

# Gatherings

**THE HEIDEGGER CIRCLE ANNUAL**

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*Gatherings: The Heidegger Circle Annual* is a publication of the Heidegger Circle, a group of scholars who have been meeting annually in North America since 1966 to discuss the work of Martin Heidegger. In the Spring of 2010, at the business meeting of the Heidegger Circle, the membership voted to produce an annual publication of research on the thought and writings of Martin Heidegger and related themes. The first issue of the annual was published in the Spring of 2011.

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## *Gatherings: The Heidegger Circle Annual*

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DESIGN BY AJM

# GATHERINGS

VOLUME 5, 2015, SPECIAL ISSUE

## HEIDEGGER'S *BLACK NOTEBOOKS*

Heidegger, "World Judaism," and Modernity <i>Peter Trawny</i>	1
Heidegger's <i>Black Notebooks</i> and the Question of Anti-Semitism <i>Jesús Adrián Escudero</i>	21
Heidegger, Machination, and the Jewish Question: The Problem of the Gift <i>Anthony J. Steinbock</i>	50
Heidegger's "Nazism" as Veiled Nietzscheanism and Heideggerianism: Evidence from the <i>Black Notebooks</i> <i>Joshua Rayman</i>	77
Heidegger's Mask: Silence, Politics, and the Banality of Evil in the <i>Black Notebooks</i> <i>Adam Knowles</i>	93
ELECTRONIC CONTENT	
A Reception History of the <i>Black Notebooks</i> <i>Andrzej Serafin</i>	118
Texts of Heidegger cited and abbreviations used	143



# Heidegger, “World Judaism,” and Modernity

*Peter Trawny*

Translated by Christopher Merwin

## I

In March 2014, Heidegger’s *Überlegungen* II–XV, a series of what he called his *Black Notebooks*, were published. These texts differ from Heidegger’s previously known writings in that they seem to speak more clearly and directly to the philosophical motivations and intentions in Heidegger’s thinking of the 1930s, and they demonstrate that Heidegger’s being-historical thinking during the Second World War was open to anti-Semitic ideas. The discussions, which have until now been behind the scenes in Heidegger research, have so far brought no agreement. The often unnecessary struggle for the prerogative of interpretation has finally highlighted a question again. Heidegger’s *Black Notebooks* force us, like no other manuscript from this philosopher, to ask: How do we read Heidegger?

This question especially crystallizes the issue of how we are to understand the problematic statements about Judaism. Is Heidegger’s thought anti-Semitic? If so, is it something in his entire thought or just a phase? If not, how are we to understand these statements? There is no doubt that these issues are crucial for the future of Heidegger’s thought. The severity of the discussion is to be understood accordingly.

There are answers that I do not want to ignore because they belong in a specific way to the problem. Thus there have been voices raised particularly against my thesis that there is in Heidegger a “being-historical anti-Semitism” (a thesis I will explain in more detail later), voices which do not abstain even from personal attacks.

One of these voices belongs to Friedrich-Wilhelm von Herrmann, who has represented his view of the problem in several articles. To begin my remarks, I would like to present this viewpoint in its most essential strokes. This will demonstrate to what extent such responses to Heidegger's texts themselves belong to the problem of textuality in Heidegger's thinking. Heidegger's writing produces a specific bearing that makes the meaning of that thinking fruitless, even castrates it.

I will come directly to the argument. Von Hermann writes: "With respect to the thirty-four notebooks, the very few passages relating to Judaism, taking part in no greater context, are completely irrelevant and thus superfluous for Heidegger's thinking. Above all, they form no conceptually systematic component [*Baustein*] of being-historical thinking. This is attested at the same time by all of the composed lectures, essays and treatises, which contain nothing anti-Semitic."<sup>1</sup>

The entire statement carries the title: "No Systematic Component of Heidegger's Thought – Philosophically Irrelevant." Here we find a two-part argument. First, that the quality of the statements is too insignificant to attach any meaning to them. Actually, they are "superfluous," i.e. the publisher could also have just deleted them. "Above all," that is, beyond the quantity argument, they would not be "conceptually systematic components" of Heidegger's thought. Therefore, they would be not only "superfluous" but also "irrelevant."

I would like to comment only briefly on the first and seemingly more marginal part of the argument. Contrary to the view that what is rarely said is insignificant, is the view that what is rarely said is in fact the most significant. Plato's remarks concerning a fixed unwritten doctrine can be counted on one hand. Is this reference to an esoteric dimension in Platonic philosophy therefore meaningless? On the contrary. It could be that Heidegger is very taciturn with respect to the most important motives of his thought.

The second part of the argument constructs an alternative: either the anti-Semitic utterances of Heidegger belong to the "systematic" core of his thinking, or they are unimportant. I do not want to accept this alternative. Heidegger's thinking does not insist that a "system" be

separated from "irrelevant" ideas. There is no difference of *ergon* and *parergon* in Heidegger's philosophy. "Ways, not works" is the motto of the *Gesamtausgabe*, and where there are no "works," there are likewise no accessory parts of a "work."

Nevertheless it is striking that the anti-Semitic passages in the *Black Notebooks* allow for such a wide range of interpretations. There is on the one side the radical critique of Emmanuel Faye and his friends, in which Heidegger's thinking appears as a kind of prototype of National Socialism; on the other side, there are interpreters like von Herrmann and the French supervising translator of the *Notebooks*, François Fédier, who see in Heidegger's engagement with National Socialism only a temporary error. Finally there is a position in the middle of these extremes, which tries to understand the meaning and importance of Heidegger's anti-Semitic remarks in the context of his thinking as a whole. Because of these well-nigh incommensurable interpretations we have to ask: how do we read Heidegger?

The first impression of this question is ambiguous. The question seems to be necessary since Heidegger's texts are often abstruse not simply because they operate with many neologisms, but because they have their own writing style. But at the same time it's obvious that all philosophers speak in their own way, in their own style, with their own concepts. In this sense we could direct the question "How to read X?" to any philosopher.

But Heidegger and his texts are a special case. Heidegger is a thinker who tried to influence the organization of his texts. With this organization originates, whether consciously or unconsciously, an authority over the text's reception. For that reason I see at least some evidence that Heidegger distinguishes between an exoteric and an esoteric sphere of philosophy.

The distinguishing of an exoteric sphere from an esoteric one in Heidegger's thought corresponds to the differentiation of addressees. On the one hand there are the lectures and published texts such as *Being and Time*, which do not turn to any specific addressee. In any case, Heidegger problematizes neither the addressing of texts, nor of thinking.

This changes in writings such as *Contributions to Philosophy (Of the Event)*. This text speaks directly to specific addressees. Heidegger calls them the “future ones” or the “few.”

These readers are now brought in a decisive manner to a position against the exoteric sphere of philosophy generally. Authentic philosophy in the “public sphere” (Heidegger is thinking of the university and the media) has become impossible. It is a matter then of practicing this “essential thinking” beyond the “public sphere.” The thought is certainly arguable. Today we know of good public-relations philosophers, who not only function as life-coaches but also must therefore represent banalities. It is more inevitable than ever to pose the question within the university. But what arose with Heidegger’s rejection of “the public sphere” and the direct address of the addressee, is a group of readers who turned away distrustfully from any open discussion. At issue is the emergence of the “Heideggerian.”

The esoteric texts in Heidegger’s collected works are his *Black Notebooks*. They are not focused directly on “the few” as addressees. In Heidegger’s thought they speak purely and primarily to themselves, although this verdict must be refined because there is evidence which contradicts it. Through this self-addressing, thinking folds back on itself. The abandonment of the “public sphere” is carried out with no regard for others whatsoever. The thinking in the *Black Notebooks* speaks in a being-historical intimacy to itself. In this way the texts are never personal.

(The question has been asked, how do the *Black Notebooks* stand in relation to Heidegger’s other texts? Some scholars already want to hear a reservation and hesitancy in titles like *Considerations* [*Überlegungen*], *Remarks* [*Anmerkungen*], etc., as if questions of understatement in the title of the *Contributions to Philosophy (Of the Event)* do not go far enough. I hold that the *Black Notebooks* are so relevant that they will change our understanding of Heidegger.)

The esoteric initiative in Heidegger’s thinking and writing in the *Black Notebooks* would not be adequately understood if we overlooked how the direct address of the addressee occurs in the text. Heidegger



is not the thinker to maintain an argumentative discourse – this is the language of the “public sphere.” Admittedly, it would be wrong to label a work like *Being and Time* as argumentative. But the esoteric address follows another, if not seductive, then perhaps erotic, style.

The conversation that Heidegger’s thinking calls out for is not a critically distanced discussion. It has much more to do with hearing, hearkening to silence, and obedience, as Heidegger often stresses. The critical distance of an argument is opposed to the nearness of an intimate agreement. With this the esoteric initiative first receives its authentic character.

Here now is the reason why the “Heideggerian” assumes that Heidegger’s self-interpretation must be the beginning of every engagement with this thinker. We must follow the “master’s” “instructions.” The self-identification is inevitable. Now it becomes impossible, for the “Heideggerian,” that their lover or friend could be anti-Semitic – even if during the 1930s and 1940s not only the majority of Germans, but even the majority of Europeans, were anti-Semites. It simply cannot be the case for them that this philosopher, who seduces the reader with such an intimate rapport, could keep to anti-Semitic stereotypes.

Heidegger’s thought engenders lovers. They are often, without a doubt, the best Heidegger scholars. They follow this thinking through the subtlest variation, they know it exactly and in detail. They dedicate themselves to him. Is love not the prerequisite for any hermeneutics? An interpretation born from hatred is bad mostly because the one who hates has no patience to engage with the longwindedness of the philosopher. This is also the same for Heidegger research.

But then the question of how we should read Heidegger seems aporetic. Either we become “Heideggerians” who penetrate the vast corpus of Heidegger’s thought, or we become mediocre researchers and/or critics who only look at this philosophy superficially. For us to know Heidegger, it seems necessary to self-identify with him. But there is a third possibility.

Along with the loving-scholastic reading and the superficial-critical reading, there is also the philosophical reading. A philosophical reading

loves the philosopher. It knows *eros*, the erotic dimension of its respective philosophy. But beyond that it knows the erotic dimension of philosophy par excellence, the freedom of thought which inscribes itself in every philosophy. The freedom of philosophy counts for more than obedience to a beloved thinker. The “Heideggerians” are not familiar with this experience. That is their weakness – they are not philosophers and never can be.

Heidegger’s texts require, perhaps more than others, a philosophical interpretation. It could be that Heidegger knew a genuine reader is one who enjoys his seductions, gives himself over to them – but does *not* succumb to them. From this standpoint I reject the view that Heidegger’s self-interpretations must be the beginning of every interpretation, just as much as I reject the temptation of bathing in Heidegger’s thinking as in the endless melody of Wagnerian music-drama.

## II

I turn now to the question of whether we can speak of a being-historical anti-Semitism in Heidegger. For this, it must become clear what that could mean in the context of Heidegger’s thinking in general. In other words, we must try to understand the being-historical character of these claims about Judaism. For this two things must be accomplished: 1) we must get to know the essential characteristics of Heidegger’s thinking of the history of being in the 1930s and 1940s, and 2) we must question whether the remarks about “world Judaism” are related to being-historical thinking and, what is more, we must find out whether these remarks first become comprehensible from the vantage point of being-historical thinking.

However, to make these two questions possible, we must take note of the most important aspects of Heidegger’s remarks about “Judaism” and “world Judaism.” Accordingly, I will begin my deliberations with this. I want to cite three of Heidegger’s remarks, isolating the core statements in each.

- A     The reason for Judaism’s temporary increase in power, however, is that the metaphysics of the West, particularly in its modern development, provided the starting point for the spread of a rather empty rationality and calculative ability, which, in these ways, procured accommodation for itself in “spirit,” without ever being able to grasp the concealed regions of decision on their own terms. (GA 96: 46)
  
- B     Even the thought of an agreement with England, in the sense of a distribution of the “franchise” of imperialism, does not get at the essence of the historical process which England is now playing out to the end within Americanism and Bolshevism, and this means at the same time also within world Judaism. The question concerning the role of *world Judaism* is not a racial one, but rather the metaphysical question concerning the kind of humanity which, *utterly unattached*, can take over the uprooting of all beings from being as its world-historical “task.” (GA 96: 243)
  
- C     World Judaism, spurred on by the emigrants let out of Germany, is everywhere elusive. In all the unfurling of its power, it need nowhere engage in military actions, whereas it remains for us to sacrifice the best blood of the best of our own people. (GA 96: 262)

## CONCERNING A

The remark can be reduced to three basic propositions: 1) Judaism comes into view in the course of a “temporary increase in power”; 2) this is related to contemporary metaphysics; 3) contemporary metaphysics is characterized by an “empty rationality and calculative reckoning,” which is why the “increasing power” of Judaism, with its “calculative capacity,” is related to this.

Regarding 1), it is one of Heidegger’s essential propositions about modern history that in its course it has increasingly taken shape as a history of the “will to power.” The modern subject, the (Cartesian) *ego cogito me cogitare*, ultimately projects itself as complete only in view of its possible perspectives for willing and expanding its power. To do so, it subjugates itself in its inventions to a technology that in the 1930s Heidegger, drawing upon Ernst Jünger’s concept of “total mobilization,” characterizes as “machination.”<sup>2</sup> “Machination,” in which all beings appear in the perspective of making or, we could say, of production, is once described by Heidegger in the *Black Notebooks* as follows: “The power of machination – the extermination even of god-lessness, the humanization of man into the animal, the exploitative utilization of the earth, the apportionment of the world – has entered a state of finality; differences of peoples, states, cultures exist only as facades. Machination cannot be inhibited and disabled by any measures” (GA 96: 52–53).

God – humanity – earth – world – a pre-figuration of the “fourfold” – are wholly occupied by the “power of machination.” All is integrated into it, nothing can prevent it. In the last notes of the *Überlegungen* (1941), but not only there, the thought appears that a connection exists between the eruption of the World War and the “power of manipulation.” It is not accidental that a history ends in the gigantic confrontation of totalitarian-technical systems of National Socialism/Bolshevism/Americanism.

The unfolding of the “power of machination” to its “finality,” however, leads to 2), the historical time-space of modern metaphysics. This begins in Descartes’ thinking and ends, concludes, in Nietzsche’s thinking. This thought belongs to the narrative of “being-historical thinking.” Being unconceals itself in modernity as the will of the subject,

consequently I-ness, ramping itself up beyond the will to will of Hegel into the will to power of Nietzsche.

The movement of history is a "sending" (*Geschick*), that is to say, it is not due to humanity's influence but to an internal developmental dynamic of being in modernity and its understandings. The Zürich seminar of 1951 provides an example of this thinking. There Heidegger says that the atomic bomb "exploded long ago," namely, "in the moment when man stepped into an uprising against being and positioned being in and of himself and made it the object of his representation." And he adds: "this is since Descartes" (GA 15: 433).

And finally regarding 3), "Empty rationality and calculative capacity" is typical of modern thought. With this Heidegger means the occurrence that in modern science mathematics is technically instrumentalized for "the exploitative utilization of the earth, the apportionment of the world," as was said earlier. And Descartes actually characterizes humanity, the modern subject, as "maître et possesseur de la nature."<sup>5</sup> Much could be said about the differentiation of science and its history, and also about the problematic relationship that, since Hegel, philosophy has to this history.

But it is more important to see that Heidegger inscribes Judaism in this history of modern technology and science or, as he terms it, of "machination." He ascribes to Judaism a "calculative capacity." At this point we must be accurate, because Heidegger was. In the *Contributions to Philosophy*, this very important text from the middle of the 1930s, we find the following thoughts. It says: "Sheer idiocy to say that experimental research is Nordic-Germanic and that rational research, on the contrary, is of foreign extraction! We would then have to resolve to number Newton and Leibniz among the 'Jews'" (GA 65: 163/127).

Heidegger was therefore not persuaded by the differentiation between a "German" or "Aryan" physics and a "Jewish physics." He rejected it because he was aware that such a distinction is impossible in the project of modern science. But that does not mean that this thought from the *Contributions* contradicts Heidegger's imputation that the Jews are defined by a "calculative capacity." There is a

difference, here, between the propositions: all calculative thinking is Jewish and all Jewish thinking is calculative. The first proposition is false because modern science was not established by the Jews. The second proposition Heidegger apparently considered accurate: all Jewish thinking is calculative.

The consequence of all of these considerations is that the ascription of “calculative thinking” to Judaism enabled Heidegger to depict Judaism as a moment of the “will to machination.” Judaism is a representative of modern technology next to other such representatives including, incidentally, the National Socialists. If I can characterize this whole construct of a historical classification of Judaism as being-historical, on the one hand, and likewise consider the attribution of a gift for calculation to Jews as an anti-Semitic stereotype, on the other, then we are here dealing with a “being-historical anti-Semitism.”

#### CONCERNING B

The second remark is divided into two propositions that are fundamentally difficult to connect: 1) there is a “historical process” in which England has played a role that cannot be changed by an “agreement”; 2) the role of “world Judaism” – in which “England” has a role to play, and in addition to which (this is important) “Americanism” and “Bolshevism” likewise play their parts – this “world Judaism” is not “racially grounded” but stems from the “metaphysical question concerning the kind of humanity which, *utterly unattached*, can take over the uprooting of all beings from being as its world-historical “task.”

The first part of this thought need not, it seems, detain us long. Heidegger – much like Nietzsche – despised not only English philosophy, but above all the “English spirit,” which for him is a merely economically oriented imperialist pragmatism. It would perhaps be possible to correlate Heidegger’s thinking at the end of the 1930s with Hitler’s speeches. If we think of Hitler’s speech on the 8th of November 1939, we find again this peculiar mix of contempt for England and anti-Semitic allusions. In general, it appears to me that the person of Hitler

represents the key to understanding the Heideggerian loyalty to the Third Reich.

The second part of the thought is more important. Heidegger maintains, first of all, that an understanding of “world Judaism” does not necessarily have to be “racially” motivated. I will leave this without comment for the moment. The question concerning racism in Heidegger must, in my opinion, be posed anew. I have done this in my book, so I will leave this issue to one side. There is a kind of “metaphysics” of “world Judaism.” “World Judaism” represents a “humanity” that, being “unattached” itself, furthers the “uprooting of all beings from being.”

However, “world Judaism” plays an important role in the cited passage. I cite it in part here once again:

Even the thought of an agreement with England, in the sense of a distribution of the “franchise” of imperialism [that is to say, the right or law of the established authority], does not get at the essence of the historical process [namely] which England is now playing out to the end within Americanism and Bolshevism, and this means at the same time also within world Judaism.  
(GA 96: 243)

The question concerns the sequence “England” – “Americanism” – “Bolshevism” – “this is to say at the same time...also within world Judaism.” What does “this is to say” mean here? Are England, Americanism, Bolshevism not only equal to but the same as “world Judaism”? Perhaps “world Judaism” is even the ground or the origin of Bolshevism, Americanism, and England?

A note from the *Anmerkungen* of 1942 reads: “In the time-space of the Christian West, and this means in the time-space of metaphysics, Jewry [*die Judenschaft*] is the principle of disintegration. That which is disintegrative in the reversal of the completion of metaphysics - i.e., the reversal of Hegel’s metaphysics by Marx. Spirit and culture become the superstructure of ‘life’ - i.e., of the economy, i.e. of organization - i.e., of

the biological – i.e. of the ‘people’” (GA 97: 20). I refer only to the second half of the citation. Marx, the Jew, turns Hegel’s metaphysics around. With that inversion, “spirit” is the epiphenomenon of “economy” and “organization.” Apart from the fact that Heidegger takes it as a disintegration, it can now become clear to what extent “Jewry” and “world Judaism” are the source of Bolshevism, Americanism and England, even of the “biological” of National Socialism that Heidegger mentions.

How different Heidegger’s reference to Marx in the “Letter on ‘Humanism’” sounds, a reference that came perhaps only a year later: “Because Marx by experiencing alienation attains an essential dimension of history, the Marxist view of history is superior to that of other historical accounts” (GA 9: 340/259, tm). The difference is deceptive, for there is no difference between this statement and that in the *Black Notebooks*. Simply put, the “alienation” Marx experiences is not the “alienation” of the modern world of labor, but that of the homeless Jew.

Judaism is the “principle of disintegration.” In what way? The “detachment” of the Jewish is connected to the furthering of the “uprooting of beings from being.” The “detachment” of “world Judaism” is, as it was called elsewhere, a kind of “worldlessness” (GA 95: 97) or, in my interpretation, “homelessness.” This concerns the Jewish Diaspora, in Hebrew *galut* (גלות), a disintegration that the Jewish people had to bear since the Babylonian conquest of the kingdom of Judea in 597 BC. In this sense the Diaspora is the condition of Zionism, and it is noteworthy that the Dreyfus affair in France at the end of the 19th century had both the *Protocols of the Elders of Zion* as well as Theodor Herzl’s *Der Judenstaat* in its wake. But this is only an aside.

The “unattachedness” of “world Judaism” apparently allowed it to further advance the “uprooting of all beings from being.” To give a being-historical exegesis of this idea, in my opinion, requires first briefly considering Heidegger’s being-historical understanding of homeland (*Heimat*) and homelessness (*Heimatlosigkeit*).

In a comment from the beginning of the 1940s, we read the following remark about the homeland : “The homeland is the appropriation of earth to become a site for the preparation of residence, which safeguards



the arrival of beyng from whose truth [*Wahr-heit*] gods and humans first conceive the region of their response" (GA 73.1: 755). Allow me to add to this a further definition from the same text: "Homeland is the historical site of the truth of beyng, called and received by the earth, rooted in it and in it held safe." This understanding of "homeland" is no longer related to a concrete nationally bounded community, to a people in the everyday sense. Homeland is at this point thought from *Ereignis* as "the event of appropriation," as the historical provenance of the truth of beyng.

"Earth" belongs necessarily to this "homeland." It "calls" and "receives" the "historical site of the truth of being." The "site" is "rooted and held safely" in it. It concerns, in other words, what Heidegger elsewhere called the "intimacy of the strife between world and earth" (GA 94: 274). The homeland as world is "rooted" in and "held safe" by the earth, the world occasions the earth's opening and uncovering. Homeland/world and earth open a respective history, however, when they happen as strife.

Returning to "unattached" "world Judaism," this means that with the "uprooting of beings from being," world Judaism promotes homelessness in a being-historical sense. World Judaism in its earthless Diaspora works towards making a sense of home impossible. How could it not, since it is excluded from the historical happening of the strife between world and earth?

However, in order to further the "uprooting of all beings from being," that is to say, the separation of beings from being, a certain capability is required. We are already acquainted with this. It is the "calculative capacity" that grasps technology and mathematics as a universal instrument to grind down every historically developed difference between cultures or peoples. And yet this is apparently not the only way that "world Judaism" brings about "disintegration."

Immediately after his depiction of the role that Marx plays in the history of metaphysics, Heidegger continues with the following thoughts:

Only when what is essentially “Jewish” in the metaphysical sense fights against the Jewish, only then is the pinnacle of self-destruction attained in history; assuming that the “Jewish” has everywhere completely seized control such that even combat against the “Jewish,” and this first and foremost, will be brought under its sway. (GA 97: 20)

Heidegger completes a movement of thought he had already discovered earlier. It is not easy to grasp. National Socialism is an epiphenomenon of “machination,” and that now means of the “Jewish.” The “Jewish” (that means National Socialism, or rather, machination), however, he now sees in a struggle with the “Jewish.” But what here is the “Jewish”? Do we have to think of “world Judaism” and/or of the persecuted, deported, and exterminated European Jews? However, the “self-destruction” of “machination” is a self-destruction of the “Jewish.” To fight against this, against what is “Jewish,” would be to be “brought under its sway” and thus to become yet another form of the “Jewish.”

I would like to pose here again the question of a being-historical anti-Semitism and respond to questions concerning its legitimacy. For Heidegger, the peculiar “worldlessness” of the Jews goes together with their “calculative capacity.” To the extent that this “worldlessness” is driving “the uprooting of all beings from being” it collides with the being-historical “home” as the “appropriation of earth to become a site for the preparation of residence.”

\*

A digression: Emmanuel Levinas attempts in his 1961 essay “Heidegger, Gagarin and Us” to bring out this most important difference between Judaism and Heidegger and the Heideggerians, whom he names explicitly. In essence, it concerns Heidegger’s emphatically topographic world-order and the destruction of this order by technology, as approved by Judaism.

"One's implementation in a landscape, one's attachment to *Place*," this would be the "splitting of humanity into natives and strangers." In this perspective, "technology is less dangerous than any spirit of a place." According to Levinas, technology attacks "the privileges of this enrootedness and the related sense of exile." He suggests that technology "wrenches us out of the Heideggerian world and the superstitions surrounding *place*."<sup>4</sup>

Against this, Gagarin has shown us how we can leave the site. The text reads: "For one hour, man existed beyond any horizon – everything around him was sky, or, more exactly, everything was geometrical space. A man existed in the absolute of homogeneous space."<sup>5</sup> In 1961 Yuri Gagarin had orbited the earth for 106 minutes in the space capsule *Vostok I*.

Decisive, however, is that Levinas relates the idea of replacing "place" with "homogeneous space" to Judaism. Judaism "has not sublimated idols – on the contrary, it has demanded that they be destroyed." "Like technology," Judaism "has demystified the universe." Through its "abstract universalism" it damages "imaginations and passions." Indeed, it has "discovered man in the nudity of his face."<sup>6</sup>

I think it is unavoidable to confront Heidegger's being-historical anti-Semitism with the thoughts of Levinas. Does this show that Heidegger's ideas have something of an instinctive reaction against actual characteristics of Judaism? Or would Levinas – assuming he had knowledge of these ideas – not have to revise his opposition between Heideggerian "*site*" and Judaic "universality"?

\*

#### CONCERNING C

The third of Heidegger's comments reads: "World Judaism, spurred on by the emigrants let out of Germany, is everywhere elusive. In all the unfurling of its power, it need nowhere engage in military actions, whereas it remains for us to sacrifice the best blood of the best of our own people" (GA 96: 262).

The proposition works with three subjects: a) world Judaism, b) emigrants who were allowed to leave Germany, c) we ourselves, who “sacrifice the best blood of the best of our own people.” We have already heard how world Judaism plays a role in the “power of machination.” The World War is the decisive context for this remark. “Emigrants” spur on world Judaism. It is not said who Heidegger is thinking of. Jewish refugees? People such as Thomas Mann who broadcast his speeches with the help of the BBC in London? They – just like “we” – appear to be identifiable. It is stated of world Judaism that it is “everywhere elusive.”

The worldlessness of Judaism appears to mean that it is “everywhere” but in this everywhere it conceals itself and remains “elusive.” The semantic of grasping, however, already indicates the problematic of this point. The “everywhere elusive” world Judaism is powerful precisely because it is “everywhere elusive.” And it is even on account of this special power that world Judaism needs “to participate nowhere in acts of war.” But how is that possible?

