

The Confluence of Authenticity and Inauthenticity in Heidegger's *Being and Time*

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ABSTRACT: I argue that there is a confluence of authenticity and inauthenticity inherent to the structure of average everydayness in *Being and Time*. I support this reading by recasting Heidegger's notion of fallenness in *Being and Time* in terms of its precursor, ruinance, which he introduces in his 1921–22 lecture course, *Phenomenological Interpretations of Aristotle: Initiation into Phenomenological Research* (GA 61). In this lecture course, Heidegger explains that ruinance is constituted by a dual movement of reluctance and prestruction: the former, an intentional openness to the world; the latter, a securing that conceals that openness. While this dual movement is not expressed explicitly in these terms in *Being and Time*, I show that it is nevertheless tacitly operative in the structure of falling and that it grounds the duality of average everydayness. I frame this study around the debate on how Dasein can be authentic despite its fallenness, given that fallenness paradoxically renders Dasein essentially inauthentic.

KEYWORDS: authenticity, inauthenticity, average everydayness, fallenness, ruinance

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I. THE APPARENT CONTRADICTION

In *Being and Time*, Heidegger says that Dasein can be authentic (*eigentlich*) despite its fallenness (*Verfallenheit*). Fallenness or falling (*Verfallen*) is the third structural feature of care (*Sorge*) along with facticity and existentiality. It accounts for Dasein's absorption in its world of concern (*Besorgen*) and the "they" (*das Man*), the shared, public interpretations that govern the intelligibility of its world.¹ And although Heidegger says that "the Self of everyday Dasein is the *they-self* [*Man-selbst*], which we distinguish from the *authentic Self* [*eigentlichen Selbst*]" (GA 2: 172/SZ 129), authenticity (*Eigentlichkeit*) is nevertheless not a way of escaping the "they." For the "they" is a "*primordial phenomenon*" and, as such, "*it belongs to Dasein's positive constitution*" (GA 2: 172/SZ 129). Consequently, authenticity is only an "existentiell modification" of the "they": "*Authentic Being-one's-Self* [*eigentliche Selbstsein*] does not rest upon an exceptional condition of the subject, a condition that has been detached from the 'they'; *it is rather an existentiell modification of the 'they' – of the 'they' as an essential existentielle*" (GA 2: 173/SZ 130). Dasein is therefore always already absorbed in the shared, public interpretations of the "they." As a result, we find that because it is the structure of falling that accounts for this absorption, Dasein is, accordingly, also always fallen: "Being-in-the-world is always fallen" (GA 2: 241/SZ 181). Indeed, Heidegger renders falling as an essential structure of Dasein: "Falling is a definite existential characteristic of Dasein itself" (GA 2: 234/SZ 176). For this reason, he claims that falling does "not express any negative evaluation" (GA 2: 233/SZ 175). For as an essential structure or existential, falling is determinative for Dasein in every mode of its Being. It is on this basis that Heidegger at times seems to present inauthenticity (*Uneigentlichkeit*) as a possible way in which Dasein can, but need not, fall: "Not-Being-its-self [*Das Nicht-es-selbst-sein*] functions as a *positive* possibility of that entity which, in its essential concern, is absorbed in a world" (GA 2: 233/SZ 176). However, in this same section (§38), Heidegger also seems to undermine this neutral sense of falling when he claims that Dasein "has mostly the character of Being-lost in the publicness of the 'they'." Dasein has, in the first instance, fallen

away [*abgefallen*] from itself as an authentic potentiality for Being its Self, and has fallen into the ‘world’” (GA 2: 233/SZ 175). What is more, he continues by presenting four “essential characteristics” of falling which seem to render inauthenticity a necessary feature of falling itself.

The movement of falling is tempting (*versucherisch*), tranquilizing (*beruhigend*), alienating (*entfremdend*), and self-entangling (*sichverfangend*). Falling is tempting because it offers Dasein the opportunity to relinquish all responsibility for itself. It therefore makes life “easy” for Dasein (GA 2: 170/SZ 127–28). For the “they” dominates Dasein and thus deprives it of its agency and accountability, which means that Dasein never has to make any decisions for itself. Indeed, as Heidegger explains, since Dasein’s activities are always governed by the shared, public interpretations of the “they,” it can always blame the “they” for its actions (GA 2: 170/SZ 127). Moreover, falling is tranquilizing because the “they” secures for Dasein the supposition that it is “leading and sustaining a full and genuine ‘life’” (GA 2: 235–36/SZ 177). For the “they” has seen, heard, and understood everything, which means that Dasein never has to find meaning for itself (GA 2: 235/SZ 177). Heidegger notes, however, that “this tranquility in inauthentic Being does not seduce one into stagnation and inactivity, but drives one into uninhibited ‘hustle’” (GA 2: 236/SZ 177). For when Dasein is inauthentic, it understands itself strictly in terms of the things that it deals with in its daily activities; as a consequence, it plunges into a kind of restless “knowing it all,” busying itself with worldly distractions that have been dictated by the “they” (GA 2: 236/SZ 178). Furthermore, the “tempting tranquilization” of falling is also alienating because it “closes off from Dasein its authenticity” (GA 2: 236/SZ 178). But if in falling Dasein is closed off from its authenticity, then inauthenticity no longer seems to be a mere “positive possibility” of Dasein as Heidegger describes it. On the contrary, inauthenticity seems to be a necessary feature of falling itself. Such a reading becomes unavoidable as Heidegger then claims that the alienation of falling “forces [Dasein] into its inauthenticity” (GA 2: 236/SZ 178). As a result, we find that the movement of falling is also self-entangling because it has always already led Dasein into “inauthenticity – into a possible kind of Being *of itself*” (GA 2: 236/SZ 178). With

this, we can see what I term the “apparent contradiction” starting to take form. For if it is indeed the case that inauthenticity is a necessary feature of falling itself, as these passages seem to suggest, then how can we hold Heidegger to his promise that Dasein can be authentic despite its fallenness?

There may be hope yet. For although falling is an essential structure of Dasein, recall that Heidegger initially presents the plunge into inauthenticity as a “temptation.” In this way, it may be the case that it is just the temptation to plunge into inauthenticity that is essential to the structure of falling, not inauthenticity itself, which would mean that inauthenticity, albeit highly prevalent, is not binding. And if this is so, then the further possibility of authenticity for Dasein would not be so hard to maintain. However, it is important to note that if this account is right, then it requires that Dasein can at one time be fallen without being either authentic or inauthentic. This entails reading average everydayness (*Alltäglichkeit*) as a third, neutral mode of Dasein’s Being that is therefore “undifferentiated” because it is neither authentic nor inauthentic.² Such an interpretation of average everydayness gains support in §12, where Heidegger claims that “in each case Dasein exists in one or the other of these two modes [authenticity or inauthenticity], or else it is modally undifferentiated” (GA 2: 71/SZ 53). In any case, the following question arises: What motivates Dasein to succumb to temptation and take the plunge into inauthenticity? Heidegger’s answer is that because Dasein is always unsettled in its Being by virtue of its Being as care – for “*care itself, in its very essence, is permeated with nullity through and through*” (GA 2: 378/SZ 285) – Dasein flees its unsettledness by turning-away from itself and plunging into inauthenticity, thereby becoming lost in the “they” (*verloren in das Man*) (GA 2: 244-53/SZ 184-91). The problem, so it seems, however, is that Heidegger identifies the structure of falling with Dasein’s flight from its unsettledness: “Dasein’s falling into the ‘they’ and the ‘world’ of its concern, is what we have called a ‘fleeing’ in the face of itself” (GA 2: 246/SZ 185). For if falling is fleeing, then because fleeing means fleeing into inauthenticity, and because falling is an existential, then Dasein’s plunge into inauthenticity is not merely possible, but structurally

necessary. It is for this reason that although Heidegger describes Dasein's plunge into inauthenticity as a "temptation" (which seems to imply that Dasein can, but need not, take the plunge), he qualifies this by explaining that "since the way in which things have been publicly interpreted has already become a temptation to itself in this manner, it holds Dasein fast in its fallenness" (GA 2: 235/SZ 177). For Dasein is permanently indebted to the "they" for the intelligibility of itself and its world, which means that insofar as Dasein is, it has always already succumbed to temptation and surrendered itself to the shared, public interpretations of the "they." We now find ourselves in the throw of the apparent contradiction: Since falling is an essential structure of Dasein, and because this structure renders Dasein inauthentic, Dasein is structurally inauthentic, and this seems to preclude even a possibility for authenticity.⁵

In the following investigation, we will show that there is no contradiction between the possibility for Dasein's authenticity and its fallenness. In order to do so, we will argue that there is a confluence of authenticity and inauthenticity inherent to the structure of average everydayness. On this account, average everydayness is not a third existentiell mode of Dasein's Being, but the way in which Dasein exists in both of its existentiell modes of authenticity and inauthenticity alike.⁴ We will support these claims by showing that Dasein is simultaneously *both* an "authentic-self" *and* lost in the "they" as a "they-self." This analysis will also enable us to show how Heidegger can claim unproblematically that authenticity is an "existentiell modification" of inauthenticity and *vice versa*.⁵ For, as we will see, while authenticity cannot mean that Dasein disperses its ontic concealments, thereby abandoning its they-self, neither can inauthenticity mean that Dasein relinquishes its primordial existentiality, thereby abandoning its authentic-self.

