Gatherings

THE HEIDEGGER CIRCLE ANNUAL

2019

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Gatherings is a publication of the Heidegger Circle, a group of scholars who have been meeting annually in North America since 1966 to discuss the work of Martin Heidegger.

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Gatherings: The Heidegger Circle Annual

SUBMISSION GUIDELINES

All submissions other than letters and brief responses to articles (under 1000 words) should be formatted for blind review and include a title page with paper title, author name, affiliation (if applicable), abstract (up to 150 words), and up to 5 keywords. Papers should be submitted single-spaced in Times New Roman font, 12 point, under one of the following file formats: PDF, RTF, DOC, or DOCX. Any Greek words or text should be entered as Unicode characters. Papers should adhere to *The Chicago Manual of Style* and follow the citation scheme provided at the end of each issue. The same paper may be submitted to the yearly meeting of the Heidegger Circle and to *Gatherings*. All papers should be sent in attachment to polt@xavier.edu, with subject "Gatherings."

DESIGN BY AJM

GATHERINGS

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BOOK REVIEWS

Letter from the Editor

Richard Polt

This year's *Gatherings* includes a wide variety of offerings. We begin with a text from one of the founders of the Heidegger Circle. William J. Richardson's questions to Heidegger provided the seed for the philosopher's important preface to Richardson's landmark study, *Heidegger: Through Phenomenology to Thought*, published in 1962.

Four researchers who have not published in *Gatherings* before give us explorations of Heidegger's relationship to Aristotle and Epicurus, as well as an interpretation of Heidegger in terms of place. I am glad to welcome Jennifer Gammage, Paul Gyllenhammer, Onur Karamercan, and Khafiz Kerimov as contributors to this journal.

Our next offering is a new kind of feature. I invited five leading interpreters of Heidegger to reflect on a key issue in his thought: the limits of presence. Readers of *Gatherings* are also invited to contribute to this discussion by submitting responses of up to 1000 words (as they may for any article in this issue). I think this experiment has been a success, and I would like to repeat it; I welcome suggestions for topics and participants for next year's symposium.

Finally, readers will find reviews of five recent books that study Heidegger or take inspiration from his thought.

While I did not receive submissions for a Letters to the Editor department, I would like such a department to come into being. It could be a good opportunity for us to share thoughts and questions in a format that is more durable and prominent than a post on social media, yet less formal than an article. Letters may address points in Heidegger's texts, contemporary concerns to which Heidegger is pertinent, or issues regarding Heidegger research in the academy.

Gatherings: The Heidegger Circle Annual 9 (2019): v–vi.

To assist such research, articles in *Gatherings* will now be included in the Philosopher's Index, a long-running and thorough database. To make the articles and their authors more visible, we are also beginning to publish abstracts, keywords, and contact information for every article.

FROM THE ARCHIVES

William Richardson's Questions for Martin Heidegger's "Preface"

William J. Richardson

Edited, translated, and with a commentary by

Richard Capobianco &

Ian Alexander Moore

Gatherings: The Heidegger Circle Annual 9 (2019): 1–27.

AUS DEN ARCHIVEN: WILLIAM J. RICHARDSONS FRAGEN AN MARTIN HEIDEGGER FÜR DESSEN "VORWORT" [1. MÄRZ 1962]

Da Sie, sehr geehrter Herr Professor, mich gebeten haben, Ihnen aus der geschilderten Situation in den Vereinigten Staaten heraus einige Hinweise für ihre Eingangsworte zu geben, möchte ich mir anschließend erlauben, einige Vorschläge zu machen.

A. Möglicherweise hängt das tiefste Mißverständnis Ihres Weges in Amerika damit zusammen, daß man den Sinn der "Kehre" von Heidegger I zu Heidegger II nicht versteht – und das vielleicht gerade deshalb, weil man den Sinn des Weges von Heidegger I nicht sehen will. Von daher wäre es vielleicht nützlich, wenn Sie einige weitere Angaben über die ersten Schritte Ihres Weges machen könnten, um auch so noch einmal deutlich werden zu lassen, daß es Ihnen seit Ihren Anfängen nie um eine philosophische Anthropologie ging. So haben Sie zum Beispiel ja schon geschrieben, daß die Frage nach dem Sinn von Sein Sie zunächst in der Gestalt der Dissertation von Brentano 1907 traf (*Unterwegs zur Sprache*, s. 92). Könnten Sie nun vielleicht dieser Erfahrung noch weiter nachgehen?

Sofern ich Sie recht verstanden habe, hatten Sie mir in unserem Gespräch diese frühe Erfahrung in folgende Elemente auseinandergelegt:

1. Was ist der Grund (Sinn) des "ist," das jedes Seiende zum Seienden macht; d.h.: was ist der Sinn des Seins?
2. Diese Frage wurde von Aristoteles nicht beantwortet, ja sogar nicht einmal gestellt. In eins mit der Erfahrung der Frage nach dem Sinn von Sein, erfuhren Sie also auch die Seinsvergessenheit.
3. Sein (*einai*) bedeutete für die Griechen Anwesen, Gegenwart, Präsenz – also wurde Sein durch Zeit bestimmt. Damit entstand die Frage: wie kann Sein überhaupt durch Zeit bestimmt werden? Noch Aristoteles hatte die Zeit ja umgekehrt gedacht als bestimmt durch Sein: damit gab es aber bisher gar keine Möglichkeit, diese neue Frage zu stellen.

FROM THE ARCHIVES: WILLIAM J. RICHARDSON'S QUESTIONS FOR MARTIN HEIDEGGER'S "PREFACE" [1 MARCH 1962]

Since you, most esteemed professor, have asked me to provide you with a few indications for your introductory words on the basis of the situation in the United States that I have described, I would like to take the liberty of following up on this with a few suggestions.

A. The deepest misunderstanding of your path in America is possibly connected to the fact that one does not understand the sense of the "turn" from Heidegger I to Heidegger II – and this is so perhaps precisely because one does not want to see the sense of the path of Heidegger I.[1] Accordingly, it would perhaps be useful if you could provide further information regarding the first steps of your path, in order also to make clear once again that what is at issue for you, from the outset, has never been a philosophical anthropology.[2] Thus you have already written, for example, that you initially encountered the question concerning the sense of Being in the form of Brentano's 1907 dissertation (*Unterwegs zur Sprache*, p. 92).[3] Could you perhaps go even further into this experience?

Insofar as I have understood you correctly, in our conversation you had broken down this early experience into the following elements:

1. What is the ground (sense) of the "is" that makes every being a being; i.e.: what is the sense of Being?
2. This question was not answered, indeed never even posed, by Aristotle. Together with the experience of the question concerning the sense of Being, you thus also experienced the forgottenness of Being.
3. For the Greeks, Being (*einai*) signified presence, present, presentness – thus Being was determined by time. With this the question emerged: how can Being be determined by time at all? Indeed even Aristotle had thought of time the other way around, as determined by Being: consequently, there was still, up to now, no possibility at all to pose this new question.

4. Sein wird immer schon vom Menschen verstanden, wenn nicht sogar eigens gefasst: also gehört Seinsverständnis zum Wesen des Menschen. Wenn das aber so ist und wenn Sein anderseits durch Zeit bestimmt wird, dann muss auch das Sein des Menschen durch Zeit bestimmt werden.

Falls Sie diesen Vorschlag aufnehmen möchten, könnten Sie ja vielleicht der Form nach auf eine von mir gestellte oder zu stellende Frage eingehen, die so formuliert werden könnte: Wie ist Ihre erste Erfahrung der Seinsfrage bei Brentano eigentlich zu verstehen?

B. Eine noch wesentlichere Frage würde die "Kehre" selbst aufwerfen. Ihre amerikanischen Leser wissen wohl, daß Heidegger II sich "anders" ausdrückt als Heidegger I; viele halten diese "Änderung" aber für eine Abschwächung, für einen Verfall an bloßes Etymologisieren, manchmal sogar nur für mythisch-mystische Wortspielerei. Es könnte also sehr zum Verständnis Ihres Werkes in Amerika beitragen, wenn diese Leser einzusehen lernten, wie die "Kehre" aus einer seinsgemäßen *Not* entsprungen ist. Und wäre dies nicht vielleicht eine günstige Situation darauf einzugehen?

Walter Schulz hat in seinem berühmten Artikel: "Über den philosophiegeschichtlichen Ort Martin Heideggers" diese "Kehre" als eine Wandlung der Erfahrung des Nichts in die Erfahrung des Seins aufgefasst. Ich selbst habe sie anders verstanden und mit besonderem Hinweis auf: "Aus einem Gespräch von der Sprache" so ausgelegt: die "Kehre" ist vermutlich nur eine Vertiefung (und d.h. ein weiterer Schritt auf demselben Weg) der Erfahrung des Seins-als-*Logos* (und d.h.: des ursprünglichen Sagens) in dem Sinne, daß der schon als *Alētheia* erfahrene *Logos* nun in seinem Sich-Verbergen (und d.h. in seinem Vorrang über das Dasein) gedacht (und d.h. gesagt) werden könnte. Obwohl ich in meinem Buch noch nicht bereit war, diese Formel zu prägen, scheint es mir der Sache doch angemessener zu sein, die "Kehre" in Heideggers Seins-Denken viel weniger als "Kehre" Heideggers (also im Seins-*Denken*) denn als "Kehre" des Seins (besser vielleicht: Seyns?) selbst (also im *Seins*-Denken) aufzufassen.

4. Being is always already understood, albeit not properly grasped, by the human being: thus the understanding of Being belongs to the essence of the human being. Yet if this is the case, and if Being, on the other hand, is determined by time, then the Being of the human being must also be determined by time.

Should you wish to take up this suggestion, you could indeed perhaps follow the form of a question I have posed, or one still to be posed, which could be formulated as follows: how are we properly to understand your first experience of the Being-question in Brentano?[4]

B. A still more essential question would concern the "turn" itself. Your American readers are well aware that Heidegger II expresses himself "differently" from Heidegger I; however, many take this "change" to be an attenuation, a deterioration into mere etymologizing, sometimes even simply to be mythical-mystical wordplay.[5] It could therefore contribute greatly to the understanding of your work in America if these readers learned to appreciate how the "turn" emerged from a *need* in compliance with Being. And would this not be an opportune occasion to pursue this matter further?

In his well-known article "Über den philosophiegeschichtlichen Ort Martin Heideggers" ["On Martin Heidegger's Place in the History of Philosophy"], Walter Schulz conceived of this "turn" as a transformation of the experience of the Nothing into the experience of Being.[6] For my part, I have understood it differently and, with particular reference to "Aus einem Gespräch von der Sprache," have interpreted it as follows: the "turn" is presumably only a deepening (and that means a further step along the same path) of the experience of Being-as-*Logos* (and that means: of the primordial saying) in the sense that the *Logos*, already experienced as *Alētheia*, could now be thought (and that means said) in its self-concealing (and that means in its primacy over Dasein).[7] Although I was not yet ready in my book to formulate it this way, in substance it nevertheless seems more appropriate to me to conceive of the "turn" in Heidegger's thinking of Being much less as a "turn" of Heidegger (thus in the *thinking* of Being) than as a "turn" of Being (or perhaps better: of Beyng?) itself (thus in the thinking of *Being*).[8]

Vielleicht könnten Sie bei der Aufnahme dieses Hinweises eine von mir formulierte Frage zugrunde legen, die die ganze Interpretationsrichtung De Waelhens–Löwith nicht nur in Amerika sondern auch in Europa berühren würde: Zugegeben, *daß* in Ihrem Seins-Denken eine "Kehre" geschehen ist, – *wie* ist dann diese "Kehre" geschehen – oder, anders gefragt, wie ist dies Geschehen selbst zu denken?

•

Ohne die Vorbehalte zu übersehen, mit denen ich Ihnen diese Vorschläge nur machen kann, scheint mir doch die zweite Frage dringlicher zu sein. Aber ich möchte Ihrer Entscheidung nirgends vorgreifen; jede Frage, die Sie selbst vorziehen, würde auch für mich einen Vorrang haben.

Ich möchte hoffen, daß Sie, sehr geehrter Herr Professor, aus den gegebenen Hinweisen verstehen, warum ich es gewagt habe, Sie um eine Einführung in meine Arbeit zu bitten. Sie haben die genaue Zusammenfassung dieser Arbeit, die sich der allgemeinen Stimmung der Heidegger-Interpretation in Amerika so radikal entgegensetzt, geprüft und für einigermaßen treffend gehalten. So könnte mein Buch vielleicht in einem Land, in dem Ihr Werk ohnehin immer mehr gelesen wird, und in dem das die Logik und Technik überwindende Seinsdenken so notwendig ist, ein Beitrag zum besseren Verständnis Ihres Denkens sein.

William J. Richardson, S.J.
Au soin de: Christopher Mooney
42 Rue de Grenelle
Paris VII, Frankreich.

Perhaps, in taking up this indication, you could consider as a basis the following question as I have formulated it, which would touch on the entire interpretive direction of De Waelhens–Löwith not only in America, but also in Europe: granted *that* a "turn" has occurred in your thinking of Being – *how* then did this "turn" happen – or, posed differently, how is this happening itself to be thought?[9]

•

Without overlooking the reservations with which I can only make these suggestions to you, the second question nevertheless seems to me to be more urgent. Nevertheless, I would never wish to anticipate your decision; any question you choose would also have precedence for me.

I should hope that you, most esteemed professor, understand from these indications that I have provided why I have ventured to ask you for an introduction to my work. You have examined the précis of this work, which so radically opposes the general tenor of Heidegger interpretation in America, and you have found it rather fitting.[10] Thus my book could perhaps be a contribution to a better understanding of your thinking in a country where your work is in any case being read more and more, and in which the thinking of Being that is overcoming logic and technicity is so necessary.

William J. Richardson, S.J.
Care of: Christopher Mooney
42 Rue de Grenelle
Paris VII, *France*.



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III. Vorschläge

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FIGURE **1.** Richardson's "Vorschläge" typed page with ink annotations.

NOTES TO THE TRANSLATION

1 We have rendered *Kehre* as "turn," although Richardson himself preferred "reversal."

2 In the German typescript, "nie um eine philosophische Anthropologie ging" ("at issue . . . has never been a philosophical anthropology") is underlined in red pen. See Figure 1.

3 GA 12: 88/OWL 7. Franz Brentano, *Von der mannigfachen Bedeutung des Seins bei Aristoteles* (Freiburg im Breisgau: Herder, 1862); *On the Several Senses of Being in Aristotle*, trans. Rolf George (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1981).

4 In the German typescript (see Figure 1), "Wie ist Ihre erste Erfahrung der Seinsfrage bei Brentano eigentlich zu verstehen?" ("How are we properly to understand your first experience of the Being-question in Brentano?") is underlined in red pen. To the left, in the margin, is written, likewise in red pen: "τὸ ὂν λέγεται πολλαχῶς" ("being is said in many ways"). Cf. William J. Richardson, S.J., *Heidegger: Through Phenomenology to Thought* (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1963), VIII–IX, where Heidegger replicates Richardson's question.

5 Here Richardson is playing on the etymological connection between *anders* ("differently") and *Änderung* ("change"), but, for the sake of clarity, we have opted not to carry it through in English.

6 Walter Schulz, "Über den philosophiegeschichtlichen Ort Martin Heideggers," *Philosophische Rundschau* 1 (1954): 65–93, 211–32. Richardson describes Schulz's article in the bibliography of his book as follows: "An authority on Schelling situates Heidegger in terms of the German Idealists, underlining those elements in Heidegger's thought which suggest an affinity with the transcendental tradition. The author's well-informed and provocative interpretation of the 'reversal' differs considerably from the present writer's and offers a knowledgeable challenge to it." *Heidegger: Through Phenomenology to Thought,* 686.

7 See GA 12: 79–146. Translated as "A Dialogue on Language between a Japanese and an Inquirer," OWL 1–54.

8 Richardson preferred to render the antiquated German spelling *Seyn* with the Old English *Beon*, whereas we have opted for the obsolete spelling *Beyng*. See *Heidegger: Through Phenomenology to Thought*, 554.

9 Based on previous sections of Richardson's "Das Denken Martin Heideggers in Amerika" (not published here), we are certain Richardson is referring to Karl Löwith, *Heidegger. Denker in dürftiger Zeit* (Frankfurt am Main: Fischer, 1953), and to Alphonse de Waelhens, *La philosophie de Martin Heidegger* (Louvain: Éditions de l'Institut Supérieur de Philosophie, 1942). In Richardson's typescript, "Zugegeben, *daß* in Ihrem Seins-Denken eine 'Kehre' geschehen ist, – *wie* ist dann diese 'Kehre' geschehen" ("granted *that* a "turn" has occurred in your thinking of Being – *how* did this 'turn' happen") is underlined in red pen, and a red line is drawn next to the lines beginning with "Europa" ("Europe") and ending with the conclusion of the paragraph. Heidegger replicated Richardson's question in his Preface. See Richardson, *Heidegger: Through Phenomenology to Thought*, XVII. Richardson renders it as follows: "Granted *that* a 'reversal' has come-to-pass in your thinking, *how* has it come-to-pass? In other words, how are [we] to think this coming-to-pass itself?" (XVI).

10 Richardson is presumably referring to a version of what would eventually be published as William J. Richardson, S.J., "Heideggers Weg durch die Phänomenologie zum Seinsdenken," *Philosophisches Jahrbuch* 72, no. 2 (1965): 385–96. Heidegger's Preface to Richardson's book also appeared in the same issue of *Philosophisches Jahrbuch* under the title "Ein Vorwort. Brief an P. William J. Richardson" (pp. 397–402). Richardson's précis is available in English as "Heidegger's Way Through Phenomenology to the Thinking of Being," in *Heidegger: The Man and the Thinker*, ed. Thomas Sheehan (Chicago: Precedent, 1981), 79–93.

APPENDIX: MARGINALIA IN FRITZ HEIDEGGER'S COPY OF WILLIAM J. RICHARDSON, *HEIDEGGER: THROUGH PHENOMENOLOGY TO THOUGHT*

Whereas most of the marginalia in William J. Richardson's letter to Martin Heidegger (published above) are evidently from Heidegger, the same does not seem to be the case for the marginalia in the copy of Richardson's book owned by Heidegger's brother Fritz. Nevertheless, we believe the marginalia in the book may be of interest for understanding Martin's Preface and his relation to Richardson generally, and have therefore decided to include the marginalia here. Fritz himself took particular interest in Richardson's work, met with Richardson personally before Martin wrote his Preface, and acted as a typist and go-between during the preparation of Martin's text. It should also be noted that Fritz's copy was once located in the library of the workroom that Martin would use when staying at Fritz's house. (The volumes from the library have since been relocated to the Martin-Heidegger-Archiv der Stadt Meßkirch.) Page numbers refer to William J. Richardson, S.J., *Heidegger: Through Phenomenology to Thought* (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1963). After the German we include Richardson's English translation of the relevant passages from Heidegger's Preface.

P. XIII

In the following sentence, "als solche" ("as such") is underlined in lead pencil, and a diagonal line is drawn off to the side in the righthand margin: "Aber die wörtliche, d. h. die aus der Sache gedachte Übersetzung spricht erst dann, wenn der Sachgehalt der Sache, hier die Anwesenheit als solche, vor das Denken gebracht wird." ("But a literal translation, sc. a translation that thought draws out of the matter itself, is expressive only when the heart of the matter, in this case Presence as such, is brought before thought.")

P. XVII

A vertical line was drawn in lead pencil to the right of "Das Denken der Kehre *ist* eine Wendung in meinem Denken." ("The thinking of the reversal *is* a change in my thought.")

P. XIX

A vertical line was drawn in lead pencil to the right of "Wer bereit ist, den einfachen Sachverhalt zu sehen, daß in 'Sein und Zeit' der Ansatz des Fragens aus dem Bezirk der Subjektivität abgebaut, daß jede anthropologische Fragestellung ferngehalten, vielmehr einzig die Erfahrung des Da-seins aus dem ständigen Vorblick auf die Seinsfrage maßgebend ist [. . .]" ("One need only observe the simple fact that in *Being and Time* the problem is set up outside the sphere of subjectivism – that the entire anthropological problematic is kept at a distance, that the normative issue is emphatically and solely the experience of There-being with a constant eye to the Being-question [. . .]")

A vertical line was drawn in lead pencil to the right of "Vielmehr geht das Sein als das aus seinem Zeit-Charakter geprägte An-wesen das Da-sein an." ("It is rather Being, stamped as Presence by its time-character, [that] makes the approach to There-being.")

P. XXI

A vertical line was drawn in lead pencil to the right of "Das 'Geschehen' der Kehre, wonach Sie fragen, 'ist' das Seyn als solches. Es läßt sich nur *aus* der Kehre denken." ("The 'coming-to-pass' of the reversal which you ask about 'is' Beon as such. It can only be thought *out of* the reversal.")

A vertical line was drawn in lead pencil to the right of "aus dem, wie Es Sein, wie Es Zeit gibt. Über dieses 'Es gibt' versuchte ich in dem Vortrag 'Zeit und Sein,' den Sie selbst [. . .]" ("by the way Being is granted, Time is granted. I tried to say a word about this 'is granted' in the lecture 'Time and Being' which you heard yourself [. . .].")

A vertical line was drawn in lead pencil to the right of "Es ist weder das Verdienst meines Fragens noch der Machtspruch meines Denkens, daß dieses Gehören und Erbringen im Er-eignen beruht und Ereignis heißt [. . .]" ("It is [due] neither [to] the merit of my questioning nor [to some] arbitrary decision of my thought that this reciprocal bearing reposes in a [mutual] ap-propriation and is called e-vent [. . .].")

P. XXIII

A vertical line was drawn in lead pencil to the right of "der philosophischen Sprache, ist nicht ihre Erfindung und Willkür. Es ist die höchste Mitgift für ihre Sprache, in der das Anwesende als ein solches zur Unverborgenheit und – Verbergung gelangte." ("[The fact that what we thoughtlessly enough call 'truth' the Greeks called Ἀ–Λήθεια – as well, indeed, in poetical and non-philosophical as in] philosophical language – is not [a result of] their [own] invention and caprice. It is the richest endowment of their language, in which that-which-comes-to-presence as such attained non-concealment and – concealment.") In the righthand margin next to the vertical line, there is a question mark in lead pencil.

There is a question mark in lead pencil to the right of "Aber I wird nur möglich, wenn es in II enthalten ist." ("But [the thought of] Heidegger I becomes possible only if it is contained in Heidegger II.")

A wide v-shaped figure was drawn in lead pencil, running off the page, to the right of the paragraph beginning with the sentence "Indes bleibt alles Formelhafte mißverständlich." ("Meanwhile, every formulation is open to misunderstanding.").

COMMENTARY ON WILLIAM J. RICHARDSON'S QUESTIONS FOR MARTIN HEIDEGGER'S "PREFACE"

Martin Heidegger wrote one and only one preface for a scholarly work on his thinking, and it was for William J. Richardson's study *Heidegger: Through Phenomenology to Thought*, first published in 1963. Ever since, both Heidegger's Preface and Richardson's groundbreaking book have played an important role in Heidegger scholarship. Much has been discussed about these texts over the decades, but what has not been available to students and scholars up to this point is Richardson's original comments and questions to Heidegger that led to the famous Preface. These are published here for the first time both in the German original and in our English translation.[11] In our commentary we 1) discuss how Heidegger's Preface came about, 2) explain the source and status of the materials published above, and 3) pair selected passages from Richardson's text with Heidegger's reply in his Preface to highlight the consonance of their thinking.

I. THE GENESIS OF HEIDEGGER'S "PREFACE"

Richardson had been working on Heidegger's thought for five years before requesting a formal meeting with him. On 2 February 1960, he sent Heidegger a letter introducing himself and asking whether they might speak personally.[12] Appended to the letter were four documents: 1) a letter of recommendation from Max Müller (dated 5 December 1959), in which Müller praises Richardson's mind and character and anticipates the revolutionary impact that Richardson's book will have on Heidegger interpretation; 2) Richardson's twenty-five-page précis in German of his work on Heidegger (at that time totaling 1034 pages); 3) a table of contents for the work; and 4) several questions Richardson had for Heidegger.

Heidegger was impressed with the précis (which he marked up extensively), and accordingly invited Richardson to his home in Freiburg on 24 February 1960 at 3:00 p.m.[13] (It is noteworthy that Heidegger's invitation, and all subsequent handwritten letters to Richardson, are written in Roman script, not Heidegger's usual *Sütterlinschrift*, which

for an American, indeed even for many Germans, is hardly legible; this is a small sign that, unlike with other interpreters of his work, Heidegger made a special effort when it came to Richardson.) There the esteemed German professor and the younger American priest and scholar would converse for four hours on matters both philosophical and personal. Not only did Richardson find it "one of the richest memories of my own intellectual experience," he also heard shortly after their meeting that Heidegger had been so struck that he telephoned Müller right away to convey his astonishment and admiration: "After so many misreadings, how is it possible [. . .] that an *American* could get it right?"[14]

Emboldened by this report, and by Müller's encouragement, Richardson dared petition Heidegger for a preface on 27 September 1960. Unfortunately, we have not been able to locate Richardson's letter, but we know it was sufficiently persuasive to elicit Heidegger's assent.[15] Three days later, Heidegger wrote back, agreeing to make an exception to his hitherto firm principle never to introduce the work of other authors. He asked only for a few indications as to what he should write in the Preface in order to redress and preempt misunderstanding of his work in America, since he had recently been hearing disconcerting reports on how his work was being taken up there.

Once Richardson's work was complete, he responded to Heidegger's request in a letter two years later. Richardson provides a summary of the letter in the "Preface to the U.S. Edition" (September 2002) of his book:

> The substance of my letter of March 1, 1962, was simple indeed: "You will recall that you were kind enough to offer to write a preface for my book, *From Phenomenology to Thought*, provided I formulate one or two questions that might be directly addressed. The questions that seem most relevant to me are these. . . . In advance, please be sure of my deep gratitude, etc." There was no more immediate context for them than that.

While helpful, Richardson's summary is also puzzling. For although the substance of the letter is in fact straightforward, it does not itself

pose the questions Heidegger would go on to answer in his Preface. These questions instead appear in a thirteen-page document, written in polished German, titled "Das Denken Martin Heideggers in Amerika" ("The Thinking of Martin Heidegger in America"), which Richardson had included with his letter. This document provides not only an extensive survey of the literature on Heidegger (§1, "Überblick über die Literatur") and a report on the intellectual reception of Heidegger's work in America (§2, "Geistige Situation"), but also two pages of suggestions for how Heidegger might structure his Preface (§3, "Vorschläge"). Thus even though Richardson's letter may not have provided more context for the two questions he ended up posing to Heidegger, the appended document "Das Denken Martin Heideggers in Amerika," especially its final section, surely does. This context no doubt contributed greatly to the form and content Heidegger's Preface would take as he composed it over the next month. It is precisely for this reason that we have edited and translated the final section of "Das Denken Martin Heideggers in Amerika" above.

II. THE SOURCE AND STATUS OF THIS DOCUMENT

Although certain scholars have had access to a copy of "Das Denken Martin Heideggers in Amerika," the document has, to our knowledge, never been mentioned in Richardson's published writings or in any of the literature on his relationship to Heidegger. The copy was likely made before Richardson sent the document to Heidegger, as it does not contain any of the marginalia that can be found on the original document. Our edition, in contrast, derives from the original, which is located inside a first-edition copy of *Heidegger: Through Phenomenology to Thought* in the library of the Martin-Heidegger-Archiv der Stadt Meßkirch that comes from the room in Fritz Heidegger's home where Martin Heidegger would work.[16]

Even though the document bears no signature, we have no reason to doubt that it is an authentic work by Richardson. It is less clear who authored all of the marginalia, however. Although Martin Heidegger was initially in possession of the document, he eventually sent it to his

brother Fritz, who himself comments on it in a letter to Richardson from 14 April 1962. While we are inclined to believe that the majority of the marginalia derive from Martin, in one instance (or possibly two) it seems more likely that Fritz is the author.

At the top of the first page, "P. Richardson" is written with partially cursive, Latin-type letters in lead pencil. On the back page, "Richardson" is written similarly, except in blue pen. Even though Martin rarely wrote with this script, elsewhere he did write Richardson's name in like fashion. This can be seen in his epistles to Richardson from 10 February 1960, 17 February 1960, 12 March 1962, and 9 April 1962, the last of which also contains an abbreviated *P* for "Pater" ("Father"). Now, one might object that Martin used a Latin script for these epistles only for the sake of legibility, and that, when writing for himself, he would have availed himself exclusively of *Sütterlinschrift*. The name on the first and back pages would accordingly stem from the hand of Fritz, who, as may be gleaned from the numerous volumes owned by Fritz in the Martin-Heidegger-Archiv der Stadt Meßkirch, himself used a Latin script in his own marginal notes. However, in notes pertaining to the lecture course *Der Satz vom Grund* that are housed at the Deutsches Literaturarchiv Marbach, there is a loose sheet with Richardson's name at the top written almost exactly like that on the first and back pages of "Das Denken Martin Heideggers in Amerika," even though the rest of the note is written in Martin's normal handwriting.[17] It is therefore plausible that, by this time, Martin had come to associate Richardson's name with a particular type of script. Moreover, it is likely that this note was composed around the same time as Martin's Preface. For the note pertains to a document that Richardson appears to have sent Martin together with "Das Denken Martin Heideggers in Amerika," namely, the list of Martin's seminars and lecture courses that Richardson published as an appendix to his book.[18]

The same cannot be said for the second marginal note in "Das Denken Martin Heideggers in Amerika." It occurs on page six, at the end of Richardson's summary of Thomas Langan's *The Meaning of Heidegger: A Critical Study of an Existentialist Phenomenology* (New

York: Columbia University Press, 1959). In the document, Richardson translates the following passage from p. 231 into German:

> Each time we have penetrated to the depth of notions such as mystery, the *Heilige*, the grace of Being, *alētheia* itself, we have been unable to retain our initial excitement, for we came to suspect that they were high-flown words hiding the real emptiness of an existence for which there is no "other." "Mystery" turns out to hide no incomprehensibly rich other, but only our own limits; the *Heilige* turns out to hold no real gift, but is rather an expression of our finite "not yet"; the "grace of Being" turns out to be no real gift, for it is drawn inexplicably from our own resources. *Alētheia* itself finally fails to be an end and motive force, to become an historical sign of our incompleteness. Penetrating far enough beyond the exciting terms to discover that there is no other, we are left wondering if perhaps Sartre was not more direct in simply declaring such an existent, who is all alone, *de trop*.

After *de trop*, "überflüssig, zuviel" ("superfluous, too much") is written in lead pencil in what appears to be Fritz's non-*Sütterlin* handwriting. In this instance it seems unlikely that Martin would have written to himself in this script. Moreover, Martin could read French quite well, and would hardly have needed to provide himself with a translation of such a phrase.

Whatever the case may be, the most important marginalia appear in the final section of "Das Denken Martin Heideggers in Amerika" that we have reproduced above. Fritz was, admittedly, especially interested in this section (as he relates in his aforementioned letter to Richardson), and might therefore seem to be the composer of the marginalia in it; however, the underlining pertains to material that Martin addresses directly in the Preface – not just Richardson's two questions, but also the matter of philosophical anthropology. What is more, one finds "τὸ ὂν λέγεται

πολλαχῶς" ("being is said in many ways") written in perfect Greek in the margins, in a script that closely resembles the way Heidegger writes these Greek words elsewhere in the 1960s.[19] This Greek phrase from Aristotle (*Metaphysics* IV.2) also makes its way into Heidegger's Preface. Finally, unlike in the previous two instances, all of the marginalia in this final section are written in red pen (the same color Heidegger used to mark up Richardson's précis a couple of years prior[20]).

We surmise, therefore, that Martin wrote the marginalia in the final section in red pen shortly before or while he was composing the Preface. Then, when his manuscript of the Preface was complete, he decided to send it, together with "Das Denken Martin Heideggers in Amerika" and Richardson's letters from 1 March and 21 March 1962, to his brother to be typed, but before doing so he wrote Richardson's name on the back of "Das Denken Martin Heideggers in Amerika" in blue pen, since Richardson himself had not done so. (It is possible that he also wrote Richardson's name in lead pencil on the first page as well, although, if it is true that Fritz wrote "überflüssig, zuviel" in lead pencil upon receiving the documents, he may well have written Richardson's name on the first page too.) However, because of the uncertainty of authorship, we have refrained from attributing the marginalia to anyone in the edited document itself.

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In general, we have tried to be as faithful as possible to Richardson in our edition of "Das Denken Martin Heideggers in Amerika." The only changes we made to the original German typescript are as follows: we converted underlining to italics, we replaced instances of "ss" with "ß" when appropriate, and we changed the title of the third section ("*Vorschläge*" or "Suggestions") to "Aus den Archiven: William J. Richardsons Fragen an Martin Heidegger für dessen 'Vorwort'" ("From the Archives: William J. Richardson's Questions for Martin Heidegger's 'Preface'") in order to better convey the content and context of the document.

III. CONCORDANCE

In this final section, we pair selected lines from Richardson's text with corresponding lines from Heidegger's response in the Preface. This selected concordance helps bring into sharper relief how Richardson's comments and questions decisively shaped the content of Heidegger's Preface. What is more, this pairing brings to light ever more clearly how Heidegger was at home with Richardson's overall interpretive effort to discuss "the turn" or "reversal" (*die Kehre*) from "Heidegger I" to "Heidegger II" in terms of a greater and more explicit emphasis on the primacy of Being in relation to the human being.[21]

A. On Brentano's Influence on the Core Question Concerning Being

Richardson: "Thus you have already written, for example, that you initially encountered the question concerning the sense of Being in the form of Brentano's 1907 dissertation. Could you perhaps go even further into this experience?"…"[…] how are we properly to understand your first experience of the Being-question in Brentano?"

Heidegger: "'In Brentano.' You have in mind the fact that the first philosophical text through which I worked my way, again and again from 1907 on, was Franz Brentano's dissertation: *On the Manifold Sense of Being in Aristotle* (1862). On the title page of his work, Brentano quotes Aristotle's phrase: τὸ ὂν λέγεται πολλαχῶς. I translate: 'A being becomes manifest (sc. [i.e.] with regard to its Being) in many ways.'[22] Latent in this phrase is the *question* that determined the way of my thought: what is the pervasive, simple, unified determination of Being that permeates all of its multiple meanings?" (X)

"[…] the question about Being, aroused by Brentano's work, nevertheless remained always in view. […] and if from ancient times the guide-question of philosophy has perdured in the most diverse forms as the question about the Being of beings, then Being had to remain the first and last thing-itself [*Sache selbst*] of thought." (XII, XIV)

B. Not a Philosophical Anthropology

Richardson: "Accordingly, it would perhaps be useful if you could provide further information regarding the first steps of your path, in order to make clear once again that what is at issue for you, from the outset, has never been a philosophical anthropology."

Heidegger: "One need only observe the simple fact that in *Being and Time* the problem is set up outside the sphere of subjectivism – that the entire anthropological problematic is kept at a distance [...]" (xviii)

"This transformation [in the Being of the human being] is not demanded by new psychological or biological insights. Man here is not the object of any anthropology whatever." (citing his "first draft" of a lecture course for the winter semester of 1937–1938, xx)[23]

C. From the Temporality of Dasein to Being-as-time

Richardson: "For the Greeks, Being (*einai*) signified presence, present, presentness – thus Being was determined by time."

Heidegger: "The disquieting, ever watchful question about Being under the guise of Presence (Present) developed into the question about Being in terms of its time-character." (xii)

Richardson: "Yet if this is the case, and if Being, on the other hand, is determined by time, then the Being of the human being must also be determined by time."

Heidegger: "Time became questionable in the same way as Being. The ecstatic-horizonal temporality delineated in *Being and Time* is not by any means already the most proper attribute of time that must be sought in answer to the Being-question." (xii)

D. The Primacy of Being

Richardson: "It could therefore contribute greatly to the understanding of your work in America if these readers learned to appreciate how the 'turn' emerged from a *need* in compliance with Being. [...] the 'turn' is presumably only a deepening (and that means a further step along the same path) of the experience of Being-as-*Logos* (and that means: of the primordial saying) in the sense that the *Logos*, already experienced as *Alētheia*, could now be thought (and that means said) in its self-concealing (and that means in its primacy over Dasein)."

Heidegger: "One need only observe [...] that the normative issue is emphatically and solely the experience of There-being [*Dasein*] with a constant eye to the Being-question – for it to become strikingly clear that the 'Being' into which *Being and Time* inquired cannot long remain something that the human subject posits. It is rather Being, stamped as Presence by its time-character, [that] makes the approach to There-being [*Dasein*]. As a result, even in the initial steps of the Being-question in *Being and Time* thought is called upon to undergo a change whose movement cor-responds with the reversal [turn]." (XVIII)

"Contrary [to what is generally supposed], the question of *Being and Time* is decisively ful-filled in the thinking of the reversal [turn]. He alone can ful-fill who has a vision of fullness. This fulfillment likewise furnishes for the first time an adequate characterisation of There-being [*Dasein*], sc. of the essence of man [as] thought in terms of the truth of Being as such [...]" (XVIII-XX)

"Man comes into question here in the deepest and broadest, in the genuinely fundamental, perspective: man in his relation to Being – sc. in the reversal [turn]: Beon [Beyng, *Seyn*] and its truth in relation to man." (citing his "first draft" of a lecture course for the winter semester of 1937–38, XX)[24]

"Without an eye for the granting of such a gift to man, without a sense for the e-mitting [*Schicken*] of such an e-mittence, one will no more comprehend what is said about the mittence of Being [*Seinsgeschick*] than the man born blind can ever experience what light and color are." (XXII)

E. On the "Turn"

Richardson: "[. . .] granted *that* a 'turn' has occurred in your thinking of Being – how then did this 'turn' happen – or, posed differently, *how* is this happening itself to be thought?"

Heidegger: "The thinking of the reversal [turn] *is* a change in my thought." (XVI)

"The 'coming-to-pass' [happening] of the reversal [turn] which you ask about 'is' Beon [Beyng, *Seyn*] as such. It can only be thought out of the reversal [turn]. There is no special kind of coming-to-pass [happening] that is proper to this [process]. Rather, the reversal [turn] between *Being and Time*, between Time and Being, is determined by the way Being is granted, Time is granted. I tried to say a word about this 'is granted' [*Es gibt*] in the lecture "Time and Being," which you heard yourself here [in Freiburg] on January 30, 1962." (XX)[25]

"The distinction you make between Heidegger I and II is justified only on the condition that this is kept constantly in mind: only by way of what Heidegger I has thought does one gain access to what is to-be-thought by Heidegger II. But [the thought of] Heidegger I becomes possible only if it is contained in Heidegger II." (XXII)

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Heidegger concluded his Preface to Richardson's masterful work of scholarship by stating three times that "a manifold thinking" (*ein mehrfältiges Denken*) is called for in calling forth the core matter for

thought, and he expressed a "wish" for the book – a wish that has been fulfilled many times over since its publication in 1963 – that it set into motion this "manifold thinking" of the core matter, which, "by reason of its very simplicity, abounds in hidden plenitude" (xx).

NOTES TO THE COMMENTARY

11 The existence of the document was first announced in Ian Alexander Moore, "Rapport sur le fonds d'archives Martin Heidegger de la ville de Meßkirch," trans. Christophe Perrin, *Bulletin heideggérien* 8 (2018): 5. In English as "A Report on the Holdings of the Martin-Heidegger-Archiv der Stadt Meßkirch," *Gatherings: The Heidegger Circle Annual* 8 (2018): 81–82.

12 Incidentally, Richardson does not mention in his letter that he and Heidegger had actually already met five years prior, in 1955, when Richardson ventured into Heidegger's office during office hours to ask for advice on a possible dissertation topic. After rejecting a comparative study of Husserl and Heidegger's phenomenology, as well as one devoted to the ontological difference, Heidegger agreed that "The Nature of Foundational Thinking" (in Heidegger's work) "would probably be manageable." Quote from William J. Richardson, "An Unpurloined Autobiography," in *Portraits of American Continental Philosophers*, ed. James R. Watson (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1999), 145. See also "On Heidegger to Lacan: An Interview with William J.

Richardson," with the participation of Mario L. Beira and Sara Elena Hassan, *Acheronta: Revista de Psicoanálisis y Cultura* 22 (December 2005); and William J. Richardson, "Preface to the U.S. Edition," in Richardson, *Heidegger: Through Phenomenology to Thought*, 4th ed. (New York: Fordham University Press, 2003), xxvii.

13 Richardson does not always recall the year correctly; in the "Preface to the U.S. Edition" (xxxiii, xxxvii), and in "An Unpurloined Autobiography" (147), he has "February 1959," instead of February 1960.

14 Richardson, "An Unpurloined Autobiography," 148.

15 It is not included in their correspondence available at the Deutsches Literaturarchiv Marbach, call numbers HS.2003.0151.00001, HS.2003.0151.00002, and 75.7350,4. We thank Gudrun Bernhardt for this information, and for providing us with access to several letters that are available only in Marbach.

16 Inside the book there is a card from the publisher stating that the book comes "with the author's compliments." Richardson would have had reason to send Fritz a copy, as Fritz was the one who typed up his brother's preface, and Richardson had himself visited Fritz in Meßkirch in February 1962 (as Fritz recalls in a letter to Richardson from 14 April 1962).

17 Catalogued under the title "Zu der Vorlesung, Satz vom Grund," call number B 79. In the mentioned note, Heidegger seems worried about people misconstruing the purpose of his teaching and the path of his thinking once they have a complete catalogue of his courses, as though that were enough to understand his trajectory and consequently the matter for thought. Nevertheless Richardson tells us Heidegger reviewed the list and "kindly made" corrections, "adding whatever comments that appear" (*Heidegger: Through Phenomenology to Thought*, 663).

18 In his letter from 12 March 1962, Heidegger thanks Richardson for not just one, but plural documents. Regarding the list, see "Verzeichnis der Vorlesungen und Übungen von Martin Heidegger,"

in Richardson, *Heidegger: Through Phenomenology to Thought*, 663–71. Richardson mentions this list in his letter to Heidegger from 1 March 1962, though not, explicitly, that he had included it with his letter.

19 Compare, for instance, his notes for his seminar on Heraclitus with Eugen Fink, available in the Deutsches Literaturarchiv Marbach, call number 75.7345. Alfred Denker agrees that the handwriting seems to be Martin's. We thank him for his input on this and other matters.

20 Richardson, "Preface to the U.S. Edition," XXXI. In "On Heidegger to Lacan," Richardson says it was marked in red *and* blue pen, "like an American flag, every page, and with circles around it." Recall that Richardson's name is written in both lead pencil and blue pen in "Das Denken Martin Heideggers in Amerika."

21 Heidegger's responses in what follows are from Richardson's translations in his book *Heidegger: Through Phenomenology to Thought*. In addition to Richardson's own brackets in the text, we have also provided bracketed material for clarification.

22 After this sentence Heidegger added a marginal note to a typescript of his Preface that can be found in GA 11: 145n1. The marginal note reads: "vgl. Was ist das – die Philosophie? 1956 (Schluß) (S. 46) / 'Das seiend-Sein kommt vielfältig zum Scheinen.'" This note refers to the final line of his lecture "What is that – Philosophy?," delivered in Cerisy-la-Salle, Normandy, France, in 1955, also available in GA 11: 7–26. His rendering of Aristotle's line in this instance may be translated as: "Being-coming-to-be comes to shine in manifold ways." The peculiar construction *das seiend-Sein* illustrates once again how Heidegger never ceased seeking new and creative ways to express in language the temporal, dynamic character of Being.

Heidegger's alterations to the aforementioned typescript served as the basis for the slightly different version of the Preface available in GA 11: 145–52, and in the *Heidegger Lesebuch*, ed. Günter Figal (Frankfurt am Main: Klostermann, 2007), 327–33. The

latter has been translated by Jerome Veith in *The Heidegger Reader* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2009), 298–304. Curiously, the *Lesebuch/Reader* version omits the additional marginal note, as well as one other that derives from a special printing of Heidegger's Preface, and can be found in GA 11: 150n2.

23 Cf. GA 45: 214; *Basic Questions of Philosophy: Selected "Problems" of "Logic,"* trans. Richard Rojcewicz and André Schuwer (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1994), 181.

24 Cf. GA 45: 214/181.

25 According to GA 14: 151 and other sources, Heidegger's lecture "Zeit und Sein" ("Time and Being") took place on 31 January 1962.

Accidental Origins: The Importance of *Tuchē* and *Automaton* for Heidegger's 1922 Reading of Aristotle

Jennifer O. Gammage

ABSTRACT: I examine a passage from Heidegger's 1922 overview of a proposed book on Aristotle wherein he addresses the importance of Aristotle's treatment of accidental (*sumbebēkos*) causes in the *Physics* II.4–6. My analysis shows that this passage plays a key role within the account of Aristotle's ontology presented in the overview insofar as it allows Heidegger to open up a new way of reading Aristotle, one that both diagnoses and pushes through the inheritance of being understood as *technē* in order to retrieve originary insights about the movement of factical human life, world, and care. Rather than subordinate *tuchē* and *automaton* (chance) to the four "real" causes they would remain merely incidental to or derivative of, Heidegger asks that we recognize the priority of *praxis*, whose *archē* unfolds as care toward and within a world of accidents.

KEYWORDS: accident, chance, facticity, *phronēsis, technē*

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In this paper I unfold one enigmatic passage within Heidegger's 1922 proposal for a book on Aristotle in order to reveal four important facets of Heidegger's thinking that arise from his engagement with the *Physics*. In this passage Heidegger claims that Aristotle's analyses of *tuchē* and *automaton* (chance and accident) in Physics II.4–6 – despite the fact that they remain unappreciated with regard to their ontological import – are of key importance for explicating the historical movement of factical life itself. My reading approaches these claims about the accidental (*sumbebēkos*) strategically, such that in offering an interpretation of them, it becomes clear how they open onto Heidegger's early readings of *technē*, world, *phronēsis*, and the historical movement of factical life within the *Nicomachean Ethics* and *Metaphysics*. Of course the history of the typescript of Heidegger's Aristotle proposal is, itself, an illustration of the power of chance and accident. I will thus begin this discussion of Heidegger's fascination with the *archē* research of the *Physics* with a story of the origins of his own manuscript.

I. INTRODUCTION TO THE *EINLEITUNG*: A STORY OF ACCIDENTS

Over a three-week period in the fall of 1922, Heidegger, pressed for evidence of publication while being considered for positions at Marburg and Göttingen, quickly put together a short manuscript intended to serve as an introduction to and overview of a forthcoming work on Aristotle, which he and Husserl planned to publish in Husserl's *Jahrbuch für Philosophie und phänomenologische Forschung*.[1] The story, as Kisiel tells it, is that while Heidegger planned his upcoming courses around material related to the anticipated publication, he struggled to complete the project, and in a letter to Löwith in early 1923 wrote that he might even have to withdraw it from the *Jahrbuch*.[2] Perhaps luckily for Heidegger, the *Jahrbuch* ceased publication in late 1923, when hyperinflation following the First World War was at its peak, and although Heidegger would continue to discuss the Aristotle project as a book in progress, he eventually abandoned it to write "The Concept of Time." Heidegger referred to this overview for a book project as his "Aristotle Introduction [*Einleitung*]," though it is often referred to as the "Natorp Report."[3]

Ironically, the only full version of the text in circulation today is not the well-received typescript sent to Natorp, which ended up securing a position for Heidegger at Marburg in winter of 1923–1924, but the somewhat ill-received copy sent to Misch in Göttingen. Natorp passed his copy of the *Einleitung* down to his student Gadamer, upon whom it made a famously favorable impression, at some point in the few years after receiving it. Gadamer would eventually write the introduction for the first published version of the *Einleitung* in the *Dilthey-Jahrbuch für Philosophie und Geschichte der Geisteswissenschaften* in 1989; Gadamer's own copy of the manuscript, however, was lost during an air raid on Leipzig in 1942. Misch, like Natorp, passed along his copy of the *Einleitung* to one of his students, Joseph König, but not until 1962, at which time König marked the manuscript unread and put it into storage with the rest of his files, where it remained until it was discovered as part of his estate in 1989. The typescript published in the *Dilthey-Jahrbuch* in 1989 and in volume 62 of the *Gesamtausgabe* in 2005 is, properly speaking, not the "Natorp Report" at all, but the manuscript sent to Misch as part of a failed job application for the position at Göttingen.

The full title of the *Einleitung* is "Phenomenological Interpretations in Connection with Aristotle: An Indication of the Hermeneutical Situation," a title that resonates with the two lecture courses immediately preceding its creation, the winter 1921–22 course (GA 61), published in translation as *Phenomenological Interpretations of Aristotle: Initiation into Phenomenological Research*, and the as of yet untranslated summer 1922 course (in GA 62), *Phenomenological Interpretations of Aristotle: Selected Treatises on Ontology and Logic*.[4] The *Einleitung* itself can, in many ways, be read as a distillation of the work in these lecture courses, but to consider the entire manuscript nothing *but* a reiteration of these courses would miss the fact that Heidegger introduces in the overview of his forthcoming material several nascent ideas and themes he had not yet worked out in his seminars. For example, the passages from the *Nicomachean Ethics*, the *Metaphysics*, and *De Anima* glossed in the second section of the overview became the focus of his winter 1922–1923 practicum with Becker, titled "Phenomenological

Interpretations to Aristotle."[5] The *Einleitung* thus serves to preserve Heidegger's thoughts on Aristotle in 1922 while prefiguring the lectures on Aristotle Heidegger would go on to teach at Freiburg and Marburg over the next several years.

The full *Einleitung* contains three parts: an introduction (GA 62: 345–75/SUP 111–29) grounding Heidegger's methodological approach to Aristotle in an explication of phenomenological hermeneutics; section one of the project overview (GA 62: 376–96/SUP 129–37), which is subdivided into three sections outlining Heidegger's readings of Aristotle's *Nicomachean Ethics* VI, *Metaphysics* I.1–2, and *Physics* I-III; and section two of the overview (GA 62: 397–99/SUP 143–45), which is a relatively sketchy, yet dense proposal of the culmination of the project as a reading of *Metaphysics* VII-IX that will make detours through the *Nicomachean Ethics*, *De Anima*, *On Interpretation*, and the *Analytics* in order to argue that we can find in Aristotle's thought an explication of the movement of factical life itself. Or, as Walter Brogan so nicely puts it, we find a *Daseinsanalytik* that reveals "that philosophy *is* life, that is, the self-articulation from out of itself of life."[6] I will refer to these parts as, respectively, the section on methods and the first and second sections of the overview, and will refer to the readings of particular texts within the first overview by the names of the texts. Although each subsequent part of the proposed project seems less fully developed than the last, every piece is significant in itself as well as in relation to the proposed project as a whole and the overall trajectory of Heidegger's thought.