At this point I want to remind us of the already mentioned *Protocols of the Elders of Zion*. In his book, *What is Anti-Semitism?*, Wolfgang Benz pointed out that the concept of “world Judaism” generally belongs in the context of a myth of a “Jewish world conspiracy.”<sup>7</sup> In this sense the *Protocols of the Elders of Zion* represent a “textual incunabula,” an “absolute point of reference.”<sup>8</sup> It is the original document of modern anti-Semitism even if it is not the only source of this.

The malicious fiction of the *Protocols* describes a Judaism which strives for world domination and which recognizes even war as a possibility in this striving. Under the heading: “the taming of the resistances of the non-Jewish through war and a general world war,” it states that “as soon as a non-Jewish state dares to resist us, we must be in a position to incite its neighbors to war against it. But if the neighbors too want to make common cause with it and advance against us, we must unleash a world war.”<sup>9</sup>

There is no way of proving whether Heidegger had actually read the *Protocols*. There is a remark by Karl Jaspers according to which Heidegger was aware of them. According to this remark, in a

discussion concerning the “evil nonsense of the *Elders of Zion*,” Heidegger had once maintained: “But there is a dangerous international association of Jews.”<sup>10</sup>

Heidegger would not have needed to read the fiction of the *Protocols* in order to be taken in by them. They were an element of National Socialist propaganda. Hannah Arendt had noted this in connection with a book by Alexander Stein written in 1936 entitled *Adolf Hitler, Student of the “Elders of Zion.”*<sup>11</sup> In any case, we hear a reference to such anti-Semitism in Hitler’s speech on the 30th of January 1939, which states: “If international Jewish financiers in and outside Europe should succeed in plunging the peoples once more into a world war, then the consequence will not be the Bolshevization of the earth and therewith the victory of Judaism but the annihilation of the Jewish race in Europe.”<sup>12</sup> One can consider this speech as the first announcement of the annihilative actions of “task forces of the state police and the SD [*Sicherheitsdienst*; Security Service]” which began with the invasion of Poland in September 1939.

Heidegger followed Hitler’s speeches and would have taken note of this remark about the “international Jewish financiers.” Their spirit or rather their specter speaks from the *Protocols of the Elders of Zion*. This elucidates the context in and out of which Heidegger’s remark about world Judaism being “everywhere elusive” is uttered. “World Judaism” has become an international agitating power that can make use of certain figures (England, the USA, the Soviet Union) without having to come into view itself. At the same time, Heidegger obviously regards it as an enemy of the German people. Otherwise we could not explained the contrast he proposes: “whereas for us it only remains to sacrifice the best blood of the best of our own people.”

### III

Ernest Renan wrote in 1883: “The Judaism which, so far, has been good for the past, will be good for the future. It is the true root of liberalism, it answers to the modern spirit [*esprit moderne*]. Every Jew is a liberal [...]. He is so by his essence. The enemies of Judaism, however, if you

only look at them more closely, you will see that they are the enemies of the modern spirit in general.”<sup>15</sup>

Renan’s own position to Judaism is not unimportant here. It is vital that he ascribes to Judaism a representation of the “modern spirit.” In this way the anti-Semite is an anti-modernist.

If Heidegger uses the concept of “modernity” at all, he uses it in quotation marks. While Heidegger’s use of quotation marks is a topic all its own, with regards to “modernity” they are meant critically. Besides antiquity and the Middle Ages, is there a fourth epoch after modernity that we could positively define? Doubtful, according to Heidegger.

The determination of the concept “modern” remains problematic. It is ambiguous and, therefore, mostly misunderstood. Even today there is a dispute as to what extent the “Enlightenment” of the 18th century is at the center of this concept. Is modernity a child of Kant’s *Critique*, and if so, in what sense? Is enlightened rationality the leading authority in our media-based public sphere? However such questions might shift the meaning of the concept of “modernity,” its use in many contexts is still unavoidable.

Here – for my reading of Heidegger’s remarks on “world Judaism” – it is not necessary to present a complete account of “modernity.” It is enough to single out from these remarks, without attempting to be comprehensive, both negative and positive moments that cluster around the concept of modernity. These meanings include: 1) homelessness, i.e. the mobility of Judaism, 2) lack of origin [*Ursprungslosigkeit*] in relation to the “first beginning,” i.e. the complete inclusion of Judaism in the “calculative thinking” of modernity, 3) devastation, i.e. the complete inclusion of Judaism in “machination.” All three meanings form a coherent semantic field and also revolve around each other. Accordingly, Judaism would be the source of homelessness and lack of origin, as well as the devastation of an idealistic ordering of metaphysics.

This semantic field belongs to the epochal sense of modernity. The modern subject emancipates itself from national or ethnic determinations so as to be able to follow the advances of universal capital unhindered. In so doing, it assumes that ideological, political, religious,

aesthetic or moral determinations recede before the technical-pragmatic demands of a universal way of life.

If possible, has Heidegger here confused the modern subject with the Jew? Does the meaning of "being-historical anti-Semitism" perhaps lie in a hidden being-historical survey of the "modern spirit"? No. A shift from "being-historical anti-Semitism" to a "being-historical anti-modernism" is not permissible. In fact, the identification of Judaism with the "modern spirit" itself remains caught up in a stereotype, which today we would interpret as anti-Semitic, a stereotype, incidentally, that is countered by Zionism. In Zionism, there were attempts, ignored by Heidegger, to ground Judaism back upon its original source texts.

However, even if we do not permit the shift from "being-historical anti-Semitism" to a "being-historical anti-modernism," there remains, nevertheless, a consistent interpretation that "being-historical anti-Semitism" has traits of "being-historical anti-modernism." The impact of this connection is troubling. It seems to be a thorn in the side of Heidegger's thinking. For if we assume that today freedom consists in a – perhaps impossible – minimum personal distance from the undeniably present universal reductions of modernity, then we would have to acknowledge that this freedom is not only no longer to be thought with Heidegger, but no longer to be thought against him as well.

NOTES

- 1 Friedrich-Wilhelm von Herrmann, "Kein systematischer Baustein des Denkens – philosophisch belanglos," *Meta: Research in Hermeneutics, Phenomenology, and Practical Philosophy* 6: 2 (2014): 637–38.
- 2 See Ernst Jünger, "Total Mobilization," trans. Joel Golb and Richard Wolin, in *The Heidegger Controversy: A Critical Reader*, ed. Richard Wolin (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1993), 119–39.
- 3 Descartes, *Discourse on the Method*, in *The Philosophical Writings of Descartes*, vol. 1, ed. and trans. John Cottingham, Robert Stoothoff, and Dugald Murdoch (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), 142–43.
- 4 Levinas, Emmanuel, "Heidegger, Gagarin and Us," in *Difficult Freedom: Essays on Judaism*, trans. Seán Hand, 231–34 (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1990), 232–33.
- 5 Ibid., 233.
- 6 Ibid., 234.
- 7 Wolfgang Benz, *Was ist Antisemitismus?* 2nd ed. (Munich: C. H. Beck, 2005), 174.
- 8 Ibid., 192.
- 9 Jeffrey S. Sammons, ed., *Die Protokolle der Weisen von Zion. Die Grundlage des modernen Antisemitismus – eine Fälschung. Text und Kommentar* (Göttingen: Wallstein Verlag, 1998), 53.
- 10 Karl Jaspers, *Philosophische Autobiographie*, erweiterte Neuauflage (Munich: Piper Verlag, 1977), 101.
- 11 Alexander Stein, *Adolf Hitler, Schüler der "Weisen von Zion"* (Karlsbad: Verlagsanstalt Graphia, 1936).
- 12 Max Domarus, *Hitler. Reden und Proklamationen 1932–1945*, vol. 2: *Untergang*, Erster Halbband 1939–1940 (Munich: Süddeutscher Verlag, 1965), 1328.
- 13 Ernest Renan, "De l'identité originelle et de la séparation graduelle du judaïsme et du christianisme," in *Oeuvres complètes de Ernest Renan*, vol. 1, 907–24, ed. Henriette Psichari (Paris: Calmann Lévy, 1947), 922.



# Heidegger's *Black Notebooks* and the Question of Anti-Semitism

*Jesús Adrián Escudero*

Heidegger's silence following the discovery of the horrors of Nazism was well known. In recent times, there is an ongoing effort to uncover the ultimate reasons that led him to sympathize with the National Socialist movement. However, Heidegger did not remain silent. A significant number of documents – some of them recently published – clearly capture his personal and political opinions. At the same time, he hastens to add excuses and downplay the level of his involvement. Fortunately, the recent publication of his philosophical journal in the spring of 2014 – known within the framework of Heideggerian studies as the *Black Notebooks* (*Schwarze Hefte*) – now allows new light to be shed on his level of personal commitment to National Socialism and a reevaluation of the political dimension of his thought.<sup>1</sup>

The publication of the first few volumes of the so-called *Black Notebooks* has undoubtedly re-kindled the controversy. The controversy started up even before the publication of these notebooks. The circulation of some of the book's extracts generated a bitter discussion in various German, French, and Italian journals among defenders and critics of Heidegger's thought and image.<sup>2</sup> It is indisputable that the *Black Notebooks* contain some controversial and ambivalent statements about the topic of Jews and Judaism – a fact that has re-awakened the prickly subject of anti-Semitism and triggered a re-opening of the so-called Heidegger Case.

Nevertheless, faced with the abundance of documentary material and evidence available today, one must be sensible and cautious when

reconsidering the problem of Heidegger, his politics, and anti-Semitism. Besides asking “Was Heidegger a Nazi?” and “Was Heidegger an anti-Semite?” it seems more suitable to inquire about the type of National Socialism that he was aiming to establish during his time as rector of the University of Freiburg. Furthermore, his political discourse of the thirties cannot be read on the fringes of the German socio-historical context, characterized by the fall of the Weimar Republic and the National Socialist Party’s rise to power. For Heidegger, German identity is founded upon groundedness in one’s homeland. Proceeding from this basic idea, the present work addresses the following four issues.

First, what the *Black Notebooks* are is explained. Secondly, a brief description of the so-called Heidegger Case is provided, as well as a review of the current state of the investigation regarding Heidegger’s connection to National Socialism. Thirdly, an analysis is offered of the role and spiritual significance that Heidegger gives to groundedness (*Bodenständigkeit*), to homeland (*Heimat*) and to the people (*Volk*) as unifying elements of German identity. This analysis is carried out starting with the influence exerted on him by his reading of Yorck, Spengler and other representatives of the conservative movement of right-wing Germans who were opposed to the Weimar Republic. Lastly, the prickly subject of Heidegger’s anti-Semitism is settled.

## I. WHAT ARE THE *BLACK NOTEBOOKS*?

Around the year 1930, a time in which the well-known turning (*Kehre*) started, Heidegger undertook the drafting of texts that aimed to clarify central elements of his most esoteric thought, especially the philosophical and conceptual experiments regarding the thought of the enowning-event (*Ereignis-Denken*), which begins to flourish in *Contributions to Philosophy* (1936–38). His brother Fritz Heidegger was already alluding to these notebooks in a 1950 letter to Hugo Friedrich: “Heidegger is completely himself in the actual manuscripts (not in the courses and lectures); these manuscripts themselves are here almost intact, only a few have been transcribed. That fundamental attitude that should be the beginning and end of all philosophizing appears here; for a while

I have been calling it humility. Here, in these manuscripts are hidden away the gems and delights of Heideggerian thought. I hope that they remain hidden for a long time.”<sup>3</sup>

Heidegger himself made a decree – incidentally very Nietzschean – that these manuscripts should be kept closed for at least one hundred years, just as is deduced from the testimony of his son Hermann Heidegger: “When I die, what you must do is seal everything that I leave behind, tie it up and file it away for one hundred years. The times are still not ready to understand me.”<sup>4</sup> The hesitation that Heidegger showed concerning the publication of his *Collected Works* is already known. Even in 1972 he wrote to his publisher Vittorio Klostermann: “Regrettably, I cannot grant your wish to print a complete edition of my works.”<sup>5</sup> Nevertheless, the editor succeeded in convincing Hermann Heidegger to establish a common objective, and finally, in 1973, Heidegger agreed to the proposal of an edition of his works.

The *Black Notebooks*, through Heidegger’s own wish, should have been published once the 102 volumes that compose the *Collected Works* (*Gesamtausgabe*) had been printed. However, said wish was not carried out to the letter. Given the great interest generated by these notebooks, three of the new volumes were published this past spring of 2014 by the German publishing house Vittorio Klostermann.

All the same, what do the *Black Notebooks* consist of? For decades, these texts have composed one of the myths surrounding the image of Heidegger, one of the best-kept secrets stored in the Heidegger Archives in Marbach. In the opinion of the few who have had access to them, they are the essence of his philosophy. The co-editor of the *Gesamtausgabe* and last assistant to Martin Heidegger, Friedrich-Wilhelm von Herrmann, expresses the importance of these *Black Notebooks* in the following terms:

A separate issue are volumes 94 to 102 of the fourth division. These volumes contain the so-called *Black Notebooks and Workbooks*, as Heidegger called them. They begin in the year 1931, that is to say, just at the beginning of his thought on the history of being, and

they end the year of his death. The *Black Notebooks* accompany his entire journey from 1931 to 1976. In this sense, they form a lengthy and, temporarily, contextual manuscript, despite being notes that started anew each week, each month, each year. [...] What is here is a dense collection of thought. [...] It is not only a different stylistic form; he mentions many things which, as he wrote them here, he would not write in any of the other essays, not even in the large ones. Because of this, these nine volumes are of great importance.<sup>6</sup>

In short, the *Black Notebooks* (GA 94-96) comprise thirty-four black-covered booklets, in which Heidegger composed a series of notes between 1931 and 1976. The first fourteen booklets – which have now been published – are entitled *Reflections* (*Überlegungen*) and span the years between 1931 and 1941. The other twenty booklets are classified as follows: nine of them are dedicated to *Observations* (*Anmerkungen*, the first volume of which was published in 2015), two of them to *Four Notebooks* (*Vier Hefte*), another two to *Vigils* (*Vigilae*), one to *Nocturne* (*Notturmo*), two more to *Hints* (*Winke*), and four to *Provisionals* (*Vorläufiges*). In the last few years two other notebooks have appeared – *Megiston* and *Fundamental Words* (*Grundworte*). As of now, it is not foreseen that the last two notebooks will be published within the framework of the *Gesamtausgabe*.

Why is it that so many expectations have arisen with regard to these texts? Until recently, it was thought that the *Black Notebooks* comprised a kind of philosophical journal, a log of thoughts that would provide the key to reading Heidegger's works. However, Heidegger has a surprise in store once again. As he himself asserts, it is not about aphorisms or any kind of wisdom-giving literature, but rather “simple little advance parties that generally try to conquer the road of a still indescribable reflection toward an initial questioning, which, unlike metaphysical thought, is called onto-historical” (GA 95: 274). The different representations that are found in the history of metaphysics are irrelevant. What remains crucial here is how one asks about being, not what is said about

it. In his text *Mindfulness* (1936–38), Heidegger refers to his notebooks, especially to *Reflections* II, IV, and V, with a reminder that in them are preserved “the basic mental states of questioning and the paths to the most extreme horizons of all attempts at thinking” (GA 66: 426). The act of emphasizing “the basic mental states of questioning” reinforces the idea that these reflections concern “attempts at thinking.” In this sense, the author of the notebooks decided to make an observation which likely dates to the beginning of the seventies, in which it is stated that the *Black Notebooks* “are not notes for a planned system, but instead, are really attempts at a simple naming” (GA 94: 1). It does not cease to surprise that in all these cases the *Black Notebooks* are considered mere attempts, approaches towards an earlier thinking, tries at saying the unspeakable, efforts towards thinking the unthinkable. If what remains “crucial” is “how one asks,” that is, how the meaning of being is put into words, then a new style of writing is found in the *Black Notebooks*. Along with his lectures, books, conferences, treatises, and discourses, there is a peculiar style that approaches what could be called a “thought journal” or “thinking diary” (*Denktagebuch*).

In general, there are philosophical reflections mixed with annotations about events of the time. Thus, in the more than 1,200 pages of GA 94–96 there are indicators of the course that his philosophy took after *Being and Time* and clarifications regarding his second fundamental work, *Contributions to Philosophy*. There are also opinions about his time as rector in Freiburg, and multiple reflections about the dangerous signs of the growing mechanization of everyday life and the fulfillment of technology as an expression of will to power, whose “ultimate act” will be carried out when “the earth itself explodes in the air” and “contemporary humans disappear” (GA 96: 238).<sup>7</sup> However, along with these interesting observations about the trajectory of his thought and his assessment of the progression of the history of metaphysics, there are some intriguing strong opinions about National Socialism and, starting from 1938, his severe commentary about Judaism.

As Peter Trawny, the German editor of his notebooks, well observes, there is no evidence that Heidegger had read *The Protocols of the Elders*

of *Zion*, which spread the theory of a worldwide Jewish conspiracy.<sup>8</sup> Nevertheless, part of Hitler's discourse spread the stereotypes that were proposed therein, which Heidegger assimilated and associated with his philosophical questioning in various sections of his work. That is to say, he associates calculability – the way of thinking of the contemporary time period – with the Jewish world-view, which he identifies with the spirit of calculation. In this way, the criticism of modernity is united with, and extended to, that of Judaism. Thus, in *Reflections* VIII, he writes: “One of the stealthiest forms of gigantism and perhaps the most ancient is the cleverness of calculation, pushiness, and intermixing whereby Jewry's worldlessness is established” (GA 95: 97). Also, in *Reflections* XII, he maintains: “Contemporary Jewry's increase in power finds its basis in the fact that Western metaphysics – above all, in its modern incarnation – offers fertile ground for the dissemination of an empty rationality and calculability” (GA 96: 46). Assertions such as these have reawakened the topic of anti-Semitism and revived the famous Heidegger Case. These first three recently-published volumes offer enough evidence to discard the image of Heidegger as an apolitical rural recluse shut up in his cabin, who ignored the socio-political reality of his time.

## II. THE HEIDEGGER CASE: NEW DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE AND THE CURRENT STATE OF THE INVESTIGATION

The appearance of Heidegger's work has revealed serious doubts regarding the political viability of his thought. These doubts date to the political scandal – the so-called Heidegger Case – which led to the publication of the pioneering works of the late 1980s by Derrida, Farías, Lyotard, and Ott about Heidegger's entanglement in National Socialism.<sup>9</sup> These first works concerning the political dimension of Heidegger's work were followed in the early 1990s by those of Nolte, Pöggeler, Rockmore, Sluga, Young, and Wolin, among others.<sup>10</sup> In light of this scandal, it was realized that Heidegger can no longer be read in the same way, and that his connection with National Socialism was undeniable.

On the other hand, there is the official history as told by Heidegger himself at different moments in his life: from his reflective essay “The Rectorship 1933–34: Facts and Thoughts” and his letter dated November 4, 1945 addressed to the Denazification Committee of the University of Freiburg, to his well-known interview with *Der Spiegel* magazine in 1966.<sup>11</sup> To this is added the recent publication of his political discourses, academic proceedings, and radio-broadcast interviews of the thirties in volume 16 of the *Collected Works*, the well-known Rectoral Address, the controversial text of 1933–34 about *Nature, History, State*, the reflections from 1936 to 1938, and the commentary about the Jewish people found in *Contributions to Philosophy*.<sup>12</sup> Additionally, there are the opinions expressed by Heidegger’s contemporaries, such as Karl Löwith, Hermann Mörchen, Hans Jonas, Karl Jaspers, and Heinrich Petzet.<sup>13</sup>

After a few years of silence, the Heidegger Case was reopened with the books of Farías and Faye, which revealed new documents and political writings that aim to prove Heidegger’s Nazism.<sup>14</sup> The volume organized by Tauereck appeared as well, which establishes a commonality of interests between Heidegger and National Socialism.<sup>15</sup> However, this kind of extremely politicized interpretation shows some documentation errors and a high degree of bias, as has been evidenced in the latest research of Denker, Zaborowski, Grosser, and Xolocotzi.<sup>16</sup>

Despite the wide consensus within the field of Heideggerian studies regarding Heidegger’s political affiliation, the debate remains open, especially following the publication of new documents and political discourse contained in the Heidegger Archives and, of course, the recent publication of the *Black Notebooks*. These notebooks contain crucial biographical and political information about the turbulence of the Nazi era. Among other things, it remains clear that Heidegger rejects the National Socialist ideology of racial and biological oppression. The *Black Notebooks* demonstrate that Heidegger attempts to philosophically consider some of the questions posed by National Socialism, particularly the question of what it is that defines the German people (*Volk*). Barely anything is said of specific political matters. His interest lies more in

the spiritual and symbolic significance of the National Socialist revolution than in its particular effects.

The studies of Farías, Sheehan, Ott, and others have clearly proved the connection between Heidegger and National Socialism. However, the discussion of Heidegger's political stance frequently rests on an ahistoric conception of Nazism, which tends to be understood more as a moral failure than as a complex political, ideological, and social movement that ended in a Holocaust which is unparalleled in modern European history.<sup>17</sup> National Socialism is not anything monolithic, but rather a movement which, especially in its initial stages, sought a political and social revolution that was dramatically transformed into a regime of human devastation.

Hence the necessity of situating Heidegger's texts within the context of the fall of the Weimar Republic and the National Socialist Party's rise to power. Noteworthy studies of Weimar include Gay's classic cultural approach, Fergusson's in-depth research into the economic consequences following the Treaty of Versailles, Weitz's sociological analysis, Jelinek's legal study of the Weimar Constitution, Möller's sociological approach, and Jay's historical explanation.<sup>18</sup> To these it is worth adding Benz's studies of National Socialist ideology and the historical analyses of the specific academic context of the German university of the thirties compiled by Leaman and Martin.<sup>19</sup>

In conclusion, on the one hand, what Heidegger said during the era of the National Socialist regime – his reflections – and did – his actions – must be analyzed; and, on the other hand, it must be understood how those actions would be interpreted in relation to his philosophy and his historical context. In other words, the “official history” as told by Heidegger himself as well as the “Heidegger Case” must be completed, and, in part, corrected based on archival, documentary, historical and philosophical research. Here it is interesting to focus attention on reading Heidegger's reflections about Judaism as deeply rooted in the social and historical context of a conservative Germany, a Germany that was very critical of the Weimar Republic.



### III. WHAT IS GERMANY? GROUNDEDNESS, HOMELAND, AND PEOPLE

#### III.A POLITICS OF THE LAND

Heidegger has a particular perspective on the history of being, in which a privileged relationship is established between the Greeks and the Germans – to be specific, between the Greek thinkers and the German poets. From his viewpoint, German identity is shaped linguistically, historically, and culturally around the notion of “homeland” or “native land” (*Heimat* or *Heimatland*). German spirit is not defined by the territorial model of the nation state, but rather by the groundedness that Germans establish through ties to their community and their history. As is known, Heidegger persistently rejected the biologism of Nazi ideology and its racist rhetoric. He seemed to be more interested in philosophically considering some of the main problems with National Socialism, particularly the question of what it means to be a people (*Volk*).<sup>20</sup> Here, a people is not thought of in racial or biological terms. A people identifies with the spirit of a nation. The state – as Heidegger points out – is a people’s way of being.<sup>21</sup>

Heidegger is convinced that philosophy in its original sense can only be carried out in dialogue with politics – albeit with a very specific notion of politics. In his case, it is not so much politics in an institutional, legal, and socio-economic sense as it is land politics, geopolitics, archi-politics.<sup>22</sup> This land politics represents the historical and ontological space in which *Dasein* struggles to find its place. Its own sense of being is rooted in the community, in tradition, in history. Here, the land has an ontological significance.<sup>23</sup> It becomes the space that allows for the unfolding of basic human possibilities, this is to say, it comprises the field, the *there* (*Da*) in which and against which *Dasein* is self-fulfilled as a given political entity. As human beings inhabit the land and dwell in it, they create spaces whose borders do not necessarily coincide with territorial and/or geographical boundaries. The land constitutes what the Greeks call *chthōn*: the place where humans dwell and create a homeland (*Heimatland*).<sup>24</sup>

What is the appropriate moment to carry out this kind of politics? The turbulent years of the Weimar Republic present the awaited opportunity – not only for Heidegger but for a large part of the German academic world.<sup>25</sup> The economic instability, social uprising, and political unrest of the Weimar era seem to offer the auspicious occasion (*kairos*) to free philosophy from the cosmopolitanism, liberalism, and, therefore, groundlessness (*Bodenlosigkeit*) that are characteristic of urban Weimar culture. In order to combat that groundlessness, Heidegger attempts to regain access to the deep roots of Germany and to the Western philosophical tradition. This explains the close relationship that is established between the German poets (Hölderlin, George, Trakl, Rilke) and the Greek thinkers (Heraclitus, Parmenides, Plato, Aristotle). Already in his lectures of the summer semester of 1924, *Basic Concepts of Aristotelian Philosophy*, Heidegger reminds his students of the necessity of restoring the groundwork that keeps Greek knowledge alive (GA 18: 36–37). What Heidegger refers to is nothing more than remaining on one’s own soil, permanence (*Ständigkeit*) on one’s land (*Boden*). This return to German origins of homeland is a common claim of the conservative wing of the so-called “people’s movement” (*Volkstum*). Authors such as Paul Yorck von Wartenburg and Oswald Spengler are two representatives of this movement who, among others, had a strong influence on Heidegger.

### III.B YORCK AND GROUNDEDNESS IN ONE’S HOMELAND

The same years in which Heidegger dedicated great effort to interpreting Aristotle’s texts on practical and political philosophy (1924–25) are also marked by his detailed reading of the correspondence between Paul Yorck von Wartenburg and Wilhelm Dilthey, which was published in 1923. In the letters Yorck sent to Dilthey, which crucially influence the meaning of historicity in *Being and Time*, Heidegger finds an important source of inspiration for his concept of “homeland” (*Heimatland*). In many of these letters, Yorck returns time and again to the subject of Germany’s groundlessness (*Bodenlosigkeit*) and supports a life that is rooted in one’s own soil and in historical tradition. Remaining in one’s homeland constitutes a primordial element of stability (*Ständigkeit*) – as

much for the individual as for the community. Those who abandon their own soil in favor of the flux of capital and urban life have lost their ties to their own historical identity. Here, Yorck points to Jews as an example of this kind of life that is governed by money and a desire for profit: "Jews – that entire tribe lacks all feeling toward physical and psychological ground."<sup>26</sup>

The interest Yorck shows in place of birth and in a life settled in one's homeland generated great influence on Heidegger's thought. By reconfiguring German identity in terms of groundedness and autochthony rather than by strictly economical and territorial criteria, Yorck emphasizes a fundamental dimension of German existence: its establishment in a land whose true significance is more historical than topographical. The understanding Yorck has of homeland and of local landscape as forces that form German historical destiny provide Heidegger with a model that allows him to consider the connection between groundedness (*Bodenständigkeit*) and destiny (*Geschick*). In paragraphs 73–77 of *Being and Time*, Heidegger revisits Yorck's analysis and offers a particular understanding of the destiny of human existence: Dasein, as determined by care (*Sorge*), never exists in solitude, disconnected from the heritage of its tradition. His reading of Yorck allows him to reconceptualize the constitutive roles of tradition and of groundedness in one's homeland as two basic elements that determine individual and collective existence. This existence – of individuals as much as of communities – is something dynamic, and is subject to a constant process of revision and reinterpretation.

