Heidegger's Endoxic Method: Finding Authenticity in Aristotle

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ABSTRACT: I argue that Heidegger's methodological breakthrough in the early 1920s, the development of hermeneutic phenomenology, and the structure of *Being and Time* are the result of Heidegger's appropriation of Aristotle's philosophical method in his *Physics* and *Nicomachean Ethics*. In part one, I explain the general structure of Aristotle's method and demonstrate the distinction between scientific and philosophical investigations. In part two, I show how formal indication and phenomenological destruction are the product of Heidegger's reading of Aristotle's method by demonstrating their affinity in approach, content, and criteria for success. Lastly, in part three, I show how aspects of *Being and Time*, specifically *das Man* and the destruction of history, become more intelligible when framed in terms of an Aristotelian investigation into *endoxa*.

KEYWORDS: method, formal indication, Aristotle, *endoxa*, *das Man*, authenticity

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INTRODUCTION

Heidegger's hermeneutic phenomenology, which debuted in *Being and Time*, has often been interpreted as a synthesis of the two dominant influences on his early thinking. Following Husserl, Heidegger is adamant that phenomenology is the only proper way to do philosophy; following Dilthey, Heidegger claims that philosophy is not possible without a radical reinterpretation of the tradition. As the story goes, with only months to produce a publication to get a job, Heidegger writes *Being and Time*, creates hermeneutic phenomenology, and resolves the problems presented by both sides, ushering in a new age of philosophy. Now that we have access to Heidegger's early lectures, however, we can see that the story is much more complex. Rather than overcoming these two contradictory views in a single moment of vision, we now see that Heidegger went to lengths to defend phenomenology from criticisms (Dilthey and Natorp) while simultaneously pushing it beyond the confines of descriptive accounts of objects (Husserl). These years leading up to the publication of his *magnum opus* involved serious investigations into the history of philosophy carried out in the classroom, meticulously developing his method to the delight and exasperation of his students.[1] These gradual advances come to a head in 1921 in his interpretive readings of Aristotle, where he finds a philosopher who both roots his investigations in the phenomena of everyday experience and looks to history for philosophical insights. These exciting lectures, which Gadamer once described as seeing Aristotle come back from the dead, are the primary source of Heidegger's early thinking.[2] In this paper, I show that although Husserl, Natorp, and Dilthey generate the puzzles occupying early Heidegger's investigations, it is Aristotle who provides the resolution.

PART ONE: ARISTOTLE'S METHOD

Given the breadth and complexity of Aristotle's corpus, it should not be surprising that the status of his method (or methods) is a topic of intense debate. Even though he often explains his method at the outset of his

writing, it is an open question as to whether Aristotle truly follows the project that he sets out for himself.[3] For the purposes of this paper, we are only interested in a broad overview of Aristotle's method, which will prove illuminating for our understanding of Heidegger. Consequently, I will present a general account of Aristotle's method, leaving some notable objections in the footnotes for further investigation. In my presentation, I will follow Christopher Shields's view that phenomena and *endoxa* are the two pillars of Aristotle's method.

It is in the *Nicomachean Ethics* that, in discussing the concept of "lack of self-control" (*akrasia*), Aristotle provides a general formula for all of his investigations:

> We must, as in all other cases, set the phenomena before us and, after first discussing the difficulties [*aporiai*], go on to prove, if possible, the truth of all the reputable opinions [*endoxa*] about these affections or, failing this, of the greater number and the most authoritative; for if we both resolve the difficulties [*aporiai*] and leave the reputable opinions undisturbed, we shall have proved the case sufficiently.[4]

Aristotle begins each investigation by surveying what appears to be the case, or what we call the phenomena. He describes this process in the *Physics* as advancing "from what is more obscure by nature, but clearer to us, towards what is more clear and more knowable by nature."[5] Because we always start with what seems to be the case, there is always the possibility that we are being deceived. In other words, all investigations start with what is familiar or self-evident but possibly false and proceed towards what really is the case, which may be more difficult for us to comprehend. Consequently, a satisfactory or "sufficient" resolution to the puzzle must preserve the phenomena. I take this simple formula – gather the phenomena, lay out the puzzles, and seek a resolution which preserves the most phenomena – to be the general methodological approach in all of Aristotle's works.[6] It varies only with regard to the types of phenomena in question. In scientific works like

the *Meteorology*, the *Parts of Animals*, *De Caelo*, etc., the phenomena in question are the objects of sense experience (what literally appears to be the case). In philosophical works like *Metaphysics*, *De Anima*, and the *Nicomachean Ethics*, the phenomena in question are the *endoxa* (what has been said to be the case). In both cases, however, the goal remains the same: start with these and preserve as many of them as is consistent with a successful resolution of the puzzle.

A paradigmatic example of scientific investigation can be found in Book One of *Meteorology* where Aristotle presents the following observation: It seems to be the case (the empirical phenomena show) that a group of rivers and lakes continue to dry up more and more every year.[7] The puzzle arises from the fact that the phenomenon of disappearing water seems to contradict a core philosophical presupposition that forms part of our understanding of reality: that nothing in the universe can be destroyed.[8] When Aristotle gathers more empirical data, he concludes that this puzzle is a result of confining one's phenomena too narrowly. For the person who lives near the lake, it may appear as though the world's water was slowly disappearing. However, if we expand our view more broadly, we will notice that there are places in the world where the water level is rising. Thus, the solution to the puzzle of the missing water: it is not being destroyed, but just going somewhere else. But Aristotle does not simply stop after giving his alternative explanation; as Shields puts it, "[for Aristotle] a scientific explanation does not only put facts on display, but gives an account of *why* the fact should be so."[9] Aristotle draws on the evidence of silt deposits and historical accounts of rivers which no longer exist to show that, "the same parts of the whole earth are not always either sea or land, [rather] all this changes in the course of time."[10] Aristotle concludes that rivers and lakes grow and change, naturally moving from one location to another, advancing in one place and receding in another on a massive timescale.

In this example, Aristotle explains a puzzle that arises from our everyday experience (missing water), presents the relevant phenomena (empirical observations about more general water levels), and seeks a resolution which preserves the phenomena (things seem to disappear)

while maintaining our philosophical principles (nothing can be destroyed). He achieves all of this by explaining the phenomena in a broader context (the developmental cycle of rivers and lakes). This example from elementary science demonstrates how Aristotle uses empirical evidence in scientific investigations to ground his arguments and support his philosophical principles.

