is what “stands against” subjectivity from outside it, provoking our myriad *subjectivistic* efforts to bring these objects back within our sphere of subjective mastery and control.) *Subjectivism* thus refers to humanity’s increasingly global quest to achieve complete control over every aspect of our objective reality; we metaphysically privilege *the subject* as the being “who gives the measure and provides the guidelines for everything that is” (GA 5 94/QCT 134) as we seek to develop “our unlimited power for calculating, planning, and breeding [*Züchtung*] all things” (GA 5 94/QCT 135).

As that highly provocative reference to “breeding” suggests, Heidegger first recognized the emergence of something not just horrifying but metaphysically unprecedented in the Nazi’s murderous program of genocidal eugenics, which treated even the subject, that privileged foundation of early modernity, as just another object to be mastered and controlled.¹¹ This *self-objectification of the subject* signals a crucial historical turning point, a rupture between the two epochs of modernity. Early-modern *subjectivism* turns into late-modern *enframing* as the modern subject, seeking to master and control all aspects of its objective reality, turns that objectifying impulse (and the myriad techniques developed and deployed in its service) back onto itself. As a result:

Enframing, we could say, is *subjectivism squared* (or subjectivism applied back to the subject). For, the subjectivist impulse to master reality redoubles itself in enframing, even as enframing's objectification of the subject dissolves the very subject/object division that [defined early modernity and] initially drove the subject's relentless efforts to master the objective world standing over against it. Subjectivism "somersaults beyond itself" in our late-modern age of "enframing" because the impulse to control everything intensifies and accelerates even as it breaks free of its modern moorings and circles back on the subject itself. . . . In this way, the modern subject increasingly becomes just another late-modern entity to be efficiently optimized along with everything else. We are thus moving from modern subjectivism to the late-modern enframing of reality insofar as we understand and relate to all things, *ourselves included*, as nothing but intrinsically-meaningless "resources" (*Bestand*) standing by for endless optimization.¹²

With its very emergence, in other words, the late-modern epoch is *already* moving beyond the metaphysical foundations of early modernity, dissolving the subject/object dichotomy early modernity is founded on and thereby propelling humanity into a new historical epoch which Heidegger calls late-modern "enframing" (the second of the two epochs which together constitute the modern age, or *modernity*, as a whole). Remember that Heidegger's critique of modernity is primarily a critique of its *metaphysical foundations*; in terms of these, late-modernity has *already* left early-modernity behind. If we truly want to understand what exactly it is from modernity that Heidegger's *postmodern* "other beginning" seeks to help us "twist-free of" (that is, *recognize, undermine, transcend*, and so at least partly *recover* from), then we need to focus primarily on the metaphysical substructure of late-modern "enframing." For, it is precisely the metaphysical *ontotheology*

undergirding this technological understanding of being that remains with us today and that Heidegger's postmodern other beginning seeks to help humanity move beyond historically.¹⁵

Beginning in the late 1930s, Heidegger painstakingly traces the late-modern epochal shift he first noticed in Nazi eugenics back to an "unthought" ontotheology he uncovers in Nietzsche's work.¹⁴ To briefly summarize Heidegger's most important conclusions: just as Kant "thought Descartes' unthought," so *Nietzsche thinks Kant's unthought*, developing the heretofore unrecognized consequences of Kant's establishment of subjectivity as the metaphysical foundation for morality, politics, and art. By making the rational subject the ground of what is good, right, and beautiful, *Kant kills God*, in Nietzsche's terms; that is, Kant finally severs this human world from all its traditional ("otherworldly") metaphysical foundations. The abyssal foundationlessness that remains becomes, paradoxically, the metaphysical substratum of our own late-modern epoch. Seeking to think Nietzsche's unthought in turn, Heidegger traces many of Nietzsche's views back to the two most fundamental pillars of his thought, the "will to power" and "the eternal return of the same." Generalizing from Darwinian biology, Smith's *laissez-faire* economics, and even contemporary chemistry, Nietzsche discovers "the will to power" as the *ontological* essence of all things, a name for that endless struggle between competing forces, an Olympic *agon* without final victor, which (as with the lion chasing the gazelle, the competing forces of supply and demand, or the opposing forces constituting matter) ultimately serves only to maximally perpetuate the endless circulation of these forces themselves (whether by driving the arms race of evolution, maximizing economic growth, or preserving the elemental forces composing what we call "matter"). And, when we try to think about what shape such cosmic becoming ultimately takes (thereby seeking to take up that *theological* God's-eye-view from nowhere), the universe looks like a river running forever in a circle – a cosmic loop in which life always begins again after the last deadly stroke of midnight (as *Zarathustra* suggests), or even a divine dance of the god Dionysus (in which we never stop dying and being reborn).