Yorck highlights the necessity of understanding Dasein not as an isolated, monadic, and bourgeois subject, but rather as an entity whose being is comprised by its generation. This means that the destiny of every individual (*Schicksal*) is closely interwoven with the collective destiny of the people (*Volksgeschick*) to which he/she belongs. Collective destiny, *Ge-schick*, is not something granted in advance. Instead, it is a collective search (*Ge-*) for the historical possibilities that tradition sends (*schickt*) to a community, possibilities which should always be fulfilled and adopted in conformity to their historical roots.

In Heidegger's opinion, groundedness is linked to historicity. *Dasein* – understood collectively as people – only becomes what it is (that is, German) in the struggle and the effort to recover its roots in history, language, and homeland. However, during the twenties and the era of the Weimar Republic, Heidegger never explicitly addresses the meaning of what it is to be German. This will not happen until the euphoric outbreak of National Socialism in 1933, the time when Heidegger shows growing interest in the topic of popular groundedness (*völkische Bodenständigkeit*) in open dialogue with the politics of the conservative revolution.<sup>27</sup> The emergence of National Socialism in 1933 offered Heidegger what Machiavelli called *l'occasione*: the political opportunity, the kairological occasion, the opportune moment for the German people and the role of leadership of their Führer. Beyond the writings, manifestos, and words of Heidegger, beyond his political intentions, one must understand his political stance within the framework of the academic conservatism of the time period, one of whose objectives consists of reestablishing the historical roots of the German people. This spirit of revitalization is strongly felt in the famous Rectoral Address of May 1933, "The Self-Assertion of the German University."

### III.C THE GERMAN QUESTION

When it is asserted that Heidegger develops concepts such as "homeland," "community," and "people" from reading Yorck and Spengler, it is not suggested that the usage of such vocabulary justifies his involvement with Nazism, although neither can it be denied that it levels and eases the road toward a positive interpretation of the National Socialist movement. It can be claimed that the usage of such terms within the intellectual context of the time period is not merely accidental. This unexpected ideological background is easily mobilized when asserting Germanness (*Deutschtum*), reclaiming blood ties, protecting rootedness in the same soil, and appealing to sacrifice, patriotism, and nationalism.

In the final stages of the twenties one finds the testimonies of Max Müller and Hans Jonas, which confirm Heidegger's inclination toward the German nation (*deutsche Volkstum*) and his sympathies toward the

ideology of blood and soil (*Blut und Boden*). Max Müller describes the Freiburg Heidegger of 1928–29 as follows: “Heidegger developed a style with his students that was completely different from that of other professors. We went on many outings. Of course, connection to the people [*Volk*], nature, and the student movement was a recurring topic of conversation. The word ‘national’ [*völkisch*] was a favorite of his, even if he never associated it with any political party.”<sup>28</sup> Also, Hans Jonas offers the following account: “It is true that one could always detect in Heidegger a certain point of view influenced by the idea of ‘blood and soil.’ His origin from the Black Forest was of great importance to him. This was not only due to the fact that he loved skiing and the mountains, but also that it had something to do with his ideological standpoint: one should remain close to nature. Some of his observations showed a sort of primitive nationalism.”<sup>29</sup>

Heidegger was truly convinced that a profound and lasting change in German reality was necessary when he wrote a letter to Elisabeth Blochmann in the spring of 1933 in which one detects revolutionary language that marks the defining moment of his entrance into the realm of politics: “For me, the present situation demands action in service of a great commitment and participation in the construction of a world founded in the people. We can find this, as well as the calling of the German people, in the history of the Western world, but only if we ourselves are exposed to and take ownership of it in a new way. The time for a first awakening has arrived.”<sup>30</sup>

Heidegger’s assessment of German society of that time concludes with an appeal to change, a change that should lead to university reform. This is one of the messages expressed in his Rectoral Address. Incidentally, similar proclamations are found among rectors of other German universities of the same time period; for example, those of Hans Heyse at the University of Königsberg and those of Ernst Krieck at the University of Frankfurt. Heyse, Krieck, and Bäumler, among many others, were convinced that German society’s road to transformation was through university reform and a return to Greek culture. A reform seasoned with an intense patriotic, military, national and heroic rhetoric; a reform that invokes strength and severity. In this context,

Heidegger sees himself as a transitional philosopher in a transitional time that heroically faces the dangers that stalk the university and, therefore, Germany during an era dominated by nihilism.

The footsteps of Ernst Jünger and Friedrich Nietzsche can be strongly seen here as well. Both helped Heidegger understand the profound metaphysical implications of their time. Beginning with his reading of Nietzsche and Jünger, initiated in the early thirties, Heidegger starts to realize that mechanization and nihilism are the forces that fuel the destiny of the West. The political and metaphysical causes of nihilism are the will to power and the groundlessness of the modern world. Heidegger wishes to shake the drowsy consciences of his contemporaries through a message of revelation (*Offenbarung*), a revelation that consists of a leap (*Sprung*) toward the origin (*Ursprung*).

In the midst of Heidegger's growing interest in Jünger, George, and Hölderlin one finds the basic question: "What is Germany?" Germany is able to determine its destiny in three ways: a) in the style of Jünger, who speaks of a "worker's Germany" within the framework of a new social and military tinted nationalism; b) in the style of National Socialism, which envisions a Germany subject to the *Führerprinzip* and race theory; c) in the style of Stefan George, who idealizes Hölderlin's notion of a Germany understood as a fatherland and homeland. The German fatherland (*deutsches Vaterland*) is the silent and secret origin that is still waiting to be discovered at the right moment. Again one finds the development of the myth of homeland (*Heimatland*) that answers to a clear kairological structure of time.

In fact, the *Black Notebooks* begin with an observation concerning the essence of the German people: "To be German: to cast the innermost burden of the history of the West before oneself and take it on one's shoulders" (GA 95: 2). One of the central questions that gives structure to many of Heidegger's reflections contained in the *Black Notebooks* is "Who are we?" Here, one takes a step away from *Jeweiligkeit*, the well-known being-in-every-case-mine of Dasein as analyzed in *Being and Time*, toward the second Heidegger's *Jeunsrigkeit*, the being-in-every-case-ours, that is to say, one takes a step away

from individual destiny toward the collective destiny of the German nation. Beyond the legitimate moral and political opinions that can be formulated against Heidegger's entanglement with National Socialism, it seems to be the framework from which one can philosophically interpret Heidegger's passages about Judaism, which, as is known, are integrated with his criticisms of modernity and with his repeated attacks on Americanism and Bolshevism.

Reconsidering the relationship that Hölderlin establishes between the Germans and the Greeks, Heidegger finds a source of inspiration for his ideal of a German homeland. Germans – as he writes to Schwoerer recommending one of his students – should reassert their legacy or suffer the fate of a “growing Judaization” (*Verjudung*).<sup>51</sup> The letter to Schwoerer concludes by differentiating Germans and Jews in terms of homeland. Germans are deeply rooted in their homeland (*Heimatland*) and in their native soil (*Vaterland*), while Jews are a people characterized by diaspora, migration, and exodus, that is, by groundlessness (*Bodenlosigkeit*). The Jews' urban and ungrounded way of life can come to represent a danger for the people's community (*Volksgemeinschaft*). From Heidegger's perspective, in which autochthony is based on groundedness in one's homeland, Jews are an ungrounded people. As Derrida observes, the only form of groundedness known to Jews is that of words and writing.<sup>52</sup> Hence it should not be surprising that in 1933 Heidegger warned Jaspers of the “Jews' dangerous international network” and in *Contributions to Philosophy* he declares that “Bolshevism is Jewish” (GA 65: 54).<sup>53</sup> Nevertheless, one must be cautious when deciphering the meaning of Heidegger's statements. Heidegger is not a typical racist anti-Semite. He rejects biological racism on numerous occasions.<sup>54</sup>

#### IV. ANTI-SEMITISM OR ANTI-JUDAISM?

Every time that Heidegger's connection with National Socialism is spoken of there is a tendency to pose the question of whether Heidegger was anti-Semitic or whether there are detectable anti-Semitic elements

in his philosophical works. The answer to this kind of question is not at all easy given the political implications and moral ramifications that it entails. Of course, it cannot be answered with a simple “yes” or “no.” Before answering the question of whether Heidegger and his work are anti-Semitic it must be clear what is understood as anti-Semitism and, therefore, what is understood as anti-Judaism.<sup>35</sup> The differences between both phenomena must be clear in order to not fall prisoner to hasty judgments.

Thus, for example, one speaks of anti-Judaism having a religious and cultural basis and anti-Semitism having a biological and racial basis. There must be a distinction between, on the one hand, the tradition of hostility against Jews as members of a religious community, which dates to the first century, and, on the other hand, a political social movement of rejection of and discrimination against the “Jewish race.” Clearly, it is not a matter of downplaying Heidegger’s culpability. In discussing National Socialist anti-Semitism, it is difficult to find the right words to describe the events that occurred, particularly when attempting to explain the Holocaust. Neither is it easy to clearly determine the boundary between “anti-Semitism” and “anti-Judaism.” One cannot be understood without the other. The boundary between the two phenomena fluctuates.

Could perhaps two types of enmity against Jews be clearly distinguished? Would that not mean excusing anti-Judaism in comparison to anti-Semitism and its search for a “final solution” to the Jewish question? With all the difficulties involved in differentiating between anti-Judaism and anti-Semitism and in being aware of the care that must be shown in using such differentiation, one cannot lose sight of the fact that there were and are important differences between: a) an ideological prejudice against Jews conditioned by cultural and religious motives, and b) the pseudo-scientifically justified goal of exterminating the whole “Jewish race.” As Zaborowski observes, even if one foregoes distinguishing between anti-Judaism and anti-Semitism and chooses to use the general concept of “anti-Semitism,” it would be necessary to distinguish between different types of anti-Semitism – at least with



regard to Jews' social position and the use of violence against them.<sup>36</sup> When discussing Heidegger's relationship with Jews, one must keep in mind a set of distinctions and nuances about what "anti-Semitism" means. One cannot limit oneself to only a few sources.<sup>37</sup> Heidegger's thought process and life must also be considered from their specific historical context.

In practice, a clear difference must be established between anti-Semitism, understood as racial and biological animosity against Jews, and anti-Judaism, understood as reflecting a long-held European tradition against the Jewish people and religion. According to the documentary evidence available, it is difficult to speak of a systematic anti-Semitism in Heidegger's philosophy.<sup>38</sup> What can be detected in Heidegger are strong traces of a spiritual and cultural anti-Judaism, particularly present in the university and academic spheres. There is no doubt that Heidegger's relationship with Judaism is highly problematic and ambiguous, but his stance cannot be described as unilaterally anti-Semitic, if anti-Semitism is understood as the racial persecution and systematic annihilation of the Jews.

Therefore, how can the question of whether or not Heidegger was anti-Semitic be answered? Towards the end of the twenties the rumor was already circulating that Heidegger was anti-Semitic. Toni Cassirer, the wife of Ernst Cassirer, acknowledges in her autobiography that "[Heidegger's] tendency toward anti-Semitism was not unknown to us." Also, at the beginning of the thirties – as Bultmann points out – the rumor was spread that Heidegger had joined the National Socialist Party.<sup>40</sup> Even his old friend and former colleague, Karl Jaspers, in his report written for the University of Freiburg in 1945, showed reservations concerning Heidegger's attitude toward Jews.<sup>41</sup> Additionally, in his letters from 1916 to his wife, Elfride Petri, published in 2005, Heidegger already spoke of the "jewification [*Verjudung*] of our culture and universities."<sup>42</sup> Heidegger again speaks similarly of "jewification" in a 1929 letter addressed to Victor Schworer, the vice-president of the *Notgemeinschaft der Deutschen Wissenschaft*.<sup>43</sup> These letters to his wife and Schworer are two instances that seem to clearly show a certain racist anti-Semitism.

Once again, there arises the same question that was posed at the beginning: what type of anti-Semitism does Heidegger support? In light of the available documentation, it seems difficult to speak of a racist or biological anti-Semitism in Heidegger. Also, in the *Black Notebooks* and in other writings there are passages in which Heidegger appears extremely critical of this type of anti-Semitism. It is true that Heidegger establishes a difference between Jews and non-Jews, but this difference is not based on biological criteria. His commentary about Jews is made from the perspective of spirit and not race. Thus, for example, in his book about Nietzsche he leaves it clear that “biology as such never decides *what* is living” (GA 6.1: 468/N3: 42). The true debatable question concerning Heidegger’s relationship with Jews cannot be settled in this way. Instead, one must consider how his philosophical approach to Hebrew tradition comprises a deciding moment in the way he interprets the whole history of philosophy. Heidegger is not interested – at least not philosophically speaking – in legitimizing the extermination of the Jews, but rather in reaching a critical understanding of their condition. His assessment of the present is strongly influenced by his interpretation of Nietzschean nihilism: the present is a time that is controlled by the metaphysical principle of will to power. The introduction of a “racial breeding,” which Heidegger speaks of in his texts about Nietzsche in the thirties (GA 6.2: 278/N3: 231), has nothing to do with what Faye calls “a selection of race like that which was in those times bloodily set in motion with National Socialism.”<sup>44</sup> It is not an ontological legitimization of National Socialist racism. The “breeding of human beings” (*Züchtung des Menschen*) is the culmination of the metaphysics of subjectivity; it is the maximum expression of modern technology in its attempt to exploit natural and human resources – a product of the mechanization (*Machinalisierung*) that governs the present. Heidegger believes that Nietzsche is the first to recognize the metaphysical character of the machine, which transforms human beings into a type (*Typ*); into a simple form (*Gestalt*) on which a shape can be imprinted; into material for experimentation (*Versuchsmaterial*) (GA 50: 55–56/N3: 229–30).

In this regard, the passage from the Bremen Lectures tends to be quoted in support of the theory that Heideggerian thought is essentially anti-Semitic. This is the argument of Wolin and Faye, among others. In the 1949 lecture entitled “Positionality” (*Das Ge-Stell*), it says: “Agriculture is now a mechanized food industry, in essence the same as the production of corpses in the gas chambers and extermination camps, the same as the blockading and starving of countries, the same as the manufacture of hydrogen bombs” (GA 79: 27/27).<sup>45</sup> How can the “production of corpses” be placed together with the “mechanized food industry”? Besides Heideggerian insensitivity and the moral discussion about the Holocaust, Heidegger wanted to philosophically consider the deeper motives of the “production of corpses in the gas chambers.” From the perspective of Heidegger’s criticism of quickly-spreading planetary technology, the production of corpses is the expression and the consequence of the spiritual desertification that is inherent to the will to power. This will reduces anything, even any person or group, to a mere object of use and exploitation beyond any human, social, political, religious, or moral considerations. One might tremble before Heidegger’s insensitivity and “supposed” ignorance, but such does not do his thought justice. On the one hand, Faye’s and Farías’ interpretations and, to a lesser extent, Taureck’s, take passages out of context and, on the other hand, they do not seem to establish the necessary differentiation between anti-Judaism and anti-Semitism.

In Heidegger’s case, it is a type of anti-Semitism that could be qualified as “religious,” “cultural,” or “spiritual.” In a letter to Hannah Arendt, in which he comments on the rumors about his anti-Semitism, it reads: “As to the rest, in matters related to the university I am as much an anti-Semite as I was ten years ago in Marburg. This anti-Semitism even found the support of Jacobstahl and Friedländer. This has nothing to do with personal relationships (for example, Husserl, Misch, Cassirer and others).”<sup>46</sup> When Heidegger speaks of “Judaization” (*Verjudung*), he does so from a given cultural context. Once again, one must tread carefully and avoid excusing Heidegger as a product of the spirit of his time. However, on the other hand, neither can one fall into making

generalized accusations. It seems that for every piece of evidence for anti-Semitism there is another piece of evidence against it.<sup>47</sup> Also, there is the argument that the existing documents can be interpreted in different ways. Without a doubt, this cultural or spiritual anti-Semitism was reinforced by National Socialism's pseudo-scientific anti-Semitism. Once again: it is not a question of downplaying Heidegger's anti-Semitism, but neither is it proper to deduce a direct relationship with the Shoah as exhibited by the radicalized racist ideology of Nazism.

The issue of Heidegger's culpability and relationship with Judaism is certainly problematic and, according to the latest statements contained in the *Black Notebooks*, very prickly. It is a relationship that has nothing to do with political matters, but rather seems to be classified within his interpretation of the metaphysical destiny of a Western world dominated by science and technology.<sup>48</sup> Heidegger's estrangement from the urban spirit of the Jews is not the result of a biological racism, but rather the consequence of his analysis of the metaphysics of subjectivity and nihilism. From this perspective, Jews represent empty rationality and the calculating spirit that is characteristic of the modern era. As he points out in the *Black Notebooks*: "The question about the role of Judaism is not racist, but rather a metaphysical question about [a] type of humanity" (GA 96: 243). One might not agree with Heidegger's criticism of modern technology, one might even wonder if Heidegger's understanding of modernity is not overly one-sided and simplified. However, if one analyzes Heidegger's confrontation with modernity, starting with the available texts, then the assertion that Heidegger justifies and condones the extermination of the Jews ends up being highly questionable. Does Heidegger exhibit anti-Judaism? Without a doubt. Anti-Semitism? Yes, as long as it is not directly associated with the racist interpretation of the Jewish people and National Socialism's policy of extermination. Should a great thinker like Heidegger be shown leniency? Probably not, but neither can his philosophical legacy be ignored. In any case, the *Black Notebooks* invite one to reflect upon philosophy's responsibility toward politics.

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## ENDNOTES

- 1 “There will come a day, perhaps, when we will know every single aspect of Heidegger’s life and every single detail of his work. Perhaps, then, we will be able to establish a freer relationship to his philosophical heritage, not exclusively guided by finding traces of National Socialism in his thought.” Miguel de Beistegui, *Heidegger and the Political: Dystopias* (New York: Routledge, 1998), 3.
- 2 See, for example, Eric Aeschimann’s opinion in *Le Nouvel Observateur* regarding the polemic between François Fédier, Hadrien France-Lanorad and Peter Trawny (December 7, 2013). It is also worth mentioning the words of Donatella di Cesare, Vice-President of the Heidegger Gesellschaft and member of the Jewish Community in Rome, published in the Italian journal *La Repubblica* (December 18, 2013), the comments of Jürg Altweg on the collapse of French philosophy published in *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung* (December 13, 2013), and the reply of the German editor of the *Black Notebooks* – Peter Trawny – published in the German journal *Die Zeit-Online* (December 27, 2013). For a rejoinder by the co-editor of Heidegger’s *Collected Works* – Friedrich-Wilhelm von Herrmann – see the cultural supplement of the Italian journal *Avvenire* (July 17, 2014). Other German scholars – like Rüdiger Safranski, Günther Figal and Klaus Held – have discussed this issue on various radio and TV shows. Likewise, the international press has rekindled the controversy by publishing phrases and quotes where Heidegger openly expresses his attitude toward National Socialism and Judaism.
- 3 This letter can be found in the archives of the University of Freiburg; see Angel Xolocotzi, *Facetas heideggerianas* (Mexico: Los Libros de Homero, 2009), 66.

- 4 Interview with Hermann Heidegger; see Xolocotzi, *Facetas heideggerianas*, 66.
- 5 Ibid.
- 6 Angel Xolocotzi, “En torno a Heidegger: Diálogo con Friedrich-Wilhelm von Herrmann,” *Revista de Filosofía* 108 (2003): 41f.
- 7 From Heidegger’s point of view, this is not a misfortune but rather the occasion, the *kairos*, for “purifying *being* [*Reinigung des Seins*] of its greatest distortions caused by the hegemony of entities [*des Seienden*]” (GA 96: 238). However, he clearly rejects the principles of racial purification applied by National Socialism. At the same time, he interprets world Judaism (*Weltjudentum*) as the highest onto-historical manifestation of the spirit of calculability and machination (GA 96: 46). Therefore, one should not read Heidegger’s words in a political or racial sense. Rather, he is developing his particular philosophical interpretation of the history of being. To put it differently, Judaism – together with Bolshevism, Americanism and National Socialism – is an onto-historic phenomenon.
- 8 See Peter Trawny, *Heidegger und der Mythos der jüdischen Weltverschwörung*, 3rd expanded ed. (Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 2015), 45ff, 138.
- 9 See Jacques Derrida, *De l’esprit: Heidegger et la question* (Paris: Editions Galilée, 1987); Victor Farías, *Heidegger et le nazisme* (Paris: Éditions Verdier, 1987); François Lyotard, *Heidegger et “les juifs”* (Paris: Débats, 1988); Hugo Ott, *Martin Heidegger: Unterwegs zu seiner Biographie* (Frankfurt am Main: Campus Verlag, 1989).
- 10 See Ernst Nolte, *Heidegger: Politik und Geschichte im Leben und Denken* (Berlin: Propyläen, 1992); Otto Pöggeler, *Der Denkweg Martin Heideggers*, 3rd edition (Pfullingen: Neske 1990); Tom Rockmore, *On Heidegger’s Nazism and Philosophy* (Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1991); Hans Sluga, *Heidegger’s Crisis: Philosophy and Politics in Nazi Germany* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1993); Richard Wolin, *The*

- Heidegger Controversy: A Critical Reader*, (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1993); Julian Young, *Heidegger, Philosophy, Nazism* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997).
- 11 See “Das Rektorat 1933/34 – Tatsachen und Gedanken (1945),” “Antrag auf die Wiedereinstellung in die Lehrtätigkeit – Reintegration (November 4, 1945),” and “*Spiegel*-Gespräch mit Martin Heidegger (September 26, 1966)” in GA 16: 372–94, 397–404, and 652–83, respectively.
  - 12 See GA 16; “Die Selbstbehauptung der deutschen Universität (Mai 27, 1933)” (GA 16: 107–17); GA 65; and “Über Wesen und Begriffe von Natur, Geschichte und Staat. Übung aus dem Wintersemester 1933/34” in *Heidegger und der Nationalsozialismus, Heidegger Jahrbuch 4: Dokumente*, ed. Alfred Denker and Holger Zaborowski (München: Karl Alber, 2009), 53–88; *Nature, History, State: 1933–1934*, ed. and trans. Gregory Fried and Richard Polt (London: Bloomsbury, 2013).
  - 13 See, respectively, Karl Löwith, *Mein Leben in Deutschland vor und nach 1933* (Stuttgart: Metzler, 1986); Hermann Mörchén, *Adorno und Heidegger. Untersuchung einer philosophischen Kommunikationsverweigerung* (Stuttgart: Klett-Cotta, 1981); Hans Jonas, *Erinnerungen* (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 2003); Heinrich Petzet, *Erinnerungen an Martin Heidegger* (Pfullingen: Neske, 1977).
  - 14 See Victor Farías, *Heidegger y el nazismo* (extended edition) (Palma de Mallorca: Objeto Perdido, 2009); Emmanuel Faye, *Heidegger: The Introduction of Nazism into Philosophy*, trans. Michael B. Smith (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2009).
  - 15 B. Taureck (ed.), *Politische Unschuld? In Sachen Martin Heidegger* (München: Wilhelm Fink, 2008).
  - 16 The most flagrant example of this kind of biased misinterpretation is Julio Quesada, who ignores many of the texts published in GA 16; see Julio Quesada, *Heidegger de camino al holocausto* (Madrid: Biblioteca Nueva, 2008). For latest research see Alfred Denker and Holger Zaborowski (eds.), *Heidegger und der*

- Nationalsozialismus, Heidegger-Jahrbuch 5: Interpretationen* (München: Karl Alber, 2009); Florian Grosser, *Revolution denken. Heidegger und das Politische 1919 bis 1969* (München: Beck, 2011); Angel Xolocotzi, *Heidegger y el nacionalsocialismo: Una crónica* (México, D.F.: Plaza y Valdés Editores, 2013); Holger Zaborowski, “Eine Frage von Irre und Schuld?” *Martin Heidegger und der Nationalsozialismus* (Frankfurt am Main: Fischer, 2010).
- 17 See Charles Bambach, *Heidegger’s Roots: Nietzsche, National Socialism, and the Greeks* (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 2003).
- 18 See Peter Gay, *Weimar Culture: The Outsider as Insider* (London and New York: Norton & Company, 1968); Adam Fergusson, *When Money Dies: The Nightmare of the Weimar Collapse* (London: William Kimber, 1975); Eric Weitz, *Weimar Germany: Promise and Tragedy* (Cambridge: Princeton University Press, 2007); Walter Jelinek, Ottman Buhler, and C. Bornati, *La constitución de Weimar* (Madrid: Tecnos, 2010); Horst Möller, *La República de Weimar. Una democracia inacabada* (Madrid: Antonio Machado Libros, 2010); Martin Jay and Anton Kaes (eds.), *The Weimar Republic Sourcebook* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1994).
- 19 See Wolfgang Benz, Hans Buchheim, and Hans Mommsen (eds.), *Der Nationalsozialismus. Studien zur Ideologie und Herrschaft* (Frankfurt am Main: Fischer, 1993); George Leaman, *Heidegger im Kontext. Gesamtüberblick zum NS-Engagement der Universitätsphilosophen* (Berlin/Hamburg: Argument, 1993); Bernd Martin, Eckhard John, Marc Mück, and Hugo Ott (eds.), *Die Freiburger Universität in der Zeit des Nationalsozialismus* (Freiburg: Ploetz, 1991).
- 20 Obviously, politics also plays an important role in Heidegger’s thought during his years as rector. For him, in 1933–34, the National Socialist state embodies a continuation and fulfillment of the Prussian state. In Heidegger’s opinion, Bismarck made the mistake of not including the working class in the state (*Nature, History, State*, 52). Hence his interest in and fascination with



National Socialism: “national” expresses the people’s element (*völkisch*); “socialism” refers to the integration of the worker. In this context, Hitler is the *Führer*; the person who represents and carries out the will of the people (*Völkswillen*). In 1933–34, the *Führer* and the *Führerprinzip* have a recurring presence in Heidegger’s philosophy of the state. However, already in 1934–35 one begins to detect signs of estrangement from and disappointment with the National Socialist regime and a growing interest in Hölderlin’s poetry and Nietzsche’s philosophy. For a detailed analysis of the stages of Heidegger’s thought during the National Socialist regime see Grosser, *Revolution denken*, 66–98.

