

FROM THE ARCHIVES

William Richardson's
Questions for Martin Heidegger's "Preface"

William J. Richardson

Edited, translated, and with a commentary by

Richard Capobianco &

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AUS DEN ARCHIVEN: WILLIAM J. RICHARDSONS FRAGEN AN MARTIN HEIDEGGER FÜR DESSEN "VORWORT" [1. MÄRZ 1962]

Da Sie, sehr geehrter Herr Professor, mich gebeten haben, Ihnen aus der geschilderten Situation in den Vereinigten Staaten heraus einige Hinweise für ihre Eingangsworte zu geben, möchte ich mir anschließend erlauben, einige Vorschläge zu machen.

A. Möglicherweise hängt das tiefste Mißverständnis Ihres Weges in Amerika damit zusammen, daß man den Sinn der "Kehre" von Heidegger I zu Heidegger II nicht versteht – und das vielleicht gerade deshalb, weil man den Sinn des Weges von Heidegger I nicht sehen will. Von daher wäre es vielleicht nützlich, wenn Sie einige weitere Angaben über die ersten Schritte Ihres Weges machen könnten, um auch so noch einmal deutlich werden zu lassen, daß es Ihnen seit Ihren Anfängen nie um eine philosophische Anthropologie ging. So haben Sie zum Beispiel ja schon geschrieben, daß die Frage nach dem Sinn von Sein Sie zunächst in der Gestalt der Dissertation von Brentano 1907 traf (*Unterwegs zur Sprache*, s. 92). Könnten Sie nun vielleicht dieser Erfahrung noch weiter nachgehen?

Sofern ich Sie recht verstanden habe, hatten Sie mir in unserem Gespräch diese frühe Erfahrung in folgende Elemente auseinandergelegt:

1. Was ist der Grund (Sinn) des "ist," das jedes Seiende zum Seienden macht; d.h.: was ist der Sinn des Seins?
2. Diese Frage wurde von Aristoteles nicht beantwortet, ja sogar nicht einmal gestellt. In eins mit der Erfahrung der Frage nach dem Sinn von Sein, erfuhren Sie also auch die Seinsvergessenheit.
3. Sein (*einai*) bedeutete für die Griechen Anwesen, Gegenwart, Präsenz – also wurde Sein durch Zeit bestimmt. Damit entstand die Frage: wie kann Sein überhaupt durch Zeit bestimmt werden? Noch Aristoteles hatte die Zeit ja umgekehrt gedacht als bestimmt durch Sein: damit gab es aber bisher gar keine Möglichkeit, diese neue Frage zu stellen.

**FROM THE ARCHIVES: WILLIAM J. RICHARDSON'S QUESTIONS FOR
MARTIN HEIDEGGER'S "PREFACE" [1 MARCH 1962]**

Since you, most esteemed professor, have asked me to provide you with a few indications for your introductory words on the basis of the situation in the United States that I have described, I would like to take the liberty of following up on this with a few suggestions.

A. The deepest misunderstanding of your path in America is possibly connected to the fact that one does not understand the sense of the "turn" from Heidegger I to Heidegger II – and this is so perhaps precisely because one does not want to see the sense of the path of Heidegger I.¹ Accordingly, it would perhaps be useful if you could provide further information regarding the first steps of your path, in order also to make clear once again that what is at issue for you, from the outset, has never been a philosophical anthropology.² Thus you have already written, for example, that you initially encountered the question concerning the sense of Being in the form of Brentano's 1907 dissertation (*Unterwegs zur Sprache*, p. 92).³ Could you perhaps go even further into this experience?

Insofar as I have understood you correctly, in our conversation you had broken down this early experience into the following elements:

1. What is the ground (sense) of the "is" that makes every being a being; i.e.: what is the sense of Being?
2. This question was not answered, indeed never even posed, by Aristotle. Together with the experience of the question concerning the sense of Being, you thus also experienced the forgottenness of Being.
3. For the Greeks, Being (*einai*) signified presence, present, presentness – thus Being was determined by time. With this the question emerged: how can Being be determined by time at all? Indeed even Aristotle had thought of time the other way around, as determined by Being: consequently, there was still, up to now, no possibility at all to pose this new question.

4. Sein wird immer schon vom Menschen verstanden, wenn nicht sogar eigens gefasst: also gehört Seinsverständnis zum Wesen des Menschen. Wenn das aber so ist und wenn Sein andererseits durch Zeit bestimmt wird, dann muss auch das Sein des Menschen durch Zeit bestimmt werden.

Falls Sie diesen Vorschlag aufnehmen möchten, könnten Sie ja vielleicht der Form nach auf eine von mir gestellte oder zu stellende Frage eingehen, die so formuliert werden könnte: Wie ist Ihre erste Erfahrung der Seinsfrage bei Brentano eigentlich zu verstehen?

B. Eine noch wesentlichere Frage würde die "Kehre" selbst aufwerfen. Ihre amerikanischen Leser wissen wohl, daß Heidegger II sich "anders" ausdrückt als Heidegger I; viele halten diese "Änderung" aber für eine Abschwächung, für einen Verfall an bloßes Etymologisieren, manchmal sogar nur für mythisch-mystische Wortspielerei. Es könnte also sehr zum Verständnis Ihres Werkes in Amerika beitragen, wenn diese Leser einzusehen lernten, wie die "Kehre" aus einer seinsgemäßen *Not* entsprungen ist. Und wäre dies nicht vielleicht eine günstige Situation darauf einzugehen?