Additional support for this interpretation of average everydayness will then be drawn by showing that its inherent duality is grounded by a dual movement that is implicitly at work in the structure of falling. This dual movement will be brought into relief by recasting the notion of fallenness in *Being and Time* in terms of its precursor, "ruinance"

(*Ruinanz*), which Heidegger introduces in his 1921–22 winter lecture course, *Phenomenological Interpretations of Aristotle: Initiation into Phenomenological Research* (GA 61).⁶ In this lecture course, Heidegger explains that ruinance is constituted by a dual movement of “relucence” (*Reluzenz*) and “prestruction” (*Praestruktion*): the former, an intentional openness to the world; the latter, a securing that conceals that openness. While this dual movement is not expressed explicitly in these terms in *Being and Time*, we will show that it is nevertheless tacitly operative in the structure of falling and that it grounds the duality of average everydayness. This analysis will provide support for the view that far from precluding the possibility for Dasein’s authenticity, Dasein’s fallenness is precisely that which accounts for it. For, as we will see, while falling is the reason for Dasein’s inauthenticity by virtue of its prestruction, it also constitutes the possibility for Dasein’s authenticity by virtue of its relucence.

In his book on the genesis of *Being and Time*, Theodore Kisiel writes, “But even those who are quite familiar with *Being and Time* will find, I believe, that approaching it by way of this genealogical track makes us look at its passing landscape in a way that is quite different, traveling against the grain of many an old interpretation.”⁷ We will thus begin our study with a discussion of four other interpretations that explicitly deal with this issue in *Being and Time* of how Dasein can be authentic despite its fallenness, given that fallenness paradoxically renders Dasein essentially inauthentic, none of which take into account Heidegger’s earlier lecture (GA 61).

II. FOUR STRATEGIES TO RESOLVE THE APPARENT CONTRADICTION

A. Falling Is an Existential that Can Disappear

Rudi Visker interprets “falling and the existentials related with it” as “existentials that can disappear.”⁸ Such a reading, he says, “explains the fact that there *can* be inauthenticity” despite the fact that Dasein “does not always give in to this tendency.”⁹ He arrives at this view by first pointing out that Heidegger seems to identify falling with

inauthenticity: “*Being and Time* in general considers *Verfallen* to be that essential structure of Dasein’s Being which explains why Dasein’s Being is first and foremost (*zunächst und zumeist*) inauthentic.”¹⁰ On this basis, he reasons that because Heidegger claims that Dasein can be authentic, the structures that seem to account for inauthenticity, namely, falling and the “they,” must not be binding like the other existentials:

If falling were like the other existentials, it would allow not only for an inauthentic, but also for an authentic mode; it would be a structure characteristic of Dasein’s Being as such, and not merely a structural possibility [...] Because the “they” constitutes only an existential *structure of possibility*, and not, as Being-in-the-world does, an existential *structure*, it can, but need not, put itself through to the existentiell level: Dasein can, but need not, be inauthentic.¹¹

We can see how this strategy might resolve the apparent contradiction. For if falling and the “they” were merely structural possibilities or “existentials that can disappear,” then because falling and the “they” are the structures responsible for Dasein’s inauthenticity, inauthenticity would not be binding, which means that authenticity would not be precluded as a further possibility for Dasein. However, although Visker is right to point out the relation between these existential structures (of falling and the “they”) and inauthenticity, falling and the “they” do a lot more work in *Being and Time* that Visker seems to overlook, rendering his account problematic.¹²

In §41, which brings together the structural totality of care, Heidegger writes, “The fundamental ontological characteristics of [Dasein] are existentiality, facticity, and Being-fallen [*Verfallensein*]” (GA 2: 254/SZ 191). Therefore, as mentioned above, falling is the third structural feature of care along with facticity and existentiality. And by bringing this structural unity of care into relief, the care-structure (*Sorgestruktur*), Heidegger says, now “becomes something which it is

possible for us to grasp as such ontologically” (GA 2: 254/SZ 191). This section then proceeds by recharacterizing the three structural features of care on what Heidegger deems to be more existentially appropriate terms: existentiality becomes “Being-ahead-of-itself”; facticity becomes “Being-already-in-a-world”; falling becomes “Being alongside” (*Sein bei*) (GA 2: 255/SZ 192).

Heidegger introduces the notion of Being-alongside in §12, which offers a preliminary sketch of Being-in-the-world through an orientation of Dasein’s Being-in. Here, we learn that Dasein is “in” the world not in the sense of a spatial insiderness, but rather in the sense of being always already “familiar” with the world in a manner of being “absorbed” in it (GA 2: 73/SZ 54). And Heidegger designates Being-alongside as the *existential* structure that accounts for this absorption: “‘Being alongside’ the world in the sense of being absorbed in the world [...] is an existiale founded upon Being-in” (GA 2: 73/SZ 54). Moreover, the claim that Being-alongside as absorption is the sense of falling that Heidegger takes to be essential to the structure of care is further strengthened when he writes, “Dasein’s factual existing is not only generally and without further differentiation a thrown potentiality-for-Being-in-the-world; it is always also absorbed in the world of its concern” (GA 2: 255/SZ 192).¹⁵ Dasein, an entity that has Being-in-the-world as its basic state, is thus always already absorbed in its world. This is because Dasein’s self-understanding depends upon its commerce with intraworldly entities. As Heidegger states, Dasein is “bound up in its ‘destiny’ with the Being of those entities which it encounters within its own world” (GA 2: 75/SZ 56).

Heidegger spells out the mechanics of absorption (in §18) with his notion of “significance” (*Bedeutsamkeit*): entities within-the-world are always already understood on the basis of a prior disclosure of a totality of involvements (a structure of significance) that ultimately leads back to the Being of Dasein. For example, in using my bike, there is an involvement in riding; in riding, there is an involvement in increasing my aerobic (or anaerobic) shape; in increasing my shape, there is an involvement in racing; and in racing, there is an involvement in understanding myself in terms of the social role of “athlete.” The Being

of intraworldly entities is thus constituted by a totality of involvements, which includes a totality of equipment and a hierarchy of goals and ends, that ultimately leads back to an existential possibility which Dasein presses into in order to take a stand on its Being. The Being of Dasein thus serves as the ultimate end of the hierarchy of involvements in the structure of significance. As Heidegger writes,

the totality of involvements itself goes back ultimately to a “towards-which” in which there is *no* further involvement [...] The primary ‘towards-which’ is a “for-the-sake-of-which”. But the ‘for-the-sake-of’ always pertains to the Being of *Dasein*, for which, in its Being, that very Being is essentially an *issue* (GA 2: 112–13/SZ 84).

There is thus an inextricable link between the Being of intraworldly entities and the Being of Dasein: not only are entities constituted as such by virtue of their relation to the way Dasein understands itself, but Dasein’s self-understanding depends upon its commerce with intraworldly entities. Furthermore, the “for-the-sake-of-which” that Dasein presses into in order to take a stand on what it means to be is not an arbitrary construction; it is allotted to Dasein by the pool of existential possibilities afforded to it by its thrownness (*Geworfenheit*). As a result, we come to see that the referential network that constitutes the structure of significance is permanently indebted to the shared, public interpretations of the “they” for its intelligibility. As Heidegger says, “Dasein is for the sake of the ‘they’ in an everyday manner, and the ‘they’ itself articulates the referential context of significance” (GA 2: 172/SZ 129). Consequently, the existential structures of falling and the “they” cannot, as Visker argues, be existentials that can “disappear.” For in such a case Dasein would have to suspend its commerce with entities within-the-world, which would mean that Dasein would have to suspend its basic state of Being-in-the-world, which would mean that Dasein would no longer have the character of Dasein, which is an impossibility.

B. Falling Is a Tendency that Can Be Flouted

Ethan Leib¹⁴ proposes to “redeem the crucial part of Visker’s analysis, that even existentials are structures of possibility”¹⁵ but in such a way that “does not preclude falling’s existential status or necessitate a magic act requiring falling to disappear.”¹⁶ Although his interpretation is more complex, Leib employs the same general strategy of reconceiving the notion of an existential in order to show how falling can be read as both an essential structure and as a mere possibility in order to ensure the further possibility of Dasein’s authenticity.