Indeed, within the interplay between Heidegger's condensed articulation of a phenomenological-hermeneutical method and his interpretation of Aristotle we find him struggling with many of the themes that would come to dominate his work in *Being and Time* and beyond – *alētheia*, concealment (*Verborgenheit*), care (*Sorge*), circumspection (*Umsicht*), falling (*verfallen*), authenticity (*Eigentlichkeit*), death, and the historical movedness of factical life, among others. Given its place in Heidegger's development, this deceptively brief text should not simply be brushed aside as an unfinished project. Neither, however, should we rush to deem it the *direct* precursor to *Being and Time*, an

identification that risks overlooking critical changes in Heidegger's thinking and writing between 1922 and 1924, when he composes his self-declared first draft of *Being and Time*, "The Concept of Time" (GA 64).[7] While some of the themes I want to address in Heidegger's *Einleitung* evince a clear resonance with Heidegger's thinking in 1927, there remain critical differences that I cannot address in a paper of this scope; my analysis, therefore, should not be taken as assuming that the accounts of the environing world, facticity, care, and so on presented here can be seamlessly mapped onto later articulations of these themes they might seem to indicate but which nevertheless do not echo them. There have been a number of rich accounts in the secondary literature that address the *Einleitung* in terms of its importance to and distinction from *Being and Time*, and Heidegger's lifelong engagement with key themes and concepts in Aristotle's work.[8] My aim here is far more modest and restricted in breadth.

I want to unpack just one rather enigmatic passage of the *Einleitung*, which has not received much – if any – attention in the scholarship, and in which Heidegger very quickly insists on the importance of Aristotle's treatment of *tuchē* and *automaton* in *Physics* II.4–6.[9] My own reading follows alongside those of Theodore Kisiel, William McNeill, and Walter Brogan whose research and writing on Heidegger's early work have made clear, respectively: Heidegger's indebtedness to Aristotle within his development of the method of phenomenological hermeneutics and understanding of the historical nature of factical life; the importance of *technē* and *phronēsis* within Heidegger's thinking of the *Augenblick*; and the way in which Aristotle's phenomenology helps Heidegger discover the twofoldness of the movement of factical life. What I want to add to these accounts is the insistence that Heidegger's reading of *tuchē* and *automaton*, or the accidental (*sumbebēkos*), plays a key role within the *Einleitung* insofar as it allows Heidegger to open up a new way of reading Aristotle, one that pushes through the inheritance of being understood as *technē* in order to retrieve originary insights about human life. In the 1922–1923 winter semester course on Aristotle as well as in the 1939 essay on the *Physics*, Heidegger insists that a reading of Aristotle's ontology

and logic must begin with the *Physics* and that both the *Metaphysics* and the *Nicomachean Ethics* must be read *through* the *Physics* to understand the true gift of Aristotle's thought. What tends to fall out of view in Heidegger's future work on Aristotle is the way in which the *sumbebēkos* functions as an interruption within Aristotle's ontology, insofar as it acts as a *Gestalt* that moves us from one understanding of motion (*kinēsis*) to another. Here, in the *Einleitung*, Heidegger's overview indicates the importance of Aristotle's account of *sumbebēkos* in a manner that is unprecedented and unmatched in his other work.

> This book [*Physics* II] (chapters 4–6) is of decisive importance with respect to the problem of facticity as such. It is shown that under the headings of τύχη [*tuchē*], αὐτόματον [*automaton*] (terms utterly untranslatable when it comes to their authentic meanings) Aristotle ontologically explicates the "historical" ["*historische*"] movement of factical life, i.e., "what happens and can happen in such and such a way to someone everyday" [198b36]. These ontological analyses have to this day not only remained unsurpassed but have not even been understood and utilized for what they are. They have been treated as an awkward and no longer usable supplement to the definition of the "real causes," though these causes themselves clearly bear witness to the fact that they are *conditioned* by a particular approach to the problems in question. (GA 62: 395/SUP 143)

I will explore three claims in this passage and use them to open onto the project of the *Einleitung* as a whole. These claims are that Aristotle's analysis of *tuchē* and *automaton* 1) "ontologically explicates the 'historical' movement of factical life," 2) remains unsurpassed and misunderstood with regard to the ontological status and import of the analysis; and 3) reveals that Aristotle's account of the four "real causes" is "*conditioned* by a particular approach to the problems in question." I will work through these points in reverse order, as doing so will allow us to work from Heidegger's analysis of the danger inherent in Aristole's

prioritization of the motion of production toward an understanding of the importance and promise of the accidental (*sumbebēkos*) as it appears in the *Physics*, first in terms of the revelation of the historical environing world and then in terms of the movement of factical life itself.

In an effort to remain faithful to Heidegger's claim that these terms cannot retain their authentic meaning in translation and to avoid potential confusions in translations that conflate *tuchē* and *automaton*, I will leave these two terms untranslated here. *Tuchē* is typically translated as "chance" or "luck" in the *Physics* and as "fortune" in *Nicomachean Ethics*. *Automaton* is frequently translated as "chance" as well, sometimes as "spontaneity" or "accident," and rarely, but most in accord with Heidegger's own reading, as "self-moving." Despite the difficulties in translating *sumbebēkos*, I will sometimes risk translating it as "accident," with the acknowledgement that this cannot encompass the meaning it held for Heidegger, who himself either leaves it untranslated or equates it with "being-found-along-with" (*Mithaftigkeit*). But before doing so, I want to call attention to Helene Weiss' notes regarding her own translation of *sumbebēkos* as *Zufall* (accident).[10] Weiss makes the point that this translation is insufficient and perhaps misleading insofar as the Greek word is composed of *bainein* (to step, stand, or be in a place) and *sum* (together). A more literal definition would thus be "that which stands, or comes, or is in a place together," as shown in Heidegger's own use of *Mithaftigkeit*, which Weiss' appended notes to the summer semester lecture course discuss in some detail (GA 62: 328–29).

II. THE PRODUCTION OF CAUSALITY: THE DANGER OF *ARCHE* RESEARCH

> [The ontological analyses of *tuchē* and *automaton*] have been treated as an awkward and no longer usable supplement to the definition of "real causes," though these causes themselves clearly bear witness to the fact that they are *conditioned* by a particular approach to the problems in question (GA 62: 395/SUP 143).

A cursory look at this passage might read Heidegger as suggesting a simple reversal of the ontological priority in Aristotle's account of

causality, that is, as suggesting that *tuchē* and *automaton*, as species of *sumbebēkos*, are actually that which condition, rather than remain merely incidental to, causality proper. Although my discussion of the movement of factical life in the fourth section will suggest there is a way in which a more nuanced version of that claim might be well-founded, Heidegger is focused on a different point in this passage. Just before laying out these enigmatic passages regarding *Physics* II, Heidegger spends the bulk of the *Physics* portion of the overview discussing Aristotle's engagement with the Eleatics in book I. Through Aristotle's confrontation with Parmenides, Heidegger locates two important and inseparable aspects of Aristotle's work in the *Physics* – the method with which Aristotle approaches the phenomena of motion (*kinēsis*) in question and the insight that being must be manifold if a study of motion, and therefore causality, is going to be possible at all. While Heidegger's reading will find Aristotle correcting Parmenides' reductive preconceptions of a unitary sense of being, it will also reveal that the reason the scholarship has tended to overlook the importance of *tuchē* and *automaton* is due to Aristotle's similarly reductive approach to the problem of motion. One of Heidegger's closing claims in the *Einleitung* is that Aristotle's prejudice caused him to neglect "truth as a characteristic of beings, as the how of their unveiled being-there as they are in themselves," and "being in the how of being-found-along-with [*Mithaftigkeit*]" (GA 62: 398/SUP 144). This tells us not only that *tuchē* and *automaton*, as belonging to *sumbebēkos* (which Heidegger translates with *Mithaftigkeit*), belong essentially to being in the way in which we find it, but that, like Parmenides', Aristotle's own approach to the problem of change, or motion, conditioned his results. My task in this section is to show how and why this is the case while providing some sense of the general orientation of Heidegger's *Einleitung* as a whole.

In the methods section that opens the *Einleitung*, Heidegger has already laid out the groundwork for the tripartite hermeneutic approach to philosophical research he has been developing in his courses over the last two years to claim that a phenomenological hermeneutics must be attuned to "the particular state of the having-been-interpreted of factical life given in advance," and particularly to "what is not discussed

in it, what is thought to require no further explanation, which [...] sustains the reigning effective force of pregiven problems and directions of questioning" (GA 62: 366–67/SUP 123). As Kisiel has discussed, Heidegger's articulation of his own methodological project in this text has been slightly revised to stress the particularly Aristotelian approach in terms of a phenomenology of sight and vision; this emphasis on vision is, as McNeill's work has shown, integral for Heidegger's own working out of the *Augenblick* and will extend into *Being and Time* and beyond.[11] Heidegger is here concerned with revealing the standpoint of factical life that comprises his own "*initial position of looking* [Blickstand]" as shaped by "the *direction of looking* [Blickhabe]" and "the *scope of looking* [Blickbahn]" inherited from the Greek tradition such that he can, through a "*deconstructive regress*, penetrate into the original motivational sources of these explications" (GA 62: 345, 368/SUP 112, 124).[12] This is, of course, not only a statement of Heidegger's own motivations for and approach to the work on Aristotle, but also a reformulation of what he discovers in Aristotle himself. As such, it is perhaps unsurprising that Heidegger finds Aristotle posing the following questions in his encounter with the Eleatics:

> Were those beings that were thought of as [nature] brought into the forehaving of research in such a way that their decisive phenomenal character, namely, motion [...] was taken into true safekeeping and explicated in a primordial manner? Or was the way traditional research sought to gain access to the domain of being in question such that this research moved from the outset within "theories" and thematic principles that not only were not drawn [from] this domain of being but blocked almost all access to it? (GA 62: 392/SUP 140).

Aristotle will go on to demonstrate that the Eleatics, insofar as they insisted on a unitary understanding of being, "blocked access" to the very kind of beings under investigation in the *Physics*, beings that undergo change, beings that are moved and moving (GA 62: 392/SUP 141).

Because Parmenides insists on the unity of being, change and motion seem to indicate a realm of non-being. This is problematic insofar as *archē* research – which is, for Heidegger, concerned with a from-out-of-which that occurs *for* something else – becomes "impossible if being is not articulated as having more than one sense" (GA 62: 393/SUP 141). Aristotle's challenge in his own *archē* research will thus be, as Brogan summarizes, to "think multiplicity at the heart of unity."[13] One of the best-known outcomes of this challenge will be Aristotle's development of the relationship between *dunamis* (potency) and *energeia* (actuality), which Heidegger indicates in the *Einleitung* are of crucial importance, if almost impossible to speak of, although he will certainly go on to do so at length in his future teaching (especially GA 33). More importantly for our purposes here is the way in which Heidegger reads Aristotle's account of movement as both an improvement upon his predecessors' accounts and an obstacle to his inheritors' ontological investigations. Because Aristotle, on Heidegger's reading, recognizes that the search for an *archē* of motion must contend with those events that happen *for the sake of* something else, he recognizes that being must be understood as having multiple senses. But insofar as contemporary "philosophy moves inauthentically within *Greek* conceptuality" that has been shaped by Aristotle's own ontological preconceptions, Heidegger will claim that we still have our own work to do to clear the path for research into the phenomenon of motion itself (GA 62: 367/SUP 123).

Toward the end of the methods section, leading into his overview of the texts, Heidegger writes that the guiding question of his interpretation of Aristotle is: "*As what kind of object, with what kind of characteristics of being, was human being, i.e. 'being in life,' experienced and interpreted?*" (GA 62: 372/SUP 127). In anticipation of the concluding paragraphs of the *Einleitung* his overview will work toward, Heidegger's introductory remarks already indicate that a certain kind of motion, the motion proper to *technē* (production), became the "archontic sense of being" for Aristotle such that Aristotle's own view, like that of Parmenides, continues to block access to our own understanding of the movement proper to life today (GA 62: 373/SUP 127). Heidegger's closing paragraphs of the *Einleitung*, which indicate the full force of

his proposed book, will thus claim that Aristotle's account of categories is given neither entirely from things themselves nor from *logos*, but is conditioned by his privileging of "a particular ontology of a particular domain of being and the logic of a particular kind of addressing [that] came to be regarded [. . .] as *the one and true ontology* and the *one and true logic*" (GA 62: 397/SUP 144).

On one hand, this tendency is neither unique to Aristotle nor due entirely to an error in method, for as Heidegger notes, the Greek prephilosophical understanding of *ousia* (substance) already presupposes being in the sense of objects as possessions or property and therefore as artifacts of production (GA 62: 373–74/SUP 128). On the other hand, if Aristotle carries this understanding of being into his work in the *Physics*, the explicit task of which is not concerned with artifacts at all, but with explicating the kinds of movement proper to living beings, then Aristotle has committed the same error as Parmenides insofar as he covers over, rather than brings to light, his object of study.[14]

And, indeed, Heidegger's charge is that Aristotle does just this, although Heidegger's *Destruktion* will reveal that this is not *all* he does. In the first portion of the overview focused on the *Nicomachean Ethics*, Heidegger tells us that Aristotle's having taken production as the exemplary sense of movement results in "*an ontological radicalization of the idea of beings that are moved* [. . .in] the motion of *production*. . .Being is *finished-and-ready*, i.e. a kind of being in which motion has arrived at *its end*" (GA 62: 385/SUP 136). There is, according to Heidegger, a contradiction in Aristotle's idealization of *nous* as pure contemplation, in which motion, "precisely as having arrived at its end – really *is motion* for the first time" (GA 62: 386/SUP 136). This radicalization motivated Aristotle to conflate the movement proper to human life, which by virtue of finitude is never complete within itself, with an ideal of motion that is always already at its end. Aristotle thus seems to miss essential features of human life, such as the kind of movement it unfolds, its always being-found-along-with, and the singular and indexical nature of its concrete manifestations. Instead, the highest accomplishment of life comes to be understood by

Aristotle as the "pure and simple perceiving" of *noēsis* as pure *theorein* that satisfies the highest ideal of movement in its simultaneous seeing and having seen (GA 62: 386/SUP 137).

As Heidegger goes on to discuss in the brief overview of the *Metaphysics* that conjoins his reading of the *Ethics* and the *Physics*, this "just looking" looks away from human life, withdraws itself from the environing world of concernful dealings, and addresses things only in terms of their *ultimate* "why" (or *archē*), with the result that even objects of production are no longer viewed in terms of their particular contexts of use and concern, but merely in terms of their universalizable *eidos*, or "final" cause. Heidegger explains this tendency thus:

> In its tendency toward this looking and seeing more, factical life eventually gives up the care of directing itself to routine tasks. The with-which of those dealings directed to routine tasks changes into the toward-which of a *mere* looking at [. . .]. The look of an object becomes viewed and explicated with respect to those relations in its why that characterize the what of the object itself. Here the tendency of caring has displaced itself into a looking at [. . .] for its own sake (GA 62: 388/SUP 138).

We should note that Heidegger introduces a perplexity here insofar as he tells us that the "just looking" of *theoria* and the prioritization of production result from a tendency within care itself. But at this point, I want to bracket this curious statement until my fourth section, when Heidegger will be shown to find in Aristotle indications for thinking the movement of factical life itself. For now, what I want to emphasize in the above passage is the manner in which this "just looking" of *theoria* leads to a conflation of the "why," or *eidos*, of an object with, or as, its "what," or essence; once the *eidos* of *technē* is understood as the essence of an object, not only are we left with an essentialist ontology incapable of addressing singularities, but the object's essence becomes available in advance, without regard for how the object itself is encountered or what might happen to and with it in a world of relations. As McNeill

has discussed, this is the critique that will eventually lead Heidegger to develop his notion of presence-at-hand (*Vorhandenheit*), but already in the early 1920s Heidegger shows that the tendency to understand being in terms of technē leads to an understanding of beings as being "before the hand" (*vor-handen*).[15] Indeed, Heidegger's 1922 summer course, completed just before the composition of the *Einleitung*, ends with a discussion of *sumbebēkos* in which Heidegger's rendering of the Greek term as *Mithaftigkeit* is used to show that Aristotle's understanding of the accidental, as that which can fail to be-before-the-hand (*vorhandensein*), helps reveal the second meaning of the *sumbebēkos* as the wherein of being-found-along-with everyday dealings in the world (GA 62: 247).

Moreover, it is this tendency to focus on the *eidos* to the exclusion of the accidental, Heidegger explains, that further cements the prioritization of a kind of movement complete in itself, a movement that runs counter to the always-on-the-way movement of finite life and seems to transcend human life and finitude toward the timeless and unchanging realm of the divine. As both McNeill and Brogan have discussed, Heidegger's reading reveals that emphases on the theological importance of Aristotle do not stem from Aristotle's own privileging of the divine as such, but are, rather, drawn from the tendency to conflate the kind of motion proper to production (*technē*) with motion as such.[16] Heidegger's discussion of the *Metaphysics* demonstrates that Aristotle's accounts of divine, eternal movement in book VIII of the *Physics* and book XII of the *Metaphysics* along with the special status given *sophia* in the *Ethics* are not direct results of any of these investigations into phenomena themselves, but only the residual outcomes of the privileging of a particular kind of motion, the motion of *technē*, carried to the extreme. This insight allows Heidegger to correct, or amend, a long-standing bias toward the eternal and necessary in the scholarship, which stems from the theological inheritance of Aristotle.[17] In the context of the *Einleitung*, this is significant for two reasons. First because Heidegger explicitly states for the first time in the methods section that philosophy – as concerned with a different object of study than theology – must be atheistic, thus marking his own distance from the Scholastics, and secondly, but more importantly for our purposes here, because it allows

Heidegger to amplify the ways in which the *Physics*, as a direct investigation into movement itself, can be read as a site of resistance to the prioritization of *eidos*. Heidegger's reading of Aristotle's account of motion in *Physics* II.4–6 will, like Aristotle's reading of Parmenides in *Physics* I, retrieve an originary aspect of the phenomena; by shedding light on the preconceptions in Aristotle's ontology, Heidegger will work to reveal that which stands out in relief in Aristotle's own account.

When Aristotle begins to work through motion in the ways we encounter it, he cannot help but move beyond the *eidos* of an artifact of production to confront the ways in which motion unfolds in everyday experience where we daily encounter beings that can and will be otherwise, beings that are finite, singular, changing, and affected. As such, we find – even in Aristotle's analysis of an artifact in the *Metaphysics* – causes that cannot, by nature, be understood in terms of a movement already complete in itself, but instead gesture toward being "*for the sake of*" something. Heidegger thus modifies the question such that inquiry into causality must move from asking "why?" to asking "how?" He plays on the famous example of the house in the *Metaphysics* (1026b6–10) to note that Aristotle's reduction of that which is accidental, "[*kata sumbebēkos*], i.e. being in the how of being-found-along-with [*Mithaftigkeit*]," about the house – such as the house's being-red, being-warm, being-aside-a-lovely-river, being-filled-with-friends, etc. – to that which is *merely* accidental, or "*merely* found-along-with [*als* nur *mithaft*]," misses the way in which "objects are given in terms of their full significance in the environing world" (GA 62: 398/SUP 145).[18] An analysis of *why* the house is would miss not only *what* this house is by overlooking the possibility of singularity (*this* warm, red house, full of *these* friends, along *this* river) but also the *way* in which we initially encounter our understanding of beings as being-found-along-with others and artifacts with which we are involved within an environing world.

Even while Heidegger wants to point out the ultimate danger of Aristotle's ontology, he nevertheless credits Aristotle for having been the first to reveal the environing world as such. Heidegger writes of the promise of Aristotle's account of *sumbebēkos*:

> The fact that Aristotle was able to bring this being-found-along-with into relief as a separate sense of being is at the same time the strongest expression of the fact that he did take up the environing world as it is fully experienced…[even] if it lost this provenance due to the pressure exerted by the kind of ontology worked out [by him] (GA 62: 398–99/SUP 145).[19]

Heidegger asked us to recognize the way in which Aristotle's analysis of causes was conditioned by his approach, and tracing the steps of the overview allowed us to see that this was due to a radicalization of the ideal of production in his ontology and the attendant focus on pure perception within his logic. In order to get clear as to why *tuchē* and *automaton*, as *sumbebēkos*, are crucial for understanding this development, we need to illuminate the ways in which the eruption of that which is *sumbebēkos* within the *Physics* places into relief the conditional status of Aristotle's analysis discussed here so as to allow an analysis of the environing world and movement proper to human life to come forward.

III. THE *ATOPOS* NATURE OF *TUCHE* AND *AUTOMATON*: THE PROMISE OF *ARCHE* RESEARCH

> But is it not equally strange [*atopos*] that, however freely men admit that every kind of luck [*tuchē*] and everything that 'happens accidentally' [*automaton*] can really be assigned to some definite cause, still, while accepting this venerable argument for the elimination of chance from their thoughts, they nevertheless invariably distinguish, in fact, between things that do, and things that do not, depend upon chance [*automaton*] or luck [*tuchē*]? (196a12–17)[20]

If Aristotle, in the opening passages of *Physics* II.4, marvels at the *atopos*, or strange, nature of *tuchē* and *automaton* (196a10–15), his critiques of those who exclude chance or fortune from accounts of causality show he finds their dismissal even stranger. And yet this is precisely

what traditional doctrinal and Scholastic readings of Aristotle have tended to do by relinquishing *tuchē* and *automaton* to the realm of the merely accidental, incidental to, derivative of, and/or inferior to the four "real" causes. When Heidegger calls us to see that "*these ontological analyses have not even been understood and utilized for what they are*," he asks us to recognize that even though Aristotle's discussion of *tuchē* and *automaton* is bookended between insistences that there are just four kinds of causes, it is not the least bit accidental that they enter into his account (GA 62: 395/SUP 143, em). Aristotle's investigation shows that *aitia* (cause), like being, is said in many ways and that any substantive investigation into causes will, therefore, have to account for *tuchē* and *automaton*.

In II.4 of the *Physics* Aristotle explains that our experiences of *tuchē* and *automaton* bear witness to the fact that we perceive occurrences in addition to those that happen always or for the most part in the same way, that is, that happen beyond the bounds pre-inscribed by the eidetic projection of the producer or the inherent *telos* of nature (196b10). When we look around at the kinds of movement exhibited by living beings, we find events that appear singular and contingent, as matters of inexplicable "luck" or "chance." Of the class of things that can be otherwise, Aristotle notes, some seem to happen for the sake of something else, toward some end, and some not (196b20). *Tuchē* and *automaton* must belong to the subclass of things that do not take place necessarily (i.e. things that can be otherwise), but which nevertheless belong within the sphere of that which takes place *for the sake of* something. That is, *tuchē* and *automaton* "lead to a result that *might have been* voluntarily sought, or to a result which stands in the corresponding relation to the movements of Nature," but which nevertheless, in appearing not to have been chosen or not to have happened by design, appear to have happened accidentally (*kata sumbebēkos*) (197b20–25).

Tuchē pertains to accidental events that unfold within the realm of human decision, as shown in Aristotle's example of a debt collector meeting his debtor in the marketplace. Although he did not go to the market in order to retrieve the money owed, he very well *might*

have. "Thus," Aristotle concludes, "since choice implies intention, it follows that luck [*tuchē*] and intention are concerned with the same field of objects" (197a1–3). *Tuchē* breaks out of Aristotle's account of natural *archē* to reveal the human arena of choice and desire, and not by highlighting it as such but through the strange intervention of *tuchē*, which brings out that which would be covered over by an exhaustive focus on the four "primary" causes. Considerations of *why* or *how* occurrences of "luck" or "chance" unfold the way they do merely frustrate us, for *tuchē* cannot, by definition, be accounted for via intentional accounts of willing or other causal analyses. *Tuchē*, as an indefinite cause, eludes the grasp of *theoria* and *epistēmē*; we cannot know what stands behind it, but can only respond to the opportunities or hindrances it places before us.

Automaton, while not necessarily part of the domain of choice and intention, also shows up as that which *could have been* either the result of some intention or a result of some natural *telos* or end. Aristotle tells us that although all instances of *tuchē* are instances of *automaton*, automaton, or "spontaneity," is the larger class (197a36–38). Whereas *tuchē* is a specifically human phenomenon, *automaton* reveals itself within the realm of inanimate and natural objects and among animals as well. When things seem to happen that *could have been* the result of some natural aim, but seem instead to have happened "in vain" – *matēn*, "for nothing, to no purpose" (197b23) – we find ourselves in the realm of *automaton*. If I am hiking along a trail and a rock falls and hits me, I have to assume (barring the presence of any enemies hiding nearby) that the rock fell by chance or spontaneity (197b32–35). *Automaton*, like *tuchē*, illuminates the limits of our ability to get down to ultimate causes and origins of motion or change at the level of singular events we encounter within an incalculable world. And this is not because we do not have the foresight or hindsight to follow these seemingly random events down to a final cause that would eventually ground them, though there are moments when Aristotle and his translators seem to suggest such in deeming *tuchē* and *automaton merely* incidental to, or derivative of, the four "primary" causes (198a5–10 and 198a14, for example). Rather, Aristotle

tells us, they are indefinite, and infinitely so – we cannot get behind them now or ever, at least not without, Heidegger suggests, resorting to theological explanation (198a1–5). *Tuchē* and *automaton* completely elude the grasp of *epistēmē* and *theoria* by thrusting us into the realm of the unexpected occurrences of that which could be otherwise not merely within human life but within nature itself.

If the *Physics* is, as Heidegger suggests, the ultimate outcome of an exacerbated path of wondering "why?" then the *Physics* also, in these chapters on *tuchē* and *automaton*, discovers the limits of such questioning. Human life and its environing world intrude within the very investigation that would attempt to circumscribe the kinds of movement proper to them. Through the eruption of *tuchē* and *automaton* Heidegger finds Aristotle's acknowledgment of kinds of motion and causes that do not fit within the preconceptions of his own ontological framework. We get a picture of being-found-along-with (*mithaftig*) events that cannot help but appear singular and contingent, that place the unfolding of human and natural life into a field of relations and vulnerability to external and incalculable interactions. This, for Heidegger, is the hidden promise of Aristotle's account of motion and the reason why his account of *tuchē* and *automaton* remains unsurpassed in the tradition; for it is precisely where Aristotle's prioritization of a motion complete in itself and accessible to *theoria* comes to the fore that Aristotle opens his investigation to attest to that which his own framework cannot accommodate.

As Kisiel has noted, Heidegger, in his summer 1922 lecture course, admits that Aristotle's account of that which occurs incidentally (*kata sumbebēkos*) in the *Metaphysics* comes close to placing these phenomena in the realm of non-being (GA 62: 256).[21] However, Heidegger's move to the *Physics* within that lecture course and the *Einleitung* stress that Aristotle's acknowledgement of the *sumbebēkos* points beyond an ontology that reduces being to being-produced-and-ready for calculation, to reveal a promise within the slippage between Aristotle's logic and his explication of the phenomena of movement.

Heidegger's translation of *sumbebēkos* as being-found-along-with (*Mithaftigkeit*) gives us three indications of the ways in which Aristotle's examination of motion opens onto, rather than simply closes off, access to factical life via care (*Sorge*), the environing world (*Umwelt*), and the auto-motion of life itself. Weiss' literal translation of *sumbebēkos* as "that which comes together" (noted in my introduction) was motivated at least in part by her own working out of the definition of *Mithaftigkeit* given in Heidegger's 1922 summer course, where his intervention into 186b18 of the *Physics* provides an alternative definition of *sumbebēkos* as that wherein something is found-along-with (*mithaft*) (GA 62: 328–29; 247).[22] Within the methods section of the *Einleitung*, Heidegger describes this wherein as the environing world (*Umwelt*) or with-world (*Mitwelt*) where we find ourselves navigating based on care for the sake of concernful dealings (GA 62: 352/SUP 115). Heidegger's emphasis on care, like his reading of Aristotle's treatment of causality, highlights that that *toward* and *for* which we act extends to a world wherein we encounter others and tasks *as* that which we care *about*. When Heidegger refers to *sumbebēkos* as that which is *mithaft* in the closing sections of the *Einleitung*, it is to acknowledge that Aristotle did, indeed, discover *mithaft* as a "separate sense of being," one that reveals objects "in terms of their full significance in terms of the environing world" (GA 62: 398/SUP 145). And of course, this is not without temporal significance. Insofar as *tuchē* and *automaton* surprise and frustrate our attempts to locate the *archē* from out of which and the *telos* toward which they unfold, they point toward the fact that we always already find ourselves in a worldly, historical context that has been shaped in advance and heads toward a final destination we have yet to arrive at. This intrinsic relation between the inability to find the ground and ends of action and the already and not-yet of human finitude will be found to be determined by the movement of care intrinsic to human life, into which we are always already thrown, and toward which the gravity of disposition and tradition pull us. Heidegger thus writes in the winter 1921–1922 lecture course that life has a kind of "auto-motion, which is precisely its *own* in the fact that *life lives outside of itself*" (GA 61: 130/97).

This movement is not, however, unidirectional, but evinces a double turning in which we are both drawn toward and turn away from the world in which we find ourselves. Heidegger will thus go on to show, in the concluding sentences of the *Einleitung*, that Aristotle's tendency to fall into an idealization of the model of production and the "just looking" of *theoria* illustrates something about the movement of factical life as such, rather than – or in addition to – the Greek understanding of being as *technē*. Heidegger will ask us to see not only that Aristotle's ontological idealization was unable to run its course without simultaneously placing in relief a realm of phenomena that it could not inscribe within its own limits, but that within the very study of nature, the position and circumstance of the investigator himself crops up as a testament to the inherent pull of the movement of facticity. Following Heidegger's indications in the methods section of the *Einleitung* alongside the directives his reading of Aristotle has provided thus far will allow me to unpack Heidegger's opening claim regarding the historical movement of life in the passage I am working through, and allow us to complete our own project of making some sense of Heidegger's mysterious remarks on *tuchē* and *automaton* by coming full circle toward the double movement of life Heidegger's *Einleitung* works to expose.

IV. THE *ATOPOS* MOVEMENT OF FACTICAL LIFE: MOVEMENT AND COUNTER-MOVEMENT

> It is shown that under the headings of [*tuchē*], [*automaton*] (terms utterly untranslatable when it comes to their authentic meaning), Aristotle ontologically explicates the "historical" movement of factical life, i.e. the movement of "what happens and can happen in such a way to someone everyday" (GA 62: 395/SUP 143).

Kisiel has rightly noted that Heidegger thinks *tuchē* and *automaton* "come closest to characterizing the thoroughly historical movement of factical life" where beings can and must "also be otherwise" than they are within any given moment.[23] What I want to show in this section is the manner in which Heidegger's retrieval of the historical

movement proper to factical life in the *Einleitung* finds the resources within Aristotle's *Physics* to bring out two additional insights regarding the movement of factical life. It is my contention that we can stretch this passage in at least two directions, both of which deepen Heidegger's reading. One of these readings comes back to a thread we left tangled in obscurity in the first section, when we saw Heidegger remark that Aristotle's emphasis on the "just looking" of *theoria* was an indication that "the tendency of caring has displaced itself into a looking at…for its own sake" (GA 62: 388/SUP 138). This reading, the first I will offer in this section, looks at this passage in order to show that Heidegger, rather than treating Aristotle's reduction of that which comes about *kata sumbebēkos* to that which is ontologically secondary exclusively as a flaw in Aristotle's thought, understands this as an ongoing tendency of the movement of factical life itself. The second indication given in this passage, which I will then proceed to follow, picks up some of the characteristics of *tuchē* and *automaton* brought out in the last section of this paper to explicate the movement of factical life as primarily unfolding being as *kata sumbebēkos*, or, as Heidegger translates, being as being-found-along-with (*Mithaftigkeit*), within the movement of *phronēsis*.

Heidegger tells us that Aristotle's way of addressing beings in terms of the "why" of *theoria* comes about through "*the factical movement of care with respect to its ultimate tendency*" (GA 62: 389/SUP 139). In the methodological section of the *Einleitung*, Heidegger describes the basic movement of factical life in terms of care for its dealings in the world, and an attendant desire to intimately know the with-which of those dealings. This does not, however, entail that all of our ways of encountering things see them in terms of the significance of our involvements with them as objects "for" or "as." Heidegger cites a tendency within factical life itself through which "dealings are transformed into a mere looking around…. In the care of this looking, i.e. in curiosity […] the world is there for one not as the with-which of dealings directed toward routine tasks but solely from the point of view of its *look* (*eidos*), its *appearance*" (GA 62: 353/SUP 116). This is, Heidegger goes on to explain, the source of science, which steps back

from addressing things in terms of the "how" of our everyday manners of involvement, and instead seeks to engage objects for the sake of defining them in terms of their *eidos* or ultimate cause. This results in a reduction of the significance of objects in the way we encounter them as being-found-along-with to bare presence or facts.

Heidegger's point here is that things as they are in themselves are not, after all, brought into appearance by "just looking"; rather, things appear found-along-with a world of significant involvement, which is to say we really do not encounter things *in themselves* at all. Hence his remarks in the conclusion, cited earlier in this paper, that Aristotle misses both the way in which beings are unconcealed in truth and the way being appears in being-found-along-with, neither of which show up in the "just looking" of curiosity or *theorein*. Heidegger indicates that Aristotle's focus on the *eidos* of production and consequent relative neglect of that which happens *kata sumbebēkos* reveal a tendency toward *epistēmē*, or scientific knowledge, within the caring of factical life itself, a tendency that leads to a focus on actuality conceived in terms of the bare presence of objectivity. Heidegger diagnoses this "basic characteristic of the movement of caring" as the "factical tendency in life toward *falling away* [Abfallen] from itself and as included in this, *falling into* [Verfallen] the world" (GA 62: 356/SUP 117).

This inclination is part and parcel of the "falling" movement of factical life within its world of concern through which one immerses oneself in one's world not in terms of one's involvement in it, but in such a way that life itself is viewed in a "worldly manner as an object of dealings able to be produced in some ideal form" (GA 62: 356/SUP 117). Paradoxically, "falling" into worldly immersion obscures the world as that which we care about. Caring, as the inherent movement of factical life, tends toward a hypertrophic immersion in the world to the degree that caring ceases to unfold as a relationship to people and things we care *about*. Instead, the ideal of involvement is pushed to its utmost limits, where life understands *itself* via the ideal of an object of production. If we take this back to Heidegger's reading of the danger of Aristotle's ontology, we are reminded that the idealization

of an object of production as an object complete in itself and standing ready misses human life itself. Brogan thus points out that Aristotle has committed a misapplication of the category of *Vorhandenheit* (beings found as present and available) to beings that can and will, by nature, always be otherwise.[24] And of course, Heidegger's translation of *sumbebēkos* as *Mithaftigkeit*, that which is marked by its possibility of *not appearing vorhanden*, emphasizes that we daily and for the most part encounter beings and objects that resist our attempts to capture them within theoretical apprehension. Even here, where the danger of "falling" is most acutely diagnosed, however, Aristotle's promise appears twofold. He shows us, through his setting into relief of the realm of the *sumbebēkos*, that there is an originary way in which the motion of human life differs from the motion of production.

Initially, we encounter being and ourselves as being-found-along-with a world of involvement, as *on kata sumbebēkos*. Factical life always already finds itself thrown into a historical world of uncertainties, singularities, and relationships that – as we were called to see in the second section of this paper – it can never get behind or in front of, but only respond to. When the basic movement of this life, as caring for and in the world, is taken to an extreme, factical life becomes "tempted" to "conceal itself from itself in the world," and to secure itself against the uncertainty of finite exposure through just looking (GA 62: 358/ SUP 118). Heidegger's linking of his account of facticity with Aristotle's account of motion stresses that when this transpires, life desires to be complete in itself – that is, it transposes the ideal of the motion proper to the *eidos* of production onto itself. This tendency within care is described by Heidegger as a way in which life avoids confrontation with its own finitude and concern for its own contingency by taking refuge in the tranquilizing movement of *sophia* as careless looking. This move, as Brogan's analysis of the twofoldedness of being has helped illuminate, leads to an interpretation of the *archē* of human life as that which is concerned solely with asking "why?" at the expense of inquiring into the "how" of the twofold motion of human life.[25]

Life, as finite, can never be complete in itself, but is always *on the way* toward its own end. As such, there must be another kind of motion

with which to understand the movement of human life, one that resists the completeness of the *eidos* to bear witness to the temporal circumstances of human existence. Heidegger finds the resources in Aristotle for just such an understanding of motion by reading the *Nicomachean Ethics* through the *Physics*. Heidegger prefaces his remarks on *tuchē* and *automaton* with the insistence that *Physics* 1.7, which discusses coming to be as being-otherwise, contains Aristotle's most fundamental insight into motion, an insight that keeps him from simply repeating the mistakes of the Eleatics and allows us to access the importance of his account in Book 11. It is Aristotle's admission in *Physics* 1.7 that *sterēsis*, lack or absence, belongs to being itself that causes Heidegger to proclaim that Aristotle's first definition of *sumbebēkos* as that which, in being inconstant, borders on non-being in book 1.3 must be reread from the perspective of book 1.7. Once we do this, we are prepared to approach the analysis of *tuchē* and *automaton* in 11.4–6 as testament to another sense of being, the being-found-along-with (*Mithaftigkeit*) of *sumbebēkos*. Moreover, as Brogan has emphasized, it is Aristotle's discovery of *sterēsis* that allows Heidegger to recover the sense in which motion (*kinēsis*) demonstrates a middle-voiced character, a movement and counter-movement within human life itself.[26]

Heidegger pushes back against Aristotle's emphasis on *theoria* not merely to pick up what is shown in relief within the *Physics*, but to bring this back to bear upon the *Nicomachean Ethics*, where he discovers a "motion running counter to the falling of its care" that arises in a "concrete manner at [a] particular time" (GA 62: 358/ SUP 118). Heidegger's reading of the *Ethics* will question the priority of *sophia* in order to illuminate the importance of *phronēsis*, which is complete only within the moment (*Augenblick*) of circumspection that is attentive to its "for the sake of which" from within the "how" of practical involvement within the singular context of action rather than the already complete *archē* of *eidos*. *Phronēsis* shines through for Heidegger as both the kind of motion proper to human life, and the kind of knowing capable of revealing being as it is in being-found-along-with (*on kata sumbebēkos*). This is, Heidegger, maintains, the true *archē* of action, the double face of *kinēsis*, which "always is what

it is only in its concrete reference to the moment," with all of the particularities it presents (GA 62: 384/SUP 135).

McNeill's reading of the *Einleitung* develops this problem in a way that not only makes clear the importance of Book VI of the *Ethics* for Heidegger's own development of the *Augenblick* in *Being and Time*, but also brings to light one of Heidegger's key insights regarding Aristotle's account of motion in 1922.[27] McNeill argues that within the *Einleitung*, Heidegger's summary of Aristotle presents the movement of *praxis* as evincing its own particular and peculiar manner of completion within the *kairological* unity of that which has yet to occur and that which has already been the case. As McNeill explains, "the *prakton*, as disclosed within *phronēsis* has at once not yet happened, in that it has yet to be achieved concretely, and yet has already happened in the sense that it is already held in readiness (as a determinate possibility) by the disclosive moment of *phronēsis*."[28] This holding in view of the not-yet differs from the making present of the *eidos* of *theorein* in the sense that the glance afforded by *phronēsis* remains radically unstable and ever incomplete; insofar as the concrete field of action will always be directed toward the possible and insofar as the one acting is a being whose own future takes the form of a lack, the not-yet of Dasein's own death, the movement of *phronēsis* accommodates *sterēsis*. As such, *phronēsis* unfolds a movement that McNeill tells us should be understood as the "coming into full presence of a potentiality [*dunamis*]."[29] While Aristotle's radicalization of the movement proper to production (*technē*) leads to the prioritization of *eidos*, which eclipses potency (*dunamis*) in order to bring actuality (*energeia*) into view, his account of *phronēsis* reveals a counter-movement within human life, one that depends upon, rather than conceals, absence. Heidegger writes in the *Ethics* portion of the overview:

> [*Phronēsis*] is a doubling of the point of view into which Aristotle placed the human being and the being of life [. . .]. In circumspection, life is there for itself in the concrete how of the with-which of going about its dealings. However, and this is decisive for Aristotle, it is [. . .] not

> in a positive manner that the being-which of dealings is ontologically defined. Rather, it is defined in a formal manner of being capable of being otherwise than it is and thus not necessarily and always what it is. This ontological definition gets actualized through a *negative* comparison with another [positive sense] of being (GA 62: 386/SUP 136).

In this passage Heidegger stresses *phronēsis* as the kind of motion whose "for the sake of which," or *archē*, reaches back toward the context of the environing world in which beings are not necessary, but contingent and accidental (*sumbebēkos*), not complete, but unfinished and on the way. This double sense of *archē* is what allows Aristotle to move beyond Parmenides; even if Aristotle subordinates the kind of motion proper to *sumbebēkos* in his prioritization of *technē*, he nevertheless succeeds in revealing that motion and cause, like being, must hold more than one sense.

Phronēsis reveals a way in which life can recuperate itself from out of its dispersion in the world of accidents and exposure to the realm of chance not through cutting itself off from the world and taking refuge within the already complete movement of *sophia*, but through taking up concrete life in all of its singularities within the moment of decision, thereby letting life find its own kind of unity in the ever-incomplete and ongoing movement of historical, factical life. If the last section situated us within a field of events we encountered as accidental (*sumbebēkos*), as not having been chosen or directed in advance, a field in which we ran into the limits of *epistēmē* and *theoria*, then *phronēsis* emerges as that manner of acting and knowing proper to our situation.

When Heidegger insists that Aristotle's ontological analyses of *tuchē* and *automaton* reveal the historical movement of factical life, he shows us two ways in which this is the case. First, within Aristotle's reduction of the accidental to that which is derivative of and secondary to "real" causes, Heidegger recovers a tendency toward "falling into the world" within the movement of factical life. The movement of "falling" transposes the kind of motion proper to production, in which the *eidos*

is always already complete in itself, onto human life so as to foreclose the possibility of confrontation with the movement of finite human life traversing a complex field of relations. Once we understand that this is the case, Heidegger is able to retrieve a second sense of motion from Aristotle's account, one that reveals the counter-movement of praxis. The kairological unity of *phronēsis* as the moment of action demonstrates that the movement proper to human life is able to find its own kind of completion – a completion that accommodates, rather than avoids, exposure to potentiality (*dunamis*) and absence (*sterēsis*) – within the recuperation of itself from out of its dispersion in the world. This movement illustrates another sense of *archē* as that which is what it is by being "for the sake of" beings that are found-along-with (*mithatft*) an environing world, beings that can and will be otherwise.

V. CONCLUSIONS WITHOUT ENDS

In unpacking Heidegger's remarks as to the importance of *Physics* II.4–6, we have come full circle from an account of the motion of production (*technē*), with its attendant focus on the *archē* of the *eidos*, to an account of *praxis*, whose *archai* are always embedded within the environing world of that which is found-along-with and accidental. If we return to Heidegger's initial remarks regarding *Physics* II.4–6 from this perspective, we can expand his initial suggestions to say that Aristotle's account of *tuchē* and *automaton*

1) "ontologically explicates the 'historical' movement of factical life," by revealing both the tendency toward "falling" within factical life, which led Aristotle to prize *eidos* and *theoria* to the neglect of the *sumbebēkos*, and the counter-movement of factical life, which unfolds itself as being-found-along-with from within phronetic temporalization;
2) remains unsurpassed and misunderstood as regards the import of the ontological analysis insofar as the *sumbebēkos* is considered merely derivative of and not fundamental for an account of causes; and

3) reveals that the account of the four "real causes" is itself conditioned by Aristotle's own understanding of being in terms of *technē* and consequent privileging of the motion of production, both of which are called into question by his own account of that which is *kata sumbebēkos*.

The force of Heidegger's reading of *tuchē* and *automaton* in 1922 reveals itself within the retrieval of the movement and counter-movement intrinsic to historical life, in which we find a double sense of *archē*. Once we understand care as concern for that toward which we are disposed and to which we are exposed at every moment, the eidetic *archē* of *technē* shows up as that which arises in response to the anxiety of being-found-along-with (*Mithaftigkeit* or *sumbebēkos*). Rather than subordinate *tuchē* and *sumbebēkos* to final causes, Heidegger asks that we recognize the priority of *praxis*, whose *archē* is always already, like human life itself, *mithaftig*.[30]

NOTES

1 Heidegger composed this from late September to mid-October, 1922. It would have been published in volume 7 and possibly volume 8 (1924/1925) of Husserl's *Jahrbuch für Philosophie und phänomenologische Forschung*. This information is presented in Hans-Ulrich Lessing's afterword to the first published edition of the *Einleitung*: "Phänomenologische Interpretationen zu Aristoteles (Anzeige der hermeneutischen Situation)," *Dilthey-Jahrbuch für Philosophie und Geschichte der Geisteswissenshaften*, 6 (1989): 235–74.

2 Martin Heidegger and Karl Löwith, *Briefwechsel, 1919–1973*, ed. Alfred Denker (Freiburg/Munich: Karl Alber, 2016), 88. Kisiel and Sheehan have also made some of the correspondence between Husserl, Natorp, and Misch regarding this text available in *Becoming Heidegger: On the Trail of His Early Occasional Writings 1919–1927*, ed. Theodore Kisiel and Thomas Sheehan (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 2007), 366–72.

3 While Heidegger's handwritten note on the typescript identifies only the first section of the text as the *Einleitung* proper, I will here – for reasons of brevity and clarity as well as disambiguation from Heidegger's published lecture courses – refer to the manuscript as a whole as such.

4 All citation will be to the translation of the *Einleitung* available as Martin Heidegger, "Phenomenological Interpretations in Connection with Aristotle: An Indication of the Hermeneutical Situation," trans. John van Buren, SUP 111–45. The first full translation of this text by Michael Baur, also consulted, is published as Martin Heidegger, "Phenomenological Interpretations with Respect to Aristotle: Indication of the Hermeneutic Situation," trans. Michael Baur, *Man and World* 25 (1992): 355–93. Baur's translation is based on Misch's copy of the text, edited to remove Misch's notes by Hans-Ulrich Lessing (see note 1). Baur's translation has been reproduced in part, with a summary by the editors, as "Phenomenological Interpretations with Respect to Aristotle," in Kisiel

and Sheehan, *Becoming*, 150–84; and reproduced in part, with edits by the editor, as "Indication of the Hermeneutic Situation," in *The Heidegger Reader*, ed. Günter Figal, trans. Jerome Veith (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2009), 38–61. Sections of the *Einleitung* have also been translated and edited in Kisiel, *Genesis*, 252–74.

5 As Kisiel notes, Heidegger's substitution of a lecture with a practicum on the material for the Aristotle book shows he was planning to focus on further developing the work over the winter of 1922–1923. The title Kisiel gives is taken directly from Becker's notes: *Genesis*, 556 n15.

6 Walter A. Brogan, *Heidegger and Aristotle: The Twofoldness of Being* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2005), 12.

7 Kisiel notes changes in terminological usage between the two essays in *Genesis*, 311–22.

8 For key discussions of the importance of the Aristotle *Einleitung* for *Being and Time* see Kisiel, *Genesis*, 248–52 and 311–22; Brogan, *Twofoldness*, 13–20; William McNeill, *The Glance of the Eye: Heidegger, Aristotle, and the Ends of Theory* (Albany: State University of New York University Press: 1999), 123–31; Kisiel and Sheehan, *Becoming*, 150–54; Franco Volpi, "*Being and Time*: A Translation of the Nicomachean Ethics?" trans. John Protevi, in *Reading Heidegger from the Start: Essays in His Earliest Thought*, ed. Theodore Kisiel and John van Buren (Albany: State University of New York Press: 1994), 195–211.

9 Kisiel offers a gloss of this section as pointing out the historical nature of factical life in *Genesis*, 268 and *Becoming*, 183. David Webb, in *Heidegger, Ethics, and the Practice of Ontology* (New York: Continuum, 2009) briefly mentions Heidegger's citation of Aristotle on chance to work toward a discussion of freedom without unpacking it within the context of the *Einleitung*. Heidegger's student from 1920–1934 Helene Weiss wrote her doctoral work on the concept of the *sumbebēkos*, but even her book ends without an explication of *tuchē*, which she states the entire work has been a

preparation for: Helene Weiss, *Kausalität und Zufall in der Philosophie des Aristoteles* (Ph.D. dissertation, Basel, 1935; reprinted, Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgemeinschaft, 1967).

10 Weiss, *Zufall*, 157.

11 McNeill, *Glance*.

12 Kisiel and Sheehan, *Becoming*, 152–53.

13 Brogan, *Twofoldness*, 18.

14 For an excellent discussion of this tension in terms of *Being and Time*, see William McNeill, "Tracing *technē*: Heidegger, Aristotle, and the Legacy of Philosophy," in *Heidegger's Question of Being*, ed. Holger Zaborowski (Washington D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 2017), 71.

15 McNeill, "Tracing," 75.

16 McNeill, "Tracing," 76–77; McNeill, *Glance*, 127; Brogan, *Twofoldness*, 17.

17 For readings that stress the theological implications of the Einleitung, see Gadamer's introduction to the first publication of it in the *Dilthey-Jahrbuch für Philosophie und Geschichte der Geisteswissenschaften* 6 (1989): 235–37; John van Buren, *The Young Heidegger: Rumor of the Hidden King* (Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1994).

18 Heidegger works through this example in his 1922 summer semester course as well (GA 62: 251); Kisiel summarizes this in *Genesis*, 248.

19 This articulation appears almost verbatim in the 1922 summer course (GA 62: 256–57).

20 All translations from Aristotle, *Physics*, trans. P. H. Wicksteed and F. M. Cornford, in *Aristotle IV*, Loeb Classical Library (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1929).

21 Kisiel, *Genesis*, 248.

22 Weiss, *Zufall*, 157.

23 Kisiel and Sheehan, *Becoming*, 183.

24 Brogan, *Twofoldness*, 14.

25 Brogan, *Twofoldness*, 18.

26 Brogan, *Twofoldness*, 19.
27 McNeill, Glance, 123–31.
28 McNeill, Glance, 125.
29 McNeill, Glance.
30 In addition to those cited throughout, who make this work possible, my gratitude extends to everyone who offered feedback on drafts or presentations of this material. I am indebted to Will McNeill and Sean Kirkland for their generous comments on my first drafts of this project. This paper also benefited from comments and questions posed by Jessica Elkayam, Larry Hatab, and Bob Scharff during the 2017 Heidegger Circle SPEP satellite session. Special thanks to Cameron Coates and Khafiz Kerimov, whose conversation greatly enriched my understanding of Aristotle. And, finally, gratitude to Richard Polt and members of the editorial board for comments on this revision.

Heidegger's Epicureanism: Death, Dwelling and *Ataraxia*

Paul Gyllenhammer

ABSTRACT: Heidegger and Epicurus seem to be separated by a great divide. Where Epicurus seeks *ataraxia* by minimizing anxiety and our concern with death, Heidegger describes how anxiety and death are factored into authentic living. But looks can be deceiving. A close study of Heidegger's critique of *das Man* reveals a distinctly Epicurean line of thinking. His account of curiosity, in particular, parallels Epicurus's own criticism of normal life as being mired in unnatural/empty desires due to an unconscious fear of death. Despite this similarity, Heidegger's interest in ontological anxiety, i.e., homelessness, contrasts deeply with Epicurus's goal of mental tranquility. Yet this difference is overcome, in part, in Heidegger's turn to peaceful dwelling as an expression of authentic Being-in-the-world. Indeed, Heidegger's account of the fourfold as the essence of dwelling can be seen as an Epicurean four-part cure to suffering (*tetrapharmakos*), bringing Heidegger into dialogue with the tradition of philosophical therapy.

KEYWORDS: anxiety, *ataraxia*, death, dwelling, fourfold, therapy

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More should be said about the relationship between Epicurus and Heidegger than what can be found in either Heidegger's own writings or the secondary literature about Heidegger or Epicurus. Heidegger mentions him rarely and mostly in passing.[1] The same happens in the secondary literature. I do not know of a single extended account of their possible convergence.[2] I would like to remedy this absence in the following essay.