However, the missing water is only a puzzle in conjunction with the principle that nothing can be destroyed. Where does this principle come from and how can Aristotle assert it so authoritatively? Aristotle wrestles with the origin of principles at length in the *Posterior Analytics*, where he considers how science depends on a foundation which has not been adequately explained.[11] He notes that for scientific investigations to produce understanding, they must depend on things which are "true and primitive and immediate and more familiar than and prior to and explanatory of the conclusion."[12] These principles which ground our understanding could not themselves be the product of scientific demonstration as this would result in circular reasoning and consequently undermine the veracity of the knowledge.[13] Aristotle ultimately concludes that the proper way to establish principles is through philosophical investigation.[14]

The method for philosophical investigations follows the same approach as the scientific one outlined above: first we gather up the phenomena, then we address the puzzles, and ultimately, we seek a resolution that preserves the most phenomena. Here, however, the phenomena to be preserved cannot be empirical data since those are themselves derivative from philosophical principles; the philosophical phenomena are instead the *endoxa*. In the *Topics*, Aristotle defines these as the opinions that are reputable to "everyone" or "most people" or just "the wise."[15] This appeal to "what has been said" (*legomena*) by reputable opinions (*endoxa*) is different from its scientific counterpart because it investigates the intuitions of wise and common people who have come to understand the world through their everyday experience. In endoxic method, we seek an account which preserves as much as possible of what has been said by "the many" or "the wise" while resolving the

puzzle at hand. The process of weighing these various options is called dialectic, and Aristotle argues it is the sole "path to the principles of all inquiries."[16] For example, in the *Nicomachean Ethics*, Aristotle utilizes endoxic method to investigate the ultimate good for human beings. Although there is general agreement that it is happiness (*eudaimonia*), the details surrounding what constitutes happiness are jumbled and confused.[17] To provide an answer that is adequate, Aristotle must explain these various dominant perspectives and show how they each relate to the truth of the matter.

In some cases, it is difficult or outright impossible for Aristotle to preserve all the phenomena since the ambiguous nature of this definition allows many things to qualify as *endoxa*, including views that directly contradict one another. In this way, *endoxa* can be both problem and solution for Aristotle. They are a problem because many of the views found in our everyday thinking are passed down generationally with little thought. Such dogmatic accounts acquire a great deal of authority even though they may not have arisen through a proper investigation of the matters. Shields argues that, when using endoxic method, Aristotle holds no view to be certain and is always willing to disregard those which are patently false.[18]

On the other hand, their very popularity indicates that they likely have some relation to the truth. Although Aristotle admits that we are unable to examine "all the opinions," he is willing to entertain any view that is "prevalent" or seems "to have some reason in their favour."[19] Shields concludes that, for Aristotle, *endoxa* are important because they "often track the truth – if not the surface truth presented by the appearance, then a discoverable truth whose relation to our initial appearance becomes clear upon investigation and analysis."[20] On this reading, Aristotle works through *endoxa* because, despite their potential to mislead, they are likely to bear some relation to the truth or to what really is. For Aristotle, the fact that something is widely believed is not definitive proof that it is true, far from it, but it does indicate some shared relation to the truth which must be considered and comprehended, a view that clashes with Plato's notion that only the views

of the wise are worth considering.[21] Thus, the goal of endoxic method is to carefully sort through what has been said and uncover what truth it contains.

A representative example of endoxic method can be found in the *Physics* Book 1.[22] Aristotle is investigating the philosophical puzzle of how things can be said to "become something else" or "change."[23] The puzzle arises, as in the case of the missing water, because something in our everyday experience clashes with a philosophical principle. We see many things change (seasons, people, weather, etc.) but numerous ancient philosophers, most notably Parmenides, have stated that all things being one, change is impossible.[24] Aristotle seeks to resolve the tension between our lived experience and the *endoxa* of earlier thinkers by investigating the first principles of nature and what is said about change.

Following the process outlined above, Aristotle starts by presenting the various *endoxa* relevant to this discussion, surveying views from such wise men as Parmenides, Democritus, Anaxagoras, Melissus, Heraclitus, and Empedocles.[25] A cynical reading might view these "reputable opinions" merely as strawmen that Aristotle has assembled so he can take them to task. Although he is critical of these thinkers, he rarely dismisses them outright and often points to moments of clarity and ingenuity in their thought. In this way, Aristotle's critique remains positive, always looking to what we can learn from our predecessors: how they set up the problems, their attempted solutions, and the mistakes that they made in their reasoning.[26] *Endoxa* are not merely outdated viewpoints to be discarded like alchemy once chemistry is discovered, to use an anachronistic analogy, but genuine glimpses of the truth, and any glimpses are to be appreciated, no matter how dim or fleeting. As we noted above, what is truest in nature is attained by advancing through what is self-evident to us. In this case, what is self-evident or commonly accepted about the first principles of nature is a confused jumble of contradictory views, so these constitute our starting point.[27]

To resolve the puzzle, Aristotle compares these *endoxa* with each other in order to uncover their similarities and differences. This allows him to show that most of these ancient accounts actually agree with one another about one important aspect of the nature of reality:

> Hence their principles are in one sense the same, in another different; different certainly as indeed most people think, but the same inasmuch as they are analogous; for all are taken from the same table of columns, some of the pairs being wider, others narrower in extent.[28]

The various *endoxa* agree that the universe should be understood in terms of "contraries." Even though just what those things standing in contradistinction from one another are is a matter of debate among these earlier thinkers, their common reliance on contraries is indicative of some deeper truth about reality. Aristotle summarizes this insight by stating, "It is clear then that our principles must be contraries" because such a consensus was not arbitrarily established but "constrained…by the truth itself."[29] Rather than dismiss these previous accounts for his own, entirely different view, Aristotle looks to what is true in them and builds his own account from there. Like we saw in the example of the *Meteorology*, Aristotle wants to show how his view supersedes theirs by accounting for wider phenomena and making greater sense of the world of our experience. Finally, another criterion for success is to provide an account that can explain how these earlier thinkers could have been led astray.[30] In this way, Aristotle decisively surpasses his predecessors in providing an account which grapples with the history of the puzzle and explains how it came to be.

To resolve the *Physics*' puzzle of mutability, Aristotle looks to a problem inherent in the language used by the earlier thinkers, asking what we mean when we use the word "becoming": Do we take this to mean the generation of something entirely new? Or is there some other way to view change? Aristotle's answer is that earlier thinkers were misled because they conflated different senses of "becoming," specifically, the sense of generation *ex nihilo* with the sense of changing in any way.

As a result, these earlier thinkers struggled to reconcile their commitment to the principle that "nothing can come from nothing" with the phenomena of constant change and motion present in everyday life. By explaining *why* these thinkers were misled, he has met his own methodological criterion, concluding: "Such then was their opinion, and such the reason for its adoption."[31] In contrast, Aristotle's own account argues that while qualities of something can always change, there must be an underlying substance that remains constant. This distinction can account for changes in the qualities of something, explain what the earlier thinkers got right and what they got wrong, and still maintain the philosophical principle that nothing can come from nothing.[32] The endoxic method salvages what is true and accounts for the false along the way to clearing up the puzzle.

To summarize: in both scientific and philosophical investigations, Aristotle begins with the phenomena, although in the former these are empirical experience while in the latter, *endoxa* (what has been said or taken for granted). He then shows how these phenomena generate various puzzles (*aporiai*). He resolves the puzzle(s) by giving an account that untangles the initial puzzle, preserves as much as possible of the relevant set of phenomena, and explains the failures and successes of earlier thinkers.