Walter Schulz hat in seinem berühmten Artikel: "Über den philosophiegeschichtlichen Ort Martin Heideggers" diese "Kehre" als eine Wandlung der Erfahrung des Nichts in die Erfahrung des Seins aufgefasst. Ich selbst habe sie anders verstanden und mit besonderem Hinweis auf: "Aus einem Gespräch von der Sprache" so ausgelegt: die "Kehre" ist vermutlich nur eine Vertiefung (und d.h. ein weiterer Schritt auf demselben Weg) der Erfahrung des Seins-als-*Logos* (und d.h.: des ursprünglichen Sagens) in dem Sinne, daß der schon als *Alētheia* erfahrene *Logos* nun in seinem Sich-Verbergen (und d.h. in seinem Vorrang über das Dasein) gedacht (und d.h. gesagt) werden könnte. Obwohl ich in meinem Buch noch nicht bereit war, diese Formel zu prägen, scheint es mir der Sache doch angemessener zu sein, die "Kehre" in Heideggers Seins-Denken viel weniger als "Kehre" Heideggers (also im Seins-*Denken*) denn als "Kehre" des Seins (besser vielleicht: Seyns?) selbst (also im *Seins*-Denken) aufzufassen.

4. Being is always already understood, albeit not properly grasped, by the human being: thus the understanding of Being belongs to the essence of the human being. Yet if this is the case, and if Being, on the other hand, is determined by time, then the Being of the human being must also be determined by time.

Should you wish to take up this suggestion, you could indeed perhaps follow the form of a question I have posed, or one still to be posed, which could be formulated as follows: how are we properly to understand your first experience of the Being-question in Brentano?⁴

B. A still more essential question would concern the “turn” itself. Your American readers are well aware that Heidegger II expresses himself “differently” from Heidegger I; however, many take this “change” to be an attenuation, a deterioration into mere etymologizing, sometimes even simply to be mythical-mystical wordplay.⁵ It could therefore contribute greatly to the understanding of your work in America if these readers learned to appreciate how the “turn” emerged from a *need* in compliance with Being. And would this not be an opportune occasion to pursue this matter further?

In his well-known article “Über den philosophiegeschichtlichen Ort Martin Heideggers” [“On Martin Heidegger’s Place in the History of Philosophy”], Walter Schulz conceived of this “turn” as a transformation of the experience of the Nothing into the experience of Being.⁶ For my part, I have understood it differently and, with particular reference to “Aus einem Gespräch von der Sprache,” have interpreted it as follows: the “turn” is presumably only a deepening (and that means a further step along the same path) of the experience of Being-as-*Logos* (and that means: of the primordial saying) in the sense that the *Logos*, already experienced as *Alētheia*, could now be thought (and that means said) in its self-concealing (and that means in its primacy over Dasein).⁷ Although I was not yet ready in my book to formulate it this way, in substance it nevertheless seems more appropriate to me to conceive of the “turn” in Heidegger’s thinking of Being much less as a “turn” of Heidegger (thus in the *thinking* of Being) than as a “turn” of Being (or perhaps better: of Beyng?) itself (thus in the thinking of *Being*).⁸

Vielleicht könnten Sie bei der Aufnahme dieses Hinweises eine von mir formulierte Frage zugrunde legen, die die ganze Interpretationsrichtung De Waelhens–Löwith nicht nur in Amerika sondern auch in Europa berühren würde: Zugegeben, *daß* in Ihrem Seins-Denken eine "Kehre" geschehen ist, – *wie* ist dann diese "Kehre" geschehen – oder, anders gefragt, wie ist dies Geschehen selbst zu denken?

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Ohne die Vorbehalte zu übersehen, mit denen ich Ihnen diese Vorschläge nur machen kann, scheint mir doch die zweite Frage dringlicher zu sein. Aber ich möchte Ihrer Entscheidung nirgends vorgreifen; jede Frage, die Sie selbst vorziehen, würde auch für mich einen Vorrang haben.

Ich möchte hoffen, daß Sie, sehr geehrter Herr Professor, aus den gegebenen Hinweisen verstehen, warum ich es gewagt habe, Sie um eine Einführung in meine Arbeit zu bitten. Sie haben die genaue Zusammenfassung dieser Arbeit, die sich der allgemeinen Stimmung der Heidegger-Interpretation in Amerika so radikal entgegengesetzt, geprüft und für einigermaßen treffend gehalten. So könnte mein Buch vielleicht in einem Land, in dem Ihr Werk ohnehin immer mehr gelesen wird, und in dem das die Logik und Technik überwindende Seinsdenken so notwendig ist, ein Beitrag zum besseren Verständnis Ihres Denkens sein.

William J. Richardson, s.J.
Au soin de: Christopher Mooney
42 Rue de Grenelle
Paris VII, Frankreich.

Perhaps, in taking up this indication, you could consider as a basis the following question as I have formulated it, which would touch on the entire interpretive direction of De Waelhens–Löwith not only in America, but also in Europe: granted *that* a “turn” has occurred in your thinking of Being – *how* then did this “turn” happen – or, posed differently, how is this happening itself to be thought?⁹

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Without overlooking the reservations with which I can only make these suggestions to you, the second question nevertheless seems to me to be more urgent. Nevertheless, I would never wish to anticipate your decision; any question you choose would also have precedence for me.

