Preston's Endoxic Reading of Heidegger's Endoxic Method: Finding Aristotle in Heidegger

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> In any investigation in this field, where 'the thing itself is deeply veiled' one must take pains not to overestimate the results. For in such an inquiry one is constantly compelled to face the possibility of disclosing an even more primordial and more universal horizon from which we may draw the answer to the question, "What is *'Being'*?" (GA 2: 36/SZ 26)

I have always been somewhat unsure of the precise significance of Aristotle for Heidegger's early thought. Traces of certain ideas are recognizable – the extensive presence of teleology, praxis, and judgment, all bear the Philosopher's mark, just to list a few – but the constancy of Heidegger's return to him in seminar after seminar (documented in even more detail by John Preston's other, valuable work), and the obeisance he shows Aristotle are extraordinary. It makes sense that Aristotle's influence would fall substantially on method, given Heidegger's view of phenomenology as a method rather than a set of conclusions (GA 2: 37/SZ 27). In this view, he follows Husserl while simultaneously departing from him, objecting in particular to Husserl's sifting out of the historical as a necessary precaution before any real work can begin. "The historicity of thought," Heidegger later recounted, "remained completely foreign to such a position."[2] This

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compulsion to bracket the historical, Heidegger argues, is itself a historical phenomenon, a pressure laid upon philosophers by the tradition's sempiternal rejection of all things non-eternal. The ahistorical is a historical product, the way the Dasein-independence of presence-at-hand is Dasein-dependent[3] and our autonomy heteronomously derived.[4] Husserl's *epoché* peels back the veneer of experience to reveal the experiencer, the transcendental ego who must be separate from and prior to all that is worldly in order to constitute it all. Dasein, however, is thrown – among other things, thrown into a conversation that has been taking place since long before we were here, that constitutes us and gives us thought, including the thought that we are constituting it and so can bracket it.

The way to solve a lack of history is to supplement it with history, but this is no simple addition; if your belief is that thinking as such is historical, then so must be the way you reach this belief. As Heidegger says of the very basis of reasoning, "if we try to discuss the principle of reason, then such an effort, like every other one, is only possible as a conversation within and with the tradition" (GA 10: 66/44). Thinking this ground principle of thinking must take place as a conversation *with* the tradition because it's a conversation that takes place *within* the tradition because the tradition is what gives thinking its place. So if Heidegger is to think history at the proper depth, to acknowledge our immersion appropriately, he must think history historically; he must come to understand our comprehensive engagement with the tradition by engaging with it.

Looking to the history of philosophy, we can see in Plato the origin of Husserl's attempt to leave conditionedness behind. What else does Socrates do but scold his fellow Athenians for letting custom, ritual, convention, myths, habits, or really anything determine their actions instead of bracketing all of that, subjecting it to critical analysis, and making up their own minds, on their own, for themselves? Aristotle, on the other hand, begins his inquiries by taking these scorned *doxa* seriously. He surveys the tradition of philosophy that he finds himself within – the views of the wise – and the average everyday beliefs of

those around him – the views of the many. He goes on to analyze them, of course – this is no unthinking acceptance just because they have been accepted – but neither is it a knee-jerk rejection or suspicion because of their acceptance. These mark the starting place for philosophizing because they are the starting place for, well, everything. We start where we are; even if that is locked in a cave staring at shadows, we can only escape by first scrutinizing our chains. Aristotle says that outside of the *polis* gods and animals may live, but not humans; I think something similar can be said of thinking outside the tradition. Heidegger explains the relevance of this notion for his own escape from Husserl:

> Husserl's teaching…demanded that one give up introducing the authority of the great thinkers into the conversation. However, the clearer it became to me that the increasing familiarity with phenomenological seeing was fruitful for the interpretation of Aristotle's writing, the less I could separate myself from Aristotle and the other Greek thinkers. Of course I could not immediately see what decisive consequences my renewed occupation with Aristotle was to have. (GA 14: 97–8/78)

Now we can: Heidegger chose Aristotle as his hero.

Aristotle's endoxic method is the first in the history of philosophy to recognize that it is taking place *in* the history of philosophy,[5] to take that fact seriously, and to use it productively rather than protest it as an outrage upon thought. *Being and Time* takes up and repeats this historical possibility for doing philosophy, specifically in the discussion of repeating historical possibilities.