- 21 *Nature, History, State*, 38. Concerning this, see Zaborowski’s interesting observations about Heidegger’s attempt to formulate an ontology of politics, a meta-politics starting from a spiritual perception of the people that has nothing to do with biological and racist criteria (“*Eine Frage von Irre und Schuld?*” 414–20). Here, without a doubt, one notices the influence of Hegel’s *Philosophy of Right*, to which Heidegger dedicated several work sessions in the semester of 1934–35 (see GA 86: 59–185).
- 22 See Bambach, *Heidegger’s Roots*, 14.
- 23 For example, the concept of “earth” as used in “The Origin of the Work of Art” does not refer to an idealized nature that is present before the appearance of culture. Instead, earth is a dimension of an individual’s existence that is manifested in one’s struggle with culture and the world. Earth is not a stable foundation, but rather a space for carrying out creative possibilities of existence; see GA 5: 35–36/26–27.
- 24 This can be seen in the interpretations of Hölderlin’s hymns that Heidegger offers in the lecture of 1934/35; see GA 39: 167ff/151ff.
- 25 For a detailed analysis of the entanglements of Freiburg University with National Socialism –and particularly Heidegger’s role as rector – see Bernd Martin, “Universität im Umbruch: Das Rektorat Heidegger 1933/34,” in *Die Freiburger Universität in der Zeit des Nationalsozialismus*, 9–23.

- 26 Paul Yorck von Wartenburg, “Katharsis,” in *Die Philosophie des Grafen Paul Yorck von Wartenburg*, ed. Karlfried Gründer (Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1970), 174–175.
- 27 Ferdinand Tönnies is one of the main representatives of this people’s (*völkisch*) movement. According to him, the West is defined by two types of social organization: society (*Gesellschaft*) and community (*Gemeinschaft*). The first is an artificial association based on the idea of an interest-motivated free contract between individuals, while the second is characterized by family and blood ties, by sharing a common place and land, by having a same people’s spirit. Societies are governed by calculation, greed, power, ambition, vanity, profit, lack of spirit, and the exploitation of nature and of individuals. In contrast, communities are guided by passion, sensuality, courage, piety, imagination, respect for nature, and remaining in one’s homeland. In the words of Tönnies, “in the course of history, the people’s culture [*Kultur des Volkstums*] has become a state civilization [*Zivilisation des Staates*].” See Ferdinand Tönnies, *Gemeinschaft und Gesellschaft* (Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1963), 251. In Spengler, one can find a deeper development of Tönnies’ theses concerning culture’s decadence and the dangers of civilization at its peak. Heidegger came into contact with the motifs of “community,” “people,” and “culture” expressed by Tönnies through his reading of Spengler’s book *The Decline of the West*, a reading to which he dedicated several classes during the first Freiburg courses at the beginning of the twenties.
- 28 Max Müller, *Martin Heidegger: Ein Philosoph und die Politik* (Freiburger Universitätsblätter, 1986), 18.
- 29 Jonas, “Heidegger’s Resoluteness,” 200.
- 30 Martin Heidegger and Elisabeth Blochmann, *Briefwechsel 1918–1969* (Marbach: Deutsche Schillergesellschaft, 1990), 60.
- 31 See Ulrich Sieg, “Die Verjudung des deutschen Geistes. Ein unbekannter Brief Heideggers,” *Die Zeit* 52 (December 22, 1989).

- 32 See Jacques Derrida, “Edmond Jabès and the Question of the Book,” in *Writing and Difference* (London and New York: Routledge, 2002), 77–91.
- 33 Jaspers, *Philosophische Autobiographie*, 101. Regarding *Contributions*, that does not mean annihilating the Jews. Heidegger is against the idea of a racial domination (see GA 65: 397).
- 34 See Richard Polt, “Jenseits von Kampf und Macht. Heideggers heimlicher Widerstand,” in *Heidegger Jahrbuch* 5: 156, 159, 169, and 171.
- 35 For a history of anti-Semitism see Wolfgang Benz, *Was ist Antisemitismus?* (München: Beck, 2004), 9–26; Wolfgang Benz and Werner Bergmann (eds.), *Vorurteil und Völkermord. Entwicklungslinien des Antisemitismus* (Freiburg: Herder, 1997); Julius Schoeps and Joachim Schlör (eds.), *Antisemitismus. Vorurteile und Mythen* (München/Zürich: Piper, 1996); and Detlev Claussen, *Vom Judenthass zum Antisemitismus. Materialien einer verleugneten Geschichte* (Darmstadt: Buchgesellschaft, 1987). It is also interesting to consult the history of the concept of “anti-Semitism” offered in Cornelia Schmitz-Berning, *Vokabular des Nationalsozialismus* (Berlin: De Gruyter, 2000), 34–39.
- 36 See Zaborowski, “Eine Frage von Irre und Schuld?,” 603–604. More recently, Donatella di Cesare has meticulously analyzed the cultural and religious context as well as the theological and philosophical origins of Heidegger’s anti-Semitism. See Cesare, *Heidegger e gli ebrei. I “Quaderni neri”* (Roma: Bollati Boringhieri, 2014), 12–96. For my part, I have tackled this issue in “Heidegger e i Quaderni neri. La rinascita della controversia nacionalsocialista,” in *Metafisica e antisemitismo. I Quaderni neri di Heidegger tra filosofia e politica*, ed. Adriano Fabris (Pisa: Edizione ETS, 2014), 60–66.
- 37 In Heidegger’s work, particularly in the multiple volumes that compose the *Gesamtausgabe*, there is no perception of a systematic anti-Semitism that allows for the discussion of a philosophical anti-Semitism or, as Faye states, an introduction of Nazism

into philosophy. It is another matter to evaluate Heidegger's statements about Judaism from the perspective of his philosophical program. This work, of course, can be carried out at the same time that one continues to examine Heidegger's personal and political attitude and his sympathies toward certain aspects of National Socialist ideology. In this context, see the work of Roubach dealing with Heidegger's reception in Israel: M. Roubach, "Die Rezeption Heideggers in Israel" in *Heidegger Jahrbuch* 5, 419–32.

- 38 In this sense, one leans more toward the more moderate stances of Grosser, Martin, Safranski, Sluga, Thomä, Xolocotzi and Zaborowski than toward the accusations of Faye and Farías. In this regard, one might cite the letter that Herbert Marcuse writes to Heidegger in August of 1947, in which Marcuse accuses him more of a total lack of sensitivity than of an evil and perverse anti-Semitism; Herbert Marcuse, "Brief an Martin Heidegger vom 28. August 1947," in *Heidegger und das "Dritte Reich." Ein Kompendium*, ed. Bernd Martin (Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1989), 156.
- 39 Tony Cassirer, *Mein Leben mit Ernst Cassirer* (Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 2003), 187.
- 40 See Heidegger and Bultmann, *Briefwechsel* (Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 2009), 187f, 191f. Heidegger himself confirms the existence of such rumors in a letter written to Hannah Arendt in the winter of 1932/33: Martin Heidegger and Hannah Arendt, *Briefwechsel 1925 bis 1975* (Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1999), 68.
- 41 See Martin Heidegger and Karl Jaspers, *Briefwechsel 1920–1963* (Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1990), 270.
- 42 Martin Heidegger, *Letters to his Wife*, trans. R.D.V. Glasgow (Cambridge: Polity, 2008), 28. However, twelve years later he writes to his wife: "Indeed, the best are – Jews" (ibid., 115). It remains difficult to support the theory that Heidegger was a spiritual anti-Semite in the twenties. This situation changes at the beginning

of the thirties with the growing importance shown to the issues of the German people and nation.

- 43 See Sieg, “Die Verjudung des deutschen Geistes.”
- 44 Emmanuel Faye, “Heidegger, der Nationalsozialismus und die Zerstörung der Philosophie,” in *Politische Unschuld? In Sachen Martin Heideggers*, ed. Bernhard Tauereck (München: Wilhelm Fink, 2008), 53.
- 45 For a critical interpretation of this passage, see Dieter Thomä, *Die Zeit des Selbst und die Zeit danach. Zur Kritik der Textgeschichte Martin Heideggers* (Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp, 1990), 626ff.
- 46 Heidegger and Arendt, *Briefwechsel*, 69.
- 47 For example, one finds proof of Heidegger’s ambivalent relationship with the Jews in a letter to his wife from the year 1932. In it he expresses his disappointment with Baeumler’s philosophical abilities, though he highly praises his worth as a historian (*Letters to His Wife*, 133). This ambivalence is also accounted for in a 1945 letter from Jaspers addressed to the Denazification Committee (Heidegger and Jaspers, *Briefwechsel*, 271): “In the twenties Heidegger was not an anti-Semite. His words about the Jew Fraenkel prove that, at least in 1933, he showed certain anti-Semitic connections. This does not exclude, I believe, that in other cases anti-Semitism was contrary to his conscience and his liking.”
- 48 As Donatella di Cesare maintains, Heidegger’s critique at many times adopts a messianic tone (cf. interview published 18 December in *La Repubblica*, p. 40). This messianic, spiritual, and religious tone is clearly evident in the idea of the last god found in *Contributions to Philosophy*. In this work it is stated that only those of “the future” are the true voice of the people, and that the rebirth of the people will most likely occur by means of a religious awakening. The people must find their god, and the future ones should initiate the search; see GA 65: 65, 319, and 398.

# Heidegger, Machination, and the Jewish Question: The Problem of the Gift

*Anthony J. Steinbock*

## INTRODUCTION

I recall my first sustained exposure to the so-called “Heidegger Affair.” I was a DAAD *Stipendiat* in Bochum, listening to the radio when a report came through about Heidegger’s Nazi affiliation. The reporter was inspired by the new release of the Fariás book.<sup>1</sup> The commentator had not only lambasted Heidegger, but also Foucault and Derrida. How could Foucault, a radical leftist, challenging power relations, truth, and knowledge in radical ways – how could he read Heidegger? How could Derrida, the advocate of *difference/différance*, have taken so much inspiration from this Nazi? What does this mean for *their and our* thinking? What does this mean for their and our *thinking*?

The overall point was that the Heidegger-waters were toxic, and if one draws philosophical sustenance from these waters in any way, then the reader, too, will be poisoned. It is best, then, to avoid any contact lest we also become contaminated, even against our better selves. It also seemed to be imperative now to have no truck with any thinkers who had also drunk from those waters, be this thinker a Foucault, a Derrida, a Levinas, or a de Beauvoir.

When the Fariás book was first released, I recall thinking: “Should we reduce the meaning of a work to the life of the person? If the skeletons in one’s closet are exposed, does it render his or her work suspect?”

Is *Sein und Zeit* inherently ‘Nazi’? Is it anti-Jewish? And even if this were true, are we really so insecure in ourselves that we think reading a work will contaminate us or our own thought? Could Jews become anti-Jewish by studying Heidegger? Even if Heidegger were a Nazi, does it mean that his writings are fascist, National Socialistic, or even anti-Semitic?”

Not everyone was as naïve as this reporter. To the credit of certain philosophers in Germany at the time – at least where I was situated – those like Bernhard Waldenfels, Otto Pöggeler, Elmar Holenstein, and in Wuppertal, Klaus Held – they did not go the route of such reductionism.<sup>2</sup> Pöggeler unveiled his lectures on the then unpublished *Beiträge*, and Held taught a seminar on *Langeweile* and tried to rethink Heidegger’s philosophy of *Grundstimmungen* or fundamental moods in this context.<sup>3</sup> A bit later in Paris, I witnessed an effluence of books and discussions on Heidegger (François Lyotard, Jacques Derrida, Françoise Dastur – just to name a few), and in 1989–90, École Normale hosted a special open seminar on the *Beiträge*, inviting a variety of speakers.

If the 1960s saw a first wave of reaction to this Heidegger Affair, and if the late 1980s witnessed a second wave, indeed, a virtual tidal wave of responses, then Heidegger’s *Schwarze Hefte* or the *Black Notebooks* are stirring waters that had regained their calm, agitating a third wave of reactions to the Heidegger Affair.<sup>4</sup> In a recent article in *Die Zeit*, the headline read: “Heideggers *Schwarze Hefte*: Das vergiftete Erbe” (“Heidegger’s *Black Notebooks*: The Contaminated Legacy”).<sup>5</sup> This new “wave” carries slightly different currents, because on Peter Trawny’s view, whereas the former two tides disclosed Heidegger’s association with Hitler and National Socialism, the *Black Notebooks* reveal Heidegger’s reprehensible anti-Semitism.<sup>6</sup>

Nevertheless, as before, the questions rear their heads again: Can one study Heidegger and not be contaminated by his works? Do Heidegger’s convictions repudiate his work as philosophy? Can one study Heidegger without confronting his (political) past? Or again: Do these past and current revelations such as we see in the *Black Notebooks* have anything to do with his philosophy?

We all might wonder how such a gifted thinker like Heidegger could have supported the Hitler regime, how he could have nourished the hope that National Socialism might establish his philosophical convictions in the political sphere, or even more specifically, how he could have believed that a conflict existed in any form between “the best blood of the best” of Germany’s own people and “world Jewry.”<sup>7</sup> We wonder this in part because we admire Heidegger, in part because we take him as exemplary, and in part because we think that, of all people or at least of all thinkers, he should know better, he should think better. Without going the way of apologetics by asserting that the “thinking” we need to think is not even upon us yet in order to make sense of these avowals, we can still maintain that it is not only too easy, but both ingenuous and misleading for us to point the finger at Heidegger, while supposing that we are somehow absolved from or not complicit in the general problem of evil.

My effort then is not to condemn Heidegger along these lines, or to engage in a kind of apology, now in the context of the *Schwarze Hefte*. However, I do want to take up Heidegger’s association of *Machenschaft* or “machination” with the Jews as the touchstone for my reflections, and examine this issue within the context of giving and the gift. I do this, first, by briefly underscoring Heidegger’s assertions on machination in relation to the “Jewish problem,” second, by examining his explication of giving and the gift in the context of overcoming metaphysics and calculative thinking, and finally, by making some critical reflections on individuation within the context of giving and the gift.

## I. MACHINATION AND THE JEWS

However brief his flirtation with National Socialism, Heidegger’s attraction to it was related to what he perceived as a problem in the contemporary human condition. While his own National Socialism was not aligned with Hitler’s regime, this was not because he was critical of Hitler and National Socialism per se, but because the latter had not remained true to itself; instead, it had itself become swept up



in the expansive technological power dominating the modern age that he called *Machenschaft* or “machination,” a power that he thought National Socialism would somehow be able to transcend in the political realm.

Machination (and what Heidegger will *mutatis mutandis* later term *Gestell* or “enframing”) is expressive of the omnipresent rational, technical-scientific, and quantitative managerial control of all reality, and the reduction of Beyng-historical (*seynsgeschichtliche*) truth to efficacious problem-solving. For Heidegger, it is not just a question of control or power, but the power of planning, of manipulation, of the holding sway of an insidious style of technological measure, perpetuated through a will to calculate and to quantify, a leveling-out of everything qualitative and distinctive, which in its complexity becomes expressive of nihilism and metaphysics. Machination affects Dasein (Heidegger’s modal term for the human being), by robbing the “Beyng-historical truth” of Beyng (*Seyn*) from the human being, rendering the latter world-poor, and ordering Dasein into the category of beings as a whole; however, machination is also perpetrated by the human being. As a consequence, we become the unwitting “tools” of the defeat of our own humanity. Human beings are not the makers of machination, but carry out machination as entangled in it, as the “last” expression of metaphysics. In the appearance of machination, human culture has reached its extreme, but it also thereby signals the possibility of a new beginning.

How does Heidegger’s assessment of machination play into the problem of racism, anti-Semitism, or the Jewish question? On the one hand, it is difficult to accuse Heidegger of racism, or in particular, of anti-Semitism because for him the language of racism is itself already expressive of machination and its drive to render everything calculable, manipulable, and interchangeable. Indeed, such an organic biologism actually leads human beings (especially the German people) astray from their Beyng-historical mission (GA 96: 31, 213).

In fact, to my count, Heidegger “only” mentions the Jews in one form or another a little more than a dozen times in the 1200+ pages that

make up the first three volumes of *Black Notebooks*, and these references are consolidated in the second and third volumes (GA 95 and GA 96). The disparaging references to the “Bolsheviks” and “Christianity” are far more numerous. But, as Heidegger himself observes in a different context, we should not succumb to machination’s temptation of the quantitative, and think that just because the references are fewer in number that they are therefore less significant.

It is indeed disconcerting that when Heidegger references certain figures of Jewish heritage, he mentions them disparagingly precisely in the context of their race, linking it to spiritual flaws. For example, he mentions his former teacher, Edmund Husserl (Jewish by birth, but who converted to Protestantism), in the context of the putative increase of the power of Jewry, empty rationality, the aptitude to calculate, and the lack of ability to penetrate the realm of essential decisive resoluteness (GA 96: 46); he cites the “Jew ‘Freud’” in the context of psychoanalysis, which reduces everything to life and instinct and whose thought is pure nihilism (GA 96: 218); and when discussing a Soviet diplomat as an example of the “underhandedness” of Bolshevik politics, he names the “Jew Litvinov” (GA 96: 242).<sup>8</sup>

Heidegger stereotypically associates the Jews with the propensity for calculating and profiteering, and therefore ascribes machination, and the alienation of *Beyng*, to the Jews and to Judaism. Furthermore, unlike the Germans, who are rooted in soil and history, the Jews are homeless (evoking the typecast of “the wandering Jew”); unlike the Germans, Judaism suffers from a so-called uprootedness, being putatively bound to nothing, and therefore having a propensity to make everything serviceable or at its disposal.<sup>9</sup> In short, the Jews are not only caught up in and susceptible to the intoxicating matrix of machination (like everyone else), but they are also cast as the privileged conveyors of machination, who facilitate the domination of modern technology over human beings and nature, draining themselves and everyone else of their *Beyng*-historical “existence” and of their “humanity.”

Put differently, Jews were not for Heidegger a political or a racial problem, but a “metaphysical” problem because the Jews (among others

of their ilk) are the symptomatic conveyors of the withdrawal, forgetfulness, or the abandonment of Being. Heidegger reflects: "The question concerning the role of *world Jewry* is not a racial one, but rather the metaphysical one concerning the type of humanity that can *straightforwardly and non-bindingly* undertake as a world historical 'task' the uprootedness of all beings from Being."<sup>10</sup> Machination is not the Jews' fault, but because of Judaism's apparent similarity in structure, the Jews are presumably particularly adept at the machination's domination and can especially "prosper" in it.

Thus, it is not a matter of world-domination as the quantitative spread of Jews et al., all over the earth, because machination is itself the "power" of quantitative manipulation and measured extension in which human beings become entangled, and of which they are "thoughtlessly" the executors (GA 96: 6, 25, 30-2, 46-7, 48, 52-3, 111). The true danger is not world Jewry or world Judaism, but the exclusive "success" of machination in the metaphysical sense – what we can call "metaphysical Judaism" – the abandonment of the Being of beings through the forgetfulness of the Being of beings. It cannot be just "world Jewry" that is implicated here as a metaphysical problem; like the latter, England, Americanism, pragmatism, liberalism, Bolshevism, and Christianity are oriented toward and play themselves out in the global unleashing of machination such that they (and we) live uncritically in the abandonment of Being (GA 96: 110-11).<sup>11</sup>

Machination was expressed in the war as technological prowess, power, and the will to calculate; it had further implications for reducing the earth to a resource under quantitative measure, bringing all beings under our dominion as controllable and at our disposition, as well as reducing human beings to the status of beings deprived of decisive resoluteness. In his sweeping critique of such machination in 1949, Heidegger's original version of the "Question Concerning Technology" maintained that the motorized food industry is essentially the same as the manufacture of corpses in the gas chambers and the death camps.<sup>12</sup>

Granted, we all like to make connections and to detect structures that animate apparently disparate experiences. Who has not at the

very least been struck by if not impressed with Horkheimer and Adorno's sweeping discernment of "Enlightenment Rationality" operative already in Homer's *Odyssey*, and with having read the domination of nature in Odysseus's act of having plugged the ears of his shipmates and bound himself to the mast while gaining knowledge from the Sirens? But do we not at the same time, at least with Heidegger, witness the loss of individuation and uniqueness of persons (despite his protests to the contrary) when equating the murder of even one person with the motorized food industry? A possible "animal ethics" notwithstanding (where motorized food has evolved into fast food), are there not any moral discriminations to be made? Was Heidegger able to rethink his position when he excerpted this statement from the 1953 version of this work?

While machination is expressed in the radical quantitative indifference and interchangeability of all beings (GA 96: 213), finding its political expression in popular movements like democracy, pluralism, liberalism, Bolshevism, Christianity, mass communication, etc.; while it is also expressive not only of the withdrawal of Being, but of our perilous forgetfulness of the withdrawal, for Heidegger, the extreme position of machination meant that we were (and presumably still are) also on the verge of something else, a new beginning, precisely in the possible recovery of the self-denying withdrawal. The recovery of the latter as openness to the mystery of Being, as the overcoming of machination qua metaphysics, should be the harbinger of a new sense of uniqueness that has no essential connection to the leveling-out of all differences in terms of interchangeability, and quantitative and technological control.

The task for Heidegger is to overcome the metaphysics of presence as the uncritical prevailing privilege of this way of Being. The question for us, however, bears on the structure of Heidegger's thought given the problem of overcoming metaphysics, which amounts to overcoming machination, and therefore overcoming world Jewry as the privileged cipher of the latter and of its manifold expressions. The question is not therefore whether or not Heidegger was anti-Semitic or a Nazi, whether we might become contaminated by his writings,

or whether we might be able find in his writings sporadic statements about love. Rather, given these world-historical events, and given his discernment of machination, the concern is whether or not he guides us successfully to the matter of individual uniqueness (that he professes or points to) and to individual and collective responsibility in the face of such uniqueness.

## II. THE GIFT AND RESPONSIBILITY

I have attempted to grapple with some aspects of Heidegger's notion of individuation in the context of describing religious experience and moral emotions.<sup>13</sup> My conclusions (restricting them here to *Being and Time*) were that the individualizing at stake concerns Dasein as a *mode* of being in relation to the ontological anonymity of *das Man* (the One). Thus, it concerns retrieving Dasein from its ontological/modal self-disorientation among other modes of being (e.g., being-ready-to-hand, being-present-at-hand), appropriating it *uniquely* as the *there-being* (Dasein) of world-disclosure – it does not bear on the concrete individual. Accordingly, while Heidegger speaks of guilt in both ontic and ontological senses, it cannot bear on the deepest sense of individuation that is both personal and interpersonal.<sup>14</sup> For the purposes of this work, I wish to approach the question of individuation and the related issue of responsibility from another angle, namely, the matter of giving and the gift.

While our unique access to Being in *Being and Time* was through that privileged mode of being called Dasein, the *Black Notebooks* suggest that in order to be taken hold by historical Being (*Seyn*) as freed from machination, that is, in its deepest sense as *Ereignis*, we have to free ourselves of the being-ness and hegemony of beings.<sup>15</sup>

Years later in "Time and Being," Heidegger embarks upon this new approach more systematically in attempting to think Being without beings or even without this privileged mode of being, Dasein. He does this in order to evade the sway of machination and not to be misled from the start by reducing Being to a thing that beings have. It is an attempt to think Being outside of the framework or better, outside the

enframing of metaphysics. The problem, as we saw in the *Schwarze Hefte*, is that beings (and all things intelligible in the field of beings) are beset by machination such that Being is in principle unintelligible for thinking; “ordinary” beings and culture render the mystery of Being unapproachable. Recognizing the mystery of Being outside of calculative manipulation is the beginning of a new thinking, the openness to the *Unheimlichkeit* of Beyng.<sup>16</sup> The task, then, is to break with the realm of beings in order to be open to the event of Beyng, to follow the withdrawal of Being from beings by tracing Being to its “own” from *Ereignis*. To approach Being without beings and without regard to metaphysics is to be attentive to the matter of Being and to the *matter* of Time (GA 14: 29/24).<sup>17</sup>

In *Hamlet*, Polonius asks the brooding Hamlet, “What is the matter, my Lord?” (implying both “what is wrong?” and “what is the subject matter of your reading?”). And in a rather snarky, sarcastic reply, Hamlet quips, “Between who?”<sup>18</sup> Here, Shakespeare is playing on another sense of the term “matter,” namely, as a conflict or a tension in between. It is precisely this sense of the matter, or in German, *Sache*, to which Heidegger harkens when he characterizes Being and Time as “matters.” Being and Time are matters of thinking; they are not things, not beings. What is at stake is the relation “between” them (a *Sachverhalt*) or that which issues them forth as matters: The relation relates Being and Time and yields (*er-gibt*) Being and Time (GA 14: 9/5). In this way, Heidegger approaches Being and Time not through temporal beings, but through the giving, the letting forth of Being and Time.

While one could use the predicative form, Being “is” or Time “is,” this would point to some particular thing that “is” in being or in time, reducing Being and Time to something before us. This would be misleading with respect to the givenness of Being and Time as matters for thought, as the “matter” that gives thinking and calls for thinking. Thus, Heidegger resorts to the expression *es gibt Sein, es gibt Zeit*: literally, it gives Being, it gives Time (though the colloquial expression in English is “there is” Being, Time, etc., which again would not only

presuppose Being, Time, etc., but would render them accessible as objects potentially at our disposal). In order for this not to be a mere difference in idioms or a theme of ordinary language analysis, it is necessary for Heidegger to turn to the phenomenological experiential dimension of this expression and to describe the “It” and its “giving.” How this *Es gibt* can be experienced and seen concerns the “how” of givenness of Being and of Time, that is, our relation to Being and Time without an appeal to beings (including Dasein).

Heidegger notes that from the very beginning of Western thinking, Being and Time are thought, but not the *Es gibt* that gives the gifts of Being and Time. How is it that we have missed the *Es gibt*? It is because, according to Heidegger, the *Es gibt*, the It gives, withdraws in favor of the gifts which It gives. This retreat opens the space for the gifts to be thought misleadingly and exclusively as Being with regard to beings, conceptualizing Being as the ground of beings, as Time with regard to the present (as the punctual now or as the living present); Being and Time can then become the objects of thought, the possible projects of calculative manipulation at our disposal, in short, the province of machination (GA 4: 12/8). Although (and this can be seen as one of Heidegger’s points) the fact that we could become forgetful of the giving at all such that Being as sending becomes Being as present – the forgetfulness of Being – is testimony to the withdrawal/denial of giving in favor of the gift. There must accordingly be some sense in which machination is also “given.” I revisit this point in my concluding section.