I should hope that you, most esteemed professor, understand from these indications that I have provided why I have ventured to ask you for an introduction to my work. You have examined the précis of this work, which so radically opposes the general tenor of Heidegger interpretation in America, and you have found it rather fitting.¹⁰ Thus my book could perhaps be a contribution to a better understanding of your thinking in a country where your work is in any case being read more and more, and in which the thinking of Being that is overcoming logic and technicity is so necessary.

William J. Richardson, S.J.
Care of: Christopher Mooney
42 Rue de Grenelle
Paris VII, *France*.

QUESTIONS FOR HEIDEGGER'S "PREFACE"

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III. Vorschläge

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FIGURE 1. Richardson's "Vorschläge" typed page with ink annotations.

NOTES TO THE TRANSLATION

- 1 We have rendered *Kehre* as “turn,” although Richardson himself preferred “reversal.”
- 2 In the German typescript, “nie um eine philosophische Anthropologie ging” (“at issue . . . has never been a philosophical anthropology”) is underlined in red pen. See Figure 1.
- 3 GA 12: 88/OWL 7. Franz Brentano, *Von der mannigfachen Bedeutung des Seins bei Aristoteles* (Freiburg im Breisgau: Herder, 1862); *On the Several Senses of Being in Aristotle*, trans. Rolf George (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1981).
- 4 In the German typescript (see Figure 1), “Wie ist Ihre erste Erfahrung der Seinsfrage bei Brentano eigentlich zu verstehen?” (“How are we properly to understand your first experience of the Being-question in Brentano?”) is underlined in red pen. To the left, in the margin, is written, likewise in red pen: “τὸ ὄν λέγεται πολλαχῶς” (“being is said in many ways”). Cf. William J. Richardson, s.J., *Heidegger: Through Phenomenology to Thought* (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1963), VIII–IX, where Heidegger replicates Richardson’s question.
- 5 Here Richardson is playing on the etymological connection between *anders* (“differently”) and *Änderung* (“change”), but, for the sake of clarity, we have opted not to carry it through in English.
- 6 Walter Schulz, “Über den philosophiegeschichtlichen Ort Martin Heideggers,” *Philosophische Rundschau* 1 (1954): 65–93, 211–32. Richardson describes Schulz’s article in the bibliography of his book as follows: “An authority on Schelling situates Heidegger in terms of the German Idealists, underlining those elements in Heidegger’s thought which suggest an affinity with the transcendental tradition. The author’s well-informed and provocative interpretation of the ‘reversal’ differs considerably from the present writer’s and offers a knowledgeable challenge to it.” *Heidegger: Through Phenomenology to Thought*, 686.

- 7 See GA 12: 79–146. Translated as “A Dialogue on Language between a Japanese and an Inquirer,” OWL 1–54.
- 8 Richardson preferred to render the antiquated German spelling *Seyn* with the Old English *Beon*, whereas we have opted for the obsolete spelling *Be yng*. See *Heidegger: Through Phenomenology to Thought*, 554.
- 9 Based on previous sections of Richardson’s “Das Denken Martin Heideggers in Amerika” (not published here), we are certain Richardson is referring to Karl Löwith, *Heidegger. Denker in dürftiger Zeit* (Frankfurt am Main: Fischer, 1953), and to Alphonse de Waelhens, *La philosophie de Martin Heidegger* (Louvain: Éditions de l’Institut Supérieur de Philosophie, 1942). In Richardson’s typescript, “Zugegeben, daß in Ihrem Seins-Denken eine ‘Kehre’ geschehen ist, – wie ist dann diese ‘Kehre’ geschehen” (“granted that a “turn” has occurred in your thinking of Being – how did this ‘turn’ happen”) is underlined in red pen, and a red line is drawn next to the lines beginning with “Europa” (“Europe”) and ending with the conclusion of the paragraph. Heidegger replicated Richardson’s question in his Preface. See Richardson, *Heidegger: Through Phenomenology to Thought*, xvii. Richardson renders it as follows: “Granted that a ‘reversal’ has come-to-pass in your thinking, how has it come-to-pass? In other words, how are [we] to think this coming-to-pass itself?” (xvi).
- 10 Richardson is presumably referring to a version of what would eventually be published as William J. Richardson, S.J., “Heideggers Weg durch die Phänomenologie zum Seinsdenken,” *Philosophisches Jahrbuch* 72, no. 2 (1965): 385–96. Heidegger’s Preface to Richardson’s book also appeared in the same issue of *Philosophisches Jahrbuch* under the title “Ein Vorwort. Brief an P. William J. Richardson” (pp. 397–402). Richardson’s précis is available in English as “Heidegger’s Way Through Phenomenology to the Thinking of Being,” in *Heidegger: The Man and the Thinker*, ed. Thomas Sheehan (Chicago: Precedent, 1981), 79–93.

APPENDIX: MARGINALIA IN FRITZ HEIDEGGER'S COPY OF WILLIAM J. RICHARDSON, *HEIDEGGER: THROUGH PHENOMENOLOGY TO THOUGHT*

Whereas most of the marginalia in William J. Richardson's letter to Martin Heidegger (published above) are evidently from Heidegger, the same does not seem to be the case for the marginalia in the copy of Richardson's book owned by Heidegger's brother Fritz. Nevertheless, we believe the marginalia in the book may be of interest for understanding Martin's Preface and his relation to Richardson generally, and have therefore decided to include the marginalia here. Fritz himself took particular interest in Richardson's work, met with Richardson personally before Martin wrote his Preface, and acted as a typist and go-between during the preparation of Martin's text. It should also be noted that Fritz's copy was once located in the library of the workroom that Martin would use when staying at Fritz's house. (The volumes from the library have since been relocated to the Martin-Heidegger-Archiv der Stadt Meßkirch.) Page numbers refer to William J. Richardson, s.j., *Heidegger: Through Phenomenology to Thought* (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1963). After the German we include Richardson's English translation of the relevant passages from Heidegger's Preface.