PART TWO: HEIDEGGER'S EARLY LECTURES

In his autobiographical descriptions of his development, Heidegger is explicit about the importance of Aristotle in both his pre-philosophical development, via Brentano's dissertation, and his early philosophical development at Freiburg and Marburg, circa 1919-1927.[33] Scholars frequently point out the shared content of Heidegger and Aristotle's thinking, such as the emphasis on practical wisdom (*phronesis*), or the ineliminable role of affectedness in understanding (*pathe* for Aristotle, *Befindlichkeit* for Heidegger). These concepts, and many others, are in fact central to Heidegger's analysis of Aristotle's philosophy and factor into much of his early thought. But Heidegger often cites Aristotle not just as a source of rich content, but as an inspiration for his own phenomenological

method.[34] In "My Way to Phenomenology," Heidegger notes that the "self-manifestation of phenomena is thought more originally by Aristotle" (GA 14: 99/OTB 79). This insight, that Aristotle could be interpreted as a phenomenologist, was a crucial breakthrough for Heidegger's method at the time. To see how this resolution came to be, we must look to the puzzles which troubled Heidegger in these early lectures.

Heidegger's early lectures portray a young and serious thinker who is frustrated with the current state of philosophy. In his lectures and correspondence, we see that Heidegger wishes to reestablish philosophy as the heart of the university.[35] As a student of Husserl, Heidegger adopts and advocates for phenomenology as the only method which grasps things as they show themselves.[36] At this time, however, Husserlian phenomenology was under a great deal of scrutiny. Most notably, Paul Natorp, a founding member of the Marburg school of Neo-Kantians whom Heidegger referred to as "the one who was best prepared to discuss Husserl" (GA 19: 3/2), objected that Husserlian phenomenology was overly theoretical and detached from the world of lived experience.[37] Additionally, Heidegger's Diltheyan intuition that philosophy is an inherently historical enterprise led him to question the ahistorical nature of Husserl's rigorous and scientific account of phenomenology.[38] This insistence on history created an insurmountable gap between Heidegger and Husserl's approach to phenomenology from the outset of their relationship.[39] Consequently, while Heidegger begins his early years defending Husserl's approach from Natorp, describing his own historical work as merely an extension of Husserl's project, by 1923 he concedes that Husserl's unwillingness to take history seriously bars the way for a genuine phenomenological method.[40] These courses find Heidegger struggling to develop a method, an inquiry that itself follows Aristotle's method rather strikingly. He wants to maintain the insights of these thinkers – Heidegger's method must be phenomenological (Husserl), rooted in non-theoretical lived experience (Natorp), and historical (Dilthey) – while addressing these criticisms. The solution to the puzzle of the method is found in Heidegger's two-part method of formal indication and phenomenological destruction.[41]

Formal indication, which is used more often than explained, is not easy to define.[42] It addresses Natorp's criticisms by enabling Heidegger to investigate the phenomena which give rise to our theoretical concepts and so occur before the theoretical, in the flow of lived experience. As Kisiel puts it, formal indication relies on the fact that every theoretical understanding contains some reference to something "pre-theoretical," what Heidegger called the "pre-worldly something [*Das vorweltliche Etwas*]" or "primal something [*Ur-etwas*]."[43] By analyzing our theoretical understandings, as codified in definitions or senses of our everyday words, we can uncover the primal something to which they refer, thus exposing the pre-theoretical aspects of our lived experience to philosophical investigation. The method consists in laying out the various ways that a concept has come to be understood and then looking for how these various senses could have arisen, what connects and gives rise to them all. In his 1920 lecture course *Phenomenology of Intuition and Expression*, for example, Heidegger looks at the various ways that we have come to understand the term "history." He presents multiple definitions or senses of the term before showing that only one sense of the term refers to the original pre-worldly experience that makes all of the other senses possible. He concludes that the derivative senses of history, such as the practice of studying the past or the body of scholarship found in texts, arise from and are only made possible by a primordial experience situated in "concrete individual historical Dasein" (GA 59: 86/66), making that the genuine meaning.[44]

The other element of his early method, phenomenological destruction, addresses Dilthey's concern to take history seriously. It refers to the process of showing what the calcified definitions got wrong. Already in 1920, Heidegger argued that these hardened definitions are the product of an intellectual history which cannot be ignored and that any attempt to start philosophy "from scratch" would result in a naïve internalization of the historically determined values we already hold (the reproving allusion to Husserl, the perpetual beginner, is hard to miss) (GA 59: 29/21). While phenomenological destruction is critical, it is not negative;

instead, it seeks the positive in each account (GA 59: 37/26).[45] In our example, the formal indication's result of the sense of Dasein's own historicity as the primal something towards which all definitions of history relate was merely the first step. The subsequent destructive task is to explain how derivative senses like the academic study of history could have come to be understood as the dominant meanings by addressing the various presuppositions which lead to this erroneous view. This is precisely what we find when Heidegger performs a destruction of Natorp and Dilthey in the lectures that immediately follow this formal indication of history.[46] Formal indication uncovers the pretheoretical basis, while phenomenological destruction traces its fall into theorizing, the covering up that necessitates the former's uncovering.

In his 1921 course, *Phenomenological Interpretations of Aristotle,* Heidegger explicitly defines formal indication and establishes its link to phenomenological destruction for the first time. Despite the title of the course, the text appears to be shockingly bare of Aristotelian interpretations. Like many courses during this period, Heidegger forgoes much of the promised content and instead investigates the problem of method and the foundation of philosophy, which leads him to formally indicate and phenomenologically destruct philosophy itself. In formally indicating philosophy, Heidegger splits interpretations of philosophy into various camps, roughly grouped by whether their definitions "overestimate" or "underestimate" the goals of philosophy (GA 61: 15/13). In underestimations, philosophy loosely means some way of living one's life. In overestimations, philosophy is seen as a strict discipline on par with the sciences or even superseding them in significance. We see Heidegger asking whether we can truly grasp concepts without removing them from lived experience, and whether we can really do philosophy without addressing history.

This formal indication of philosophy occupies most of the semester, apparently squeezing out the titular subject matter, until, in a dramatic flourish, Heidegger reveals that Aristotle has actually been the subject the entire time:

> The sphere of tasks with regard to the interpretation of Aristotle is not different from that dealt with in the introduction, and the mode of explication of the latter is not more systematic than the one to be pursued in the former sphere; on the contrary, it is less genuine [*uneigentlicher*]. In terms of the content, the same three groups of problems we have discussed, more or less determinately, up to now in the introduction will also occupy us in our interpretation of Aristotle: the knowledge of principles which, in its actualization, concerns its own facticity. (GA 61: 112/83)[47]

While the major topics of the lecture have appeared to be meditations on methodology with no direct links to Aristotle's philosophy, in fact they have been Aristotelian all along. Heidegger grapples with the question of first principles and their foundation, and like Aristotle, the solution is not to turn to science alone. Instead, first principles must be grounded in an appeal to the meanings found in our historical and social understanding of the world – what has been said by previous thinkers, and what is now taken for granted. This supports the thesis of this paper, that Heidegger developed his early method by means of his close readings of Aristotle. Just as Aristotle settles on endoxic method for his philosophical method, we find Heidegger settling on formal indication and phenomenological destruction as his solution.