In short, Heidegger isolates the “ontotheological” substratum of late-modern enframing by thinking Nietzsche’s *unthought* metaphysical unity of will to power and eternal recurrence. As we late-moderns implicitly come to understand the being of all things as “eternally recurring will-to-power,” that is, *as nothing but forces coming together and breaking apart endlessly*, we increasingly reduce everything to *meaningless* “resources” (*Bestand*), mere stuff standing by to be optimized for maximally-efficient use – including (most *dangerously*) ourselves. For Heidegger, the “greatest danger” of this “nihilistic” late-modern epoch of technological enframing is that it could become permanent (thereby achieving what no previous metaphysics could) by rewriting human nature, should our endless quest for self-optimization accidentally (or even deliberately) erase our defining capacity for creative and responsive world-disclosure. It is, in other words, precisely this Nietzschean ontotheology underlying *late-modern* enframing that Heidegger seeks to help us recognize and transcend with his *postmodern* “other beginning.”

Now, what Gadamer could never understand (by his own admission to Vattimo) was that this transformation from “the danger” of nihilistic late-modern enframing to “the promise” of a genuinely-meaningful postmodern understanding of being is not something off in the distant future, a day we can at best only wait and prepare for, hoping that it might arrive.¹⁵ On the contrary, as I show in detail in *Heidegger, Art, and Postmodernity*, Heidegger believed this postmodern understanding of being is *already here*, having already arrived in the visionary work of “futural” artists and thinkers like Van Gogh, Hölderlin, and even Nietzsche himself (since, as Heidegger later recognized, Nietzsche’s polysemic thinking cannot be reduced to its “unthought” ontotheology but contains *other*, more promising and still partly *unthought* insights).¹⁶ Like first arrivers from another land, these “emissaries” are ambassadors of a postmodern future who can help facilitate the more widespread arrival of that other, post-metaphysical (that is, no longer *ontotheological*) understanding of being.¹⁷ In short, *Heidegger’s postmodern revolution already began two centuries ago*, and (taking the long view) humanity’s progress toward its larger historical realization has indeed tended to

unfold *progressively* (just as Liakos prefers), albeit typically in short bursts of dramatic “revolutionary” historical progress followed by longer periods of reactionary retrenchment.¹⁸

Rather than looking East for the sun (in the opposite direction from Gadamer, as Liakos imagines Heidegger and Gadamer, standing back-to-back), then, we might instead suggest that Heidegger helps attune us to a special kind of “green flash” in which *the late-modern sunset transforms in an instant into the post-modern sunrise*. Standing side-by-side and looking toward the same sun, we undergo an ontologically-transformative gestalt switch in which we suddenly see the endless dynamism of Nietzschean becoming not as a meaningless *nothing* in which all being is dissolved but, instead, as the myriad glimmering hints of that which is not-yet-a-thing, beckoning for our creative and responsive disclosures to help bring them into being.¹⁹ As we progressively learn to dwell in the effulgent light of this more poetic *postmodern* sun, we increasingly recognize it already rising on an “other beginning” beyond nihilistic late-modern enframing, “a hesitant dawn” that continues to spread and grow into that new day of Heidegger’s postmodern age.²⁰ Or, more prosaically expressed:

if we can learn from the great poets and artists to become comportmentally attuned to [“being as such” or] the dynamic phenomenological presencing that both precedes and exceeds all conceptualization, then we too can come to understand and experience entities [in a *postmodern* way] as being richer in meaning than we are capable of doing justice to conceptually, rather than taking them as intrinsically-meaningless [late-modern] resources awaiting optimization. Such experiences can become microcosms of, as well as inspiration for, the [postmodern] revolution beyond our underlying onto-theology that we need in order to transcend the nihilism of late-modern enframing and set our world on a different, more meaningful path.²¹