P. XIII

In the following sentence, "als solche" ("as such") is underlined in lead pencil, and a diagonal line is drawn off to the side in the righthand margin: "Aber die wörtliche, d. h. die aus der Sache gedachte Übersetzung spricht erst dann, wenn der Sachgehalt der Sache, hier die Anwesenheit als solche, vor das Denken gebracht wird." ("But a literal translation, sc. a translation that thought draws out of the matter itself, is expressive only when the heart of the matter, in this case Presence as such, is brought before thought.")

P. XVII

A vertical line was drawn in lead pencil to the right of "Das Denken der Kehre *ist* eine Wendung in meinem Denken." ("The thinking of the reversal *is* a change in my thought.")

P. XIX

A vertical line was drawn in lead pencil to the right of "Wer bereit ist, den einfachen Sachverhalt zu sehen, daß in 'Sein und Zeit' der Ansatz des Fragens aus dem Bezirk der Subjektivität abgebaut, daß jede anthropologische Fragestellung ferngehalten, vielmehr einzig die Erfahrung des Da-seins aus dem ständigen Vorblick auf die Seinsfrage maßgebend ist [...]" ("One need only observe the simple fact that in *Being and Time* the problem is set up outside the sphere of subjectivism – that the entire anthropological problematic is kept at a distance, that the normative issue is emphatically and solely the experience of There-being with a constant eye to the Being-question [...]")

A vertical line was drawn in lead pencil to the right of "Vielmehr geht das Sein als das aus seinem Zeit-Charakter geprägte An-wesen das Da-sein an." ("It is rather Being, stamped as Presence by its time-character, [that] makes the approach to There-being.")

P. XXI

A vertical line was drawn in lead pencil to the right of "Das 'Geschehen' der Kehre, wonach Sie fragen, 'ist' das Seyn als solches. Es läßt sich nur *aus* der Kehre denken." ("The 'coming-to-pass' of the reversal which you ask about 'is' Being as such. It can only be thought *out of* the reversal.")

A vertical line was drawn in lead pencil to the right of "aus dem, wie Es Sein, wie Es Zeit gibt. Über dieses 'Es gibt' versuchte ich in dem Vortrag 'Zeit und Sein,' den Sie selbst [...]" ("by the way Being is granted, Time is granted. I tried to say a word about this 'is granted' in the lecture 'Time and Being' which you heard yourself [...]")

A vertical line was drawn in lead pencil to the right of “Es ist weder das Verdienst meines Fragens noch der Machtspruch meines Denkens, daß dieses Gehören und Erbringen im Er-eignen beruht und Ereignis heißt [...]” (“It is [due] neither [to] the merit of my questioning nor [to some] arbitrary decision of my thought that this reciprocal bearing reposes in a [mutual] ap-propriation and is called e-vent [...].”)

P. XXIII

A vertical line was drawn in lead pencil to the right of “der philosophischen Sprache, ist nicht ihre Erfindung und Willkür. Es ist die höchste Mitgift für ihre Sprache, in der das Anwesende als ein solches zur Unverborgenheit und – Verbergung gelangte.” (“[The fact that what we thoughtlessly enough call ‘truth’ the Greeks called Ἀ-Λήθεια – as well, indeed, in poetical and non-philosophical as in] philosophical language – is not [a result of] their [own] invention and caprice. It is the richest endowment of their language, in which that-which-comes-to-presence as such attained non-concealment and – concealment.”) In the righthand margin next to the vertical line, there is a question mark in lead pencil.

There is a question mark in lead pencil to the right of “Aber I wird nur möglich, wenn es in II enthalten ist.” (“But [the thought of] Heidegger I becomes possible only if it is contained in Heidegger II.”)

A wide v-shaped figure was drawn in lead pencil, running off the page, to the right of the paragraph beginning with the sentence “Indes bleibt alles Formelhafte mißverständlich.” (“Meanwhile, every formulation is open to misunderstanding.”).

**COMMENTARY ON WILLIAM J. RICHARDSON'S QUESTIONS FOR
MARTIN HEIDEGGER'S "PREFACE"**

Martin Heidegger wrote one and only one preface for a scholarly work on his thinking, and it was for William J. Richardson's study *Heidegger: Through Phenomenology to Thought*, first published in 1963. Ever since, both Heidegger's Preface and Richardson's groundbreaking book have played an important role in Heidegger scholarship. Much has been discussed about these texts over the decades, but what has not been available to students and scholars up to this point is Richardson's original comments and questions to Heidegger that led to the famous Preface. These are published here for the first time both in the German original and in our English translation.¹¹ In our commentary we 1) discuss how Heidegger's Preface came about, 2) explain the source and status of the materials published above, and 3) pair selected passages from Richardson's text with Heidegger's reply in his Preface to highlight the consonance of their thinking.