Allow me to continue by noting that this giving that holds back in favor of the discernibility of the gift is qualified in a distinctive way. What is the nuance of this giving for Heidegger? This giving, which does not give itself, but only its gift, this giving that holds itself back is called sending (*Schicken*). In other words, the way of Being as letting-presence, and which in its own way belongs to giving, is a giving as sending and as a making place for. Thus, Heidegger can contend that the sending in the destiny of Being is characterized as a giving in which the sending source keeps itself back and, thus, withdraws from unconcealment

(GA 14: 28/22). Being with regard to the grounding of beings is what is sent, Being is unconcealed (or more dynamically, unconcealing) in the concealing withdrawing of the It gives. It is when Being is disconnected from giving that the “metaphysics of presence” or Western thought only grasps the “gift” of Being as something present or as the “ground” of beings.

Similarly, Time is not present. Here Time itself – as is the case in machination – would lend itself to being managed (“time management”) or saved like something I could possess (“saving time”), or designated as some period in time (“modern times”), or some slice of a day (“tea time”); likewise, Time is not mundane and measurable “clock time” (“what time is it?”). Rather, It gives Time as the temporalizing movement itself that cannot be contained as a moment “in time.” Accordingly, the way of Time as letting-presence, which in its own way belongs to giving, is a giving as extending that opens and conceals space-time (GA 14: 20/16). This is also why, for Heidegger, giving that gives time is determined by denying and withholding nearness: “An extending is itself a giving, the giving of a giving is concealed in genuine Time” (GA 14: 20/16, tm). Belonging to giving as sending, we can also find a keeping or holding back, which is a denial or removal from the living present.

This holding back/withdrawing/concealing therefore also designates a peculiar temporal structure of Being as sent. The holding-back, the holding in abeyance, is epochal – as in the Greek *epochē*. The *epochē*/epoch is the holding back – of “It”self for Being and Time. Each of its transformations (epochs) remains destined in this way such that the history of Being means the destiny of Being. Being is unconcealed for thinking with its epochal modifications, with its manifold sendings that in some way take place as history (GA 14: 12–14/8–10).

If Being and Time are unconcealed “gifts,” then we can ask (to remain close to Heidegger’s formulation): What withdraws in the granting as opening of Being-Time, and preserves what remains denied in what has-been? What is withheld in the approaching? In the expression “It gives,” it is the “It” as giving. Heidegger capitalizes the impersonal



“It” in the expression “It gives,” not to determine the “It” as another kind of being, or Being itself – in which case we would have the idea that Being gives Being – but to highlight a peculiar presence of an absence in the It gives Being and It gives Time.

Further, he attempts to gain access to the “It” (which is not a being or a present) by thinking the kind of giving that belongs to it – as noted above: the giving as sending, epochal destiny, as an opening up that reaches out (*lichtendes Reichen*) (GA 14: 21/18–19). To evoke the dynamic character of the It through its kinds of giving, Heidegger qualifies “It” further as *Ereignis*.

*Ereignis* is often translated as the Event of Appropriation in order to capture the sense both of “eventing,” “occurring,” “happening,” and “belonging,” “appropriating,” “owning.” I supplement this with a different translation that captures the sense of *Ereignis* in these two senses, namely, “taking place.” However, although *Ereignis* is “Taking Place,” it is not only an eventing through which there is a taking or appropriating. Deepening his earlier sense of truth as *a-lētheia* or unconcealing-concealing, and retrieving the kinds of giving detected in Being and Time as noted above (sending/extending), Heidegger hones in on the It gives as *withdrawal*.

Accordingly, as much as *Ereignis* is an appropriating, *Ereignis* withdraws what is most fully its own from boundless unconcealing. Accordingly, “keeping back, denial, withholding – shows something like a self-withdrawing,” what Heidegger terms, in short, *Entzug* or withdrawal (GA 14: 27/22). Being and Time as matters relate (to) each other such that sending and extending are the modes of giving as determined by withdrawal. In the language of appropriation, *Ereignis* can also be said “to expropriate” itself such that expropriation too belongs to *Ereignis* as such. By this expropriation, *Ereignis* does not abandon itself – rather, it preserves what is its own or proper to it such that withdrawal belongs to “It” (GA 14: 28, 19/22–3, 15).

There are two further points upon which I would like to focus, points that concern Heidegger’s descriptions of *Ereignis* presented here. I do this before turning to more critical observations regarding giving and the gift.

First, in Heidegger's description of *Ereignis*, the gift of presence, Being, which is the "property" (*Eigentum*) of *Ereignis* as appropriation or taking place, vanishes in *Ereignis*. Any "as" structure – and all that it implies – any "as" structure that would hold in tension a dynamic unity in difference *disappears* in Heidegger's description of *Ereignis*. Thus, Heidegger tells us that in the expression "Being 'as' *Ereignis*," Being now means simply letting-presence in *Ereignis*; where Time is concerned, "Time 'as' *Ereignis*" now means simply extending-opening in *Ereignis*. We could put it this way in short: *Sein und Zeit ereignend im Ereignis*, or Being and Time taking place in Taking Place. Ultimately, this means "only" *das Ereignis ereignet*, Taking Place takes place: "only" sheer eventing (GA 14: 29/24).

When we become attuned to sheer eventing in this way, we realize that the attempt "to overcome" metaphysics only reinforces metaphysics, so that the proper thinking on this matter – or the proper way to expose oneself to the matter itself, which can be realized in poetry and art, as well as in philosophy – calls thinking simply to cease all overcoming, and to let metaphysics go its own way (GA 14: 30/24).

Second, Being and Time are gifts of giving, where the giving is qualified as sending/extending-opening. Given that "It" withdraws in favor of the gifts; given that "It" gives, given that *Ereignis* withdraws in expropriation as appropriation, given that the "as" structure disappears, what is the "status" of the gifts (if we are allowed to put it this way)? What "*happens*" to the gifts?

Heidegger assures us that while the withdrawal is peculiar to *Ereignis*, while we lose this tension of the "as," the gifts are not expunged from the giving in the withdrawal.<sup>19</sup> The gifts, Heidegger reassures us, are retained in the self-withdrawing sending of giving. Being and Time are properties of *Ereignis* (in the sense of being proper to "It"); they belong to the "It gives"; accordingly, Being and Time, the gifts, disappear in *Ereignis*. Being and Time are appropriated in *Ereignis*: or Being and Time take place in Taking Place as expropriation.

In and of itself, and at least on a certain reading, Heidegger's descriptions may not be seen as problematic. After all, Heidegger is attempting to

evoke the sheer unmotivated event of being released as letting-presence such that the gifts of Being and Time take place in *Ereignis*, in Taking Place. While we can follow Heidegger to the extent that the gifts *take place in* Taking Place; while we might rest assured that the gifts are *retained* in the giving and not forsaken; while we can be reassured that the gifts *belong properly to Ereignis*, it is necessary, on my view, to make the following observation explicit: While the gifts are retained, for Heidegger, they are not retained *as* gifts.

These observations allow us to raise the following questions: If the gifts take place in *Ereignis*, if they are not expunged, does *Ereignis* take place *in* or *as* the gifts? Put still differently: Does the eventful giving accompany the gifts as gifts? However, nowhere in “Time and Being” (in the explication of the retention of the gifts in the giving), nowhere in the comfort that the gifts are not lost, nowhere do we have a further recognition or even hint that the *giving is revealed in and takes Its place in the gifts*, in other words, that *Ereignis* takes place *as* gifts, or is taken up *in* the gifts.

For Heidegger’s part, interestingly, the gifts of Being and Time *do* qualify the happening in *Ereignis* when the “as” disappears. This is to say that *Ereignis*, *while impersonal, is not neutral* because “It” is not the same upon the delivery of the gifts of Being and Time. The “as” vanishes, but Being and Time retained in *Ereignis* means that *Ereignis* is qualified *according to the gifts*: Being colors *Ereignis* in the way of Being/sending (“Anwesenlassen geschickt im Ereignen”); Time colors *Ereignis* in the way of Time/extending-opening (“Zeit gereicht im Ereignen”). But Heidegger does not go so far as to say that *Ereignis accompanies* Being and is *revealed* in Being *as* Being, that *Ereignis accompanies* Time and is *revealed* in Time, *as* Time.

Of course, one can appreciate Heidegger’s sensitivity here: He is trying to face sheer eventing, and to give heed to that indeterminacy and to that mystery. What occurs, occurs within *Ereignis*, and this insight seems to preclude his saying anything about how *Ereignis* occurs in the gifts. They are appropriated in *Ereignis*, but we can apparently say nothing about *Ereignis* in them. On this understanding,

for Heidegger, the point would be precisely not to take responsibility for the sending or extending-opening, because as Heidegger attempts to evoke it in another work, it is that “enigmatic region where there is nothing for which to be responsible [*wo es nichts zu verantworten gibt*]” (GA 77: 120/78, tm).

The point would rather be *not to obscure the sheer eventing* or sheer “gifting” in whichever way the gift has been delivered over to itself, appropriated in the eventing. The gifts are no-thing. *Ereignis* is no-thing, and our effort, the thinkers’ effort (if it can be called that) is to step-back to a more originary dimension of experience, and *to reflect* (to think and to mirror) *Ereignis* taking place, to let “take place” without intrusion or getting in the way of the giving. Our thinking “task” would therefore reflect non-obtrusively, without memory, without anticipation, “Taking-place” taking-place. Sheer eventing.

### III. CRITICAL OBSERVATIONS: THE GIFTS AND RESPONSIBILITY

We have seemingly taken a few steps back, from beings to Being, from Being and Time as gifts to giving, from giving to the “It” as *Ereignis*. According to Heidegger, the gifts are not expurgated, but retained in *Ereignis*; Time and Being take place in Taking Place, disappearing as they send/extend-open. Sheer eventing as sheer destining in this way admits decisively no point or motivation for responsibility.

For Heidegger, the forgetfulness of Being, and machination that is occasioned by the withdrawal, cannot be due simply to a deficit in human existence; rather, in a more primordial manner, “It gives” itself to be forgotten. Original forgetfulness would then be the veiling (*Verhüllung*) of the difference between Being and beings understood as concealment. This veiling “has in turn withdrawn itself from the beginning” such that forgetfulness is not a consequence of mere human thinking (or unthinking), *but must be somehow endemic to the withdrawal itself*. Machination is a sent forgetfulness rooted in the denial of the presencing of Being, as withholding the disclosure of *Ereignis* (GA 11: 59/50).<sup>20</sup>

But, to play on Heidegger's metaphors, do we not also need a step-forward, completing the step-back? On my view, not only do we have to recognize that the gifts are retained in the giving, as Heidegger recognizes; we also have to acknowledge that *giving accompanies its givenness in and as the gifts*. To put it in Heidegger's terms, we would insist that Time "takes place" as the revelation, as the extending-opening of *Er-eignis*; Being "takes place" as the revelation, as the sending-presence of *Ereignis*. Recognizing this, or going this far, however, would be going too far for the position advocated by Heidegger because it would place his thinking into a radically different structure in a two-fold sense.

First, if the "as" structure were to remain functional, *Ereignis* – in sustaining Being and Time as Being and Time, in sustaining them as gifts – would retain the tension of the revelatory gifts, Being and Time. Second, if this were the case, the sustaining-giving at this level would have to be qualified more radically, expressive of this distinctive structure – not as a sending or extending-opening – but, I suggest, in terms of the emotional sphere of the person, and more specifically as loving, as a unique *Ereignis* of difference, to play on Heidegger's terms. Eventful giving as loving in turn would qualify the impersonal "It" or *Ereignis* now as Lover-Loving Movement, becoming in and through loving; the gifts would be qualified as the "beloveds."

We are not simply replacing terms here (loving for giving, Lover for *Ereignis*, beloveds for gifts). There is a qualitative and decisive difference: Loving, by virtue of its very structure, "*cannot withdraw, deny, or hold back*, such that infinite Loving "must" boundlessly accompany its "free," creative revelation (which is also a self-revelation) as and in the beloved.<sup>21</sup> (For instance, in the movement of loving, I cannot anticipate an end to loving, e.g., "I will stop loving you in five years," etc.)<sup>22</sup> The taking place of that Loving is not merely "Being," or a mode of being (Da-sein), but the "beloved," which is precisely the be-loved as retaining and creatively originating the revelation of loving *as* such. Where human beings are concerned, the loving is qualified personally, such that the Lover is revealed as Person, and the beloveds who love as persons.

Loving holds or sustains the dynamic tension of Lover and beloved in their difference (through the “event of difference,” or rather, personal loving). More specifically, the Lover reveals itself through loving *as* beloved. To be sure, it holds the beloved in loving, but the Lover also *accompanies* the beloved in that revelation. Rather than expropriation or simply appropriation; rather than denying, withholding, holding back, we would understand loving as “necessarily,” infinitely accompanying its own revelation, vigilant in its loving, as letting beloveds become what or, in an inter-Personal and interpersonal nexus, who they are. The individuals are let be ... but in their uniqueness, without vigilant, overabundant loving somehow reducing them to radical immanence.<sup>23</sup>

We find such an experience articulated – not in the *paganism* of the ancient Greeks, who for Heidegger already stood within Being and hence did not have or need culture<sup>24</sup> – in the Abrahamic mystics: in the Sufi experience of *baqa* or sustaining, in the experience of the sparks of Holiness being contained in every shard of the broken vessels, or in the Name being found in every name, or again where the “Father,” “Mother,” or “Parent” is given as and in the children, uniquely. It comes down to being able to account for individuation, uniqueness in an interpersonal and inter-Personal nexus.

On this understanding, machination would be problematic because of the over-accompanying Loving that is always somehow there, because machination goes against the presence of person, infinite and/or finite. It is not due to the withdrawal of giving or the forgetfulness of Being, but to the violation of loving where infinite Person and finite persons are concerned. The problem of machination is *experienced* most profoundly in this way, in the turning away from persistent Loving. This also means that the revelation of Loving is what is “normal,” and it is machination that is “abnormal” because it takes place within the ongoing vigilance of Loving.<sup>25</sup> In short, characterizing the movement as the “withdrawal,” “denial,” “withholding” of *Ereignis*/giving constitutes a profound *misunderstanding* of our belonging-together, a misunderstanding that we can see has dramatic consequences for Heidegger.

One of the consequences is the following. For the Heidegger of the *Black Notebooks*, both the “matter and way” of our philosophizing “is never thinking about ‘others’ – the ‘you’” (and even less so about the “I”), but uniquely about and for the origin of Being.<sup>26</sup> For Heidegger, thinking at its most profound core is not about the “others” in the sense of the plural, or about the other, the You, in the sense of singular uniqueness, or about Myself in the dynamic relational or vocational sense, or even about the “I-you” word-pair, as in Martin Buber’s thinking.<sup>27</sup>

But for the mystics of the Abrahamic “culture,” for whom loving is central, and who also “retreat” and seek the “source” through the experience, God, the Holy, the Origin, or the Godhead is immediately and directly connected to the love of neighbor. It is not possible within this structure to be comforted with or within the origin of Being/Beyng and to be unconcerned with the “You” “the other,” or the I/Myself (where the latter is understood relationally). The so-called “religious” and the “moral” are inextricably and mutually bound and de-limiting, and for essential reasons.

To be sure, there are statements throughout Heidegger’s works suggesting that he is sensitive to the issue of uniqueness or individuation. Indeed, in the *Black Notebooks* he is also wary of succumbing to the intoxicating allure of the quantitative expressed in machination, and therefore of losing the sense of qualitative uniqueness. He gives an example: So that we do not become distracted from our “German” way, we should not assume that the killing of thousands is somehow worse than the killing of one person simply because the former is “more.” The single individual is already the most! This could lead to the danger of supposing that killing fewer is better simply because it is a smaller quantity.<sup>28</sup> Fine.

But without an interpersonal basis, how can we adjudicate this very qualitative dimension that Heidegger putatively evokes? According to Heidegger, if we ask “what” the human being is, we presuppose the human being as a human animal, and the implication is that we remain entrapped within machination’s order of the undifferentiated organic, biological sphere such that we treat the human being merely

within metaphysics' anthropologies. But, he asserts, when we ask the "who"-question of the human being, we appropriately situate the human as the in-standing in the Truth of Beyng.<sup>29</sup> The question for us is whether such a distinctiveness of a mode of being speaks decisively to the uniqueness of the individual concrete "being."

The problem is that his qualitative distinction is not "personal" and retreats from individuation in the interpersonal sphere to an individuation of the modality of the Da in relation to other modes of being. While machination might result in assuming that murdering many is worse than murdering few because it is "more," how can the mere modal distinction of the "who" of the "Da" of Da-sein take a stand against not only the murder of one, but murdering many *just because* it "amounts to the same thing" as the murder of one?

Heidegger expunged that problematic line that I cited above from "The Question Concerning Technology" (a work, by the way, that was penned after GA 94-97), namely, that the motorized food industry is the same as the production of corpses in the gas chambers. Could this be a sign that he took seriously his distinction between the "what" and the "who"? But what would be the Dasein-modal basis for such an expurgation or even for the prohibition against the murder of even one, which is already "the most"? Within the Jewish tradition, it is said that to save a life is to save a world. But this is based on the uniqueness of the person, e.g., within the context of loving-beloved.

In the face of the Other person, we are in the presence of the absolute uniqueness of this or that person as the Presence of Loving, Personal Loving. For thinkers like Emmanuel Levinas, indeed, the face of the Other is the trace of God, where the Other "teaches" the idea of Infinity; for thinkers like Max Scheler, the personal presence is exemplary of the Holy. This absolute distinctiveness is not "because" of "God" or "the Holy" as if the only value of the other person were the latter. Precisely as "gifts," precisely as having their own integrity that each originates uniquely, persons are uniquely "who" they are, without deriving their value simply from the "Holy" or the "Giving." This is a delicate issue that I develop in another work.<sup>30</sup>



The point here is that I am immediately and directly responsible for the other person before I could choose to be responsible or not. This is what Levinas calls election, not “sending/extending.” It is not a matter of quibbling over terms, but the meaning that infuses them. An election before I could choose, which obligates me with responsibility and a new kind of freedom as binding me to another; an ante-memorial origin that accompanies His/Her revelation is not a sending/extending whose “origin” withdraws or denies in favor of the gift, and for which there is nothing to be responsible.<sup>31</sup>

If the giving accompanies the revelation in the gift, *as* the gift, then the integrity of the person/loving is given in every personal presence. There is a double demand and a double violation: moral and religious. Rather than withdrawal and forgetfulness, it concerns murder on the one hand, and idolatry, on the other; and they are intertwined.<sup>32</sup> The inextricable double violation would at least provoke guilt (for what we have done), shame (for who we have become against who we most deeply are), and the possibility of repentance (turning to our deeper selves with others). Jaspers, accordingly, can describe both a metaphysical guilt that is grounded in a solidarity among all persons such that each person is co-responsible for every wrong and injustice in the world, and likewise a moral guilt in which I am responsible as an individual for all that I do, within a loving struggle between persons in solidarity.<sup>33</sup>

Heidegger purposefully distances himself from “*an individuation in the moral-metaphysical sense of the ‘person’*” (my emphasis). Instead, for him, it concerns the retrieval and taking over of the modal character of the Da in the “self” from its ontological anonymity with things and tools, as standing in the clearing.<sup>34</sup> But for precisely this reason, in my view, Heidegger is still too far “this side” of specificity to provoke guilt, shame, repentance, and responsibility.<sup>35</sup> We lack the direct interpersonal encounter: the face-to-face or the person-to-person in which the other would be revealed and make us in awe, not of the source of Being or as the harbinger of a new beginning, but of the unique other and the unique “Myself” as beloved.

The “occurrence” of six million Jews gassed and tortured could not be an historical happening reducible to an anonymous *Machenschaft*; the mass murders in the gulags, the persecution of gays and lesbians, the institutionalization of racism and slavery is not an eventing for which there is nothing to be responsible, nothing for which to be guilty or shameful, nothing for which to repent. It is not particularly illuminating, to say the least, to assert as Heidegger does that there are slave markets in which the slaves themselves are often the biggest slave handlers – whether this be a veiled reference to our own place in machination, an insensitive or misguided allusion to responsibility, another way of articulating his reprehensible contention (during the Shoah itself) that the Jews are the principle of their own/our own destruction, or a citation of some historical fact.<sup>36</sup> Without the context and movement of loving, and loving given irreducibly “in” the beloved, there is no responsibility, no shame, no guilt, no repentance; we only have sheer eventing, which can only be historicized.

This may seem unfair to Heidegger. Of course, for Heidegger, to attempt to think such specificity beyond metaphysics is illusory at best, because we are not there yet. Rather than reinforcing it by trying to get beyond it, we have to let metaphysics be. For him, this cannot become a new ground of morality or a basis for religion, etc., in part because the latter are still determined within Western metaphysics. What they would mean concretely beyond Western metaphysics is still open, and thus for him still vague.

Yet we can still pose one further question: Does overcoming metaphysics as not trying to overcome metaphysics, does getting beyond machination, mean that we only need a different kind of *thinking*, a thoughtful speaking of the abyss of Beyng (e.g., Hölderlin, as the founder of decisive resoluteness)? Instead, do we not need to draw on the sphere that is most intimate to persons, namely the emotions, which are other than reason and sensibility? Do we not need, more specifically, a deeper kind of loving? As important as they are, our only exemplars cannot be the “thinker” or the “poet,” but the “lover,” or the saint, the *tzaddik*, the friend of God.<sup>37</sup>

The basic problem in Heidegger is that he, philosophically for his own reasons, could not come to terms with uniqueness or singularity or individuation in an appropriate manner. By stark contrast, Viktor Frankl does: "This uniqueness and singleness which distinguishes each individual and gives a meaning to his existence has a bearing on creative work as much as it does on human love. When the impossibility of replacing a person is realized, it allows the responsibility which a man has for his existence and its continuance to appear in all its magnitude." He continues writing that one who becomes conscious of the responsibility that he or she bears toward a human being will never be able to throw away his or her life, and knowing this "why" of his or her existence, he or she is able to bear almost any "how."<sup>38</sup>

Let me finally hasten to add that this does not mean that Heidegger's work is meaningless; it does not mean that it is contaminated; it does not mean that it is fascist. The philosophical difficulties are not just with Heidegger alone. In fact, Heidegger is at least confronting the problem in a profound, reflective way – which is more than what most of us do. We can still sort through those insights that are helpful for us overall. But his "matter and way" are all the more misleading because of his depth. What is called for when confronting the stranglehold of calculating managerial technologies or machination is not a novel paganism of thinking, but a rehabilitation, a reclamation of the emotional sphere of human persons, and in particular, the interpersonal emotions, which give us novel ways of freedom, critique, normativity, and specifically, a deeper sense of person.

## NOTES

- 1 Victor Farías, *Heidegger and Nazism*, trans. Paul Burrell and Gabriel R. Ricci (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1989).
- 2 In Wuppertal, by the way, Peter Trawny, editor of the *Schwarze Hefte*, was also a student at that time.
- 3 Klaus Held, "Fundamental Moods and Heidegger's Critique of Contemporary Culture," trans. Anthony J. Steinbock, in *Reading Heidegger: Commemorations*, ed. John Sallis (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1993), 286–303.
- 4 To date, the *Schwarze Hefte* or *Black Notebooks* make up four volumes (GA 94–97).
- 5 Thomas Assheuer, *Die Zeit*, N° 12/2014, March 21, 2014.
- 6 See Peter Trawny, *Heidegger und der Mythos der jüdischen Weltverschwörung*, 3rd ed. (Frankfurt am Main: Klostermann, 2015).
- 7 "Das Weltjudentum, aufgetauchelt durch die aus Deutschland hinausgelassenen Emigranten, ist überall unfassbar und braucht sich bei aller Machtentfaltung nirgends an kriegerischen Handlungen zu beteiligen, wogegen uns nur bleibt, das beste Blut der Besten des eigenen Volkes zu opfern" (GA 96: 262).
- 8 Maxim Maximovich Litvinov (1876–1951) was a Soviet diplomat, the "People's Commissar of Foreign Affairs" (1930–1939), and the Soviet Ambassador to the United States (1941–1943). As a Jew, Litvinov was unable to represent the USSR to Hitler, so was sent to the US as an Ambassador, thus for Heidegger putatively contributing to the worldwide proliferation of Judaic machination. (I would like to thank Peter Trawny for this latter observation.)
- 9 "Und vielleicht 'siegt' in diesem 'Kampf', in dem um die Ziellosigkeit schlechthin gekämpft wird und der daher nur das Zerrbild des 'Kampfes' sein kann, die größere Bodenlosigkeit, die an nichts gebunden, alles sich dienstbar macht (das Judentum)" (GA 95: 96–7). See also GA 95: 282 and GA 29/30: 261 ff. But such a characterization of worldlessness also strikes at his conviction that animals are "world poor," and thus reducing Jews to what he considers the world-poverty of animals.

- 10 “Die Frage nach der Rolle des Weltjudentums ist keine rassische, sondern die metaphysische Frage nach der Art von Menschentümlichkeit, die schlechthin ungebunden die Entwurzelung alles Seienden aus dem Sein als weltgeschichtliche ‘Aufgabe’ übernehmen kann” (GA 96: 243).
- 11 In a critical assessment of “sociology,” Heidegger asks why “Jews and the Catholics” prefer doing sociology (i.e., rather than genuine Beyng-historical thinking). “Ist es Zufall, daß der Nationalsozialismus die ‘Soziologie’ als Name ausgemerzt hat? Warum wurde die Soziologie mit Vorliebe von Juden und Katholiken betrieben?” (GA 95: 161). What is “Catholic,” he writes as an obvious criticism, is absolutely “un-Nordic,” and “completely un-German.” “Das ‘Katholische’ in diesem wesentlichen Sinne ist seiner geschichtlichen Herkunft nach römisch – spanisch – ; ganz und gar un-nordisch und vollends undeutsch” (GA 95: 326).
- 12 “Agriculture is now a mechanized food industry, in essence the same as the production of corpses in the gas chambers and extermination camps, the same as the blockading and starving of countries, the same as the production of hydrogen bombs” (GA 79: 27/27). See Wolfgang Schirmacher, *Technik und Gelassenheit: Zeitkritik nach Heidegger* (Munich: Alber, 1983), 25.
- 13 Anthony J. Steinbock, *Phenomenology and Mysticism: The Verticality of Religious Experience* (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 2007/2009), esp., ch. 6; Anthony J. Steinbock, *Moral Emotions: Reclaiming the Evidence of the Heart* (Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 2014); esp., ch. 3.
- 14 See my *Moral Emotions*, ch. 3.
- 15 “Um vom Seyn als dem *Ereignis* er-eignet zu werden, müssen wir der Seiendheit des Seienden und der Vormacht des Seienden ledig sein” (GA 96: 108).
- 16 “Das Seyn ist aus dem Seienden niemals zu erklären und das Seiende ist auch nie die ‘Wirkung’ des Seyns. Unerklärbar und wirkungslos ist das Seyn – dies zu wissen gehört in den Anfang des Denkens. Aber dieses Wissen bedeutet das Offenhalten der

Unheimlichkeit des Seyns als einer Bestimmung seiner Wahrheit – ; wobei diese Un-heimlichkeit mit der gewöhnlichen – innerhalb des Seienden angetroffenen – nichts gemein hat” (GA 95: 290–91). Also: “Wir müssen aus tieferem Grund über ‘Kultur’ hinauswachsen – in einen wesentlichen Raum.