The focus of this study stems from my interest in bringing Heidegger into dialogue with the philosophical therapeutic tradition, particularly the Epicurean view of therapy. Philosophical therapy finds its roots in classical Greek, Hellenistic and Roman thinkers. The core idea linking these various views is that philosophy is a way of life or spiritual exercise that brings out our true being.[3] Bringing Heidegger into dialogue with this tradition is needed because his own focus on recovering a proper grasp of Being demands that a person is himself or herself open to Being. The (Epicurean) therapy implied in Heidegger's view relates to how such an openness is nurtured.

This essay begins with a study of Epicurus's famous account of death, the right understanding of which leads to his main goal of *ataraxia*. We will see how well Epicurus's position not only relates to Heidegger's account in *Being and Time* – where their views of death are closer than what is commonly understood – but also how it helps bring to light Heidegger's later account of therapeutic transformation through dwelling (*Wohnen*). Indeed, a distinctly Epicurean way of life is suggested within Heidegger's own critique of modernity. Even if Epicurus's account of *ataraxia* does contrast with Heidegger's description of anxiety in *Being and Time*, it also offers an important parallel to what Heidegger will ultimately take as deeply relational living. Both thinkers base their understandings of these transformative experiences (*ataraxia* and dwelling) on a proper disposition toward nature or *physis* – a disposition that is attuned to the reality of death as much as it is to the magnetically affective presence of beings in the world.

I. ON THE SUPPOSED DISAGREEMENT BETWEEN EPICURUS AND HEIDEGGER

Whenever I come across a discussion of Epicurus and Heidegger, the author usually focuses on the seeming difference between their concerns with death. Mark Wrathall, for example, uses Epicurus's famous quotation as a way to set him apart from Heidegger. Wrathall says,

> Epicurus…argued that death, "that most frightful of evils…is nothing to us, seeing that when we exist death is not present, and when present we do not exist." As a consequence, Epicurus believed that it was incoherent to have anything but a stance of indifference towards our own deaths. For Heidegger, by contrast, death is "not nothing to us," but our ownmost possibility. And for Heidegger, anxiety in the face of death is the right way to respond to it.[4]

I maintain that this rather common contrast is not entirely correct.[5] As I show, Epicurus does not suggest that we should be indifferent toward death. His point is that we should have a correct attitude toward death, which brings him rather close to Heidegger's focus on death as our ownmost possibility. Death shapes our attitude toward life, so we cannot be indifferent to it. Yet Wrathall's point about anxiety is a point of contrast to Epicurus – at least in Heidegger's early work. Even here, however, the contrast to Epicurus is not so black and white.

A. EPICURUS ON DEATH AND THE CRAVING FOR IMMORTALITY

Epicurus's philosophy is explicitly and fundamentally therapeutic.[6] He goes so far as to say that even the studies of physics and meteorology should be subordinated to human well-being. In a statement that could be (partly) advanced by Husserl or Heidegger, Epicurus says: "For we must not conduct scientific investigation by means of empty assumptions and arbitrary principle, but follow the lead of phenomena: for our life has not now any place for irrational belief and groundless

imaginings, but we must live free from trouble."[7] Human well-being (brought about through proper reason or wisdom) is the ground by which all other studies should be measured.[8]

What is also distinctive about Epicurus's account of the good life is that it is, theoretically, open to anyone and at any time. Happiness or fulfillment, in a word, can be now. Epicurus's view is in sharp contrast to Aristotle's theory of well-being, which is both based on a cumulative development of virtue and elitist. However, even if happiness could be now, the fact is that most people live in misery – a misery that is, by and large, self-generated. Epicurus's philosophy is geared toward showing people the way to a healthy life – free from both mental anxiety or *ataraxia* and physical pain or *aponia*.[9] And the key to finding such mental/physical tranquility lies in the reduction of life's complexity. In short, "The most unalloyed source of protection…is in fact the immunity which results from a quiet life and the retirement from the world" (SEP, 36). This claim is at the heart of Epicurus's famous proverb "Live in hiding" (*lathe biōsas*).

Even if Epicurus is technically a hedonist, this emphasis on minimalism seems, in many respects, the opposite of what a typical hedonist would advocate as the goal of life. Indeed, Epicurus is so radical in his view that he implores his followers to avoid all the refined trappings of a cultured society. Paradoxically, this is what makes Epicurus's life philosophy so difficult to engage.[10] Most of us are so mired in the so-called "goods" of society that we cannot imagine living without them. We are so deeply afraid of losing the refinements of life that the simple life appears as terrifying. So, even if the good life can be now, in reality, most of us are so addicted to destructive things that there is a long road ahead to healthy living.

Achieving a healthy state or *ataraxia* demands a change in habits. The goal is to establish a constant, peaceful attitude toward the world and maintain it throughout the pursuit of long- and short-term goals. We have to, in other words, establish a firm foundation in the "freedom from disturbance and suffering" (i.e., *ataraxia*) so that our pursuit of distant goals is not how we determine our well-being. If future goals

are not met, the firm foundation of *ataraxia* allows us to dismiss these losses as meaningless. But how do we establish this firm foundation?

Epicurus bases his therapeutic philosophy on the *tetrapharmakos* or four-part cure. His therapy is rooted in the claim that there are four main causes of unnecessary suffering – the elimination of which will lead to a life of peace. Concisely stated, Epicurus says:

> For indeed who…is a better man than he who holds reverent opinions concerning the gods, and is at all times free from fear of death, and has reasoned out the end ordained by nature? He understands that the limit of good things is easy to fulfil and easy to attain, whereas the course of ills is either short in time or slight in pain. (SEP, 32–33)

From this passage (and others like it) the four-part cure has been summarized as:

1. God should not concern us.
2. Death is not to be feared.
3. What is good is easy to obtain.
4. What is bad (or painful) is easily avoided.[11]

In what follows, I would like to explain more precisely what Epicurus means by not fearing death. His point is not that we should be indifferent to it. What we need is a proper attitude toward it, since an improper attitude toward death causes unnecessary fear and anxiety. To this end, I will highlight how 1) the fear of God and 3) fear of the simple life are interwoven into 2) Epicurus's famous criticism of fearing death.[12] In a longer passage than the one used by Wrathall above, Epicurus says:

> Become accustomed to the belief that death is nothing to us. For all good and evil consists in sensation, but death is deprivation of sensation. And therefore a right understanding that death is nothing to us makes

> the mortality of life enjoyable, not because it adds to it an infinite span of time, but because it takes away the craving for immortality. (SEP, 30)

Now, if we approach only the first part of Epicurus's view about death (the "deprivation of sensation"), then a rather clear contrast to Heidegger is present. Heidegger is focused on how we deal with our being as a Being-toward-death (*Sein zum Tode*). However, if we emphasize the latter point ("the craving for immortality") we see how it ties, not only to the other aspects of the *tetrapharmakos*, but to Heidegger as well. Let us explore the former before the latter.

Epicurus's attitude toward death can be taken as based on the removal of the "craving for immortality."[13] At one level, this view is derived from his metaphysics. Given his materialism, at death there is nothing that survives, making any hope for immortality irrational. Tying this to the first point of the *tetrapharmakos*, at least one worry about death is dispelled. Namely, if there is a God, nothing anyone does in this life could possibly affect the way God deals with us in the afterlife. Since there is no personal immortality, no one has to fear God's wrath.[14]

Now, Epicurus's philosophy is never purely theoretical. His view is significantly informed by the actual causes of misery – one of which is the personal and social tensions that diverse religions/cults create in the world.[15] So Epicurus's practical suggestion is to withdraw from any participation in religious practices and let nature itself be our guide. Since we all live within nature, it should guide us, not some mystical other-world. Thus, dispelling the fear of God (#1 of the *tetrapharmakos*) is linked to dispelling fear of death by eliminating the "craving for immortality," which happens not only by abstract argumentation but by disengaging ourselves from religious practice altogether.[16] But how does the elimination of the "craving for immortality" also relate to the third part of the *tetrapharmakos*?

For Epicurus, the fear of death is a deep affliction in the human psyche, which is linked to more than religious belief. It is an unconscious fear that realizes itself in the fascination people develop with luxurious pleasures, political conquest, and fame.[17] All of these endeavors

are destructive for Epicurus in that they defy the third part of the four-part cure: what is good is easy to get in life. But they are also tied to the problem of "craving immortality."

Epicurus highlights that what humans really need is not hard to acquire or, negatively, that much of human anxiety is caused by needing pleasures that are either unnecessary or unnatural, i.e., empty (SEP, 37). The unnecessary pleasures are dangerous because if we become addicted to them, then our lives become dependent on them. We will have to work harder to afford the unnecessary pleasures and we will become mentally unstable in their absence. Here, Epicurus warns against the reliance on luxuries, such as fine clothes, houses, and lavish meals.

Regarding the unnatural pleasures, these are purely artificial creations and serve no natural or necessary need. Epicurus has in mind, again, the dangerous passion for religion but includes also the desires for political power and fame. Politics and popularity suffer from the same defect: no individual controls these arenas and the desires are constantly frustrated due to the impermanence of these realms.[18] One's very freedom to find peace is violated in these endeavors since the object of the pursuit is constantly out of one's control. And these desires defy nature because they are completely social artifacts. Epicurus drives a wedge between nature and culture.

Now, it seems fairly obvious how the desires for political power and fame correlate to the desire for immortality. The notion of *kleos* or glory is a part of the Homeric system from which Epicurus is distancing himself.[19] But how does the pursuit of luxurious pleasures relate to the desire for immortality?

On the one hand, seeking pleasure and avoiding pain are not directly related to a desire for immortality. For Epicurus, as a hedonist, pleasure and pain are the main clues for living the good life. But people do lose themselves in a miserable pursuit of complex pleasures, wasting their lives because they falsely believe they need them and pretend they have all the time in the world to chase after them. In this way, the slavish pursuit of unnecessary pleasures is linked to a false belief in immortal time. So, a correct attitude toward our mortality is needed

to break the bad habit of seeking unnecessary pleasures as means to open us to the importance of the now. For Epicurus, there is no time to waste. We should seek *ataraxia* now!

Before we turn to a comparison with Heidegger, a final point must be made about *ataraxia*. As we eliminate the sources of anxiety by dispelling false belief in the need for certain things (unnecessary and unnatural goods), we learn to live within the scope of both natural and necessary pleasures. This distinction seems more analytic than real, since the goal of the simple life is to take pleasure in the contemplative realization that what we need is already there for us to use for the sake of promoting the good life. Water, sleep, simple shelter, readily available food sources, friendly conversations, etc., are all examples of both necessary and natural goods.[20] We need them to live; yet, when we appreciate them as the grounds of the good life then they are understood to be the very sources of happiness. The so-called simple pleasures are now seen as the most exalted goods in life.

Again, recall that the goal for Epicurus is to enjoy the simple life. In a rather compelling passage, he says,

> For it is to obtain this end that we always act, namely, to avoid pain and fear. And when this is once secured for us, all the tempest of the soul is dispersed, since the living creature has not to wander as though in search of something that is missing…For it is then that we have need of pleasure, when we feel pain owing to the absence of pleasure; but when we do not feel pain, we no longer need pleasure. (SEP, 31)

This passage highlights exactly why it is so hard to classify Epicurus as a hedonist. What type of state is this that is neither painful nor pleasurable? Are we in a state of nothingness? No. What Epicurus has in mind goes back to the importance of maintaining a peaceful state of mind even in the pursuit of distant goals. We are no longer frustrated by a need for distant pleasures – which put us in motion due to a painful lack – because we have minimized our needs to what is easily available.

More importantly, we are attuned to the tranquil presence of what is. There is, for Epicurus, an experience of fullness that arises from simply Being-in-the-world (to use Heidegger's phrase), which sustains us even when we must pursue necessary goods. This fullness is captured by Epicurus when he says, "For a man who lives among immortal blessings is not like…a mortal being" (SEP, 33).

B. HEIDEGGER ON ANXIETY AND THE EVASION OF DEATH

Heidegger's interest in philosophy as a form of therapy or spiritual exercise should not be so surprising given that a main motivation for engaging in the "question of the meaning of Being," in *Being and Time*, is to address a crisis that arises from the forgetfulness of Being. Of course, the ultimate purpose of *Being and Time* is simply too broad a topic to discuss in this essay. Much more narrowly, we can see that Heidegger's ontological inquiry is specifically therapeutic in the way it heightens our responsibility for the meaning of beings in the world. Heidegger directly invokes the therapeutic tradition when he says,

> Man's *perfectio* – his transformation into that which he can be in Being-free for his ownmost possibilities (projection) – is 'accomplished' by 'care'. But with equal primordiality 'care' determines what is basically specific in this entity, according to which it has been surrendered to the world of its concern (thrownness). (GA 2: 264/SZ 199)

We will see that there are two dimensions to Heidegger's concern for "transformation."[21] Both are related to the way we can – from out of a stagnant existence – regain passionate wonder and insight into our relationships with the world. And this is achieved by understanding that we are not just registers of the world order. Much more than this, our way into life can gather the deepest meanings because we are the sources out of which Being is disclosed. Heidegger captures this in his use of the term *Dasein* – a term that highlights the fact that humans are not merely beings among other beings. As Dasein (literally "Being

there") we are more like a site for the revelation of Being, where our questioning of and engagement with beings is a constitutive aspect of the appearance of Being itself.

What is also distinctive about Dasein is that, unlike other beings, we are the beings who question ourselves. "Who am I?" is a distinctively human question. As we seek a response to this question, we do not begin with a solitary, self-sufficient subject (contra Descartes). First and foremost, from a practical level, Dasein is a Being-in-the-world, which means that we are immersed within an environment (*Umwelt*). We discover who we are (our Being or *Sein*) in the context of where we live (our here or *Da*). And a constitutive feature of our life-world is a framework of like-minded others – a *Volk* or people. Who we are is "nobody" in a distinct sense (GA 2: 170–71/SZ 128). As Epicurus might say, we are originally part of the many (*hoi polloi*). Just as this is a problem for Epicurus, it presents itself as a problem for Heidegger as well. This fact can be seen in his description of "inauthenticity" – a mode of Being that is deficient due to a lack of virtue or excellence.[22]

Our Being-with-others is a primordial feature of our existence, but also a problem in the way we live. Heidegger raises this dilemma throughout his description of our unreflective Being-with-others. His account of this level of experience is rich in detail. I will move quickly through these details, honing in on the places that clearly link him to Epicurus.

In section 27, "Everyday Being-one's Self and the 'They,'" Heidegger explains the problem of our unreflective relationship to our social context through a development of terms: averageness, levelling down, and Being-disburdened. The main point is that as we exist within our social sphere we are directed or dominated by that frame of reference as long as we do not throw it into question. This domination happens in the way that our current context is taken for granted or taken as unquestionably true. When dominated by custom, we not only take what is given and regular (average and levelled down) as reality itself. We also do not attempt to legitimate the world as given. We are, in other words, disburdened of our responsibility for the meaning we attribute to things.

Heidegger develops how this is a problem in the sections on "Idle Talk," "Curiosity," and "Ambiguity" (sections 35, 36 and 37, respectively).

With idle talk, Heidegger is describing a mode of discourse between people that is unreflective and unchallenging. "Nothing is not understood" in this frame of mind (GA 2: 229–30/SZ 173). Heidegger uses the examples of "gossip" and "passing the word along" as ways to reveal this level of engagement. But the real problem of our unreflective life is captured in the intimately related section on curiosity.

The average and familiar way of discoursing about things is framed by a distinct restlessness with the world. Curiosity is, for Heidegger, a mode of "not tarrying" with things, being distracted or, most importantly, "not dwelling anywhere" (GA 2: 229/SZ 173).[23] "Curiosity is everywhere and nowhere" (GA 2: 229/SZ 173). And the following passage highlights what such a distracted attitude misses: "Curiosity has nothing to do with observing entities and marveling at them – *thaumazein*. To be amazed to the point of not understanding is something in which it has no interest" (GA 2: 229/SZ 172).[24] Following this, in the section on ambiguity, Heidegger expresses how the time of *thaumazein* and the time of idle talk/curiosity are distinct:

> When Dasein goes in for something in the reticence of carrying it through or even of genuinely breaking down on it, its time is a different time and, as seen by the public, an essentially slower time than that of idle talk, which 'lives at a faster rate.' Idle talk will thus long since have gone on to something else which is currently the very newest thing. (GA 2: 231/SZ 174)

Following this distinction between the slow and fast paced, in section 38 ("Falling and Thrownness"), Heidegger discusses the experiences of temptation, tranquilization, and alienation. Temptation is the force of falling into this unreflective mode of life because it is disburdening (as Heidegger described previously in section 27). But now, he uses the word "tranquility." In our context, this is intriguing, since *ataraxia* is often translated as a tranquil state of mind. Is Heidegger implicitly criticizing Epicurus? No.

The tranquility Heidegger describes fits more with the medical notion of being tranquilized, given that this way of life is ultimately alienating ourselves from ourselves. "When Dasein [is] tranquillized… it drifts along towards an alienation in which its ownmost potentiality-for-Being is hidden from it" (GA 2: 236/SZ 178). What is being hidden, in other words, is our death as well as our transformative rebirth.

At this point in Heidegger's analysis, he is close to Epicurus. Heidegger's description of the groundless pursuit of newness resonates perfectly with Epicurus's concern with the empty/unnatural goods that are available in a corrupt society.[25] Heidegger's interest in *thaumazein* as a slower-paced life also seems to be in league with Epicurus's turn to the simple life, although this is by no means a necessary way of interpreting Heidegger in *Being and Time*. Actually, what Heidegger is describing is an expert engagement with a world, where we take concentrated time to gain a deep familiarity with a particular field of Being. Here, Heidegger is making the case that through a commitment to a particular way of life (e.g., being / the life of / living as a musician), a person can achieve a level of "virtuosity" that makes the person a constitutive source of disclosure for everyone else.[26] In such a way, the expert becomes a model for human achievement as much as a conduit for a particular dimension of Being. This is one of the two levels of personal transformation that has both a cultural and ontological significance. Being a world discloser is the essence of Dasein, so excelling in this ability is good not only for the person but the community as well. What, for example, would music be without an expert's ability to display to us a way into a world of music?

But there is a deeper concern with "authenticity" that sets up a more radical distance from normal life. Heidegger famously introduces *Angst* or anxiety as a mood that offers the chance for the deepest kind of emancipation from the everyday, anonymous mode of existence. At first, when the mood is discussed, Heidegger directly contrasts it with fear. Fear is fear of something; there is an intentional object, whether real or imagined. Anxiety, however, is a mood that has no distinct object confronting us. In anxiety we feel out of balance with the world, but

why we feel in such a way is not clear. Heidegger describes anxiety as a sense of being uncanny or, literally, homeless (*unheimlich*). This homelessness does two things for us. First, it breaks our participation with the world, allowing it to become an object of consideration.[27] The whole significance of the world is, so to speak, switched off, leaving Dasein in an existential isolation (GA 2: 250/SZ 188). Second, and intimately related, the familiar world becomes an object of consideration because its taken-for-granted status becomes a question. There is, in other words, a crisis of legitimacy. The ordinary world of concern is held in suspension and the reality of possibility is considered in a more radical way.

In the transition from the first part of *Being and Time* to the second, Heidegger explains the meaning of anxiety. The mood that seemingly comes from nowhere is actually related to primordial time or temporality. As the title of Heidegger's work intimates, his claim is not merely that all beings are in time; rather, temporality is the horizon of Being itself. Humans have a background awareness of this horizon, and anxiety is the mood that bothers us about this fact.

On the negative side, anxiety takes us over because Dasein is aware of itself as a temporal being ending in death. Ours is a dramatic time. We are stunned by the strangeness of our ultimate end because it is not something we can actualize. Our ownmost potentiality can never be an actuality (contra naturalism) and, so, our ownmost reality is, in a way, unreal. Through anxiety, this nothingness disrupts the normal flow of life.

On the positive side, anxiety is a mood that is calling us to take stock of our lives. It is, in other words, the "call of conscience" reminding us that there is only so much time to accomplish anything at all in our life. Anxiety is the mood that does not let us forget that nothing lasts forever and that time is precious. Hence, anxiety is intimately tied to death; but, for Heidegger, anxiety is not to be eliminated for the sake of tranquility. Becoming lost in the everyday world offers a false tranquility as an evasion of the truth of death. So while Heidegger could agree with Epicurus that humans evade death by unreflectively participating in frivolous needs, he appears to be directly contradicting Epicurus's

goal of constant peace or *ataraxia* – a life without anxiety. Indeed, it is the incomprehensibility of my not being that brings me back to the importance of the now – the moment of vision or *Augenblick*. Epicurus lumps together fear and anxiety in the face of death. Heidegger decisively separates them in terms of inauthenticity and authenticity. Fear of death is lost in the world, worried about our demise. Anxiety, on the other hand, makes us responsible for the world by revealing to us the possibility of the impossibility of existing. In this sense, Heidegger links our mortality/anxiety to our careful way of being. I have care (*Sorge*) about the meaning of my existence because I am mortal.

Of course, even Epicurus argues that we should reach *ataraxia* before it is too late. Mortality has to pressure us to live well. So the great divide between them is not so much death, to which we should not be indifferent. The great divide is the status of anxiety. Yet again, the difference is less than it seems to be. When Heidegger describes how we live in the moment of vision, he describes it as a mood of equanimity (*Gleichmut*) or calmness, which is distinct from indifference (*Gleichgültigkeit*), previously described as the medicated tranquility that is lived in the inauthentic curiosity with newness. Heidegger says,

> Indifference, which can go along with busying oneself head over heels, must be sharply distinguished from equanimity. This latter mood springs from resoluteness, which, in a moment of *vision, looks at* those Situations which are possible in one's potentiality-for-Being-a-whole as disclosed in our anticipation of death. (GA 2: 457/SZ 345)

The equanimity of Heidegger's moment of vision shares a family resemblance to the calmness of Epicurus' *ataraxia* – a relationship we shall visit again at the end of the essay.

So what is the fundamental difference between Heidegger and Epicurus? The answer is, again, anxiety – but we have to emphasize its ontological status. In *Being and Time*, anxiety is ontological; it is not the product of false beliefs that can be overcome by a calm appreciation

of natural goods. As such, Heidegger's view of authenticity can never meet with the *ataraxia* of Epicurus. There is, in other words, no way of finding static peace, since humans are caught in the flux between the conformity of average everydayness, dedication to a craft, and authentic homelessness. And this flux is ever present because Dasein is not merely part of the world of its involvement. The distinctive "nature" of Dasein is its being an open possibility – never fulfilled in a world of which it is not merely a part (GA 2: 56–57/SZ 42). Dasein is the source from which the world or "equipmental totality" makes sense. Things in the world make sense through this totality, but not Dasein. Even when expertise is achieved through committed involvement, Dasein is never determined by the sense of wholeness achieved through that expertise. Possibility is never extinguished from our Being-in-the-world. Nevertheless, possibility is not negative because it is the source of the second – higher – transformative experience for Heidegger.

When Dasein resolutely responds to anxiety/death, his or her life-world can be reformed in a more radical way due to the challenge of what is possible. Although we are embedded in our life-world and care for what "they" care for, the liberating truth is that the way things are is not the way things have to be. Death, for Heidegger, is not only about a personal death – death also means the alterability of the life-world that embeds each Dasein in meaningfulness. In this sense, Dasein is given a chance to become a kind of visionary for his or her people. This is what Heidegger refers to as Dasein's "authentic historicality" (GA 2: 511/SZ 386).[28] And when responding to such a call, a difficult task faces the person due to the openness of the challenge. We need courage and tenacious perseverance to achieve our highest transformative potential, making Heidegger's view difficult to square with Epicurus's goal of a life in hiding (*lathe biōsas*).[29] But as we will see next, Heidegger's later interest in dwelling (*Wohnen*) alters this difference from Epicurus. When dwelling is sought as a way beyond anxiety – a key swerve in Heidegger's thinking – he is brought ever closer to the virtue of *ataraxia*.

II. ANXIETY IN THE MODERN WORLD: THE PROBLEM OF TECHNOLOGY

Heidegger's later philosophy changes the role of anxiety from *Being and Time*. Where that mood served a unique purpose in the mode of authenticity, anxiety becomes demoted in Heidegger's interest in dwelling. Anxiety loses its ontological status and becomes a symptom of our modern nihilistic approach to Being as a whole. I take this to be Heidegger's deepest Epicurean turn. We can follow this by looking at the problem of technology and see the counter-point of dwelling as a way into an ontological home-coming.[30]

In his essay "The Question Concerning Technology," a perspective comes to the fore that is expressed, but not developed, in *Being and Time*. Above we saw Heidegger claim that the problem with curiosity is that it is blind to wonder. As we have seen, Heidegger says, "Curiosity has nothing to do with observing entities and marveling at them – *thaumazein*. To be amazed to the point of not understanding is something in which it has no interest." Of course, what Heidegger means by this sense of wonder is not really explored in *Being and Time*. But he does so in the context of technology.

Before we turn to Heidegger's critique of technology, let us go back to *Being and Time*. In that work, a twofold ontology is developed. Objects can be either ready-to-hand (*zuhanden*) or present-at-hand (*vorhanden*).[31] The present-at-hand is a deficient way of accessing the meaning of beings since it is a detached, reductionist point of view. Here, Heidegger has in mind our theoretical attitude toward the world, where things are abstracted from context and viewed as objects for observing subjects. Our relationship to the ready-to-hand, however, refers to how things matter to us in an unreflective or habitual mode of access to the world. For example, a cup on the shelf can be thought to be made up of atoms when viewed as present-at-hand; whereas, as ready-to-hand, the cup is for my morning coffee as I prepare for the coming day. Being, for Heidegger, is given in the day-to-day encounters we have with the world, which is always ontologically prior, richer, and more ambiguous than the scaled-down "reality" given through theory. Yet in his discussion of technology, there is an additional way to conceive of the meaning of the

thing that is distinct from both the ready-to-hand and present-at-hand. This third way is linked to Heidegger's interest in the Greek notions of *physis, poiēsis*, and *technē*. Ultimately, our discussion will lead to the meaning of dwelling as dwelling in the presence of things.

Technē is human craftwork, which broadly includes everything brought into appearance by humans (literature, pottery, theories, politics, etc.). The realm of *technē* is, then, a form of *poiēsis* in that such creations are a "bringing forth" of form (GA 7: 12–14/QCT 10–13). But the realm of *physis*, i.e., not humanly created things, is also a form of *poiēsis*. Moreover, it is a "higher" form of "bringing forth" because *physis* produces itself from itself, whereas *technē* is produced from another, namely, humanity (GA 7: 12–13/QCT 10–11). Heidegger's fascination with the (hidden) power of *physis* is precisely the source of his critique of the modern attitude toward things. To understand this attitude, we need to highlight yet another distinction he makes between the ancient and modern senses of technology.

The technological attitude is Heidegger's reworking of his notion of the ready-to-hand in that things are taken as belonging to an equipmental horizon of meaning. Things are used for the sake of something else. When in use, the actual thing is not the focus of attention because of our future-oriented behavior. However, in this technological attitude, there are two ways things can be taken up into an equipmental horizon. In what Heidegger calls the Greek attitude, a thing stands before the subject as a unique object, and the craftsperson uses it because of its uniqueness. A craftsperson, for example, may search for the perfect piece of wood to construct a kitchen utensil.

In the modern sense, on the other hand, the thing is not a whole standing before the craftsperson but an object to be used up completely for the sake of something else. A forest of trees, for example, may be cut down to make space for a new housing development. The point is that in the first attitude there is a reverence for the thing as a whole (even if it is to be used) and, in the second, the thing is seen as only raw matter to be used up.[32] And the modern sense is itself perpetuated by the actual technologies that give humans the power to recreate nature in a radical way.[33]

Now, the larger concern Heidegger has with the modern attitude is that it is the ever increasing, defining attitude toward the meaning of Being as a whole. This attitude, in other words, is enframing (*Ge-stell*) our entire relationship to ready-to-hand things. As everything is seen as only a resource or standing reserve (*Bestand*), the future use dismisses the present manifestation of things, leaving environmental and human degradations in its wake. Nothing is seen with reverence, and this is the emptiness of the modern life. This attitude is, for Heidegger, the expression of a deep homelessness that becomes the source of anxiety (GA 7: 148, 163–64/PLT 144, 159). So, in his account of the modern world, a loss of spirit (due to nihilism) is now attached both to anxiety, as feeling ungrounded, and to a profound boredom due, as Schopenhauer would say, to the "emptiness of existence."[34] Was not the discussion of curiosity and indifference in *Being and Time* already insight into this problem of the modern technological revelation of Being?[35]

This change of attitude about anxiety and homelessness is, I maintain, Heidegger's Epicurean turn. The link to Epicurus's third part of the four-part cure is most obvious. The emptiness of unnatural desires is a sign for an inquiry into the deficient nature of such things. So too with Heidegger, who does not side with Schopenhauer's pessimism but sees it as an opportunity to think about the meaning of Being in a technological age. We have already seen the connection between Heidegger's early interest in the evasion of death and the Epicurean "craving for immortality," but now we see a terrifying global crisis at hand. Both thinkers are advocating a change of disposition as a means to *ataraxia* or, for Heidegger, dwelling as "peace" (GA 7: 150–51/PLT 147). But there is an urgency to Heidegger's appeal, since we are dealing with mass destruction.[36] So we cannot be indifferent to death, given the global crisis that is on the horizon.

III. FOURFOLD AS *TETRAPHARMAKOS*

Heidegger's interest in dwelling has a distinctly ecological flair. In "Building Dwelling Thinking," he directly appeals to a reverence that goes into cultivation: "Such building only takes care – it tends the

growth that ripens into fruit of its own accord. Building in the sense of preserving and nurturing is not making anything" (GA 7: 149/PLT 145). But as Iain Thomson explains, we should not confuse Heidegger's ecology with naturalism.[37] Rather, Heidegger offers us a "transcendental realism" that does not collapse *physis* into a fixed conceptualization, as naturalists tend to do. Being remains inaccessible to human cognition, although we can find our way within it, which is what the notion of dwelling tries to address. How to dwell authentically is now the call to which humans must respond (GA 7: 164/PLT 159). And dwelling is itself discussed through the "fourfold" of earth and sky, divinities and mortals – the four quadrants of our meaningful access to beings. The fourfold is something we need to remember and respond to, since our current technological frame keeps diverting our attention away from it. So, in a way, the fourfold is Heidegger's own *tetrapharmakos*. Each element brings us into a sense of belonging that is currently overshadowed in the modern mode of revealing.[38]

If we take Heidegger's first two terms (earth and sky) somewhat literally, we bear witness to our natural context – a framework that is diametrically opposed to the technological world. What he has in mind is a deep relationship with what is worthy of awe and inspiration for that which is greater than us, namely, *physis*. "Earth is the serving bearer, blossoming and fruiting, spreading out in rock and water, rising up into plant and animal" (GA 7: 151/PLT 147). Here Heidegger is restating the Epicurean insight that our attitudes are distorted, since we are more fascinated with artifacts than with nature. A Lamborghini, for example, is more of a fascination for us than an ant is, even though we create a car but have no clue as to how to design an ant. Earth, therefore, is not simply all the things around us, but the origin out of which all things come and to which things go. To marvel at it is the proper attitude of wonder – to preserve and nurture it is the active way we can participate in the disclosure of Being.

Heidegger's interest in the sky lies in the need to reconnect with the seasons of our existence (GA 7: 151/PLT 147). Indeed, sky and earth are correlated in that the seasons relate to the geographic regions in which we live, although from the technological frame, we might as well live

on Mars. In the technological frame, our place beneath the stars – as Earth dwellers – is totally obscured. We need to resist constancy and regularity by immersing ourselves in the seasons as a way to participate actively in our essence as world-disclosers.[39]

Also, rekindling our relationship to the seasons opens us back to our heritage, a community of mortals who are bound by mutual caring, which is smothered in the anonymous work of everyday existence. Resisting a globalizing They-self, we strive to recover our self-identity through a remembrance of our people and how they came to be in this place, under this sky. Here Heidegger's concern for localized communities certainly works with Epicurus's own interest in creating a community of like-minded people in the Garden.[40] Heidegger even admits that there is an "inner relationship" of his work "to the Black Forest and its people" (GA 13: 11/HMT 28).

What Heidegger means by "divinities" is a difficult phenomenon to capture. Julian Young suggests that it might refer back to *Being and Time*'s idea of Dasein's choosing its hero (GA 2: 509/SZ 385), since the gathering of a people happens around the visionaries who speak through them. It is similar to Hegel's interest in world-historical individuals whose work survives in a community's world-spirit. If this is the case, we can be critical of modern heroes in that they are not grounded in profound reverence. Modern heroes are celebrities or sports figures, who offer only a thin insight into what it takes to dwell. Modern heroes are lost in the fast-paced newness of commodity production.

Although Young's interpretation has the value of consistency with the early work, what needs to be emphasized (and which is not lost in Young's account) is Heidegger's more basic point:

> Mortals dwell in that they await the divinities as divinities…They wait for intimations of their coming and do not mistake the signs of their absence. They do not make their gods for themselves and do not worship idols. In the very depth of misfortune [*Unheil*] they wait for the weal [*Heil*] that has been withdrawn. (GA 7: 152/PLT 148)

Divinities are absent in the modern world, but its nihilism is not all-consuming for those who recognize the need for respect for that which is greater than them. It is from out of the destitution of the current epoch that a hope for a new beginning arises. A respect for what is holy (*heilig*) may be rekindled through marginal practices available within the modern frame, including (and I would argue most importantly) Epicurean simplicity. Healthy practices (the weal) are called on to replace the sickness (the woe).

Dwelling through the fourfold is, as Young helps us understand, a twofold endeavor: a care for beings in their uniqueness but also a care for the care-givers. The care for the care-givers comes from distinguishing our selfish egos from our greater Self.[41] This distinction evokes Epicurus because, even if he is technically a hedonist, his focus on discovering immediate natural beauty makes the human ego seamlessly at one with the world. Our greater self is acknowledged when we find our passion stemming from Being itself, which is the very opposite of egoism. For both Heidegger and Epicurus, a key way of discovering peace (whether *ataraxia* or dwelling) is to rekindle our gratitude for being given a nurturing plenitude. This gratitude always stems from our mortality, as Epicurus says: "Existence is to be considered, first and foremost, as a pure accident, so that it may then be lived as a completely unique miracle. We must first realize that existence, inevitably, is a one-shot affair, in order to be able to celebrate that in it which is irreplaceable and unique."[42]

IV. CONCLUSION

Heidegger would most surely criticize Epicurean metaphysics as forgetting the meaning of Being. A reduction of things to atoms as the building blocks of reality is surely abstract from a poetic dwelling in the world. Yet, if we recall from the beginning, Epicurus takes practical concerns as central – so the debate about how the atoms actually operate upon us is not paramount.[43] Unlike some atomists who might use this view to dissect nature – taking things as merely "standing reserve" – Epicurus is focused on the wholeness of phenomena. Finding peace is Epicurus's goal. Epicurus gives us solid clues on how to escape the grips

of anxiety, and they relate to Heidegger's sense of dwelling. Epicurus advocates life in the Garden – actually dropping out of normal, i.e., irrational society. This is at the heart of his famous proverb "Live in hiding" (*lathe biōsas*). Heidegger too has his Epicurean fascination with life closer to nature, and it does not seem to me that he ever abandons this vision entirely. Heidegger speaks of a deep solitude when living in the Black Forest – away from the fast-paced life of the city. He says, "Solitude has the peculiar and original power not of isolating us but of projecting our whole existence into the vast nearness of the presence of all things" (GA 13: 11/HMT 28). Nature – or poetic nature – remains the inspiration for turning away from the illusion of mass control and commodification to the enjoyment of what Heidegger calls "little things" (GA 7: 34/QCT 33) – a distinctly Epicurean sentiment that grows from out of the increasing terror of a world out of control. Of course, in the heightened tension of mass destruction, anxiety cannot be forgotten under a reactionary desire for tranquility. We cannot hide in our self-made sanctuary.[44] Yet the small movements of individuals that display what dwelling is like, such as nurturing a garden, minimizing one's carbon footprint, or simply walking blissfully among the giant sequoias, are necessary openings to show how Being-in-the-world can be different now. Epicurus says something similar when he states that the time of *ataraxia* need not be long-term. To experience it once can be enough to sustain a person through even the toughest events.[45] Dwelling in the "presence of all things" for even just a moment can open a possible way out of our destitution.

NOTES

1 In an index to ancient thinkers named throughout Heidgger's *Gesamtausgabe*, there are merely nine places where "Epicurus" or "Epicureanism" appear: GA 6.1: 272/N2: 52; GA 7: 270/EGT 106; GA 8: 74/69; GA 19: 2/2 (only in the title of a work by P. Natorp); GA 22: 21/17; GA 44: 55/N2: 52 (which is the same as GA 6.1: 272); GA 45: 220/185; GA 54: 35, 40/24, 27; GA 90: 135 (which is the same passage as appears in GA 6.1: 272). See François Jaran and Christophe Perrin, "Concordance Heidegger," *Bulletin heidéggerien*, Vol. 2 (2012): 127. My thanks to Richard Polt for directing me to this index. All of these citations contain passing references to Epicurus's famous phrase *lathe biōsas* (GA 7: 270/EGT 106; GA 54: 35, 40/24, 27) or Nietzsche's mixed view of Epicurus (GA 6.1: 272/N2: 52; GA 8: 74/69), claim that Greek philosophies after Aristotle (including Epicureanism) are no longer originary (GA 45: 220/185) or simply list Epicureanism as part of a tradition (GA 22: 21/17). No sustained development of Epicurus's philosophy is offered. I will draw attention to some of these references in following endnotes.

2 Derrida briefly discusses how Epicurus's swerve (*parenklisis*) could relate to Heidegger's fallenness. But his account is more suggestive than developed, and it is not the main focus of his essay. See Jacques Derrida, "My Chances: A Rendezvous with Some Epicurean Stereophonies," in *Psyche: Inventions of the Other*, Vol. 1, trans. Irene Harvey and Avital Ronell (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2007), 344–76.

3 Pierre Hadot explains philosophical therapy as a spiritual exercise in the following way: "The philosophical act is not situated merely on the cognitive level, but on that of the self and of being. It is a progress which causes us to be more fully, and makes us better. It is a conversion which turns our entire life upside down, changing the life of the person who goes through it." *Philosophy as a Way of Life*, ed. and trans. Arnold I. Davidson (Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishing, 1995), 83.

4 Mark Wrathall, *How to Read Heidegger* (New York/London: W. W. Norton, 2006), 65–70.

5 Alan Paskow and Andrew J. Mitchell also contrast Epicurus and Heidegger around similar points. See Alan Paskow, "The Meaning of My Own Death," *International Philosophical Quarterly* 14:1 (1974): 51–69; Andrew J. Mitchell, *The Fourfold: Reading the Late Heidegger* (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 2015), 224–25.

6 See Martha Nussbaum, *The Therapy of Desire: Theory and Practice in Hellenistic Ethics* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994).

7 *The Stoic and Epicurean Philosophers: The Complete Extant Writings of Epicurus, Epictetus, Lucretius, Marcus Aurelius*, ed. W. J. Oates, trans. C. Bailey (New York: Random House, 1940), 19. Hereafter citation appears parenthetically in the body of the text as SEP.

8 Cf. Nussbaum, *Therapy of Desire*, 121; Richard W. Hibler, *Happiness through Tranquility: The School of Epicurus* (New York/London: University Press of America, 1984), 21. What needs to be emphasized is that as philosophical therapy, Epicurus still advocates wisdom or rational insight as the source of well-being (see Nussbaum, *Therapy of Desire*, 5).

9 The relationship between *ataraxia* and *aponia* is complex and beyond the scope of this essay. What I can say is that the distinction is analytical more than real, since Epicurus is operating with a non-dualist theory of the soul/body relationship. In what follows, I will simply refer to *ataraxia*, which is commonly taken to be the main goal of Epicurean ethics.

10 For an illuminating study on this issue, see Geert Roskam, *Live Unnoticed* (Λάθε βιώσας): *On the Vicissitudes of an Epicurean Doctrine* (Leiden/Boston: Brill, 2007).

11 James Warren, *Facing Death: Epicurus and his Critics* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), 7.

12 Number 4 – the fear of pain – is also based on the fear of death, although I will not pursue this link in this essay. The main point is that the fear of pain arises because people (falsely) believe that the pain interferes with attaining a complete life. In other words, pain ruins our life because we will not reach fulfillment before

death. However, for Epicurus, the complete life is attained in a state of *ataraxia* and pain can be overlooked by attending to this underlying state of peace. Indeed, it is commonly known that Epicurus, especially near the end of his life, suffered from chronic pain, yet it did not detract from his ability to die well.

13 This is a broadly Nietzschean interpretation of Epicurus. See: Joseph Vincenzo, "Nietzsche and Epicurus," *Man and World* 27:4 (1994): 383–97; Keith Ansell-Pearson, "True to the Earth: Nietzsche's Epicurean Care of the Self and World," in *Nietzsche's Therapeutic Teaching* (New York: Bloomsbury, 2013), 97–116. In his middle period, Nietzsche expresses a strong admiration for Epicurus's naturalism. However, by the end of his career, Nietzsche thought of him as a decadent type. One notable exception is Nietzsche's description of the *Übermensch* as an "Epicurean God" (GA 8: 74/69).

14 I will not be exploring the logic of Epicurus's argument against providence. His basic point is that because the gods are perfect they have no concern for mortal affairs. On Epicurus's argument against providence, see Warren, *Facing Death*; Hibler, *Happiness through Tranquility*.

15 On the problem of actually existing religions and cults for Epicurus, see Morgan Rempel, "Nietzsche, Epicurus, and the After Death," *Journal of Nietzsche Studies* 43:2 (2012): 342–54.

16 Some disagreement seems to revolve around this point. James Warren contends that Epicurus advocated involvement with existing religions/cults due to the good that arises from contemplating the perfection of the gods. But is it hard to imagine Epicurus endorsing an involvement with the actual rituals of a religion/cult, given his view on the lack of concern the gods have for humans. Hibler points out that Epicurus may have simply enjoyed the festivals that accompany religious practices (*Happiness through Tranquility*, 39–40).

17 For "unconscious" see Nussbaum, *Therapy of Desire*, 113.

18 As seen from the beginning, Epicurus advocates a life removed from the public eye (*lathe biōsas*). A life of anonymous serenity

is more secure than one dependent on public appreciation (see Hibler, *Happiness through Tranquility*, 36–41). See note 30 below.

19 Epicurus's disdain for the Homeric system is clearly evident in his overall disdain for the model of education during his time. See Hibler for a clear account of Epicurus's view of authentic education (*Happiness through Tranquility*, Chapter 111: "The Garden School").

20 Of course, such goods can be scarce, which displays a crucial complexity in Epicurus's view. We must live with some type of social order as means to find readily available goods. On this social necessity, see Emily Austin, "Epicurus and the Politics of Fearing Death," *Apeiron* 45 (2011): 109–125.

21 Iain Thomson offers richly nuanced accounts of Heidegger's perfectionist-transformative account of education (or *Bildung*) in two important studies: "Heidegger's Perfectionist Philosophy of Education in *Being and Time*," *Continental Philosophy Review* 37 (2004): 439–67; *Heidegger on Ontotheology: Technology and the Politics of Education* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005).

22 Of course, Heidegger repeatedly says that inauthenticity is not an ethical dilemma; it is one of the two ontological modalities of Dasein. But as we shall see next (and as discussed at length in the secondary literature), it is almost impossible to look past Heidegger's disparaging remarks about our conformity to a depthless curiosity about the world. This dilemma raises a call for a more committed way into life because we lose sight of the kind of beings we are. This is what triggers a concern with human excellence, virtue or perfection.

On Heidegger's connection to virtue, see Hubert Dreyfus, "Could Anything be more Intelligible than Everyday Intelligibility?" in *Appropriating Heidegger*, ed. James Faulconer and Mark Wrathall (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 155–74. In his essay (and elsewhere), Dreyfus invokes the hierarchy of skillful coping, where a novice's ambiguous relationship

to a context of significance is deepened through engaged levels of familiarity. The highest levels are expertise and, ultimately, mastery, where a master opens an entire culture to a new possible way into being.

23 *Aufenthaltslosigkeit* is translated as "never dwelling anywhere." Later, Heidegger uses *Wohnen* for dwelling.

24 I have transliterated the Greek from Heidegger's text. *Thaumazein* means wondering.

25 In German, *neu* (new) is etymologically related to *Neugier* (curiosity). As to the Epicurean connection, this is merely implicit in *Being and Time* because Heidegger is claiming that *das Man* is an ontological modality of Dasein and, so, is not an ontical problem of a specific life-world. Nevertheless, given that Heidegger is borrowing heavily from Kierkegaard's own criticism of "the public" and the ambiguity of "levelling," it is nearly impossible not to see Heidegger's description of curiosity about newness as an implicit critique of modern industrial society, where a fascination with commodity production dominates. Indeed, this connection becomes that much clearer in Heidegger's question concerning technology (discussed below). On the connection between Kierkegaard and Heidegger on this issue, see Harrison Hall, "Love, and Death: Kierkegaard and Heidegger on Authentic and Inauthentic Human Existence," *Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy* 27:1–4 (1984): 179–97.

26 On "virtuosity" see Dreyfus, "Could Anything be more Intelligible than Everyday Intelligibility?" 160–65.

27 My world of familiar engagement is no ordinary object of consideration because it cannot be what Heidegger calls present-at-hand (see GA 2: 171/SZ 128). The terms "present-at-hand" and "ready-to-hand" are discussed later in the essay.

28 Dreyfus refers to this as "cultural mastery" ("Could Anything be more Intelligible than Everyday Intelligibility?" 167).

29 It is worth pointing out that Heidegger's political scandal in the 1930s is influenced by his own account of authentic transformation of the life-world. As Thomson says, "There can…be little

doubt that the concept of authentic historicality presented in [sec.] 74 of *Being and Time* provides the general philosophical framework in terms of which Heidegger understood his decision to join the National Socialist 'revolution' in 1933" (*Heidegger on Ontotheology*, 105). Here, we can highlight Epicurus's warning that the passionately political life is a trap. He advises us, instead, to "Live in hiding." Heidegger actually refers to Epicurus's saying (*lathe biōsas*) three times: see GA 7: 270/106; GA 54: 35/24, 40/27. However, each time he uses the phrase, he is pointing out how to properly translate it in order to capture the originary Greek concern with "concealment." Heidegger does not discuss Epicurus's own reason for using the phrase.

30 On the transition from anxiety as ontological homelessness to dwelling as ontological homecoming, see Kelly Oliver, *Earth and World: Philosophy after the Apollo Missions* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2015), 136–40; Richard Capobianco, *Engaging Heidegger* (Toronto: Toronto University Press, 2011), 70–86; Julian Young, *Heidegger's Later Philosophy* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 63–74.

31 Actually, it could be a threefold ontology, if we take broken tools as a transition from the ready-to-hand to the present-at-hand. On this distinction, see Michael Wheeler, "Heidegger," Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/heidegger).

32 See Young, *Heidegger's Later Philosophy*, 47–50.

33 Heidegger says that the essence of technology is not specific technologies. Nevertheless, so-called "advanced" technologies do the work in the demise of an appreciation of *physis*.

34 Schopenhauer's essay "The Emptiness of Existence" claims that boredom is proof that life has no meaning (https://ebooks.adelaide.edu.au/s/schopenhauer/arthur/essays/chapter4.html). I cannot help thinking that Heidegger's own account of boredom is inspired by Schopenhauer. On the connection between Heidegger and Schopenhauer on boredom and anxiety, see Julian Young, "Schopenhauer, Heidegger, Art, and the Will," in *Schopenhauer,*

Philosophy and the Arts, ed. Dale Jacquette (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 162–80.

35 On this ambiguity regarding the ready-to-hand in *Being and Time*, see Hubert Dreyfus, "Heidegger's History of the Being of Equipment," in *Heidegger: A Critical Reader*, ed. Hubert Dreyfus and Harrison Hall (Oxford and Cambridge: Blackwell, 1992), 173–85.

36 Heidegger is clearly critical of our environmental problems: "To save properly means to set something free into its own essence. To save the earth is more than to exploit it or even wear it out. Saving the earth does not master the earth and does not subjugate it, which is merely one step from boundless spoliation" (GA 7: 152/ PLT 148). See Paul Gyllenhammer, "Sartre and Heidegger on Social Deformation and the Anthropocene," *Sartre Studies International* 24:2 (2018): 25–44.

37 See Iain Thomson, "Ontology and Ethics at the Intersection of Phenomenology and Environmental Philosophy," *Inquiry* 47 (2004): 380–412.

38 Young actually develops practical ways to engage the fourfold. He takes inspiration from Heidegger's discussion of authentic building, but provides other ways that we can care-for earth/ sky and divinities/mortals. See Young, *Heidegger's Later Philosophy*, 105–121.

39 It is worth noting that Stephanie Mills, in *Epicurean Simplicity* (Washington, D.C.: Island Press, 2002), structures much of her discussion of Epicurus according to the seasons (Spring, Summer, Autumn, Winter).

40 The Garden was Epicurus's famous school that sat outside the walls of Athens.

41 Young, *Heidegger's Later Philosophy*, 71.

42 As cited in Hadot, *Philosophy as a Way of Life*, 115–66.

43 For a discussion of Epicurus's non-reductionist approach to life, see Lisa Wendlandt and Dirk Baltzly, "Knowing Freedom: Epicurean

Philosophy Beyond Atomism and the Swerve," *Phronesis* 49:1 (2004): 41–71.

44 This is a main criticism of Epicurus we find Heidegger highlighting when he is discussing Nietzsche. See GA 6.1: 272/N2: 52. See also GA 90: 135, where the same passage by Nietzsche is used.

45 In his summary of Epicurus's attitude toward the time of *ataraxia*, Hadot says: "Only once we have become aware of the fact that we have already – in one instant of existence – had everything there was to be had, can we say with equanimity: 'my life is over'" (*Philosophy as a Way of Life*, 226).

The Place-Being of the Clearing and Language: Reading Thomas Sheehan Topologically

Onur Karamercan

ABSTRACT: I elucidate Heidegger's understanding of the "place-being" of the "question of being." My premises are: 1) Heidegger's "question of being" can be appropriately made sense of as the "question of language." 2) The "question of language" requires a topological approach that looks into the link between the place-nature of language and the open-bounded essence of human existence. First, I explain the topological underpinnings of Heidegger's later thought of being as the clearing and language; second, I examine Sheehan's phenomenological reading of Heidegger by focusing on the relationship between *alētheia* and appropriation (*Ereignis*). In the first section, I explain the correlation between place and language within the context of the "question of being" and display how understanding the former is crucial in having a more complete perspective for the latter. In the second section, I examine Sheehan's acknowledgment of Heidegger's idea of place (*topos*) in his understanding of the nature of human existence in relation to *Ereignis*, while criticizing the "metaphorical" reading of the "place-being" of the clearing.

KEYWORDS: clearing, language, place, topology

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With *Being and Time* . . . the "question of Being" . . . concerns the question of being qua being. It becomes thematic in *Being and Time* under the name of "the question of the meaning [*Sinn*] of being." Later this formulation was given up in favour of that of "the question of the truth of being," and finally in favour of that of "the question concerning the place [*Ort*] or location of being" [*Ortschaft des Seins*], from which the name topology of being arose [*Topologie des Seins*]. Three terms which succeed one another and at the same time indicate three steps along the way of thinking. MEANING – TRUTH – PLACE [*topos*]. If the question of being is supposed to become clarified, what binds together the three successive formulations must necessarily be disclosed, along with what distinguishes them.