I. THE GENESIS OF HEIDEGGER'S "PREFACE"

Richardson had been working on Heidegger's thought for five years before requesting a formal meeting with him. On 2 February 1960, he sent Heidegger a letter introducing himself and asking whether they might speak personally.¹² Appended to the letter were four documents: 1) a letter of recommendation from Max Müller (dated 5 December 1959), in which Müller praises Richardson's mind and character and anticipates the revolutionary impact that Richardson's book will have on Heidegger interpretation; 2) Richardson's twenty-five-page précis in German of his work on Heidegger (at that time totaling 1034 pages); 3) a table of contents for the work; and 4) several questions Richardson had for Heidegger.

Heidegger was impressed with the précis (which he marked up extensively), and accordingly invited Richardson to his home in Freiburg on 24 February 1960 at 3:00 p.m.¹³ (It is noteworthy that Heidegger's invitation, and all subsequent handwritten letters to Richardson, are written in Roman script, not Heidegger's usual *Sütterlinschrift*, which

for an American, indeed even for many Germans, is hardly legible; this is a small sign that, unlike with other interpreters of his work, Heidegger made a special effort when it came to Richardson.) There the esteemed German professor and the younger American priest and scholar would converse for four hours on matters both philosophical and personal. Not only did Richardson find it “one of the richest memories of my own intellectual experience,” he also heard shortly after their meeting that Heidegger had been so struck that he telephoned Müller right away to convey his astonishment and admiration: “After so many misreadings, how is it possible [...] that an *American* could get it right?”¹⁴

Emboldened by this report, and by Müller’s encouragement, Richardson dared petition Heidegger for a preface on 27 September 1960. Unfortunately, we have not been able to locate Richardson’s letter, but we know it was sufficiently persuasive to elicit Heidegger’s assent.¹⁵ Three days later, Heidegger wrote back, agreeing to make an exception to his hitherto firm principle never to introduce the work of other authors. He asked only for a few indications as to what he should write in the Preface in order to redress and preempt misunderstanding of his work in America, since he had recently been hearing disconcerting reports on how his work was being taken up there.

Once Richardson’s work was complete, he responded to Heidegger’s request in a letter two years later. Richardson provides a summary of the letter in the “Preface to the U.S. Edition” (September 2002) of his book:

The substance of my letter of March 1, 1962, was simple indeed: “You will recall that you were kind enough to offer to write a preface for my book, *From Phenomenology to Thought*, provided I formulate one or two questions that might be directly addressed. The questions that seem most relevant to me are these. . . . In advance, please be sure of my deep gratitude, etc.” There was no more immediate context for them than that.

While helpful, Richardson’s summary is also puzzling. For although the substance of the letter is in fact straightforward, it does not itself

pose the questions Heidegger would go on to answer in his Preface. These questions instead appear in a thirteen-page document, written in polished German, titled "Das Denken Martin Heideggers in Amerika" ("The Thinking of Martin Heidegger in America"), which Richardson had included with his letter. This document provides not only an extensive survey of the literature on Heidegger (§1, "Überblick über die Literatur") and a report on the intellectual reception of Heidegger's work in America (§2, "Geistige Situation"), but also two pages of suggestions for how Heidegger might structure his Preface (§3, "Vorschläge"). Thus even though Richardson's letter may not have provided more context for the two questions he ended up posing to Heidegger, the appended document "Das Denken Martin Heideggers in Amerika," especially its final section, surely does. This context no doubt contributed greatly to the form and content Heidegger's Preface would take as he composed it over the next month. It is precisely for this reason that we have edited and translated the final section of "Das Denken Martin Heideggers in Amerika" above.

II. THE SOURCE AND STATUS OF THIS DOCUMENT

Although certain scholars have had access to a copy of "Das Denken Martin Heideggers in Amerika," the document has, to our knowledge, never been mentioned in Richardson's published writings or in any of the literature on his relationship to Heidegger. The copy was likely made before Richardson sent the document to Heidegger, as it does not contain any of the marginalia that can be found on the original document. Our edition, in contrast, derives from the original, which is located inside a first-edition copy of *Heidegger: Through Phenomenology to Thought* in the library of the Martin-Heidegger-Archiv der Stadt Meßkirch that comes from the room in Fritz Heidegger's home where Martin Heidegger would work.¹⁶

Even though the document bears no signature, we have no reason to doubt that it is an authentic work by Richardson. It is less clear who authored all of the marginalia, however. Although Martin Heidegger was initially in possession of the document, he eventually sent it to his

brother Fritz, who himself comments on it in a letter to Richardson from 14 April 1962. While we are inclined to believe that the majority of the marginalia derive from Martin, in one instance (or possibly two) it seems more likely that Fritz is the author.

At the top of the first page, “P. Richardson” is written with partially cursive, Latin-type letters in lead pencil. On the back page, “Richardson” is written similarly, except in blue pen. Even though Martin rarely wrote with this script, elsewhere he did write Richardson’s name in like fashion. This can be seen in his epistles to Richardson from 10 February 1960, 17 February 1960, 12 March 1962, and 9 April 1962, the last of which also contains an abbreviated *P* for “Pater” (“Father”). Now, one might object that Martin used a Latin script for these epistles only for the sake of legibility, and that, when writing for himself, he would have availed himself exclusively of *Sütterlinschrift*. The name on the first and back pages would accordingly stem from the hand of Fritz, who, as may be gleaned from the numerous volumes owned by Fritz in the Martin-Heidegger-Archiv der Stadt Meßkirch, himself used a Latin script in his own marginal notes. However, in notes pertaining to the lecture course *Der Satz vom Grund* that are housed at the Deutsches Literaturarchiv Marbach, there is a loose sheet with Richardson’s name at the top written almost exactly like that on the first and back pages of “Das Denken Martin Heideggers in Amerika,” even though the rest of the note is written in Martin’s normal handwriting.¹⁷ It is therefore plausible that, by this time, Martin had come to associate Richardson’s name with a particular type of script. Moreover, it is likely that this note was composed around the same time as Martin’s Preface. For the note pertains to a document that Richardson appears to have sent Martin together with “Das Denken Martin Heideggers in Amerika,” namely, the list of Martin’s seminars and lecture courses that Richardson published as an appendix to his book.¹⁸