“Kultur – ist ein Gebilde – das nichts mehr zu suchen hat im Da-Sein” (GA 94: 196).

- 17 See Françoise Dastur’s analysis of “Time and Being” in “Time, Event, and Presence in the Late Heidegger” in *Continental Philosophy Review* 47: 3 (2015): 399–421.
- 18 Shakespeare, *Hamlet*, Act 2, Scene, 2, 194–195.
- 19 “As the gift of this It gives, Being belongs to giving. As a gift, Being is not expelled from giving” (GA 14: 10/6). “Always retained in the withdrawing sending, Being is unconcealed for thinking with its epochal abundance of transmutations” (GA 14: 13/9).
- 20 See Arthur R. Luther, “Original Emergence in Heidegger and Nishida,” *Philosophy Today* 26: 4/4 (1982): 345–56.
- 21 See for example, Max Scheler, *Vom Ewigen im Menschen*, *Gesammelte Werke*, Vol. 5, ed. Maria Scheler (Bern: Francke, 1954), 330–32.
- 22 See my *Moral Emotions*, chs. 4 and 7.
- 23 See my *Phenomenology and Mysticism* and “The Problem of Forgetfulness in Michel Henry,” *Continental Philosophy Review*, “The Philosophy of Michel Henry,” ed. Anthony J. Steinbock, 32/3 (1999): 271–302.
- 24 “Die einzige Volk, das keine ‘Kultur’ hatte, weil es noch im Sein stand und ihrer nicht bedurfte, sind die Griechen des 6. vorchristlichen Jahrhunderts. – Jetzt aber trieft Alles von ‘Kultur’” (GA 95: 322). See also GA 95: 325–26 and GA 96: 95, 125.
- 25 For a clarification of the sense of “normal” and “abnormal” here, see Anthony J. Steinbock, *Home and Beyond: Generative Phenomenology after Husserl* (Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 1995), section 3.

- 26 “Im Philosophieren nie an die ‘Anderen’ – an das ‘Du’ denken,  
aber ebensowenig an das ‘Ich’, einzig an und für den Ursprung des  
Seins – das gilt von Sache und Weg gleichermaßen” (GA 94: 28).
- 27 Martin Buber, “Ich und Du,” in *Das dialogische Prinzip* (Heidel-  
berg: Lambert Schneider, 1965).
- 29 “Ob die Bolschewiken einen einzigen Menschen ohne Rechtspre-  
chung und Untersuchung und, nur weil er anderer Überzeugung  
ist, umbringen oder hundertausende, gilt gleichviel. Unsere an  
das Quantitative gewohnte Zeit meint, hier seien hunderttausend  
‘mehr’ als Einer, während doch ein Einziger schon das Meiste  
ist, was durch keine Zahl eingeholt werden kann. Damit wir die  
deutsche Haltung nicht verwirren, dürfen wir nicht, auch hier  
nicht, in den Rausch der Zahlen verfallen.  
“Sonst könnte die Gefahr entstehen, daß die Tötung von eini-  
gen Wenigen gegenüber vielen Tausenden gar nicht so schlimm  
gehalten wird und das ‘Untermenschentum’ erst bei einer hin-  
reichend großen Anzahl beginnt” (GA 96: 237).
- 29 “Solange das Wesen des Menschen durch die Tierheit (animali-  
tas) vorbestimmt bleibt, kann immer nur gefragt werden, was  
der Mensch sei. Nie ist die Frage möglich: wer der Mensch sei?  
Denn diese Wer-frage ist als Frage schon die ursprünglich andere  
und einzigartige Antwort auf die Frage nach dem Menschen –  
dieses Fragen selbst setzt den Menschen in seinem Wesen an als  
die Inständigkeit in der Wahrheit des Seyns. ... Erst diese Frage  
überwindet die neuzeitliche anthropologische Bestimmung des  
Menschen und mit ihr alle voraufgegangene, christliche hellen-  
istische – jüdische und sokratisch-platonische Anthropologie”  
(GA 95: 322).
- 30 In *The Beloved: On Vocations and Exemplars in the Verticality of  
Moral Experience* (in preparation).
- 31 See Emmanuel Levinas, “Being Jewish,” trans. Mary Beth Mader,  
in *Continental Philosophy Review* (2007) 40: 209–210: “The mean-  
ing of election, and of revelation understood as election, is not  
to be found in the injustice of a preference. It presupposes the

relation of father to children in which each one is everything to the father without excluding the others from this privilege. Thus, Jewish election is not initially lived as pride or particularism. It is the very mystery of personhood. Against every attempt to understand the ego starting from a freedom, in a world without origin, the Jew offers to others, but already lives, the emotional schema of personhood as a son and as elected.

“In a new sense, then, to be created and to be a son is to be free. To exist as a creature is not to be crushed beneath adult responsibility. It is to refer in one’s very facticity to someone who bears existence for you, who bears sin, who can forgive.

“Jewish existence is thus the fulfillment of the human condition as fact, personhood and freedom. And its entire originality consists in breaking with a world that is without origin and simply present.”

- 32 See my *Phenomenology and Mysticism*, esp., chs. 6 and 8.
- 33 Karl Jaspers, *Die Schuldfrage: Ein Beitrag zur deutschen Frage* (Munich: Piper Verlag, 1947/1965). English translation, Karl Jaspers, *The Question of German Guilt*, trans. E. B. Ashton (New York: Fordham University Press, 2000).
- 34 “Da-sein trägt in sich die Notwendigkeit einer Über-eignung an das Selbst des Menschen, die von jeder Subjektivierung (weil überhaupt kein ‘Subjekt’ mehr) ebenso weit entfernt ist, wie von einer Vereinzelung im moralisch-metaphysischen Sinne der ‘Person.’ Die ‘Ver-einzelung’ bestimmt sich aus der Über-nahme der Inständigkeit im Da in das Selbst” (GA 96: 31).
- 35 See my *Moral Emotions*.
- 36 “Es gibt Sklavenmärkte, bei denen die Sklaven selbst oft die größten Händler sind” (GA 95: 455).
- 37 See my *Phenomenology and Mysticism*.
- 38 Viktor E. Frankl, *Man’s Search for Meaning*, trans. Ilse Lasch (Boston: Beacon Press), 79–80.



Heidegger's "Nazism" as Veiled  
Nietzscheanism and Heideggerianism:  
Evidence from the *Black Notebooks*

*Joshua Rayman*

To read the reviews, the publication of Heidegger's *Reflections*, from 1932–1941 (GA 94–96), under the ominous, descriptive subtitle, the *Black Notebooks*, has affirmatively settled the hoary old debate concerning whether there is a substantial link between Heidegger's philosophy and his biographical Nazism. However, I would argue that the *Reflections* so far do very little to add to this link. First, many of the most notorious remarks have precedents in prior volumes of Heidegger's *Gesamtausgabe*, in reports of personal interactions, and in class notes. Second, the new remarks in the *Reflections*, including the most notorious ones, do very little to link his philosophy to Nazism. Third, his political remarks, as typically oblique and ambiguous as they are, are far more typically anti-Nazistic or anti-modern than Nazistic or anti-Semitic. Fourth, the lion's share of his remarks, here as elsewhere in his work, concern the abandonment of radical questioning, the forgetting of truth and being, and the critique of technological modernity. Thus, in order to characterize Heidegger's attitude toward Nazism and its relation to his philosophy, we need to see precisely what he was and was not affirming. On my account, his selective affirmation of Nazism transforms it largely into his own philosophy and dispenses with much of the concrete racial, political, and economic doctrines that characterize it. What seems most Nazistic

about his philosophy is Nietzschean, but there are very substantial differences between Heidegger's Nietzscheanism and the official Nietzsche of Nazi Party theoreticians.

While there are certainly divergent responses to the *Reflections*, ranging from the skepticism of French deconstructionist Heideggerians to the validation of Heidegger skeptics, the general consensus seems to be that the *Reflections* demonstrate the Nazism of Heidegger's philosophy, as Karl Löwith long ago contended. In the *New York Review of Books*, Peter E. Gordon describes Heidegger as "a convinced Nazi," and says that the *Notebooks* "will cast a dark shadow on his legacy," for his views only "grew more extreme" following his rectorate.<sup>1</sup> In the *New York Times* report, many scholars cited regard the 2½ pages of anti-Semitic references in the 1200-page *Reflections* as sufficient to demonstrate Heidegger's ongoing anti-Semitism and to link his philosophy to Nazism.<sup>2</sup> For instance, Richard Wolin is quoted as saying, "The evidence now isn't just undeniable, it's over the top ... Heidegger was engaged with these issues philosophically and intellectually through the course of the whole regime." And Thomas Meyer is quoted as arguing that Heidegger's views on Jews became radicalized in 1938–39 to the point where he identified them with modernity and imagined a world without Jews. However, Richard Polt argues that it was already clear that Heidegger was an anti-Semite, and Thomas Sheehan even argues that it was already clear that Heidegger's critique of modernity as decline was a way for him to "launder" his anti-Semitism. In the *Chronicle of Higher Education* article, the *Notebooks* are said to possibly provide the "smoking gun" of Heidegger's philosophical Nazism and Peter Trawny, editor of the *Reflections*, is quoted claiming that "We knew that he had expressed anti-Semitism as private insights, but this shows anti-Semitism tied in to his philosophy."<sup>3</sup> In the *Guardian's* summation, Heidegger's critique of modernity is a veiled critique of "World Jewry" (*Weltjudentum*), or, at least, he regards "World Jewry" as a driver of modernity.<sup>4</sup> He describes Jews with their "talent for calculation" as "so vehemently opposed to the Nazis' racial principles because 'they themselves have lived according to the race principle for the longest.'"

Thus, in these accounts, Heidegger appears as both anti-Semite and philosophical Nazi.

However, the caveats turn out to be quite significant. Gordon concedes that "after 1934 [Heidegger] grew disenchanted with the Nazi movement," but "only because he felt that Nazism had betrayed its original promise and had succumbed to the technological fate that afflicted the modern age overall." And the *Guardian* notes that he "distanc[es] himself from the racial theories pursued by Nazi intellectuals," that for Heidegger, "fascism, 'world Judaism', Soviet communism and British parliamentarianism should be seen as part of the imperious dehumanizing drive of Western modernity," and that "[t]he bourgeois-Christian form of English 'Bolshevism' is the most dangerous. Without its destruction [*Vernichtung*], the modern era [modernity, *Neuzeit*] will remain intact [further preserved]" (cf. GA 94: 117-18; GA 96: 154, which identifies the English and Soviet states). This last view is not even new to Heidegger scholars, for it appears verbatim in *Die Geschichte des Seyns*, also edited by Peter Trawny (GA 69: 208-209).<sup>5</sup> Although the Nazis also opposed Bolshevism, Heidegger's critiques of Bolshevism and modern technology cannot be identified with this Nazi critique, for in criticizing Bolshevism, he is simultaneously criticizing Nazism. He writes that "Bolshevism and authoritarian socialism ["in the variants of fascism and National Socialism"] are metaphysically the same and are grounded in the domination of the beingness of beings [*Seiendheit des Seienden*]," in the sense that they are "a corresponding (not the same) form of the completion of modernity" (GA 96: 109).<sup>6</sup> Nor is there something specific to Judaism in these critiques of communism and Bolshevism, for in the *Beiträge*, Heidegger departs from the Nazi doctrine in writing that "the final form of Marxism ... has essentially nothing to do either with Judaism or even with Russia" (GA 65: 54/44, tm). Hence, the evidence from the newspaper reports hardly amounts to the scathing indictment of Heideggerian philosophy as anti-Semitic Nazism that we have been led to believe. The point is not to exculpate Heidegger from his Nazism and anti-Semitism, but rather to argue that even in his early explicit

affirmations of Nazism, he was merely dressing up his own philosophy in another guise, rather than affirming anything specific to Nazism.

Despite his membership in the Nazi Party, his 1933–34 service as rector of Freiburg University under the Nazis, his institution of Nazi racial policies at Freiburg, his 1933–34 speeches affirming the Führer, and his subsequent participation in an advisory committee drafting Nazi legislation, including racial laws, with the likes of Julius Streicher and Carl Schmitt, Heidegger's philosophy and actions in the 1930s and early 1940s were largely at odds with the Nazi Party, as its own functionaries and theorists recognized. Karl Löwith writes that the Party regarded Heidegger suspiciously for the lack of "Jewish and racial considerations" in his philosophy, for his dedications to the Jewish Edmund Husserl (GA 2) and the half-Jewish Max Scheler (GA 3), and his lack of interest in Nordic themes. Nazi theorists criticized him in party organs; he refused to carry out numerous party dictates, both as rector and in his later seminars; he was critical of Nazism in his lectures; and in 1944 he was deemed by the Nazis "the least indispensable of the professors at the university" and drafted into the *Volkssturm*.<sup>7</sup> Among the exculpatory evidence discussed by Karl Moehling, drawing on documents from the de-Nazification proceedings, is his refusal to allow anti-Jewish posters to be placed in the university, his protection of his Jewish assistants Werner Brock and Helene Weiss, his resigning the rectorate rather than carry out the request of Otto Wacker, Baden Culture Minister, to fire his predecessor Wilhelm von Moellendorf, and the attacks he was subjected to in various articles by the race theorist Ernst Krieck, the rector of Frankfurt University.<sup>8</sup> Indeed, Krieck did not think that Heidegger's philosophy was Nazistic. He describes it as

outspoken atheism and metaphysical nihilism, as it formerly had been primarily represented by Jewish authors; therefore, a ferment of decay and dissolution for the German nation. In *Being and Time*, Heidegger philosophizes consciously and deliberately about "everydayness" – there is nothing in it about nation, state, race, and all the values of our National Socialist view of the world.<sup>9</sup>

Of course, Nazism was by no means such a unified body of doctrine as to preclude internecine disputes, and Heidegger's time as rector, which he called "the greatest stupidity of [his] life," is at the very least highly compromised by his association with the Nazi Party, even if we buy his line that he was merely seeking to preserve university autonomy.

But on many occasions in the *Reflections*, which is my focus, Heidegger criticizes Nazism directly – its militaristic ends, its racial philosophy, and most generally, its participation in the general technological forgetting of being and mastering of beings, or the beingness of beings, that he calls *Machenschaft*. The latter ideas are far broader than Nazism or any particular ethnic or political identity.

The power of manipulation – the destruction even of godlessness, the dehumanization of the human into the animal, the misuse of the earth, the misreckoning of the world – has passed into the condition of finality; differences of peoples, states, cultures are still only a façade. *Machenschaft* can be restricted and cut off through no measures. Never before in the history of the human has being uniformly forced the entirety of beings into a state of indecision so unconditionally and in a furious paroxysm, while still remaining fully concealed behind the respective operative beings. (GA 96: 52–53).

Thus, Heidegger denies that *Machenschaft*, as a widely disseminated event of modernity, is restricted to any particular people, culture, or race. It is for this reason that I would argue that we should not magnify his rare but reprehensible connection of Judaism to calculative rationality and *Machenschaft* into a grand narrative of the anti-Semitic foundations of his philosophy. Heidegger refers to Judaism's "current increase in power" as deriving from its "empty rationality and capacity for calculation," which in "the metaphysics of the West, especially in its modern development," becomes useful without enabling decision, and he links this lack of decisiveness to Husserl's inability to attain "the realms of essential decisions," yet he argues that his "'attack' against

Husserl is not directed against him only and in general not essentially ... [but] against the neglect of the question of being” (GA 96: 46–47). Indeed, it is crucial to note that his trafficking in cultural generalizations allows him to extend this very same critique of *Machenschaft* and an alleged Jewish and Husserlian failure to come to a decision concerning the meaning of being to modernity as such, as well as National Socialism, fascism, Bolshevism, England, and America. Thus, Heidegger’s critique of the historical uprooting enacted by modernity (GA 94: 363–64) is nothing specific to or primarily driven by Judaism; rather, it traces back to Descartes’s construction of the subject: “the modern, beginning. Subjectivity and *certitudo*: Descartes” (GA 50: 83).<sup>10</sup>

Even the most widely cited remark in the *Reflections* turns out to be characteristically ambiguous. In the ninth of ten points that he sets forth “at the beginning of the third year of the planetary war,” he writes that “World Jewry, incited by the emigrants allowed to leave Germany, is everywhere elusive and nowhere needs to campaign in military actions in its unfolding of power [*Machtentfaltung*], against which it remains to us only to sacrifice the best blood of the best of our own people” (GA 96: 261–62). In reports, this remark is understood as self-evidently anti-Semitic, with no explanation, and certainly it does assert the existence of a World Judaism, that it cannot be grasped, that it is influential without possessing a military, that there is a distinction between Heidegger’s people and World Jewry, that Germans somehow have to sacrifice their best, that it is the best of the Germans that are sacrificed, and that there is a blood tie in this sacrifice. Yet, both on its own terms and especially in relation to his other notes, this claim can be read quite differently to say that the Nazi racial mission cannot possibly succeed by going to war at all costs, whether to achieve influence or to destroy a spectral World Judaism that cannot be seized through any military force, and therefore, that this mission should be abandoned. Thus, he often condemns the “war catastrophe and catastrophic war” with its resultant “devastation” and “decisionlessness” (GA 96: 45), and he criticizes Nazi Germany’s imperialist ambitions, asking, “is Germany the land of the Germans, is its history borne through the grounding of

the Germans in their essence, or do the Germans consume themselves in mere expansion [*Verbreiterung*] and dispersal [*Verstreung*] for the formation of the highest form of unbinding of all instituted powers of machination [*Machenschaft*]?" (GA 96: 50–51). He also condemns racial thinking on the same anti-modernist grounds. "All race thinking is modern, moves in the track of the constitution of the human being as a subject. In race thinking, the subjectivism of modernity is completed through the inclusion of corporeality in the subject and the complete grasping of the subject as humanity of the masses of human beings. At the same time with this completion, and forcing it into its service, the empowerment of machination carries itself out unconditionally" (GA 96: 48). In its context, then, Heidegger's remark about World Judaism depends on the view that the war's universalization of technological destruction and mastery of the human self only destroys the essential task: the radical thinking of being.

This explanation accords closely with his subsequent rejection of the Nazi approach to what he deemed to be the essential mission of German Dasein and the German *Volk*: the thinking of being. As Trawny argues, what Heidegger is looking for everywhere in the events of the 1930s are "'signs' of an always more catastrophically looming 'forgetting of being'" (Trawny, GA 94: 533). As throughout his career, he seeks a radical questioning of the meaning of being and truth (GA 94: 365, 408, 411–12), not socialism or ontic warfare. He writes, "do we ask after the truth of being in order to ground an originary belongingness – or do we proceed to explain and to 'master' [*beherrschen*] the entity [*das Seiende*] from out of the entity [*Seiendem*]?" This 'mastery' [*Beherrschung*'] is no dominion [*Herrschaft*], but rather a badly veiled slavery within an event [*Vorgangs*] that must be at its end" (GA 94: 365). Thus, he opposes as slavery an ontic mastery or dominion over the entity characteristic of technology in general or even Nazi biologicistic destruction (GA 94: 364), in favor of the questioning and questionable, not the "non-figure [*Ungestalt*] of 'problems'"; what is demanded is "the question ... the grounding of the truth itself and its essence for itself," being as *Er-eignis*, rather than ontic *Vorgang* (GA 94: 504–505).

It would require the insertion of a questionable set of equations (being = *physis* = German blood and soil) to translate his ontology directly into a German nationalism of the Nazi biological type. Early on, he does identify the Führer as leading the way to an originary path for thought. He writes of “the great experience and luck that the Führer has awakened a new reality, which gives to our thinking the right path and impetus [*Stoßkraft*]. Otherwise it would have remained lost in all groundedness still and would have only with difficulty found its effect” (GA 94: 111). But this is a highly conditional attachment that he seemed to accept only early on, and which refers only to Heideggerian thinking. Around this time, he does come quite close to identifying his thinking in *Being and Time* with Nazi ideology. He writes that “[t]he project of being [*Seins*] as time overcomes all up to this point in being and thinking; not idea, but rather mission [*Auftrag*]; not solution, but rather tie [*Bindung*]. The project does not break itself up [*löst sich nicht ab*] into pure spirit, but rather opens and first binds blood and soil [*Blut und Boden*] in accompaniment of action [*Handlungsbereitschaft*] and capacity for *effect* and *work*” (GA 94: 127). Here he is quite explicit about defining being as time precisely as a link not to some abstract pure spirit but to the binding of the Nazi racial slogan of blood and soil to action, capacity for effect and work. He also suggests a direct identification between his ontology and politics in writing in italics, “*metaphysics as meta-politics*” (GA 94: 116); “we must bring [philosophy] to an end and thereby prepare something completely other – metapolitics. Accordingly also the *transformation of science*” (GA 94: 115).

Yet his early affirmation of National Socialism and his subsequent critical remarks toward it are very specific to a certain conception of it deprived of most of its essential properties and allied closely to his own thinking. In other words, his affirmation of Nazism is always linked to a very particular, indeed, idiosyncratic, version of it, and he offers criticisms of other understandings of it from the beginning. National Socialism is valid for him only according to certain standards, standards that bear little resemblance to the movement itself. “*National*



*Socialism* is a genuine becoming power only when it still has something to be silent about behind all its doing and saying – and has an effect with a strong holding-back [*Hinter-hältigkeit*] effecting into the future. But if the present were already the achieved and willed, then only a horror of the fall is left" (GA 94: 114). Its unsatisfactory form is encapsulated in the phrase "*vulgar National Socialism*," by which he means "the world and the measures and demands and attitudes of the appointed, esteemed newspaper writers and culture-makers of the time," as well as the "ethical materialism" of "an entirely determinate doctrine of history and human beings in the people that proceeds from this by brainless appeal, naturally, to Hitler's *Mein Kampf*" (GA 94: 142). Hence, if there is a non-vulgar National Socialism, then it would appeal not to Hitler's own foundational National Socialist text, but probably to *Being and Time* and the Rectoral Address, with its own resistance to the *Führerprinzip*. Heidegger explicitly rejects any National Socialism that accepts ethical materialism and biologism. According to Trawny,

Heidegger at the latest in the Summer of 1936 finds a distance from the really existing National Socialism in which he can catch sight of and criticize the "world-view" of the "desolate and coarse 'biologism.'" At the same time, he places himself in opposition from the beginning to the National Socialist critique of so-called "intellectualism," i.e. of an allegedly senseless extravagance in theoretical questioning. In the *Reflections* from this time, we thus see how the thinker works his way out of his early party participation for National Socialism in a stepwise fashion [as evident in Heidegger's works from the same time, GA 65-66, 69-71]. (Trawny, GA 94: 533-34).

Heidegger's criticism of Nazi biologism is that "the subject character ... still experiences a particular hardening through the privileging of the biological (i.e. in truth, unbiological) interpretation of the essence

of the people, which remains plausibly a ‘biological’ interpretation of the crowd in particular, and therefore also must be often particularly emphasized with regard to it” (GA 94: 521–22). Hence, Heidegger opposes Nazism if it means something biologicistic and anti-intellectual. And if Nazism entails ideology and socialism, then he also opposes it.

“Socialism”:

as mere desire for levelling [*Gleichmacherei*] –  
 as superiority [*Übermacht*] of that to be dragged down –  
 as mere operation of the commonweal –  
 as structuring-levelling need of all for their mission  
 according to their conduct and typing in the whole of the  
 people (GA 94: 124).

In his later notes from 1939 to 1941, he again criticizes the notions of nationalism and socialism, writing that “[t]his politics is ‘total’ – not because it comprehends everything but because it is grounded according to its essence in the execution of the beingness of beings. Representations like ‘nationalism’ and ‘socialism’ belong to a time in which the modern still resided in the preliminary stage of its completion; now they are merely historically used titles for an entirely different event [*Vorgang*], which can no longer be designated ‘political’” (GA 96: 43). There is nothing positive in his definitions of nationalism and socialism, even in the early *Reflections* (GA 94), and he refers contemptuously to “the socialistic posturing [*Getue*] of the student bodies [*Studentenschaften*] – the stupidest Romanticism” (GA 94: 146). He writes that “the present student is no National Socialist, but rather a full-blown petit bourgeois ... This ‘socialistic’ posturing is only a cloak [or fig leaf, *Deckmantel*] for a flight before the actual task and before their proper incapacity” (GA 94: 147). The actual task, however, has nothing to do with socialism, for it concerns, as we have seen, a radical questioning of being and truth. Even in discussing what defines German idealism, he writes that

the German in this ‘idealism’ (i.e. the interpretation of being as pre-sentedness [re-presentedness,

*Vor-gestelltheit*]), ... consists in the originary experience of the beginning essence of being [*Seyns*] as *physis*; in other words: the essence of the German determines itself from there first as the ur-own [*ur-eigene*] power for such experience – ; metaphysics is not Germanized 'folk-like,' but rather the German attains through this metaphysical effort for the first time to historical moments in its essence. (GA 96: 9)

So, the possibilities in Nazism will be contingent on its meeting such standards of historical essencing, and it will not in itself constitute these possibilities. He refers to "*National Socialism* not as completely eternal truth fallen from the sky – taken thus it becomes an error and foolishness. Thus, as it has become, it must itself be becoming and form the future – i.e. as an image itself to step back before itself" (GA 94: 114–15). To determine the proper understanding of the task, it "remains decisive whether the spiritual-historical outreaches [*Ausgriffe*] and basic moods are so originary and at the same time so clear that they compel a creative transformation [*Umschaffung*] of Dasein – ; and for that the presupposition is that National Socialism remains in war – in the position of having to execute itself, not only of 'spreading itself out' and 'growing' and holding its ground [*Behauptens*]" (GA 94: 141). That National Socialism, then, that Heidegger early on affirms is to be defined by a constant movement of originary creative transformation and struggle, rather than rigidification (GA 94: 140–41). Thus, while Heidegger's use of *Machenschaft* has been understood to indicate an affirmation of National Socialist images of scheming machinations or its operations of power, it plays a solely negative role in his thinking, attached to modernity as such, in contrast to a particular intellectual or spiritual operation. "Not to confuse [the creative] with machination [*Machenschaften*]" (GA 94: 133); "[p]erhaps that all counts as conceptual foolery – but perhaps we learn once to surmise that only the decision of the West is meant – whether the people experiences itself as used [or needed, *gebrauchtes*] by 'beyng' [*Seyn*] and sacrificed to it – or as a giant playground of an allegedly 'eternal' machinery [or machination,

*Machenschaft*]" (GA 94: 522). The proper rank consists not in manipulation, machinic operations, or machinations, but rather in an "inconspicuous, grasping power which fosters in others the essential and brings it to development. Radicalism of a movement can only be preserved where it must be always newly created most clearly and deeply – in the spiritual. ... Divert the machinery, reconcile disputes, integrate and validate institutions, administer transactions – all that has nothing to do with leading [*Führung*]" (GA 94: 138). We must keep these qualifications in mind when we see Heidegger write of "the inner demands of German socialism" (GA 94: 135) and validate a *Führerwille* (GA 94: 139). "*Führen* means: develop to independence and self-responsibility; and spiritual *Führen* means: awaken the creative forces and build up to leadership [*Führerschaft*]" (GA 94: 138). In other words, he interprets Hitler's *Führer* principle not as dictating that all follow Hitler, but that there be a creative rebirth of autonomous human spiritual powers, just as it meant to him in the Rectoral Address a resistance to that will.