When Heidegger describes his method in detail, we find that, as with Aristotle, public opinion (*endoxa*) is both problem and solution. It is part of the problem insofar as common views become stagnant or calcified to the point of becoming self-evident. This process of becoming stagnant is called "ruinance," an early conception for what becomes "fallenness" in *Being and Time*. Heidegger argues that there are many ways that something can become ruinant, but all of them are a naturally occurring process that can be traced back to how we use language, just as Aristotle located the error of his predecessors in their confusion over the word "becoming" in the endoxic survey that began *his* philosophical investigation.[48] Here ruinant average interpretation is both problem and

solution: "Insofar as everything is clarified in factical life, stands in some implicit discourse [*Rede*] or other, and 'is' in an undelineated and factically ruinant interpretation, there then resides in this life the possibility and factical necessity of formal indication as the method of approach of the existentiell-categorial interpretation" (GA 61: 134/100). In other words, Heidegger sees in the calcified rhetoric of everyday language references to some hidden truth which can be uncovered. Formal indication and phenomenological destruction become a counter-movement to the fallenness of our everyday interpretation (GA 61: 153/113).

Formal indication is his method for moving through the ruinant (or fallen) interpretations in our everyday intelligibility to uncover the truth, and we can now see how Aristotelian it is:

> The term "formally indicated," does not mean merely represented, meant, or intimated in some way or other, such that it would remain completely open how and where we are to gain possession of the object itself. "Indicated" here means that that which is is said of the character of the "formal," and so is admittedly *inauthentic* [*uneigentlich*]. Yet precisely in this "*in*" [*un*] there resides at the same time a positive reference.
>
> There resides in the formal indication a very definite bond; this bond says that I stand in a quite definite direction of approach, and it points out the only way of arriving at what is authentic [*eigentlich*], namely, by making the most of [*auszukosten*] and fulfilling what is inauthentically [*uneigentlich*] indicated, by following the indication. A making the most [*Auskosten*], a drawing out: precisely not such a one that the more it grasps, the less it leaves behind (by way of removal) to be acquired, but the reverse: the more radical and formal is the understanding of what is empty, the richer it becomes, because it leads to the concrete. (GA 61: 33/27, tm, em)[49]

The talk of "making the most of" and "fulfilling" what has been indicated should remind us of Aristotle's dialectic method of moving through what has been said insofar as the account is able to provide a rich understanding of the concrete, which is why this "destruction" is "at the same time a positive reference."

Heidegger splits the method into its two constitutive words in this passage. First, in gathering the relevant phenomena, Heidegger is mirroring the first step of Aristotle's approach.[50] "Indication" means a way of maintaining an "arm's length" precautionary distance from them, so that we can remain open to the various ways that meanings show themselves. As noted above, Aristotle approaches philosophical puzzles in a similar way: by remaining open to the *endoxa* and letting them all speak for themselves until some shared aspect of their thinking comes into view. Second, "formal" describes the content which is moved through. It is only through "making the most of" these formal indications that we get at "what is authentic [*eigentlich*]." We can see clear parallels between this language and the language of Aristotle's advance from what is self-evident to us, towards what is knowable by nature. Taken together, formal indication is the method of maintaining an openness towards the way phenomena show themselves – often pre-theoretically as Natorp insisted – and where the true meaning of a concept is uncovered by advancing through the various meanings to find the primal something which explains how the other definitions could come to be – in a historical manner, as Dilthey taught him.

Heidegger's method relies on investigating what has been said by the many or the wise. In other words, both Heidegger and Aristotle rely on *endoxa*, but not in the sense of putting them before us as bare facts. Heidegger states that we cannot just look back at opinions in the history of philosophy since the task is to interpret them (GA 61: 112/84). Only insofar as we address what was "left behind" can we explain our new interpretation, namely, by destructing the past in order to uncover their root source. This formal indication is "fundamentally" (GA 61: 141/105) clarified only once the phenomenological destruction has taken place, showing the two methods to actually be facets of a single method.

We can now see that Heidegger's 1921 lecture course, where he joins his twofold method of formal indication and phenomenological destruction, shows great affinity to Aristotle's method. First, in his formal indication of philosophy, Heidegger presented the relevant *endoxa* to see what puzzles arise. Then Heidegger shows us, not just how they come up short, but what they happen to get right. Lastly, he resolves the tension among these views by providing an account of how they were led astray and how his method avoids the same pitfall by means of a phenomenological destruction. Heidegger's formal indication matches Aristotle in its approach (addressing a puzzle by laying out the *endoxa*), content (the various meanings of what is being investigated), and criteria for success (establishing an account which preserves what was right in the phenomena and explains his predecessors' errors). The method also neatly satisfies the two objections to phenomenology that initially troubled him: it focuses on the phenomena of our lived experience as they show themselves, and it is deeply historical because the *endoxa* in question are the product of our intellectual and cultural traditions.

By 1924, Heidegger has spent almost three years lecturing on Aristotle and thinking about his relevance for phenomenology.[51] In the lectures of this year, Heidegger pushes this view of *endoxa* further by expanding it beyond what has been said in the tradition (what has been said by philosophers or the wise) to what has been said by the many (the average view found in Dasein's everyday Being-in-the-world). This expansion brings it even closer to the Aristotelian sense since *endoxa* can also mean "the common view" or what is "taken for granted." This more expansive use of *endoxa* indicates an appeal to a social intelligibility which is always present, frequently misguided, but necessarily bears some relation to the truth. Here Heidegger describes this approach:

> Even beings with which I negotiate, not in the sense of concern but in the sense of setting forth facts in the way that they are, initially are there in a *doxa*. From there, Aristotle consciously refers back to the history of philosophy. He initially reviews every fundamental

> problem with regard to the way one thought about it, on the basis of the positive understanding of the fact that the matter must have somehow come into view in such a *doxa*. Indeed, *doxa* is the characteristic trust in that which shows itself initially. And that which shows itself initially is the basis of the investigation of the matter itself [*Sache selbst*]. (GA 18: 152/103)

In this discussion, we find Heidegger exploring the role of *das Man*, which will loom large in *Being and Time*, and doing so under the influence of Aristotle's endoxic method.[52]

Recall that Aristotle suggests in the *Physics* that we must move from "what is more obscure by nature, but clearer to us, towards what is more clear and more knowable by nature," pointing out that what is "clear to us" is actually quite "confused."[53] Heidegger paraphrases this Aristotelian insight:

> It is so self-evidently there, that I see beyond it; I do not notice it…But I must proceed precisely from what is inauthentically [*uneigentlich*] there to what is authentically [*eigentlich*] passed over in acquaintance. These principles are the programmatically authentic [*eigentlich*] counter-thrust to Platonic philosophy. Aristotle says: I must have ground under my feet, a ground that is there in an immediate self-evidence, if I am to get at being. (GA 18: 37/27 tm)

Relying on the self-evident implicitly, while lacking an explicit understanding of it, is a central theme for both thinkers. Already, we can see parallels to discussions in *Being and Time* where Heidegger describes our everyday experience as ontically close but ontologically farthest away (GA 2: 22/SZ 16).