> It is not necessary that in resoluteness one should *explicitly* know the origin of the possibilities upon which that resoluteness projects itself. It is rather in Dasein's temporality, and there only, that there lies any possibility that the existentiell potentiality-for-Being upon which it projects itself can be gleaned *explicitly* from the way in which Dasein has been traditionally understood.

> The resoluteness which comes back to itself and hands itself down, then becomes the *repetition* of a possibility of existence that has come down to us. *Repeating is handing down explicitly* – that is to say, going back into the possibilities of the Dasein that has-been-there…. Dasein may choose its hero…. Repetition does not let itself be persuaded of something by what is 'past', just in order that this, as something which was formerly actual, may recur. Rather, the repetition makes a *reciprocative rejoinder* to the possibility of that existence which has-been-there. (GA 2: 509–10/SZ 385–6)

While we usually take on roles and projects in ignorance of their source, we can also search the tradition to find their progenitor, the hero who handed it down to us. No matter what we tell ourselves in our inauthentic moments, however, fate has no inertia; that which we have, we must hand down to ourselves. Understanding the tradition enables us to appreciate the possibilities it holds, the unrealized future of the past, so that we can take it into our present by creatively responding and adapting rather than unimaginatively corresponding and adopting. This is a reciprocative rejoinder.

What John Preston's "Heidegger's Endoxic Method: Finding Authenticity in Aristotle" shows us is how Heidegger, over a period of years, comes to choose Aristotle as his hero to supplement the weaknesses of his *Doktorvater*, Husserl. The specific possibility of Aristotle's that Heidegger is repeating, though, is the very possibility of repeating possibilities, for Aristotle is chosen as the pioneer of looking backwards, the founder of the rejection of foundationalism. Aristotle's endoxic method is *his* way of choosing his heroes and making reciprocative rejoinders to them, and this is the heroic pose that Heidegger chose to rejoin, using a historical method to break away from his own mentor's ahistoricism.

Let's compare what each said about his academic master. First, look at Heidegger's backhanded insult to his teacher, Husserl:

> the following investigation would not have been possible if the ground had not been prepared by Edmund Husserl, with whose *Logische Untersuchungen* phenomenology first emerged. Our comments on the preliminary conception of phenomenology have shown that what is essential in it does not lie in its *actuality* as a philosophical 'movement' ["*Richtung*"]. Higher than actuality stands *possibility*. We can understand phenomenology only by seizing upon it as a possibility. (GA 2: 51–2/SZ 38)

Now compare that to Aristotle's more polite separation from his teacher, Plato:

> we had better examine the universal good, and puzzle out what is meant in speaking of it. This sort of inquiry is, to be sure, unwelcome to us, because those who introduced the Forms were friends of ours; still, it presumably seems better, indeed only right, to destroy even what is close to us if that is the way to preserve truth.... Though we love both the truth and our friends, reverence is due to the truth first.[6]

Both weigh their indebtedness to their teacher against their obligation to their students, self-consciously philosophizing as a historical process of inheriting, altering, and passing on. Intriguingly, in both cases, the specific terms of their disagreement carry important implications for the historicity of such relationships in general.

Part of the problem with the actuality of phenomenology, as Preston and others have shown, is its ahistorical stagnancy, the fact that Husserl focuses on actual present states. He deals in presents even when trying to account for temporality, with actuality even when describing potentiality. Heidegger, on the other hand, is seizing on phenomenology as a possibility, for he will take it further than its present state, partly by using it to give us a more appropriate account of possibility, but also because he recognizes it *as* a possibility from the tradition[7] that

he is handing down to himself in modifying its attitude towards history. Husserl does not just not see possibilities; he specifically does not see the possibilities of the tradition, writing them off as dangers to actualizing universal knowledge. Heidegger sees a higher possibility in phenomenology – the possibility of repeating possibilities of previous philosophies – and this is the possibility of his teacher that he is repeating, playing on the actual/potential concept that came from Aristotle.

Aristotle's approach to the puzzle about the good first looks to the views of the wise – here his friend, the friend of the Forms – and starts by analyzing what is good in this kind of dialogue with one's predecessors, this very starting place. Such dialogue is inevitably a negotiation between conflicting goods: loyalty to friends or admired elders and fidelity to new discoveries. He picks the latter, and this choice is partly due to the choice itself. The fact that there are competing and incompatible goods here in this endoxic method provides an example of an irreducible multiplicity of goods, and so forms an objection to Plato's view of the good as one and simple: "good is spoken of in as many ways as being [is spoken of]. . .. Hence it is clear that the good cannot be some common and single universal."[8] Aristotle speaks of the different goods in the different ways good is spoken of.