Leib’s interpretation takes falling and the other existentials as “possibilities into which Dasein is *always* thrown.”¹⁷ In other words, he argues that existentials should be identified with existential possibilities which have their basis in Dasein’s thrownness. Leib starts by presenting Heidegger’s notion of thrownness and notes that there is manifest a similarity between the way Heidegger describes thrownness and the way he describes existentials: “Heidegger always speaks of Dasein as essentially thrown into a definite pool of possibilities from which it cannot extract itself (just as he speaks of every existential). Dasein is ‘surrendered to thrownness’ [GA 2: 192/SZ 144].”¹⁸ To draw further support for this equivalence, he then marshals a passage in which Heidegger secures the ontological priority of possibility: “Possibility as an *existentiale* is the most primordial and ultimate positive way in which Dasein is characterized ontologically” (GA 2: 191/SZ 143-44). Given that existential possibilities have their basis in Dasein’s thrownness, and given the ontological priority of possibility, he reasons that “falling must be based in thrownness which opens up any possibility whatever.”¹⁹ However, recall that such a rendering, according to Leib, “does not preclude falling’s existential status.” Pointing to places in the text where Heidegger says things like, Dasein “*is* its possibilities as possibilities” (GA 2: 193/SZ 145) and “Dasein is in every case what it can be” (GA 2: 191/SZ 143), Leib reasons that

Exactly because Dasein is constituted by its activity, its usual mode of activity (falling into the ‘they’ in this case)

becomes constitutive for it. Indeed, falling is an existential because it is what Dasein has a propensity for; and we must say that Dasein has a propensity for falling because we can only define Dasein through what the “they” does, its norms.²⁰

On this basis, he explains that “existentials are like commands which [...] carry an element of normativity because they are derived from the ‘they,’ the source of all norms.”²¹ As a result, we find that it is this normative link between Dasein and falling that “opens up both the possibility of executing the command and of flouting it.”²² And such a reading is advantageous. For by interpreting falling as a kind of “command” or existential possibility, falling can be said to be constitutive for Dasein even when Dasein chooses not to fall, by virtue of the fact that it can still be said to be part of the pool of existential possibilities that have their basis in Dasein’s thrownness. On this basis, then, Leib reasons that because pressing forward into the possibility of falling is merely optional for Dasein, “authenticity as a further possibility for Dasein does not remain so logically complicated to maintain.”²³ However, this strategy is problematic for the same reason that Visser’s is. For if falling were an existential possibility or “command” that Dasein could choose to “flout” in order to be able to press forward into authenticity as a further possibility, then falling would be merely optional. But if falling were optional, then Dasein’s commerce with entities within-the-world would be optional, which would mean that Dasein’s basic state of Being-in-the-world would be optional, which would mean that having the character of Dasein would be optional, which is an impossibility.

C. Structural Falling and Psychological Fleeing

Reiterating the apparent contradiction, Hubert Dreyfus²⁴ argues that “if Heidegger derives falling as absorption from falling as fleeing he makes authenticity impossible.”²⁵ According to Dreyfus, the apparent contradiction is a result of Heidegger’s “confusion of an existential and existentielle sense of falling” which causes him to conflate the two.²⁶

For this reason, he holds that the apparent contradiction can only be resolved by reading into the text a foreign distinction: “To understand Heidegger’s complex and confusing discussion of falling, we must disentangle a structural from a psychological sense of the term. Although Heidegger does not thematize this distinction, I shall treat these two topics separately.”²⁷ And this move might nevertheless be appropriate. For, as Dreyfus points out, Heidegger takes up the discussion of falling in two separate places in *Being and Time*, which, he argues, “is a sign of Heidegger’s hesitation between a structural and a motivational account.”²⁸ The first is in his delineation of the threefold structure of Being-in in Division I, where he presents falling as the third essential structure of Dasein’s Being as care. Here, as we have seen, Heidegger describes falling as a constant inclination towards its inauthentic mode of Being. The second is in his discussion of inauthenticity and resoluteness in Division II, where he presents falling as a motivated flight from Dasein’s unsettledness in the face of anxiety. Accordingly, then, by separating a structural from a motivational account, Dreyfus shows that we can resolve the apparent contradiction by extricating Dasein’s ineluctable flight into inauthenticity from the structure of falling.

In the appendix to his book, however, Dreyfus and Jane Rubin point out that the strategy of separating a structural from a motivational account is something of a pyrrhic victory, for “the very success of Heidegger’s description of an authentic life makes his account of inauthenticity incoherent.”²⁹ For by extricating fleeing from the structure of falling, Dreyfus and Rubin claim to be robbing the structure of falling of a motivation towards inauthenticity. As Dreyfus says with regard to his reconceived structural account, “On this structural account, the tendency toward fascination [inauthenticity] remains unaccounted for.”³⁰ For if the motivation to flee into inauthenticity is no longer structurally conditioned, then inauthenticity becomes a spontaneous aberration. And if fleeing into inauthenticity is just a spontaneous aberration in this way, as Dreyfus and Rubin argue, then if it is the case that authenticity leads Dasein to “unshakable joy” (GA 2: 410–11/SZ 310), as Heidegger claims it does, then “resoluteness is so rewarding,” says Dreyfus and

Rubin, “that, once one is authentic, falling back into inauthenticity becomes incomprehensible.”⁵¹ Dreyfus and Rubin therefore claim that Heidegger’s “position runs into a double contradiction: inauthenticity becomes both inevitable and incomprehensible.”⁵² On the one hand, if one identifies the structure of falling with fleeing into inauthenticity, then, as Dreyfus and Rubin contend (and as we spelled out in section I above), “Dasein becomes essentially inauthentic.”⁵³ On the other hand, if one separates structural falling from motivated fleeing in order to retain the possibility for Dasein’s authenticity, as Dreyfus and Rubin do, then inauthenticity “becomes incomprehensible.” For reasons that Dreyfus and Rubin admit, then, this strategy might “resolve” the apparent contradiction, but in doing so it elicits further complications which seem to be just as problematic.

The problem with this approach to the text seems to stem from interpreting authenticity and inauthenticity as two opposing states from which Dasein can choose. For such a reading seems to travel directly against the grain of the structural account of Dasein that Heidegger explicitly puts forth. As Heidegger writes in §9, which spells out the theme of the existential analytic of Dasein, “All *explicata* to which the analytic of Dasein gives rise are obtained by considering Dasein’s existence-structure [*Existenzstruktur*]” (GA 2: 59/SZ 44). Let us now turn to Taylor Carman’s position, which, formulated in response to Dreyfus and Rubin’s interpretation, advocates for a strictly structural account of falling.

D. Inauthenticity Is a Structurally Conditioned yet Ontically Contingent Effect of Falling

Akin to Dreyfus and Rubin, Carman⁵⁴ holds that “if fallenness were merely a function of Dasein’s spontaneous flight in the face of anxiety, as the motivational story suggests, then Dasein would be doomed to inauthenticity.”⁵⁵ He also thinks that “Dreyfus and Rubin are right that the structural and the motivational stories are incompatible as competing wholesale explanations of fallenness.”⁵⁶ However, contra

Dreyfus and Rubin, he contends that “a properly reconstructed version of the structural story taken by itself renders inauthenticity neither inevitable nor incomprehensible.”⁵⁷ He thus asserts that although “Heidegger at times seems to have intended” to identify the structure of falling with fleeing into inauthenticity, because Heidegger “clearly does not regard inauthenticity as an inescapable fact of existence,” fleeing into inauthenticity “must be understood as a structurally conditioned yet ontically contingent inclination or tendency.”⁵⁸

On Carman’s interpretation, then, the structural story holds the burden of accounting for that which motivates Dasein to take the plunge into inauthenticity. The way it does so, he says, “has to do with Dasein’s concrete particularity, and its relation to the discursive – that is, the expressive and communicative – conditions of interpretation.”⁵⁹ Concrete particularity, he explains, is Dasein’s “essential dimension of particularity inherent in the structure of existence.”⁴⁰ In other words, it is that which makes Dasein the self-interpreting entity that it is. For “human existence,” writes Carman, “exhibits an essential concrete reflexivity, for I must make sense of not just the being of entities at large, but of *my own* being.”⁴¹ The discursive conditions of interpretation, he explains, have to do with the fact that “Dasein finds itself and its world always already interpreted, and moreover finds its own interpretations conditioned by and permanently indebted to the anonymous social normativity governing intelligibility at large, a normativity that Heidegger calls *das Man*.”⁴² According to Carman, there is thus an inherent tension between Dasein’s concrete particularity and the discursive conditions of interpretation. He writes, “Precisely because it is rooted in discourse, interpretation is constantly subject to a kind of genetic drift, since articulations and elaborations of meaning essentially move in the direction of common intelligibility [...] The effort to make oneself intelligible in discourse therefore tends to drift into ever shallower waters, eventually bottoming out in sheer banality and cliché.”⁴³