For Heidegger, what significantly determines our everyday ontic understanding is the social horizon of intelligibility known as *das Man*. In the *Nicomachean Ethics,* Aristotle is always aware of the significance of the social interpretedness of human experience and speaks of

it regularly when discussing various conceptions of the good life. These social interpretations passed down by our tradition are the *endoxa* which Aristotle sees as the initial phenomena investigated in matters of philosophical inquiry. We can see now that Heidegger's investigation into the average everydayness of Dasein's Being-in-the-world is, if Aristotle is right, a methodological necessity. Heidegger then notes that he sees *endoxa* and the average intelligibility which determines our everyday understanding, or *das Man,* as one and the same: "the intelligibility in which Dasein moves, the one [*das Man*], is grounded ultimately in *doxa*, in the average meanings of things and of oneself" (GA 18: 73/52). Charles Guignon, in his discussion of these lectures, notes that for Heidegger, the "given" of phenomenology is the idle talk (*Gerede*) of our shared understanding of the world, such as the ungrounded language of "history" or "becoming" we have been noting. He describes the investigations in Heidegger's early work as a shift from *Gerede* to *Rede*, from idle talk to discourse, which is a shift from average intelligibility to genuine understanding.[54]

In these lectures, Heidegger describes *endoxa* as "the authentic discoveredness of Being-with-one-another-in-the-world" (GA 18: 149/101 tm) and portrays *das Man* in a positive sense, as the ample source for philosophical investigations.[55] Heidegger is explicit and consistent in *Being and Time* that he does not see *das Man* or the "they-self" (*Man-selbst*) as some sort of moral failing for human beings. Scholars often disregard these comments from Heidegger, which is understandable given that his characterization of *das Man* and *Man-selbst* are overwhelmingly negative. However, we can now understand both Heidegger's insistence on its positive role and the strong negative sense: Although *das Man* as the social horizon of intelligibility tends to cover up and distort the truth, it is also our main source of philosophical analysis, and leads to truth when developed. This positive and negative aspect is inherent to the problem of phenomena itself that Aristotle presented, i.e., that phenomena can lead to the truth, but they can also deceive. This also explains why Heidegger spends so much of *Being and Time* investigating the average everyday interpretation of concepts central to

philosophy (death, self, time, etc.). Here, Heidegger notes an inherent tendency to simply appeal to what ancient thinkers said (often handed down unwittingly) without investigating the matters for themselves. When it comes to *das Man*, "one does not have to investigate everything with regards to its concrete content; what others say about it is what one thinks about it" (GA 18: 152/102). In other words, *das Man*, like *endoxa*, is both the necessary resource for opening philosophical investigation and an unfortunate source of close-mindedness.

With this reinterpretation of Aristotle's method, Heidegger has finally overcome the objections that he has been struggling with for years. By orienting his method towards the average interpretedness of everyday life – what the many say – Heidegger's analysis remains rooted in factical lived experience (meeting Natorp's challenge). By utilizing Aristotle's method of investigating philosophical questions, Heidegger's philosophy grapples with the tradition in a way that remains deeply historical (meeting Dilthey's challenge). By focusing on *endoxa*, Heidegger appropriates an Aristotelian subclass of phenomena that can address philosophical puzzles while remaining phenomenological (meeting Husserl's challenge). Heidegger reconciles Natorp and Dilthey with Husserl by means of Aristotle: an extraordinary fulfilling of his own *endoxa*.

The last piece is Aristotle's criterion of success in his ability to give an account for how the various *endoxa* got things right and where they got things wrong. This, called the destruction of the tradition, is what Heidegger set out to do in *Being and Time*.

PART THREE: *BEING AND TIME*

Our methodological investigations clarify a number of matters about *Being and Time*. The question taken up here, of course, is what we mean by the word "being." In proper Aristotelian fashion Heidegger begins with what "has been said" about being, setting out the various *endoxa* for our examination at the very start of the inquiry. Being is said to be: "the most universal," something "indefinable," and "self-evident" (GA 2: 4–6/SZ 3–4).[56] In each of these definitions, we find a traditional view

which has calcified into self-evidence. He notes that these accounts are not the product of fantasy but instead stem from Dasein's "average understanding of Being in which we always operate and which in the end belongs to the essential constitution of Dasein itself" (GA 2: 11/SZ 8). We noted before that such average understanding is a product of what gets said by the many, or *das Man*. Heidegger rightly concludes then, that any investigation into the meaning of being will be determined by our average historical and traditional everyday ways of self-interpretation. However, this investigation must not only provide us with an account which is satisfactory, but in addition, it will explain how each of the *endoxa* relates in some (albeit likely erroneous) way to what is really the case. Thus, *Being and Time* itself, as an investigation into the question of being which looks to what has been said and what is understood through the everyday historical understandings passed down to us, embodies the Aristotelian approach to its fundamental question. In the introduction to *Being and Time* we can see this approach in the outline of Heidegger's plan for the two parts of the text, which starts with a formal indication of being in the first part and concludes with a phenomenological destruction of the entire historical tradition in the (unwritten) second part. Ideally, this formal indication and phenomenological destruction would have explained what previous thinkers got right, while providing a new account of being to explain and solve all the problems which arose from these conflicting accounts.[57]

Heidegger not only uses this endoxic method to frame the inquiry of the book as a whole; he employs it multiple times within the work, usually when he opens the discussion of a new topic. I will briefly show two examples of this. First, his discussion of the various ways we talk about ourselves, as "I", "ego", "subject," etc. in I.3 contains one of the few direct references to formal indication found in *Being and Time*: "The word 'I' is to be understood only in the sense of a non-committal *formal indicator*, indicating something which may perhaps reveal itself as its 'opposite' in some particular phenomenal context of Being" (GA 2: 155/SZ 116).[58] Heidegger takes up and works through the various self-evident and given interpretations before concluding that his account

of Dasein alone can both account for all of these misunderstandings while getting the rest of the phenomena right. In his critical yet positive style, he explains that such interpretations of the self accurately grasp one aspect of Dasein's being – the mode of existence of theoretical contemplation – but miss the broader phenomenon in question. The second example is found in the second division where Heidegger analyzes the concept of death.[59] Heidegger lays out the various ways that death is understood: as demise, perishing, as the end, as something ownmost, as something non-relational, etc. Here Heidegger formally indicates what has been said about death by all, the many, or the wise, in other words, the *endoxa*. He then looks through them to find the one understanding of death that can account for all of the others. Heidegger concludes that one sense of death can capture the primordial phenomenon, and he performs a destruction, demonstrating how these other conceptions are derivative of the originary meaning.

Returning to the puzzle of being: recall that Aristotle's critique of the "earlier thinkers" was that they lacked an understanding of nature that could account for change and that his proposed solution was a differentiation of subjects from predicates. Heidegger's solution to the problem of being in *Being and Time* follows a similar trajectory by looking to an unclarified aspect of traditional ontology. Heidegger suggests that our inadequate understanding of time is what limits our understanding of being, leading to these puzzles. Much of his critique in the introduction centers on a view of time which overemphasizes the present at the cost of covering up a fuller, more human sense of temporality. Heidegger suggests that once he has fully explained his conception of time, we can reinterpret the various puzzles and resolve them, concluding that his account will not be successful "until it brings us the insight that the specific kind of Being of ontology hitherto, and the vicissitudes of its inquiries, its findings, and its failures, have been necessitated in the very character of Dasein" (GA 2: 26/SZ 19).