Aristotle's disagreement with Plato on this crucial point shows how our inheritance of the tradition is always a fraught one, negotiating reception, rejection, and revision in forming our own reciprocative rejoinders. The very fact that we must sometimes separate ourselves from what we have been taught helps him separate himself from his teacher on his central doctrine – the nature of the good – because the difficult decision itself embodies a counter-argument to Plato's view that a universal, ahistorical good rules all decisions. The doctrine in question, to add another layer, happens to be the *endoxa* of how the good is spoken of, which is as various as being, the very insight that incited Heidegger's entire career.[9]

In Heidegger's historical inheritance and modification of a possible way of doing philosophy from his teacher's ahistorical, actual phenomenology, and in Aristotle's conflict of goods in engaging with his teacher's

insistence on a single ahistorical good, the two use an endoxic method that itself demonstrates the truth of the endoxic method. Both choose truth over unthinking loyalty and, in Heidegger's use of Aristotle to break away from Husserl's rejection of history, the key notion was truth:

> What occurs for the phenomenology of the acts of consciousness as the self-manifestation of phenomena is thought more originally by Aristotle and in all Greek thinking and existence as *aletheia,* as the unconcealedness of what-is-present, its being revealed, its showing itself. That which phenomenological investigations rediscovered as the supporting attitude of thought proves to be the fundamental trait of Greek thinking, if not indeed of philosophy as such. (GA 14: 98–9/79)

As Aristotle says, "though we love both the truth and our friends, reverence is due to the truth first," a reverence that defines philosophy for Heidegger.

Heidegger is choosing Aristotle's choosing of heroes as *his* hero, many parts of *Being and Time* reading as reciprocative rejoinders to Aristotle's method of reciprocatively rejoining. This is particularly true of the opening of *Being and Time*, that puzzling start so puzzled about being puzzled, the opening of the question that questions questioning. With the benefit of Preston's paper, I now understand that this beginning is following where Aristotle begins when he deals with first principles – a survey of the views of the wise for the aporias generated, generating the inquiry that the book carries out.

Of course, Heidegger's rejoinder does Aristotle one better, for Heidegger finds an aporia of the aporia. What he finds curious is the lack of curiosity, calling for a provocation of puzzlement, a questioning of questioning that must precede any attempt to answer. Heidegger is using the *endoxa* of the wise patriarchs in order to become "perplexed at our inability to understand the expression 'Being'" (GA 2: xv/SZ 1), his epigraph accordingly citing Plato not for his knowledge but for his confusion. He notes here what he will later express as the notion that,

"*most thought-provoking is that we are still not thinking*" (GA 8: 6/4). What should provoke thought is that we are not provoked by what is most thought-provoking, which makes the generation of puzzlement through a survey of the wise even more important for Heidegger than it was for Aristotle. We have lost the aporia that spurs the asking of the question of being, and we will reacquire it by surveying what the wise have said since, instead of illuminating and settling the question, they show it to be "the darkest of all." Their answers do "not eliminate the question of its meaning; [they demand] that we look that question in the face" (GA 2: 5–6/SZ 3–4). Heidegger solves the puzzle of the lack of puzzlement by drawing on *endoxa* to puzzle us.

To properly conduct Aristotle's endoxic method, Heidegger must critically examine Aristotle's *endoxa* as well, subjecting all historical views to what he calls *Destruktion*. If Aristotle, the first phenomenologist,[10] is now one of his teachers, Heidegger must forge his independence from him just as he did from Husserl, for that is the inherently conflicted loyalty of repetition. Intriguingly, he does so on the same topic as with Husserl.

Just as Aristotle was the first proper thinker of the tradition, so he was also the first and most influential thinker of its underlying condition, time. "Aristotle's essay on time is the first detailed interpretation of this phenomenon which has come down to us. Every subsequent account of time…has been essentially determined by it" (GA 2: 35/SZ 26). This rich heritage has exerted a questionable influence, precisely because it has not been questioned. Heidegger is not accusing anyone "of any 'dependence' on Aristotle, but [is] calling attention to *the ontological import which this filiation has in principle*" (GA 2: 571/SZ 433 n.14). The ontological import is that Aristotle's interpretation of time in terms of the now results from his interpretation of being in terms of presence, rendering all beings present-at-hand, i.e., a kind of actuality. Higher than the actuality of Aristotle's theory of both being and time in terms of actuality stands the possibility of *Being and Time* interpreting them in terms of a new understanding of possibility, one that isn't just a variation of actuality. On the one hand, "as a modal category of presence-at-hand, possibility signifies what is *not yet* actual