Carman asserts that inauthenticity, however, might still seem inevitable on this view, “since it implies that as a matter of principle no general terms can ever do justice to the particularity of Dasein’s factual

condition.”⁴⁴ Against this, he argues that “fleeing must be understood as an essentially contingent effect of falling [...] for banality and leveling do not by themselves necessarily amount to the evasion and obfuscation characteristic of inauthentic existence.”⁴⁵ To support this claim, he points out that “Heidegger insists that the existential analytic in Division I of *Being and Time* is an interpretation of Dasein in its ‘average everydayness,’ which is as such neither authentic nor inauthentic, but modally undifferentiated.”⁴⁶ On the basis of taking Dasein’s average everydayness or undifferentiated mode as a third existentiell way of Being, then, he reasons that although Dasein cannot escape the banalizing, leveling pressures of the generality of discourse that condition its fallenness, “to say that there is an inner tension between existentiality and discourse is not to say that all interpretation is therefore false, distorted, or inauthentic.”⁴⁷ And this means that “the genetic drift of discourse and the essential averageness of everyday understanding do not by themselves render authentic existence impossible.”⁴⁸ In this way, then, authenticity, Carman asserts, “is not a stable, self-sufficient mode of existence,” which he takes to be Dreyfus and Rubin’s position, “but a perpetual struggle against the reifying and banalizing forces inherent in discursive practice.”⁴⁹

Carman, it seems to me, is right to argue against Dreyfus and Rubin that a structural account of inauthenticity is closer to Heidegger’s thinking than a motivational account. His description of authenticity as a “perpetual struggle” against the obfuscating tendencies of language also seems to hit the mark. However, his claim that not all interpretation is “false, distorted, or inauthentic” and therefore that inauthenticity is an “essentially contingent effect of falling” is perhaps open for questioning. For Heidegger claims more than once in *Being and Time* and elsewhere not only that inauthenticity is a modification of the authentic-self or authenticity, but that authenticity is a modification of the they-self or inauthenticity, which seems to suggest that even authentic interpretation is, in a sense, inauthentic.⁵⁰ This view gains support in §44, where Heidegger claims that “to be closed off and covered up belongs to Dasein’s *facticity*. In its full existential-ontological meaning,

the proposition that ‘Dasein is in the truth’ states equiprimordially that ‘Dasein is in untruth’” (GA 2: 294/SZ 222). In her study on this issue, Joan Stambaugh uses ideas put forth by the later Heidegger to suggest that a view that takes Dasein to be simultaneously both authentic and inauthentic does the job of “at least softening” the contradiction between Heidegger’s claims that authenticity is a modification of inauthenticity and vice versa.⁵¹ She writes, “To return to this problem formulated by Heidegger as the question of authenticity and inauthenticity [...] we are both at once, usually without realizing it.”⁵² While this is precisely the view we will advance, by elucidating the connections between authenticity, inauthenticity, falling, average everydayness, and factual life, we will go further than Stambaugh and argue that there is no contradiction.⁵³ Therefore, in what proceeds, we will show that Dasein’s average everydayness is properly deemed its “undifferentiated” mode not because it is neither authentic nor inauthentic, but rather because it is both at once. Appealing to Heidegger’s notion of ruinance as put forth in his 1921–22 lecture course on phenomenological interpretations of Aristotle, we will then support this reading by showing that the duality of average everydayness is grounded by a dual movement that is tacitly operative in the structure of falling. This analysis will show that far from precluding the possibility of authenticity, Dasein’s fallenness is precisely that which accounts for it. For, as we will see, the disguises and concealments of inauthenticity are the productions of care itself, which means that fleeing into inauthenticity is constituted by a perpetual failure to flee, which means that Dasein can be explicitly authentic only because it has always already been so implicitly.

III. THE DUALITY OF AVERAGE EVERYDAYNESS

In the first introduction to *Being and Time*, Heidegger posits three priorities that Dasein maintains over all entities that do not have the character of Dasein (GA 2: 18/SZ 13). The first priority is an *ontical* one: Dasein is ontically distinct in that its Being has the character of existence; its Being is disclosed to it. The second priority is an *ontological*

one: not only does the Being of Dasein have the character of existence, but its existence is determinative for it; its essence is its existence. The third and last priority is an *ontico-ontological* one; it signifies the fact that “Dasein is ontically ‘closest’ to itself and ontologically farthest; but pre-ontologically it is surely not a stranger” (GA 2: 22/SZ 16). The ontico-ontological priority of Dasein takes precedence in Heidegger’s methodological considerations for carrying out an existential analytic of Dasein because it reveals the “peculiar difficulties” that encumber such a task: by virtue of the fact that Dasein is “ontically closest,” it tends to understand itself strictly in terms of the worldly entities with which it concernfully deals, therefore tending to conceal from itself its primordial existentiality (GA 2: 22/SZ 16). However, because Dasein nevertheless retains a pre-ontological understanding of Being, the ontico-ontological priority also provides the existential analytic with a foothold to begin: although the ontic dimension of Dasein tends to conceal from it its ontological dimension, it is also precisely that through which its ontological dimension can be grasped. In other words, although Being is not a being, Dasein can approach Being only through beings. For, as we saw in our treatment of the interpretations of Visker and Leib, Dasein’s basic state of Being-in-the-world depends necessarily upon its commerce with intraworldly entities, which means that its transcendence is necessarily finite.

Oriented by Dasein’s ontico-ontological priority, Heidegger argues that if the existential analytic is to be carried through with primordiality, it will be by approaching Dasein in its *average everydayness*:

In obtaining and securing the right access to Dasein we have no right to resort to dogmatic contractions and to apply just any idea of Being and actuality to this entity, no matter how ‘self-evident’ that idea may be; nor may any of the ‘categories’ which such an idea prescribes be forced upon Dasein without proper ontological consideration. We must rather choose such a way of access and such a kind of interpretation that this entity can show itself in itself and from itself. And this means that it is

to be shown as it is *proximally and for the most part* – in its average *everydayness* (GA 2: 23/SZ 16).

Therefore, by interpreting Dasein in its mode of average everydayness, the existential analytic can approach Dasein with “proper ontological consideration.” Indeed, for “in this everydayness,” continues Heidegger, “there are certain structures which we shall exhibit – not just any accidental structures, but essential ones which, in every kind of Being that factual Dasein may possess, persist as determinative for the character of its Being” (GA 2: 23/SZ 16–17). The important point here is that the existential analytic operates on the understanding that if Dasein is approached in its average everydayness, then its ontic dimension can be grasped in such a way that the ontological structures constitutive of its primordial existentiality are revealed.

The duality of average everydayness is signified by Dasein’s ontical closeness and ontological farness. As we know, Dasein is always already absorbed in its world of concern, which is constituted by a structure of significance (a referential network of equipment, tasks, ends, and existential possibilities), which is articulated by the shared, public interpretations of the “they.” In §27, which spells out the mechanics of how Dasein’s world of concern is articulated by the “they” (through its existential characteristics of distantiality, subjection, averageness, levelling down, publicness, disburdening, and accommodation), Heidegger states that

the “they”, which supplies the answer to the question of the “who” of everyday Dasein, is the “nobody” to whom every Dasein has already surrendered itself in Being-among-one-other. In these characters of Being which we have exhibited – everyday Being-among-one-another, distantiality, averageness, levelling down, publicness, the disburdening of one’s Being, and accommodation – lies that ‘constancy’ of Dasein which is closest to us (GA 2: 170–71/SZ 128).

The “they” therefore signifies the “who” of Dasein in its average everydayness; that is to say, it constitutes the contingent but nevertheless binding ontic dimension of Dasein’s disclosedness that is “closest” to it. For Dasein does not have its own factual ways of Being but receives them from its heritage which it has always already been thrown into. Consequently, if the “they” is seen “ontico-ontologically with an unprejudiced eye,” says Heidegger, “it reveals itself as the ‘Real subject’ of everydayness” (GA 2: 171/SZ 128). And because Dasein maintains an ontico-ontological priority, the “positive phenomenon” of the “they” is identified as the reason why the ontological dimension of Dasein’s average everydayness has been overlooked: “Thus by exhibiting the positive phenomenon of the closest everyday Being-in-the-world, we have made it possible to get an insight into the reason why an ontological Interpretation of this state of Being has been missing” (GA 2: 173/SZ 130). However, although average everydayness is concealing by virtue of Dasein’s ontical closeness, its concealments are also open to revelation by virtue of the fact that Dasein retains a privileged access to Being: “Anything which, taken ontically, is in an average way, can be very well grasped ontologically in pregnant structures which may be structurally indistinguishable from certain ontological characteristics of an *authentic* Being of Dasein” (GA 2: 59/SZ 44).