Like Aristotle, his investigation only succeeds once even the failures have been explained. He clarifies what he means in Section 6, "The task of destroying the history of ontology." Here Heidegger stresses

the problematic influence of the tradition, which can block "our access to those primordial 'sources,'" but he also stresses that we have a chance to overcome this influence as well (GA 2: 29/SZ 21). As with Aristotle before him, and as we saw in the lecture courses, Heidegger is emphatic that the purpose of destruction is not to render history into "nullity," rather "the aim is positive" (GA 2: 31/SZ 23). He is looking to find what primordial sources inspired the thinkers who came before him and where these thinkers went wrong. Consequently, Heidegger describes the entire investigation in *Being and Time* as provisional:

> Our analysis of Dasein, however, is not only incomplete; it is also at the first instance, provisional. It merely brings out the Being of this entity, without interpreting its meaning. It is rather a preparatory procedure by which the horizon for the most primordial way of interpreting Being may be laid bare. Once we have arrived at that horizon, this preparatory analytic of Dasein will have to be repeated on a higher and *authentically* ontological basis. (GA 2: 23-24/SZ 17)

This use of "authentic" (*eigentlich*) in discussing his method is not accidental.[60] Although there is a tendency in the scholarship to focus on this term as it relates to existentialist themes, it is also significant in Heidegger's description of his method.[61] For instance, Heidegger described formal indication above as the move from what is inauthentically known to what is authentically known, the "removal" of the "in" (*un*) of "inauthentic" (*uneigentlich*). Heidegger then describes Aristotle's movement from self-evidence towards truth as the move from what is inauthentically there towards what is authentically there. Here in *Being and Time*, Heidegger argues that the resolution to the puzzle of being can only be accomplished by repeating the interpretation on an authentically ontological basis.

All throughout *Being and Time* and his early lectures, we find Heidegger using this language of authenticity in regards to methodological matters. In these courses, we find Heidegger looking to the

average everyday interpretation of things, which is, proximally and for the most part, inauthentic. Only by carefully utilizing his method does he uncover what is authentic. For Heidegger, as for Aristotle, this inauthentic starting point is necessary and has both positive and negative aspects. On the one hand, there is a tendency in inauthentic understandings to mislead or deceive, but on the other hand these understandings are the result of some original experience that can be uncovered: "inauthenticity is based on the possibility of authenticity" (GA 2: 344/SZ 259). Understanding the inauthentic starting point of all investigation on these terms, we can see why Heidegger goes to such lengths to dismiss any notion that inauthentic means "immoral" or "lesser" (GA 2: 57/SZ 43). In Aristotelian terms, the inauthentic is merely the self-evident confused jumble which serves as the unavoidable point of departure for philosophical inquiries. Formally indicating the meanings found therein and destructing the tradition are the only way back to the primordial position which made such inauthentic understandings possible.[62] This is why Heidegger explicitly describes his own method in 1921 and 1927 in terms of a move from what is self-evident but inauthentic towards what is authentic but initially hidden.

Reading Heidegger's *Being and Time* often feels like entering a conversation that has been going on for some time. This is because the arguments, methods, and results found in this text are just that – ideas that Heidegger has been working on steadily by that point for almost a decade in a heated confrontation with the thinking of Dilthey, Natorp, and Husserl. A look back to Heidegger's very early work reveals that it was in Aristotle that Heidegger found a method that could address the contemporary issues surrounding phenomenology at the time. The method was rooted in the world of lived experience (satisfying Natorp), grounded in what has been passed down through history (satisfying Dilthey) while remaining open to the many ways that beings show themselves in themselves (satisfying Husserl). This method explains the necessity of starting with the inauthentic understanding of our everyday lives as well as the significance of investigating what has been said by *das Man*. It has further drawn our attention to the fact that

authenticity, when used in a broader sense, has methodological resonances which link his thinking in *Being and Time* back to the development of formal indication in 1921. Lastly, we can see in the outline provided in the introduction to *Being and Time* that Heidegger planned to follow this method regarding the question of the meaning of being itself, which would have culminated in a phenomenological destruction of the entire history of philosophy.

NOTES

1 In a letter to Karl Löwith in September of 1920, Heidegger expresses his desire to use his courses to grow as a philosopher: "I myself want to learn something in my seminars…" (Theodore Kisiel, *The Genesis of Heidegger's Being and Time* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993), 150). This echoes Heidegger's more famous mantra: "In all teaching, the teacher learns the most" (Martin Heidegger, *What Is a Thing?*, trans. W.B. Barton and Vera Deutsch. (South Bend: Gateway Editions, 1970), 73). Gadamer and other members of the "Aristotle breakfast club," the nickname for the students who attended Heidegger's courses on Aristotle which took place early in the morning, remarked that the early Marburg lectures were completely life changing (Hans-Georg Gadamer, *Heidegger's Ways*, trans. John W. Stanley [Albany: SUNY Press, 1994], 115). This approach was not enjoyed by all of Heidegger's students, however. In the semester on *Phenomenology of Religious Experience*, Heidegger faced backlash from his students for spending weeks discussing phenomenological method, rather than talking about religion. For Heidegger's frustrated response to mutinous students, see GA 60: 65/45.

2 Ted Sadler, *Heidegger and Aristotle: The Question of Being* (London: The Athlone Press, 2001), 13. Sadler is citing Gadamer's paper

"Erinnerungen an Heideggers Anfänge" in *Dilthey-Jahrbuch für Philosophie und Geschichte der Geisteswissenschaften* vol. 4. (1986/87), 21.

3 For a critique of Aristotle's inconsistency using endoxic method, see John Cooper's "*Nicomachean Ethics* VII. 1-2: Introduction, Method, Puzzles" in *Aristotle's Nicomachean Ethics, Book VII: Symposium Aristotelicum,* 1st edition, ed. Carlo Natali (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009), 9-40. For a critique of the "over-inflation" of endoxic method in Aristotelian scholarship, see Dorothea Frede's "The *Endoxon* Mystique" in *Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy: Volume 43*, 1st edition, ed. Brad Inwood (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013), 185–216.

4 Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics,* 1145b1–7. All citations to Aristotle in this paper are from: *The Complete Works of Aristotle*, ed. Jonathan Barnes, Vol. 1 and 2 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1995).

5 Aristotle, *Physics*, 184a20. See also *Nicomachean Ethics,* 1095b1: "Presumably then, *we* must begin with things familiar to us."

6 Shields describes the broad formula in "The Phainomenological Method in Aristotle's *Metaphysics*" in *Aristotle on Method and Metaphysics*, 2013th edition, ed. E. Feser (Houndmills, Basingstoke; New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013), 7–27. Cooper describes this section from the *Nicomachean Ethics* in similar terms in "*Nicomachean Ethics* VII. 1–2" though he expresses concerns about applying this method generally.

7 Aristotle, *Meteorology*, 352a17.

8 Aristotle, *Meteorology*, 352b18: "Since there is necessarily some change in the whole world, but not in the way of coming into existence or perishing (for the universe is permanent), it must be, as we say, that the same places are not for ever moist through the presence of sea and rivers nor for ever dry."

9 Christopher Shields, *Aristotle,* 2nd edition (London: Routledge, 2014), 125. Shields is citing Aristotle, *Posterior Analytics*, 78a22–28.

10 Aristotle, *Meteorology*, 353a24.

11 Aristotle, *Posterior Analytics*, 74b5: "Now if demonstrative understanding depends on necessary principles (for what one understands could not be otherwise), and what belongs to the objects in themselves is necessary. . . , it is evident that demonstrative deduction will depend on things of this sort."