– "Seminar in Le Thor 1968" (GA 15: 344/FS 47)

In order to counter this mistaken conception and to retain the meaning of "project" [*Entwurf*] as it is to be taken (that of the opening disclosure), the thinking after *Being and Time* replaced the expression "meaning of being" with "truth of being." And, in order to avoid any falsification of the sense of truth, in order to exclude its being understood as correctness, "truth of being" was explained by "location of being" [*Ortschaft*] – truth as locality [*Örtlichkeit*] of being. This already presupposes, however, an understanding of the place-being of place.

– "Seminar in Le Thor 1968" (GA 15: 335/FS 41)

I. WHEREFORE TOPOLOGY?

Without a doubt, Heidegger's thought concerns itself with "being" (*Sein*), yet there is still much confusion as to what to understand from this philosophically loaded concept. Heidegger's own obscure use of the word "being," a point that he acknowledged in the 1950s (GA 12: 105, 112/OWL 20, 26), reflects the inherent difficulties of attempting to understand the core issue of "being." We will all remember Heidegger's opening reminder in *Being and Time* via Plato's *Sophist*. Perhaps owing to this general difficulty, Heidegger's way into the *Seinsfrage* did not always stay the same from the mid 1910s up until 1976, as Heidegger took up different paths in order to illuminate the question of "being." Nevertheless, it was for him the fundamental issue of thinking. One way of approaching Heidegger's idea of "being" is to take up the question of language, and this is not a matter of philosophical taste, but an attempt of returning to where we already find ourselves in thinking, which concerns the essence and the ground of hermeneutic phenomenology.

The question of language was always in the background of Heidegger's thought. It was already a concern for him as early as in the 1915 dissertation "Duns Scotus' Doctrine of Categories and Theory of Meaning," the 1921 course *Phenomenology of Intuition and Expression* (GA 59), section 34 in *Being and Time,* and the 1934 lecture course *Logic as the Question Concerning the Essence of Language* (GA 38) (see GA 12: 86–9/OWL 6–8). After the mid 1930s and onwards, however, the issue started to appear on its own terms. Insofar as the final issue of Heidegger's philosophy turned out to be what he called the "topology of being," understanding the place from which we can trace how both "meaning" (*Sinn*) and "un-concealment" (*alētheia*) co-determine one another as relevant concepts and steps in Heidegger's investigations into the "question of being" is crucial. Here when I mention "topology," it simply refers to the philosophical study of space and place on hermeneutic grounds. When I use the word "topological," I mean the kind of approach that thinks in terms *of place*. The expressions "place-being and "place-nature" are various translations of the German *Örtlichkeit*. Thus, when I concern myself with "topology of language," I imply

the place-oriented, onto-ethical and hermeneutic investigation of our experience of being and dwelling in and with language. As such, what follows is an attempt to rethink Heidegger's understanding of "being" via the notions of "place" and "language," and specifically to point out how language appears as the place of human experience. Engaging with the "place-being" of Heidegger's question of language can provide a new perspective for bringing into closer view the very core issues of the "question of being" and problematizing the very ground of hermeneutic phenomenology.

The following passage from Heidegger and his Japanese colleague Professor Tezuka's partly fictitious dialogue (1953/54) can help us situate the "question of being" in its proper context in Heidegger's later thought:

> I: It did, however, become the occasion for very great confusion, a confusion grounded in the matter itself and linked with the use of the name "Being." For this name belongs, after all, to the patrimony of the language of metaphysics [...]
>
> J: The fact that this dispute has not yet got onto the right track is owing – among many other motives – in the main to the confusion that your ambiguous use of the word "Being" has created.
>
> I: You are right: only, the insidious thing is that the confusion which has been occasioned is afterward ascribed to my own thinking attempt, an attempt which on its own way knows with full clarity the difference between "Being" as "the Being of beings," and "Being" as "Being" in respect of its proper sense, that is, in respect of its truth (the clearing).
>
> J: Why did you not surrender the word "Being" immediately and resolutely to the exclusive use of the language of metaphysics? Why did you not at once give its own name to what you were searching for, by way of the nature of Time, as the "sense of Being"?

> 1: How is one to give a name to what he is still searching for? To assign the naming word is, after all, what constitutes finding (GA 12: 103–4/OWL 19–20).

Accordingly:

1. "Being," in the sense of the "being/substance of beings," is a word of metaphysics, which has its original place in the history of ontology between Plato-Nietzsche. This is not the understanding of "being" that is the main *Sache* of Heidegger's thought. Furthermore, Heidegger explicitly writes, "being only remains the provisional word" (GA 7: 234/EGT 78).
2. "Being" (in the sense of the "clearing," the open) is Heidegger's own contribution to the question of "being," which is the main *Sache* of Heidegger's thought. Thus it is possible to abandon the word "being," and simply employ the "clearing" (*Lichtung*).

Of course, the fact that "being remains the provisional word" does not mean that our issue is no longer about "being," just as it does not mean that only the word "being" is appropriate in problematizing the issue of being. Yet, we must not disregard or underestimate the fact that Heidegger views the "clearing," which is apparently a place-related term, as a word that hints at a non-metaphysical way of thinking that can help us better grasp what is at stake. This is why a topological inquiry is suitable to delineate what "being" comes to mean for Heidegger, since the promise of topology is not to cling to various sorts of subjectivism or metaphysics, but to explicate the situated nature of human existence and its horizonal being.

First it will be useful to specify a few important implications of Heidegger's "topology of being." Otto Pöggeler was one of the first in Heidegger scholarship who used the term "topology" in relation to Heidegger's thought.[1] Joseph Fell is another important figure who investigated the ontological sense of place in Heidegger's thought of being.[2] Of course, there are many other important figures, such as Edward Relph and Stuart Elden, whose works offer careful examinations of Heidegger's idea of space, place and dwelling in different registers.

Nonetheless, in the most recent scholarship, a comprehensive understanding of "topology of being" has been fostered by Edward Casey, and especially by Jeff Malpas, whose works on space and place offer the most encompassing explorations and interpretations of Heidegger's place-oriented thought.[3] In a nutshell, Malpas suggests that topology (as a composite of Greek *topos* and *logos*) can be understood as the kind of endeavor that looks into the "saying" and "gathering" that ontologically connects human beings to the place in which the experience of the world emerges.[4] Malpas argues, "The happening of world occurs first in the calling of language, in the gathering of the thing, in the opening up of the time-space that is also the 'taking-place' of place."[5] Indeed, philosophical topology appears as a hermeneutic project that investigates the very emergence of the sense of things in the world from our "emplaced" situation. In that sense, topology can also be seen as a hermeneutic way of making use of phenomenology, since it is concerned with examining the very "relation" between the part and the whole and their dynamic interaction, as this relation must always be grasped as a "situated" one. In that regard, one of the crucial tasks of philosophical topology is to show the hermeneutical underpinnings of the essence of the human existence in place.[6]

In general, the idea of place that is at issue here concerns the ontological *situation* (or situatedness) of the human being *as* the human being vis-à-vis the presencing (*Anwesen*) of phenomena. This ontological "situated-ness" implies that the human being opens up to the world in experiencing phenomena in and of place. Here we must distinguish at least three correlated senses of place in Heidegger's thought:

1. Place (*topos*, *Ort*, *Ortschaft*; but also die *Lichtung*) as the "open-bounded" clearing within which the experience of the world emerges for the finite human being. It is open, because it is where one goes beyond oneself, opening up to the world, yet at the same time it is bounded, since the openness that is at issue is not an infinite one, but one that is horizonally determined. The openness of place which allows one to move in a certain field or region also demarcates the limits of this movement. Thus, being

in place means being open to the world while being delimited by the conditions and circumstances to which one belongs which constitute the horizon of the clearing at issue.

2. Place as a locality or a site within which things are gathered, disclosed and inter-connected in their distinctiveness. For instance, the fourfold (*Geviert*) is an example of such an understanding of site or locality where distinct entities (or regions) of the same world co-determine one another by constituting the same context of referentiality or inter-relationality.
3. Ontic, "real" place(s) or locations (*Plätze*, *Stelle*) in space: for instance, Germany, Athens, Heidegger's hut in the Black Forest, the classroom, the drawer in which we find the hammer.

When we think of place, we usually think of the third, ontic designation of it. However, we must not forget that these "real" and precise places and locations are possible for human experience as the places that they *are* if and only if the two former dimensions are already disclosed. This threefold understanding of place, as well as the correspondent terminology that Heidegger employed, are by no means consistent, as they vary depending on the context and different periods of Heidegger's thought. A more detailed understanding of the particular relationship among *topos*, *Ort*, *Ortschaft*, *Stelle*, *Platz* (as well as *Aufenthalt*) requires its own systematic study, which is beyond the limits of this essay. Unless stated otherwise, the notion of place that concerns my argument here refers to the first one, that is, place as the "open-bounded," which indicates the topological essence of the clearing.

Let us here briefly put the historical development of Heidegger's explicit topological thinking in context. 1) Heidegger already had in mind a sophisticated idea of the "place-being" of the human existence via the conception of Dasein in *Being and Time*. The essence of existence is its being-in-the-world, always being emplaced in a particular world-situation. 2) In the period between 1934 and 1942 (marked by the *Germania and the Rhine* lecture course and *The Ister* lecture course) Heidegger started to thematize his notion of place *qua* place via the notions of *Ortschaft/Ort*, however still without a well-defined

understanding of these terms in relation to the question of being. When engaging with Heidegger's philosophy from the mid 1930s and 1940s, we must not forget that in this transitional phase of his thought Heidegger incorporated nationalistic elements in his thinking of "place," being influenced by the romanticist and nationalist ideas of the populist *völkisch* movement, which gained much popularity in Nazi Germany. Before he abandoned this approach, he attempted to engage with the "political" dwelling of a particular "people" in a particular region via his interpretation of Hölderlin's poetry, whose success is very disputable. However, he eventually came to see that such an engagement with "place" in nationalistic terms could play no role within the framework of the "question of being." 3) As Heidegger delved deeper into the place-nature (*Örtlichkeit*) of "language," which became explicit for the first time in the "Letter On Humanism" with the statement that "language is the house of being," it was clear that the primary question was the "dwelling" of human existence, and not the dwelling of Germans or a particular people. In that regard, the shift from mere *Ort* and *Ortschaft* to *Örtlichkeit* signifies a very important development in Heidegger's understanding of the issue of place, which is a transformation that is most remarkably noted in the essays included in *On the Way to Language*. This is why the ideas of the "place-being" of the clearing and language are bound together.[7] After the mid 1940s and early 1950s and onward, first he turned to a poetic idea of dwelling (*wohnen*) via the notion of the fourfold (*Geviert*), which can be seen as an elaboration of his project of the topology of being. Later on, Heidegger's explicit concentration on the question of dwelling, and the link between appropriation (*Ereignis*) and the essence of language (*sagen* as saying), brought him to his mature *Topologie des Seins*.[8] In that vein of thinking, when we are considering the "place-being" of language, the very world-forming nature of language is our concern, and not the disclosure of a certain worldview via language. That means that Heidegger's later notion of language ventures to explore the nature of the primordial dwelling place of human existence in which the "being" of phenomena appears. For the later Heidegger, language as *Sprache* is the region of human

existence where the acts of language, such as listening, speaking, communicating, understanding, interpreting and remaining silent, appear. Being more than a mere sum total of these acts of language, language is essentially where the human being is brought back to its mortal essence. This broad existential understanding of language took a more concrete form when it came to be designated as the "house of being." Within that context, it will be useful to consider what Heidegger writes in the *Letter on Humanism*:

> The reference in *Being and Time* (p. 54) to "being-in" as "dwelling" is not some etymological play. The same reference in the 1936 essay on Hölderlin's word, "Full of merit, yet poetically, man dwells upon this earth," is not the adornment of a thinking that rescues itself from science by means of poetry. The talk about the house of being is not the transfer of the image "house" onto being. But one day we will, by thinking the essence of being in a way appropriate to its matter, more readily be able to think what "house" and "dwelling" are. (GA 9: 358/272).

This passage shows the basis for, and one of the most explicit expressions of, Heidegger's appeal to a topological mode of thinking that must acknowledge *place* and place-related notions without disregarding them as "metaphors" or "symbols." In that regard, the notion of "language" (*Sprache*) figures in three interrelated senses, which can be taken to correspond to the threefold understanding of place:

1. Language as the open-bounded place (the human being's dwelling-place, i.e., the house that belongs to the clearing) in which any phenomenon can meaningfully appear as the phenomenon that it *is*. This is where the human being's encountering of the meaningful presencing of phenomena in and from stillness (*Stille*) takes place through listening and hearkening. When I am using the word "language" as such without further explication, it is always this first sense of language that I am employing.

2. Language as the discursive movement in and through which the human being brings words (*Worte*) from stillness into the sounded words (*Wörter*). This is where the poetic actions of language such as "naming" (*nennen*) and "saying" (*sagen*) happen.
3. Language as spoken languages such as English, Greek, and Chinese. This is the ontic sense of language that we are most accustomed to in our everyday experience, where written or oral communication, self-expression and such transpire via the articulation (*Verlautbarung*) of sounds associated with meaning. The third dimension of language is dependent on the availability of the first two, while the former two can show themselves only through the third. In that sense perhaps we could even add a fourth sense of "language" as *Rede/logos*, which is the simultaneous taking place of these three registers of language, though Heidegger dropped the notion of *Rede* in his later thought, and explained the essential matter of language with "saying."

I have argued that language is the place in which the essence of human existence is brought back its proper dwelling place, where humans are capable of finding a relation to their mortal essence. Let me unpack this idea. In *On the Way to Language*, in specifying human existence's relation to the manifestation of phenomena, Heidegger makes use of the notion of *Ereignis* in a quite particular way.[9] As Heidegger admits himself, in *Being and Time* he "ventured too far and too early" with the question of language (GA 12: 89/OWL 7); thus we can argue that the full implications of appropriation as the movement in and of language did not appear in the 1920s. In the essay "The Way to Language," Heidegger brings into view the meaning of "way-making movement" (*Bewëgung*) by drawing on this word from the Swabian-Alemannic dialect of German to elucidate the relationship between the clearing and what becomes apparent in/to the clearing. Expounding on the "appropriation" of language, Heidegger puts forward the etymological connection between "way" (*Weg*) and movement (*Bewegung*). The word *Be-wëgung* signifies a way that clears up the field and indicates the very sense of movement that opens up space (GA 12: 249–50/OWL 129–30). In other

words, "movement" is the happening of the "way" which shows forth the openness, namely the clearing. For Heidegger, "saying" amounts to the act of moving in and with language, which opens up the way (the way that extends between the thing and its sense) to bring the meaningful manifestation of phenomena into words while also disclosing the boundaries of the clearing itself. "The way-making of Saying into spoken language is the delivering bond [*das entbindende Band*] that binds by appropriating" (GA 12: 251/OWL 131). Words (*Worte*), though, do not amount to the mere agreement of vocal sounds and signs. In fact, words emerge from the stillness (*Stille*) of language, as our *saying* traverses the site of meaningfulness via the act of speaking, being delivered to the sounded words (*Wörter*). Words arise from the stillness of language because all authentic saying first listens and hearkens before it comes to "speak." In that, words belong to the region of the stillness (*Stille*), not in the sense of mere muteness, but in the sense of the tranquil openness of listening and hearing, where responding can arise as a possibility in the first place.

With the experience of the openness of stillness, which constitutes the boundary of meaningfulness, the "way-making" of the clearing becomes apparent. The "way-making" constitutes the two-fold relation between the clearing (the essence of "being") and the way in and through which the being of beings occurs (GA 12: 112/OWL 26). As such, Heidegger looks into our experience of language, which for him occurs from the clearing in "ringing stillness" (GA 12: 241/OWL 121–22). The correspondence (*Ent-sprechung*) between stillness and signs takes place via saying, that is, by our "naming" the words. This brings to the fore the space and spacing in and by which we traverse the open expanse of the interval. The way-making *movement* (*Be-wëgung*) that *appropriates* and situates the human existence in its proper place is the core issue of language (GA 12: 249/OWL 129).

In Heidegger's thought, human beings fulfill their humanness in saying. Without language, the world in which we exist would never come to touch us, for we would be deprived of the "being" of things. What makes us the kind of beings that we are is precisely our *openness* to understanding things in their being. For instance, when I learn the

meaning of the word "flower" in a different language-world, its sense hints at the source of a distinct experience of the "being" of flowers. For example, while we are used to thinking the concept of "language" via words such as *glossa*, *lingua*, *language*, *tongue*, for the Japanese it can also come to mean the blossoming of the petals of plum or cherry flowers from stillness, as the word *koto ba* indicates according to Heidegger's own interpretation (GA 12: 134/OWL 45). Here we must be careful. What primarily concerns us is not some particular "meaning" (*Bedeutung*) of language that we have now discovered and whether it "really" means the "blossomming of the petals of plum or cherry flowers," as if this meaning could be a linguistically "verified" definition by a native speaker. Of course, this does not imply changing or interpreting the common sense of words at will, and we must admit that some of Heidegger's re-constructive attemps with ancient Greek, or in this case with Japanese, can be read as bold interpretations that force the boundaries of linguistic sensibility. Nevertheless, the chief aim remains to reconsider our relation to words by giving them room, letting them "take place," so that new meanings or new interpretations can emerge. As such, what allows us to experience language is not the dictionary meaning, or even the so-called poetic sense of a word that we learn, but the way of language that leads us to the disclosure of the fact that signs can never exhaust the meaning (*Bedeutung*) of the phenomena that they signify, which only hearkening to the word can help us find out. Following the traces that language leaves on the path of thinking would be undergoing a poetic experience with language, in the sense of going along with it. Words are doomed to "fail" (*ver-sagen*) every single time they are *said*. However, human beings are bound to continue searching for new ways of "saying" and coming to an understanding of things, since this is how they "exist." This is where we find the true sense of language as the clearing, as well as the "house of being."

Language is where we always find ourselves as the kind of beings we are, where our relation to the existential situation to which we belong comes to appear. This characteristic of language is concealed in everyday speech, where language is used as an instrument of communication. We simply overlook the ways in which we "dwell" because

it is so near and we are so "accustomed" to language that it escapes our attention. Thus we must take seriously the hermeneutic implications of the correlativity (which is established in and of language) between entities that are meaningfully present and the horizon of understanding within which entities emerge. This is why Heidegger calls language (as world-moving saying) "the relation of all relations" (GA 12: 203/OWL 107). In a certain sense, without maintaining language, we would have no "relation" to the clearing, meaning that there would be no experience of things *as* things to be experienced. Language, as the *appropriated* place of existence, provides room for the *gathering* in which things and the world open up to one another in a meaningful way, long before language comes to mean mere speech that gets communicated via dictionary-words, concepts and other linguistic processes of signification. In other words, in and with language, we find the first possibility of "sensing" things not as neutral, irrelevant objects, but as things that matter to us.

II. READING SHEEHAN TOPOLOGICALLY

In this section what I want to achieve is to include Sheehan in my ongoing discussion of Heidegger's topology of being and language by inquiring into the topological underpinnings of his phenomenology.[10] Although at first one might not think of Sheehan as a topological writer, his hermeneutic-phenomenological analysis of Heidegger could be read as a topological inquiry that asks concerning the place in which human experience of the world occurs, which is nothing but Heidegger's "question of being" as the clearing. In Sheehan's account or in general, we should not understand topology simply as a certain type of phenomenology. Insofar as topology is an engagement with the "place" and "place-being" of human existence, it sits at the very core of the phenomenological project in determining the correlation between the understanding of human beings and the way in which phenomena meaningfully appear. Nonetheless, the topological aspects of his accounts may remain implicit to the reader that does not think in place-related terms. In that vein of thought, the very significance

of Sheehan's phenomenological interpretation comes to the fore in a much clearer way with a topological mode of thinking. Dealing with Sheehan's account in this way can show us what the primary and final matters of Heidegger's phenomenological project were, namely the question of language and the clearing.[11] Lack of attention to the correlativity of "meaning" and "place" results in interpretations that lose track of Heidegger's original and final philosophical concerns. The fact that Heidegger's thought moves from meaning to truth to place, and that place is the last step of his line of thinking, makes it equally important to inquire where Sheehan's account stands within the context of the meaning–truth–place trifold that Heidegger highlights in the *Le Thor* seminars.

Sheehan's comprehensive analysis of Heidegger is extremely important mainly due to its precision in highlighting the existential situatedness of Da-sein in making sense of things. Of course, what is at issue here is an inquiry into the way in and through which phenomena appear to mortals. Sheehan convincingly makes his case that the question of "being" is not a question concerning some sort of a deity, a metaphysical beyond, or a driving force or energy of nature. It is a question concerning the *correlation* between phenomena and the mode of existence for which there *are* something like *phenomena* in the first place. In light of Heidegger's indications, Sheehan makes the important distinction between "being as beingness" (*Sein* as *Seiendheit*) and "being" that refers to the clearing. The former notion of "being" signifies the account of "being" as substance that was never the issue of Heidegger's thought, while the latter indicates the site of the correlativity of human existence and the un-concealment of phenomena.[12] Thus Sheehan suggests that the *Ur-phänomen* of Heidegger's thought was *die Lichtung*, namely the "opened clearing" (or the "world of meaning") that makes space for the appearance of the sense of things (MSH 20). The conception of the clearing in Sheehan's account is the primary topological thought, which remains implicit and thus needs to be explicated.

According to Sheehan, the hermeneutic sense-making capacity of the human existence is *the source of the understanding* of the realness of things. In the history of western philosophy, various names have

been assigned to the ground and essence of all that exists, such as *idea*, *ousia*, God, absolute mind, will, will to power, etc., which has been the kind of approach that Heidegger sought to fix. Yet, Heidegger's main issue was not putting forward a theory concerning the ground (as the foundation) of things "out there," but rather bringing into view the "is-ness" of "is." In other words, Heidegger's thought is about the source of the existential conditions of the intelligibility of phenomena, which is accessible to our understanding through the phenomenological mode of inquiry, as phenomenology is an investigation of "relations" (MSH 10).

A particularly important example of what I consider Sheehan's implicit topology can be found in his comparison of early and late Heidegger: "His earlier work stressed *ex-sistence* insofar as its thrownness has always already opened up the clearing and holds it open (Da-*sein*), whereas his later work stressed the *clearing as held open* by thrown-open ex-sistence (*Da*-sein)" (MSH 22). The second proposition means: the human being does not *make* the open, but maintains its openness. In other words, without human existence, which Heidegger famously calls the "shepherd of being," the openness in and from which the realness of things can issue would remain undisclosed and unintelligible. Sheehan here underlines the word *Da* (there), which he takes as the "openness" or the "clearing" within which the sense of things appears for the human understanding. He writes:

> In Heidegger's telling, the correlativity of man and being has long been known to philosophy. However, the open space (*Lichtung*) which makes such correlation possible, as well as the opening up (*Lichten*) of that space – or better, its ever-openedness (thrown-openness) – has long been overlooked by metaphysics because of the intrinsic hiddenness of that openness. (MSH 158)

Here what I take to be the topological vein in Sheehan's reading becomes all the more clear. He claims that the "sought-for" of Heidegger's thought is not only the *whence* of beings, but the "whence and how is there the open" (MSH 69) that is, *Ereignis*. In other words, Heidegger asks concerning the *site* of this manifestation by bringing to the fore

the astonishing fact that things are accessible to us as meaningful things. Our access to the meaningful presence of things is a result of our *appropriated* (*er-eignet*) existence as the *openness* of the "being" of phenomena. This is the meaning of *Da* as the always already cleared-openness, which defines the essence of the human being. Without the *Da* (the clearing) that the human being maintains, there is no disclosure of the *Sein des Seienden* (the Greek *on*, or the being of beings). In other words, the *Sein* of things occurs only in cases where *Da* is available, open, that is, when it is appropriately sustained. What Heidegger called the "oblivion of being" (*Seinsvergessenheit*) in *Being and Time* in fact could be renamed as the "oblivion of appropriation" (*Lichtungsvergessenheit* or *Ereignissesvergessenheit*) (MSH 259), which also indicates the oblivion of the place-nature of the issue. Hence Sheehan asserts that "being" as the clearing denotes "disclosedness-to-understanding," and the key point in Heidegger's thought is that he problematizes the *site* from which the "presencing" of meaningfulness arises.

Sheehan understands the situated nature of the human existence as thrownness (*Geworfenheit*), in light of early Heidegger's philosophy. Da-sein is *thrown* (pro-jected) into its future possibilities of existence, always ahead of itself in the world. "The open" signifies the "always-already opened up space" (MSH 20), which is the disclosedness of the intelligibility of things and its accessibility for human experience. Secondly, without the "thrown" nature of the human being's situatedness in the world, which also signifies the *finite* essence of the human existence, there would be no relation to that open site (because in each and every case the human being *finds* itself "bound" to the "there"). There is neither an agency nor a natural power that literally "throws" the human being into the world from a mysterious "yonder," but the human being finds itself in the world, "thrown" into a particular history, society, and geography, that is, always emplaced into its own situation. Accordingly, for Sheehan *Ereignis* and *Geworfenheit* amount to the same thing, since *appropriation* is precisely what designates the taking place of the proper situation of the human existence.

Sheehan explains the "taking place" of *appropriation* in six points (MSH 20), where the first and the third points specifically concern us:

> 1. To think or act dis-cursively entails "running back and forth" (*dis-currere*) between the thing and its meaning, or the tool and the task, as we check out whether this thing actually does have that meaning or whether in fact this tool is suitable for that task. (…)
> 3. But we *can* think and act discursively only by metaphorically "traversing the open space" between the tool and the task, or the thing and its possible meaning. (MSH 21)

Here two notions need to be addressed: a) *discurrere* in the sense of "running back and forth *between*" and b) "traversing the open space," and its so-called "metaphorical" essence. Here what we first find is another hint that appeals to us to think the *place*-nature of "being" (the occurrence of the clearing), as the idea of "traversing" that Sheehan draws on links up the issue with the phenomenon of "relation" and "between-ness." When topologically thought, that which is "traversed" must be situated between the two "ends," which means that the act of traversing takes places in the "between." We know that in Heidegger's thought the idea of "the between" (*das Zwischen*) is particularly crucial in thinking the essence of hermeneutics.[13] The between is not some empty space that stretches between two "points" in space, but two opposites or ends which appear as regions insofar as the middle space relates them to one another, by letting them co-exist in the same expanse. In other words, it allows them to constitute a whole, namely an inter-relational site of presencing in which things can emerge and remain correlated. This means that that which "the between" connects cannot be thought as mere presences, but rather as relations. As such, "the between" is not a mere space of empty passage, but rather a recurrent emergence, for it establishes the correlating *movement* between things by providing the required space and the spacing for them. Therefore "space" always implies "spacing" in its essence (*Wesen*) and essencing

(*Wesung*), in the sense of the "opening up" of space. Put differently, the essence of space (*Raum*), namely spacing, occurs as space making (*einräumen*).

Sheehan's understanding of *Ereignis* is tied to his reading of *alētheia* as the un-concealment of phenomena, which Heidegger temporarily called the "truth of being" in the 1930s and 1940s, although he abandoned this designation in the 1950s. The notion is central to Heidegger's philosophy, since it served as the bridge from "meaning" to "place." First, let us look to Sheehan's trifold explanation of *alētheia*:

> *Alētheia*-3: The correctness of a statement, namely the correspondence of intellect and thing.
> *Alētheia*-2: The pre-propositional meaningfulness, as the disclosedness of things.
> *Alētheia*-1: The "un-disclosed" open *place* of the thrown-open.

Sheehan claims that it is *Alētheia*-1, as the occurrence of the open region of meaningfulness, that makes possible 2) the pre-propositional availability of the unfolding of things as (true or false) things to understanding, and 3) the apophantic correctness of things. Without the taking place of the openness in which the sense of things can be gathered and disclosed, the correctness of our representations could not even become a matter of thought. What nevertheless must be noted is that the openness that is at issue does not indicate some sort of "infinite openness," but a finite one bounded by the limits of the human existence. This also means that human existence marks the "limit" of *Alētheia-1*, just as *Alētheia-1* de-fines and de-limits that field of human existence. The finite nature of human existence (as mortals or being-towards-death) is bound to the "place-being" of the manifestation of phenomena. According to this scheme of thought, *Alētheia*-1 is the most fundamental instance of un-concealment, indicating the "open space" in which the individual human being can take things "as" something in their meaningful presence (MSH 74–75). I suggest that *Alētheia-1* can be taken to mean the "occurrence of the clearing," indicating the gatheredness of the two sides of the interplay between the "to-which" and

the "from-which." Un-concealment always occurs in and of place for the kind of being that maintains this *openness*. Therefore, the question concerning the clearing is about the opening up of the "region" (*Gegnet*), which encompasses the two-way movement and encountering of the disclosure of phenomena and the "thrown-open" human existence.

From this we can infer that the human being is essentially a "placed" being, "thrown" into the world as the "open-bounded." It is "finite" in that it is moving towards its own death through the present moment, yet the utmost possibility of existence within the limits of its being-there is "open," as Da-sein exists futurally as "e-ject." If so, it follows that *appropriation* situates the correlation between *Da* and *Sein* into its proper site. At issue is neither *Da*sein nor Da*sein*, but rather *Da*<–>*sein*, which is one of the reasons why after the *Beiträge* the notion almost always appears hyphenated.[14] *Appropriation* signifies both the place (world) and the taking place of the disclosure of the "being" of phenomena in their mutual, gathered and two-way movement. Things appear meaningfully via the appropriating movement, that is, *appropriation* that makes space for the back-and-forth movement between the *Da* <–> *Sein*, finitude and openness. Here "<–>" can be taken to be the mark of the appropriating movement that arises in the "thrown-open." The happening of appropriation transforms the appropriated clearing so that it becomes the open-bounded in and by which the disclosure of phenomena can occur and be gathered. In this way, human existence can become itself (its *own/proper*), that is, the openness that it *is* via the appropriating movement.

Sheehan states that the open (the world, the clearing, *topos*) is the discursive space where existence takes place (MSH 103). In other words, we "sustain the space within which the discursive understanding of things can take place" (MSH 104). As I have mentioned earlier, I consider this space that we sustain language. Sheehan does not discuss the topic of language *qua* language (or the idea of dwelling) in his major work.[15] Nonetheless, there are a few instances where Sheehan touches on the relation between *logos* and *alētheia* (MSH xviii), which indicates an equivalence between *Alētheia*-1, 2, 3 and *Logos*-1, 2, 3.

Without *Alētheia*-1 and *Logos*-1, there would be no language as discourse or speech, which means that the world would never come to the fore *as* the world. Sheehan remarks that for Heidegger *Rede* (speech, discourse) does not mean the correspondence of meaning with sounds or the linguistic system of signification-communication (MSH 150), arguing that in *Being and Time* worldly "ex-sistence" (the essence of Dasein) and *logos* amount to the same thing. I interpret this as follows: in *existing*, that to which we first respond as the meaningful occurrence of the clearing is language. Within the boundaries of this primary sense of language, our everyday spoken languages appear. In other words, language as the open-bounded is the site in which human beings can "be made to remain" (*sistere*) and comport themselves to the disclosure of phenomena from and out of (*ex*) their particular "place." Without it, they would remain captivated in their own subjectivity, not being able to open up to the world and thus not encounter the opening up of the world.

The core issue of Heidegger's thought is the emergence of the interrelation between that which becomes manifest (phenomena) and the openness that can make sense of this manifestation (Dasein), in the very site as which appropriation takes place (language). This threefold interrelation is precisely what constitutes the basis of Heidegger's "question of being" as the clearing. "Being" implicates the very gatheredness of these three distinct elements. Thus the core matter of Heidegger's later thought, i.e., the clearing, is possible only if the openness that is at issue is *appropriated* in and with and as *Alētheia*-1 (or *Logos*-1). For Sheehan, this means that the human being does not remain open to the clearing as if the clearing is some other space (MSH 24). It is an opening that emerges where we always already *are*. The essence of the human existence and "being" are not two different "beings" that are connected by an external bridge (language), precisely because "being" is not just an entity (*Seiendes*) or a metaphysical life force (such as God) simply out there. In turn, in order for an understanding of "being" to exist so that we can thematize its "meaning" and "disclosure," there needs to be the open-bounded place (*Ortschaft*, *topos*) from which such

an understanding can emerge. This place is where the origin of the "ontological difference" is groundlessly grounded in that we can distinguish "being" from "beings," just as we can distinguish what grows in a field from the field itself. For the later Heidegger, *Ereignis* is not just another name either for "being" or the individual human being. *Ereignis* is what belongs to the existential structure of the understanding of being, a place of gathering where the possibility of differentiating phenomena from the site of disclosedness in which they appear (*alētheia*) occurs. This is why the clearing and language point to the *same* open-boundedness in their distinctness.

I hope to have shown thus far how and why I proposed to read Sheehan topologically, and why Sheehan's phenomenological interpretation of Heidegger is a very cohesive one due to its receptivity of the topological Heidegger. Nonetheless, as is the case in most studies on Heidegger, even though Sheehan examines notions such as "field," *topos*, "openness," "clearing," "the thrown-open clearing," "the open region of understanding," and "the realm of disclosedness in relation to site of *meaningfulness*" (MSH xviii, 9, 12, 20, 92), he does not explicitly ask *why* Heidegger sought to explain the matters by such space- and place-related notions. For Sheehan, the focus always remains on *meaningfulness*, but not so much on the "place-being" of place. One of the reasons why Sheehan does not pay close attention to the place-nature of *Ereignis* on its own accord is related to the fact he considers the "place-being" of the clearing a metaphor. To say the least, this is in contrast with Heidegger's own understanding of metaphors, especially considering Heidegger's study of Hölderlin's poetry in the *Ister* lectures (GA 53: 17–32/16–27). Sheehan writes, "Metaphorically speaking, as thrown-open (i.e., appropriated), human being is the 'open space' or clearing within which the meaningful presence of things can occur. (The previous sentence is Heidegger's philosophy in a nutshell.)" (MSH 15). Sheehan indicates that the human being is not the source of *appropriation*, but it is that which is *appropriated* and brought to its *proper* place. This is certainly true, yet this is also why the matter must be investigated beyond a simple metaphor-literal dualism. Asking whether the clearing at issue is a "real" clearing in a "real" forest or not would imply that our thinking of the issue is still influenced by

the viewpoint of Platonist meta-physics, one that divorces the ideal from the real, the sensuous from the non-sensuous. According to this account, the so-called ontological clearing exists only in our conceptions, yet the clearing in the woods is the "real" phenomenon. Connecting the two by means of an analogy indicates that we are transferring the image of the latter onto the former. However, this is not how Heidegger understands the clearing, which is related to his idea of language.

Since Heidegger does not see language as a "rule governed system of signification," words cannot be considered as mere signals that signify objects in the world that correspond to the signifier. The main function of words is to bring the meaning of the signified into discourse in and from silence by *saying* it. Since words can never simply exhaust the meaning of a phenomenon, they must be seen as the hints of whatever phenomenon that we are trying to think, interpret, and name. Just as the idea of the "house of being" is not an image of the conception of language (GA 12: 107, 111–12/OWL 22, 26), the image of the clearing in the woods is not a spatial symbol of *alētheia* either. *Alētheia* is not an objectively present fact in the "real world" "represented" by the image of the clearing, or the "open space" in the woods, attached to it *post facto*. Likewise, we should consider the sign "the clearing" a *beckoning*. It hints at the occurrence of spacing and lighting that is at issue with *alētheia* and that requires our naming and saying in language. We are not simply "connecting" the clearing as "being" with a clearing in a forest by means of "signs" in our minds: they already *beckon* us to the same matter, that is, the same "occurrence," before we can ever come to re-connect them with the help of an analogy. In the essay *Why Poets* Heidegger writes:

> If we go to the fountain, if we go through the woods, we are already going through the word "fountain," through the word "woods," even if we are not saying these words aloud or have any thoughts about language. (GA 5: 310–11/232–33)

In that sense, considering the space- and place-related notions that Heidegger employs in his philosophy as mere metaphors is simply

incompatible with Heidegger's idea of language, just as it is incompatible with a phenomenological reading of Heidegger, since our openness to language is where things appear to us *as* things. The metaphorical reading of the clearing opens up the question as to how we are to speak or think without these so-called "metaphors."[16] If expressions such as "the open region" and "the openedness" are metaphorical, then what can we say about *Ereignis*, *Existenz*, *alētheia*, Da-sein, *Entwurf*? Subsequently we could suggest that language itself is a pool of metaphors all the way down, since words are never sensible objects (GA 12: 122/ OWL 35), but this is precisely the metaphysical notion of language that Heidegger criticizes. For Heidegger, language is not a tool, just as a house is not one, because the issue of language concerns *our openness to saying*, just as a house indicates the place from which we are opened to the world. Language is the open-bounded *place* (*topos*) of meaningfulness (*Sinnlichkeit/Bedeutsamkeit*) from which the particular meanings of things (*Sinn/Bedeutung*) appear. Being open to language is where the essence of being human resides, just as fishness requires being in the water. Even the idea that language may not be our primary dwelling place or that we could "make sense" of things themselves without language is a *sense* that only *we* experience in and of language.[17]

NOTES

1 Otto Pöggeler, "Heideggers Topologie des Seins," *Man and World* 2 (1969), 331–56; Otto Pöggeler, "Heidegger's Topology of Being," in *On Heidegger and Language*, ed. Joseph J. Kockelmans (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1972), 107–47.

2 Joseph Fell, *Heidegger and Sartre: An Essay on Being and Place* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1997).

3 Edward S. Casey, *The Fate of Place: A Philosophical History* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1998); Jeff Malpas, *Place and Experience: A Philosophical Topography* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999); Jeff Malpas, *Heidegger's Topology: Being, Place, World* (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 2006); Jeff Malpas, *Heidegger and the Thinking of Place: Explorations in the Topology of Being* (Cambridge, Mass.: The MIT Press, 2012).

4 "Both "topology" and *Topologie* have a specific technical sense that refers to a branch of mathematical geometry that studies the nature of surfaces. Heidegger, however, drawing on the Greek roots that lie embedded in the term – *topos* and *logos* – takes it in the sense of a "saying of place" (*Ort-reden*): Malpas, *Heidegger's Topology*, 33.

5 Malpas, *Heidegger's Topology*, 306.

6 On the hermeneutic essence of topology, see Jeff Malpas, "Place and Situation," in *The Routledge Companion to Hermeneutics*, ed. Jeff Malpas and Hans-Helmuth Gander (New York: Routledge, 2017), 354–66.

7 Concerning the difference between a historical-political notion of place and the place-nature of being, what Heidegger regrettably left unexplained are the hermeneutic and phenomenological relationships among the ontic, onto-ethical, and ontological registers of the meaning of "dwelling." Heidegger did not worry himself much with the question as to how one's dwelling in language manifests itself in everyday-practical situations, which led to the confused designations of Heidegger's thought as "linguistic idealism." The link between the actual history (and places) in

which we live and the onto-ethical register of place as language remained utterly untouched.

8 There are no perfect translations of *das Ereignis* in English. The main role of the translation is to bring us back to the original word, *Ereignis*, and not to cover the entire etymological background of the word in German. As long as we know that "appropriation" or "the event" indicates *das Ereignis*, our thinking will be on the right track.

9 Jeff Malpas notes that the notion is the key topological conception in Heidegger's thought and provides the following explanation: "Etymologically 'Ereignis' has its roots in the now somewhat archaic term 'eräugnen' meaning to see or to be evident. Once again this is suggestive of a connection back to *Being and Time* – to the idea of the "moment of vision," *Augenblick*, in which Dasein grasps its existential situation": Malpas, *Heidegger's Topology*, 215.

10 From here on abbreviated as MSH: Thomas Sheehan, *Making Sense of Heidegger: A Paradigm Shift* (London: Rowman & Littlefield International, 2015).

11 The Crowell-Malpas debate on this issue encompasses particularly the link between phenomenology and subjectivity and topology's place within that context. See Steven Galt Crowell, "Is Transcendental Topology Phenomenological?," *International Journal of Philosophical Studies* 19 (2011): 267–76; Malpas, *Heidegger and the Thinking of Place*, 45–56.

12 "I try to make sense of Heidegger by showing that his work, both early and late, was not about 'being' as Western philosophy has understood that term for over twenty-five hundred years, but rather about sense itself: meaningfulness and its source" (MSH, xi).

13 "The expression 'hermeneutic' derives from the Greek verb *hermēneuein*. That verb is related to the noun *hermēneus*, which is referable to the name of the god Hermes by a playful thinking that is more compelling than the rigor of science. Hermes is the divine messenger. He brings the message of destiny; *hermēneuein* is that exposition which brings tidings because it can listen to a

message. Such exposition becomes an interpretation of what has been said earlier by the poets who, according to Socrates in Plato's *Ion* (534e), *hermēnes eisin tōn theōn*, 'are interpreters of the gods'" (GA 12: 115/OWL 29).

14 Jeff Malpas, "Heidegger's Topology of Being," in *Transcendental Heidegger*, ed. Steven Crowell and Jeff Malpas (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2007), 128–29.

15 For more on Sheehan's understanding of language, see Sheehan, "Sense, Meaning and Hermeneutics: From Aristotle to Heidegger," in *The Blackwell Companion to Hermeneutics*, ed. Niall Keane and Chris Lawn (Hoboken, NJ: Wiley-Blackwell), 2016.

16 Wittgenstein argues: "278. The secondary meaning is not a 'metaphorical' meaning. If I say, 'For me the vowel e is yellow,' I do not mean: 'yellow' in a metaphorical meaning – for I could not express what I want to say in any other way than by means of the concept of yellow": Ludwig Wittgenstein, *Philosophical Investigations*, trans. G.E.M. Anscombe, P.M.S. Hacker and Joachim Schulte (Oxford: Blackwell, 2009), 228.

17 Explaining how we would and could "sense" the world without language is no different from telling a friend what things I would and could do tomorrow if I stopped breathing today.

From Matter to Earth: Heidegger, Aristotle, and "The Origin of the Work of Art"

Khafiz Kerimov

ABSTRACT: This article focuses on Heidegger's engagement with the distinction between form and matter in the 1935 essay "The Origin of the Work of Art." This distinction is articulated by Aristotle in the context of production (of useful equipment), which is taken to be finished once a certain matter (potentiality) is subjected to a certain form or shape (actuality). Insofar as Aristotle takes actuality to have primacy over potentiality, he is unable to think material potentiality as such (save in the paradoxical idea of "prime matter"). Against the Aristotelian thinking of hylomorphism, however, Heidegger takes art as an instance of the reversal of the traditional relationship between form and matter. By appealing to artworks, Heidegger shows an excess of material potentiality over form and function, which he calls "earth."

KEYWORDS: art, earth, form, matter, potentiality

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I. INTRODUCTION

Heidegger's philosophical program in the 1920s could be described in terms of a critical engagement with the technological interpretation of being, i.e., an understanding of being rooted in the Greek conception of τέχνη. Heidegger's diagnosis of the Western metaphysical tradition runs something like the following. From Greek ontology onward philosophy has approached beings as artifacts, as something produced or designed (GA 33: 137/117).[1] But that means that Greek ontology is characterized by a certain "forgetting" of those beings that cannot be accommodated by the structure of τέχνη. Such is the case, according to Heidegger, with (human) Dasein: "Dasein has apparently been forgotten in naive ancient ontology" (GA 24: 156/SZ 111). Indeed, *Being and Time* can be viewed as articulating a fundamental ontology of Dasein beyond the technological interpretation of being.[2]

However, something surprising transpires in the 1930s: Heidegger begins a series of meditations on the work of art, as a result of which the question of Dasein leaves center stage.[3] Yet, art ostensibly belongs to the very sphere of τέχνη that Heidegger diagnosed as problematically reductive in the 1920s. Chief among these meditations is Heidegger's 1935 text "The Origin of the Work of Art" (along with two other unpublished versions of the same essay).

Yet, it would be incorrect to say that "The Origin of the Work of Art" marks the end of Heidegger's critique of the paradigm of τέχνη. In the 1930s, rather, Heidegger's criticism of τέχνη begins to employ the very conceptual resources inherent in the Greek conception of τέχνη. Central to Heidegger's "immanent" engagement with τέχνη in the 1935 work is the form-matter distinction, whose most significant formulation in the history of philosophy belongs to Aristotle. In "The Origin of the Work of Art" Heidegger shows that while the form-matter distinction has been traditionally applied to artworks, this distinction is in fact inappropriate for this purpose (just as it is inappropriate with regard to the human Dasein), for it stems from the sphere of produced tools. Heidegger thus conceives of an artwork not as a compound of form and matter but as something that emerges in

a strife between world and earth. Therefore, as the common interpretation has it, the form-matter structure is rejected by Heidegger (in favor of the concepts of world and earth).

However, in this essay I will argue that the project of "The Origin of the Work of Art" lies not in a rejection of the form-matter distinction but in a reformulation thereof. My suggestion is that the relationship of inheritance and transformation between Aristotle and Heidegger in the 1935 essay is much more complicated than is customarily assumed.

In particular, I will focus on Heidegger's reintrepretation of Aristotle's concept of matter as "earth" (*Erde*). I would suggest that the notion of the earth articulates Heidegger's attempt to think material potentiality *at the limit* of the form-matter structure. Given its focus on Aristotle's hylomorphism, however, this essay might appear to go against the letter of Heidegger's text. Therefore, it calls for a brief methodological remark. Now, as a number of commentators have not failed to suggest, Heidegger indeed finds the form-matter distinction inappropriate for understanding art. As Françoise Dastur puts it, for instance, "matter and form are categories that are not relevant in the case of the work of art, which is not the result of a fabricating process."[4] What's more, Michel Haar specifically denies that the earth can be conceived by analogy with prime matter: "[The] Earth cannot be reduced to the pure passivity of a 'prime matter' that is to be informed."[5] Insofar as Heidegger's earth is an attempt to think materiality at its limit, however, I would suggest that it is best understood in relation to Aristotle's own liminal idea of prime (or first) matter (πρώτη ὕλη). Indeed, Aristotle has already broached the limits of the form-matter structure (albeit in a way that is different from Heidegger's) with his idea of prime matter as a pure potentiality. Thus, in this article I will approach Heidegger's concept of the earth in terms of a pure, formless potentiality. Such is the way in which the originality of Heidegger's interpretation of τέχνη in "The Origin of the Work of Art" can be best appreciated, and this is what this essay purports to accomplish.

The essay is divided into three sections. In the first section of this article I will consider the emergence of the form-matter distinction in Aristotle's philosophy, in particular, in its relation to the being of useful tools and equipment. My chief aim in the first section is to show the subordination of material potentiality to form and actuality in human equipment. In the second section of this article I will investigate Aristotle's concept of prime matter, which is situated at the very limits of the form-matter structure (and against the background of which Heidegger's notion of the earth is best understood). In the third section of this article I will consider Heidegger's reformulation of matter as earth in the context of the artwork. My suggestion is that for Heidegger art gives rise to a rethinking of the traditional distinction between form and matter. In the work of art matter (as earth) is no longer subordinate to form, and potentiality is no longer subordinate to actuality.[6] Although the primary focus of this essay is Heidegger's transformation of matter into earth, in the third section I will also consider Heidegger's conception of world (to the extent that it clarifies the meaning of the concept of earth).

II. FORM, MATTER, AND EQUIPMENT

In "The Origin of the Work of Art" Heidegger turns to the ancient Greek understanding of art as τέχνη, which has nothing to do with aesthetics.[7] While aesthetics is concerned with the object (and subject) of feeling, art as τέχνη is about the act of coming into being.[8] Such is the definition of τέχνη in Book VI of the *Nicomachean Ethics*: "[To] practice art is…to consider how something capable of being or not being [ἐνδεχομένων καὶ εἶναι καὶ μὴ εἶναι]…may come into being."[9] While this definition is nowhere present in the essay,[10] Heidegger seems to hint at it, when he writes in the Third Section of "The Origin of the Work of Art" that the work of art "*is* at all rather than is not [ist *und nicht vielmehr nicht ist*]" (GA 5: 53/190). In fact, this formulation hints at two sources at once: One of them is Leibniz's fundamental question "Why is there something instead of nothing?,"[11] and the other is Aristotle's definition of art. According to Book VI the *Nicomachean Ethics*, τέχνη

is a rule (or knowledge) accompanying production (ἕξις μετὰ λόγου ποιητική), in the same way as prudence (φρόνησις) is a rule accompanying action.[12] Now, making (or production) is a species of coming-to-be (γένεσις), which Aristotle describes as a change (μεταβολή) from something to something.[13] However, it is not just production that belongs to change and coming-to-be; alongside technical production Aristotle also recognizes natural generation and change. Aristotle separates natural beings from the objects of ποίησις, because the former have in themselves "a source of source of motion and rest,…but a bed or a cloak [qua artifact]…has no innate impulse of change."[14]

However, as I have already mentioned in the introduction, the form-matter paradigm (which is the keystone of the concept of production) stems from the domain of produced equipment rather than that of living beings (GA 5: 13–14/154–55). It is only then that the distinction of form and matter is applied to the rest of beings (including living beings). Now, Aristotle would not deny that the distinction between form and matter originates in the sphere of artifacts. As he suggests in the opening of the *Physics*, the natural path of investigation proceeds from the products of art to the natural beings.[15] The sphere of τέχνη is the necessary starting point of Aristotle's study, because it discloses something that cannot be disclosed by simply looking at φύσις. Such is one of the crucial distinctions between φύσις and τέχνη, which is introduced in Chapter 11 of Book Z of the *Metaphysics*. Aristotle notes that the products of art are "brought into being in materials different in form, such as a circle in bronze or stone or wood."[16] When it is a matter of art, therefore, the same εἶδος can be brought into more than one kind of material, i.e., in bronze *or* stone *or* wood.[17] What this lack of necessary relation means for Aristotle, however, is that it is easy to separate form and material in thought. The objects of art thus admit material variability, for "the bronze or the wood does not in any way belong to the thinghood of the circle, because of its being separated [χωρίζεσθαι] from them."[18] When it is a matter of φύσις, on the other hand, the separation between form and matter is not obvious, for the form does not exist in other kinds of material substratum. Therefore,

in the case of natural beings, says Aristotle, "it is difficult to subtract [ἀφελεῖν] the form in thought."[19] Indeed, the human form cannot be in bronze or wood; rather, "the form of a human being always appears in flesh and bones and parts of that sort."[20] The form and matter of a living being appear as having an absolutely necessary relation, i.e., they are inseparable.