The same cannot be said for the second marginal note in “Das Denken Martin Heideggers in Amerika.” It occurs on page six, at the end of Richardson’s summary of Thomas Langan’s *The Meaning of Heidegger: A Critical Study of an Existentialist Phenomenology* (New

York: Columbia University Press, 1959). In the document, Richardson translates the following passage from p. 231 into German:

Each time we have penetrated to the depth of notions such as mystery, the *Heilige*, the grace of Being, *alētheia* itself, we have been unable to retain our initial excitement, for we came to suspect that they were high-flown words hiding the real emptiness of an existence for which there is no "other." "Mystery" turns out to hide no incomprehensibly rich other, but only our own limits; the *Heilige* turns out to hold no real gift, but is rather an expression of our finite "not yet"; the "grace of Being" turns out to be no real gift, for it is drawn inexplicably from our own resources. *Alētheia* itself finally fails to be an end and motive force, to become an historical sign of our incompleteness. Penetrating far enough beyond the exciting terms to discover that there is no other, we are left wondering if perhaps Sartre was not more direct in simply declaring such an existent, who is all alone, *de trop*.

After *de trop*, "überflüssig, zuviel" ("superfluous, too much") is written in lead pencil in what appears to be Fritz's non-*Sütterlin* handwriting. In this instance it seems unlikely that Martin would have written to himself in this script. Moreover, Martin could read French quite well, and would hardly have needed to provide himself with a translation of such a phrase.

Whatever the case may be, the most important marginalia appear in the final section of "Das Denken Martin Heideggers in Amerika" that we have reproduced above. Fritz was, admittedly, especially interested in this section (as he relates in his aforementioned letter to Richardson), and might therefore seem to be the composer of the marginalia in it; however, the underlining pertains to material that Martin addresses directly in the Preface – not just Richardson's two questions, but also the matter of philosophical anthropology. What is more, one finds "τὸ ὄν λέγεται

πολλὰ ἄλλοις” (“being is said in many ways”) written in perfect Greek in the margins, in a script that closely resembles the way Heidegger writes these Greek words elsewhere in the 1960s.¹⁹ This Greek phrase from Aristotle (*Metaphysics* IV.2) also makes its way into Heidegger’s Preface. Finally, unlike in the previous two instances, all of the marginalia in this final section are written in red pen (the same color Heidegger used to mark up Richardson’s précis a couple of years prior²⁰).

We surmise, therefore, that Martin wrote the marginalia in the final section in red pen shortly before or while he was composing the Preface. Then, when his manuscript of the Preface was complete, he decided to send it, together with “Das Denken Martin Heideggers in Amerika” and Richardson’s letters from 1 March and 21 March 1962, to his brother to be typed, but before doing so he wrote Richardson’s name on the back of “Das Denken Martin Heideggers in Amerika” in blue pen, since Richardson himself had not done so. (It is possible that he also wrote Richardson’s name in lead pencil on the first page as well, although, if it is true that Fritz wrote “überflüssig, zuviel” in lead pencil upon receiving the documents, he may well have written Richardson’s name on the first page too.) However, because of the uncertainty of authorship, we have refrained from attributing the marginalia to anyone in the edited document itself.

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In general, we have tried to be as faithful as possible to Richardson in our edition of “Das Denken Martin Heideggers in Amerika.” The only changes we made to the original German typescript are as follows: we converted underlining to italics, we replaced instances of “ss” with “ß” when appropriate, and we changed the title of the third section (“*Vorschläge*” or “Suggestions”) to “Aus den Archiven: William J. Richardsons Fragen an Martin Heidegger für dessen ‘Vorwort’” (“From the Archives: William J. Richardson’s Questions for Martin Heidegger’s ‘Preface’”) in order to better convey the content and context of the document.

III. CONCORDANCE

In this final section, we pair selected lines from Richardson's text with corresponding lines from Heidegger's response in the Preface. This selected concordance helps bring into sharper relief how Richardson's comments and questions decisively shaped the content of Heidegger's Preface. What is more, this pairing brings to light ever more clearly how Heidegger was at home with Richardson's overall interpretive effort to discuss "the turn" or "reversal" (*die Kehre*) from "Heidegger I" to "Heidegger II" in terms of a greater and more explicit emphasis on the primacy of Being in relation to the human being.²¹

A. On Brentano's Influence on the Core Question Concerning Being

Richardson: "Thus you have already written, for example, that you initially encountered the question concerning the sense of Being in the form of Brentano's 1907 dissertation. Could you perhaps go even further into this experience?"... "[...] how are we properly to understand your first experience of the Being-question in Brentano?"