12 Aristotle, *Posterior Analytics* 71b20.

13 Aristotle, *Posterior Analytics*, 72b35: "There results for those who say that demonstration is circular not only what has just been described, but also that they say nothing other than that this is the case if this is the case – and it is easy to prove everything in this way." He continues at 73a1: "Hence it results that those who assert that demonstration is circular say nothing but that if *A* is the case *A* is the case. And it is easy to prove everything this way."

14 The resolution is found in *Topics* 101a34-b4: "For it is impossible to discuss them at all from the principles proper to the particular science in hand, seeing that the principles are primitive in relation to everything else: it is through reputable opinions [*endoxa*] about them that these have to be discussed, and this task belongs properly, or most appropriately, to dialectic; for dialectic is a process of criticism wherein lies the path to the principles of all inquiries." See also *Nicomachean Ethics* 1139b25–31: "And all teaching starts from what is already known, as we maintain in the [*Posterior*] *Analytics* also; for it proceeds sometimes through induction and sometimes by deduction. Now induction is of first principles and of the universal and deduction proceeds *from* universals. There are therefore principles from which deduction proceeds, which are not reached by deduction; it is therefore by induction that they are acquired."

15 Aristotle, *Topics*, 100b20.

16 Aristotle, *Topics*, 101b1.

17 Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics*, 1095a16–21: "Verbally there is a very general agreement; for both the general run of men and people of superior refinement say that it is happiness, and identify living well and faring well with being happy; but with regard to

what happiness is they differ, and the many do not give the same account as the wise."

18 Shields, *Aristotle*, 31.

19 Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics*, 1095a27.

20 Shields, *Aristotle*, 30.

21 Plato, *Crito*, 48a: "Socrates: We should not then think so much of what the majority will say about us, but what he will say who understands justice and injustice, the one, that is, and the truth itself. So that, in the first place, you were wrong to believe that we should care for the opinion of the many about what is just, beautiful, good, and their opposites." Plato, *Plato: Five Dialogues: Euthyphro, Apology, Crito, Meno, Phaedo*, ed. John M. Cooper, trans. G.M.A. Grube, Second Edition (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, Inc., 2002).

22 Although we might be inclined to think of "physics" as a scientific enterprise, Aristotle is very clear from the outset of the text that his main goal is to become acquainted with the "principles" of nature. In the *Posterior Analytics*, Aristotle argues that this process of establishing principles is not the task of science but of philosophy. One of the first scholars to explain endoxic method, G.E.L. Owen, relies heavily on these two texts in his famous essay "*Tithenai ta phainomena*" (in *Aristote et les problèmes de méthode*, ed. S. Mansion (Louvain: Publications Universitaires de Louvain, 1961), 83–103), where he argues that Aristotle's *Physics* should be read as both a philosophical and scientific work. Owen suggests that in the first half of the *Physics*, we find Aristotle generating the principles through endoxic method, whereas in the latter half, we see Aristotle apply those principles to phenomena of sense experience. Our example, which Owen references, comes from this first half.

23 Aristotle, *Physics*, 189b30.

24 Aristotle, *Physics*, 184b15.

25 Aristotle, *Physics*, 184a10–192b8.

26 Shields, *Aristotle*, 27.

27 Aristotle, *Physics*, 184a24.

28 Aristotle, *Physics*, 188b37–a2.

29 Aristotle, *Physics*, 188b30.

30 Aristotle, *Physics*, 191a23. "We will now proceed to show that the difficulty [*aporia*] of the early thinkers, as well as our own, is solved in this way alone."

31 Aristotle, *Physics*, 191a25.

32 Aristotle, *Physics*, 191b30.

33 See the letter between Heidegger and Richardson (c. 1962) in the preface of *Heidegger: Through Phenomenology to Thought*, William J. Richardson, S.J., 4th ed. edition (New York: Fordham University Press, 1993.) Also see Heidegger's essay "My Way to Phenomenology" (GA 14: 91/OTB 74).

34 Although my thinking here arose from my own research, I must note that Charles Guignon gave this link a brief but excellent discussion in "Wittgenstein, Heidegger, and the Question of Phenomenology" which appears in *Wittgenstein and Heidegger*, 1st edition, ed. David Egan, Stephen Reynolds, and Aaron Wendland (New York: Routledge, 2013), 82–98. For Guignon's account of *endoxa*, which he attributes to Nussbaum's reading of Aristotle, see page 91. Special thanks to Megan Altman for bringing this paper to my attention.

35 During this period, Heidegger writes Karl Jaspers frequently to discuss how they might team up to radically change the university and "revitalize philosophy" *Martin Heidegger Karl Jaspers: Briefwechsel 1920–1963*, 1st edition, ed. Walter Biemel and Hans Saner (München: Vittorio Klostermann, 1990) 15.

36 Heidegger often references Husserl's *Logical Investigations* as a major source of inspiration. Kisiel notes that Heidegger is often vague in these lectures concerning how much of Husserl's view he adopts (Kisiel, *Genesis* 18). In his 1923 lecture, *Introduction to Phenomenological Research*, Heidegger gives a more detailed account of how Husserl's philosophy relates to his own thinking (GA 17: 49/37).

37 While he is generally critical of Natorp's philosophical views, Heidegger does take Natorp's philosophy seriously. Consequently, Heidegger explains and critiques Natorp's philosophical position (known as "reconstruction [*Rekonstruktion*]") in every course from 1919 to 1921 (GA 56/57: 99/77, GA 58: 7/6, GA 59: 92/77, GA 60: 11/8).

38 For his critique of Dilthey, *Weltanschauung* (worldview) philosophy, and historicism, see Edmund Husserl, *Phenomenology and the Crisis of Philosophy*, trans. Quentin Lauer, 1st edition (New York: Harper and Row, 1965), 122.

39 For a detailed account of Heidegger's Diltheyan influences, read Robert C. Scharff, *Heidegger Becoming Phenomenological: Interpreting Husserl through Dilthey, 1916–1925* (New York: Rowman & Littlefield, 2018.) Scharff argues convincingly that, contrary to the dominant narrative, Heidegger was never a Husserlian. For a summary of the text, see my review: John J. Preston, "Robert C. Scharff's *Heidegger Becoming Phenomenological: Interpreting Husserl through Dilthey, 1916–1925*," *Gatherings: The Heidegger Circle Annual* 10 (2020): 262–66.

40 Heidegger's description of Husserl's critique of Dilthey and historicism is almost pathological (GA 17, 90–107/66–77). He speaks as though Husserl were afraid to adopt a position which could not establish objectively valid truth and calls Husserl anxious: "With a squinting glance at existence, one is made anxious." Heidegger describes Husserl's quest for validity as a fallen investigation into a public form of truth inspired by Plato. In this text, Heidegger is referencing *Phenomenology and the Crisis of Philosophy*, where Husserl argues that philosophical considerations of history result in "worldview [*Weltanschauung*]" philosophy and dangerous skepticism (Husserl, *Phenomenology and the Crisis of Philosophy*, 124). In 1920, private correspondence between Heidegger and his students (most notably Karl Löwith) indicate that Heidegger is frustrated with Husserl, whom he refers to unkindly as "the old man [*der Alte*]." (See *Becoming Heidegger: On the Trail of His Early Occasional Writings, 1910–1927*, 1st edition, ed. Theodore

Kisiel and Thomas Sheehan [Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 2007], 104; and Kisiel, *Genesis* 150).