Now, in contrast to natural beings, the source of the objects of τέχνη lies in the soul of the craftsperson, which is external to the objects themselves. That source has to do with the form of the product, i.e., what Heidegger calls "[an] anticipated look of the thing, sighted beforehand" (GA 24: 150/SZ 106). That is to say, the craftsperson conceives of a form (i.e., design) of what she is going to make in her mind before she begins the process of making. Such an anticipated look (proto-typical image or *Vor-bild*, in Heidegger's words) "shows the thing as what it is before the production and how it is supposed to look as a product" (GA 24: 150/107). When it is a matter of useful tools, the form or look is determined by function and serviceability; for example, a knife has the particular form that it does in order to cut. In the language of Heidegger's analysis of tools in *Being and Time*, tools are determined by their *Wozu* (whereto, assignment), by human projects and purposes (GA 2: §15, 92/SZ 68). Yet, the anticipated look or form would have no existence without the matter in which the craftsperson realizes it.[21] Although *Being and Time* lacks an ontology of art, then, Heidegger already recognizes the material component of artifacts in the 1927 work: "Hammer, tongs, nails in themselves refer to – they consist of – steel, iron, metal, stone, wood. 'Nature' is also discovered in the use of the useful things, 'nature' in the light of products of nature" (GA 2: §15, 94/SZ 70).[22] From which it follows that in addition to their *Wozu*, useful tools are also marked by their *Woraus* (whereof), which refers to matter. "The work to be produced is not just useful for…; production itself is always a using of something for something" (GA 2: §15, 94/SZ 70). What this means is that production requires some pre-existing matter – nothing comes from nothing, as it were.[23] Now, the source of matter, which is always already there, refers to the beings of nature (φύσις). Properly

considered, then, the task of production is to bring a form into some suitable matter provided by nature: The iron saw comes from the one that is without matter (i.e., the anticipated look).[24] And the product can be considered finished exactly at the moment when its matter is fully subjected to a given form.

Aristotle explains in the *Metaphysics* that the craftsperson "will not make a saw out of wool, or out of wood either."[25] From which it follows that the matter has to be different when the products are different: It is requisite for a saw to have teeth made of iron. Thus, the form "prescribes in each case the kind and selection of the matter – impermeable for a jug, sufficiently hard for an ax, firm yet flexible for shoes" (GA 5: 13/154). But the selection of matter in turn depends on the function assigned to the useful tool, be it an ax or shoes. Thus, the craftsperson does not consider natural beings as they are but addresses them in terms of their suitability for being used in production.[26] From the standpoint of production, then, the matter of the artifact is not considered *as such* but as the iron of which the saw is to be made, nothing more. Here matter is discovered in the context of use, not as itself; what is according to φύσις is thus subordinated to the productive intention. This is exactly what Heidegger must have in mind when he writes in "The Origin of the Work of Art": "The matter is all the better and more suitable, the less it resists being absorbed in the equipmental being of the equipment" (GA 5: 32/171, tm). When the choice of matter is right, therefore, the matter is inconspicuous, does not seem to play a role in equipment: An iron saw is just a saw, in conformity with the form. "Because it is determined by usefulness and serviceability," explains Heidegger, "equipment takes into its service that of which it consists: the matter. In fabricating equipment – e.g., an ax – stone is used, and used up [*gebraucht und verbraucht*]. It disappears into usefulness" (GA 5: 32/171).

Now, Aristotle identifies the material cause with the question ἐξ οὗ ("from out of which?" or "whence?").[27] Given that the act of γένεσις is temporal, i.e., takes time, the meaning of the question could be likewise taken as temporal. Otherwise stated, the question concerning the

material cause is about the past source of the artifact. Now, Walter Brogan emphasizes exactly the temporal dimension of change when he writes that "a characteristic of change is that it is *no longer* that from out of which it changes."[28] This is what the name μεταβολή itself suggests: "[There] is one thing before [πρότερον] and another after [ὕστερον]."[29] While the "before" of change refers to the matter marked by the deprivation of form, i.e., "what is shapeless, formless or disordered," the "after" refers to the finished product, to something that has the desired form.[30] The lack of form in question, however, refers to an incidental (κατὰ συμβεβηκός) deprivation, i.e., deprivation of the form of a house at which production aims.[31] So, the matter in question is deprived of form only from the standpoint of the productive intention of the craftsperson. The material cause is, according to art, only potentially a formed product, because it does not yet have the desired look. From the perspective of ποίησις, therefore, matter has to be left behind, relegated to the past. Herein lies the "pastness' of ὕλη: Although it is something out of which the product has been made, it is itself left behind. And this is exactly how Aristotle describes the process in Book VI of the *Physics*: "[What] changes something stands apart from that from which it changes, or leaves it behind [ἀπολείπειν; to forsake, to withdraw]."[32] To be sure, the Greek verb ἀπολείπειν does not mean that the material cause disappears entirely in the formed product. Rather, as I have already suggested, the product is finished when the matter deprived of form is fully subjected to form. Hence, what is truly left behind is not the matter as such but its initial state of deprivation, which is also the state of readiness (or openness) to acquire a form. That is, once the stone, which can potentially be many things, is shaped into a statue, it is no longer capable of becoming something else, at least, not right away. In Book II of the *Physics* Aristotle relates a joke, originally belonging to Protarchus, which illustrates precisely what might be called the finitude (pastness) of material potentiality. Aristotle says that beings without the power of choice can be neither fortunate nor unfortunate, "except metaphorically, as Protarchus says the stones out of which altars are made are fortunate, because they are

honored, while their quarry-mates are trampled on."[33] My suggestion is that the presupposition underlying this joke is that, once the matter is enformed, it is improbable that it will take another form. So, having lost their capacity to become an altar, quarry-stones will remain quarry-stones. In other words, every act of ποίησις is a foreclosure of sorts of some of the δύναμις that belongs to the used up matter. Evidently, then, the framework of production considers material potentiality within the parameters of the past. That is, produced equipment has no future, or rather it lacks an open, determinable future. For a lack of a better expression, its future is deprived of potentiality.[34] As I am about to show, the parameters of an artwork are the opposite of those of equipment: In the work of art, the material component precisely preserves its potentiality, its openness, from subjection to form and function, and thus preserves its future, as it were.

Indeed, as Heidegger will suggest in "The Question Concerning Technology," τέχνη does not necessarily entail the subordination of matter to usefulness. Heidegger notes that the essence of Greek τέχνη is intrinsically ambiguous: "It has often been pointed out that Greeks, who knew a few things about works of art, use the same word, τέχνη, for craft and art and call the craftsman and the artists by the same name: τεχνίτης" (GA 5: 36/184).[35] The essence of τέχνη thus harbors in itself not just the possibility of technology but also the possibility of art. Then, art is a different mode of revealing from technology, a higher mode of revealing, according to Heidegger, although it, too, originally belongs to what the Greeks used to call τέχνη.[36] "This producing that brings forth, e.g., erecting a statue in the temple precinct, and the ordering that challenges…are indeed fundamentally different, and yet they remain related in their essence" (GA 7: 22/QCT 21). Before I proceed to the question of the work of art, however, it is vital to consider the concept of Aristotle's philosophy that could be said to mark the very limits of his distinction between form and matter (and thus of the technological interpretation of being, as it were). The concept spoken of here is, of course, Aristotle's own concept of prime matter.

III. ARISTOTLE'S PRIME MATTER

Now, the state of the deprivation of form, which is the starting point of manufacturing in Aristotle, is always only a relative rather than absolute deprivation. When it is a matter of making a statue out of a piece of bronze, for example, all that is relevant is that the original shape of bronze is *not* the desired one. Though deprived of the desired form, however, the piece of bronze is far from formless; instead, it possesses its own relative form. Otherwise, bronze would lack any being or actuality, i.e., it would not exist in the first place. Then, the concepts of form and matter in Aristotle are relative. In Aubenque's words, "[what] is matter in relation to this form is itself a form in relation to some more primitive matter."[37] Yet, the relativity of the form-matter distinction in Aristotle naturally introduces the risk of a regress *ad infinitum*: If every material possesses a form (in order to be actual), then form cannot be ever removed or expunged from matter, which can turn into an infinite regress. Hence, whenever we try to separate matter from form, the matter appears to have its own form, and we have to repeat the procedure. Now, the problem of infinite regress is a recurrent problem in Aristotle's philosophy, and it is customarily solved by introducing an absolute first term.[38] As far his hylomorphism is concerned, Aristotle solves the problem of the infinite regress by introducing the so-called primary bodies (τα σώματα τὰ πρῶτα), which he also calls perceptible (αἰσθητά) or simple (ἁπλά) bodies, or elements (στοιχεῖα): fire, earth, water, and air.

However, Aristotle does not entirely solve the problem of the infinite regress in this way, for the primary bodies are themselves defined by a member of each of the following contrary pairs: on the one hand, hot and cold; on the other hand, wet and dry. Properly considered, then, primary bodies can exchange qualities, thus change into one another (for example, water can evaporate into air). However, change is impossible without some underlying potentiality, as Aristotle shows in Book I of the *Physics*: "[In] all…cases of change…it is obvious that there must be some underlying subject which undergoes the change."[39] If all change requires an underlying subject (matter or potentiality), and

if Aristotle's primary bodies can mutate into one another, then there must be a substratum for the primary bodies themselves. Such appropriate substratum of the elements in Aristotle is what is traditionally called "prime matter." As Aristotle explains, "'the hot' is not matter for 'the cold,' nor 'the cold' for 'the hot,' but the substratum is matter for them both."[40] Inasmuch as prime matter underlies the basic contrary qualities, however, it lacks all quality itself. As Aristotle explains in the *Metaphysics*, prime matter is deprived of "anything else by which being is made definite.…The ultimate underlying subject is in itself neither something nor so much, nor is it anything else; and it is not even the negations of these, for these too would belong to it as attributes."[41] Yet, what is formless and lacks all quality cannot exist, according to Aristotle. We read elsewhere in Aristotle that "matter is that which has points and lines at its limits and cannot possibly ever exist without qualities and without shape."[42] From which it follows that prime matter simply does not exist, or only ever exists potentially, which is, however, a contradiction in terms.[43]

And yet, prime matter *must* exist (even if it is not separable from what it underlies); otherwise, the reciprocal transformation of Aristotle's elemental bodies would not be possible. What is more, given that prime matter functions as an underlying subject, it must possess those formal qualities that make change possible.[44] But, as I have just emphasized, Aristotle's prime matter appears to lack any qualities altogether. Now, Aristotle's purported solution to the paradox of prime matter is as follows:

> Our theory is that there is matter of which the perceptible bodies consist, but that it is not separable but always accompanied by contrariety, and it is from this that the so-called elements come into being…However, since the primary bodies are also derived in this way from matter, we must explain about these also, reckoning as a source and as primary the matter which is inseparable from, but underlies, the contrarieties.[45]

While Aristotle's solution removes the paradox of prime matter's separate existence, it is still difficult to see how something entirely indeterminate can serve as an underlying subject. And it is difficult to see Aristotle's prime matter as anything more than an *ad hoc* solution to the problem of the infinite regress of matter. And yet, inasmuch as the concept of prime matter renders Aristotle's hylomorphism partially incoherent, it also reveals something important about it. That is, the paradox of prime matter makes evident that in Aristotle's philosophy the concept of matter (potentiality) cannot be conceived without its opposite, i.e., form (actuality), to which it is subjected. For Aristotle, then, potentiality cannot be thought as such but always instrumentally, in the context of use and function, as subordinated to form. Insofar as the concept of prime matter is at once necessary and contradictory, then, the matter-form structure is brought *to its limit* with this concept.

In the second section of "The Origin of the Work of Art," I would suggest, Heidegger recognizes virtually the very same problem of the infinite regress of form and matter (in slightly different terms). Heidegger writes incisively:

> A stone presses down and manifests its heaviness. But while the heaviness exerts an opposing pressure upon us it denies any penetration into it. If we attempt such a penetration by breaking open the rock, it still does not display in its fragments anything inward that has been opened up. The stone has instantly withdrawn again into the same dull pressure and bulk of its fragments. (GA 5: 33/172)

My suggestions is that the problem that Heidegger raises in this passage is that the concepts of form and matter are relative. In this connection, William McNeill explains that "even the 'atom' supposedly indivisible can, like every particle, in principle be divided into ever smaller, subatomic particles. But in this ongoing process of splitting, a process that is in principle infinite, we never reach an 'inside' of things."[46] To never reach an 'inside' of an object, I submit, means exactly that matter

cannot be accessed as such, in a formless state. Thus, it is the same problem that for Aristotle results in the paradoxical concept of prime matter that Heidegger traces in the passage above. And that matter shrinks from disclosure has to do with the form-matter structure itself. However, Heidegger will transform this negative implication into something positive: The work of art will disclose matter in its very resistance to disclosure, thus it will disclose matter as such. In the work of art, therefore, matter exhibits a resistance to determination similar to that of Aristotle's prime matter, and it does so right away. Properly considered, then, instead of trying to solve the problem of infinite regress, Heidegger does not even let the regress begin. Such is the role of the work of art for him: Matter speaks differently in the artwork, it speaks in the mode of silence, resistance, or refusal. It is at this point that the traditional concept of matter can be said to undergo a reformulation (into earth) in Heidegger: "It shows itself only when it remains undisclosed and unexplained. Earth thus shatters every attempt to penetrate it" (GA 5: 33/172). And in the language of the first version of the essay, the earth is "a ground which, since it is essential and always closing itself off, is an abyss [*Abgrund*]."[47] In the next section I will consider precisely the way in which matter (reformulated by Heidegger as earth) is disclosed in the work of art, beyond the limitations of form and function.

IV. MATTER, EARTH, AND ARTWORK

In the third section of "The Origin of the Work of Art" Heidegger defines two specific marks or characteristics (*Kennzeichen*) of the work of art. Heidegger never explicitly indicates the first *Kennzeichen* of the artwork, but he does indicate the second one: "Not so when a work is created. This becomes clear in the light of the second characteristic, which may be introduced here" (GA 5: 52/189). If Heidegger's explanation of the second characteristic (which clarifies the first) comes after the quoted sentence, then an account of the first characteristic must come before it. Indeed, in the previous paragraph Heidegger emphasizes the difference between equipment and artwork as regards the role

of matter in them. Although the manner in which matter is employed in art "to be sure, looks like the employment of matter in handicraft," suggests Heidegger, it is an illusion "that artistic creation is also an activity of handicraft. It never is" (GA 5: 52/189). Therefore, the first *Kennzeichen* must be about the role of matter in an artwork, which is radically distinct from the role that it fulfills in equipment (indeed, to the extent that the very term "matter" becomes inappropriate).[48]

As I have already suggested in relation to Aristotle, and as Heidegger suggests now, "[the] production of equipment is finished when a material has been so formed as to be ready for use. For equipment to be ready means that it is released beyond itself, to be used up in usefulness" (GA 5: 52/189).[49] By contrast, it is characteristic of an artwork that it "does not use up or misuse the earth as matter, but rather sets it free to be nothing but itself" (GA 5: 52/189). Equipment consumes, or uses up, the matter of which it consists, i.e., it subordinates matter to a determinate function. By determining the use in advance, that is, the equipmental mode of production puts demands to matter rather than lets it be itself. However, that is not what transpires in the work of art, as Heidegger shows with the example of the Greek temple:

> By contrast the temple work…does not cause the material disappear, but rather causes it to come forth [*hervorkommen*] for the very first time and to come into the open region of the work's world. The rock comes to bear and rest and so first becomes rock; the metals come to glitter and shimmer, colors to shine, tones to sing, the word to say. (GA 5: 32/171)

If what makes matter disappear in equipment is its subordination to usefulness, then the artwork causes matter to "come forth for the very first time" precisely by releasing it from usefulness. Indeed, the deconstruction (in the Heideggerian sense of *Destruktion*) of the matter-form structure is accomplished here in a single step, i.e., by suspending usefulness. Heidegger writes: "To be sure, the sculptor uses stone just as the mason uses it, in his own way. But he does not use it up…To be sure,

the painter also uses pigment, but in such a way that color is not used up but rather only now comes to shine forth" (GA 5: 34/173). In contrast to matter in useful tools, in the work of art matter as earth comes forth as nothing but itself, independently from function.[50] In Miguel de Beistegui's words, "in the work of art, there is an excess of materiality, or earth, over function."[51] But when the parameters of usefulness are suspended by Heidegger, it is no longer the question of the traditional concept of matter. It is at this juncture that Heidegger reformulates the ὕλη of the artwork as earth: "Nowhere in the work is there any trace of a work material [*Werkstoff*]" (GA 5: 34/173).[52] Rather, as Heidegger has it, "[that] into which the work sets itself back, and thereby allows to come forth, is what we called 'the earth'" (GA 5: 32/171). And further Heidegger writes: "[What] looks like the thingly element [i.e., matter], in the sense of our usual thing-concepts, in the work taken as object is…its earthy character [*das Erdhafte*]" (GA 5: 56–57/194). As far as artworks are concerned, then, Heidegger explicitly substitutes the concept of matter for the concept of earth. If for Heidegger metaphysics has been (at least, in part) defined by the technological interpretation of being, and if in the artwork matter is released as earth, then his conception of earth can be understood as matter taken non-metaphysically.[53]

Heidegger introduces the second characteristic of the work of art immediately after the first one. In fact, the second *Kennzeichen* is supposed to elucidate the first, retrospectively. Heidegger describes the second characteristic as follows: "[In] contrast to all other modes of production, the work is distinguished by being created so that its createdness is created into the created work [*in das Geschaffene mit hineingeschaffen ist*]" (GA 5: 52/189).[54] As we already know, there are created (produced) objects other than artworks (e.g., equipment). Hence, what Heidegger calls *Geschaffensein* (createdness) is not an exclusive property of an artwork. Indeed, "[everything] brought forth surely has this endowment of having been brought forth, if it has any endowment at all" (GA 5: 52/189).[55] And yet, inasmuch as that createdness is created into the work of art, the property of *Geschaffensein* is made manifest in art, "in an expressly specific way [*eigens*]" (which is not the case in equipment) (GA 5: 52/190, tm). Thus, artworks are characterized by Heidegger by a

certain kind of self-referentiality (of createdness, specifically): What the artwork makes manifest is exactly that it has been brought forth, that is a product of ποίησις. Heidegger describes this self-referential quality of the work of art in terms of that-ness (*das "Daß"*).[56] Heidegger is worth quoting at length here:

> [The] simple *factum est* ["it is made"] is to be held forth into the open region by the work: namely this, that unconcealment of a being has happened here, and that as this happening it happens here for the first time; or, that such a work is at all rather than is not [*daß solches Werk ist und nicht vielmehr nicht ist*]…this thrust, this "that it is" [*dieses "Daß"*] of createdness, emerges into view most purely from the work. (GA 5: 53/190)

Having reintroduced createdness in terms of that-ness, Heidegger contrasts it with the being of equipment for the second time:

> To be sure, 'that' it is made is a property also of all equipment that is available and in use. But this 'that' does not become prominent in the equipment; it disappears in usefulness. The more handy a piece of equipment is, the more inconspicuous it remains that, for example, this particular hammer is. (GA 5: 53/190)

At this juncture, recall that what makes an equipment equipment is what Heidegger calls *Wozu*, its purposive assignment or function. It follows that what renders the that-ness of a useful tool inconspicuous is exactly purposive referentiality. By contrast, that same usefulness is suspended in the work of art, which is what makes the artwork's existence, its that-ness, self-referential and conspicuous.[57] That is to say: the work of art is not subordinate to any further end and portrays nothing; instead, it simply is (rather than is not).

It is far from insignificant that Heidegger resorts to the formula *daß es ist* in his description of the second mark of an artwork, in addition to the fact that it carries an implicit, and double, reference to Aristotle and Leibniz (and Schelling, as well). For, in spite of the substantial

shift in philosophical vocabulary between *Being and Time* and "The Origin of the Work of Art" (and, to be sure, the few terms that are preserved in the latter work, e.g., "world," undergo a considerable transformation), the *Daß* formula is to be found at important junctures in both works.[58] One such important moment in *Being and Time* is §29, where Heidegger writes: "And even in the most indifferent and harmless everydayness the being of Dasein can burst forth as a naked 'that it is and has to be [*Daß es ist und zu sein hat*].' The pure 'that it is [*daß es ist*]' shows itself, the 'whence [*Woher*]' and the 'whither [*Wohin*]' remain in darkness" (GA 2: §29: 134/SZ 131). While the problematic of *Being and Time* remains largely outside the scope of this article, what is of concern here is that the (human) Dasein is in darkness concerning its origin and destination (purpose).[59] Unlike the being of equipment, then, the being of Dasein has no pre-assigned purpose; rather, the Dasein *just is*, and nothing more could be said about it (at least, *a priori*). That is exactly what Heidegger means by formulating the that-ness of Dasein as thrownness (*Geworfenheit*) or facticity (*Faktizität*): As it were, Dasein is thrown into existence (it has not chosen to exist), *factically*, without a model or purpose to fall back on. Indeed, we can say no more of the human Dasein than *that it is* (although, as Heidegger adds, the Dasein also *has to be* in its very thrownness). And yet, that is exactly wherein Dasein's freedom lies, i.e., in the indeterminateness of "whence" and "whither." In the vocabulary of potentiality (possibility), that Dasein's "whence" and "whither" are veiled entails that Dasein's potentiality is not exhausted by actuality. Rather, for Dasein, "[higher] than actuality stands possibility [*Möglichkeit*]" (GA 2: §7: 38/SZ 36). My suggestion is that Heidegger's use of the *Daß* formula in "The Origin of the Work of Art" betrays a similar logic: What Heidegger finds in the work of art is its own peculiar sort of freedom, i.e., freedom from purposive assignment, as well as potentiality (earth) that is higher than actuality.

As we have seen, the two characteristics (or marks) of the work of art stem for Heidegger from one and the same operation of suspending the artwork's function; the artwork is, for a lack of a better expression, *useless*. Then, although the two marks of the artwork might have

appeared disconnected at first, in truth, Heidegger's *Kennzeichen* are closely bound together. Given that for Heidegger it is the second mark that clarifies the first (rather than *vice versa*), the connection could be formulated as something like the following: If the the work of art is not subjected to any purpose (for the work simply is), which is its second mark, then the material is released to be nothing but itself (as earth), which refers to its first mark. However, insofar as it is precisely form and function that afford intelligibility to matter, Heidegger's earth (as matter in excess of function) cannot but appear as refusal of intelligibility. Indeed, that the matter of an artwork is without assignment entails that earth for Heidegger only appears as resistance to disclosure, as concealment. "But what exactly does appear [in an artwork]?" asks Dastur appropriately, "Not a material which is waiting for a form which will make it invisible, but that which resists all attempts of penetration."[60]

Such is indeed the self-secluding nature of the earth, in Taminiaux words, "which we best reach 'when we can say no more of beings than they are.'"[61] Now, recall that the problem with Aristotle's prime matter, which refers to something like pure, boundless (ἄπειρος) potentiality without form, was precisely that it could not appear. But the existential status of prime matter is paradoxical, undecidable, because it marks the limits of the form-matter distinction. It cannot appear, in other words, because it lies outside the technological interpretation of being. What transpires in the work of art, however, is exactly that matter appears (albeit as refusal) as free from form and function, from the technological interpretation; it appears *as itself*, for the first time. But for matter to appear "as itself" means to appear as potentiality free from function, thus to appear as refusal. If we were to limit ourselves to Aristotle's terminology, then, the concept "earth" would correspond exactly to prime matter. Indeed, the work of art is the closest we get to something like a *phenomenal appearing* of πρώτη ὕλη. In this regard, Heidegger writes incisively: "The earth appears openly cleared as itself only when it is perceived and preserved as that which is essentially undisclosable, that which shrinks from every disclosure and constantly keeps itself closed up" (GA 5: 33/172). What is at stake in the work of art, I would submit,

is therefore nothing less than a "phenomenologization" of the resistance of prime matter: With the earth, concealment itself is brought into appearance *as* concealment.

In contrast to πρώτη ὕλη, however, Heidegger's concept of earth designates not a merely passive potentiality *for* actualization (i.e., a potentiality subservient to actuality) but something that indeed stands *higher* than actuality. As Backman explains, "[in] Aristotle's production oriented model…materiality…as such is articulated in negative terms, as *in*articulate *in*determinacy that still *lacks* articulation and is therefore a mere potential…for being articulated."[62] Then, although Aristotle articulates the concept of prime matter in terms of resistance to form and function, for him the former is still subordinate to the latter. Thus, Aristotle considers materiality (almost without exception) in terms of a lack (or deprivation) of form. In the work of art, on the other hand, Heidegger attempts to conceive of materiality in terms of excess (in relation to form) rather than lack. Although Aristotle's thinking of prime matter (at the limit of the form-matter structure) can be said to inform Heidegger's conception of earth, then, Heidegger evidently goes (at least) one step further than Aristotle. That is to say, inasmuch as the matter of an artwork is not subjected to function, the work of art retains its material potentiality, its determinability, thus its future, open (here, possibility indeed stands higher than actuality). While in useful tools matter is exhausted in and by a given form, the matter of an artwork remains unused, as it were, even after the process of production has finished. To be sure, the wood of a table, say, can still be made into something else (e.g., a wooden door), but that possibility is merely *per accidens*, i.e., the wooden table would have to cease to exist first. On the other hand, as far as the work of art is concerned, its potentiality to be other than it is is intrinsic in its essence. In other words, it is a *per se* power of an artwork to become something that it is not (while remaining, for a lack of a better expression, the artwork that it is). And it is precisely in its refusal to portray anything, to perform a function, that the potentiality of an artwork keeps its openness to determination, its freedom (recall §29 of *Being and Time*). Such is

the fundamental challenge of Heidegger's thinking of earth: To think silence and refusal of the earth together with the overflow of potentiality "contained" therein. The difference between matter and earth, or between the useful tool and the artwork, is that the latter preserves its δύναμις, its potentiality, while the former does not. When reformulated as earth, therefore, matter is not the "past" of the work but its future, excessive potentiality to be otherwise.[63]

Now, the claim that the potentiality (i.e., earth) of the work of art is boundless, excessive, like Aristotle's πρώτη ὕλη, might appear as an overstatement. But to say that the potentiality of the artwork is boundless is not to say that it can mean anything at any given moment; rather, it is to say that its meaning cannot be exhausted at any given moment. So, while the εἶδος of the useful tool is fixed, subjected to a definite *Wozu* (what-for), the form of the artwork is expressly open to interpretation. This is how the work of art, of which we can say no more than that it is, nonetheless calls for an interpretative, hermeneutic decision, recurrently and repeatedly. However, this does not mean that the artwork can be interpreted in an infinite number of ways; rather, the range of interpretation is at each time limited, as well as made possible, by what Heidegger calls the world (*Welt*). The concept of world is defined by Heidegger as follows:

> The world is not the mere collection of the countable or uncountable, familiar and unfamiliar things that are at hand. But neither is it a merely imagined framework added by our representation to the sum of such given objects.…World is *never an object* that stands before us and can be seen. World is the *ever-nonobjective* [immer Ungegenständliche] to which we are subject as long as the paths of birth and death, blessing and curse keep us transported into being. (GA 5: 30–31/170)

The first part of the definition is negative, while the second part is more positive. First, Heidegger rejects understanding world as an object (or collection thereof) or as objective, i.e., the world is *ungegenständlich*.

And yet, the world is something to which we human beings are subject; herein lies the positive part of the definition. "By the opening up of a world," adds Heidegger, "all things gain their lingering and hastening, their remoteness and nearness, their scope and limits" (GA 5: 31/170). One might say then that the world is what grants beings inhabiting it significance, reveals them in this or that way, meaningfully and with sense. The concept of world refers to "the non-thematic background of all the ways of revealing – perceiving, acting, desiring, appraising, attunement and understanding."[64] This means that things (including artworks) cannot be just anything, i.e., the work of art cannot but appear in a *particular* world of meaning, in a *particular* relational context. Indeed, that is what Heidegger's concept of world in "The Origin of the Work of Art" refers to: a historically determined configuration of meaning. It is within this historical articulation alone that things (and, especially, artworks) can be meaningful, give rise to various interpretations. Such is also the way in which the work of art discloses the character of the world into which the human Dasein is thrown: A historical world is reflected in an artwork.

And yet, as was already mentioned, there is an excess of potentiality in the work – this is its earthly (as opposed to "material") aspect. From which it follows that no historical world can exhaust earth, for the earth harbors the potentiality to be otherwise at all times.[65] And it is art that is capable of bringing forth what is potential in earth into appearance, such that "everything becomes otherwise than it is [*alles anders ist als sonst*]" (GA 5: 59/197, tm). Then, the relationship of an artwork to world is not merely descriptive, i.e., the former does not merely reflect the latter; rather, it is capable of disclosing something new about the world. In Sandra Bartky's words, "the artist's discovery of meaning [in the world] is at the same time a founding of meaning."[66] Such is indeed the power of art: "to transform our accustomed ties to world and earth and henceforth…all usual doing and prizing, knowing and looking" (GA 5: 54/191). Thanks to this transformative power of art, the world *worlds*, and history enters the picture, saving us "as much from fatalism as from eternal logical necessity."[67] Indeed, the concept of world in Heidegger is processual-historical rather than fixed and eternal. By the

same token, the concept of truth (*Wahrheit*) no longer refers in "The Origin of the Work of Art" to something eternal: "[Truth] does not exist in itself beforehand, somewhere among the stars" (GA 5: 49/186).[68]

Now, with the collapse of a world, works of art can themselves be subject to passing away: "The Aegina sculptures in the Munich collection, Sophocles' *Antigone* in the best critical edition, are, as the works they are, torn out of their own native sphere.…World-withdrawal and world-decay can never be undone. The works are no longer the works they were" (GA 5: 26/166). Be the letter of Heidegger's text as it may, if the artwork has the capacity to open up a world by itself, then it must be capable of transcending world-decay. This is what it means to say that the earth (of the work) is ἄπειρος: The work cannot be limited or bounded, in a word, exhausted, by any particular world. "That this lies in the earthly sensuousness of the works (thanks to which they can appear across different ages) the works of art themselves show us," writes David Espinet, "for, in their sensuous givenness and in spite of all cultural and historical distance, they are *always more and other than mute hieroglyphs*."[69] Following Espinet, I would suggest that the potentially of the work speaks across worlds. The work is unlike the quarry-stones from Book II of the *Physics* that will remain quarry-stones; the work of art has a future in the full sense of the term. If the potentiality of an artwork is indeed higher than actuality, then the work of art (as having an earthly aspect) could never lack a future (in principle). And it could be equally said that without earth, this strange and unfamiliar source, there could not be a future, there could not be possibility in the first place. In turn, art is one of the ways in which that strange source of future is brought into phenomenal appearance, in its very resistance to and refusal of phenomenality.

V. CONCLUSION

The epilogue of "The Origin of the Work of Art" quotes Hegel's famous sentence: "Art is and remains for us, on the side of its highest vocation, something past" (GA 5: 68/205). Heidegger uses this sentence as an occasion to raise the question of the future of art: "The truth of Hegel's judgment has *not yet* [noch nicht] been decided" (GA 5: 68/205, my).[70]

Then, although Heidegger agrees with Hegel's judgment, he nonetheless keeps the question of art undecided (unlike, it seems, Hegel himself). For it is indeed possible that it is only in relation to Hegel's own conception of art that art belongs to a past period.[71] That is, another conception of art could be (and may have been) possible. And this other conception would not belong to the past because it would not relegate matter or earth to the past. Indeed, what I have attempted to show in this essay is that it is precisely the "not yet" that forms the heart of Heidegger's thinking of the work of art. For what the work of art makes manifest is the inapparent potentiality of a historical world, which is what Heidegger calls the "earth." Inasmuch as art brings earth into phenomenal appearing (albeit as opaque, self-secluding), then, the truth of the work of art lies precisely in the "not yet." Crucial for Heidegger's conception of art is his reformulation of the traditional form-matter distinction, which, as I have shown, considers material potentiality within the parameters of the past, that is, as exhausted by form in the productive process. By means of an immanent critique of the form-matter structure, which originates most distinctively in Aristotle's philosophy, Heidegger endeavors to rethink matter as no longer subordinate to form (as it is the case with useful tools). To this end, Heidegger reformulates the concept of matter as "earth," which designates matter free from subordination to form. In order to elucidate Heidegger's complicated reformulation of matter as earth, this essay has interpreted Heidegger's conception of earth against the background of Aristotle's concept of prime matter, which designates something like pure potentiality. It is precisely insofar as the matter of the work of art is not subjected to form and function, then, that the work of art keeps an open, determinable future ("not yet"), and its potentiality stands higher than actuality.

NOTES

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1 The entirety of GA 33 is devoted to Aristotle's discussion of actuality and potentiality in the opening chapters of Book Θ of the *Metaphysics*.

2 The reason why Heidegger reformulates the human being as Dasein is precisely to avoid falling back into the technical paradigm. That is, if production always rests on a preconceived design or essence to be realized, then the point is to deny the human being an essence (e.g., rational animal or ζῷον λόγον ἔχων) by calling it [Heidegger claims that Dasein is prior to gender, and does not use the expression *ein Dasein*] Dasein, a term "which is a pure expression of being" (GA 2: §4, 12/SZ 11).

3 For an extended discussion of this shift, see William McNeill, "Tracing *technē*: Heidegger, Aristotle, and the Legacy of Philosophy," in *Heidegger's Question of Being: Dasein, Truth, and History*, ed. Holger Zaborowski (Washington, D.C.: The Catholic University of America Press, 2017), 71–89.

4 Françoise Dastur, "Heidegger's Freiburg Version of 'The Origin of the Work of Art,'" in *Heidegger Toward the Turn: Essays on the Work of the 1930s*, ed. James Risser (Albany: SUNY Press, 1999), 128. See also Michel Haar, *The Song of the Earth: Heidegger and the Grounds of the History of Being*, trans. Reginald Lilly (Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 1993), 60. In this regard, Jussi Backman is one of the few commentators who takes such an hermeneutical approach to the 1935 text. See *Complicated Presence: Heidegger and the Postmetaphysical Unity of Being* (New York: SUNY Press, 2015), 146: "Heidegger is not inviting us to simply discard the matter/form distinction in the context of art. Rather, he wants to reopen and rethink this articulation by no

longer deriving it from the traditional paradigm of a produced implement." However, Backman does not actually spend any time tracing the transition from matter to earth.

5 Haar, *The Song of the Earth*, 58.

6 Although it is beyond the scope of this essay, my reading of Heidegger's concept of earth against the background of Aristotle might help better understand Giorgio Agamben's work on potentiality. See, for example, Agamben's seminal essay "On Potentiality," in *Potentialities: Collected Essays in Philosophy*, ed. Daniel Heller-Roazen, trans. Daniel Heller-Roazen (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1999), 177–84.

7 See Diana Aurenque, "Die Kunst und die Technik. Herstellung, ποίησις, τέχνη," in *Heideggers "Ursprung des Kunstwerkes": Ein Kooperativer Kommentar*, ed. David Espinet and Tobias Keiling (Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 2011), 33.

8 See, for example, GA 5: 56/193.

9 Aristotle, *Nicomachean Ethics*, trans. Joe Sachs (Newburyport: Focus Publishing, 2002), VI, 1140a10–13. See also GA 9: 280–81/214.

10 At the same time, Heidegger refers exactly to Chapters 3 and 4 of Book VI of the *Nicomachean Ethics* in GA 7: 14/QCT 13.

11 See David Espinet, "Kunst und Natur. Der Streit von Welt und Erde," in Espinet and Keiling, *Heideggers "Ursprung des Kunstwerkes,"* 63, where he writes that "under the aesthetic proviso Heidegger thus reformulates the wonder expressed in the question: 'Why are there beings at all rather than nothing?'" (this and all other quotations are my translations).

12 See Pierre Aubenque, *La Prudence chez Aristote* (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1963), 66. Cf. also GA 5: 46–47/184.

13 See Aristotle, *Metaphysics*, Z, 1032a12–14.

14 Aristotle, *Physics*, trans. Joe Sachs (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1996), II, 192b13–19. Interestingly, given that φύσις is a spontaneous self-production, an *autopoiēsis* of sorts, Heidegger stipulates in 1954 that it is a "production in the highest sense" for Aristotle (GA 7: 12/QCT 10).

15 Aristotle, *Physics*, I, 184a16–21.

16 Aristotle, *Metaphysics*, Z, 1036a31–32.

17 Heidegger emphasizes precisely this point in GA 9: 253–54/194.

18 Aristotle, *Metaphysics*, Z, 1036a33–34. See also Pierre Aubenque, "Sur l'ambivalence du concept aristotélicien de substance," in *Ontologie et Dialogue: Hommage à Pierre Aubenque*, ed. Nestor L. Cordero (Paris: Librairie Philosophique J. Vrin, 2000), 103, who appears to have something similar in mind: "In order to be explained, the mode of composition [of compound substances] ought to have an essential articulation, i.e., the deductibility of essence or form. This deductibility is given only in those cases where composition follows some intention or telos" (this and all other quotations are my translations).

19 Aristotle, *Metaphysics*, Z, 1036b2–3, tm.

20 Aristotle, *Metaphysics*, Z, 1036b3–4.

21 For Heidegger's discussion of the etymology of the word ὕλη as "the woods that yield wood as construction matter," see GA 9: 274/209–10.

22 See Haar, *Song of the Earth*, 102–103.

23 See Aristotle, *Metaphysics*, Z, 1032b31–32. One might say that production requires a pre-existing matter, because otherwise it would either amount to creation ex nihilo or generate infinite regress (i.e., each underlying thing would require a making of its own underlying thing).

24 See Aristotle, *Metaphysics*, Z, 1032b12.

25 Aristotle, *Metaphysics*, H, 1044a29.

26 See Walter Brogan, *Heidegger and Aristotle: The Twofoldness of Being* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2005), 38–46.

27 For a discussion of the various senses of the preposition ἐκ, see Aristotle, *Metaphysics*, Δ, Chapter 24.

28 Brogan, *Heidegger and Aristotle*, 37, em.

29 Aristotle, *Physics*, V, 225a1–2.

30 See Aristotle, *Physics*, I, 190b17–20.

31 For Aristotle's discussion of the distinction between καθ' αὐτό and κατὰ συμβεβηκός (or *per se* and *per accidens*) see *Physics*, I, 191b4–10.

32 Aristotle, *Physics*, VI, 235b8–9.

33 Aristotle, *Physics*, II, 197b9–11.

34 When Heidegger returns to the question of τέχνη almost two decades later (in "The Question Concerning Technology"), the productive intention begins to correspond or, rather, gives rise to the concept of enframing (*Gestell*). What enframing refers to is an aptitude that considers beings as matter for the ends that are established by the human being. In this way, enframing shares its essence with τέχνη. Yet, enframing is something like τέχνη at its limit: "The revealing that rules in modern technology is a challenging [*Herausfordern*], which *puts to nature unfair demands*" (GA 7: 16/QCT 14, tm, em). Therefore, enframing does not just approach nature as matter but makes demands on nature on the basis of some pre-established project. Therefore, enframing is not open to the possibilities inherent in the matter, but neglects them. Nature is thereby reduced to a reserve of abstract energy.

35 See also GA 7: 14/QCT 12–13.

36 See Robert Bernasconi, "The Greatness of the Work of Art," in *Heidegger Toward the Turn: Essays on the Work of the 1930s*, ed. James Risser (Albany: SUNY Press, 1999), 113, where he writes: "Heidegger turns to art not because of its power to destroy, nor because of its radical difference from the technological order. It is the proximity between art and technology, between the work and equipment, which opens the possibility that art might offer an essential meditation and a decisive confrontation with technology."

37 Pierre Aubenque, *Le problème de l'être chez Aristote* (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1994 [1962]), 480. All quotations are my translations, my emphasis.

38 See Aubenque, *Le problème de l'être chez Aristote*, 266.

39 Aristotle, *Physics*, I, 190a33–34.

40 Aristotle, *On Generation and Corruption*, I, 329a31–32.

41 Aristotle, *Metaphysics*, Z, 1029a20–25, tm.

42 Aristotle, *On Generation and Corruption*, I, 320b16–17.

43 On this point, see, for example, Daniel Graham, "The Paradox of Prime Matter," *Journal of the History of Philosophy* 25:4 (October 1987), 477.

44 See Graham, "The Paradox of Prime Matter," 483.

45 Aristotle, *On Generation and Corruption*, I, 329a24–31.

46 William McNeill, *The Glance of the Eye: Heidegger, Aristotle, and the Ends of Theory* (New York: SUNY Press, 1999), 287. See also Haar, *The Song of the Earth*, 13.

47 Martin Heidegger, "On the Origin of the Work of Art (First Version)," translated by Jerome Veith, in *The Heidegger Reader*, ed. Günter Figal (Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 2009), 137.

48 Concerning the question of distinguishing between artworks and equipment, see Bernasconi, "The Greatness of the Work of Art," 101.

49 See Haar, *Song of the Earth*, 61.

50 See Haar, *Song of the Earth*, 112.

51 Miguel de Beistegui, *Aesthetics after Metaphysics: From Mimesis to Metaphor* (New York: Routledge, 2012), 71.

52 On the different sense of the term *Erde* in "The Origin of the Work of Art" (and beyond), see Haar, *Song of the Earth*, 57–64.

53 See Haar, *Song of the Earth*, 49.

54 Heidegger repeats this construction twice in this paragraph; therefore, it must be quite important.

55 To be more exact, Heidegger distinguishes between "createdness [*Geschaffensein*]" and "producedness (for a purpose) [*Angefertigtsein*]" as two different kinds of "bringing forth [*Hervorbringen*]" (GA 5: 44/182).

56 See Richard Polt, "Meaning, Excess, and Event," *Gatherings: The Heidegger Circle Annual* 1 (2011), 35.

57 In this regard, in the same paragraph Heidegger goes as far as to suggest that not knowing "the artist and the process and the

circumstances of the genesis of the work" only makes the thatness more prominent.

58 See Bernasconi, "The Greatness of the Work of Art," 97.

59 See Polt, "Meaning, Excess, and Event," 32, 36.

60 Dastur, "Freiburg Version," 128; see also Backman, *Complicated Presence*, 147–48.

61 Jacques Taminiaux, *Poetics, Speculation, and Judgment: The Shadow of the Work of Art From Kant to Phenomenology*, trans. Michael Gendre (Albany: SUNY Press, 1993), 148.

62 See Backman, *Complicated Presence*, 147.

63 In "Meaning, Excess, and Event" Richard Polt describes a very similar dynamic (including, very briefly, in "The Origin of the Work of Art") in terms of "excess" (31–38).

64 Espinet, "Kunst und Natur," 48.

65 See, for example, Haar, *Song of the Earth*, 3, 48.

66 Sandra Bartky, "Heidegger's Philosophy of Art," in *Heidegger: The Man and the Thinker*, ed. Thomas Sheehan (Chicago: Precedent Publishing, 1981), 270.

67 Haar, *Song of the Earth*, 2. On Heidegger's shift from earth as the matter of an artwork to earth as a "historical structure," see Bartky, "Heidegger's Philosophy of Art," 268–70.

68 See Dastur, "Freiburg Version," 126.

69 Espinet, "Kunst und Natur," 65, em.

70 On this point, see also Dastur, "Freiburg Version," 125.

71 Dastur, "Freiburg Version," 125.

GATHERINGS SYMPOSIUM

Beyond Presence?

Jussi Backman
Taylor Carman
Daniel O. Dahlstrom
Graham Harman
Michael Marder
Richard Polt

INTRODUCTION: RICHARD POLT

With this symposium, *Gatherings* inaugurates an experiment. I invited several experienced readers of Heidegger to submit brief statements on the topic of presence, and to compose even briefer reflections after reading each other's initial statements. Their texts are followed by a few words from me on the theme. However, I do not have the last word: our readers are invited to submit their own comments of up to 1000 words on this symposium (as on every article in this journal).

My invitation to the participants ran as follows.

For purposes of this discussion, we will take the word "being" to designate *das Sein des Seienden*, which can be glossed as what it means for entities to be something instead of nothing. Heidegger asks several questions about being:

Gatherings: The Heidegger Circle Annual 9 (2019): 145–74.

1. What are the ways in which being has been understood in the West?
2. How do these understandings cohere?
3. What makes it possible for us to understand being in the first place?
4. Is there a better alternative understanding of being?

In many texts, he argues that 1, the Western understandings of being range from *physis* to *Gestell*, and 2, they all descend from an early Greek experience of being as presence or presencing. His main answers to 3 are temporality and *Ereignis*.

As for 4, Heidegger often suggests that presence is too narrow, and that once we see that the understanding of being as presence is made possible by a further source, we can be open to alternatives. For example (my translations):

Being and Time:

> Here it becomes clear that the ancient interpretation of the being of beings is oriented toward the "world," or "nature" in the broadest sense, and that in fact it gains its understanding of being from "time."…That which is, is grasped in its being as "presence" [*Anwesenheit*]; that is, it is understood with a view to a particular mode of time, the "present" [*Gegenwart*]. (GA 2: 34/SZ 25)

Contributions to Philosophy:

> The first inception thinks beyng as presence [*Seyn als Anwesenheit*] on the basis of presencing [*Anwesung*], which constitutes the first flashing of *one* essencing [*Wesung*] of beyng. (GA 65: 31/26, tm)
>
> Essencing, without being conceived as such, is presencing. (GA 65: 189/148, tm)

What Is Called Thinking?:

> Even before it begins, the thinking of the Greeks dwells in the sway of the ἐόν as the presencing of what presences [*Anwesen des Anwesenden*]....This does not yet guarantee in any way that such thinking already brings the presencing of what presences into words in every respect and with all possible clarity. Much less does this decide whether, in the "presencing of what presences," there comes to light what the presencing of what presences rests upon. Thus, we would fall prey to an error if we wanted to believe that the being of beings signified only, and for all times, the presencing of what presences. (GA 8: 239/235, tm)

Taking Heidegger's proposals into consideration, we can ask: Do we need an alternative to presence as an understanding of being? If not, why not? If so, why, and what could the alternative be?

Our five participants' initial statements and their follow-up responses are presented in the alphabetical order of their last names.

JUSSI BACKMAN: THE POSTMETAPHYSICAL COMPLICATIONS OF PRESENCE

In its first, Presocratic beginning, Heidegger tells us, philosophy started out as a quest for that which unifies the diverse things that are meaningfully accessible – in other words, *present* – to thinking and perceiving: their *presence* (*Anwesenheit*), or, rather, their active "presencing" (*Anwesen*), their process of self-presentation (GA 5: 371/280). This is most explicit in the Poem of Parmenides, where a nameless goddess exhorts the narrator-thinker to consider all determinate things, whether present or absent in space and time, in terms of their unifying, indeterminate, and homogeneous intelligibility, their ability to be grasped in thought: "Being-aware [*noein*] and being-there [*einai*] are one and the same," and "even absent things [*apeonta*] are steadfastly present [*pareonta*] to awareness [*noos*]."[1] This pure intelligible presence is as such absolutely self-sufficient and self-immanent, devoid of any relation or reference to non-presence, which must mean simply absolute inaccessibility and with which philosophical thinking can have no involvement.

The being of beings is thus conceived as the presence of what is present. Accordingly, Heidegger maintains, the Platonic-Aristotelian key term *ousia*, "beingness," is fundamentally understood as *parousia*, (constant) presence. In what Heidegger characterizes as the "ontotheological," hierarchical metaphysics of Plato and Aristotle, the focus shifts from indeterminate presence as such to referring all beings back to a supreme and perfect, most complete and most constant, *instance* of presence. The most fundamental criteria of this presence are, again, completeness and self-sufficiency: in Aristotelian-scholastic theology, the divinity is pure and necessary actuality (*energeia*), purely identical with its essence, and absolute in the sense of being absolved from all constitutive relations to anything beyond itself.

In the Heideggerian narrative, in modern philosophy since Descartes the Archimedean point gradually shifts to the immediate presence of the thinking subject to itself. This shift culminates in Nietzsche's metaphysics of subjectivity as will to power, as life's self-referential and self-immanent drive to self-preservation and self-enhancement. The permanence of this will that ultimately wills only

itself is of a peculiar kind: it consists in a permanent state of becoming without external end, in a change for the sake of change that amounts to an "eternal recurrence of the same." As Heidegger puts it, its essence is a "making-constant [*Beständigung*] of becoming in presence [*Anwesenheit*]," which, for him, amounts to the extreme unfolding of the Greek understanding of being as constant presence (GA 6.1: 591–92/N3 155–57).Nietzsche opens a view upon the "apparatus" or "setup" (*Gestell*) of late modern Western technical reality as a domain of pure instrumentality and of resources available for disposing and allocating (*Bestellen*).[2] The metaphysics of presence thus culminates in a matrix of total availability and disposability.

Metaphysics, for the later Heidegger, was not a mistake but rather an "inevitable" development: an inquiry into the encounter between being and thinking could only start with the fact of intelligible presence (GA 7: 75–76/EP 90–91). However, from the outset, metaphysics entailed an implicit restriction, limitation, or exclusion, voiced by Parmenides' goddess: "Being-there is there [*esti gar einai*], and nothing is not there."[3] The focus is on presence *exclusively*; any other-than-presence is absolutely excluded from philosophy's scope. This exclusion amounts to an intensifying "forgetfulness" of being in the wide sense: metaphysics is oblivious to the meaning-constituting processes that are never in themselves immediately present but rather provide the dynamic background context *against* which the foreground of meaningful presence is possible.

In *Complicated Presence: Heidegger and the Postmetaphysical Unity of Being* (2015), I have argued that the core topic of Heidegger's postmetaphysical thinking – what in the period of fundamental ontology is addressed as the meaning or "sense" (*Sinn*) of being and later as the "truth" (*Wahrheit*) of being – is precisely this dynamic background context ignored by metaphysics. Heidegger's fundamental project consists in placing pure presence (*ousia*, the beingness or presence common to determinate beings) into a multidimensional, referential background that does not itself become immediately present as a determinate being (and is accordingly referred to by Heidegger as "nothing"), but simply

backgrounds and contextualizes presence. In the most comprehensive perspective, it is precisely the dynamic interaction between these two aspects – their differentiation, on the one hand, and their referential intertwining, on the other – that "grants" and "gives" presence as meaningful and is designated by Heidegger as "discharge" (*Austrag*) and, more importantly, as event (*Ereignis*).

As I see it, we find two successive key models in Heidegger for articulating this dynamic background/foreground structure of presence. The first is the account of the ecstatic temporality (*Zeitlichkeit*) of Dasein in *Being and Time* and the abortive attempt to correlate it with the temporality (*Temporalität*) of being as its horizon. In this model, access to the temporal present as a meaningful singular situation ("presenting," *Gegenwärtigen*) is oriented by a dimension of open possibilities and orientations (futurity or "forthcoming," *Zukunft*) that itself grows from a factical historical and cultural background (already-having-been, *Gewesenheit*). The second is the enigmatic fourfold (*Geviert*), which Heidegger gradually develops since the mid-1930s and fully announces in his 1949 Bremen lectures. The thing encountered as meaningful here becomes an intersection of two background axes, divinities/mortals and sky/earth, which can be interpreted as standing for 1) ultimate aims and purposes vs. the finite cultural and linguistic community that shares them and for 2) the open space of visibility and determinate and articulated appearing vs. inarticulate materiality. The temporal contextuality of *Being and Time* has here been complemented with spatial connotations.

Both models present meaningful presence as a node of references to dimensions that in themselves irreducibly transcend determinate and immediate presence, yet orient, contextualize, and configure presence, thus making it meaningful in a dynamic and singular manner. While for the philosophical tradition since Parmenides, the ideal of presence was self-sufficient, homogeneous, and self-identical – in a word, *simple* – Heidegger's contextual models render presence fundamentally relative, heterogeneous, and self-transcending – radically *complicated,* in the literal sense of an intertwining or folding-together

(Latin *complicare*) of multiple background dimensions, a "onefold of four," as Heidegger puts it (GA 7: 175/PLT 171, tm). *Complicated presence* would thus be a possible title for Heidegger's attempt to rethink the hidden background that the Western metaphysics of presence ultimately presupposes but has failed to address, his attempt to answer the neglected "basic question" of metaphysics, "Why is there something rather than nothing?" by considering the no-thing that allows a some-thing to be meaningfully present in the foreground. Another possible title would be *radical contextuality*.