and what is *not at any time* necessary. It characterizes the merely possible. Ontologically it is on a lower level than actuality and necessity. On the other hand, possibility as an *existentiale* is the most primordial and ultimate positive way in which Dasein is characterized ontologically" (GA 2: 191/SZ 143). In particular, Heidegger locates this proper version of possibility in our understanding, explaining it, too, in terms of an actual/possible distinction: "grasping it in such a manner would take away from what is projected its very character as a possibility, and would reduce it to the given contents which we have in mind; whereas projection, in throwing, throws before itself the possibility as possibility, and lets it *be* as such" (GA 2: 193/SZ 145). It is the understanding that can grasp possibility as possibility, thus breaking away simultaneously from both Husserl and Aristotle, and what is the project of *Being and Time* but the quest for the appropriate understanding of being?[11]

Thus, Heidegger solves the problem of ignoring history by attending to it. He searched through previous thinkers to find the first who searched through previous thinkers as the way to open his own thinking and, finding it difficult to separate himself from Aristotle, he used it to open *Being and Time*. This is not just of methodological value but a positive discovery of the book: the historicity of thought is a concrete embodiment of the temporality of being. This is the right way to enter the always already spinning hermeneutic circle: running.

Preston shows Heidegger employing Aristotle's endoxic method throughout *Being and Time*, starting from what the wise say when he examines previous philosophers' views and from what the many say when he describes *das Man's* average everyday idle talk. If we squint, we could almost see Part One as a whole as the development of what the many say into its deeper conditions of care and temporality, and Part Two as a survey of the wise to reach the same conclusion. As illuminating of *Being and Time* as these insights are, Preston's interpretive perspective has more to offer, for Heidegger continues using this approach in his later work, although I had not noticed it until now. We can read these works with fresh eyes, going around the hermeneutic circle now with a more informed sense of how Heidegger learned to go

around the circle from watching Aristotle's circlings. Let me briefly demonstrate with some insights I have now gleaned from an essay I have read (and taught and written about) many times: "The Question Concerning Technology."

When he examines causality at the start of the essay, Heidegger does not do what Husserl (or Hume) would do – carefully describe what one actually sees in witnessing a causal event such as billiard balls colliding. He starts instead with "the current conception of technology, according to which it is a means and a human activity" (GA 7: 8/312). This common view is not dismissed: "who would ever deny that it is correct? It is in obvious conformity with what we are envisaging *when we talk about technology*" (GA 7: 8/312, italics added). Our starting point is what the many say and it has its merit – it is correct but not true, and so must be developed.

This definition moves the inquiry forward by generating an aporia. It leads us to believe ourselves in complete control of everything, not just of nature but also of the ability to be technological at all: seeing and thinking about the world as obstacles to our getting what we want which we can fix through our efforts. Instilling this mentality is, after all, Descartes' program: before he could tame nature he first had to reprogram his mind, since the forms of thinking he had inherited from the Schools were inefficacious. Hence a tear-down, reconstruction, and the writing of new *Rules for the Direction of the Mind*. But this cannot work, because the very idea that we can reprogram our minds to make them technologically oriented is itself already technologically oriented: it already thinks of our ways of thinking as resources and tools to be improved for optimal performance. We cannot have built the idea that we can build a mind to construct new ideas. It is, to put it in terms of the early work, a fore-structure of the understanding that must be there for us even to entertain the notion of making it and putting it there. It is an epoch-specific always already, an already-in-order-to: we must already be technological in order to think technologically, including the aporetic technological thinking of the technological.

Heidegger reaches this aporia by examining not just what *is* said about technology, but also what *has been* said. "For centuries philosophy has taught that there are four causes" (GA 7: 9/313). We now turn from the many to the wise, since the everyday thinking of technology did not reach its essence. The problem is that we do not wonder about causality, what it truly is or where it comes from. We suffer from a lack of aporia.