41 Although Kisiel also acknowledges the link between formal indication and phenomenological destruction in *Genesis*, Jonathan O'Rourke offers a more thorough explanation in "Heidegger on Expression: Formal Indication and Destruction in the Early Freiburg Lectures" *Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology*, 49:2 (2018), 109–125. My argument in this paper attempts to take this view a step farther by linking these methods with Heidegger's reading of Aristotle.

42 The term "formal indication" first appears in the tail end of his 1919-20 winter semester course but remains relatively undefined until a year later. It can be found in the second appendix of *Basic Problems of Phenomenology*, in the transcript of the course provided by Oskar Becker (GA 58: 248/187). Heidegger's course manuscript containing the term is missing.

43 Kisiel, *Genesis*, 23. For Heidegger's "pre-worldly something," see (GA 56/57: 115/88).

44 For a thorough account of the various meanings of history that Heidegger formally indicates see Kisiel, *Genesis*, 127–130.

45 Also, see the introduction to his unwritten Aristotle Book from around that time: "this destructive confrontation with its own history is not merely a supplement for illustrating how things stood in earlier times, an occasional overview of what others before us 'came up with,' or an opportunity for depicting entertaining perspectives in world-history. Rather, destruction is the authentic path upon which the present needs to encounter itself in its own basic movement, doing this in such a way that what springs forth for it from its history is the permanent question of the extent to which it itself is worried about appropriating radical possibilities of founding experiences and of their interpretations" (GA 62: 368/S 124).

46 He outlines an investigation into "[Paul] Natorp, [William] James, [Hugo] Münsterberg and [Wilhelm] Dilthey" and describes this

sequence as "intentional" but does not hold himself to this order and only destructs Natorp and Dilthey before the course ends (GA 59: 96/76).

47 The three discussions Heidegger is referencing are: the problem of principle (*arche*), the problem of grasp (*logos*), and the problem of beings in the sense of being (*on – ousia – kinesis – phusis*). The idea is that Heidegger's lecture implicitly addresses each of these problems which are central to Aristotle's thinking in the formal indication of philosophy.

48 For a helpful summary of this, see Sean D. Kirkland's "Heidegger and Greek Philosophy" in *The Bloomsbury Companion to Heidegger*, Expanded edition, ed. Francois Raffoul and Eric S. Nelson (London: Bloomsbury Academic, 2016), 77–86. Kirkland lays out early Heidegger's conception of fallenness. There he presents two ways of falling: falling into the world of activity and falling into the general interpretation of the tradition (Kirkland 79).

49 The use of *auszukosten* and *Auskosten* here makes this sentence particularly challenging to translate. The word appears in these two sentences and nowhere else in this text. Richard Rojcewicz translates it as "exhausting," which captures the negative side of trying to get everything you can out of something. I opt for "making the most" because it suggests that whatever remains is utilized rather than discarded. The more common translation is "to savor" which also works but implies a mental state of satisfaction rather than a result of a philosophical investigation.

50 As Shields notes, this language of "it seems to be the case that" and "it is said that" is the source of constant confusion and frustration for novice readers of Aristotle who have trouble sorting between what Aristotle is investigating and what Aristotle believes to be the case (Shields, *Aristotle*, 29). Given the similarity of their methods, it should be unsurprising that we find similar problems in interpretations of Heidegger's work. For example, in a section on Descartes in *Being and Time*, Heidegger mentions that the most authentic being is what "remains constant and endures"

(GA 2: 128/SZ 96). Later, Heidegger will show that such a description fails to capture what is authentic in Dasein and many other things. This phenomenon where Heidegger argues for views that he ultimately disagrees with happens regularly enough that Lee Braver has named it "tricky Martin" (for a discussion, see Lee Braver, *Heidegger's Later Writings: A Reader's Guide* [London; New York: Continuum, 2009], 41).

51 Each of the courses from 1921 to 1924 speaks about Aristotle at some length. See GA 61, GA 62, GA 63, GA 17, GA 18 (listed chronologically) and the "Natorp Report," which secured Heidegger a job at Marburg. The "report" was an introduction to a book on Aristotle that he never wrote, which can be found in the third appendix of GA 62.

52 Although there is a great deal of debate on this issue, in general, I interpret *das Man* as the social horizon of intelligibility which dictates and determines us proximally and for the most part (see Edgar Boedeker, "Individual and Community in Early Heidegger: Situating *das Man*, the Man-self, and Self-ownership in Dasein's Ontological Structure," *Inquiry* 44 (2001): 63–100).

53 Aristotle, *Physics*, 184a22.

54 Guignon, "Wittgenstein, Heidegger, and The Question of Phenomenology," 93.

55 Scott Campbell also notes the positive account of *das Man* in *The Early Heidegger's Philosophy of Life: Facticity, Being, and Language*, 1st edition (New York: Fordham University Press, 2012), 211. Campbell cites Heidegger's 1923 course, *Ontology the Hermeneutics of Facticity*: "The 'every-one' ['*das Man*'] has to do with something definite and positive – it is not only a phenomenon of fallenness, but as such also a how of factical Dasein" (GA 63: 17/14).

56 Heidegger often cites Brentano's influential dissertation for the insight that, for Aristotle, being is said in many ways. We can see now that these many ways of being are the *endoxa* that Aristotle investigated in order to uncover the meaning of being for

himself. Heidegger's *Being and Time* can thus be seen as another investigation into the same puzzle, picking up where Aristotle left off.

57 The first part of *Being and Time* offers an interpretation of Dasein with a new account of temporality. The second part was supposed to entail a "phenomenological destruction of the history of ontology" (GA 2: 53/SZ 39).

58 The "opposite" he has in mind here is the notion that for the most part Dasein is not its authentic self, but (having lost itself) some version of the they-self (*Man-selbst*).

59 For a detailed account of Heidegger's formal indication of "death" see Thomson, "Death and Demise in *Being and Time*," in *The Cambridge Companion to Heidegger's Being and Time*, ed. Mark A. Wrathall (Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2013), 274–290. The result of the formal indication is what Thomson calls "existential world-collapse." See page 281.

60 For more on authenticity and method in Heidegger, see my dissertation "Heidegger and the Origin of Authenticity" (in process).

61 For a thorough discussion on authenticity and inauthenticity as it relates to everydayness, see David C. Abergel, "The Confluence of Authenticity and Inauthenticity in Heidegger's *Being and Time*." *Gatherings: The Heidegger Circle Annual* 10 (2020): 74–110. Abergel concludes in his paper that "For everyday human life – from its most mundane tasks and leveled-town trivialities to its most complex constructions and sophisticated theoretical abstractions – is always already not only in untruth, but truth, not only in deception but open to revelation, not only inauthentic, but authentic" (Abergel 103). I believe my paper shows how this confluence of authenticity and inauthenticity is an insight which Heidegger gleaned from Aristotle.

62 GA 63: 75/59: "What is needed is to get beyond the position started from and arrive at a grasp of the subject matter which is free from covering up. For this it is necessary to disclose the history of the covering up of the subject matter. The tradition

of philosophical questioning must be pursued all the way back to the original sources of its subject matter. The tradition must be dismantled. Only in this way is a primordial position on the subject matter possible."