Both of these titles, one can add, also characterize post-Heideggerian philosophical hermeneutics and poststructuralist thought as a whole. Putting presence in context, insisting on the irreducible situatedness and relationality of singular instants of meaningful access to things that resist the type of absolutization and absolution of presence that was always at the heart of ontotheological metaphysics, has become one of the principal topics of philosophical late modernity from Gadamer to Derrida.

NOTES

1 Parmenides, 28 B 3, 4; in Hermann Diels and Walther Kranz, *Die Fragmente der Vorsokratiker: Griechisch und deutsch* [DK], vol. 1, 6th ed. (Berlin: Weidmannsche Buchhandlung, 1951).

2 On *Gestell* as "apparatus" and as a Foucauldian "dispositif," see Giorgio Agamben, *What Is an Apparatus and Other Essays*, trans. David Kishik and Stefan Pedatella (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2009), 12.

3 Parmenides, DK 28 B 6.

TAYLOR CARMAN: PRESENCE AS THE TRUTH OF BEING

What question is "presence" or "presencing" (*Anwesen*) supposed to be the answer to? At times Heidegger seems to say that it answers the question, *What is the meaning of being?* But that would be strange, since the central thesis of *Being and Time* was that the meaning of being is not presence but time, the present (*Gegenwart*) being just one of the three temporal ecstases, along with past and future – indeed, the one ecstasis *wrongly* privileged by traditional ontology. Moreover, in the historicized inflection of his later thought, Heidegger maintains that there is not just *one* ahistorical meaning of being, but a succession of meanings corresponding to the different understandings of being that constitute the various epochs in the history of Western thought, from Greek antiquity to modern technological culture.

Where and how to fit the concept of presence in Heidegger's thought is just one of many problems issuing from a fundamental but still poorly understood shift that occurred in his thinking in the late 1930s, a shift marked most obviously by his rather abrupt disavowal of *metaphysics*. As late as 1935 Heidegger was still using the term as a synonym for *philosophy*, notably in the lecture course entitled *Introduction to Metaphysics*, in which he began outlining a history of the understanding of being, from the Presocratics to his own thought. Soon thereafter, however, "metaphysics" became, for him, a pejorative term referring exclusively to a tradition beginning with Plato (thus excluding the Presocratics) and culminating with Nietzsche (thus excluding Heidegger himself). Whereas in the 1920s he claimed to be correcting, hence continuing and in a sense vindicating, a philosophical tradition that had deviated from its own essential question concerning the *meaning* of being, in the late 1930s Heidegger came to speak of an "other beginning," a radical alternative to Western metaphysics, by which he now meant a kind of thinking – what he also calls *representational* or *calculative* thinking – that is defined by its incapacity to think being. Metaphysics is not the *thinking* of being, he now maintains, but a *forgetting* of being, not a pathway but an obstacle.

The change of philosophical orientation beginning in about 1936 is also marked by a new distinction that will be crucial to all of Heidegger's subsequent work, namely the distinction between the *meaning* and the *truth* of being. The meaning (*Sinn*) of being is what it means for entities (*das Seiende*) to be; it is what (as it were) "makes" or defines entities, what allows us to understanding them *as* entities, entities *as such*. The *meaning* of being is, in short, being understood as the being *of entities*. Metaphysics is not, as some say, thinking entities instead of being, but rather thinking being not *as such*, but merely as the being of entities, or worse as a kind of occult property. Western philosophy has always been saying, or trying to say, explicitly or implicitly, what it means for entities to be. It has always articulated, whether overtly or in its "unthought," the meaning of being, and to the question concerning the meaning of being it has offered up a series of answers: for Heraclitus being meant *phusis*, for Plato *eidos*, for Aristotle *ousia*, for the Christian Middle Ages *creation*, for Descartes *substantia*, for Kant *positing* or *representation*, for Nietzsche *will to power*, for scientific and technological modernity *objectivity* and *enframing*.

None of these answers to the question of being was either correct or incorrect, since factual correctness pertains only to entities, not to being. Even judged by Heidegger's own concept of truth as *unconcealment*, each interpretation of being can claim to reveal entities; they just do so in fundamentally different ways. The *Oresteia* enacted the battle of the gods; Gothic cathedrals opened up the space between heaven and earth; modern technology, in accord with Einstein's equation of matter and energy, grasped that physical nature is malleable resource material.

All of those discoveries, each grounded in a distinctive understanding of being, are "true" in Heidegger's sense of that word, that is, they all reveal entities. They differ dramatically, however, in that being *as such* – being *qua* being – is not itself manifest to the same degree of openness or explicitness in the various epochs. Entities are always essentially manifest in light of an understanding of being, but *being*, Heidegger now says, has itself been receding, withdrawing, passing (though never entirely) from memory into forgetting. This historical digression is no

mere change in the *meaning* of being, but a transformation in what Heidegger now calls the *truth* of being, that is, its unconcealment. The truth of being is not being understood simply as the being *of entities*, but being experienced *as such*, in its own unconcealment. The *truth* (unconcealment) of being is not *what* it is for entities to be, but rather *how* being – in contrast to entities – manifests itself. Changes in the truth of being therefore cannot be named and described in the way the successive epochs in the history of being can be. The truth of being is being's "own" unconcealment – hence Heidegger's most famous word for it, *Ereignis*.

The prompt for our symposium asks, "Do we need an alternative to presence as an understanding of being?" I think the answer is *no*, but for two reasons, since the question contains an ambiguity. An understanding of being could be construed as an understanding either of the *meaning* or of the *truth* of being. But *Anwesen* – presence or presencing – is not a name, not even a very general name, for the *meaning* of being (understood as the being of entities); rather, like *Ereignis*, it refers to the *truth* of being, to its unconcealment as such. Presence therefore does not belong on the same register, or in the same discursive space in Heidegger's thinking, as terms such as *phusis*, *ousia*, *creation*, *representation*, *will*, or *enframing*. It is not just an abstract way of saying what it is for entities to be. Nor is it merely a generic characterization of what the specific understandings of being have in common; it is not *genus* to their *species*. It is instead a word whose philosophical purpose is to evoke – without any pretended explanatory or classificatory import – the truth or unconcealment of *being as such*, in contrast to that whose meaning makes *entities as such* manifest. Presencing is the truth of being. Since I doubt that there is much more to say about the truth of being, beyond gesturing at it with suggestive terms such as *Ereignis* and *Anwesen*, I don't see the need for anything like a new word or concept that might do more or better than the humble, barely articulate work those words are already doing.

DANIEL O. DAHLSTROM: HEIDEGGERIAN RUMINATIONS ON BEING AND PRESENCE

As Aristotle puts it, "being" (used interchangeably with "existence" here) is said in many ways, including many opposing ways. Potentialities exist precisely as potentialities for specific actualities, but the potentialities and the respective actualities for which they are potentialities are not identical to one another, even though they are determinable only in terms of one another (e.g., the acorn and the mature oak, the glass before and after shattering). In this sense being exceeds the exclusive disjunction of potentialities and their respective actualities.

Something analogous holds for creators and creations, universals and instances, what is and what is not changing, and subjects and objects. Both creators and creations exist, and yet, while not identical, one is never without the other (unlike potentialities and their specific actualizations). Whereas instances exist only by instantiating universals, universals seem to exist only by virtue of being able to be instantiated, even if only in a thought (e.g., both Goodman's grue and the monster). x can be said to change relative to y only while either y or the relation between x and y in some respect do not change; thus, a birthday marks a change while the markers – the numbers of years and the numbers themselves – do not. Similar considerations apply to modern distinctions between subjects and objects. While not identical, both subjects exist and objects exist as do relations between them (and the place, as Heidegger puts it, where they are together).

These general preconsiderations bring us to the topic of presence. Presences are always correlative with absences, and not just in thought. They exist in mutually inherent ways and this inherent relatedness holds for each of the overarching ways that something can be said to be present or absent. Thus, we say that something is present *now* in view of the fact that it was absent and will be in the near future, that it is present *here* because it is absent somewhere else, or that it is present *to* an observer because it is also absent from the observer in some respect. The notion of this interplay of presence and absence encapsulates Husserl's insight that nothing is perceived adequately through the senses and

Heidegger's complementary contention that various sorts of absences no less than presences generally make up entities' manners of being. The two claims floated here (that presences and absences are correlative and that being is said of both) entails that being and presence are not identical.

The fact that being is said in these contrary ways, e.g., that it is both present and absent (actual and potential, etc., albeit not in the same respect), may suggest that being is hopelessly indeterminate, that talk of being must equivocate. But, apart from the fact that we can unequivocally register the indeterminate, it would be a mistake to suppose that determinacy and univocity are defined by those very contrarieties themselves. If being applies meaningfully to both sides of the disjunction as well as to the disjunction itself, then its meaning cannot be legitimately restricted to one side. Nor does it follow that being is neither present nor absent (neither potential nor actual, neither creating nor created, etc.). Probably more on target is Heidegger's suggestion (in the 1930s) that the "truth of being" is a determinate, unfolding, prevailing (*wesend*) interplay of presences and absences – a truth that is inaccessible (hidden) if one insists on identifying being with only one side of a particular disjunction.

Much as Quine notes that we are used to speaking principally of middle-sized objects, Heidegger observes that we are mostly concerned with beings, not being. Our survival depends upon distinguishing "things": potentialities from actualities, presences from absences, what is moving from what is not, and so on. As a result, our ordinary, practical ways of conceiving things and the theories they generate predispose us to think in terms of such entities and relations between them. If we turn our thoughts to being, it is accordingly natural to bring these ordinary ways of thinking (these bifurcations) along with us. Our natural proclivity ("fallenness") is to obscure the difference between being and beings by construing it as a difference between beings. Such a tendency is not only natural (rooted in our nature as organic beings, dependent upon interaction with beings, the rest of nature) but also historical. Our ways of thinking of being – including the ways glossed on this

page – are necessarily traditional. Although handed down to us, they are not fully ours until we have decided, following due consideration, to make them our own. Hence, these inherited ways of thinking are in need of critical, authenticating analysis (what Heidegger somewhat histrionically deems "destruction") that remains irredeemably fallible. Indeed, the history of metaphysics (emblematic of the history of being) strongly suggests that every epoch conceives being (ontology) in terms of a particular disjunction – e.g., creation, an all-objectifying subjectivity, technological (re-)producibility – and privileges one of the disjuncts as the primary being or sense of being (theology). In this sense every epoch is literally an ἐποχή, a "withdrawal" of being. Accordingly, while not unrelated, each epoch in a different way is forgetful of being itself, the unfolding of things that is both present and absent. So part of the task of thinking of being entails thinking being historically, i.e., appropriating and allowing ourselves to be appropriated by the event in which being conceals itself, albeit by no means without a trace. The task of the thinker is to bear witness to these traces of being, precisely as it refuses to yield to any attempts to master it, conceptually and otherwise.

GRAHAM HARMAN: TWO SENSES OF PRESENCE: BOTH OF THEM BAD

In your prompt, Richard, you touch on two major senses of presence in Heidegger: *Anwesenheit* and *Gegenwart*. Although both are linked with time, the second is more explicitly so. Reversing the old Leibnizian maxim, it seems to me that Heidegger is right in what he denies but wrong in what he affirms. Let's talk first about presence in the sense of presence-at-hand, and then about presence in the temporal sense, both of them obviously targeted by Heidegger for severe criticism.

The reason I've written so much about the tool-analysis – and we should not forget that it appears as early as 1919 in *Towards the Definition of Philosophy* – is that it is so widely familiar in both the continental and analytic traditions, yet still seems to be misunderstood: and I mean *philosophically* so, perhaps even by Heidegger himself (in GA 56/57). Here I will consider just one part of the misunderstanding.

The most concrete sense of presence is presence-at-hand, *Vorhandenheit*. Though Heidegger gives different examples of what counts as present-at-hand, he characterizes them all as a false sort of independence or autonomy of individual elements. Cartesian spatio-temporal substances are wrongly abstracted from their entanglement with each other and with Dasein, and the same holds for everything that is present-at-hand in consciousness for Husserlian phenomenology. What Heidegger proposes in opposition to this is his relational conception of world: "Taken strictly, there is no such thing as *an* equipment" (GA 2: 92/SZ 68). Everything is wrapped up with everything else, and nothing exists independently except insofar as it is abstracted or decontextualized, which simply makes entities present at the cost of concealing their being. In short, readiness-to-hand or *Zuhandenheit* is conceived in relational terms and *Vorhandenheit* in non-relational terms.

But Heidegger gets it backwards, if I may say so. Note that there is nothing the least bit autonomous about presence-at-hand in any of its forms. Cartesian substances are certainly abstractions, but they are abstractions *for us*; they exist only in correlation with some Dasein who abstracts them. Broken tools may seem to have become free from their deeper contexts, yet they are so only for the Dasein who perceives them.

In other words, presence is always presence *for* someone or something, and is therefore relational through and through, the opposite of what Heidegger says.

What about the supposedly relational being of tools? Before it breaks, the hammer seems to be relationally entangled with wood, nails, building projects, and the like, and only later is it said to become decontextualized. But what is overlooked is that the tool can break only because its being was *never fully deployed* in its use. However smoothly the hammer functioned, it was always a surplus beyond its smooth functioning in the equipmental contexture. For this reason, the tool-system would remain efficiently constant, would never go awry, unless the entities participating in it are conceded to have some sort of autonomous reality outside their entanglement in the system. Thus, Heidegger gets it backwards again. Although the phrase "readiness-to-hand" suggests utility, ready-to-hand entities must exist as a surplus prior to their interactions. Read properly, then, Heidegger should be seen as a realist with a strange new conception of autonomous substance. I admit that he would not appreciate this conclusion, given his well-known contempt (found also in Husserl) for the realism/anti-realism dispute.

To summarize, the present-at-hand is relational, and the ready-to-hand is non-relational, which is the exact opposite of what Heidegger says. But there is another point that needs to be stressed, counterintuitive though it may sound. Since tools in their use are clearly in relation with the rest of their environment, as Heidegger shows so nicely, then entities qua tools are *present-at-hand* rather than ready-to-hand. Perhaps a clearer way to say it is that the difference between theory and praxis, however dear to Heidegger and many commentators, is negligible, since both deal with entities solely as present. Whether I observe a hammer, invent theories of hammers, or simply use a hammer, in all of these cases I am *in relation* to this entity, which means that even the unconscious use of a thing is a way of rendering it present. In order to get at what is deeper than presence, it is not enough to retreat from theoretical to practical comportment. Instead, we have to consider the things prior to *any* contact we may have with them, regardless of

whether that contact is "practical" or "theoretical." Here I will not go into my further claim that inanimate entities "objectify" each other as well, meaning that it is not just Dasein that objectifies the world in the pejorative sense.

To avoid presence, in any case, inevitably means to avoid relationality. Does this not leave us stranded in a "negative theology," since we cannot speak of anything without relating to it? It does not. Heidegger's own reflections on poetic language remind us of what we already know from everyday life: much communication consists of allusion, hint, innuendo, and rhetorical enthymemes rather than the explicit prose propositions that occupy too much of our philosophical energy. The path forward from Heidegger therefore requires our renewed attention to aesthetics in the widest possible sense: not just art, but indirect access of every kind.

I will now speak more briefly of presence in the sense of time, which I also think is misunderstood both by Heidegger and by many of his commentators. Here it is most useful to distinguish between Heidegger and Bergson. For Bergson, of course, time is a continuum, just as for Aristotle in the *Physics*. Most famously, Bergson holds that we cannot reconstruct time from a discrete number of moments or cinematic frames. To break up the continuous flow of time into instants or individual entities is merely an abstraction by the human mind from a more primal becoming. But this is not the same as Heidegger's insight into time. Unlike Bergson, Heidegger *does not* escape the presence of the present by saying that no present moment can be isolated in the first place. We can see this from his fascination with the *Augenblick* or moment of vision, an idea that would have no place in Bergson's works.

Heidegger's philosophy of time by no means asks us to exclude individual moments as a mere abstraction. What he shows, instead, is that even if we look at an individual moment, it *already* has an intricate threefold temporal structure. Consider a single instant: a mental exercise that Bergson forbids, but that Heidegger does not. Even here, we find that Dasein is already thrown into a situation (*Vergangenheit*), projects possibilities upon it (*Zukunft*), and experiences the strife of

both at once (*Gegenwart*). By allowing us to consider the complexity of individual temporal moments, Heidegger shares something in common with the occasionalist tradition of discontinuous instants (even though he does not call upon God to link them), the exact opposite of Bergson's position.

My conclusions are as follows. First, we still need to follow Heidegger in his rejection of *Vorhandenheit*, but for the unexpected reason that presence-at-hand means *relation*, and that to relate to anything only gives us a translation or objectification of it rather than the thing itself. Second, we also need to follow Heidegger in rejecting the notion that the present is a boring lump, since as Levinas notes, the present "is not one lump; it is *articulated*." Yet despite what most commentators hold, Heidegger remains stranded in the discontinuous instant, and never accounts for how to reach the continuous flow of time from the starting point of a threefold articulated moment. For this reason, Bergson's insight is never accounted for in Heidegger's philosophy, and to do so would force us to modify Heidegger's theory of time in ways too intricate to discuss here.

MICHAEL MARDER: "...AS *PAROUSIA* OR *OUSIA*..."

The title I propose for my contribution to the *Gatherings* Symposium on the theme "Beyond Presence?" is a tiny, fragmentary quotation from the Introduction to *Being and Time*. I suggest directing a sort of hermeneutical flashlight onto the words "...as *parousia* or *ousia*..." still without specifying what appears before and after them. The advantage of partial illumination, letting these words' textual neighborhood provisionally drift into darkness, is that it fixes the theoretical gaze on a pair of observations a reader typically skips over.

First observation: the senses of *parousia* and *ousia* are so tightly intertwined that they are, in effect, interchangeable, the disjunctive conjunction *or* slotted between them. Nevertheless, they are two separate terms that, while sharing the same root, branch further away in the Christian rendition, where *parousia* names the second coming of Christ. How close do their senses have to be to become mutually replaceable? Can they ever be close enough to meld into one? Does *parousia*, by literally swallowing *ousia* up, by including it in the body of the word, affirm the possibility and, indeed, the actuality of this coalescence? Or, does *ousia* unfurl into *parousia*? Does the one secretly shelter or elliptically omit the other in its contrived simplicity?

Second observation: Heidegger offers the nearly identical – though not quite – nouns as a way of explicating something else. The third term would give a sign of itself, would articulate itself in the general structure *this as that*, where *that* is "*ousia* or *parousia*." The formulaic articulation is, of course, how Aristotle grasps second *ousia*, the *this* articulated as *that which it is*. Presumably simple in comparison to *parousia*, *ousia* divides into the first and the second, the isolated *this* (*tode ti*) and the sense of the *this* comprehended as *that*. While the curtain is still drawn on what the *this* refers to in Heidegger's text, it is already clear that the expression "*ousia* or *parousia*" is formally a part of the second *ousia*. Which makes this word (or these words) both more and less than itself (or themselves).

Let's put all the cards on the table. The minuscule fragment I have concentrated on is included in the "outward evidence" Heidegger cites

for the Greeks' understanding of being in terms of time. He locates a crucial evidentiary piece in their "treatment of the meaning of being as *ousia* or *parousia*" (GA 2: 34/SZ 25). So, the *this*, which has been hidden from view up until now, is "the meaning of being." That is the first *ousia* here; however, as a meaning structure, it is already an articulation of *this as that*, of being identified as that which it is, namely time. The first *ousia*, therefore, is the second. But that is not all. Preceding "*ousia* or *parousia*" is "the meaning of being" it spells out; succeeding it is the interpretation of being in "ontologico-temporal terms" as "'presence'" (*'Anwesenheit'*). Between the meaning of being (as time) and presence, "*ousia* or *parousia*" forms a bridge, along which being perpetually passes into time.

I think – or, at least, I hope – that the above exegetical exercise may point toward broader conclusions regarding Heidegger's problematic of presence. Chief among these is the idea that beyond presence is… presence, or, differently put, that presence is invariably beyond itself. Should it deflect its beyond, presence would lapse into an absence: the unique, idiosyncratic, idiotic, hermetically and hermeneutically sealed first *ousia*, translatable as a pure *this*, is not. Rather than an alternative, beyond-presence is what is most proper to presence without, at the same time, warranting the concept's totalizing imperialism.

What justifies the leap from my nanoscopic exegesis to these panoramic conclusions? No matter how proximate to itself, Heidegger's presence does not coincide with itself. "…as *parousia* or *ousia*…" is a symptom of its non-coincidence with itself, whether due to the imperfect duplication of presence into terms that are almost the same or due to the maddening dance of first and second *ousias*, in the course of which they incessantly change places. I could say, within this line of argumentation, that an undercurrent of *Being and Time* is the effort to replace the disjunctive conjunction *or* between *ousia* and *parousia* with the copula, yielding *Ousia is parousia* and, hence, *Presence is a coming-into-presence*, or, again, *The meaning of being is time*. Heidegger will ultimately find his own efforts unsatisfactory and embark on an elaboration of *Ereignis*, the appropriating event, exploring the constitutive *beyond* of presence.

In short, there is no need for an alternative to presence as an understanding of being because such an understanding *is* its own alternative. Sorely needed, in turn, is an alternative to the *presentist* understanding of presence (the understanding that blocks presence's constitutive *beyond*) and, by implication, of being. Presence is never abstract: something that or someone who is in attendance is present *at* a given site and time. Presence is presence-at. The *at* portion of presence-at leads it beyond "mere" presence, which transfixes the presentist interpretation. The meaning of being as presence indicates that being is presence at itself (as other to itself). *Ereignis*, for its part, provides the whereabouts at which presence can be present. Neither in itself nor outside itself, being is beside itself in its distance from and proximity to itself. That is what the temporal ecstases of Dasein signal, what pre-sence actually says, and what the *par(a)-* of *parousia* imparts to *ousia*, or, more exactly, in a mélange of Aristotelian categories, teases out of *ousia*'s silence on the subject of its whereabouts and of how it has arrived there.

Perhaps, the preposition *at* is a key – one of many – to the meaning of being encoded in presence. It may well demarcate the zone of ontico-ontological difference. Perhaps, it is a more accurate translation of *parousia*'s prefix than *beside*. (In one way or another, presentist interpretations of presence get the preposition wrong or dispense with it altogether. It would have been more forgivable to drop *presence* and to keep *at* in reflections on being – that is, to equate being with at-ness.) Spatially and temporally, being's presence at itself is being at a limit. Precisely as presence-at, being is a limit term, not a centerpiece of the so-called metaphysics of presence, which is the most recent moniker for presentism. It espouses finitude in its form and thematic content, minus a crass dialectic of absence and presence, the inner complexities of which escape the dialectical mindset. What else holds the potential to deconstruct the metaphysics of presence, if not the interpretative unfolding of being's presence at itself?

RESPONSE: JUSSI BACKMAN

Reading through our contributions, I am impressed by the fact that despite obvious differences in emphasis and wording, we all ultimately seem to move within the same hermeneutic dimension, facing the topic at the heart of Heidegger's philosophical project that I like to designate as "complicated presence" but which can, as Heidegger has taught us, be approached from a ceaseless variety of viewpoints using a ceaseless variety of terms.

I completely concur with Taylor Carman's observation that we do not need an *alternative* to presence as an understanding of being – since presence, intelligible accessibility, is inevitably the *focal point* of our understanding of what it is to *be* – and also with Dan Dahlstrom's remark that neither are being and presence *identical*, since being in the full sense is constituted by an "interplay of presences and absences." Since my rendering of Heidegger's trajectory puts the emphasis on the *contextuality* of all meaningful accessibility as precisely what makes presence ultimately complicated, I also heartily subscribe to Graham Harman's summary of the Heideggerian analysis of tool-being: "Nothing exists independently except insofar as it is abstracted or decontextualized" and "to avoid presence . . . inevitably means to avoid relationality" (the latter statement points out the direction in which Harman's own philosophical project is headed).

Of particular importance for me is Michael Marder's elegant reminder that "presence is invariably beyond-itself" and is thus always already its *own alternative*; what calls for deconstruction is the metaphysical "presentism" that "blocks presence's constitutive *beyond*." It is the presentist view on presence that is too "narrow," as Richard Polt puts it in the introduction. The constitutive beyond, the self-transcendence of presence into a background or context that is not itself present but is involved in and implicated by presence, not itself "there" except as a referential dimension, a toward-which – this, I suggest, is what our symposium on presence ultimately gravitates towards. This beyond, this *trans-*, or this beside, this *para-*, is one way of looking at the "truth" (*Wahrheit*) of being that now and again resurfaces in our statements:

as the trans- or para-present background that preserves and protects (*wahren*) truth in the sense of situated and contextual unconcealment and accessibility.

In the Presocratic first beginning or inception of philosophy, "in order to grasp being at all, presencing [*Anwesen*] must be maintained as the first and nearest feature of the emergence [*Aufgehen*] of being"; because of this exclusive concentration on presence as such, Heidegger maintains, "the truth of being must remain concealed" to Anaximander, Heraclitus, and Parmenides (GA 65: 459–60/362). The ultimate outcome of the subsequent tradition of presentist metaphysics is the late modern technical *Gestell* as the "completed oblivion of the truth of being" that is already being challenged by what it excludes: the fourfold world-context as the "guarantee" (*Wahrnis*) of being, as the multiple "beyond" presupposed by complicated presence itself (GA 79: 53/50).

RESPONSE: TAYLOR CARMAN

In my initial comments I drew attention to Heidegger's disavowal, in the late 1930s, of *metaphysics* – both the name itself and, I believe, the failure to comprehend the question (which is to say, the mystery) of being that it has represented, beginning with Plato and culminating in Nietzsche. Soon after his 1935 lectures, significantly entitled *Introduction to Metaphysics*, Heidegger drew a new distinction between the *meaning* of being understood as the being *of entities* on the one hand, and the *truth* of being or being *as such* on the other. Metaphysics, he now says, has always been an interpretation of the being of entities, but it has never thought – indeed *cannot* think – being as such.

Reading the other contributions to this discussion has made me realize that I should have related that distinction more explicitly to the verbal device by which Heidegger also frequently drew attention to it, namely, the difference between "presentness" (*Anwesenheit*), that is, being understood as a kind of aspect or quality *of* entities, and "presence" or "presencing" (*Anwesen*), by which he means the self-manifestation or unconcealment – the *truth* – of being as such. Traditional metaphysical understandings of being have indeed been

understandings of the *meaning* of being as various forms of presentness, from Platonic aspectual forms to the Nietzschean technological will to power. It was presencing as such that I meant to exempt from that metaphysical history by equating it with the *truth* rather than with the *meaning* of being.

I can therefore agree with much of Jussi Backman's brilliant and illuminating account of what he rightly calls "Heidegger's attempt to rethink the hidden background that the Western metaphysics of presence ultimately presupposes but has failed to address." I do not, however, agree with Backman that Heidegger was ever trying "to answer the neglected 'basic question' of metaphysics, 'Why is there something rather than nothing?' by considering the no-thing that allows a some-thing to be meaningfully present in the foreground." Simply put, I don't see how any appeal to such a "no-thing" could render it sufficiently intelligible to shed any light on what I think Heidegger regards as the primitive mystery of being as such, which he simply calls *Ereignis* and *Anwesen*, with no pretense to explanation.

I also agree wholeheartedly with Daniel Dahlstrom's suggestion that "being and presence are not identical," since for Heidegger, "the 'truth of being' is a determinate, unfolding, pre-vailing (*wesend*) interplay of presences and absences – a truth that is inaccessible (hidden) if one insists on identifying being with only one side of a particular distinction." Being is not presence as opposed to absence; rather, the presencing of being as such just *is* the twofold horizon of concealment and unconcealment, dispensation and withdrawal. Michael Marder makes this point nicely when he proposes that what is needed, more than an alternative to the concept of presence as such, "is an alternative to the *presentist* understanding of presence (the understanding that blocks presence's constitutive *beyond*)." That, I take it, is the gist not only of Heidegger's later critique of metaphysics, but of his envisioned "dismantling" of traditional ontology of *Being and Time*.

The only comments I find myself seriously at odds with are those of Graham Harman. Harman maintains that Heidegger characterizes things (supposedly) present-at-hand (*vorhanden*) generally as having "a

false sort of independence or autonomy" (my emphasis) and so refers in passing to what he takes to be Heidegger's "rejection of *Vorhandenheit*." But Heidegger does *not* reject that notion: he *invokes* it as a legitimate schema for the cognition of entities understood as objects with properties, in contrast to things defined by their involvement in our practices. Moreover, it seems to me that any reading of *Being and Time* that charges Heidegger with such egregious "misunderstandings" of his own concepts, as Harman asserts, merely casts doubt on its own plausibility as an interpretation of the text.

RESPONSE: DANIEL O. DAHLSTROM

Backman on presence's complications: Backman skillfully charts how Heidegger conceives the complications of presence, originally by time and later by the fourfold, in each case a "meaning-constituting process" that is never in itself immediately present. In contrast to the tradition, "Heidegger's contextual models" are said to "render presence…self-transcending." Among the many questions raised by Backman's powerful interpretation are the following: How does presence transcend itself without becoming absence? What is the *ad quem* of the transcending? Does it remain itself in self-transcending?

Carman on being's meaning and truth: Carman's elegant essay artfully brings the sweep and central stages of Heidegger's thinking together in terms of the difference between the meaning and the truth of being. The essay raises at least two issues. First, his reading privileges the first two stages that Heidegger notes as demarcating his thinking, but does it leave "place" (pardon the pun) for the third stage, the place of being (GA 15: 335, 344)? Second, "presence" is said to be a word designed to evoke "the truth or unconcealment of *being as such*, in contrast to that whose meaning makes *entities as such* manifest." This gloss faithfully reproduces a crucial differentiation in Heidegger's thinking, but how viable is the differentiation? What is the unconcealment of being as such if not that which makes beings *manifest*? How else would we *know* it, as opposed to merely thinking it (i.e., without recourse to "things")?

Harman's revisions of Heideggerian presence: Harman's delightfully provocative and revisionary interpretation raises several questions, both exegetical and systematic. For example, on the exegetical front, does Heidegger consider all examples of what counts as present-at-hand "as a false sort of independence or autonomy of individual elements"? How does this claim square with his contention that the mathematical projection of nature uncovers "something constantly present-at-hand (matter)" (GA 2: 479/SZ 362) or his talk of "being alongside something innerwordly present-at-hand" (GA 2: 480/SZ 363)? In these contexts and others (see GA 2: 95, 192, 481/SZ 70, 144, 364), he hardly seems to be imputing something false to what counts as present-at-hand. On a more systematic front (simply asking for clarification), how does "the claim to consider the things prior to *any* contact with them" cohere with the requirement to renew attention to "indirect access" to them? How can the meaning of "consideration of things prior to any contact with them" avoid piggybacking on that contact (or "indirect access" on a sense of *direct* access)?

Marder on the limits of presence: Marder's illuminating ruminations aptly explain the accent on finitude entailed by presence in its Greek (*ousia, parousia*) and Heideggerian formulations ("presence beyond itself," "presence at…"). This very accent, together with the reminder of the Second Coming and the remark that "being perpetually passes into time," invites the question of whether – and if so, in what sense – the explanation countenances infinity. So, too, it invites the question (formulated here with a greater ring of paradox than it probably deserves): is being at a limit limitless?

RESPONSE: GRAHAM HARMAN

If this were a group discussion in a tavern, I would stress agreement with the statements of my colleagues as a way of building friendly rapport. But since we are doing this primarily for readers of the symposium, it will be more valuable to emphasize points of friction.

Whereas I defend the radical non-contextuality of objects, Backman calls for "radical contextuality" in interpreting the world. Part

of his reason for doing so is that he holds Heidegger's hidden background to be "dynamic," though this sounds to me more like Bergson or Deleuze. The Heideggerian model of time pertains to the complex threefold structure of any instant, but that is not the same thing as to reject isolated instants in favor of some sort of continuous becoming – the signature move of the Bergsonian.

There are two points of disagreement with Carman, both of them important. First, he sees an important shift happening in Heidegger's thought around 1936, whereas I have a deflationary view of the *Kehre*, and hold that it happened – if at all – in the 1949 Bremen lectures. Second, and on a related note, Carman sees an important difference between the "being of beings" and being itself, while I do not. This may prevent him from properly weighting the importance of *Ding* and *Geviert* in the later works, while leading to an overestimation of the 1930s – my own least favorite period of Heidegger, and not just for political reasons.

The main difference from Dahlstrom is, again, that I think he ascribes too much philosophical blame to beings in the plural. He links Heidegger with Quine on this point by noting the latter's remark that we focus too much on "middle-sized objects," forgetting that the Heidegger of 1949 does something marvelous with the middle-sized jug, without farming it out to the natural sciences as Quine would do. Dahlstrom also links Husserl and Heidegger on the topic of presence and absence in a way that I would not. Although we can speak correctly of "Husserl's insight that nothing is perceived adequately through the senses," he does think we can grasp things adequately through the intellect. Thus Husserl is openly hostile to anything like a *Ding an sich*, whereas Heidegger praises that widely discredited notion near the close of *Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics*.

With Marder the main source of dispute no doubt stems from his acceptance and my rejection of Derrida as Heidegger's legitimate philosophical heir. Where this plays out is in Marder's clear suspicion towards any classical notion of identity. For him, "being passes perpetually into time," so that "presence is invariably beyond itself," and hence

no alternative to presence is needed. For me, however, the fact that presence is always beyond itself – its inherent relationality – is precisely the problem. A relational cosmos would be perfectly sterile in its actualism, rather than some sort of liberating escape from what Marder terms "the unique, idiosyncratic, idiotic, hermetically and hermeneutically sealed first *ousia*, translatable as a pure *this*."

RESPONSE: MICHAEL MARDER

It has become evident to me, following this intellectual exercise and other participants' responses, that the main challenge we face is to think presence outside the dialectic of presences and absences, *and* outside its independently posited, substantive, nonrelational sense. (The ambiguities of nonrelational relationality may be sensed already in Aristotle's *ousia*, particularly in its redoubling into the first and the second.) There is neither purity nor contamination in it: these categories simply do not apply. Presence, then, is neither origin nor trace, and the metaphysics of presence becomes as futile an approach as the deconstruction of that very metaphysics.

I realize, of course, that some among the contributors to this forum hold a different view. Taylor Carman's identification of presence with "the truth or unconcealment of *being as such*," taken together with his efforts at isolating it from the names or misnomers of being – *phusis, ousia, creation, representation*, etc. – moves in the direction of presence's nonrelationality. Dan Dahlstrom, on the other hand, notes that "presences are always correlative with absences, and not just in thought." Not surprisingly, he ends his reflection with "the traces of being." Graham Harman gives an even stronger expression to this strand of thought when he writes that "to avoid presence, in any case, inevitably means to avoid relationality." Jussi Backman, in his turn, dismantles large portions of the origin-trace infrastructure for thinking presence. His notion of complication accomplishes much of the work, even if it partially transposes the dialectics of presence and absence onto the dynamic relation of the background and the foreground.

The virtue of "complication" is that it is rid of the seemingly endless negative determinations of presence in terms of *neither this nor that*. While Backman calls it self-transcending, it is worth specifying that the folds of complication have been a staple figure in philosophies of immanence, from Spinoza to Bergson and Deleuze. We might say that the immanence of presence to itself is the immanence of its self-transcendence. But this sort of formulation, accurate as it may be, also holds for Husserl's intentionality as consciousness of…and risks sounding too detached from everyday experience and the world. The context thematized is a context abstracted from itself, from its own concreteness irreducible to contextuality. That's why we should never lose sight of the phenomenological perspective that situates presence not in an abstract context but in the experiential configurations of space-time.

My shorthand for the phenomenology of presence, which is certainly not limited to a human mode of being in the world, is *presence-at*. Seen through this lens, being is being-in-attendance, which is inseparable from attending to the site, at which presence is situated. There are as many modes of attendance as there are kinds of being, or, better, the different kinds of being (inanimate objects, plants, animals, microbes…) are defined by what they attend at/to and how. It is impossible to capture presence-at either through the logic of origins (a constant effectiveness of principles) or that of traces (an-archic withdrawal). In close proximity to itself beside itself, the elusive edges of presence-at are most conspicuous in plant life, where, for example, a tree is present at the site of its growth, which grows and decays with it. These edges are doubly mobile, first, because they expand and contract space and time in tandem with the growing/decaying being and its world, and, second, because the distance of at-ness between presence and its existential *wherein* (harkening back to the context) is highly variable. So, a mark of the human, whether metaphysically or historically constituted, is the valorization of presence irrespective of at-ness, triggering simultaneously the collapse of distance and its exponential increase.

Although it seems that my reflections have wandered far away from Heidegger, they are keeping very close to him. For what is this "gathering," if not a certain shared presence at his thinking?

CONCLUDING REFLECTIONS: RICHARD POLT

I am grateful to the five participants in this symposium for their rich, thoughtful contributions. My summary would be inadequate and redundant. I will say only that we should learn from our contributors that "presence" is said in many ways, and that some senses of presence are relational; what is present may be essentially related to other present entities, and even to what is absent.

For my part, I propose that our times call for renewed attention to the question of the relation between presence and temporality. As in my introduction, I use "presence" as a name for the founding Western understanding of what it means for entities to be something instead of nothing. This sense of "presence" is broad and vague, but not utterly without content. For Heidegger, it includes presence-at-hand as the dominant, traditionally privileged form of presence, but also readiness-to-hand. It does *not* include Dasein's own way of being – and Heidegger saw this as an urgently important point. I believe it remains important in our age of ever-accelerating technoscientific progress.

There is an unmistakable polemical edge in *Being and Time*: Heidegger is fighting against the reduction of Dasein's "who" to a "what." Such a reduction fails to see that "a *what* (presence-at-hand in the broadest sense)" (GA 2: 60/SZ 45) can be revealed only to an entity who is far more than present-at-hand, and even escapes the confines of presence in general. Presence itself must be critiqued – traced back to temporality as its condition of possibility.

Heidegger's later thought pushes farther. As we are reminded elsewhere in this issue (21), he writes that "the ecstatic-horizonal temporality delineated in *Being and Time* is not by any means already the most proper attribute of time that must be sought in answer to the Being-question." But well after abandoning the project of *Being and Time*, he continues to resist the narrowness of presence, or at least of the dominant conception of presence, and he seeks a deeper origin of time and the present – an origin that he now understands as *Ereignis*. In the late forties, he writes:

> Maybe appropriation will hold itself back in the midst of the suddenness of its turning, so that everything will

> freeze in machination, and this frozenness will make itself out to be life. Then there will be no more inauthentic oblivion, nor will authentic oblivion arrive; neither would having-been unfold, nor would usage's arrival into releasement take place [*weder das Gewesen weste, noch ereignete sich die Ankunft des Brauchs in die Gelassenheit*]. Humanity would then have attained what it has clamored for for centuries: the "present" [*"Gegenwart"*] that it takes as being. Humanity would operate, un-conditioned by any thing or condition, in the technical administration of itself and its brain. The preparation and steering of this organ by electric currents, immobilizing some centers and mobilizing others, which would always seem useful, would offer itself as the culmination of all organization. Not by the mass killing of human beings, but by the fact that *homo americanus* will absolutely objectify life = the world, by organizing this organ: this is how humanity will be thrust into the uttermost abjectness of the frozen oblivion of being. (GA 97: 308–9)

Isn't this a vision of the twenty-first century, when "big data" about our brains is constantly being compiled, analyzed, and put to use? When a picture of present-at-hand neural occurrences is so often mistaken for a sufficient understanding of some aspect of our own existence? When our lives are increasingly guided by psychopharmaceuticals and the "artificial intelligence" of digital "neural networks"?

In 2019, doesn't Heidegger's pronouncement from 1935 ring a bell? "Time is nothing but speed, instantaneity, and simultaneity, and time as history has vanished from all Dasein of all peoples" (GA 40: 41/42).

The disturbing political contexts of Heidegger's statements do not eliminate, but only intensify, the need to think through his critique of presence. Are we, today, in touch with time as history? Are we capable of asking *who* we are, not just *what* we are? Are we open to the arrival of what is our own? Or do we continue to be absorbed in representing, producing, and reproducing what is present?

BOOK REVIEW

Kevin Aho's *Existential Medicine: Essays on Health and Illness*

Casey Rentmeester

Kevin Aho, ed.. *Existential Medicine: Essays on Health and Illness* London: Rowman & Littlefield International, 2018. 269 pages.

Kevin Aho's masterfully selected collection is an excellent showcase of the contributions that phenomenology, hermeneutics, and existentialism can make to medicine. The volume features insights by major contributors to the field of medical humanities, inspired by the work of Heidegger and Gadamer, among others. The four parts of the volume highlight the following significant trends in medical humanities: existential psychiatry, phenomenology of illness, philosophy of biotechnology, and existential health. A brief summary of each part of the volume is offered, followed by a chapter-based synopsis and commentary.

The thought of Heidegger and Gadamer that underpins the volume is fitting, as each philosopher provided direct philosophical insights on the rise of contemporary medicine. Heidegger held seminars exclusively for medical professionals in Zollikon, Switzerland from 1959 to 1969.[1]

He shows attendees how they are "influenced largely by the scientific way of thinking" (GA 89: 75/ZS 58) that "operates with preconceptions and prejudices [which have] not been reflected on" (GA 89: 134/ZS 103) and stresses that "there is the highest need for doctors who *think* and who do not wish to leave the field entirely to scientific technicians" (GA 89: 134/ZS 103). Gadamer, influenced greatly by Heidegger, lectured on philosophy of medicine and healthcare on various occasions from 1964 to 1991, which were published as *Über die Verborgenheit der Gesundheit* in 1993 (published in English as *The Enigma of Health* in 1996). Here, Gadamer speaks of "finding the right balance between our technical capacities and the need for responsible actions and choices."[2] Both Heidegger and Gadamer highlight that the emphasis on the scientific aspects of medical practice can lead to a myopic focus on technical expertise and lose sight of, to borrow language from Karl Jaspers, "the authentic vocation of the physician," which is to establish "personal relationships with particular patients."[3]

Even prominent representatives of the medical field are beginning to admit that contemporary medical providers are far too focused on the technical nature of their field and not enough on the personal aspects of medicine. The physician-author Atul Gawande, for example, relaying an experience he and his colleagues had with a patient, states that "we could never bring ourselves to discuss *the larger truth* about his condition or the ultimate limits of our capabilities, let alone *what might matter most* to him as he neared the end of his life."[4] Aho's volume provides a wealth of avenues from which to address the impersonal nature of contemporary medicine and imagine a more humanistic version of medicine. A running thread throughout the book is that "how one experiences, interprets, and gives meaning to one's physical distress is just as important to health and healing as cutting out diseased tissue or measuring functional abnormalities" (xiii). This is the primary thesis of what has come to be known as "existential medicine," which John Russon and Kirsten Jacobson note has been around since the 1960s (191) but has really blossomed in recent decades. Many of the most respected contemporary thinkers in the field are featured in this volume.

Part One, "New Currents in Existential Psychiatry," chronicles some of the newest themes in the field of existential psychiatry by some of the biggest names in the field. Existential psychiatry came about as a response to the medical model of psychiatry. On this model, "mental dysfunction is interpreted as a discrete entity, an organic 'disease' of the brain and it is by observing the behavior of the patient that the psychiatrist can identify the disease and apply a diagnostic label."[5] Existential therapists oppose the medical model and take cues from existentialism, phenomenology, and hermeneutics as they consider the human being from the perspective of being-in-the-world, that is, in terms of average, everyday "non-thematic circumspective absorption" (GA 2: 102/SZ 76).

Shaun Gallagher continues his research on intersubjective embodiment, prominent in his book *Enactivist Interventions*, with Chapter One of the volume, "The Cure for Existential Inauthenticity."[6] Here, Gallagher argues that a relational account of authenticity can be used to cope with existential anxiety. He argues against Heidegger and Sartre's accounts of authenticity, since he regards both as thinking that "relations with others tend to lead us astray from our fundamental project – our unique projection of possibilities upon which we need to act" (8). Gallagher's own project of relational authenticity has the following three theses, which he sees lacking in Heidegger and Sartre: 1) authenticity is relational; 2) one's ownmost possibilities are not strictly "ownmost"; and 3) being with others is an occasion for authenticity (11–12). He focuses on grief as clearly relational (thus distinguishing it from major depressive disorder) as it demonstrates the fragility of relations with others; when we grieve, we can engage in "more careful (authentic) relations with the people we love or the people with whom we live and work" (13).

Gallagher's way of juxtaposing grief with major depressive disorder is appropriate, and provides an excellent demonstration of the sort of contribution existential therapy can make to the medical-model-ridden field of psychiatry. However, Gallagher's lumping Heidegger's and Sartre's accounts of authenticity together is problematic. Sartre's early philosophy certainly suffers from the individualism that Gallagher is trying to overcome. For instance, Sartre says things like

"man is…without any support or help, condemned at all times to invent man"[7] or "freedom [is] the foundation of all values,"[8] thus revealing his individualistic understanding of authenticity. Heidegger sometimes speaks in this fashion, and Gallagher provides evidence of this, but Heidegger's account is far less individualistic than Gallagher would have us believe. For Heidegger, the authentic self is "the self which has been taken hold of in its own way" (GA 2: 172/SZ 129) and he makes it clear that "authentic being-one's-self does not rest upon an exceptional condition of the subject, a condition that has been detached from the 'they'" (GA 2: 173/SZ 130). Rather, as Charles Guignon has persuasively argued, "the contexts of significance that mediate our self-interpretations are themselves embedded in a shared 'we-world.'"[9] Thus, authenticity is not as individualized a project as Gallagher claims on the Heideggerian model.

In Chapter Two, Robert Stolorow adds to his impressive corpus of existential therapy contributions with an essay focused on his specialty: emotional trauma. Stolorow claims that mainstream psychiatry, as represented by the *Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders* (DSM), is based on the flawed subject-object ontology of Cartesianism. He goes to argue that it therefore should be replaced with a psychoanalytic phenomenological contextualism that recognizes the existential meanings of life experience. Stolorow reiterates his claim, made most poignantly in *Structures of Subjectivity*, that "all emotional disturbances are constituted in a context of human interrelatedness – specifically, contexts of emotional trauma" (20).[10]

On Stolorow's analysis, trauma acts as a breakdown of the world (understood in the Heideggerian sense as a breakdown of the web of meaningful relations) for the person traumatized, which opens the person up to the uncanniness of life, thus inducing *Angst*, which he refers to as "existential anxiety." He provides practical ways of coping with this type of anxiety with his concept of a "relational home," that is, "a context of emotional understanding" (21) that allows a person to articulate, better tolerate, and perhaps eventually integrate this trauma into his or her life, thus achieving authenticity. I think what is most

important in Stolorow's account is that "*trauma recovery* is an oxymoron" (22) since we know that those who have experienced extreme trauma in their lives, including horrific experiences such as war or rape, never fully recover. Considering that this is often the case, the practical coping method he offers may be far more effective than the fallback method of mainstream psychiatry, that of prescribing psychiatric medication, as this method may not deal with the trauma head-on and may even be dangerous in some circumstances.[11]

Chapter Three showcases a relative newcomer to the field of existential psychiatry in Anthony Fernandez, who adeptly navigates the Heideggerian terrain of moods, situatedness, and care from *Being and Time* in his attempt to show that the ontological structures of Heidegger's fundamental ontology ("existentials" in *Being and Time*) are not actually the essential structures that Heidegger would have us believe, but are rather contingent. Taking a cue from one of the pioneers of existential psychiatry, Ludwig Binswanger, Fernandez focuses on the phenomenon of severe depression, noting that "some people diagnosed with severe depression are de-situated – that is, the depressed person loses the capacity to be affectively situated in and attuned to her world," which means that "the ontological category – the existential of situatedness [*Befindlichkeit*] – is lost" (39).

Fernandez's account is intriguing, but ultimately unconvincing. In speaking of *Befindlichkeit*, Heidegger claims that "in every case Dasein always has some mood [*Stimmung*]" (GA 2: 179/SZ 134), which, for him, means we invariably find ourselves in situations that affect us. Moreover, any ontic emotional state, whether elation, boredom, or the despondency that often accompanies persons with severe depression, is considered a mode of *Befindlichkeit*. If Fernandez were correct, and some severely depressed persons had no *Befindlichkeit* whatsoever, there would be no common basis for which to even start existential therapeutic treatment, since there must be some attunement to the world in order to reorient a person's being-in-the-world.

In the last chapter of Part One, Dylan Trigg provides a novel and persuasive account of the phenomenology of nostalgia and its relation

to anxiety using the concepts of being-at-home and being ill-at-home. While being-at-home is being integrated spatially, temporally, intersubjectively, etc., in one's world, being ill-at-home is to have "these taken-for-granted modes of familiarity and directionality uprooted" (45). Trigg follows the common interpretation of anxiety in Heidegger's sense as a breakdown of the world of significance but goes a step further in his discussion of nostalgia, which "aims to restore familiarity and continuity through seizing the world in and through an already-formed lens, which is then mapped over the present" (57). In Trigg's final analysis, he argues that nostalgia "amplifies and problematizes rather than subdues and assuages our capacity to call our temporal and spatial existence into question" (57).

Trigg may be correct to note that nostalgia functions as a way of fleeing anxiety, as one may be enticed to retreat to the safety of one's past, rather than take on the present head-on. However, it may also be true that nostalgia can provide a sense of continuity and a rootedness to life that one may be able to pull from during the onset of world collapse. While one cannot fully restore a distant (in both the spatial and temporal meanings of the term) sense of being-at-home, aspects of one's former world may provide elements worth revisiting and possibly worth re-instantiating in one's own life and allow for, to use Heidegger's language, "the authentic repetition of a possibility of existence that has been" (GA 2: 509/SZ 385).

Part Two of Aho's compilation tackles another topic also important to the field of existential health: the phenomenologies of pain, anxiety, and death. As Aho notes, "what scientific medicine often fails to acknowledge are the feelings and perceptions of the sufferer as they are expressed, lived, and made intelligible within the context [of] his or her world" (xvi). Phenomenological approaches to medicine provide first-person perspectives of individuals experiencing maladies so that others, particularly medical providers, can better understand the world of the person suffering, thus opening a wider avenue for empathy.

Chapter Five is a dialog between Matthew Ratcliffe, who has a wealth of experience in the realm of the philosophy of illness, and his

colleague Martin Kusch, an eminent philosopher of science who suffers from chronic pain. Through the frank and forthright first-person account of chronic jaw pain provided by Kusch, Ratcliffe and Kusch provide two points about chronic pain: 1) an experience of chronic pain is inextricably linked with how one relates with others; and 2) certain experiences of pain are simultaneously concretely focused and all-encompassing (61). Kusch's harrowing first-person account relays a change in perspective regarding medical doctors, who were once considered "specialists whose time one 'rents' for them to repair" (65) but are eventually seen as untrustworthy, impersonal, and unsympathetic.

Ratcliffe and Kusch provide an important insight in this chapter, namely, that helplessness of the person in chronic pain leads to "a *style of anticipation* – one expects more pain; one expects no relief from it; and this impacts on what one expects from the world more generally" (70). This style of anticipation leads to a disengagement from the world that ultimately strains relationships with others. The account offered may provide a springboard to empathy for both medical providers who treat persons with chronic pain, and also persons who live closely with those in chronic pain, as the constancy of the pain, the disorienting nature of it, and the impact on one's entire being is sometimes hard to imagine for those who have not suffered pain chronically.