On the reading we are attempting to bring into relief, average everydayness thus serves the role of indicating the ambiguity of factual life: it signifies not only the ways in which factual life lives in deception, but also the ways in which this deception is open to revelation. And Heidegger again seems to highlight this duality of average everydayness when he states that “the Self of everyday Dasein is the *theyself*, which we distinguish from the *authentic Self*” (GA 2: 172/SZ 129). Such a reading of this passage is supported in §54, which explains how Dasein’s authentic existentiell possibility is attested, where Heidegger writes, “But because Dasein is *lost* in the “they”, it must first *find* itself. In order to find *itself* at all, it must be ‘shown’ to itself in its possible authenticity. In terms of its *possibility*, Dasein *is* already a potentiality-for-Being-its-Self, but it needs to have this potentiality attested” (GA

2: 356/SZ 268). Since Dasein is ontically closest, it proximally and for the most part understands itself in terms of the worldly entities with which it concernfully deals, that is to say, it is first and foremost “lost in the ‘they’” (inauthentic). As Heidegger claims in §60, “Thrown into its ‘there’, every Dasein has been factually submitted to a definite ‘world’ – its ‘world’. At the same time those factual projections which are closest to it, have been guided by its concernful *lostness* in the ‘they’” (GA 2: 394/SZ 297). But Heidegger also claims that to be lost in the “they” signifies “no lessening of Dasein’s facticity” (GA 2: 171/SZ 128). For Dasein “is already a potentiality-for-Being-its-Self,” even in a manner of forgetfulness thereof. In this way, when Dasein’s authentic potentiality-for-Being is successfully attested and the call of conscience is heard, Dasein becomes lucid to its primordial Being, its nullity, which it always already implicitly understands. For despite the fact that Dasein “*is ontologically that which is farthest*” (GA 2: 412/SZ 311), it maintains a privileged access to Being. As a result, Heidegger asserts that although in inauthenticity Dasein’s authentic-self is existentially modified, it cannot be relinquished: “proximally and for the most part Dasein is *not* itself but is lost in the they-self, which is an existentiell modification of the authentic Self” (GA 2: 420/SZ 317).

Fleeing into inauthenticity is thus constituted by a perpetual failure to flee from the authentic-self. However, it is important to emphasize that although “when the call of conscience is understood, lostness in the ‘they’ is revealed” (GA 2: 406/SZ 307), this “lostness in the ‘they’” nevertheless remains intact. For being lost in the “they” belongs to Dasein’s positive constitution. Heidegger makes precisely this point in his 1927 summer lecture course, *The Basic Problems of Phenomenology*. He states,

We understand ourselves in an everyday way or [...] *inauthentically*; our self indeed but as we are *not our own*, as we have lost our self in things and humans while we exist in the everyday [...] Being lost, however, does not have a negative depreciative significance but means something positive belonging to the Dasein itself (GA 24: 228/160).

For this reason, Heidegger insists that although in authenticity the they-self is existentiellly modified, analogous to the authentic-self in inauthenticity, it cannot be relinquished: “When Dasein thus brings itself back from the “they”, the they-self is modified in an existentiell manner so that it becomes *authentic* Being-one’s-Self” (GA 2: 356/SZ 268).

The dual-structure of average everydayness is thus absolutely binding for Dasein in both of its existentiell modes of authenticity and inauthenticity alike. As Heidegger writes, “‘everydayness’ is a definite ‘*how*’ of existence by which Dasein is dominated through and through ‘for life’ [*zeitlebens*]” (GA 2: 490/SZ 370). For while inauthenticity cannot mean that Dasein renounces its primordial existentiality, thereby abandoning its authentic-self, neither can authenticity mean that Dasein disperses or clears away its ontic concealments, thereby abandoning its they-self. On this account, Dasein’s average everydayness is thus properly deemed its “undifferentiated” mode not because it is neither authentic nor inauthentic, but rather because it involves a confluence of both authenticity and inauthenticity, of both truth and untruth, whether tacitly or explicitly. Heidegger can therefore claim unproblematically that authenticity is an existentiell modification of inauthenticity and vice versa precisely because the average everyday way in which Dasein always already exists maintains this confluence. To ground this reading further and to bring out the nuances of Heidegger’s account of how Dasein can be authentic despite its fallenness, let us now turn to the “basic kind of Being which belongs to everydayness [...] the ‘*falling*’ of Dasein” (GA 2: 233/SZ 175).

IV. THE DUAL MOVEMENT OF FALLING

In his 1921–22 winter lecture course, *Phenomenological Interpretations of Aristotle: Initiation into Phenomenological Research*, Heidegger presents interpretations of what he calls the “basic categories of life” (*Grundkategorien des Lebens*); they are inclination (*Neigung*), distance (*Abstand*), sequestration (*Abriegelung*), and the “easy” (*das “Leichte”*).⁵⁴ These categories are the forerunners to the essential characteristics of falling that Heidegger presents in *Being and Time*, namely, temptation,

tranquilization, alienation, and entanglement. His aim in these interpretations is to elucidate the nature of the relationality of care. After completing an initial round of interpretations of these categories, Heidegger repeats the interpretations on what he takes to be a more primordial level. As a result, we come to find that care is guided by a dual movement called “ruinance,” which Heidegger characterizes with the terms “relucence” and “prestruction.”⁵⁵ With its relucence and prestructive characters, ruinance constitutes care as both an intentional openness to the world (relucence) and a securing that conceals that openness (prestructuring).⁵⁶

Each of the first three categories of life (inclination, distance, and sequestration) illuminates a different aspect of a central tendency of factual life, namely, that factual life tends to make things easier for itself. “Factual life,” Heidegger writes, “is always seeking the easy way” (GA 61: 108/81). The “easy” is therefore “the most basic of the four categories.”⁵⁷ Heidegger introduces the category of the “easy” by appealing to Aristotle’s *Nicomachean Ethics*. As Aristotle says, “it is possible to fail in many ways [...] while to succeed is possible only in one way (for which reason one is easy and the other difficult – to miss the mark easy, to hit it difficult).”⁵⁸ In order to make life easier for itself, life tries to secure itself by looking away from itself and in doing so loses track of itself. This establishes care, the relationality of life, as a kind of “carefreeness” (*Sorglosigkeit*) (GA 61: 109/81). And because it is precisely through its caring relation that life actualizes a world for itself to live, life’s world becomes a place in which it neither recognizes its limits nor needs to make any decisions on its own behalf. That is to say, in its carefreeness of living its world, life simply “eludes that which is difficult” (GA 61: 109/81). With this in mind, let us proceed to our treatment of the first three categories of life, each of which highlights a different feature of this central tendency of factual life to always seek the “easy” way.

The first category of life, inclination, indicates that as care actualizes different forms of meaningfulness through which life can live, life becomes “weighed down by them.”⁵⁹ This is because the forms of meaningfulness actualized by care always manifest in worldly ways,

which brings life to understand itself in terms of its world. And this makes life “self-sufficient” (*Selbstgenügsamkeit*), says Heidegger, because care is constantly actualizing worldly disguises through which life can “disperse itself” (*zerstreut sich*) (GA 61: 101-2/76). However, the world is not something that approaches life from the outside, but that which life actualizes through its own caring relation. This means that even when life is dispersed across its worldly disguises, because these disguises are precisely the productions of its own movement, the movement of life is such that life is always encountering itself. The movement of life is thus “relucant” insofar as life reveals or illuminates itself to itself in every encounter, whether tacitly or explicitly. But while life is reluctant to itself, it is also protective of itself. It protects itself against its essential unsettledness, its nullity, and it does so through the movement of prestruction (GA 61: 120/89). Heidegger further elaborates this prestructive movement in his interpretation of the category of distance. Through its caring relation, life maintains a certain distance from its world: it structurally has its world “before itself” (not spatially, but phenomenologically) as possible, meaningful determinations of itself (GA 61: 103/77). However, because life, through care, self-sufficiently disperses itself amid worldly disguises, Heidegger says that life “mis-measures” itself through a destruction of that distance (*Abstandstilgung*) (GA 61: 103/77). As a consequence, life identifies itself solely with worldly phenomena, which makes it obsessed, Heidegger says, with “rank, success, position in life (position in the world), superiority, advantage, calculation, bustle, clamor, and ostentation” (GA 61: 103/77). For if the distance between life and world is destroyed, then, as Scott Campbell explains in his treatment of this lecture, “distance becomes measure, worldly measure, and life comprehends its own importance only through that measure.”⁶⁰ The theoretical attitude (and thus the genesis of science) is therefore, according to Heidegger, grounded in the prestructive character of life’s movement. For the theoretical attitude sets objectivity as life’s highest value and accordingly busies it with the infinite task of building up and securing objective “inner-worldly distantiations and arrangements” (GA 61: 122/90). However, in the rampant prestructuring of the theoretical attitude, the movement

of life nevertheless remains reluctant. That is to say, even in the most abstract, objective determinations of theoretical reason, factual life breathes, albeit silently. It is precisely this obstinate character of reluctance that Heidegger further implicates with his interpretation of the category of sequestration.