Heidegger: "In Brentano, you have in mind the fact that the first philosophical text through which I worked my way, again and again from 1907 on, was Franz Brentano's dissertation: *On the Manifold Sense of Being in Aristotle* (1862). On the title page of his work, Brentano quotes Aristotle's phrase: τὸ ὄν λέγεται πολλαχῶς. I translate: 'A being becomes manifest (sc. [i.e.] with regard to its Being) in many ways.'²² Latent in this phrase is the *question* that determined the way of my thought: what is the pervasive, simple, unified determination of Being that permeates all of its multiple meanings?" (x)

"[...] the question about Being, aroused by Brentano's work, nevertheless remained always in view. [...] and if from ancient times the guide-question of philosophy has perdured in the most diverse forms as the question about the Being of beings, then Being had to remain the first and last thing-itself [*Sache selbst*] of thought." (XII, XIV)

B. Not a Philosophical Anthropology

Richardson: “Accordingly, it would perhaps be useful if you could provide further information regarding the first steps of your path, in order to make clear once again that what is at issue for you, from the outset, has never been a philosophical anthropology.”

Heidegger: “One need only observe the simple fact that in *Being and Time* the problem is set up outside the sphere of subjectivism – that the entire anthropological problematic is kept at a distance [...]” (XVIII)

“This transformation [in the Being of the human being] is not demanded by new psychological or biological insights. Man here is not the object of any anthropology whatever.” (citing his “first draft” of a lecture course for the winter semester of 1937–1938, XX)²³

C. From the Temporality of Dasein to Being-as-time

Richardson: “For the Greeks, Being (*einai*) signified presence, present, presentness – thus Being was determined by time.”

Heidegger: “The disquieting, ever watchful question about Being under the guise of Presence (Present) developed into the question about Being in terms of its time-character.” (XII)

Richardson: “Yet if this is the case, and if Being, on the other hand, is determined by time, then the Being of the human being must also be determined by time.”

Heidegger: “Time became questionable in the same way as Being. The ecstatic-horizonal temporality delineated in *Being and Time* is not by any means already the most proper attribute of time that must be sought in answer to the Being-question.” (XII)

D. The Primacy of Being

Richardson: "It could therefore contribute greatly to the understanding of your work in America if these readers learned to appreciate how the 'turn' emerged from a *need* in compliance with Being. [...] the 'turn' is presumably only a deepening (and that means a further step along the same path) of the experience of Being-as-*Logos* (and that means: of the primordial saying) in the sense that the *Logos*, already experienced as *Alētheia*, could now be thought (and that means said) in its self-concealing (and that means in its primacy over *Dasein*)."

Heidegger: "One need only observe [...] that the normative issue is emphatically and solely the experience of There-being [*Dasein*] with a constant eye to the Being-question – for it to become strikingly clear that the 'Being' into which *Being and Time* inquired cannot long remain something that the human subject posits. It is rather Being, stamped as Presence by its time-character, [that] makes the approach to There-being [*Dasein*]. As a result, even in the initial steps of the Being-question in *Being and Time* thought is called upon to undergo a change whose movement cor-responds with the reversal [turn]." (XVIII)

"Contrary [to what is generally supposed], the question of *Being and Time* is decisively fulfilled in the thinking of the reversal [turn]. He alone can fulfill who has a vision of fullness. This fulfillment likewise furnishes for the first time an adequate characterisation of There-being [*Dasein*], sc. of the essence of man [as] thought in terms of the truth of Being as such [...]" (XVIII-XX)

"Man comes into question here in the deepest and broadest, in the genuinely fundamental, perspective: man in his relation to Being – sc. in the reversal [turn]: *Beon* [*Beyng, Seyn*] and its truth in relation to man." (citing his "first draft" of a lecture course for the winter semester of 1937–38, XX)²⁴

“Without an eye for the granting of such a gift to man, without a sense for the e-mitting [*Schicken*] of such an e-mittance, one will no more comprehend what is said about the mittence of Being [*Seinsgeschick*] than the man born blind can ever experience what light and color are.” (XXII)

E. On the “Turn”

Richardson: “[...] granted *that* a ‘turn’ has occurred in your thinking of Being – how then did this ‘turn’ happen – or, posed differently, *how* is this happening itself to be thought?”

Heidegger: “The thinking of the reversal [turn] *is* a change in my thought.” (XVI)

“The ‘coming-to-pass’ [happening] of the reversal [turn] which you ask about ‘is’ Beon [*Beyng, Seyn*] as such. It can only be thought out of the reversal [turn]. There is no special kind of coming-to-pass [happening] that is proper to this [process]. Rather, the reversal [turn] between *Being and Time*, between Time and Being, is determined by the way Being is granted, Time is granted. I tried to say a word about this ‘is granted’ [*Es gibt*] in the lecture “Time and Being,” which you heard yourself here [in Freiburg] on January 30, 1962.” (XX)²⁵

“The distinction you make between Heidegger I and II is justified only on the condition that this is kept constantly in mind: only by way of what Heidegger I has thought does one gain access to what is to-be-thought by Heidegger II. But [the thought of] Heidegger I becomes possible only if it is contained in Heidegger II.” (XXII)

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Heidegger concluded his Preface to Richardson’s masterful work of scholarship by stating three times that “a manifold thinking” (*ein mehrfältiges Denken*) is called for in calling forth the core matter for

thought, and he expressed a "wish" for the book – a wish that has been fulfilled many times over since its publication in 1963 – that it set into motion this "manifold thinking" of the core matter, which, "by reason of its very simplicity, abounds in hidden plenitude" (xx).