In Chapter Six, Kristin Zeiler provides a phenomenological account of what it means to make a choice in a medical context by focusing in specifically on a parent choosing to donate a kidney to a child with end-stage renal disease (ESRD). Using Merleau-Ponty's concept of the relational lived body as her primary basis, she argues that "there are choices to make, but that which stands out as a choice is formed by our bodily modes of acting and interacting with others and the world" (97). For instance, a parent who "chooses" to donate a kidney to his or her child with ESRD may not perceive this as a matter of *choice* at all but rather as something one "simply does" or "should do" (94).

Zeiler's analysis provides an insightful look into what it means to choose in a medical context that goes beyond the case of parent-to-child kidney donation. All too often, discussions of decision-making in this

sphere take for granted the presence of what Charles Taylor calls "self-determining freedom," that is, "the idea that I am free when I decide for myself what concerns me, rather than being shaped by external influences" even though, as Taylor brilliantly argues, "reasoning in moral matters is always reasoning with somebody."[12] Zeiler provides a fitting vocabulary to help us understand how reasoning and decision-making are relational in nature, and how the co-constitution of our lived bodies informs such decisions.

In Chapter Seven, Jenny Slatman provides an original perspective on how to approach medically unexplained physical symptoms (MUPS) such as fibromyalgia. Many philosophers working on the phenomenology of illness utilize Husserl's famous distinction from *Ideas II* of the body as *Körper*, which refers to the corporeal body, and the body as *Leib*, which refers to the lived body, that is, "the experience of *my own body* [that is] fundamentally bound up and entwined in the 'life-world' [*Lebenswelt*] that I am involved in."[13] Slatman argues that the *Körper/Leib* distinction "easily falls prey to a new form of dualism" (107) wherein the *Leib* comes to be seen as what was previously called a soul or spirit. Thus, pain experienced by the lived body of persons with fibromyalgia can be trivialized, given that it is not able to be referenced in the corporeal body. She utilizes Jean-Luc Nancy's notion of embodiment wherein humans "are matter *and* we sense matter" (111) to overcome what she interprets as the residual Cartesian dualism of Husserl's distinction and recommends utilizing alternative and fragmented ways of speaking of the body, especially those found on the internet, to better articulate the experience of MUPS.

Slatman is right to point out that the common ways of speaking of MUPS in the medical model are problematic. The frequently used labels of "atypical" or "psychosomatic" by medical practitioners in the medical model to explain such symptoms make it seem like the pain is merely "in a person's head" and thus not real, and we should therefore support her project of legitimizing such pain. Nevertheless, her critique of the dualistic framework of *Körper/Leib* is unpersuasive, since there is clearly a difference between the body as studied by modern science

and our bodily experience of the world. The latter, although it depends on the former, cannot ultimately be reduced to what science discovers, since Heidegger is right to point out that "the fact that physiology and physiological chemistry can scientifically investigate the human being as an organism is no proof that in this 'organic' thing, that is, in the body scientifically explained, the essence of the human being consists" (GA 9: 156/247).[14] Moreover, one could argue that Slatman's preferred matter/sensing matter distinction borrowed from Nancy falls prey to the same dualistic model that she is attempting to overcome.

In Chapter Eight, Adam Buben continues his research on the philosophy of death by surveying arguments posed by philosophers as to the importance of death to the meaning of life. He ultimately argues against them and shows that Heidegger's approach to death is superior. While death is typically understood as the event of one's demise, Buben shows that, for Heidegger, death is "a way of being toward available possibilities" (120) and entails the realization "that you are not essentially determined to be anything specific" (122), thus providing the occasion for authentic living.

Buben's interpretation of Heidegger's conception of death is a fitting antidote to the misinterpretation provided by Gallagher in Chapter One. Gallagher states, "For Heidegger authenticity is nonrelational; a phenomenon of being-unto-(one's-very-own-individual)-death" (6). Gallagher seems to think that because death is, to quote Heidegger, one's "ownmost non-relational possibility" (GA 2: 333/SZ 250), authenticity must be non-relational as well. Buben shows that what death teaches us is that "we define ourselves, intentionally or not, through all kinds of activities and *relationships*, but…no particular involvement or approach to life can ever be definitive for Dasein in the same essential manner as its pure possibility" (122, em). While death is non-relational, the activity of defining ourselves in an authentic manner is not.

Part Three features articles that engage the intersections between biomedical ethics, medicalization, and technological advances in medicine. Hans-Johann Glock has argued that biomedical ethics is traditionally a child of analytic philosophy.[15] However, as Catherine

Mills has noted, "with the development of technologies that challenge our ethical intuitions, the traditional (bio)ethical conceptions… are coming under challenge."[16] She points to Continental philosophy as a fitting conceptual well to pull from to address biotechnological developments. Part Three provides examples of how Continental philosophy becomes particularly relevant in the technology-ridden contemporary biomedical context.

In the first chapter of Part Three, Fredrik Svenaeus shows how Heidegger's philosophy of technology is relevant to contemporary biomedical ethics. Taking a cue from Heidegger's "The Question Concerning Technology" and the *Zollikon Seminars*, Svenaeus argues that "the danger is that the scientific attitude finds a dominating *hold* by way of the technology that makes the [scientific] attitude in question harder to critically scrutinize and complement with the phenomenological point of view" (136). This attitude leads to the expansion of "the domain of the diseased and disordered" (141) to such an extent that medicalization, understood in Foucault's sense of "normalizing functions that go beyond the existence of diseases,"[17] becomes the norm.

In this chapter, Svenaeus continues to build his reputation as one of the foremost thinkers in the field of existential medicine, showcased recently in *Phenomenological Bioethics*.[18] The most impressive aspect of this chapter is his engagement with medicalization and its effect on the life-worlds of human beings. Given the wealth of biotechnological developments to treat issues as diverse as sexual dysfunction and neurosis, there is no longer any excuse for not being healthy if we all ascribe to the medical model (141). Svenaeus does an excellent job of showing how this leads to a leveled-down world, and how Heidegger's later philosophy provides an avenue to help stave off that leveling.

Chapter Ten features the well-known philosopher of medicine Havi Carel and one of her graduate students, Tina Williams, who provide a phenomenology of breathlessness as a product of their research related to the "Life of Breath" project for the Wellcome Trust. Williams and Carel argue that phenomenology "provides a descriptive and interpretive framework…which can complement medical understanding of

illness experiences" (158). They show the similarities and differences of persons experiencing breathlessness as a result of a respiratory illness and as a result of panic anxiety by looking at physiological, emotional, cognitive, behavioral, and situational factors.

Williams and Carel provide a robust analysis that allows clinicians to better label different types of breathlessness. They provide a phenomenology of what it feels like to experience breathlessness both at the immediate subjective level and also at the social level, which adds to the wealth of phenomenological insight Carel has already contributed to the field.[19] Such insights show how intrusive breathlessness can be on a person's world, which may allow for greater empathy on the part of clinicians.

In Chapter Eleven, Tara Kennedy utilizes Heidegger's later philosophy to examine the rise of biotechnologies. Kennedy views the surging biotechnology industry as linked with an almost exclusive focus on calculative thinking, that is, thinking dedicated to "measuring, counting, and quantifying" (163), with the result of leaving meditative thinking, that is, "that form of being-with-things in which [Dasein] is capable of testifying to *poietic* disclosure" (163), understood as "the disclosure of ontological possibility" (162), by the wayside. She argues that meditative thinking tends towards virtuous action, while a myopic focus on calculative thinking tends toward vicious action. At the end of the article, Kennedy provides an interesting discussion on the gene-editing tool CRISPR-Cas9, which is able to make direct changes to genomic DNA, arguing that "the use of CRISPR-Cas9 to select against a debilitating disease is ethical" as long as it is not motivated by the drive to order and manipulate (170).

As of February of 2018, as many as 86 individuals have had their genes altered in clinical trials using CRISPR technology in China.[20] Thus, Kennedy's engagement with the ethics of this technology is timely, as it may be available on a wider scale soon. Her appropriation of the later Heidegger for an ethics of technology, however, is off the mark. Heidegger explicitly differentiates the ethics of technology from his own project, which is an ontology of technology (GA 11: 43/ID 34).

Thus, Kennedy's consistent reference to "Heidegger's ethics" is misleading. Moreover, her way of linking calculative thinking with vicious action and meditative thinking with virtuous action is problematic, as Heidegger makes it clear that each type of thinking is "justified and needed in its own way" (GA 16: 519/DT 46).

Rounding out the volume is Part Four, which is titled "Existential Health," and includes articles dedicated to the phenomenology of health, patient experience, and the philosophy of aging. This part of the volume focuses on ways to reframe our understanding of what it means to live a healthy life; I found it to represent the discipline of existential medicine in the most robust manner.

Carolyn Culbertson argues that a true understanding of healthcare today requires an insight into its relation to modern science and its historical link with how healthcare was practiced in the past in Chapter Twelve. Understanding *technē* in the Heideggerian sense of "not just a means to an end but a way of revealing" (182), Culbertson shows how premodern *technē* was responsive to nature and heedful of the importance of right timing, but modern *technē* "seems to have left behind this kind of skill" (184). Using Heidegger and Gadamer, she shows how this narrow-mindedness leads to alienation on the part of the patients *and* medical providers in the contemporary context.

Culbertson's contribution encapsulates the essence of the entire volume, as it not only accurately diagnoses a key problem with the institution of contemporary healthcare but also shows a better way forward. Moreover, it is well-written, conceptually clear, and full of real-world examples that help to convey her message. Thus, this article is a paragon of the sort of work that should be done in existential health. Her claim that medical providers "must take to heart, for example, what makes a life worth living for this person and his or her community" (187) is especially on point.

In Chapter Thirteen, John Russon and Kirsten Jacobson argue that "an existential conception of medicine requires treating the body first and foremost as a reality situated within and participating in relationships of recognition and communication" (191). They focus in on

individuals with inflammatory bowel disease (IBD) and HIV-AIDS to show how such illnesses are far more than medical diagnoses but rather concern the matter of "living a happy and healthy *life*" (198). What is especially poignant is their emphasis, inspired by Merleau-Ponty, on how the lived body necessarily entails co-habitation with others; thus, intersubjective aspects of illness – such as the stigmatization by others that often accompanies individuals with IBD and HIV-AIDS – must be given careful attention.

Like Culbertson, Russon and Jacobsen cut to the heart of existential medicine, noting that "an authentic, human medicine – an existential medicine – must *in principle* include the personal interaction between healthcare providers and patient, oriented to the understanding of the *meaning* – the *necessarily personal* meaning – of the illness" (197). Their insight that contemporary medicine often works against existential health due to its impersonal nature and overemphasis on instrumentality is particularly perceptive. Moreover, the examples that they utilize offer clear illustrations of what Merleau-Ponty meant by his assertion that the social is carried about "inseparably with us."[21]

Nicole Piemonte and Ramsey Eric Ramsey join forces in Chapter 14 to interpret the seemingly contradictory but common responses to critical illness wherein an individual 1) evades illness in the attempt to restore health or 2) intentionally confronts illness to allow for personal transformation (206). Importantly, they note that "one can never return to who she once was or how she once saw the world around her, even if her body is fully restored" (214). They reach the somewhat ironic conclusion that those who confront illness and acknowledge the vulnerability of their lives are actually the healthiest.

Piemonte and Ramsey make a convincing case regarding the importance of acknowledging one's vulnerability. Indeed, in her recent book *Afflicted*, Piemonte elaborates on the importance of "recognizing our own vulnerability and learning how to respond to the vulnerability of others" and provides specific guidance for medical professionals to respond to their patients' vulnerability.[22] This is much needed work to cultivate a better understanding on the part of medical professionals,

especially if we heed Gadamer's claim that "we must place ourselves in the other situation in order to understand it."[23]

In the last chapter of the volume, Drew Leder examines the deficiencies of various models of successful aging in Western industrialized countries and provides alternative, more fitting images culled from various cultural traditions, including Hindu and Native American sources. He calls such models "positive archetypal images associated with the elder that can inspire our cultural re-envisioning" (226). Noting that there is "no one way to 'age well'" (234), Leder sees these archetypes as complementary and non-exclusive.

Leder's article is, to some extent, a condensed version of his book *Spiritual Passages*, in which he intimates various ways to initiate a "joyous rebirth even in life's second half."[24] Apart from a few exceptions, notably the work of Jan Baars, the philosophy of aging has not received the attention it deserves in the contemporary context.[25] Thus, Leder's work is a welcomed philosophical foray into an overlooked topic. The archetypes he offers can perhaps offer "the repetition of a possibility of existence that has come down to us" (GA 2: 509/SZ 385), to use the words of Heidegger, for individuals approaching old age.

I think *Existential Medicine* is a valuable contribution to the ever-relevant field of medical humanities. In his preface to the *Zollikon Seminars*, Medard Boss notes that Heidegger "saw the possibility that his philosophical insights would not be confined merely to the philosopher's quarters but also might benefit many more people, especially people in need of help" (GA 89: x/ZS xvii). Aho has done an excellent job of compiling articles that show just how Heidegger's philosophical insights – and the insights of his most famous students – are able to enact this possibility.

NOTES

1 The content of these seminars is contained in *Zollikoner Seminare: Protokolle – Gespräche – Briefe*, ed. Medard Boss (Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1987), made available in English as the *Zollikon Seminars* (ZS) in 2001. GA 89 (published 2017) reprints all the texts included in this 1987 edition and adds previously unpublished material. My references to GA 89 cite pages of that GA volume, but all the material cited is also included in the 1987 text.

2 Hans-Georg Gadamer, *The Enigma of Health: The Art of Healing in a Scientific Age*, trans. Jason Gaiger and Nicholas Walker (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1996), ix.

3 Karl Jaspers, "The Physician in the Technological Age," trans. Arthur A. Grugan, *Theoretical Medicine and Bioethics* 10:3 (1989), 255.

4 Atul Gawande, *Being Mortal: Medicine and What Matters in the End* (New York: Metropolitan Books, 2014), 6 (my emphasis).

5 Kevin Aho, *Existentialism: An Introduction* (Malden, MA: Polity Press, 2014), 123.

6 Cf. Shaun Gallagher, *Enactivist Interventions: Rethinking the Mind* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017).

7 Jean-Paul Sartre, *Existentialism is a Humanism*, trans. Carol Macomber (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2007), 29.

8 Sartre, *Existentialism is a Humanism*, 48. This pertains, of course, only to Sartre's early philosophy, since he changes his mind later in life, noting that the "relation with Others…determines [the human being] in his being *and already awaits him*" in *Critique of Dialectical Reason, Volume One: Theory of Practical Ensembles*, trans. Alan Sheridan-Smith and ed. Jonathan Rée (New York: Verso, 2004), 265.

9 Charles Guignon, *Heidegger and the Problem of Knowledge* (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1983), 104.

10 Cf. George E. Atwood and Robert Stolorow, *Structures of Subjectivity: Explorations in Psychoanalytic Phenomenology and Contextualism*, 2nd ed. (New York: Routledge, 2014).

11 Cf. Peter C. Gøtzsche, Allan H. Young, and John Crace, "Does long term use of psychiatric drugs cause more harm than good?" *British Medical Journal* 350 (2015): 2435.

12 Charles Taylor, *The Ethics of Authenticity* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1991), 27, 31.

13 Kevin Aho, "The Body," in *The Bloomsbury Companion to Heidegger*, ed. François Raffoul and Eric Sean Nelson (New York: Bloomsbury, 2016), 270. Cf. Edmund Husserl, *Ideas Pertaining to a Pure Phenomenology and to Phenomenological Philosophy, Second Book*, trans. Richard Rojcewicz and André Schuwer (Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1989).

14 This is not to say that the physical is reducible to the objective, as Heidegger's understanding of *physis* is clearly more complex than this. Cf. especially GA 9: 309–371/183–230.

15 Hans-Johann Glock, "Doing Good by Splitting Hairs? Analytic Philosophy and Applied Ethics," *Journal of Applied Philosophy* 28:3 (2011): 225–40.

16 Catherine Mills, "Continental Philosophy and Bioethics," *Journal of Bioethical Inquiry* 7:2 (2010): 145–48.

17 Michel Foucault, "The Crisis of Medicine or the Crisis of Antimedicine?" trans. Edgar C. Knowlton, Jr., William J. King, and Clare O'Farrell, *Foucault Studies* 1 (2004): 13.

18 Fredrik Svenaeus, *Phenomenological Bioethics: Medical Technolgies, Human Suffering, and the Meaning of Being Alive* (New York: Routledge, 2018).

19 Cf. Havi Carel, *Phenomenology of Illness* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016) and Havi Carel, *Illness: The Cry of the Flesh* (New York: Routledge, 2014).

20 The Lancet Editorial Staff, "Editing the Human Genome: Balancing Safety and Regulation," *The Lancet* 391, no. 10119 (2018): 402.

21 Maurice Merleau-Ponty, *Phenomenology of Perception*, trans. Colin Smith (New York: Routledge, 2002), 421.

22 Nicole M. Piemonte, *Afflicted: How Vulnerability can Heal Medical Education and Practice* (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 2018), xii.

23 Hans-Georg Gadamer, *Truth and Method*, 2nd ed., trans. Joel-Weinsheimer and Donald G. Marshall (New York: Continuum, 2004), 302.

24 Drew Leder, *Spiritual Passages: Embracing Life's Sacred Journey* (New York: Tarcher/Putnam, 1997), xv.

25 Cf. especially Jan Baars, *Aging and the Art of Living* (Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2012).

BOOK REVIEW

Jussi Backman's *Complicated Presence: Heidegger and the Postmetaphysical Unity of Being*

Pascal Massie

Jussi Backman, *Complicated Presence: Heidegger and the Postmetaphysical Unity of Being*. Albany, NY: SUNY Press, 2015. 342 pages.

In an early work entitled *Philosophy in the Tragic Age of the Greeks,* Nietzsche declares of Thales that "what drove him [...] was a metaphysical conviction which had its origin in a mystic intuition. We meet it in every philosophy, together with the ever-renewed attempts at a more suitable expression, this proposition that 'all things are one.'"[1] If Nietzsche is right, what justifies naming Thales the first philosopher is not the *answer* he proposed (what Nietzsche calls his "water-hypothesis") but the *question* this answer was supposed to resolve and, beyond this, the metaphysical *conviction* concerning the unity of being that the question presupposes.

If so, we should expect that the question of the unity (and multiplicity) of being would be the very kind of question that post-metaphysical

thought discards. *Complicated Presence* argues, on the contrary, that this question permeates the entirety of Heidegger's corpus. One could take this as suggesting that, to the extent that Heidegger remained committed to the question concerning the unity of being, he was unable to overcome the very metaphysics he claimed to deconstruct. Backman's intention is, on the contrary, to argue that the vocabulary of ontological unity in Heidegger is *not* a surreptitious resurgence of a traditional metaphysical structure that privileges the one over the many, but a critical transformation of that very structure (6). This unity is always differentiated. It is the unity of unity *and* difference, of presence *and* absence, of disclosing *and* withdrawing. Whereas metaphysics understands being as the universal beingness common to the manifold of beings, post-metaphysical thinking attempts to think presence in its complicated singularity as the singularity of the event of beyng. In the following essay I hope to convince the reader that *Complicated Presence* is one of the most thought-provoking recent books on Heidegger, a complicated but essential contribution.

I. PRESENCE, UNITY, AND COMPLICATION

Ordinarily, whatever we deem complicated is *difficult* and it is so because it is *complex*. Thus, this notion plays at the intersection of epistemology and metaphysics: with respect to knowledge, it is a negative term since it suggests that we do not understand, or understand only dimly, what is at stake. It is so because the complex harbors a multiplicity that prevents us from seeing the unity of a thing or a phenomenon. A complicated issue, for instance, is one that has a multiplicity of contributing factors such that this very multiplicity makes it difficult to fully understand. By contrast, to grasp this issue would be a matter of discovering its unity, of returning the multiple to simplicity. How then can presence, which Backman understands as unity, be complicated? This question is ontological as well as hermeneutical. What Backman calls "complicated presence" designates "the complicity and mutual correspondence, the replying-to-one-another – between presence and its multidimensional background context.

The event of contextualization that opens up meaningful presence *as* complicated is itself essentially *simple*" (9).

Complication should then be understood in the sense of *com-plicare*: folding together. The unity of being is thus complicated because it is a tensional, referring, and exceeding structure that does not exclude difference and opposition but is, on the contrary, based on them. In that sense, complication reverses Parmenides' movement of explication, which can be understood as the movement of unfolding the apparent multiplicity of beings into an ultimate simplicity of presence as such. Heidegger's later thought can thus be understood as unfolding this presence as a folding together of multiple dimensions of meaningfulness. "These dimensions make the presence of the thing meaningful in a singular way; however, they are not themselves implicitly included in this presence but remain in the background, implicit" (8). To support this claim, Backman reviews Heidegger's entire corpus.

Complicated Presence covers a great deal of material and I cannot comment on each of Backman's detailed analyses. Instead, I shall focus on three crucial moments: a) Dasein's unity as timeliness (*Zeitlichkeit*), b) the event, and c) the fourfold.

a) *Dasein's unity* is ecstatic; that is to say, it is the interplay of a multiplicity of temporal dimensions that generates Dasein's openness to meaningful presence as a situated, contextual, and *unique* instant of vision (*Augenblick*). Thought in terms of timeliness, Dasein's unity (care) is not the linear juxtaposition of a past that is no more, a present that is, and a future that is not yet; rather, it is the *unity of their contemporaneity*. Backman rightly insists that "the key to understanding the structure of timeliness is to discard spatial notions of linearity and succession and to think the ecstases in their "at-once" character without thereby reducing them to a simultaneity in the sense of simple co-presence or accessibility in one and the same now" (86).

"Already-having-been" is Dasein's ineradicable factical background which is meaningful in terms of the finite possibilities for being-ahead. Already-having-been arises from forthcoming (*Zukunft*). Futurity structures Dasein's possibilities but it is not subordinate to actuality,

which is to say that forthcoming is not to be understood as a deficient mode of what *lacks* presence and perhaps will never be; rather, futurity is a dimension of non-presence.

"Presenting" (*Gegenwärtigen*) is openness and receptivity to the meaningfully situated present. It is made possible in terms of forthcoming possibilities and the factical background from which these possibilities emerge (85). On this ground, time is neither flow nor linear. Because of the folding of these temporal ecstases, the present is without completion and presence does not have the fullness of simplicity. Thus, Heidegger's concern for the unity of Dasein doesn't give rise to oneness. But how can we understand this "at-once" character, this contemporaneity that is not simultaneity? In *simultaneity*, one moment of time (the present instant) has preeminence since it contains everything else in it. The unity of *contemporaneity*, however, is permeated by what is not present. Thus contemporaneity (Heidegger talks of "proximity") should not be understood as a fourth ecstasis; rather, it constitutes the horizonal schema of the three temporal ecstases whose unity is found in the mutual dependence of the ecstases.

b) With the thinking of *Ereignis*, Heidegger abandons the transcendental-horizonal approach of *Being and Time* to inaugurate being-historical-thinking. *Ereignis,* in its uniqueness, takes place in a multitude of singular events and articulates both the differential character of being and its unity. The differential corresponds to the background dimension of meaningfulness, the tensional separation of the gods and the humans, the concrete materiality of the earth and the permanence-granting ideality and universality of a shared historical articulation of meaning-relations (a world). Differentiality, however, is also a gathering of what is appropriated; it comprises the event of meaningful presence as a whole (182). As Backman shows, Heidegger's claim according to which "beyng is more than beings" should not be confused with the onto-theological claim according to which a *supreme* being is "most" (in the sense of maximally constant presence). As Heidegger puts it in *Metaphysics and Nihilism*, "it is one thing to metaphysically install being as beingness in a most-beingful…[supreme being] – and another

to experience beyng in terms of the abidance of its truth as the 'most-beingful' in *the* sense that it is precisely not 'a' being and also not supreme, not 'the' absolute" (GA 67: 183).[2] "Beyng is most" must then be understood in terms of its singular instantaneity and spatio-temporal situatedness. It is "at times" and locally. Whereas beings (*das Seiende*) constitute the foreground that metaphysics has cut off from their implicit background distinction, the unity of beyng is a differential and yet indivisible singular unity of foreground and background. In the expressions "presence *and* non-presence," "clearing *and* withdrawing," the conjunction "and" expresses being as *Ereignis*. As Backman puts it, "what now emerges is precisely the previously disregarded *other* of being as presence, i.e., *the background context* of non-presence (being$_2$ [on this terminology, see section III below]) that releases presence into the foreground of immediate accessibility by itself withdrawing" (163). The present is no longer self-sufficient identity but a situational, singular, and historically contextual *event of presencing*. Thus, Dasein and beyng enter into a play of mutual reference or reciprocal appropriation whereby the event of being takes the human being as its recipient, and the human being finds her selfhood in the reception of this givenness.

c) *The fourfold* (*Geviert*) is, argues Backman, the unity of a horizontal axis of excess constituted by two dimensions: on the one hand, the gods and the human beings (mortals) that can be regarded as a temporal axis analogous to the ecstases of forthcoming and already-having-been and, on the other hand, a vertical axis of excess that can be regarded as a special dimension of access within temporal presence and that comprises world (later on called "sky" – *Himmel*) and earth. Backman interprets the divine as the "unattainable, ever non-present dimension of ultimate possibilities toward which the human being is compelled to strive" (142). Heidegger's reading of Hölderlin stresses that neither humans nor the deities are self-contained domains, but rather are in the strife between the superhuman (aims, ideals, and obligations) and the affective nature of human beings in their ability to be receptive to such an orienting dimension.

We can then contrast the earth/world axis with the Aristotelian matter/form. In Aristotle's production-oriented ontology, materiality (*hylē*) is presented in negative terms, as *in*articulate *in*determinacy that *lacks* form and is therefore a mere potential (*dynamis*) for being articulated. By contrast, the earth, for Heidegger, is made explicit in the work of art as the soil that fulfills and bears all meanings and shows that concrete meaningfulness is never exhausted by the universality of determinate articulation. The earth resists any attempt to generalize the cultural paradigms of a historical world. The world is the network of references and involvements within which articulated meaningfulness arises. The world is always the world of a historical people. It is always situated and historical. The earth, however, is trans-epochal; it is not situated, but situates and singularizes. This is why, as Backman observes, Heidegger talks not of *a* world but of *the* earth (148).

It is essential to resist interpreting the earth-world axis alongside the prevalent distinctions of nature/culture or material/spiritual. Earth and world are not substantial beings, but two dimensions at play in the instantiation of meaningful presence in which earth is brought forth into world and world is anchored into earth. In the work of art, earth and world rest in a tensional and oppositional presence. World (articulation) seeks to integrate the earth (materiality) into a network of meaning, to make it thoroughly intelligible. However, in its opacity and indeterminacy earth resists this transparency. This conflict between articulation and resistance is interdependency and reciprocal intertwining, belonging together (150). This is why the work of art has the unity of an event.

II. UNITY, UNIVOCITY, SIMPLICITY, AND SINGULARITY

It follows from this analysis that "presence" cannot be *one* in the way that self-identity defines a substance, since meaningfulness presupposes referentiality which, in turn, requires plurality. Heidegger is indeed concerned with the question of the *unity* of being, but he does so by raising the question of the *uniqueness* of being rather than its unicity. This leads Backman to appeal to a series of terms: oneness, singularity,

uniqueness, simplicity, and identity. I propose to focus on this manifold in order to contrast it with the metaphysical one/many and address the distinctions that this series of terms introduces.

Metaphysically, being is the most universal concept, although its universality is not that of a species or a genus. This is why medieval ontology denoted being as a *transcendental*. Yet being is also common to every being. This is why medieval ontology called it *ens commune*. Transcendence and univocity comprise two possible ways of conceiving it. In either case, however, the concern for the unity of being is a matter of preserving identity and permanence. In the case of immanence (e.g., Epicurus's atomistic theory) atoms are the *archē* of all things, what remains immutable beyond the generation and destruction of compounds. In a dualistic and creationist metaphysics (e.g., Aquinas), the essence of a being stands in potency to a distinct act of existence. Heidegger's post-metaphysical thought does not simply inverse the metaphysical structure and posit multiplicity and complexity as preceding unity and simplicity. Simplicity remains a key concern: "the multiplicity of the fourfold background requires the simplicity of the thing in which it can fold together" (9). Yet "simplicity" is to be distinguished from identity (being one-and-the-same). Simplicity occurs in relationality. Meaningful presence and Dasein's receptivity are irreducibly intertwined. Thus, simplicity is not found in a common denominator. To shift from a language of "unity" to a language of "uniqueness" and "singularity" is to think of unity in its temporal and historical dimension.

Singularity is precisely what the project of a universal and comprehensive unity *cannot* account for. The haecceity or thisness of the individual is, for metaphysics, *ineffable*. Such a singularity is the opposite of God's absolute unity. The ineffability of the singular has led Western metaphysics to dismiss the singular and seek the universal. As Backman writes: "thisness, here-and-now-ness, or haecceity is regarded by the tradition of philosophy in a purely negative way as a residue that resists systematization" (71). By contrast, the task of post-metaphysical thought is to think the singularity of the thing as well as the singularity of Dasein as plural and heterogenous.

III. BEING$_1$, BEING$_2$, AND BEING$_3$

Backman's argument depends in large part on a distinction among what he calls "being$_1$," "being$_2$," and "being$_3$" which reveals a fundamental ambiguity in Heidegger's use of the term "being."

Being$_1$ corresponds to meaningful presence and accessibility. It is being as what metaphysics approaches in terms of beings and thinks *from out of* the plurality of beings. Fundamental ontology still understands being as meaningful presence by way of its multiple instances. In this sense, beingness is nothing radically different from beings. It is the common, the feature of beings by virtue of which they are.

Being$_2$ is no-thing. Aristotle acknowledged that the comprehensive being, the being of beings, resists determination. Only specific beings can be defined and determined. This leads to the insight that being is the *other* of beings, "nothing" in the sense of not-any-determinate-being. That which constitutes the presence of determinate instances of presence is not itself present in a determinate way. In its otherness to beings, being is the indeterminacy that allows determinacy. In *Wegmarken*, Heidegger writes "The nothing [*Nichts*] is the not [*Nicht*] of beings, and is thus being, experienced from the perspective of beings" (GA 9: 123/97). In this sense, being$_2$ releases beings by differing from them. Being as the no-thing is no longer simple indeterminate presence in contrast to the determinate presence of beings (Anaximander), it is the presence of non-presence that makes a foreground of presence possible.

Being$_3$ is beyng, i.e., the interplay of being$_1$ and being$_2$. Backman explains it as follows:

> Being in the third and most comprehensive sense is precisely the differentiation of background and foreground as such. It is the "temporalization" of a present in the ecstatic unity of timeliness, the emergence of something against the background of the nothing, the complication of the multidimensional background into the complicated unity of the foreground. (116)

By contrast with the universality of being$_1$, being$_3$ is the historical unfolding of meaningfulness in singular situations.

How can we understand the relation among these three? Just as in *Being and Time* the three ecstases of temporality have an "at-once-character," I take it that being$_1$, being$_2$, and being$_3$ are interrelated. But how? To understand this as a matter of semantic distinction raises some insurmountable difficulties: this would take us back to Aristotle's "being is *said* in many ways," and with this we are not questioning being anymore. Furthermore, a semantic plurality is perfectly compatible with an ontological unity, which, in a sense, it presupposes. If, on the other hand, we understand being$_1$, being$_2$, and being$_3$ as properly ontological, wouldn't we have to assume an *ens commune* that they would have to share? None of these hypotheses is cogent. Backman suggests that being$_3$ contains both being$_1$ and being$_2$.

When, however, being$_3$ is considered in terms of this full fourfold dimensionality of the event that grants "beings," we attain a transitive sense of "is." What *is* is no longer beings or things, i.e., the *outcome* or foreground of the event of being$_3$. Rather, what truly *is* is being$_3$ itself in its full event structure as the differentiation of foreground and background. (182).

The "transitive sense of is" refers to dispensation (destination) of meaningful presence. In this sense, being$_3$ exhibits both singularity because of its uniqueness (its non-reiterability) and unity in the tensional interplay that lets background and foreground belong together.

Yet still another term is required: namely, Dasein. In *Contributions*, Heidegger argues that being and Dasein mutually define each other; the emergence of unconcealment from concealment is an event that appropriates the "there" (*Da*) of Dasein.

In conclusion, one of the great virtues of Backman's book is not that it solves some issues but that it raises new questions. Heidegger's thinking of *Ereignis* provides an account of the very happening of historical epochs whereby they come to be in the first place. *Ereignis* is that very granting of historical epochs that provides for the possibility of human history. *Ereignis* is that revelation and appropriation of meaningful

presence. Entire civilizations are themselves "epochal" in Heidegger's sense of the term. But doesn't this make *Ereignis* itself trans-historical and therefore a-temporal? Aren't we then led to assuming that temporality must be determined out of eternity? This hypothesis must be ruled out, of course. *Ereignis* is not an act of creation, it is at play throughout the historical unfolding of being; but insofar as it is this event that gives rise to history, it is not itself part of that history, but is rather the singularity that gives rise to history. But that "solution" (rethinking unity in terms of "singularity") doesn't solve anything. Are there many *Ereignisse* (each epoch having its own)? If so, what (if anything), is the unity of this plurality?

NOTES

1 Friedrich Nietzsche, *Philosophy in the Tragic Age of the Greeks*, trans. Marianne Cowan (Washington, D.C.: Gateway Editions, 1962), 39.

2 Backman's translation.

BOOK REVIEW

Andrew Benjamin and Dimitris Vardoulakis's *Sparks Will Fly: Benjamin and Heidegger*

Benjamin Brewer

Andrew Benjamin and Dimitris Vardoulakis, eds.
Sparks Will Fly: Benjamin and Heidegger.
Albany: SUNY Press, 2015. 305 pages.

This is a book *long* overdue. While many thinkers, scholars, and theorists are indebted to the thought of both Walter Benjamin and Martin Heidegger and write about them regularly, and while there have been monographs addressing them together, this volume constitutes the first edited volume of its kind in English – a dedicated and sustained attempt to question the relation between the works of Heidegger and Benjamin.[1] In light of the recent publication of the *Black Notebooks*, the confrontation between, to quote the editors' introduction, "Walter Benjamin, the cosmopolitan Jew, and Martin Heidegger, who preferred his peasant hut in remote Todtnauberg to city life" (xi) seems especially timely; even beyond this, however, the relation is both fascinating and urgent, and its stakes are not simply comparative.

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First and most simply, their relation is not entirely posthumous. As Peter Fenves's contribution demonstrates convincingly, they were, at the very least, "entangled," having both attended Rickert's 1913 summer seminar, whether or not they met one another. Even if their paths had not crossed so directly, they would still be connected through Hannah Arendt, who is one of the first people to claim their proximity as thinkers.[2] Furthermore, though Heidegger's famous lack of engagement with his contemporaries also touches Benjamin, Benjamin speaks of Heidegger at several moments in letters, dating from his time as a graduate student up until the last decade of his life.[3] Indeed, the title of the volume itself comes from a letter to Gershom Scholem in January 1930 where Benjamin, speaking of the *Arcades Project*, writes:

> For this book as much as for the *Trauerspiel* book, I cannot dispense with an introduction which will treat of a theory of knowledge and this time above all a theory of knowledge of history. It is there that I will find Heidegger on my path and I anticipate certain sparks to fly from the clash between our two modes, so very different, of considering history.[4]

In another letter to Scholem from April of the same year, Benjamin writes that he and Bertolt Brecht are planning a reading group for the summer of 1930 in which they will "reduce Heidegger to rubble."[5] Much earlier, in 1920, he even lamented (again to Scholem) that Heidegger had already written a habilitation on the topic he himself had hoped to write on, taking the opportunity to pronounce that, despite Heidegger's penchant for "philosophical grandiloquence," the habilitation is ultimately in fact little more than "a bit of good translation work."[6] Clearly Benjamin thought of his own work – at least to some extent – in relation to Heidegger's, though it is ambiguous in the letters whether this is a case of the narcissism of small differences or the recognition of a genuine philosophical enemy.

And this brings us to the second and more compelling reason: their thoughts circle – relentlessly, almost uncannily – around the

same questions and problems: history, language, technology, art, and memory, to name only a few. And while, for someone who reads both seriously, the connections often loom such that it can be difficult to read one without feeling that the other is looking over one's shoulder, the singularity of each as a thinker and writer nonetheless shines through and problematizes even the most compelling similarities. Indeed, perhaps what is most notable about both Benjamin and Heidegger *is* their idiosyncratic ways of dealing with similar themes and problems, an idiosyncrasy that cannot be disentangled from the commitment they share to constantly working *within* the entanglement of writing and thinking. As Benjamin says at the beginning of the *Origin of the German Trauerspiel*, "it belongs to philosophical writing to stand anew at every turn before the question of presentation," and both Benjamin and Heidegger are exemplars of what it means to pursue the consequences of this thought doggedly, though in markedly different ways.[7] Given this configuration of undeniable idiosyncrasy and uncanny similarity, it is not only scholarly erudition that motivates thinking Benjamin and Heidegger together but also rich (and, even now, largely unexplored) possibilities for pushing each of them to the limits of their own thinking and language, bringing out their respective potentials and limitations through a posthumous *Auseinandersetzung*.

Which is a long way of saying that, to quote Heidegger, "in titles of this form sometimes everything comes down to the inconspicuous little conjunction 'and'" (GA 13: 157). An explicit concern for the richness of this "inconspicuous little conjunction" is one of the virtues of this volume. Many of the contributions directly take up the question of what it might mean to write about Heidegger *and* Benjamin – certainly a live problem, given the extent to which both thinkers put the status of "historical" and "comparative" scholarship into question. Peter Fenves's contribution, for example, develops the quantum notion of "entanglement" in order to think the conjunction of Heidegger and Benjamin in a way that is thoroughly historical yet not reliant on the positivist and historicist assumptions that underlie the idea of

"influence" (23). Gerhard Richter and Ilit Ferber open their respective chapters by explicitly addressing the question of "comparison," suggesting that what is at stake would not leave untouched two preexisting bodies of work (28, 67).

The volume has the further virtue of being both an excellent "first" and a "proof of concept," by which I mean it convincingly demonstrates the range of possibilities for thinking Heidegger and Benjamin together. The final two essays of the volume, for example, both take up the problem of politics in relation to the "Work of Art" essays of each – that is, Heidegger's "Origin of the Work of Art" and Benjamin's "The Work of Art in the Age of its Technological Reproducibility," though they do so to quite differing effect. Vardoulakis reads the two essays together along the axis of a critique of *immediacy*, claiming that the two essays "are not only, or even primarily, about art. Heidegger and Benjamin use the work of art to articulate an argument against immediacy," a "remnant of the onto-theological tradition" (237). By reading them together, Vardoulakis argues that they both take the artwork as an opportunity to stage a critique of immediacy and thus "articulate a political ontology of the artwork," before deploying Benjamin in order to argue that Heidegger nevertheless ends up constructing an immediate relation between art and politics (between the work of art and the notion of a people), which is "precisely [the] sense of immediacy that reproducibility seeks to repudiate" (252).

Ferris, on the other hand, reads the two essays by way of the question of the "uselessness" of art and the possibility of art's significance beyond the tradition of art as "beautiful semblance," which has often enlisted art into the service of securing the meaning of politics (260). It is on this basis that Ferris undertakes an illuminating examination of the role that relations of extremity play in Benjamin and Heidegger's respective ways of thinking history. He ultimately shows how Heidegger's thought can help diagnose the danger that, in trying to articulate a theory of art "useless" for fascism, Benjamin may also render impossible the alternative he wants to pose – the famous "politicization of art" by communism (276). Reading Ferris and Vardoulakis's

contributions together provides a powerful example of how the conjunction of Heidegger and Benjamin is a site for readings that are neither predictable nor simply comparative.

This is, however, only one example in a volume full of interesting moments like this. The contributions of the volume are grouped under five headings: knowledge, experience, time, Hölderlin, and politics. "Knowledge" comprises Peter Fenves's "Entanglement – of Benjamin and Heidegger" and Gerhard Richter's "Critique and the Thing: Benjamin and Heidegger." Fenves, as has been mentioned, reads the relation between Heidegger and Benjamin by way of their "entanglement," which he traces back to the summer 1913 seminar of Heinrich Rickert. Fenves simultaneously traces the differing ways in which both Heidegger and Benjamin articulate critiques of Rickert's idea of "completed life" (*vollendetes Leben*) while developing the notion of "entanglement" as a schema for understanding their relation beyond the notion of "influence" (14). Richter argues that both Heidegger and Benjamin rethink Kantian critique by way of meditations on the "thing." Insofar as Benjamin's preoccupation with critique and Heidegger's thinking of the thing are both well known, Richter's essay does a convincing job of showing it is the interrelation of these two that is at stake in both Heidegger and Benjamin. It is also worth noting that, aside from their value as compelling theoretical readings, the level of philological erudition and historical detail in these two essays makes them invaluable resources to future researchers.

"Experience" comprises Ilit Ferber's "*Stimmung*: Heidegger and Benjamin" and A. Kiarina Kordela's "Commodity Fetishism and the Gaze." Ferber's essay examines the notion of *Stimmung*, more well-known as a Heideggerian preoccupation, but which, thanks especially to Ferber's own work on melancholy in Benjamin, is increasingly recognized as an important preoccupation of Benjamin's as well.[8] Specifically, Ferber argues that *Stimmung* provides each with distinct ways of displacing the subject-object distinction, opening up a thinking of truth before or beyond that distinction. Kordela's essay focuses on Benjamin's famously (perhaps notoriously) difficult understanding of "allegory" by

way of the (Marxian) commodity and the (Lacanian) gaze. Heidegger is brought in as a foil at several points, though, to be frank, I have a hard time recognizing Heidegger in the Lacanian caricature Kordela presents.[9] That being said, Kordela's reading of Benjaminian allegory is a significant contribution in its own right, both convincing as an argument and novel as an exegesis.

"Time" comprises Paula Schwebel's "Monad and Time: reading Leibniz with Heidegger and Benjamin" and Andrew Benjamin's "Time and Task: Benjamin and Heidegger Showing the Present." Schwebel situates Benjamin and Heidegger in relation to the way they each take up Leibniz's concept of the monad (and its reception by Husserl), and uses this to bring out the intertwined but distinct ways in which each of them argues for the "openness of the past." Schwebel's reading of Benjamin here is truly illuminating and marks a real contribution to Benjamin scholarship.[10] Andrew Benjamin focuses on Heidegger and Benjamin's differing concepts of the "present," more specifically the way in which the idea of the present moment is related to the announcement or call of a *task*.

"Hölderlin" comprises Antonia Egel's "Who Was Friedrich Hölderlin? Walter Benjamin, Martin Heidegger, and the Poet" and Joanna Hodge's "Sobriety, Intoxication, Hyperbology: Benjamin and Heidegger Reading Hölderlin." Egel's essay begins by arguing that it is not simply "Hölderlin" but the figure of "the Poet" as such that is at stake in both Heidegger's and Benjamin's readings of Hölderlin, and then argues that the different ways they employ this figure of the "poet" is important for understanding other key differences between them, especially their politics. Hodge's essay – a rich and dense exploration of the tension between singularity and communicability in language as it plays out in Heidegger's and Benjamin's respective readings of Hölderlin – argues that Heidegger's readings permit "the return…of a dangerous but irrepressible intoxication, which disrupts any attempt to soothe the turbulence of Hölderlin's vision" (193).

Finally, "Politics" comprises three essays: Ziarek's "Beyond Revolution: Benjamin and Heidegger on Violence and Power," Vardoulakis's

"A Matter of Immediacy: The Political Ontology of the Artwork in Benjamin and Heidegger," and Ferris's "Politics of the Useless: The Work of Art in Benjamin and Heidegger" (the latter two essays are summarized above). Ziarek problematizes the notoriously enigmatic figure "divine violence" in Benjamin's early essay "Critique of Violence" by way of Heidegger's thinking of a "violence-free reign" (*Ge-waltlose Walten)* in *The History of Beyng* (GA 69: 8/8). Ultimately connecting this transformation of *Walten* to the idea of *Lassen* (and *Gelassenheit*) in Heidegger, Ziarek sketches a Heideggerian critique of the metaphysical dimension of Benjamin's "divine violence" while also elaborating the complicated problematic of the role *Walten* plays in Heidegger's beyng-historical thinking.

Surveying the contributions as a whole in this way, it becomes clear that the volume is, to a certain extent, more "about" Benjamin than Heidegger. This is not a failing – it would be petty and misguided to insist on "balance" in such a project – but it is noteworthy, especially since the editors write in the introduction that "the different contributions to this volume do not seek to side with one or the other thinker" (xiv). Certain contributors explicitly *do* "pick sides" – most notably Kordela, Egel, and Ziarek – but even where other contributors don't do so in a straight-forwardly argumentative or polemical sense, one nonetheless notices that enlightening and transformative engagements with Benjamin number higher than such engagements with Heidegger. There are, of course, several novel and important readings of Heidegger here – most obviously Richter, Hodge, Ziarek, and Ferris – but the pattern is nonetheless apparent in reading the volume as a whole.

That, however, simply means that many unexplored possibilities remain open for those willing to enter this volatile conjunction – and necessarily so. I say "necessarily" because the field of possible topics is far too vast for any one volume to cover, though *Sparks Will Fly* covers an impressive area. Accordingly, I'd like to conclude by offering a few possible areas for further research that came to me while reading *Sparks Will Fly*.

First, one could imagine an entire volume dedicated to the different constellations of third parties that connect Benjamin and Heidegger, especially poets. Though the volume dedicates a section to Benjamin and Heidegger's relation to Hölderlin, their relation to Hebel remains to be explored. Both Heidegger and Benjamin note the way Hebel's use of dialect places him in a strange position in regard to "German" literature, yet Heidegger sees in this a disclosure of the link between language and homeland (GA 13: 156), while Benjamin insists that Hebel's brilliance is precisely the cosmopolitanism of his relation to this homeland.[11] One could also imagine a fascinating study of their respective relations to Stefan George and the *George-Kreis*, which Egel mentions but does not unpack.[12] Similarly, the constellation of Heidegger, Benjamin, and Arendt, though it is mentioned in many of the essays, awaits a serious treatment.[13] Finally, beyond particular poets they have in common, it is notable that both Benjamin and Heidegger designate a particular poet as "the poet" – for Heidegger, Hölderlin, for Benjamin, Baudelaire – and see the task of reading them as one of paramount importance for thinking modernity and technology.

Which brings us to the areas beyond these connections, of which I want to briefly mention only two. First, the preoccupation they share with both rethinking history and transforming what it means to think historically. Recall Benjamin's words from the letter from which the title of *Sparks Will Fly* is taken: "it is there [the problem of historical knowledge] that I will find Heidegger on my path and I anticipate certain sparks to fly from the clash between our two modes, so very different, of considering history." While several essays in the volume talk about history – it is nearly impossible to talk about either Benjamin or Heidegger without mentioning history at some point – there remains *much* to be said on the topic. More specifically, to take just one example, the complicated relation between history and theology in both thinkers would be an explosive – if difficult – undertaking. It is not only the concepts of "messianic time" and "divine violence" in Benjamin and of the "last god" or the "flight of the gods" in Heidegger that are at stake, but also, more fundamentally, the aporetic relation of

history to something that exceeds it, something that cannot be reduced to or contained by history itself, even if it also cannot be encountered "outside" of history. As Benjamin writes in the *Arcades Project*: "in remembrance [*Eingedenken*] we have an experience that forbids us to conceive of history as fundamentally atheological, little as it may be granted us to try to write it with immediately theological concepts."[14] Second, and deeply related to the problem of history, is a serious confrontation between Heidegger and Benjamin on the question of *technology*. Both thinkers take technology to be an unavoidable question for the historical present, though in radically different ways. To the extent that Heidegger insists technology is the contemporary "sending" or "destiny" of beyng itself, he also famously argues that the essence of technology is nothing technological, but rather *Ge-stell*. Accordingly, Heidegger insists that the reign of the technological does not *arise* from the invention of certain machines or technological advances, but rather that these advances and inventions are possible only because beyng had already begun to give itself as the measurable, the manipulable, the available (GA 79: 9/8). Benjamin, a historical materialist – however strange a materialist he may be – thinks the rise of technological modernity as a complex intersection of ontological possibility and concrete, material developments like the printing press and the photograph. As he says in the "Work of Art" essay, "The work of art has always been reproducible in principle [*grundsätzlich*]...but technological reproduction is something new."[15] A serious reading of the different ways Heidegger and Benjamin think about technology could proceed not only by way of the historical problem of its "emergence" that I have haphazardly sketched here, but also by attending to the ways each understands the political and social opportunities and dangers technology presents, as well as the ways each understands it in relation to language and the possibilities of poetry. These are, of course, only examples meant to illustrate how deeply the question of technology runs in both thinkers, and to illustrate further how much remains to be said by bringing them into dialogue with each other on this question.

This is only a very limited selection of possible areas of further research. The sparks will continue to fly from this encounter between Benjamin and Heidegger, but thanks to Andrew Benjamin and Dimitris Vardoulakis's *Sparks Will Fly*, not only have we been offered a glimpse into the richness and depth of this field of inquiry, but we now have a group of exemplary essays to stand as proof for just how timely and fruitful this encounter can be.

NOTES

1 Most of the thinkers I have in mind as writing on both Benjamin and Heidegger regularly are those whose works are situated at the intersection of German studies and deconstruction – Alexander García-Düttman, Werner Hamacher, Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe, and Sam Weber, to cite only a few of the most prominent examples. Gerhard Richter, in a footnote to his contribution to the volume, also notes Giorgio Agamben as an example (57n4). In terms of previous work comparing and contrasting the two directly, two articles bear special mention, not least because they are cited by several authors in the current volume. The first is Rebecca Comay's "Framing Redemption: Aura, Origin, Technology in Benjamin and Heidegger," originally published in *Ethics and Danger: Essays on Heidegger and Continental Thought,* ed. Arleen B. Dallery, Charles E. Scott, and P. Holley Roberts (Albany: SUNY,

1992), 139–68; the other is Howard Caygill's "Benjamin, Heidegger, and the Destruction of Tradition," originally published in *Walter Benjamin's Philosophy: Destruction and Experience*, ed. Andrew Benjamin and Peter Osborne (London: Routledge, 1993), 1–31. A. Kiarina Kordela's contribution to *Sparks Will Fly* takes up both of these articles explicitly and develops their insights. For examples of monographs on Benjamin and Heidegger, see Marc Crepon, *Les promesses du langage: Rosenzweig, Benjamin, Heidegger* (Paris: J. Vrin, 2001); Alexander García-Düttman, *The Gift of Language: Memory and Promise in Adorno, Heidegger, Benjamin, and Rosenzweig*, trans. Arline Lyons (London: Athlone, 2000); Mathias Giuliani, *Histoire, langage et art chez Walter Benjamin et Martin Heidegger* (Paris: Klincksiek, 2014); and Charles de Roche, *Monadologie des Gedichts: Benjamin, Heidegger, Celan* (Paderborn: Fink, 2013).