The third basic category of life, sequestration, indicates life's tendency to become blind to itself through its perpetual failure to flee from itself. By constantly plunging into its own worldly forms of meaningfulness (distance-destroying inclinations), Heidegger says that "life blinds itself, puts out its own eyes" (GA 61: 108/80). To be blind to oneself, however, is not the same as completely abandoning oneself. The category of sequestration thus not only indicates that life, through care, has a structural tendency to become blind to itself, but also that in doing so it "does precisely not get loose of itself" (GA 61: 107/80). That is to say, although life unceasingly tries to flee from itself by burying itself in its world, it is nevertheless precisely in the world that life is always encountering itself. For as life constantly searches for meaningful worldly objects with which it can disperse and thus disguise itself in order to flee from itself, its efforts always come up short. This is because life can only flee from itself by moving toward itself, i.e., the movement of life is elliptical (*elliptisch*) (GA 61: 108/80-81). Through the prestructive movement of care, then, life is constantly fleeing from itself by plunging itself into worldly disguises. But because the movement of life is elliptical, as life turns away from itself in order to flee from itself, it does so precisely by moving toward itself. Indeed, by "shrinking away from itself," writes Heidegger, "life yet possesses a tendency to confront itself" (GA 61: 123/91). The sequestering character of life therefore signifies that life (through its prestructive movement) can never succeed in fleeing from itself (because its movement is at the same reluctant), which is why it merely becomes blind to itself by covering itself up with itself.

The prestructive movement of ruinance, as we now know, accounts for life's tendency to mis-measure itself through a kind of reflexive distortion in order to protect itself from its unsettledness: life plunges into its world, disperses itself amid worldly disguises (distance-destroying

inclinations), and comprehends its own importance in terms of the entities that it encounters in its world (which makes it blind to itself in sequestration). And this is precisely the phenomena that Heidegger presents in *Being and Time* with the structure of falling and its essential characteristics of temptation, tranquilization, alienation, and entanglement. As Heidegger says, “In falling, Dasein turns away from itself” (GA 2: 246/SZ 185). Indeed, prestruction is an essential feature of falling, and it is for this reason that Dasein is “proximally and for the most part inauthentic, the they-self” (GA 2: 241/SZ 181); and, moreover, it is the reason why “Dasein’s facticity is such that *as long as* it is what it is, Dasein remains in the throw, and is sucked into the turbulence of the ‘they’s’ inauthenticity” (GA 2: 237/SZ 179). And inauthenticity is an appropriate way of characterizing this mode of Being, for it is precisely by trying to become something that it is not, by “turning away” from itself, that Dasein flees its unsettledness. As Heidegger says in *History of the Concept of Time: Prolegomena*, “What is at stake in the flight from uncanniness is precisely a cultivation of Dasein itself as being-in-the-world, so much so that it lets itself be determined primarily from the world” (GA 20: 406/293). The prestructive movement of falling thus renders Dasein inauthentic right from the very start: “Dasein has, in the first instance, fallen away from itself as an authentic potentiality for Being its Self, and has fallen into the ‘world’” (GA 2: 233/SZ 175). But this does not preclude the possibility for authenticity, for prestruction is only one-half of a dual movement.

The reluctant movement of ruinance, as we now know, indicates that because the worldly disguises with which life covers itself up with (in prestruction) are the productions of care itself, life is reflexive in that it is nevertheless always illuminating itself to itself in its absorption in the world, whether tacitly or explicitly. And as Heidegger’s interpretation of the category of sequestration particularly expresses (although it is expressed in inclination and distance as well), the ruinant movement of care as a flight from its unsettledness can never actually succeed in its flight: life can only flee from itself by moving toward itself elliptically. In this way, then, by absorbing itself into its world through care, life perpetually fails to flee from itself and in doing so merely becomes

blind to itself by covering itself up with itself. And along with prestruction, this reluctant movement of ruinance is constitutive of the structure of falling in *Being and Time* as well. For, as Heidegger says, in falling, “Dasein plunges out of itself into itself” (GA 2: 237/SZ 178); that is to say, in falling, Dasein “has fallen into the *world*, which itself belongs to its Being” (GA 2: 234/SZ 176).

While falling is the reason for Dasein’s inauthenticity by virtue of its prestruction, it also constitutes the possibility of Dasein’s authenticity by virtue of its reluctance. For Dasein’s prestructions or worldly disguises, namely, the ways in which Dasein makes sense of its own Being, are the productions of care itself and thus reluctant. This means that Dasein, as Being-in-the-world, need not escape its prestructive movement in order to become authentic. On the contrary, in order to become authentic, Dasein need only become lucid to the reluctant dimension of its prestructions, that is to say, explicitly grasp the negative dimension of its disclosedness. As Hans Ruin states in his study of Heidegger’s notion of ruinance, as Dasein “reaches for itself in its most genuine self-reflexive mode, it touches – nothing,” and yet “this nothingness is not something external to life, but a direction of its movement, which this movement itself brings forth.”⁶¹ Heidegger makes precisely this point in §40: “This existentiell-ontical turning-away, by reason of its character as a disclosure, makes it phenomenally possible to grasp existential-ontologically that in the face of which Dasein flees, and to grasp it as such” (GA 2: 245–46/SZ 185). Authenticity can thus only ever amount to reaching back through the ontic cover-up of prestruction, by virtue of the fact that it retains a reluctance, so that Dasein can grasp its primordial existentiality, its nullity. Hence, it is precisely only through the ontic cover-up enacted by prestruction that Dasein retains a possibility for authenticity at all. In this way, Heidegger’s claim that alienation “forces [Dasein] into its inauthenticity” no longer poses a problem for us. For no matter how deep Dasein plunges or how entangled Dasein becomes in its inauthenticity, it is always only getting “*entangled* in itself” or plunging “into itself” (GA 2: 236–37/SZ 178). It is for this reason that “alienation cannot mean that Dasein gets factually torn away from itself” (GA 2: 236/SZ 178). Fleeing is therefore constituted by a

perpetual failure to flee because prestructions are always just manifestations of care itself and thus reluctant. As Heidegger himself states in §52, “Inauthenticity is based on the possibility of authenticity” (GA 2: 344/SZ 259). Moreover, in his discussion of the ordinary concept of time in §81, he explains that there is a “factual necessity of this levelling off and covering up” (GA 2: 563/SZ 426), but that “even in this pure sequence of ‘nows’ which passes away in itself, primordial time still manifests itself throughout all this leveling off and covering up” (GA 2: 562/SZ 426). Authenticity, therefore, “is not a way of escape” (GA 2: 410/SZ 310). Rather, it is a way of Being-in-the-world that enables Dasein to become lucid to its primordial existentiality, its nullity, “*in spite of this entity’s own tendency to cover things up*” (GA 2: 412–13/SZ 311). As Ruin puts it, factual life “lies in ruins. Life lies in ruins. And the interpretation of it can neither repair nor restore it. It can, in the end, only reveal it as such.”⁶² Therefore, far from precluding the possibility for Dasein’s authenticity, Dasein’s fallenness is precisely that which accounts for it.

V. CONCLUSION

We started this study by presenting the apparent contradiction between the possibility for authenticity and the structure of falling in *Being and Time*: falling is an essential structure of Dasein, yet it renders Dasein essentially inauthentic, which seems to preclude even the possibility for authenticity. Visker and Leib then showed us how this apparent contradiction might be resolved by reconceiving the notion of an existential in order to be able to read falling as a mere possibility so that authenticity can be secured as a further possibility: for Visker, this means reading falling and its related existentials as existentials that can disappear; for Leib, this means reading falling as optional. However, it became evident that such a strategy can never succeed in its aim. For if the structure of falling were suspended, then Dasein would have to suspend its commerce with entities within-the-world, which would mean that Dasein would have to suspend its basic state of Being-in-the-world, which would mean that Dasein would no longer have the character of Dasein, which is an impossibility. Dreyfus and Rubin