NOTES TO THE COMMENTARY

- 11 The existence of the document was first announced in Ian Alexander Moore, "Rapport sur le fonds d'archives Martin Heidegger de la ville de Meßkirch," trans. Christophe Perrin, *Bulletin heideggérien* 8 (2018): 5. In English as "A Report on the Holdings of the Martin-Heidegger-Archiv der Stadt Meßkirch," *Gatherings: The Heidegger Circle Annual* 8 (2018): 81–82.
- 12 Incidentally, Richardson does not mention in his letter that he and Heidegger had actually already met five years prior, in 1955, when Richardson ventured into Heidegger's office during office hours to ask for advice on a possible dissertation topic. After rejecting a comparative study of Husserl and Heidegger's phenomenology, as well as one devoted to the ontological difference, Heidegger agreed that "The Nature of Foundational Thinking" (in Heidegger's work) "would probably be manageable." Quote from William J. Richardson, "An Unpurloined Autobiography," in *Portraits of American Continental Philosophers*, ed. James R. Watson (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1999), 145. See also "On Heidegger to Lacan: An Interview with William J.

- Richardson,” with the participation of Mario L. Beira and Sara Elena Hassan, *Acheronta: Revista de Psicoanálisis y Cultura* 22 (December 2005); and William J. Richardson, “Preface to the U.S. Edition,” in Richardson, *Heidegger: Through Phenomenology to Thought*, 4th ed. (New York: Fordham University Press, 2003), xxvii.
- 13 Richardson does not always recall the year correctly; in the “Preface to the U.S. Edition” (xxxiii, xxxvii), and in “An Unpurloined Autobiography” (147), he has “February 1959,” instead of February 1960.
- 14 Richardson, “An Unpurloined Autobiography,” 148.
- 15 It is not included in their correspondence available at the Deutsches Literaturarchiv Marbach, call numbers HS.2003.0151.00001, HS.2003.0151.00002, and 75.7350.4. We thank Gudrun Bernhardt for this information, and for providing us with access to several letters that are available only in Marbach.
- 16 Inside the book there is a card from the publisher stating that the book comes “with the author’s compliments.” Richardson would have had reason to send Fritz a copy, as Fritz was the one who typed up his brother’s preface, and Richardson had himself visited Fritz in Meßkirch in February 1962 (as Fritz recalls in a letter to Richardson from 14 April 1962).
- 17 Catalogued under the title “Zu der Vorlesung, Satz vom Grund,” call number B 79. In the mentioned note, Heidegger seems worried about people misconstruing the purpose of his teaching and the path of his thinking once they have a complete catalogue of his courses, as though that were enough to understand his trajectory and consequently the matter for thought. Nevertheless Richardson tells us Heidegger reviewed the list and “kindly made” corrections, “adding whatever comments that appear” (*Heidegger: Through Phenomenology to Thought*, 663).
- 18 In his letter from 12 March 1962, Heidegger thanks Richardson for not just one, but plural documents. Regarding the list, see “Verzeichnis der Vorlesungen und Übungen von Martin Heidegger,”

in Richardson, *Heidegger: Through Phenomenology to Thought*, 663–71. Richardson mentions this list in his letter to Heidegger from 1 March 1962, though not, explicitly, that he had included it with his letter.

- 19 Compare, for instance, his notes for his seminar on Heraclitus with Eugen Fink, available in the Deutsches Literaturarchiv Marbach, call number 75.7345. Alfred Denker agrees that the handwriting seems to be Martin's. We thank him for his input on this and other matters.
- 20 Richardson, "Preface to the U.S. Edition," xxxi. In "On Heidegger to Lacan," Richardson says it was marked in red *and* blue pen, "like an American flag, every page, and with circles around it." Recall that Richardson's name is written in both lead pencil and blue pen in "Das Denken Martin Heideggers in Amerika."
- 21 Heidegger's responses in what follows are from Richardson's translations in his book *Heidegger: Through Phenomenology to Thought*. In addition to Richardson's own brackets in the text, we have also provided bracketed material for clarification.
- 22 After this sentence Heidegger added a marginal note to a typescript of his Preface that can be found in GA 11: 145n1. The marginal note reads: "vgl. Was ist das – die Philosophie? 1956 (Schluß) (S. 46) / 'Das seiend-Sein kommt vielfältig zum Scheinen.'" This note refers to the final line of his lecture "What is that – Philosophy?," delivered in Cerisy-la-Salle, Normandy, France, in 1955, also available in GA 11: 7–26. His rendering of Aristotle's line in this instance may be translated as: "Being-coming-to-be comes to shine in manifold ways." The peculiar construction *das seiend-Sein* illustrates once again how Heidegger never ceased seeking new and creative ways to express in language the temporal, dynamic character of Being.

Heidegger's alterations to the aforementioned typescript served as the basis for the slightly different version of the Preface available in GA 11: 145–52, and in the *Heidegger Lesebuch*, ed. Günter Figal (Frankfurt am Main: Klostermann, 2007), 327–33. The

latter has been translated by Jerome Veith in *The Heidegger Reader* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2009), 298–304. Curiously, the *Lesebuch/Reader* version omits the additional marginal note, as well as one other that derives from a special printing of Heidegger’s Preface, and can be found in GA 11: 150n2.

- 23 Cf. GA 45: 214; *Basic Questions of Philosophy: Selected “Problems” of “Logic,”* trans. Richard Rojcewicz and André Schuwer (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1994), 181.
- 24 Cf. GA 45: 214/181.
- 25 According to GA 14: 151 and other sources, Heidegger’s lecture “Zeit und Sein” (“Time and Being”) took place on 31 January 1962.