> But suppose that causality, for its part, is veiled in darkness with respect to what it is? Certainly for centuries we have acted as though the doctrine of the four causes had fallen from heaven as a truth as clear as daylight. But it might be that the time has come to ask: Why are there only four causes? In relation to the aforementioned four, what does "cause" really mean? From whence does it come that the causal character of the four causes is so unifiedly determined that they belong together? (GA 7: 9/314)

His endoxic survey that opened *Being and Time* showed us that "the very fact that we already live in an understanding of Being and that the meaning of Being is still veiled in darkness proves that it is necessary in principle to raise this question again [or repeat: *wiederholen*]" (GA 2: 6/SZ 4). Now it is causality that is "veiled in darkness" by its familiarity, and so we must repeat the historical possibility of its investigation. We behave naively, dogmatically in Kant's term, when we simply pick up concepts we find lying about as if they were self-evident, the way Sartre took up essence and existence just to reverse them. We overcome this by examining their essence: where they come from, how they devolved upon us, what makes them what they are. This requires a conversation with and within the tradition, something like a phenomenological destruction ("From whence does it come"), looking for the underlying, central sense that accounts for the four, something like a formal indication ("the causal character of the four causes is so unifiedly determined that they belong together").[12]

This is a reciprocative rejoinder to the endoxic method of Aristotle, who also plays an important role within the inquiry as the progenitor of the *endoxa* of the four causes as well as of the idea of tracing ideas back to their progenitor, making him the cause of the method Heidegger is using to investigate causality. The idea that underlies and unifies the four causes or ways of being responsible – their essence – is "a bringing that brings what presences into appearance…. Bringing-forth brings out of concealment into unconcealment" (GA 7: 13/317), i.e., truth. We have moved from the correct view to the true one which turns out to be truth itself, precisely the insight Aristotle thought "more originally" than Heidegger's teacher, loyalty to which Aristotle chose over his own. We have been seeking the cause of causality only to discover its truth to be truth, the source of its appearing to us in this fourfold form the source of appearing itself, and we found the idea that we should look through history for its source by looking through history for the thinker who is the source of the idea of looking through history to find the thinkers who are the sources of ideas. Aristotle is the thinker responsible for our understanding of the four ways of being responsible, as well as for the approach of looking for the thinkers responsible for our understandings.

The question concerning technology pivots on the notion that the revelation of the world in technological terms – the essence of technology – could not have been brought about by us as a piece of technology itself. Our purportedly autonomous making over of the world is something we have been made into, our words and deeds responses to the world's solicitations.

> Man can indeed conceive, fashion, and carry through this or that in one way or another. But man does not have control over unconcealment itself, in which at any given time the actual shows itself or withdraws. The fact that it has been showing itself in the light of Ideas ever since the time of Plato, Plato did not bring about. The thinker only responded to what addressed itself to him. (GA 7: 18/323)

Plato responded to what addressed him, but part of what addresses Heidegger is Plato's response, and it is Aristotle who addresses it to him. We are indebted to Preston's analysis for seeing better how Heidegger is indebted to Aristotle for the lesson that we are always already indebted to previous thinkers. Heidegger finds truth through "the struggle of loyally following in the footsteps of that which can be repeated" (GA 2: 509/SZ 385) in Aristotle, friend of the truth that we learn better by learning with friends: "the wise man…will do better, presumably, if he has co-workers."[13]

Heidegger finds Aristotle's method as the answer to his inquiry that was itself Aristotelian, historically discovering historicity. These layers of reflexivity – the subjects of Heidegger's inquiries in these seminars, as Preston explains, were history in 1920 and philosophy in 1921 – are no coincidence. In order to discover history at this level he had to already be historical, to find Aristotle's method he had to already be using it – precisely the solution to the aporia of technology, a solution that is strangely no different than the puzzle. Like technology, historicicity is an always already, but each of these is also an "always no longer." As soon as you grasp it properly you are past it – past the technological understanding of technology and onto receiving it as a gift of revelation; past the notion of the past as something that has passed, a time that we have passed by or that has passed by us. The essence of history changes from the past to the passed on. What we learn from *endoxa* is something that Aristotle could have learned from one of his own *endoxa*, paraphrasing Heraclitus: the way forward is the way back, for striving is the parent of all, creating harmony out of conflict.[14] And John Preston has shown us that these puzzling taken-for-granted ideas from the past will never stop having a future, that we can never pass over them although we can pass them over to our students that they may rejoin the long-running, on-going conversation. This is how the hermeneutic circle continues to turn, spun by time through generations of readers and thinkers taking their turns to return to the same works that are never the same, continually turning them over, ever making them over anew.

NOTES

1 My thanks to John Preston and Scott Campbell for their helpful comments on this paper.

2 William J. Richardson, *Heidegger: Through Phenomenology to Thought* (New York: Fordham University Press, 1993), xiv.

3 For a discussion of these issues, see Chapter 5 of Lee Braver's *A Thing of This World: A History of Continental Anti-Realism* (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 2007).