As we adopt this postmodern understanding of being – progressively understanding and relating to what-is no longer as early-modern objects to be mastered and controlled nor as meaningless late-modern resources standing by to be efficiently optimized but, instead, as “being richer in meaning than we are capable of doing justice to conceptually” – we find ourselves moving *forward* historically, not back, and so can even learn to develop what Heidegger called a “free relation to technology,” in which

it becomes possible to use even technological devices themselves to resist *technologization*, the nihilistic obviation of any meaning independent of the will. Indeed, we are already doing this, for example, when we use a camera, microscope, telescope, or even glasses to help bring out something meaningful that we might not otherwise have seen, when we use a synthesizer or computer to compose a new kind of music that helps us develop and share our sense of what is most significant to us, or even when we use a word processor to help bring out what is really there in the texts that matter to us and the philosophical issues that most concern us.²²

Those are just a few examples of what *thinking outside the box* of technological enframing means (if I may recall that nice visual riddle on the cover of Heidegger’s *Discourse on Thinking*). Coming progressively to think outside that box is, to return to the metaphor with which we began, one way of learning how to free Heidegger’s polyphonic *postmodern* stereo sound from the *late-modern* styrofoam of empty optimization.

NOTES

- 1 I knew I was being provocative in choosing to rehabilitate such a widely scorned term, and I explain why I gambled that the risk would prove worthwhile in Thomson, “Thinking Heidegger’s Postmodern Unthought: From Ontotheology to Ontological Pluralism in Technology, Education, Politics, and Art,” Polt and Fried, eds, *After Heidegger?* (London: Rowman and Littlefield, 2017), 323.
- 2 See David Liakos, “Heidegger and Gadamer on the Modern Age: The Sun Setting in the Western Sky” (this journal). Although I mostly agree with Liakos about Heidegger’s own superficial rejections of democracy, I would simply insist once again that *the implications of Heidegger’s thinking often far exceed the rather limited conclusions he personally drew from them*. For some of those “psychically livable” and “coherent and viable political categories” Liakos is looking for, which Heidegger’s later thinking helps suggest *when read charitably*, see Thomson, “Heideggerian Phenomenology and the Postmetaphysical Politics of Ontological Pluralism,” Gurley and Pfeifer, eds, *Phenomenology and the Political* (London: Rowman & Littlefield, 2016), 19–42. E.g., I show that Heidegger clearly anticipated the current crumbling of *all political fundamentalisms* as well as the deeper environmental awakening we witness “reluctantly dawning” all around us today – including in the powerful *reactions* against these postmodern developments. (See also Thomson, “Ontology and Ethics at the Intersection of Phenomenology and Environmental Philosophy,” *Inquiry* 47:4 [2004], 380–412.) On the great importance of such *hermeneutic charity* for any productive interpretation of another’s thinking, see Liakos and George’s brilliant chapter on “Hermeneutics in Post-War Continental European Philosophy,” in Becker and Thomson, eds, *The Cambridge History of Philosophy, 1945–2015* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2019), 399–415. In “Heidegger and Gadamer on the Modern Age,” unfortunately, Liakos’s Gadamerian sympathies seem to block him from recognizing that, for Heidegger, *the postmodern sun has already risen*

(see below) – and for us now, long ago – which means that we today do not need to make “unsettling predictions” about some still unforeseeable future (as Liakos suggests).