Heidegger's Nietzschean transformation of Nazi ideas here suggests what I believe is a far closer philosophical kinship, one easily mistaken for Nazism. Many of Heidegger's explicit and implicit remarks in the *Reflections* refer to Nietzsche and Nietzschean motifs of power and the rejection of the rabble, herd, and commercial culture, as might be expected, considering the many lecture courses on Nietzsche that Heidegger prepared in the latter half of the 1930s and early 1940s and now collected in a range of volumes in the GA. As I have argued elsewhere, Heidegger's views of Nietzsche can credibly be distinguished from the so-called official Nietzsche of the Nazis, promulgated by Alfred Rosenberg and Alfred Bäumler, and indeed, these views constitute a critique of the metaphysics of that reading. Thus, for instance, if Heidegger affirms a Nietzschean idea of power and creation as breeding, he explicitly distinguishes this view from the Nazi biologicistic breeding campaign. Those "wanting to breed the people 'biologically' by breeding [*biologisch'-züchterisch aufzuchten wollen*]," are in error in that "this breeding and its demand are first *the consequence* of the already posited unquestioned mastery [*fraglosen Herrschaft*] of the machinic in itself [*Machenschaftlichen an*

sich] (in the sense of a not overcome 'liberal' thinking of progress)" (GA 94: 364-65). The Nazi form of literal biologicistic eugenics is wrong not because it is conservative, but because a liberal thought of progress is at the basis of the view that the machinic should possess unquestioned mastery, and thus, at the basis of the view that a technological act of physically breeding a new people would be desirable. But this is a rejection of the Nazi biologicistic Nietzsche and its racial eugenics, as we find in Heidegger's Nietzsche lectures of the mid to late 1930s. That his view is Nietzschean is clear in his identification of this modern view of science as veiled, self-denying will to power. "'Science' – as the leading beginning of modernity was a certain 'will to power,' in the sense of the mastery of nature, as 'world' over against anxiety before the mystery of violence – a mode of unveiling directed determinately and remaining [*innehaltende*] at a determinate level" (GA 94: 140). The task now is "to undertake for knowing and science as it were the *inverse* mission: *The re-binding and thus 'liberating' awakening of the world and thereby of historical Dasein*. Binding is only the effecting work as existentiell work. *Will and entry to empowerment of powers*" (GA 94: 140). What Heidegger is after is a liberating, awakening process in thinking of world and historical Dasein, rather than a physiological, ontic eugenics campaign. Thus, he argues that the "breeding of higher and the highest *types of thinking* [*Denkarten*] is primary – above all mere communication of knowledge [*Kenntnismitteilung*]" (GA 94: 124). The transformation of thinking is, as always, his aim, his form of practice, not the body. In subsequently also criticizing a conservative attempt to rescue the past (as opposed to a liberal thought of futural progress), then, he is setting forth a non-biologicistic Nietzschean affirmation of power and creation. The conservative approach to the past is deficient because it may stem from "mere desire for power and from hatred against all creators, or from lack of power [*Unvermögen*] to create – which both are the same in their ground" (GA 94: 365). By arming or equipping in a technological sense for the end, we are "in the end unequipped for the beginning and above all for the great devastation and disturbance of everything" (GA 94: 364). What he affirms, then, is precisely the Nietzschean power of creative

transformation defined by the rank ordering of valuations, which is characteristic of the philosopher of the future, the genuine philosopher.<sup>11</sup> Indeed, these Nietzschean views can be seen in the background of such apparently Nazistic views as Heidegger's claims that "a far-grasping spiritual-historical will to the future must awaken, fixing itself and step by step preparing the next half century at least in its spiritual comprehension" (GA 94: 121), and that "[o]nly where [there is] a *strong* will – its *law* and *resistance* – where [there is] creative power, there [are found] application and consent and affirmation" (GA 94: 119).

Thus, I would argue that the superficial similarity between the Nietzschean and the official Nazistic positions cloaks the fact that what Heidegger is doing is in many respects Nietzschean, not Nazistic. When Heidegger is using language akin to the Nazis in speaking of a will to the future that might span decades or even centuries or millennia, this is also Nietzschean language, and the thoughts are closer to Nietzsche's than to the Nazis, but identifiable only with Heidegger's broader critique of modernity and its technological destruction of the being question. Heidegger's conditional attachment to Nazism was thus specific to his ontology, and hence, his philosophy can indeed be judged by reference to his philosophical Nazism. However, his philosophical Nazism bears so little resemblance to Nazism that it would be better characterized as his Heideggerianism. It is a cliché that Heidegger's Aristotle, Heidegger's Kant, Heidegger's Nietzsche, and so on are all Heidegger. Whether or not this is fair, I would argue that Heidegger's Nazism is indeed Heidegger. To the extent that it meets his standards, which is to say, to the extent that it satisfies Heidegger's philosophy, he identifies with it, and to the extent that it does not meet his standards, which is to say, in so far as it is racist, military expansionist, nationalist, socialist, herd morality, biologicistic, ideological, ethical materialism, he rejects it. Thus, he says that bound with a bourgeois affection is a "*muddy biologism*, which provides yet the correct 'ideology' to ethical materialism" (GA 94: 143). What is sought instead is "to awaken the innermost force of the Dasein of our people – not to promote our 'culture,' but rather to empower the clarity

of the will of Dasein ... to set into work the labor from innermost necessity – not to allow to rise a ‘spiritual superstructure,’ but rather to find the basic mode of popular being” (GA 94: 144). That is not Nazism. It is just Heideggerianism.

#### ENDNOTES

- 1 Peter E. Gordon, “Heidegger in Black,” *New York Review of Books*, October 9, 2014.
- 2 Jennifer Schuessler, “Heidegger’s *Notebooks* Renew Focus on Anti-Semitism.” *New York Times*, Late Edition (East Coast), Mar. 31, 2014: C.1.
- 3 Paul Hockenos, “Release of Heidegger’s *Black Notebooks* Reignites Debate Over Nazi Ideology,” *The Chronicle of Higher Education*, Vol. 60, Issue 24.
- 4 Philip Oltermann, “Heidegger notebooks show antisemitism at heart of thinking: Publication counters view that Nazism did not taint writer’s philosophy,” *The Guardian* (London, England), Mar. 13, 2014: 18 Business Insights: Essentials. Web. Jan. 27, 2015.
- 5 Cf. Slavoj Žižek, *In Defense of Lost Causes* (London: Verso, 2009), 135.
- 6 I would like to thank my colleague Martin Schönfeld for a very instructive conversation concerning the translation of several key terms in the *Notebooks* (e.g., *Machenschaft*, *Abwandlung*), as well as the social-historical context in which Heidegger’s views developed.
- 7 Karl A. Moehling, “Heidegger and the Nazis,” in *Heidegger: The Man and the Thinker*, ed. Thomas Sheehan (Chicago: Precedent, 1981), 39.
- 8 Ibid., 36–37.
- 9 Ibid., 37.

- 10 Cited in Emmanuel Faye, *Heidegger: The Introduction of Nazism into Philosophy in Light of the Unpublished Seminars of 1933–35* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2009), 399n92.
- 11 Nietzsche, *Beyond Good and Evil*, §212; Friedrich Nietzsche, *Sämtliche Werke: Kritische Studienausgabe*, 2d ed., ed. Giorgio Colli and Mazzino Montinari (Munich: dtv; Berlin and New York: de Gruyter, 1988), vol. 5, 146.



Heidegger's Mask:  
Silence, Politics and the  
Banality of Evil in the *Black Notebooks*

*Adam Knowles*

I. INTRODUCTION

"We're going to get to the bottom of exactly what happened."<sup>1</sup> These words were President Obama's first reaction to yet another shooting spree, in this case the soldier Ivan Lopez's murder-suicide at Fort Hood on April 2, 2014. The logic of the President's remarks, made in the face of sparse details with the situation still unfolding, was well-suited to satisfy one of our most basic desires – the desire for an explanation, the desire to be alleviated of uncertainty. In the *Twilight of the Idols* Nietzsche labels this desire the error of imaginary causes, which he captures under the mantra that "some explanation is better than none." As Nietzsche goes on to say: "Tracing something unfamiliar back to something familiar alleviates us, calms us, pacifies us, and in addition provides a feeling of power."<sup>2</sup> Setting aside any attempt to explain the causality of something as complex as a traumatized soldier opening fire on his comrades at Fort Hood, what interests me is the combination of natural common sense and dangerous simplicity that marks Obama's logic – a logic that is, to borrow Nietzsche's word, "*customary*."

This shooting occurred as I, like many other Heidegger scholars, had just begun reading Heidegger's *Black Notebooks*.<sup>3</sup> What struck me was that the very same customary logic behind Obama's idea of "getting to the bottom of this" could also be found in early responses to the

*Black Notebooks*. The publication of the *Black Notebooks* was celebrated as a philosophical event, and the arrival in early 2014 of the first three volumes of the eventual eight notebooks was prepared for by a flurry of activity in the German, French and, eventually, English press.<sup>4</sup> *The New Yorker* and *The New York Times*, among others, opened their pages to hastily written reviews of a journalistic bent.<sup>5</sup> More serious, detailed reviews by philosophers and historians followed in the months thereafter, while a figure no less than Jean-Luc Nancy observed a self-declared six-month moratorium before publishing a short piece on the *Black Notebooks*.<sup>6</sup> Both the early philosophical and journalistic responses were also dominated by two very different short books published in 2014 by Peter Trawny, the editor of the *Black Notebooks*, *Heidegger und der Mythos der jüdischen Weltverschwörung* and *Irrnisfuge*.<sup>7</sup>

Leaving aside Trawny, whose work on the *Black Notebooks* has always been one step ahead of others due to his position as editor of the texts, one assumption has underpinned many of these early responses to the *Black Notebooks*: We were supposed to get to the bottom of these twelve hundred pages of fresh Heidegger covering nothing less than the period in which Heidegger joined the Nazi party, served as Rector of Freiburg University, withdrew from active political engagement, and commented on the early years of the Holocaust and the Second World War, all during a period of incredible personal and professional productivity. We were supposed to get to the bottom of this strange testament left by Heidegger, this compendium of thoughts, jokes, aphorisms, political venom and banally pieced together anti-Semitism. There are many reasons why the impression of a final verdict on Heidegger is justified, for the early responses to the *Black Notebooks* have not wanted for – to paraphrase Günter Figal – “shocking” material, especially because of Heidegger’s concern with “World Jewry” in the most platitudinous reformulation of the fraudulent *Protocols of the Elders of Zion*.<sup>8</sup> The anti-Semitism of the *Black Notebooks* is pungent, and though limited to less than three pages of twelve hundred, the forcefulness of Heidegger’s anti-Semitism is all the more troubling for its brevity.

We could appeal to Heidegger himself for a hermeneutic principle to address this brevity, drawing from his 1942 *Parmenides* lecture course: “The Greeks are often silent, especially about what is essential to them [*Die Griechen schweigen viel, wenn wir auf ihr Wesenhaftes denken*]. And when they do say the essential, they say it in a way that is simultaneously reticent [*in einer zugleich verschweigenden Weise*]” (GA 54: 116/79). Was Heidegger so silent about his anti-Semitism, even during the period when it clearly would have advanced his career, because it was so essential to him and to his thinking? This question becomes all the more forceful as one takes notice of the ubiquity of silence as a theme, concern, and practice in the *Notebooks*. The *Notebooks*, Heidegger writes early in the first volume, are “written from a great silence” (GA 94: 28). Was Heidegger, then, speaking his anti-Semitism through reticence? Was Heidegger speaking his anti-Semitism through his philosophy? Was Heidegger speaking his philosophy through anti-Semitism? And, if so, what manner of silence is this?<sup>9</sup> Moreover, what does it mean that the overtly anti-Semitic remarks in the *Notebooks* begin in 1938, long after Heidegger distanced himself from National Socialism? I will suggest that answers to these questions can be found in Heidegger’s repeated use of the term “mask” in the first volume of the *Notebooks*, which is employed as a term of concealment and silence. “In reservedness,” Heidegger writes, “lies concealed audacity [*In der Verhaltenheit liegt die verschwiegene Kühnheit*.]” (GA 94: 284). Concealed beneath reticence and audacity, the *Black Notebooks* are a work of masking.<sup>10</sup>

Yet how do these hermeneutic principles culled from Heidegger help us deal with this immensely repetitive document? The *Black Notebooks* are not repetitive in the fugal cyclicity of a work such as the *Contributions to Philosophy* and the other *Ereignis* manuscripts written during the same period. The *Contributions* unfold through constant variations on a theme, much like an Aristotelian analysis that starts, stops and returns back to that which was left unsaid and may always remain unsaid, yet slowly becomes inscribed in its unsayability.<sup>11</sup> The repetition of the *Black Notebooks* does not enliven or quicken the things

touched upon and brushed against in passing successions, but instead calcifies them and hardens them. Their dominant tone is one of embitterment, and for this reason the repetition of the *Black Notebooks* is something far from the play and pliability of the *Contributions*, or even that of Heidegger's lecture courses.<sup>12</sup> The repetition is nothing short of banalizing – a term I invoke with the full force of the resonances lent to it by Hannah Arendt.<sup>13</sup> What is most banal about the *Black Notebooks* is that they reflect not stupidity, but instead what Arendt called Eichmann's "reluctance [*Unwille*]," his unwillingness to understand.<sup>14</sup> In Heidegger's case this reluctance involved a refusal to see not so much *difference*, but *differences*, which resulted in the grand gesture of leveling off difference within the narrative of the history of being that reached a point where – absurdly enough – the Nazis and the Jews were indistinguishable.<sup>15</sup>

This is the central claim of the remarks I would like to make in this essay: The *Black Notebooks* are banal. If they embody an evil, then that evil is no less banal. Moreover, this banality renders the *Black Notebooks* hard to read, and not merely because of the effect of the inevitable disappointment one feels when encountering in the second volume – some six hundred pages into reading – the first overtly anti-Semitic remark in the *Notebooks*: "One of the most secret forms of the *gigantic*, and perhaps the oldest, is the tenacious skillfulness in calculating, hustling, and intermingling through which the worldlessness of Jewry is grounded" (GA 95: 97). The remark is *not* stunning, for Heidegger has laid the groundwork for it so thoroughly with his rhetoric of race and people and his effusive praise for the potential of National Socialism as a spiritual moment in German history, especially during the rector period.<sup>16</sup> Indeed, if anything is surprising about the first volume of the *Black Notebooks*, it is the *lack* of anti-Semitism in the text. There is nothing metaphysically sophisticated about this rhetoric, even despite the pseudo-metaphysics of spiritualizing the people in the Rectoral Address. Heidegger's anti-Semitism is – as Sander Gilman, a cultural and literary historian, analyzed in a brilliantly lucid paper at the Emory conference – entirely predictable.<sup>17</sup> To put it in the briefest possible terms, Heidegger's anti-Semitism is no more profound than the anti-Semitism of any other run-of-the-mill Nazi.

Due to their banalizing force, the *Black Notebooks* are bad Heidegger and all too often they are bad Heidegger clothed in the costume of a bad Nietzsche. As David Krell writes in what will most likely be the first English-language book to appear addressing the *Notebooks* in detail, one reads the *Notebooks* "with a strong desire never to return to them."<sup>18</sup> Yet, as Figal stressed in an interview he gave to explain his resignation as director of the Heidegger-Gesellschaft in January 2015, essential work must still be done on the *Notebooks*, including a renewed focus on archival research to document Heidegger's activities in the 1930s.<sup>19</sup> We must continue to read the *Black Notebooks*.

What, then, is to be made of these curious *Notebooks*, so pseudo-Nietzschean in intent, if not execution? Whatever response we have to the *Black Notebooks*, we must equally be attentive to the *event* of the *Black Notebooks* in the press, in the philosophical world, and especially in the world of Heidegger scholarship. I will offer only tentative answers in this essay, and I will offer them with all due distance from the notion that we could or should be able to get to the bottom of the *Black Notebooks*. In other words, I read them with a healthy skepticism about the value of doing so, for every act of reading in this finite life, every act of engagement as a philosopher is a decision *not* to engage with other texts and, no less, with other tasks. It is for this reason that I will take the occasion of reading the *Black Notebooks* to formulate the preliminary sketch of an ethics of *not reading*.

In order to address some of the issues I just raised, I have divided this paper into four sections. Firstly, I will offer six observations that I, in part, elaborate on in what follows, but in part also leave as open questions. Secondly, I will introduce Peter Trawny's thesis of Heidegger's being-historical anti-Semitism and offer a critique of this thesis through Arendt's notion of banality. Thirdly, I will focus on the concept of the mask and the closely related registers of silence associated with it within the *Black Notebooks*. I will conclude by reflecting upon the impact of the *Black Notebooks* on the future of Heidegger scholarship by developing an ethics of not reading.

## II. OBSERVATIONS ON THE *BLACK NOTEBOOKS*

- 1) Heidegger *did not* invent a new form of anti-Semitism.
- 2) Saying that Heidegger invented a new form of anti-Semitism is a surreptitious defense of what is most indefensible about Heidegger.
- 3) Philosophers cannot read the *Black Notebooks* alone. If any essential work is to be done with the *Black Notebooks*, it must be done – as Figal suggests – in collaboration with historians and through a return to the archives.
- 4) The *Black Notebooks* do not diminish the value of Heidegger's thinking, nor its relevance to the current questions that philosophy faces. The *Black Notebooks* also do not contribute to the value of Heidegger's thinking. At best, they distract from it.
- 5) The *Black Notebooks* are but the culmination of a long process set into motion by the logic of production and expansion of the *Gesamtausgabe*, the quantity of which has set the conditions for producing a tradition of philology and commentary under the name of Heidegger scholarship.
- 6) Heidegger's fundamental questions are no longer our own fundamental questions.
- 7) It is possible to regard Heidegger's preservation and publication of the *Black Notebooks* as an act of philosophical and personal generosity as the document of an error.<sup>20</sup>

## III. PETER TRAWNY ON BEING-HISTORICAL ANTI-SEMITISM

Peter Trawny's short book *Heidegger and the Myth of a Jewish World Conspiracy* has set the tone for early responses to Heidegger's *Black Notebooks*. As the editor of the entire series of *Black Notebooks*, which will eventually stretch from the 1930s to 1970s, Trawny published his short book concurrent with the appearance of the second and third volumes. Since then, Trawny has been the public voice of the *Black Notebooks* in both Europe and North America, speaking with the authority gained from an unmatched familiarity with these specific texts and an unmatched

labor devoted to their publication. While Trawny's response is by his own admission ambivalent and tentative in some aspects, he has repeatedly defended the central thesis of his book, namely that Heidegger's anti-Semitism "can be more precisely characterized as *being-historical anti-Semitism*."<sup>21</sup> For Trawny, the task of confronting the *Black Notebooks* involves "elucidating what can be understood under the term being-historical anti-Semitism."<sup>22</sup> What, then, is being-historical anti-Semitism? In order to answer this question, it is first necessary to say something about Heidegger's history of being.

In Heidegger's history of being, written primarily in a number of posthumously published manuscripts composed during the 1930s concurrent with the *Black Notebooks*, Heidegger diagnoses what he sees as the technological domination of the world through rational-calculative thinking that treats the earth as a standing reserve to be measured, mapped, dominated and exploited. In the process of this technological-rational total domination, the world ceases to be a world and humans become nothing more than another resource to exploited. As Heidegger writes in 1935 in the *Introduction to Metaphysics*, the public face of his thinking of that period: "The spiritual decline of the earth has progressed so far that peoples are in danger of losing their last spiritual strength, the strength that makes it possible even to see the decline and to appraise it as such" (GA 40: 41/42). Stated ontologically, this spiritual decline means nothing less than the complete removal of beings from any experience of being. The cause of his decline is the technological-rational thinking of what Heidegger calls "the machination" (*die Machenschaft*), which enframes the world into a totalizing picture that can be calculated, measured and exploited.

Prior to the publication of the *Black Notebooks*, readers of Heidegger knew to associate this ontological story with the ontic entities America and Russia, or, as Heidegger repeatedly writes in the *Notebooks*, Americanism and Bolshevism. In the *Introduction to Metaphysics* Heidegger refers to these two entities as "the great pincers" which threaten to put Europe on the verge of "cutting its own throat." There Heidegger goes on to say: "Russia and America, seen metaphysically, are both the same:

the same hopeless frenzy of unchained technology and of the rootless organization of the average man" (GA 40: 40-41/41). Of course, this narrative has long been familiar to readers of Heidegger, though the full story of the complexity of the 'pincer movement' has been closely guarded by those in control of the Heidegger estate. This is shown most clearly in the posthumously published manuscript *The History of Beyng* (*Die Geschichte des Seyns*), composed between 1939-40, where Heidegger writes: "The planetary chief criminals of the most recent modern age, the age in which they first become possible and necessary, can be counted on the fingers of one hand."<sup>23</sup> According to Trawny, Fritz Heidegger struck out from an early version of the manuscript (prior to the "last hand" version from which the published version was produced) the following sentence: "It remains to be asked in what the peculiar predilection of Jewishness [*Judenschaft*] for planetary criminality is grounded."<sup>24</sup> The *Black Notebooks* provide an answer to the question of what the peculiar predilection of Jewishness for crimes of a planetary nature is grounded in, namely: the rootlessness and homelessness of a people without ground, a people who in Heidegger's words, "*without any restraints*, can take over the uprooting of all beings from being as its world-historical 'task'" (GA 96: 243).<sup>25</sup>

Americanism – Bolshevism – Englandism – World Jewry – thus are the planetary criminals that we can count out on one hand – and by the time of Heidegger's withdrawal from active public involvement in National Socialism, vulgar Nazism likewise joins the line-up of usual suspects. Americanism, Bolshevism and Englandism poison the German people from the outside in a pincer movement. The Jews and a degraded "*vulgar National Socialism*" (GA 94: 142) do so from the inside by spreading – as Heidegger writes – "an otherwise empty rationality and calculative skill, which in this way lodged itself in the 'spirit' without ever being able to grasp the concealed domains of decision on its own" (GA 96: 46-7). As the enemy from within, World Jewry helped to spur two world wars in order to pit Europe against Europe. In his paper entitled "Aliens vs. Predators: Cosmopolitan Jews vs. Jewish Nomads," Gilman traces each one of these aspects of Heidegger's supposed



being-historical anti-Semitism to common forms of anti-Semitism of the day.<sup>26</sup> Gilman convincingly argues that Heidegger does little more than reformulate common tropes of venerable anti-Semitic pedigree in metaphysical clothing. While the idea of a Jewish conspiracy setting into motion the wars of European self-destruction goes back to the *Protocols of the Elders of Zion*, the idea that Jews absconded in World War I while the Germans – in Heidegger's 1942 assessment – “sacrifice the best blood of the best of our own people” can be traced back to the so-called stab-in-the-back myth (GA 96: 261–2).

If Gilman's analysis rings true, a critical question must be posed to Trawny's thesis: What is behind the urge to label Heidegger's anti-Semitism something other than commonplace? Why not merely conclude that Heidegger's anti-Semitism was nothing more than the result of a set of nasty *ontic* entanglements and investments? Trawny's desire to defend Heidegger in a double-handed gesture is even more acute in the fifth chapter of the book, entitled “Life and Work.” After Trawny mentions that Heidegger had intimate and friendly contacts with Jewish friends and colleagues, he goes on to offer the following assessment of Heidegger's being-historical anti-Semitism:

After all, it is especially true of the being-historical anti-Semitism that it is very difficult to imagine that what it is directed against could be embodied by any particular individuals. That it does not show itself, that it hides itself, is precisely characteristic of being-historical anti-Semitism. What would it have looked like had it appeared? Any possible ‘image’ misses the point of being-historical anti-Semitism and cannot correspond to it. Is there an anti-Semitism without the concrete ‘image’ of a Jew targeted as the enemy? For Heidegger that seems to be the case.<sup>27</sup>

Trawny does go on to mention the nameless emigrant Jews who – to quote Heidegger – “were let out of Germany” (GA 96: 262), yet he curiously does not mention Heidegger's invectives against Husserl, the

representative of a purported Cartesio-Jewish “race” (GA 96: 46–7) or against “the Jew Litvinov” (GA 96: 242), nor Heidegger’s dismissal of “the psychoanalysis of the Jew ‘Freud’” (GA 96: 133). Overlooking these references, the first two of which Trawny discussed in detail earlier in the book, Trawny concludes: “It was clear to Heidegger that ‘World Jewry’ had no face.”<sup>28</sup> For now we can ignore the obvious Levinasian response that, if World Jewry does not have a face, then that is precisely a problem. Instead, we can remain within Heidegger’s own thinking for the moment and respond from within that space.

The history of being is *never not* both ontic and ontological. It begins in the ontic and moves phenomenologically to the ontological, or it moves from the ontological back to the ontic. Or, as Heidegger puts it in the *Black Notebooks*: “He who observes the mindfulness of the thinker is not at all tempted to make philosophy ‘practical’ because it is the task of thinking to make ‘praxis’ philosophical” (GA 94: 324). If Heidegger makes the praxis of anti-Semitism in the 1930s philosophical, he does so by adapting it only to the most banal form of his thinking – a history of being told through a hasty concatenation of leveled-off figures and 7types which could be counted on one hand. To put this objection more generally, as Heidegger’s influence on the course of post-war philosophy has shown, the history of being makes it clear that, while we may continue to regard Heidegger as a profound thinker of difference, he was not a discerning thinker of differences.<sup>29</sup> The fact that Heidegger could sweep up this constructed image of the World Jew into his own world-historical thinking and, as it were, plug it into the line-up of planetary master criminals was possible only because we are dealing with a moment in Heidegger’s thinking that had deep faults and fissures.