then showed us that the apparent contradiction could be resolved by reading into *Being and Time* a foreign distinction, namely, the distinction between a motivational and a structural account of falling. On this account, Dasein's flight into inauthenticity is removed from the structure of falling, thereby becoming a spontaneous aberration. But as Dreyfus and Rubin admit, this strategy is something of a pyrrhic victory, for by removing Dasein's tendency toward inauthenticity from the structure of falling completely, inauthenticity becomes incomprehensible. In this way, although Dreyfus and Rubin show how Dasein can be authentic despite its fallenness, they do so in a way that runs directly against the grain of the text. Carman then showed us how a filled-out structural story could resolve the apparent contradiction, and in a manner that is closer to Heidegger's thinking than the strategy employed by Dreyfus and Rubin: he suggests that it is the tendency toward inauthenticity that is essential to the structure of falling and not inauthenticity itself. On this account, inauthenticity is taken as a structurally conditioned yet ontically contingent effect of falling. Carman gains support for this reading by taking average everydayness as a third existentiell mode of Being in addition to authenticity and inauthenticity and thus "undifferentiated" because it is neither authentic nor inauthentic. On this basis, he argues that because Dasein can be, at one time, neither authentic nor inauthentic, not all interpretation is therefore inauthentic, which means that Dasein retains the further possibility for authenticity. And while it seems to me that Carman is right to describe authenticity as a "perpetual struggle" against the obfuscating tendencies of language, the reading of inauthenticity as a merely contingent effect of falling seems to be open for questioning. For if inauthenticity were a contingent effect of falling, then we would be unable, it seems, to account for several passages in *Being and Time* and elsewhere in which Heidegger says that authenticity is a modification of inauthenticity. For such passages seem to suggest that authentic interpretation, albeit revealing, is also concealing. After all, "the proposition that 'Dasein is in the truth' states equiprimordially that 'Dasein is in untruth.'"

We then proceeded to advance the view that there is a confluence of authenticity and inauthenticity inherent to the structure of average everydayness and therefore that average everydayness is properly deemed Dasein's "undifferentiated" mode not because it is neither authentic nor inauthentic, but because it involves a confluence of both authenticity and inauthenticity. This duality of average everydayness is indicated by the fact that Dasein is ontically closest and ontologically farthest. For Dasein is both an authentic-self and lost in the "they" as a they-self, which means that Dasein's transcendence is necessarily finite in that it only has explicit access to its primordial existentiality through its existentiell-ontical realm, that is to say, through its commerce with intraworldly entities. And it is for this reason that Dasein's fallenness renders Dasein essentially inauthentic right from the start. For inauthenticity is not some morally deplorable state but signifies the fact that Dasein depends upon possibilities it neither chose nor created in order to understand itself and its world. In this way, while Dasein is, most primordially, a kind of nothingness, it is not as if Dasein could actually disperse or clear away its ontic concealments in order to retrieve a sense of this nothingness, for the intelligibility of itself and its world depends upon them. On the contrary, Dasein can only retrieve a sense of its primordial existentiality, its nullity, by *grasping* and *going through* its ontic concealments. As Heidegger says in §60, "Resoluteness appropriates untruth authentically" (GA 2: 396/SZ 299). In his discussion of phenomenological destruction in Heidegger's early Freiburg lectures, Kisiel seems to be largely supportive of this reading. He writes, "Phenomenological destruction is not a senseless devastation but a very precisely guided and systematic deconstruction (*Abbau*). Individual meanings must first be regarded as indeterminate and unclear, just as they emerge in factic life, and must be retained in this indeterminacy."⁶⁵ And this is precisely the strategy that guides the existential analytic in *Being and Time*, in that all ontological investigation must start with (and hold open) the inauthentic interpretations of phenomena in order to retrieve a sense of their primordial existentiality.⁶⁴ For example, in order to retrieve an authentic grasp of the phenomenon of death, one must start with (and hold open) the relational sense of the

ordinary, inauthentic interpretation of death as the event that marks the end of life. As Campbell explains in the précis to his treatment of a lecture Heidegger gave in Marburg in 1924 entitled “Being-There and Being-True According to Aristotle,” which deals with the reasons why human beings live in deception, “What is important about all of these [modes of concealment] is that the unconcealment that Heidegger is describing here *is based on* ignorance, concealment, conformity, and objectification. Unconcealment is not simply a matter of overcoming these modes of fallen speech, but of passing through *them*.”⁶⁵

In order to support this construal of average everydayness, we then returned to a discussion of falling, the “basic kind of Being which belongs to everydayness,” by recasting it in terms of its precursor, ruinance. Here, we found that the relucient (revealing) and prestructive (concealing) movements of ruinance are very much active in the structure of falling in *Being and Time* and that while falling is the reason for Dasein’s inauthenticity by virtue of its prestruction, it also constitutes the possibility of Dasein’s authenticity by virtue of its relucence. For the very disguises that Dasein covers itself up with in fleeing are the productions of care itself, which means that Dasein can never truly escape its primordial existentiality by fleeing into inauthenticity. It rather becomes blind to itself by covering itself up with itself through its dispersal amid worldly disguises and distractions, which is another way of saying that because Dasein is ontically closest it tends to overlook that which is ontologically farthest. And it is precisely this perpetual failure at the heart of fleeing that constitutes the possibility for Dasein’s authenticity. For it means that Dasein’s disclosedness is constituted by both positive and negative dimensions, neither of which can be grasped without the other. For while authenticity cannot mean that Dasein clears away its ontic concealments, thereby abandoning its they-self, neither can inauthenticity mean that Dasein relinquishes its primordial existentiality, thereby abandoning its authentic-self. For everyday human life – from its most mundane tasks and leveled-down trivialities to its most complex constructions and sophisticated, theoretical abstractions – is always already not only in untruth, but in truth, not only in deception, but open to revelation, not only inauthentic, but authentic.⁶⁶

NOTES

- 1 By virtue of its fallenness, there are three ways in which Dasein is absorbed in the “they”; they are “idle talk” (*Gerede*), “curiosity” (*Neugier*), and “ambiguity” (*Zweideutigkeit*): idle talk signifies the way in which Dasein is absorbed in the “they” in terms of language, curiosity in terms of sight, and ambiguity in terms of a type of reflexive self-understanding (GA 2: 221–39/ 167–80).
- 2 For readings that take average everydayness as a third existentiell mode of Being, see: Hubert L. Dreyfus, *Being-in-the-World: A Commentary on Heidegger’s “Being and Time,” Division I* (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 1991); Michael E. Zimmerman, *Eclipse of the Self: The Development of Heidegger’s Concept of Authenticity* (Athens: Ohio University Press, 1981); Michael E. Zimmerman, “On Discriminating Everydayness, Unownedness, and Falling in *Being and Time*,” *Research in Phenomenology* 5: 1 (1975): 109–29; Taylor Carman, “Must We Be Inauthentic?” in *Heidegger, Authenticity, and Modernity: Essays in Honor of Hubert L. Dreyfus*, Volume 1, eds. Mark Wrathall and Jeff Malpas (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 2000); William D. Blattner, *Heidegger’s Temporal Idealism* (Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press, 1999); William D. Blattner, *Heidegger’s “Being and Time”: A Reader’s Guide* (London; New York: Continuum, 2006).
- 3 For a similar formulation of the “apparent contradiction,” see Ethan L. Leib, “Authentic Falling: Heidegger’s Paradox?” *Symposium* 4: 1 (2000): 71–88. For other noteworthy discussions on the hermeneutic difficulties that encumber the concept of falling, see: Alexander von Schoenborn, “Heidegger’s Articulation of Falling,” in *Philosophy and Archaic Experience*, ed. John Sallis (Pittsburg: Duquesne University Press, 1982); Carman, “Must We Be Inauthentic?”; Jay A. Ciaffa, “Toward an Understanding of Heidegger’s Conception of the Inter-Relation Between Authentic and Inauthentic Existence,” *Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology* 18: 1 (1987): 49–59; Zimmerman, “Everydayness, Unownedness, and Falling.”

- 4 For readings that do not take average everydayness as a third existentiell mode of Being, see: Michael Gelven, *A Commentary on Heidegger's "Being and Time"* (Dekalb: Northern Illinois University Press, 1989); Oren Magid, "Further Ado Concerning Dasein's 'Undifferentiated Mode': Distinguishing the Indifferent Inauthenticity of Average Everyday Dasein from the Possibility of Genuine Failure," *Journal of the British Society for Phenomenology* 46: 3 (2015): 233-50; Otto Pöggeler, *Martin Heidegger's Path of Thinking* (Atlantic Heights: Humanities Press International, 1987); Richard Schmitt, *Martin Heidegger on Being Human; an Introduction to "Sein und Zeit"* (New York: Random House, 1969); Robert J. Dostal, "The Problem of 'Indifferenz' in *Sein und Zeit*," *Philosophy and Phenomenological Research* 43:1 (1982): 43-58; Joan Stambaugh, "An Inquiry into Authenticity and Inauthenticity in *Being and Time*," *Research in Phenomenology* 7: 1 (1977): 153-61; William J. Richardson, *Heidegger: Through Phenomenology to Thought* (New York: Fordham University Press, 1963).
- 5 For noteworthy discussions on the apparent contradiction between Heidegger's claims that authenticity is a modification of inauthenticity and vice versa, see: Abraham Mansbach, "Heidegger on the Self, Authenticity and Inauthenticity," *Iyyun: The Jerusalem Philosophical Quarterly* 40 (1991): 65-91; Ciaffa, "Conception of the Inter-Relation"; Charles B. Guignon, "Heidegger's 'Authenticity' Revisited," *The Review of Metaphysics* 38: 2 (1984): 321-39; Stambaugh, "An Inquiry."
- 6 For two excellent discussions on Heidegger's notion of ruinance, see: Hans Ruin, "Thinking in Ruins: Life, Death, and Destruction in Heidegger's Early Writings," *Comparative and Continental Philosophy* 4: 1 (2012): 15-33; Scott M. Campbell, *The Early Heidegger's Philosophy of Life: Facticity, Being, and Language* (New York: Fordham University Press, 2012), 83-99.
- 7 Theodore J. Kisiel, *The Genesis of Heidegger's "Being and Time"* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1993), 5.