- 3 This is something I have often explained in great detail; see e.g. Iain Thomson, *Heidegger, Art, and Postmodernity* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011), chs. 1, 3 (esp. 47–64) and 4.
- 4 The very idea of an *authentic unboxing* might sound oxymoronic, but Heidegger suggests the opposite is actually the case: Every authentic discovery that brings the world closer or discloses our own being is “always accomplished as a clearing-away of concealments and obscurities, as a breaking-up of the disguises with which Dasein [i.e., our existence as a world-disclosive being-here] bars its own way” (GA 2 172–73/SZ 129).
- 5 For Heidegger, “epochs” are ways of temporarily bracketing off the seemingly inexhaustible phenomenological plenitude of “being as such” – and metaphysical *ontotheologies* are what provide the brackets. See below and Thomson, *Heidegger on Ontotheology: Technology and the Politics of Education* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), ch. 1.
- 6 See *Heidegger, Art, and Postmodernity*, ch. 1: “Understanding Ontotheology, or ‘The History that We Are.’”
- 7 (*Heidegger on Ontotheology*, 2, 55.) Heidegger’s mature understanding of metaphysics as *ontotheology* has been widely reduced to one of its parts and so largely misunderstood (see *Heidegger, Art, and Postmodernity*, 33–9), but recognizing what he really means by *ontotheology* is crucial for interpreting his later thinking sympathetically and plausibly. (That is why I began both monographs on Heidegger with initial chapters that carefully explain and develop his critique of metaphysics as ontotheology.) To simplify massively here: the later Heidegger’s famous “history of being” is his account of Western history as a series of successive but overlapping “constellations of intelligibility,” each of which is (temporarily) anchored and stabilized by a metaphysical *ontotheology*. “Ontotheology” is the mature Heidegger’s name

for these *doubly foundationalist* metaphysical accounts (or these “fundamental metaphysical positions,” which try to understand “the being of entities” in terms of “the truth concerning the totality of entities as such,” to use his terms). These historical ontotheologies link (1) metaphysics’ deepest understanding of the innermost (*ontological*) core of what-is (that perennial quest for the most elementary component out of which everything else is made) with (2) metaphysics’ ultimate understanding of the outermost (*theological*) horizon of what-is (the adoption of a kind of “God’s-eye” view that tries to comprehend all that is as if looking in from outside, in that metaphysical “view from nowhere”). When they function together successfully, these *ontotheologies* grasp and secure Western humanity’s historical understanding of what-is and what matters from both the inside-out and the outside-in at the same time. In the history of the West, each of the “ontotheological” foundations that doubly anchored and so temporarily stabilized our historical worlds were undermined only by the discovery or comprehension of the even deeper and more far-reaching foundations which then succeed them historically (at least until we reach late-modernity, in which all such metaphysical anchorings seem finally to give way, falling into the Nietzschean abyss). Still, Heidegger’s view is not an *idealism* (as some proud “materialists” like to allege), because metaphysicians do not legislate these ontotheologies from out of their own creative imaginations but, instead, receptively disclose them by picking up on the deepest and furthest reaching insights already emerging in their times, in domains such as art and poetry as well as economics, biology, and chemistry. (See below and *Heidegger, Art, and Postmodernity*, ch. 1.)

- 8 To simplify massively: Kant’s deontological *morality* is founded on the thinking subject’s universal recognition of all other subjects as capable of rationally pursuing their own ends, so that the moral domain is established by what all rational subjects can will without contradiction. Kant’s cosmopolitan liberalism is founded

on this thinking subject's right freely to pursue those ends within *political* limits set only by every other rational subject's pursuit of their own ends, so that every subject is entitled to as much political freedom as is compatible with the same freedoms for all the others. And, in *aesthetics*, art becomes fundamentally a relation between subjects and the aesthetic objects they create and view. (For the details and Heidegger's critique, see Thomson, *Heidegger, Art, and Postmodernity*, chs. 2–3.)

9 *Heidegger, Art, and Postmodernity*, 53.

10 Thus, in a very long note (perhaps the first *postmodern footnote*) added to "The Age of the World-Picture," Heidegger takes great pains to radically differentiate early-modern Cartesian *subjectivism* from that similar-sounding view from much earlier in the history of metaphysics, viz., Pythagoras's famous proclamation that "man is the measure of all things" (GA 5 102–6/77–80).

11 For the details, see *Heidegger, Art, and Postmodernity*, 57–62. On the politics of Heidegger's consistently critical relation to Nazi "biologism" and its reductive and nihilistic metaphysical underpinnings, see Thomson, "Heidegger's Nazism in the Light of his early *Black Notebooks*: A View from America," Alfred Denker and Holger Zaborowski, eds, *Zur Hermeneutik der 'Schwarzen Hefte': Heidegger Jahrbuch 11* (Freiburg: Karl Alber, 2017), 184–209. On the political "silence" haunting Heidegger and Celan's relationship (which Gadamer seems to misunderstand), see *Heidegger on Ontotheology*, 82–87.