2 Hannah Arendt, "Walter Benjamin," in *Menschen in finsteren Zeiten*, ed. Ursula Ludz (Piper: Munich, 2012), 253.

3 Gerhard Richter points out that Heidegger heard Arendt give a lecture on Benjamin when she returned to Freiburg in 1967, and that Heidegger mentions Benjamin (obliquely) in a letter to her in August of that year: "the day after our meeting, on Friday, July 28th, I found the passage that goes with the Mallarmé quotation in Benjamin," in Hannah Arendt and Martin Heidegger, *Briefe 1925–1975*, 3rd, expanded edition (Frankfurt am Main: Klostermann, 2002), 155f. There is also evidence to suggest, as Richter further points out, that Heidegger had read Benjamin's "The Artwork in the Age of Its Technological Reproducibility." See Burckhardt Lindner, "Das Kunstwerk im Zeitalter seiner technischen Reproduzierbarkeit," in *Benjamin-Handbuch: Leben – Werk – Wirkung*, ed. Burkhardt Lindner (Stuttgart: Metzler, 2006), 240. For a masterful reading of Benjamin's essay in the context of a larger discussion of Heidegger and art, see Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe, *La vrai semblance* (Paris: Galilée, 2005).

4 Walter Benjamin, *Gesammelte Briefe*, ed. Gershom Scholem and Theodor W. Adorno (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1978), 506. The translation quoted here is from Joanna Hodge's contribution to *Sparks Will Fly*, 197.

5 Benjamin, *Gesammelte Briefe*, 513. Quoted in Hodge, 198.

6 Benjamin, *Gesammelte Briefe,* 246. Quoted in Hodge, 197.

7 Walter Benjamin, *Gesammelte Schriften*, ed. Rolf Tiedemann and Herman Schweppenhäuser, vol. 1 (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1991), 207. Hereafter GS.

8 Ilit Ferber, *Philosophy and Melancholy: Benjamin's Early Reflections on Theater and Language* (Stanford: Stanford UP, 2013).

9 See, for example, the claim that "for Heidegger there is the possibility that a moment can occur at which history becomes fully conscious of itself (not unlike Hegel), whereas for Benjamin an unconscious surplus always exceeds any historical consciousness (not unlike Lacan)" (106–7), which is preceded by the sentence, "on the one hand, there is Heidegger's invocation of the subject' at the 'moment of clarity,' in which 'the moment of origin' and that of 'resolute decision' can potentially be realized in history" (106). The claim that Heidegger's thinking of history has anything to do with a self-conscious subject seems to me false on its face and symptomatic of the way Koredela superimposes Lacanian concepts onto Heidegger's text; as Ferber's contribution demonstrates (though one could cite any number of other secondary sources on this topic), one of the fundamental concerns of Heidegger's entire philosophical effort is to resituate thinking beyond or before the subject-object distinction. Dasein is many things, but it is emphatically *not* a subject. This is not to mention that Heidegger's thinking of history is fundamentally committed to a radical notion of *concealment* that is not merely the "not-yet-unconcealed." It could be granted to Kordela that Heidegger's "concealment" is not a thinking of the unconscious, but only on the condition that it is immediately added that the entire paradigm of consciousness and the unconscious is foreign to Heidegger's way of thinking.

One could, of course, imagine a reading that argues that there are residues of subjectivity, consciousness, and self-consciousness in the foundations of Heidegger's thinking of history, but Kordela pursues no such reading here.

10 Schwebel mentions in a footnote at the beginning of the essay that the material is based on a forthcoming monograph, *Walter Benjamin's Monadology*.

11 Walter Benjamin, "Johann Peter Hebel: Zu seinem 100. Todestage," GS, vol. 2, 277. See also, in the same volume, "»El Mayor Monstruo, Los Celos« von Calderon und »Herodes und Marianne« von Hebel: Bemerkungen zum Problem des historischen Dramas," 246–76; "J. P. Hebel: ein Bilderrätsel zum 100. Todestage des Dichters," 280–83; and "Johann Peter Hebel," 635–40.

12 She does, however, refer readers to a dissertation that treats the connection: Sara Jean Ogger, *Secret Hölderlin: The Twentieth-Century Myth of the Poet as Authored by the George Circle, Walter Benjamin, and Martin Heidegger*, Department of Germanic Languages and Literatures at Princeton University (Ann Arbor: UMI Dissertation Services, 2000).

13 One would probably want to start not only with Arendt's introduction to Benjamin's *Illuminations*, but also with the longer version in her essay "Walter Benjamin" in *Menschen in finsteren Zeiten*, which is, coincidentally enough, immediately preceded in that volume by "Martin Heidegger ist achtzig Jahre alt." See Hannah Arendt, *Menschen in finsteren Zeiten*, ed. Ursula Ludz (Piper: Munich, 2012).

14 Walter Benjamin, *Arcades Project*, ed. Rolf Tiedemann, trans. Howard Eiland and Kevin McLaughlin (Cambridge, MA: Harvard, 1999), 471. For the German see GS, vol. 5, 589.

15 GS, vol. 1, 474.

BOOK REVIEW

Gregory Fried and Richard Polt's *After Heidegger?*

Jessica S. Elkayam

Gregory Fried and Richard Polt, eds. *After Heidegger?*
London: Rowman & Littlefield International, 2018. 392 pages.

Gregory Fried and Richard Polt's edited volume *After Heidegger?* is a welcome addition to contemporary Heidegger scholarship. Comprised of thirty-three single-author contributions organized under seven headings, the project covers a good deal of ground. From the impact of the recent publication of the *Black Notebooks* to the developmental trajectory of phenomenology to the event, this undoubtedly ambitious effort speaks to a wide array of issues brought thoughtfully to bear upon a single question: after Heidegger?

As Fried and Polt explain in the "Editors' Introduction," they chose to title the anthology interrogatively on account of a prescribed methodology. That is to say, on the premise that Heidegger's thought is not only thought-provoking, but its philosophical relevance is assured insofar as "philosophy today takes place 'after Heidegger,'" Fried and Polt demand of the contributing authors that they delimit the key questions Heidegger's work poses while critically appropriating rather than

merely reiterating them (xv). To this end, the titular question mark does double duty. It emphasizes response to a common animating question while calling attention to the articulation of those questions each author identifies as most integral to Heidegger's thought.

Foregrounding the question in this way makes plain the extent to which Heidegger informs the prescribed methodology. Lee Braver (Chapter 18), alert to the resonance of the question – *after?* – observes, "part of [Heidegger's] legacy is that he even taught us how to understand how legacies of thought work, how to work out an endowment of thought placed in us, and to work off the debt of gratitude such thoughts place us in" (192). By contrast, Stephen Crowell (Chapter 20) insists, "the question [*after?*] concerns something we must formulate for ourselves, taking Heidegger's narrative as a contribution to a conversation that includes Heidegger but whose terms are not dictated by him" (211).

Though one gesture to the question is gracious and the other austere, taking them together is precisely what Fried and Polt call each contributing author to do. In other words, each author is asked to undertake a critical retrieval (*Wiederholung*), to deploy the very same tools of *Destruktion* Heidegger forged for the history of philosophy in his interpretive appropriations. This time, however, the iron for the proverbial hammer is not the history that predates Heidegger, but the one that includes him. A tenuous balance must be struck, then, between the piety of faithful reading and the critical posture required to steer clear of the disciple's mere reiteration.

Indeed, several contributors concur that a kind of blind discipleship has plagued Heidegger scholarship for some time. Peter E. Gordon (Chapter 4), for example, reports, "even today, [Heidegger's] intellectual legacy seems to impose upon the reader a stark choice: either one assents to the holy script as a faithful disciple or one is branded as an uncompromising heretic" (39). This spirit of wry dissatisfaction is shared by Günter Figal (Chapter 27), who opposes to those who "have followed Heidegger as if his work were a doctrine…[who] have become Heideggerians" those others who, presumably like Figal himself, have shared Heidegger's insights without being subordinate to him (284).

At the opposite end of the spectrum stands a vocal minority often identified with the position of Emmanuel Faye. On the charge of virulent anti-Semitism they hasten to excise Heidegger from the canon. Such detraction in the extreme Lawrence J. Hatab (Chapter 11) characterizes as "long on polemics but very short on philosophical competence" (112), which may account for the seductive salability that Babette Babich (Chapter 9) portrays in decrying the whole "moraline cottage industry whose self-appointed role it is and has been to denounce Heidegger" (88).

The co-existence of these two extremes, i.e., of discipleship and disavowal, sets up an either/or scenario that many contributors recognize as parasitic on the scholarship today. As Bret Davis has it, the choice is between polemical attack and apologetic defense (Chapter 32, 340); either, per Donatella Di Cesare, resentful orphans gate-keep the archive as though it is the property of their idolatrous cult, or ideological anti-Heideggerism rules the day (Chapter 6, 60). Some make this opposition slightly less stark, but nonetheless maintain a dramatic stance. Tom Sheehan (Chapter 5), for one, argues the either/or is embedded within the scholarship, which is *ab intra* under attack for its failure to reach a consensus "regarding what Heidegger's own work was about" (55). Though for Sheehan the real danger lies less in the *ab extra* attack mobilized by the revelation of the *Black Notebooks* than in the way infighting threatens to paint Heidegger scholarship into a corner of "self-congratulatory irrelevance," the "acute crisis" demands immediate, decisive address (55, 54).

However the matter of the crisis is portrayed, none dispute the claim that the *Black Notebooks* exacerbate rather than resolve its structurally consistent either/or. Fried and Polt acknowledge that the recent publication of several volumes of *Black Notebooks* has "exposed some disturbing anti-Jewish views," which makes the matter of critical appropriation "especially pressing" (xv). But as Hatab observes, "graduate students are commonly warned against concentrating on Heidegger's thought," which suggests that the *Black Notebooks* in fact threaten to dissolve justification for continued study of Heidegger.

Bookending the editors' measured reply, Iain Thompson (Chapter 31) speaks to the problem by rejecting apologetics in the same breath as he damns myopic dismissal:

> All of us would-be *post*-Heideggerians have to work through the significance of his deeply troubling Nazism for ourselves…that critical task is new only to those who are new to Heidegger (or who have somehow managed to avoid it by bunkering down in untenable and so increasingly desperate forms of denial)…. [Disentangling the most insightful and troubling aspects of Heidegger's thinking] requires both care and understanding, and so a capacity to tolerate ethical as well as philosophical ambiguity, traditional scholarly skills that seem to be growing rare in these days of one-sided outrage and indignation. (324)

Julia A. Ireland, in an especially erudite contribution to the section "After the *Black Notebooks*" (Chapter 8), cites the trenchancy of the problem, in part, in the "after" itself. She argues that an inappropriately rigid chronological sense of "after" encourages scholars to behave as though something has been decided about what to do with Heidegger in light of his disastrous politics, when in fact, "nothing has been decided" (77). However, even if we follow Heidegger, as in the more productive sense of "after" that Ireland shares with fellow contributing author and sometimes co-translator William McNeill (Chapter 24), "it is disingenuous to pretend that the word 'after' implies a continuity and not a trauma" (77).[1] She develops this notion of trauma through a side-by-side study of Baeumler's racial biologism (which Heidegger explicitly rejected) and Heidegger's own 1934–35 lecture course *Hölderlin's Hymns "Germania" and "The Rhine"* (81). The veiled references to Baeumler in the latter are troubling enough to legitimate shelving a carefully defined Nazi Heidegger, though on the whole Ireland complicates the impulse to disqualify Heidegger as a philosopher *per se*. She wonders "about the imaginative construction of a reader in need of saving from

the act of reading itself and the terrible submission undertaken on her behalf" (77), which is to say that she rejects censorially – perhaps fascistically – doing away with Heidegger altogether.

In a similar spirit, Peter Trawny (Chapter 7) complicates the impulse to save the academy from Heidegger's politics. In the alternative between moral disqualification (associated with Heidegger's critics) and moral belittlement (associated with his apologists), Trawny locates the question of what "we" – the already problematized designation of an academic community – still want to or even should do with Heidegger (71). In a provocative argument that borders on controversial, Trawny insists that while Heidegger's moral failings are "entirely plausible reasons to break off every interest in Heidegger's philosophy," ethics, understood as the God of philosophy, would bring the authentic activity of philosophy – viz., thinking – to a halt (74). Notably, Trawny declares the achievement of such moral desire impossible, however hypocritically it is deployed in the inhumane industry of academic philosophy (and for a particularly apt description of one such hypocrisy as it pertains to misogyny in the academy, see Babette Babich, Chapter 9, 90–91). He emphasizes the temporal continuity of thinking in contrast to the limits a non-philosophical moral judgment seeks to impose, and calls for a thinking that could itself "judge crimes according to moral standards" precisely by philosophizing (75).

The animate tension between moral judgment and the activity of thinking is mirrored in Dennis J. Schmidt's (Chapter 13) relation of thinking to life. Whereas Trawny engages from the angle of the continuity of thinking in spite of the ethical *aporia*, Schmidt argues it is the impasse of thought that opens the space for the ethical: "what one needs to think as one begins is the *constitutive resistance* of that theoretical question to a theoretical, philosophical response. In doing this, one begins to arrive at the point from which something like a sense of responsibility begins" (139).

Where these accounts and several others agree is in the refusal of encampment. The path forward appears to involve taking up the problem oneself, reading for oneself, and cultivating responsibility without deferring the decision to a would-be authority. In the end, the

prescription to resolve the either/or crisis in Heidegger scholarship looks a lot – for better or worse – like Heidegger's own *ēthos* of authenticity.

Given the Heideggerian methodology already in play, this is far from coincidental. An *ēthos* of authenticity – if the phrasing is permitted in fidelity to a reading of Heidegger's *Being and Time* – emerges in response to a time of crisis. But still this says too little, for this *ēthos* is not, as the language of authenticity might suggest, restricted to the "early" Heidegger. The notion that our time is a time of crisis which calls for response and – above all, resolve – permeates the entirety of Heidegger's thinking.

To give flesh not only to the claim, but to the necessity of the thematic emergence of crisis to any close study of Heidegger's thought, we might begin by noting, as several of the contributing authors do, the various crises germane to the happening of being.[2] For instance, Richard Polt (Chapter 17) cites the emergence of the self from

> events of disruption…in which the sense of our own being, and thus of all being, is challenged. We could call these events emergencies – *crises* in which being emerges as a burden. We might even call them traumas, which wound a smoothly untroubled would-be whole and force it to acknowledge its incompleteness. (186, em)

François Raffoul (Chapter 23) describes, citing GA 61, the crisis of life's expropriation, i.e., life's own tendency to fall, its tendency toward ruinance. Thinking, alternatively, runs counter to this tendency, and in so doing, wrestles with the inapparent (244–45). In other words, thinking emerges as (the) essential (activity) in response to the crisis of expropriation, of ruinance. Likewise, William McNeill (Chapter 24) and Miguel de Beistegui (Chapter 26) attend to crisis as both inherent in and resulting from the function of time. For de Beistegui, the "founding event" is displaced from the present because thinking is drawn elsewhere, to a past never present – to the time of the event that founds time – that makes the very history of which our age (the age of metaphysics) is a part (276). He writes:

> And, at this particular point in time, a time of *deep crisis*, our history is out of joint, precisely because it is absolutely cut off from its origin, unable to access the ground from which it sprang, the roots from which it grew. Cut off from its origin, it errs – and this erring takes the form of planetary domination and exploitation. (278, em)

In principle agreeing with de Beistegui, McNeill argues that the event temporalized as the "authentic time of poetizing" (GA 39: 112/102) is, in contrast with the *Augenblick* of *Being and Time*, "never simply present…[and] can only be known in retrospect, only after the event – which is to say, as a trace" (253). Such time, the time that tears (following Hölderlin in GA 39), is the "unthought of the Greek understanding of Being as producedness and presence-at-hand" (260). Moreover, this understanding of being, through a reductive yet consummate interpretation of *technē*, leads to the complete subjection to "technicity, which we are witnessing today" (260). It takes shape in part as the academic valorization of science, which emphasizes knowledge "production" and its attendant metrics to gauge "real world" application (260). In this respect, McNeill's diagnosis accords with Andrew J. Mitchell's (Chapter 29). Mitchell argues that we must acknowledge the promise of the implied "ethical end of any thinking after Heidegger," i.e., we must push back against the crisis of maximization and optimization to detect (the) singularity (of things), and to guard "latitude in our approach to the world" (308).

On the whole, to say that our history is out of joint, that we metaphysically subscribe to an understanding of being (or perhaps of time) that results in so complete a subjection to technicity that it exploits all beings as resource, is to acknowledge that if we follow Heidegger, we cannot help but find ourselves in a time of crisis. Indeed, were Heidegger to have his say, the very project of contemplating what comes "after" (Heidegger) can only begin in a time of crisis. As Gregory Fried (Chapter 2) explains, "Heidegger demands that we recognize we inhabit

a world in crisis, but crisis in the Greek sense of *krisis*, a moment of decision where what the world is and means is at stake" (18).

Tempting though it might be to follow Heidegger – as many do in drawing out the theme of crisis as a diagnostic tool for self-location (the literal sense of *Befindlichkeit*) – we would do a disservice to the diversity of voices in *After Heidegger?* should we overlook those who resist Heidegger on precisely this point. To be sure, such resistance takes numerous possible forms. For some, concession to the crisis of the West as the nihilist consummation of metaphysics is only permitted with stipulations. Daniela Vallega-Neu (Chapter 28), for example, acknowledges that Heidegger's question of being was rooted in

> what he experienced as a historical plight…[though] I (like many Heidegger scholars) am critical with respect to the way Heidegger frames…[it] in terms of a history of being that commences with the Greeks and for which he seeks to prepare another beginning in which the Germans (above all Hölderlin and Heidegger himself) are supposed to play a prominent role. (295)

As an alternative, she proposes unhinging Heidegger's account of Dasein in the 1930s from the history of being (*Seinsgeschichte*) to open the possibility of a plural ontology that "fosters sensitivity to differences without the need to subsume them under common denominators, a way of thinking that responds to and can be responsible to the complexity of the worlds we inhabit" (302).

Others are less forgiving. For Figal, the blind discipleship of the Heideggerians is only encouraged by Heidegger's oversimplified vision of history, and of modernity in particular (284–85). So if we wish to think for ourselves, we would do well to reject Heidegger's resentments and exaggerations in favor of a more phenomenological view (289). Hatab and Crowell broadly concur that phenomenology should serve as the measure of Heidegger's thought, citing Heidegger's political errancy in his departure therefrom. For Hatab, it was Heidegger's subsumption of the details of factical life to the larger goal of "getting

to some fundamental essence that can ground thinking…that made him a very poor political agent – too prone to see National Socialism in grand epochal terms, at the expense of careful attention to its actual practices and implications" (116–17). For Crowell, in recognizing that the politics of the '30s and '40s derive from non-phenomenological commitments, we stand to benefit should we explore "whether elements of [Heidegger's] philosophy are motivated by his politics, perhaps to cover for it, to rationalize it" (212).

John McCumber (Chapter 10) holds perhaps the most dramatic of these positions, portraying the *Seinsgeschichte* as the infected part of Heidegger's philosophy to be surgically excised so as to save the otherwise worthy body for posterity (102). Gordon similarly argues that the *Seinsgeschichte* "interlaced insight with ideology" such that the history of being itself smacks of totalitarian submission (34), while Polt, in examining the concurrence of the *Black Notebooks* with Heidegger's articulation of the history of being, warns that we should take care not to follow Heidegger's critique of modernity too readily. For though Heidegger excoriates National Socialism as an instance of the metaphysics of modernity, this critique is "not accompanied by a moral or political one" (180). Thus fundamentally agreeing with Hatab (above), Polt concludes that Heidegger – despite his critical effort – fails to resist.

Whether it is the crisis in Heidegger scholarship, the crises germane to the happening of being, or the crisis the history of being presents to the curator of Heidegger's future corpus, the continual re-emergence of crisis throughout *After Heidegger?* is not only not coincidental, it is necessary to any assemblage of close readings that attempt to gauge the stakes of Heidegger's thought. To this end, the anthology is an uncontested success. It delivers to the interested reader who wishes to selectively sample the issues as they confront scholarship today a variety of viewpoints rendered in short form, thereby avoiding the common grievance that readings of Heidegger rely too heavily on jargon and intra-corporeal reference.

In closing, I have but one criticism. *After Heidegger?* is the sixth edited collection issued by Rowman & Littlefield International's relatively

young series New Heidegger Research, likewise edited by Fried and Polt. To their credit, they make explicit in the "Editors' Introduction" that they "invited the members of [the] editorial board to write brief essays on what remains philosophically relevant and provocative in Heidegger's work now" (xv). They continue,

> Most members of the board were able to accept our invitation, and we were also able to include a few other voices from the diverse world of Heidegger research… [allowing] readers to discover a wealth of interpretive issues and lines of thought that a variety of successful scholars consider important (xv-xvi).

In a time when the future of Heidegger scholarship is under siege, to pose the question – *after Heidegger?* – so restrictively does not serve the effort well. Arguably Heidegger's voluminous writings demand a careful assessment, indeed one that has not only invested considerable time and energy in its findings, but can also, as Fried himself insists, stand the test of self-articulation (Chapter 2, 11). Though these stipulations tax young scholars most gravely, they likely motivated the editors' choice. Put simply, it is no easy accomplishment to speak from a place of authority as to where Heidegger's "thought leaves philosophy today, over forty years after his death" (xvi).

That said, it would be refreshing to encounter, perhaps as a second volume inclusive of blind, peer-reviewed junior scholarship, a work custom tailored to the address of Heidegger's legacy vis-à-vis the critical turn in contemporary continental philosophy toward feminist, racial, decolonial, and disability concerns (to name a few). This would offer a fresh perspective on the viability of Heidegger's thought for the next generation – taking seriously not only the veritable desert of new positions seeking Heidegger scholars to be filled, but also the troublesome insularity of the Heideggerian community. *After Heidegger?* thoroughly and carefully articulates the current challenges of being a Heidegger scholar, but perhaps the time has come to speak to those of *becoming* one.

NOTES

1 See in particular McNeill's suspicion of the chronological "after" on the grounds of its complicity with the age of technicity, when "we are constantly oriented toward what comes next, toward the next newest thing, product, or thinking, all in the naïve belief that what comes next will constitute some form of progress over what has gone before" (260–61). Thus, he concludes, we "do not come after Heidegger, but remain well before him" (261).

2 This argument owes a debt of gratitude to Charles Bambach's *Heidegger, Dilthey, and the Crisis of Historicism* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1995).

BOOK REVIEW

Lawrence Hatab's *Proto-Phenomenology and the Nature of Language: Dwelling in Speech 1*

Daniel O. Dahlstrom

Lawrence J. Hatab, *Proto-Phenomenology and the Nature of Language: Dwelling in Speech 1*. London: Rowman & Littlefield International, 2017. 274 pages.

Larry Hatab's *Proto-Phenomenology and the Nature of Language: Dwelling in Speech 1* ventures boldly and often brilliantly into pressing contemporary debates in ways that repeatedly demonstrate the promise of Heidegger's phenomenology. To be sure, this *Leistung* is possible only for someone who, like Hatab, has found his own unmistakable voice even when singing in the same key as Heidegger and has generously taken the trouble to listen diligently to quite different voices as well. The result is a model of clarity, probing acuity, and immense scholarship; every page of this adventure in thinking communicates the virtues of a thinker – searching, honest, and intrepid. There are two parts to the following remarks. In the first part I sketch the book's

contents, chapter by chapter.[1] The second part casts a critical eye on various moves and treatments.

I. ANALYSIS

Chapter One: Proto-Phenomenology and the Lived World. Following a table-setting introduction, the book commences by unpacking "the basic features of dwelling in the lived world" (4). Hatab understands this dwelling to be a pre-reflective experience that is ecstatic, i.e., an experience of standing out in the world and being immersed in it. Aping Heidegger's early analysis of worldhood, he elaborates the personal, environing, and social worlds. In each respect, engaged immersion is distinct from disengaged exposition, the former including degrees of circumspection and capaciousness. While Hatab countenances a bi-directionality between immersion and exposition (as in cases of "second nature"), he also charts a typical route from immersion to exposition by way of a contravention or disturbance (echoing SZ §16) that makes intentions and external conditions explicit. Exposition, not immersion, reveals, he submits, something akin to a subject-object transaction that can result in reification. There are, to be sure, degrees of immersion and exposition, allowing for the difference between the factical reflection of everyday exposition and philosophical reflection. With this basic account in place, he a) identifies the sense of consciousness applicable to the experiences in question, b) distinguishes his approach from representational models, and c) addresses, among other things, contemporary debates about know-how and the status of meaning and value. He rounds out the chapter with sections devoted to the social world ("the social structure of selfhood") and how pre-reflective experience is projected and projecting, fundamentally temporal and embodied.

Chapter Two: Disclosure, Interpretation and Philosophy. In this chapter, the theme of disclosure takes center stage. Hatab examines affective attunement, tacit intimation, interpretation, and philosophy as four modes of disclosure, i.e., "ways in which we engage and comprehend what the world is like and how it manifests itself" (73). In addition to revisiting exposition's scope and importance, Hatab negotiates its thorny relationship to interpretation and phenomenology. In the

chapter's concluding segments, he discusses the import of phenomenology both for cognitive science and for philosophical exposition.

Chapter Three: Proto-Phenomenology and Language. While the first two chapters are devoted to explaining what proto-phenomenology is, the third chapter turns to "the most important component of the lived world and its meaningfulness: language" (109). Language is our "window to the world," enjoying a certain phenomenological priority because it first presents the world. Yet it does so without "producing" the world or "creating" meaningful experience (119f). Instead language emerges from and with the lived world. Having made this point, he elaborates how language, as the articulation of the disclosure of the lived world, recapitulates the proto-phenomenology set forth in Chapter One. Our lives are fully engaged in a "speech-world," an "ecstatic dwelling" where the bi-directional dynamics of immersion, contravention, and exposition take shape in language (121). Language inhabits and encompasses a "disclosive field," triangulated across "the individual-social-environing world," doing so, not timelessly, but with its own distinctive "temporal-historical structure" (125–26, 129) and a distinctive embodiment in gestures and sounds; the "immediate *presentation* of meanings" in language, so construed, is the precondition of representational accounts (130).

Having shown how language thus "reiterates" the proto-phenomenology outlined earlier, Hatab introduces his conception of language's "differential fitness," a remarkably apt notion designed to capture the malleable, pre-representational fit of speech and world to one another. This fit extends to the way that language is an instance of nature "intertwining" with culture, thereby accounting for the fact that language, fitted as it is to the "lived world," is at once both conventional and cross-cultural (142–43). In the rest of the chapter Hatab does a remarkable job of situating his phenomenological account in the context of questions of several different approaches to language. He discusses, for example, the 20th-century development of ordinary language philosophy and pragmatics; he addresses the dubiousness of controversy over the relative priority of language to thought or vice versa – dubious because

language and thought are inseparable in the "lived world" and because thinking is an "internalization of speech" (147, 149–50). He also makes a powerful case for a proto-phenomenology's capacity not only to expose "representational biases" (156) common to both constitutive/nativist and communicative/relativist models of language, but also to negotiate the seemingly contrary insights underlying the split between them. He demonstrates how over-reliance upon representational and expositional models of language fails to keep up with the immersive, triangulated experience of language and its disclosive field (to the detriment of many questions of interpretation, e.g., the interpretation of feral children).

The chapter ends with accounts of language's relation to artificial intelligence and evolution. Expanding Searle's Chinese room argument to features identified in the proto-phenomenology of language, he contends that the "existential significance" of the reciprocal reach of the speech-world coincides with a "felt awareness of embodied jointure" not found in computers (161). So, too, for a computer "to count as a world-dwelling phenomenon, it would have to *care*" (161). After noting how extensively evolutionary and proto-phenomenological approaches might complement one another, Hatab argues that proto-phenomenology nonetheless underscores the irreducibility of culture – including language and the human world – to naturalist reductions, genetic or otherwise.

Chapter Four: Language and Truth. Hatab distinguishes "presentational" and "representational" truth, the former standing for some appropriate disclosure, the latter for a correspondence relation between a statement and a state of affairs. This phenomenological approach to truth looks to how truth functions in the lived world, taking on different forms in different interpretive settings. The upshot is a "pluralistic conception of truth," albeit one allegedly consistent with an expanded sense of objectivity and a modest form of realism ("phenomenological realism") (189–90). As a means of establishing how such a conception works, Hatab outlines six "inhabitive truth conditions" (responsiveness, reliability, workability, agreement, consociation, and sense), i.e., measures of dwelling differently in the lived world, in no way restricted to

"rational adjudication" (192). While truth differs contextually, e.g., from the context of physical causation to one of experienced meanings, these truth conditions "are meant to intercept a relativistic interpretation of interpretation" (207). Still, he also concedes that an argument for a baseline interpretation, like his own, at some point gives out in favor of dispositions, "existential orientations that are not usually susceptible to debate or persuasion" (208). The remainder of the chapter is devoted to elaborating this pluralistic yet contextually objective conception of truth in regard to questions of rationality, ethics, the nature of philosophy, and mind-body dualism.

II. CRITICAL REMARKS

As the foregoing gloss hopefully conveys, Larry Hatab's book is a *tour de force*, ranging over key philosophical issues with remarkable carefulness and keenness. At the risk of doing further injustice, I raise some issues that might warrant critical discussion.

A. WHERE IS LARRY? THE MISSING INDEXICAL (OR PERSONAL WORLD)

The personal world, we are told, pertains to "what it is to like to live in the world, expressed in first-person language" (22). The proposed proto-phenomenology accordingly needs to "add 'what it is like *for me*' to experience something" (23). Yet this discussion is quite brief – indeed, brief to a fault, I suspect, since it is unclear what the addition "for me" exactly means or entails. One looks in vain for much discussion of what an experience is like for Hatab – and presumably, rightly so, since otherwise it would be biographical. But then it's unclear what precisely the indexical adds. To be sure, Hatab tells us several things that it is not (e.g., "by no means a restriction to…something distinct from the wider world"; "not merely a matter of introspective mental states") as a prelude to claiming that it is "rather ecstatic immersion in *fields* of action" and thus "inextricably caught up in the environing-world and social-world" (23). But how are these claims helpful in telling us what the personal world is?

B. AN ESSENCE BY ANY OTHER NAME AND NON-FORMAL INDICATIONS

Hatab supposes that his account of the nature of language is not essentialist. Yet claims that language appeals to some "invariant capacity" and that "the fitness of language as a mode of dwelling is universal across cultures" (142) have all the look of essentialist claims. The claim that both essentialism and anti-essentialism "miss" crucial aspects of language (i.e., differentiality and fitness, respectively) seems to suppose a more accurate conception of what language is (something that is traditionally deemed "essence"). The meaning of "essence" is obviously crucial here, but since Hatab names no names, it's hard to avoid the conclusion that his talk of "essentialism" is a straw man.[2]

A cognate issue surfaces in the employment of "indicative concepts," ostensibly to act like Heidegger's "formal indications." But Heidegger himself is no more allergic to talk of formality than he is to talk of essences. His characterization of these indications as "formal" is meant to signal that the activities signaled by them are not tied to any biography or concrete, historical instances.

C. HABITS, KNOW-HOW, AND ACTING UNAWARES

Suppose we agree – and who wouldn't? – that there's something to riding a bike that is different from descriptions of the objects and conditions, actions and surroundings that typically attend it. The pre-thematic experience is different from thematizations of the experience and its contents. We ride the bike without thinking of the bike, the pedals, the wheels, the placement of our limbs, the ground beneath us, the passing environs, often even the goal of riding. Nevertheless, the phenomenological account thematizes the pre-thematic experience, yielding what the early Heidegger regarded as non-reifying objectifications. To this extent, there is a patent parallel with attempts to explain the experience through a kind of reverse engineering, identifying unconscious representations and inferences that motivate and constitute it. Yet, while granting their appeal, Hatab objects that "the question remains whether the terms of such analysis are necessary for, or always operational in, the practice as such" (29). But this objection seems

unwarranted because misdirected. There can be no question of the necessity or operationality of the terms of the analysis since the analysis makes no pretension of the presence, *in the experience*, of what those terms stand for or, more to the point, of their being part of the experience. In this regard, the appeal to unexperienced features to explain experiences is arguably analogous for the phenomenologist as for the neuroscientist.[3]

D. EXPLANATORY GAPS AND HAVING IT BOTH WAYS

Appeals to unconscious mechanisms are, Hatab tells us, "phenomenologically suspect" (29) and "unconscious representation [is] hard to fathom phenomenologically" (33). But why? The reason has to be that there is something about the pre-thematic experience that is conscious (a "wakeful awareness," as Hatab dubs it) and retrievable (in "reflexive awareness") (31f–32. In a similar vein, Hatab relates that proto-phenomenology is "a kind of exposition, a reflective bearing on the pre-reflective lived world and presumably an enhancement of understanding" (79). Two problems – one peculiar to Hatab's account, the other a long-recognized challenge facing the phenomenologist (one Husserl saw squarely) – surface here. The problems are related, raising in slightly different ways the issue of an explanatory gap between experience and phenomenological reflection. First, how does talk about wakeful awareness square with countenancing the claim, supposedly supported by neurological evidence, that consciousness emerges from contravention (37)? (Do contraventions then go all the way down and, if so, what could that possibly mean?) Second, how is the experience retrieved (reflected) or, better, what does it mean to speak of "retrieval" (or "reflection") if phenomenology necessarily thematizes the pre-thematic?[4] How would we know that the supposed reflection is not a construction or projection and, even if we could establish its authenticity, how would we justify the presumption that it constitutes an enhancement? These questions become particularly pressing when philosophy is said to have "an *internal* warrant" and to "exposit its own generative environment" when "attending to the lived world" (108).

The distinction between ecstatic immersion and disengaged exposition, we are told, does not deny the latter but points to the primacy of the former. Citing the example of hearing that your child was in an accident, Hatab advises that "it is important to maintain phenomenological discipline and be faithful to such experiences *as* experienced in life, rather than as examples of 'propositions'" (130). Such advice, sagacious as it is, leaves us with the question of the relation of the presentational to the representational levels. Here, too, proto-phenomenology seems to leave us with another sort of explanatory gap. Can the presentations (immersions) provide a warrant for the representations (expositions) without taking the form of the latter? If so, how does this happen? If not, doesn't this demonstrate the promise of representational properties all the way down?

It is certainly possible that such questions are speculative and idle, that they cannot be answered in general terms. That seems like a reasonable riposte. But then I'd like to see specific examples of how the gap is removed or why talk of it is out of place. The presence of this gap may explain what seems like an attempt at times to have it both ways, decrying a differentiation of subject and object in ecstatic dwelling (in immersion) on the one hand, while insisting on it (in exposition) on the other – all the while supposing, presumably, that acknowledgment of an insurmountable "circularity" suffices to defuse the issue.

E. THE MYTH OF THE LIVED WORLD

Contrary to the fact-value/is-ought divide of much modern thinking, the contention of Hatab's proto-phenomenology is that "we *dwell* in a meaningful world" and, indeed, meaningful in a way that is both pre-objective and pre-subjective (42). Hatab asserts that the global meaninglessness (in Weber's memorable phrase, the "disenchantment of nature") does not entail existential meaninglessness. While they seem to be simply assertions, they are telling, even personal expressions of the author (we found Larry!). They also capture a general and generally attractive sentiment. However, they also may be symptomatic of a questionable tendency of supposing a world and our pre-reflective

experience of dwelling in it that is mythical because it is demythologized (call it the "secular myth" entailing the question "whose world?"). In this regard, his assertion that existential meaning is not eclipsed by global meaninglessness is symptomatic since it is hardly a common sentiment, historically or across cultures. Hatab's proto-phenomenology – like much of Husserl's and Heidegger's phenomenologies – appears at times to presume that the structures of the given world, i.e., the lived world, can be described in abstraction from historical and ethnological, political and cultural, artistic and religious dimensions without detriment to the accuracy of the descriptions. One might argue that Hatab's proto-phenomenology can explain the lived world of the Evangelical who voted for Trump no less than that of the feminist who did not – but that therein lies the problem, that such an approach gets matters backward. The fact that Hatab sees as the target of proto-phenomenological critique a presumption that "the first world in the background of philosophy must be reformed…according to foreground reflective principles" further raises the suspicion that a certain mythical status is attributed to that "first world" (108).

F. CONDITIONS AND CONDITIONS: WHAT DOES IT MEAN?

Two distinct claims are arguably being advanced regarding the relation between language and meaning. There is the *strong* claim that is a necessary condition for the disclosure of the world's meaningfulness, "language does not produce the world but it has a certain priority in being the window to the world, without which the meaningfulness of the world would not open up" (119). Even to experience something for which we say "there are no words to describe it" is to say something meaningful about it; as language-speakers we are supposedly disposed to "prepare the meaningful engagement of…nonverbal experiences" (119). But then there is the *weaker* claim that language is not necessary, it does not "*create* meaningful experience," it "emerges *in the midst of* an enacted, embodied milieu" (120). The environing world is the source of constraints on what we can say; Hatab seems to endorse this point when he later observes that "speech emerges *out of* natural ecological

milieus and embodied practices" and that "infants and animals do exhibit the practical attitude of capacious know-how that is different from language per se" (149).

I have probably mischaracterized the point of these comments but, as it stands, the apparent presence of both claims is puzzling. Indeed, even if the strong claim is intended, i.e., even if language is a necessary condition, why should it be assigned "phenomenological priority"? There are many necessary conditions for world-disclosure, e.g., a certain affectivity, certain projects, certain activities, so it is far from clear why it should be assigned a priority. Nor, to speak for the weaker claim, is it obvious that it is a necessary condition. Consider someone hiking through the woods, looking for a place with the least underbrush. In what sense is language a necessary condition of the meaningfulness of that experience? Is there any reason to think that the person has to say something to herself or even have to be able to say something to herself in order to perform the act meaningfully?[5] To be sure, she may be able to express the experience verbally, as I have just done, but that ability is not intrinsic or even in any obvious way inherent to the meaningfulness of the experience (and presumably whether or not she has at one time learned how to express the experience in language). So, too, she may – as a matter of fact – have been verbally instructed to "avoid thickets," but the fact that verbal instruction of this sort took place is hardly essential to the meaningfulness of the experience. In other words, even without such instruction and some hidden memory of it, – indeed, even without learning a language – the experience is meaningful. Hatab is obviously aware of these considerations; they underwrite the weak claim above. But then I am left wondering about the status of the "phenomenological priority" that he assigns to language.

G. QUID EST VERUM?

In Chapter Four Hatab gives us a contrast between presentational and representational truth as well as a set of conditions of truth, but he never tells us directly what truth is. In that chapter, after contrasting presentational truth with representational truth, he simply uses the term "truth," leaving the reader wondering which sense of "truth"

he has in mind in this or that sentence. As he makes his plea for a phenomenological approach to how truth functions existentially in the lived world, he states that truth "must" do this, "cannot" be such-and-such, that it "should not be taken" in a certain manner (187). However, leaving aside the question of the justification of these modal necessities, we are given these directives without an elaboration of what "truth" (appropriate disclosure?) means here. But since he wants truth to be both "one and many," as he puts it, he needs to tell us not only what the different sorts of truth are and what its common conditions are, but what truth is.

To be sure, on the opening pages of Chapter Four, Hatab draws on the relations between truth and trust. The terms, he reminds us, are etymologically connected; more importantly, presentational truth is said to "involve" (a word dripping with ambiguity) a disclosiveness that marks human discourse in the manner of trust. He speaks of "default trust in truth," a "deep background" of the same, "veridical trust," and "aligning trust with presentational truth" (184). But in addition to failing to make any headway on the question of what truth is, these considerations fail to illuminate the relation between truth and trust. Perhaps at best we learn that truth is something on which, in everyday experience, we rely; but that is at best a characterization of truth (or, as he calls it, a condition) and fails to explain why it has that characteristic.

Am I asking for too much? Or, better, am I missing the point? Hasn't Hatab made the case that truth just is said in many ways and any attempt to say what it is falls prey to the old "What is x?"-type questions so powerfully debunked by Wittgenstein and his cohorts? Yet, as Wittgenstein's appeal to family resemblances demonstrates, these inter-contextual differences of meaning, far from lacking similarities or identities, depend upon an array of them. Just as *pros hen* is arguably not equivocation but analogy, we can make sense of how a term retains its meaning or a semblance of its meaning across contexts, but we can do so only by identifying similarities. Failing that, I don't see how Hatab can have his cake (objectivity, authority, realism, etc.) and eat it (pluralism), too.

H. A PARTING SHOT AND CONCLUSION

As noted above, Hatab introduces the extraordinarily helpful notion of differential fitness into his account of language. His account and deployment of the notion are illuminating, but I am not persuaded by his claim that "the fitness of language must have a certain priority," that the differential aspect is secondary to it (139–40). The argument for this claim strikes me as too quick – or perhaps I struggle once again with his use of the term "priority". In any case, there are reasons to think that fitness and difference may be in every respect reciprocal.[6]

In conclusion, allow me to iterate how valuable I find Hatab's book and how grateful I am to him for writing it. He shows us how to think "after" Heidegger, to draw on what is compelling in his writings, all the while incorporating it into a way of philosophizing that is as powerful and innovative as it is timely and well-conceived. The first volume of *Proto-Phenomenology and the Nature of Language* has set an example of the generosity, clarity, honesty, and – above all – the nerve it takes to think like a philosopher.

NOTES

1 The review omits discussion of the final chapter, a tease of what's to come in volume 2: *Language Acquisition, Orality, and Literacy*.

2 It is perhaps curious for a work designated "proto-phenomenology" to run away from talk of essences, since such talk is a birthright of phenomenology – Heidegger's existential phenomenology no less than Husserl's transcendental phenomenology.

3 Yet it is, to be sure, only analogous since phenomenologists (like Husserl or Heidegger) would attend to the hidden or veiled but operative senses and horizons of the experience.

4 Given Hatab's gloss on representation and emphasis on the "presentational character" of immersed practices, the absence of Brentano's and Husserl's notions of "presentation" (*Vorstellung*) in contrast to "representation" (*Representation*) is puzzling.

5 Again, appeals to phenomena like joint attention and social interaction to explain language acquisition (125) seem to reinforce the point that meanings are, in some respects, and at some levels, a condition for language rather than vice versa.

6 Since this last paragraph is a "parting shot," another worry can be mentioned in that impudent spirit, namely, that the priority of fitness can be echoing a myth of the *given* world (and all that that may entail).

TEXTS OF HEIDEGGER CITED AND ABBREVIATIONS USED

References to the works of Martin Heidegger are provided parenthetically in the text by the volume of *Gesamtausgabe* (Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1975–, abbreviated "GA"), followed by the German pagination, a slash, and the English pagination of published translations where extant. The relevant translations are listed following the information for the corresponding GA volume. There is one exception to this practice. No references to the pages of English translations are provided in the case of *Being and Time* (GA 2); instead the GA pagination is followed by "SZ," referring to the single edition, re-issued several times: *Sein und Zeit*, 11th ed. (Tübingen: Max Niemeyer Verlag, 1967), since the pagination of SZ is contained in all three of the English translations of *Sein und Zeit*. Modifications to published translations are noted by "tm," modifications to emphasis by "em."

FROM THE *GESAMTAUSGABE*

GA 2 *Sein und Zeit*. Ed. Friedrich-Wilhelm von Herrmann. 1977. English translation: *Being and Time*. Trans. Joan Stambaugh, rev. Dennis J. Schmidt. Albany: State University of New York Press, 2010; trans. John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson. New York: Harper & Row, 1962.

GA 5 *Holzwege*. 7th ed. Ed. Friedrich-Wilhelm von Herrmann. 1994. English translation: *Off the Beaten Track*. Ed. and trans. Julian Young and Kenneth Haynes. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002.

GA 6.1 *Nietzsche I*. Ed. Brigitte Schillbach. 1996.

GA 7 *Vorträge und Aufsätze*. Ed. Friedrich-Wilhelm von Herrmann. 2000.

GA 8 *Was Heißt Denken?* Ed. Paolo-Ludovika Coriando. 2002. English translation: *What Is Called Thinking?* Trans. Fred D. Wieck and J. Glenn Gray. New York: Harper & Row, 1968.

GA 9 *Wegmarken*. 3rd ed. Ed. Friedrich-Wilhelm von Herrmann. 1996. English translation: *Pathmarks*. Ed. William McNeill. Various trans. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998.

GA 11 *Identität und Differenz*. Ed. Friedrich-Wilhelm von Herrmann. 2006. English translation: *Identity and Difference*. Trans. Joan Stambaugh. Chicago: Univeristy of Chicago Press, 2002.

GA 12 *Unterwegs zur Sprache*. Ed. Friedrich-Wilhelm von Herrmann. 1985.

GA 13 *Aus der Erfahrung des Denkens*. Ed. Hermann Heidegger. 1983.

GA 14 *Zur Sache des Denkens*. Ed. Hermann Heidegger. 2007. English translation: *On Time and Being*. Trans. Joan Stambaugh. New York: Harper & Row, 1972.

GA 15 *Seminare*. Ed. Curd Ochwadt. 1986.

GA 16 *Reden und andere Zeugnisse eines Lebensweges*. Ed. Hermann Heidegger. 2000.

GA 19 *Platon: Sophistes*. Ed. Ingeborg Schüßler. 1992. English translation: *Plato's "Sophist."* Trans. Richard Rojcewicz and André Schuwer. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1997.

GA 22 *Grundbegriffe der antiken Philosophie*. Ed. Franz-Karl Blust. 1993. English translation: *Basic Concepts of Ancient Philosophy*. Trans. Richard Rojcewicz. Bloomington: Indiana University Press. 2008.

GA 24 *Die Grundprobleme der Phänomenologie*. 2nd ed. Ed. Friedrich-Wilhelm von Herrmann. 1989. English translation: *The Basic Problems of Phenomenology*. Revised ed. Trans. Albert Hofstadter. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1982.

GA 33 Aristoteles, *Metaphysik Θ 1–3. Von Wesen und Wirklichkeit der Kraft*. 3rd ed. Ed. Heinrich Hüni. 2006. English translation: *Aristotle's "Metaphysics" Θ 1–3: On the Essence and Actuality of Force*. Trans. Walter Brogan and Peter Warnek. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1995.

GA 38 *Logik als die Frage nach dem Wesen der Sprache*. Ed. Günter Seubold. 1998. English translation: *Logic as the Question Concerning the Essence of Language*. Trans. Wanda Torres Gregory and Yvonne Unna. Albany: SUNY Press, 2009.

GA 39 *Hölderlins Hymnen "Germanien" und "Der Rhein."* 2nd ed. Ed. Susanne Ziegler. 1989. English Translation: *Hölderlin's Hymns "Germania" and "The Rhine."* Trans. William McNeill and Julia Ireland. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2014.

GA 40 *Einführung in die Metaphysik.* Ed. Petra Jaeger. 1983. English translation: *Introduction to Metaphysics.* 2nd ed. Trans. Gregory Fried and Richard Polt. New Haven: Yale University Press, 2014.

GA 44 *Nietzsches metaphysische Grundstellung im abendländischen Denken: Die ewige Wiederkehr des Gleichen.* Ed. Marion Heinz. 1986.

GA 45 *Grundfragen der Philosophie: Ausgewählte "Probleme" der "Logik."* 1992. English translation: *Basic Questions of Philosophy: Selected "Problems" of "Logic."* Trans. Richard Rojcewicz and André Schuwer. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1994.

GA 53 *Hölderlins Hymne "Der Ister."* Ed. Walter Biemel. 1984. English translation: *Hölderlin's Hymn "The Ister."* Trans. William McNeill and Julia Davis. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1996.

GA 54 *Parmenides.* 2nd Edition. Ed. Manfred S. Frings. 1992. English translation: *Parmenides.* Trans. André Schuwer and Richard Rojcewicz. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1992.

GA 56/57 *Zur Bestimmung der Philosophie.* 2nd ed. Ed. Bernd Heimbüchel. 1999. English translation: *Towards the Definition of Philosophy.* Trans. Ted Sadler. New York: Continuum, 2008.

GA 59 *Phänomenologie der Anschauung und des Ausdrucks. Theorie der philosophischen Begriffsbildung.* Ed. Claudius Strube. 1993. English translation: *Phenomenology of Intuition and Expression.* Trans. Tracy Colony. New York: Continuum, 2010.

GA 61 *Phänomenologische Interpretationen zu Aristoteles. Einführung in die phänomenologische Forschung*. 2nd ed. Ed. Walter Bröcker and Käte Bröcker-Oltmanns. 1994. English translation: Phenomenological Interpretations of Aristotle: Initiation Into Phenomenological Research. Trans. Richard Rojcewicz. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2001.

GA 62 *Phänomenologische Interpretationen ausgewählter Abhandlungen des Aristoteles zu Ontologie und Logik*. Ed. Günther Neumann. 2005.

GA 65 *Beiträge zur Philosophie (Vom Ereignis)*. 2nd ed. Ed. Friedrich-Wilhelm von Herrmann. 1994. English translation: *Contributions to Philosophy (Of the Event)*. Trans. Richard Rojcewicz and Daniela Vallega-Neu. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2012.

GA 67 *Die Überwindung der Metaphysik*. Ed. Hans-Joachim Friedrich. 1999.

GA 79 *Bremer und Freiburger Vorträge*. Ed. Petra Jaeger. 1994. English translation: *Bremen and Freiburg Lectures: Insight Into That Which Is and Basic Principles of Thinking*. Trans. Andrew J. Mitchell. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2012.

GA 89 *Zollikoner Seminare*. Ed. Peter Trawny. 2018.

GA 90 *Zu Ernst Jünger*. Ed. Peter Trawny. 2004.

GA 97 *Anmerkungen* I–V *(Schwarze Hefte 1942–1948)*. Ed. Peter Trawny. 2015.

FROM OTHER ENGLISH TRANSLATIONS

DT *Discourse On Thinking*. Trans. John M. Anderson and E. Hans Freund, New York, Harper & Row, 1966.

EGT *Early Greek Thinking: The Dawn of Western Philosophy*. Trans. David Farrell Krell and Frank A. Capuzzi. New York: Harper & Row, Publishers, 1975.

EP *The End of Philosophy*. Ed. and trans. Joan Stambaugh. New York: Harper and Row, 1973.

FS *Four Seminars*. Trans. Andrew Mitchell and François Raffoul. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2003.

HMT *Heidegger: The Man and the Thinker*. Ed. and trans. Thomas Sheehan. New York: Routledge, 2017.

ID *Identity and Difference*. Trans. Joan Stambaugh. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2002.

N2 *Nietzsche*, vol. 2: *The Eternal Recurrence of the Same*. Ed. and trans. David Farrell Krell, San Francisco: Harper, 1991.

N3 *Nietzsche*, vol. 3: *The Will to Power as Knowledge and as Metaphysics*. Ed. and trans. Joan Stambaugh, David Farrell Krell, and Frank A. Capuzzi. San Francisco: Harper, 1991.

OWL *On the Way to Language*. Trans. Peter D. Hertz. New York: Harper & Row, Publishers, 1971.

PLT *Poetry, Language, Thought*. Ed. and trans. Albert Hofstadter. New York: Harper & Row, 2001.

QCT *The Question Concerning Technology and Other Essays*. Ed and trans. William Lovitt. New York: Harper & Row, 1977.

SUP *Supplements: From the Earliest Essays to "Being and Time" and Beyond*. Ed. John van Buren. Albany: State University of New York Press, 2002.

ZS *Zollikon Seminars: Protocols—Conversations—Letters*. Ed. Medard Boss. Trans. Franz Mayr and Richard Askay. Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 2001.