4 "'On one's own initiative' is already indicative of a way in which being itself lets human beings be in their essence" (GA 53: 112/90).

5 Heidegger gives this status to Hegel at times (e.g., GA 11: 54/43–4).

6 Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics*, trans. Terence H. Irwin, 2nd ed. (Cambridge: Hackett Publishing, 1999), 1.6.§1.

7 The fact that Husserl's work did not precede Heidegger's by many years does not preclude him from seeing it as part of the tradition; think of his recollection of repeatedly reading through the *Logical Investigations* with awe throughout his undergraduate years.

8 Aristotle, 1.6. §3

9 "On the title page of his work, Brentano quotes Aristotle's phrase: I translate: *'A being becomes manifest (sc. with regard to its Being) in many ways.' Latent in this phrase is the* question *that determined the way of my thought:* what is the pervasive, simple, unified determination of Being that permeates all of its multiple meanings? This question raised others: What, then, does Being mean? To what extent (why and how) does the Being of beings unfold in the four modes which Aristotle constantly affirms, but whose common origin he leaves undetermined?" (Richardson 1993, x, em).

10 Gadamer once said that, "Heidegger's masterstroke was that he convinced Husserl that Aristotle was the first phenomenologist prior to Husserl." See Hans-Georg Gadamer and Alfons Grieder, trans. Alfons Grieder, in *Gadamer In Conversation: Reflections and Commentary*, ed. and trans. Richard E. Palmer (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2001), 105–6.

11 Things are not so simple, of course. The philosopher who most struggled with breaking away from Heidegger's overwhelming influence, who thought the most about what this means after Heidegger, is Derrida. One of the main places where Derrida fought this battle was here, i.e., *Being and Time*'s attribution of now-time to Aristotle as metaphysics of presence in an extended footnote. Derrida repeats Heidegger's repetition, itself a repetition of Aristotle's endoxic method, in breaking away from Heidegger's reading of Aristotle's *endoxa*, insisting on a complex combination of following and criticizing Heidegger that itself follows and criticizes Heidegger's notion of repetition. "This play of submission and subtraction must be thought as a *formal rule* for anyone wishing *to read* the texts of the history of metaphysics. To read them, certainly, within the opening of the Heideggerian breakthrough, which is the only thought excess of metaphysics as such, but also to read them, occasionally, and faithfully, beyond certain propositions or conclusions within which the Heideggerian breakthrough has had to constrain itself, propositions or conclusions which it has had to call upon or take its support from. For example, the reading of Aristotle and Hegel during the epoch of *Being and Time*" (Jacques Derrida, *Margins of Philosophy*, trans. Alan Bass [Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1984], 62). The guiding idea of Derrida's critique of Heidegger here is that the text that Heidegger is interpreting, Aristotle's treatment of time, can be read in other ways as well, ways that move in opposite directions from Heidegger's reading, which Heidegger either ignores or doesn't see. "There is here both an instability and several possibilities of overturning; and we may wonder whether *Sein und Zeit* has not, in a way, arrested them" (Derrida 49). In other words, Heidegger is making Aristotle's text into an actuality which says only one thing, whereas Derrida is pursuing the higher possibility of seeing it as an open site of multiple possibilities of reading. This vision of textual possibility as possibility, of course, applies to Heidegger's text as well: "the footnote invites several readings" (Derrida 33).

12 This approach pops up a lot in the later work. E.g., when looking at the four senses of the question, "what is called thinking?", he immediately clarifies that, "the four ways we have mentioned, in which the question 'What is called thinking?' may be asked, do not stand side by side, separate and unrelated. They belong together by virtue of a union that is enjoined by one of the four ways" (GA 8: 118/114). This is also the approach to the question of being inspired by Aristotle, as referenced in the "Letter to Richardson" in footnote 4 above, which singles out Aristotle's four causes as an example.

13 Aristotle, X.7, 1177a34. I owe this quote to John Preston's paper included herein, an act of quotation proving the quotation itself true.

14 "Ways of thinking hold within them that mysterious quality that we can walk them forward and backward, and that indeed only the way back will lead us forward" (GA 12: 94/12). "In essential strife, rather, the opponents raise each other into the self-assertion of their essential natures…. In strife, each opponent carries the other beyond itself" (GA 5: 35/174)