12 *Heidegger, Art, and Postmodernity*, 58.

13 On *ontotheology*, see note 7 above.

14 Any effort to connect Nietzsche to the Nazis, however critically, seems destined to be highly controversial, and so it has proven to be. But Heidegger does develop his reading of Nietzsche's "unthought" ontotheology by drawing carefully on published works like *The Gay Science*, *The Genealogy of Morals*, and *Thus Spoke Zarathustra*, as well as from the much more problematic *Will to*

- Power* notes. (For the crucial details, see Thomson, *Heidegger, Art, and Postmodernity*, 14–22.)
- 15 This relation between the *late-modern* “danger” and the *post-modern* “promise” (viz. the danger as “the photographic negative” of the promise) is the central thesis of *Heidegger, Art, and Postmodernity*, ch. 7, but I also develop Heidegger’s view of these postmodern “emissaries” in Thomson, “Ontotheology,” Raffoul and Nelson, eds., *The Bloomsbury Companion to Heidegger* (London: Bloomsbury, 2013), 319–28.
- 16 On the later Heidegger’s “postmodern” Nietzsche, see *Heidegger, Art, and Postmodernity*, 30–32. Strangely, Liakos invokes Rorty’s idea of “living up to” a predecessor as a paradigm of Gadamerian “rehabilitation,” but Rorty’s example of Nietzsche “living up to” Socrates (when in fact Nietzsche reads Socrates as a secret nihilist who needs to be wholly transcended) renders this puzzling as an illustration of historical *rehabilitation* (especially when coupled with the fact that Rorty himself did not believe in *historicity*, the Heideggerian idea that humanity’s basic sense of what-is and what-matters changes over time, as Rorty publicly professed when we debated Heidegger and technology in Tokyo in 2003). Heidegger’s hermeneutic ideal of “thinking the unthought” seems like a better example of historical rehabilitation (especially if we think of the more sympathetic way the later Heidegger thinks Nietzsche’s unthought, or perhaps even the way I and others try to think Heidegger’s), since Heidegger believes that the hermeneutic unfolding of such hidden riches can help push ontohistorical transformations forward by separating the wheat of promising historical insights from the chaff of nihilistic ontotheologies.
- 17 When Heidegger *thinks* – that is, *creatively and responsively discloses* – their postmodern “unthought,” Van Gogh, Hölderlin, and even Nietzsche are not *modern* thinkers, nor are their postmodern insights “moments within modern culture” (as Liakos suggests). On the contrary, what remains greatest about their

thinking is that it can help us move beyond the early- and late-modern ways of understanding being (as objects for subjects to master and control, or as meaningless resources awaiting optimization, respectively) into a more meaningful *postmodern* understanding of being, in which we come to understand being as partly informing and yet also always exceeding our ability to conceptualize and relate to what is (see below and *Heidegger, Art, and Postmodernity*, esp. ch. 3).

- 18 For some of this larger historical progress (the unfolding of which I describe as “ten steps forward, five steps back”), see Becker and Thomson, “Introduction: Philosophical Reflections on the Recent History of Philosophy,” in Becker and Thomson, eds, *The Cambridge History of Philosophy, 1945–2015*, 1–12.
- 19 On this transformative recognition of the phenomenological “noth-ing of the nothing,” see Thomson, “Nothing (*Nichts*),” in Mark Wrathall, ed., *The Heidegger Lexicon* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2021), 520–28.
- 20 As Heidegger nicely puts it (in 1955–6), “a legacy [*Überlieferung*] is genuinely, as its name says, a delivering [*Liefern*] in the sense of *liberare*, of liberating. As a liberating, a legacy raises the concealed riches of what has-been into the light of day, even if this light is at first only that of a hesitant dawn [*einer zögernden Morgendämmerung*]” (GA 10 153/102).
- 21 *Heidegger, Art, and Postmodernity*, 21, 25.
- 22 *Heidegger, Art, and Postmodernity*, 23. My thanks to Lee Braver for skillfully orchestrating this volume.