- 8 Rudi Visker, "Dropping: The 'Subject' of Authenticity. *Being and Time* on Disappearing Existentials and True Friendship with Being," *Research in Phenomenology* 24: 1 (1994): 154.
- 9 Visker, "Dropping," 153-54.
- 10 Visker "Dropping," 153.
- 11 Visker, "Dropping," 154.
- 12 For a nuanced discussion on the role of falling in *Being and Time*, see Blattner, *Temporal Idealism*, 54-67.
- 13 Blattner, *Temporal Idealism*, 56.
- 14 Leib, "Authentic Falling."
- 15 Leib, "Authentic Falling," 81.
- 16 Leib, "Authentic Falling," 84.
- 17 Leib, "Authentic Falling," 82.
- 18 Leib, "Authentic Falling," 82.
- 19 Leib, "Authentic Falling," 83.
- 20 Leib, "Authentic Falling," 85.
- 21 Leib, "Authentic Falling," 85.
- 22 Leib, "Authentic Falling," 84.
- 23 Leib, "Authentic Falling," 85
- 24 Dreyfus, *Being-in-the-World*.
- 25 Dreyfus, *Being-in-the-World*, 299.
- 26 Dreyfus, *Being-in-the-World*, 227.
- 27 Dreyfus, *Being-in-the-World*, 225.
- 28 Dreyfus, *Being-in-the-World*, 226.
- 29 Dreyfus, *Being-in-the-World*, 333.
- 30 Dreyfus, *Being-in-the-World*, 228.
- 31 Dreyfus, *Being-in-the-World*, 334.
- 32 Dreyfus, *Being-in-the-World*, 334.
- 33 Dreyfus, *Being-in-the-World*, 334.
- 34 Carman, "Must We Be Inauthentic?"
- 35 Carman, "Must We Be Inauthentic?" 16.
- 36 Carman, "Must We Be Inauthentic?" 14.
- 37 Carman, "Must We Be Inauthentic?" 14.
- 38 Carman, "Must We Be Inauthentic?" 16.

- 39 Carman, “Must We Be Inauthentic?” 18
 40 Carman, “Must We Be Inauthentic?” 18
 41 Carman, “Must We Be Inauthentic?” 18
 42 Carman, “Must We Be Inauthentic?” 20.
 43 Carman, “Must We Be Inauthentic?” 21.
 44 Carman, “Must We Be Inauthentic?” 23.
 45 Carman, “Must We Be Inauthentic?” 24.
 46 Carman, “Must We Be Inauthentic?” 24.
 47 Carman, “Must We Be Inauthentic?” 24.
 48 Carman, “Must We Be Inauthentic?” 25.
 49 Carman, “Must We Be Inauthentic?” 24.
 50 See GA 2: 173, 237, 355, 356, 436/130, 179, 267, 268, 329. Heidegger expresses the claim that authenticity is a modification of inauthenticity most explicitly in his 1927 summer lecture course, *The Basic Problems of Phenomenology*. He states, “We have already said that inauthentic existence does not mean an apparent existence or an ungenueine existence. What is more, inauthenticity belongs to the essential nature of factual Dasein. Authenticity is only a modification but not a total obliteration of inauthenticity” (GA 24: 243/171).
- 51 Stambaugh, “An Inquiry,” 154.
 52 Stambaugh, “An Inquiry,” 158.
 53 Campbell’s book, *The Early Heidegger’s Philosophy of Life: Facticity, Being, and Language*, provides much insight into the nuanced relations between Heidegger’s notions of authenticity, inauthenticity, falling, average everydayness, and factual life. Relevant to my thesis, he convincingly argues that the early Heidegger takes there to be a confluence of authenticity and inauthenticity inherent to factual life. And although his study centers on Heidegger’s lecture courses from 1919–25, in the concluding remarks to his book he argues that this confluence is tacitly at work in the structure of facticity in *Being and Time* as well. He writes, “Facticity, then, in *Being and Time* names the dual nature of Dasein: its dynamic capacity for transcendence, since it is not just any being

but a privileged being that has access to Being, and the limitation of that transcendence by the beings with which and through which that transcendence must take place” (*Philosophy of Life*, 219). With respect to average everydayness, however, he seems to argue that while Heidegger’s early lecture courses present average everydayness as a profoundly rich structure that channels this duality (thus serving as the site of both deception and revelation), the structure of average everydayness as put forth in *Being and Time* seems to be identified solely with inauthenticity. He writes, “Unfortunately, in *Being and Time*, average everydayness takes on a decidedly negative character” (*Philosophy of Life*, 223). In this paper, I aim to show that although less prominent than in his early lecture courses, inherent to the structure of average everydayness in *Being and Time* is the same confluence of authenticity and inauthenticity that Campbell shows to be essential to Heidegger’s earlier formulations of this notion.

54 I am greatly indebted to Campbell’s *Philosophy of Life* for my account of Heidegger’s interpretations of the “basic categories of life” in GA 61.

55 As Ruin points out, it is probably the case that Heidegger starts using the term “ruinance” in his 1921 summer lecture course, *Augustine and Neo-Platonism* (GA 60), in which he offers a phenomenological interpretation of the tenth book of Augustine’s *Confessions* (“Thinking in Ruins” 19). In this lecture course, Heidegger quotes a passage from *Confessions* on the temptations of pleasure (*voluptas*), where Augustine talks about the body in terms of its “daily decay” (*quotidianas ruinas corporis*) (GA 60: 214/158–59); see Augustine, *Confessions*, trans. W. Watts (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1988), X: 31. Heidegger also adds the following in parenthesis: “‘Ruina’ [decay], philosophically-Christian: passing away, perishing – in view of immortality; the objective Greek-theoretical aspect of the concept of facticity; being-dependent-upon, urgency, which is present over against me and in me” (GA 60: 215/159). It is also noteworthy to mention that the concept

of ruinance is formulated by Heidegger as a formal indication (*formale Anzeige*). He offers the following “formally indicative definition” of ruinance: “A formally indicative definition would therefore determine ruinance as follows: the movedness of factual life which ‘actualizes’ and ‘is’ factual life *in* itself, *as* itself, *for* itself, *out of* itself, and, in all this, *against* itself. (Ontological sense of ‘is’ – not yet determined” (GA 61: 131/98). For key discussions on formal indication, see: Daniel O. Dahlstrom, “Heidegger’s Method: Philosophical Concepts as Formal Indications,” *The Review of Metaphysics* 47:4 (1994): 775–95; John van Buren, *The Young Heidegger: Rumor of the Hidden King* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1994), 324–42; Leslie MacAvoy, “Formal Indication and the Hermeneutics of Facticity,” *Philosophy Today* 54 (2010): 84–90.

- 56 Campbell, *Philosophy of Life*, 94.
 57 Campbell, *Philosophy of Life*, 90.
 58 Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics* in *The Complete Works of Aristotle*, ed. Jonathan Barnes, trans. W. D. Ross (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984), 1106b25–35.
 59 Campbell, *Philosophy of Life*, 87.
 60 Campbell, *Philosophy of Life*, 87.
 61 Ruin, “Thinking in Ruins,” 31–32.
 62 Ruin, “Thinking in Ruins,” 33.
 63 Kisiel, *Genesis*, 126.
 64 As Heidegger writes, “All ontological investigations of such phenomena as guilt, conscience, and death, must start with what the everyday interpretation of Dasein ‘says’ about them. Because Dasein has falling as its kind of Being, the way Dasein gets interpreted is for the most part *inauthentically* ‘oriented’ and does not reach the ‘essence’; for to Dasein the primordially appropriate ontological way of formulating questions remains alien. But whenever we see something wrongly, some injunction as to the primordial ‘idea’ of the phenomenon is revealed along with it” (GA 2: 373/281).
 65 Campbell, *Philosophy of Life*, 216.

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