We might find within the *Black Notebooks* a feeble apology for this move: “‘Popularizing’ what is highest and most essential doesn’t serve the ‘people’ in any way and even damages what is highest and most essential” (GA 94: 190). Were we to give in to this self-defensive gesture, we would be forced to say that Heidegger developed an ontologically higher form of anti-Semitism that was tainted by its ontic entanglements. However, were we to reject this self-defensive gesture and to

reject the second-hand defensive desire that comes along with following the Heideggerian logic of the gesture, then we could say that Heidegger brought to his philosophy a banal form of anti-Semitism and thereby banalized his own thinking.

I would like to conclude my remarks about Trawny's book, which I intend with all due respect to his philosophical labor, by remarking on one final point. Trawny notes that Heidegger kept silent about his anti-Semitism even during his period as Rector – in the precise period, in other words, when it would have furthered his career. Trawny explains this by saying that Heidegger “regarded his anti-Semitism as distinct from the anti-Semitism of the National Socialists.”<sup>50</sup> Even if this is the case, why does Heidegger's anti-Semitism begin to appear in the *Notebooks* in 1938? I would suggest a simple solution: *Kristallnacht* (Nov. 9–10th, 1938), the national pogrom that emboldened many Germans to more overtly adopt and express anti-Semitism. With *Kristallnacht*, Heidegger, like many other Germans, felt more leeway to express his anti-Semitism, and even though he did not take it public, he did at least embed it into a text that would have a certain public resonance. With *Kristallnacht*, Heidegger took off his mask.

#### IV. HEIDEGGER'S MASK

In this section I would like to focus on a term that has been overlooked in responses thus far to the *Black Notebooks*: the mask. In order to not overwhelm the material and to trace the movement of the work, I will limit my comments to the first volume of the *Black Notebooks*. I will attempt to argue that the *Black Notebooks* are most important not for what they reveal, but for what they occlude; not for what they say, but for what they do not say. Heidegger characterizes this movement of the text as occurring behind the mask, a term which is closely aligned with the cognate set of terms “silence” (*Schweigen*), “reticence” (*Schweigsamkeit*) and Heidegger's neologism *Erschweigen* – a transitivization of *Schweigen*. The importance of these terms is familiar to any reader of Heidegger, for if silence is not a central theme of Heidegger's thinking, it is nonetheless the medium of Heidegger's thinking, especially in the

1930s. That silence emerges already in the opening entry of the *Black Notebooks* is not surprising given the prominence of silence from *Being and Time* (1927) to the dialogue on silence in *On the Way to Language* (1952). In that dialogue Heidegger poses a question which is echoed in the *Notebooks*: “Who is capable of simply keeping silent about silence? [*Wer vermöchte es, einfach vom Schweigen zu schweigen*]?” (GA 12: 144/OWL 133).<sup>54</sup> In the *Notebooks*, Heidegger evidently is not, for he cannot resist the urge to flag his silences, to remind us that he is wearing a mask. In the *Black Notebooks* there is a persistent urge to vulgarize and banalize silence. This occurs through a grand gesture of *Selbstdarstellung* invoked via the figure of the mask.

As Trawny points out in his esoteric reading of Heidegger, the *Black Notebooks* have an addressee, that is to say they are written for a certain set of readers, a group given a number of pseudo-Nietzschean names: “the most solitary ones” (*die Einzigsten*), “the most futural ones” (*die Künftigsten*) (GA 94: 338), “the questioners” (*die Fragenden*), “the few” (*die Wenigen*), “the invisible ones” (*die Unsichtbaren*) (GA 94: 370), and “the race to follow” (*das übernächste Geschlecht*) (GA 94: 346). This solitary race of questioners are the ones who are capable of listening to and in silence, all the while keeping silent about silence. Heidegger addresses these listeners on the second page of the *Black Notebooks* by raising the question: “Must [the human] not have observed a long silence in order to find the strength and power of language again and to be borne along by language?” (GA 94: 6). He builds upon this question on the following page: “Must one take the great risk on one’s own, silently – into Da-sein, where beings have more being? Without any regard for the situation?” (GA 94: 10). What does it mean that Heidegger sets the stage of the *Black Notebooks* in this way?

A possible answer to this question can be found some one hundred pages later in the strange, troubling and disjointed section in which Heidegger narrates his entry into, participation in and retreat from party politics – his entry into the situation, so to speak. In contrast to the drudgery and repetition of much of what follows in the *Black Notebooks*, Heidegger’s narration – replete with historical inaccuracies – of

his time as Rector is almost a page-turner. The entries are short, angry, disturbing, and at times oracular. Heidegger describes his entry into the Rectorate as follows: "Forced into taking over the Rectorate, I act for the first time against my innermost voice" (GA 94: 110). As readers of Division II of *Being and Time* will recall, this innermost voice, the voice of the call of conscience, is silent, saying nothing – saying, in fact, the nothing. At this moment we see Heidegger put on the mask – which does not mean to say that he was not already wearing another mask. He may have switched masks, or he may be wearing layers of them – in any case there is no 'real' Heidegger to be gotten to by pulling off these masks. To phrase this differently, under Heidegger's layers of silence – and this applies no less to his purported postwar silence – there is no 'real' Heidegger to be found, certainly not in the *Black Notebooks*. With the mask of the Rector we hear Heidegger make the following platitudinous pronouncements: "Relentless in the firm goal, malleable and transforming in the ways and weapons." And on the same page: "To emerge from every struggle more tractable and more certain. Whatever fails is a lesson; hold the reins tighter in the face of resistance" (GA 94: 111). Under the mask of the Rector, Heidegger descends from the mount like Zarathustra to be among the people; there he is loquacious, there he translates his thought.<sup>31</sup> It is for this reason that he must, in Heidegger's words, "be ready, with a generous will, to fail in humdrum everyday affairs" (GA 94: 112).

The overall effect of this section is to remind the reader that this thinker does not belong in this realm of the everyday, in "the situation," and that he has descended down in the name of knowledge, and that he is saying something that the broad masses are incapable of hearing. Heidegger's remarks in this period argue that the university, though it has been degraded to a "boarding house" (GA 94: 116) and a "trade school" (GA 94: 193) and has been enslaved to the natural sciences (GA 94: 303), has an essential role in the revolution he regards himself as working toward – "*the metapolitics of 'the' historical people*" (GA 94: 124). The university would play an essential part in this metapolitics to the extent that it could inculcate knowledge through what Heidegger

calls *Wissenserziehung* – education to knowledge. While I do not have time to detail all the circumstances of this metapolitics of education to knowledge, the stakes of Heidegger’s investment in and eventual distancing from National Socialism can be succinctly demonstrated in a highly lucid passage, a passage that must be regarded as being written through the retroactive masking of self-representation, while also documenting the mask Heidegger wore during his Nazi period – both of which were inflected with their own peculiar forms of silence.

The fundamental failure of today’s ‘political education’ – a tautology – is not that too little is occurring or that it occurs too hesitantly and too uneasily, rather that too much is being done and everything is supposed to be made anew hastily in the blink of an eye. As if National Socialism were merely a veneer that could quickly be applied to us all.

*When will we grasp something of the simplicity of the essence and the deliberate steadiness of its unfolding into races [Geschlechtern]? (GA 94: 133)*

No doubt this must be read in terms of the infamous remark on the “inner truth and greatness” of National Socialism in the *Introduction to Metaphysics*. And then as Heidegger goes on to say in the following entry (GA 94: 69):

A popular saying: National Socialism was not first developed as a ‘theory,’ rather it began with action. Good. But does that mean that ‘theory’ is superfluous; does that mean that one dresses oneself up ‘elsewhere’ and ‘on the side’ with bad theories and ‘philosophies?’ [...]

The more originary and forceful the symbolic power of the movement and its work, the more necessary the knowledge. But not knowledge as its formulaic equivalence and calculability – rather as the power of the fundamental attunement of world superiority. (GA 94: 133–4)

These words are Heidegger's synopsis of what he calls "spiritual National Socialism" (GA 94: 135). By saying that Heidegger speaks here behind a mask, I do not mean to say that Heidegger did not mean his words. Instead, what I mean to say is that, if Heidegger's speech emerges out of a great silence and is always saying that which cannot be said – as Heidegger would have us believe – then the medium of Heidegger's thinking is the mask. Everything is said through the mask, and nowhere do we reveal a speech that is not masked. The possibility that Heidegger spoke through masks and registers of invisibility is all the more disturbing in the light of a remark he made as he approached the end of his Rectorate: "We will remain at the invisible front of the secret spiritual Germany" (GA 94: 155).<sup>32</sup> I will say more about this in a moment, after I close the sequence of the Rector period.

On April 28th, 1934, in one the few entries labeled with a precise date, Heidegger writes what he calls a farewell address. The university has not proven capable of what Heidegger called self-assertion in the "Rectoral Address." Heidegger does not bemoan this, for the university as it exists can only be measured based on quantitative differences. The *qualitative* shift to education to knowledge did not occur. The movement of National Socialism, from Heidegger's perspective, is in ruins; the university is likewise in ruins. Thus Heidegger writes: "I have reached the end of a very bad year...A failed year – a lost one – if failure were not the highest form of human experience..." (GA 94: 161).

In the ruins of the university Heidegger puts on another mask – the mask of the teacher working on the "the invisible front of the secret spiritual Germany" (GA 94: 155). Remember, as quoted in the introduction of this paper, that "[i]n reservedness lies concealed audacity." In closing this section I want to raise some questions about the *Black Notebooks* and their status vis-à-vis Heidegger's manuscripts and lecture courses at the time. Under the guise of the mask that Heidegger resumes after returning to the mount in solitude Heidegger describes his teaching in the following way:

The transition as leaping across; the preparation,  
the attempts, the building up – all of that is alluded to

in the lecture courses from 1927–1936, although never consciously and immediately communicated.

The mask of “historical” interpretation. (GA 94: 243)

What is communicated through the “mask of historical interpretation”? The term transition (*Übergang*) is key here, for Heidegger, in his typical play on words, aligns it closely with downfall (*Untergang*).<sup>33</sup> Thus Heidegger asks later in the *Black Notebooks* the following question: “What form must a downfall take so that it can be a transition [*Wie aber muß ein Untergang sein, damit er ein Übergang werden kann*]?” (GA 94: 277). At this point, we return to themes from the previous section on World Jewry: in order for a downfall to lead to a transition, it must occur in the essential confrontation with an enemy. By 1942 at the latest, as Heidegger’s “stock-taking” of the state of the war reveals, he no longer thought that this would occur as a result of World War II.<sup>34</sup> Yet even after removing his Nazi mask and putting on the invisible mask of the secret warrior fighting on the invisible front of spiritual Germany, Heidegger still seeks to prepare the transition in his teaching. I will thus close this section with four quotes which will set up my final closing remarks on the *Notebooks* and the *Gesamtausgabe* as a whole:

My lecture courses...are all, even when they explicitly speak about themselves and their task, only and intentionally the foreground, indeed for the most part they are concealment. (GA 94: 257)

Then later in the same volume, at the height of the pseudo-Nietzschean performance:

A lecture about “Schelling” or about “Plato” is indeed what the name says, yet it “is” something else...transitional work. (GA 94: 287)

And, then, the final fragment from the third notebook, dated July 5th, 1936:

remain opaque; the mask. (GA 94: 305)



Finally, a quote from Heidegger's lecture course on 'Heraclitus' and 'Plato' held in 1933 while Rector at a moment, now notorious among Heidegger scholars, where unmasking the enemy from within is at stake:

The enemy can have attached itself to the innermost roots of the Dasein of a people and can set itself against this people's own essence and act against it. The struggle is all the fiercer and harder and tougher, for the least of it consists in coming to blows with one another; it is often far more difficult and wearisome to catch sight of the enemy as such, to bring the enemy into the open, to harbor no illusions about the enemy, to keep oneself ready for attack, to cultivate and intensify a constant readiness and to prepare the attack looking far ahead with the goal of total annihilation. (GA 36/37: 91/73)

#### **V. CONCLUDING REMARKS: AN ETHICS OF NOT READING?**

I wish that Derrida were here to help us read the *Black Notebooks*. Or, perhaps more precisely, I wish that Derrida were here to help us *not* read the *Black Notebooks*. Of course, I do not mean this in the vulgar form of Heidegger rejection defended by Emmanuel Faye or in the form of Richard Wolin's "one-drop" theory.<sup>55</sup> Instead, I turn to Derrida as a reader and non-reader of Heidegger, who harbored a suspicion against what he called the "machine" of Heidegger scholarship. In a 2001 response to Catharine Malabou's commentary on his co-authored book *Circumfessions*, Derrida asks the following question about whether or not Heidegger would have read his book:

we must ask, why it is that Heidegger could not read such a text, or would simply dismiss it as just so much exhibition, literature, narcissism? ... So I constantly try to counter him, to try to write what he's against, what is counter to or irreducible to Heidegger's machinery. Because there is a machinery interpretation of Heidegger.

There is a machine; there is a program. My question is:  
what could disappoint or disarm Heidegger's program?<sup>36</sup>

What can we do to frustrate the Heidegger machine? Derrida demonstrates this beautifully in his final seminar, *The Beast and the Sovereign*, Vol. II, where he turns back to well-worn terrain of one of the earliest volumes of the *Gesamtausgabe* (a volume that Heidegger apparently held dear), reading it together with *Robinson Crusoe*, to create what I believe is an overlooked masterpiece of teaching, writing, thinking and – no less – Heidegger scholarship.<sup>37</sup>

So what is the Heidegger machine? The program of the Heidegger machine has long run on the following assumption: that to say something new about Heidegger we must first read something new from Heidegger. This essay is no doubt the result of the churning of that well-oiled machine. The proliferation of Heidegger's lecture courses, unpublished manuscripts and – soon enough – thousands of items of correspondence has kept this machine running and will provide enough fuel for it for a long time to come. John Updike wrote of Vladimir Nabokov in 1964, as Nabokov's fame led to the translation of his older Russian works even as Nabokov produced new ones in English, that "very curiously, his oeuvre is growing at both ends."<sup>38</sup> Heidegger's oeuvre is afflicted with an even more extreme version of this curious growth. What this proliferation has led to is a flourishing tradition of philological and scholastic readings of Heidegger. This tradition flourishes by drawing links *between* texts by Heidegger, as if the task of reading Heidegger were but a giant jigsaw puzzle in which the pieces split as soon as they are put into the right place. As a result, references to questions which were not Heidegger's own are all too often regarded as a distraction to the philological task at hand.

Yet Heidegger's questions are not our own; our time is not Heidegger's and we cannot so willfully withdraw from the situation. I call instead for Heidegger to be read in a type of project of critical phenomenology developed by Lisa Guenther in her book *Solitary Confinement: Social Death and Its Afterlives* and by the legal theorist Marianne Constable in her book *Just Silences*, which draws on Heidegger's thinking

of silence to critically analyze the right to remain silent.<sup>59</sup> Projects such as these require the critical eye to stop reading a particular thinker, to turn from that thinker to the situation. In spite of this call to stop reading Heidegger, or at least to read Heidegger in the proper measure, I will give Heidegger the last word, spoken as the first volume of the *Black Notebooks* nears its end, reaching a crescendo of silence: “The strength of a work is measured by the extent to which it refutes its own creator” (GA 94: 438–9). If Heidegger’s work remains relevant, it is because of its immense capacity for self-refutation.

I would like to offer my deepest gratitude to Eduardo Mendieta, Richard Polt, and Greg Fried for their comments on earlier drafts of this paper.

NOTES

- 1 Dave Montgomery, Manny Fernandez and Ashley Southall, "Iraq Veteran Kills 3 and Himself in Rampage," *New York Times*, April 2, 2013. [http://www.nytimes.com/2014/04/03/us/gunshots-reported-at-fort-hood.html?\\_r=0](http://www.nytimes.com/2014/04/03/us/gunshots-reported-at-fort-hood.html?_r=0).
- 2 Friedrich Nietzsche, *Twilight of the Idols*, trans. Richard Polt (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1997), 33-4.
- 3 All translations from GA 94 are my own, translations from GA 95 and 96 are Richard Polt's. I would like to thank Richard for the service he did to Heidegger scholarship by preparing and distributing translations of all the passages from the *Black Notebooks* that address Jews either directly or indirectly.
- 4 This began with the two-page exposé and interview with Peter Trawny and Emmanuel Faye in *Die Zeit* on Dec. 27, 2013. Peter Trawny, "Eine neue Dimension," *Die Zeit*, December 27, 2013, <http://www.zeit.de/2014/01/heidegger-schwarze-hefte-herausgeber-peter-trawny>; Emmanuel Faye, "Die Krönung der Gesamtausgabe," *Die Zeit*, December 27, 2013, <http://www.zeit.de/2014/01/heidegger-schwarze-hefte-emmanuel-faye>; Georg Diez, "Heidegger ein Nazi? Meister Proper!," *Spiegel Online*, January 1, 2014, <http://www.spiegel.de/kultur/gesellschaft/georg-diez-ueber-martin-heidegger-a-941646.html>; Peter Trawny, "Heidegger et l'antisémitisme," *Le Monde*, January 20, 2014, [http://www.lemonde.fr/idees/article/2014/01/20/heidegger-et-l-antisemitisme\\_4350762\\_3232.html](http://www.lemonde.fr/idees/article/2014/01/20/heidegger-et-l-antisemitisme_4350762_3232.html).
- 5 Jennifer Schuessler, "Heidegger's Notebooks Renew Focus on Anti-Semitism," *New York Times*, March 30, 2014, [http://www.nytimes.com/2014/03/31/books/heideggers-notebooks-renew-focus-on-anti-semitism.html?\\_r=0](http://www.nytimes.com/2014/03/31/books/heideggers-notebooks-renew-focus-on-anti-semitism.html?_r=0); Richard Brody, "Why Does it Matter if Heidegger was Anti-Semitic?," *The New Yorker*, March 27, 2014, <http://www.newyorker.com/culture/richard-brody/why-does-it-matter-if-heidegger-was-anti-semitic>; Robert Zaretsky, "Martin Heidegger's *Black Notebooks* Reignite Charges of Anti-Semitism," *The Jewish Daily*

- Forward*, February 21, 2014, <http://forward.com/articles/192664/martin-heideggers-black-notebooks-reignite-charges/>.
- 6 Highlights from these responses include Gregory Fried, "The King is Dead: Heidegger's '*Black Notebooks*,'" *LA Review of Books*, September 13, 2014, <http://lareviewofbooks.org/review/king-dead-heideggers-black-notebooks>; Judith Wolfe, "Caught in the Trap of His Own Metaphysics," *Standpoint*, June 2014, <http://standpointmag.co.uk/node/5583/full>; Peter E. Gordon, "Heidegger in Black," *The New York Review of Books*, October 9, 2014, <http://www.nybooks.com/articles/archives/2014/oct/09/heidegger-in-black/>; Michael Marder, "A Fight for the Right to Read Heidegger," *New York Times*, July 20, 2014, <http://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2014/07/20/a-fight-for-the-right-to-read-heidegger/>. The first edited collection on the *Black Notebooks* appeared in Italian in late 2014: Adriano Fabris, ed. *Metafisica e antisemitismo: I Quaderni Neri di Heidegger tra filosofia e politica* (Pisa: Edizioni ETS, 2014). See also Jean-Luc Nancy, "Heidegger und Wir," *Faust-Kultur.de*, August 18, 2014, <http://faustkultur.de/1908-0-Nancy-Heidegger-und-wir.html#VHJGBIctpFQ>.
  - 7 Peter Trawny, *Heidegger und der Mythos der jüdischen Weltverschwörung*, 3rd expanded ed. (Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 2015), first edition 2014, and *Irrnisfuge: Heideggers An-archie* (Berlin: Matthes & Seitz, 2014).
  - 8 Günter Figal, "Vorsitzender der Heidegger-Gesellschaft zurückgetreten," January 16, 2015, radio interview on SWR2, <http://www.swr.de/unternehmen/kommunikation/16-vorsitzender-der-heidegger-gesellschaft-zurueckgetreten/-/id=10563098/nid=10563098/did=14892558/1q7w8xo/index.html>; on Heidegger's apparent references to the *Protocols of the Elders of Zion* see Trawny, *Mythos*, 45ff.
  - 9 For a range of perspectives on Heidegger's political silence, see Babette Babich, "Questioning Heidegger's Silence: A Postmodern Topology," in *Ethics and Danger: Essays on Heidegger and Continental Thought*, ed. Arleen B. Dallery, Charles E. Scott, and

- P. Holley Roberts (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1992), 85–106; Richard J. Bernstein, “Heidegger’s Silence?: Êthos and Technology,” in *The New Constellation: The Ethical-Political Horizons of Modernity/Postmodernity* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1992), 79–141; Berel Lang, *Heidegger’s Silence* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1996); Jacques Derrida, “Heidegger’s Silence,” in *Martin Heidegger and National Socialism: Questions and Answers*, eds. Günther Neske and Emil Kettering (New York: Paragon House, 1990): 145–148; Miguel de Beistegui, *Heidegger and the Political: Dystopias* (New York: Routledge, 1998), esp. chap. 6 “And Into Silence...”; David Farrell Krell, *Daimon Life: Heidegger and Life-Philosophy* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1992), esp. 138–141; Tom Rockmore, *On Heidegger’s Nazism and Philosophy* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1997), esp. 202–3; Avital Ronell, *The Telephone Book: Technology – Schizophrenia – Electric Speech* (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1989).
- 10 For references to the mask see GA 94: 243, 245, 283, 305; cf. also Hannah Arendt’s short fable entitled “Heidegger the Fox” drawn from a 1953 entry in her own *Denktagebuch* in which the fox character builds a trap for himself to hide in. Written in the spirit of a dark humor, the wily Heidegger now appears quite ominous. Hannah Arendt, “Heidegger the Fox,” in *Essays in Understanding, 1930–1954*, ed. Jerome Kohn (New York: Harcourt, Brace & Co., 1994), 361–2.
- 11 For analyses of the performance of Heidegger’s language in the *Ereignis* manuscripts as a performance of silence, see Daniela Vallega-Neu, “Heidegger’s Poietic Writings: From *Contributions to Philosophy* to *Das Ereignis*,” in *Heidegger and Language*, ed. Jeffrey Powell (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2013), 119–45 and Krzysztof Ziarek, *Language after Heidegger* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2013).
- 12 Richard Polt also speaks of Heidegger’s embitterment upon withdrawing from the Rectorship in “Inception, Downfall, and the

- Broken World: Heidegger Above the Sea of Fog,” paper presented at the conference *Heidegger's “Black Notebooks”: Philosophy, Politics, Anti-Semitism*, Emory University, September 5–6, 2014.
- 13 Arendt's definitive treatment of the term is in her controversial work, *Eichmann in Jerusalem: A Report on the Banality of Evil* (New York: Penguin, 1963).
- 14 Arendt expresses this in a 1964 radio interview with Joachim Fest, where she goes on to say: “Eichmann was perfectly intelligent, but he had this stupidity. It was the stupidity that was so enraging. And that's what I actually meant by banality. There is no depth there—it is not demonic! It is simply the reluctance to imagine what the situation of the other is like, isn't it?” Hannah Arendt und Joachim Fest, *Eichmann war von empörender Dummheit: Gespräche und Briefe*, ed. Ursula Ludz and Thomas Wild (Munich: Piper, 2011), 43–44, translation mine.
- 15 Eduardo Mendieta makes a similar point in his paper, “Metaphysical Anti-Semitism and the Animality of the Jew: On Worldlessness, World Poorness and World Forming,” presented at the conference *Heidegger's “Black Notebooks”: Philosophy, Politics, Anti-Semitism*, Emory University, September 5–6, 2014.
- 16 Jacques Derrida, *Of Spirit: Heidegger and the Question*, trans. Geoffrey Bennington and Rachel Bowlby (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1989) still remains decisive on Heidegger's use of “spirit” in his Nazi-era speeches and writings.
- 17 Sander Gilman, “Aliens vs. Predators: Cosmopolitan Jews vs. Jewish Nomads,” paper presented at the conference *Heidegger's “Black Notebooks”: Philosophy, Politics, Anti-Semitism*, Emory University, September 5–6, 2014.
- 18 David Farrell Krell, *Heidegger-Ecstasy-Tragedy: From Being and Time to The Black Notebooks* (Albany: SUNY Press, 2015 [forthcoming]), 4.
- 19 “Philosoph Günther Figal tritt als Vorsitzender der Martin-Heidegger Gesellschaft zurück: Kritische Forschung nötig,” radio

- interview on WDR3, accessed on January 20th, 2015, <http://www.wdr3.de/zeitgeschehen/guenterfigal106.html>.
- 20 Although I do not analyze the work in detail in this essay, Trawny defends a similar vision of Heidegger's ruthless self-documentation of errancy in *Irrnisfuge*.
- 21 Trawny, *Mythos*, 11.
- 22 Ibid.
- 23 "Die planetarischen Hauptverbrecher der neuesten Neuzeit, in der sie erst möglich und notwendig werden, lassen sich gerade an den Fingern einer Hand abzählen" (GA 69: 78).
- 24 Trawny, *Mythos*, 53.
- 25 See also Polt's lucid analysis of Heidegger's definition of criminality in "Inception, Downfall, and the Broken World." Heidegger writes: "Criminality [*Verbrechen*]: that is no mere breaking up [*Zerbrechen*], but the devastation of everything into what is broken....Ordering is only the reverse of criminality, understood in terms of the history of be-ing (not in a juridical-moral way)" (GA 96: 26).
- 26 Gilman, "Aliens vs. Predators."
- 27 Trawny, *Mythos*, 96–97.
- 28 Ibid., 97.
- 29 Though not referring specifically to Heidegger, Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick makes a similar point in *Epistemology of the Closet* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2008), 23.
- 30 Trawny, *Mythos*, 16.
- 31 On the theme of Heidegger's descent, see Polt "Inception, Downfall, and the Broken World."
- 32 On the theme of a secret spiritual Germany, see Theodore Kisiel, "The Siting of Hölderlin's 'Geheimes Deutschland' in Heidegger's Poetizing of the Political," in Alfred Denker and Holger Zaborowski, eds., *Heidegger und der Nationalsozialismus II: Interpretationen, Heidegger-Jahrbuch 5* (Freiburg/Munich: Karl Alber, 2009), 145–54; Richard Polt, "The Secret Homeland of Speech: Heidegger on Language, 1933–34," in Powell, ed., *Heidegger and Language* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2013), 63–85.



- 33 Cf. Polt, "Inception, Downfall and the Broken World."
- 34 See Heidegger's tabulation of the state of the war (GA 96: 261–2):  
"At the start of the third year of the planetary war. — Common  
sense would like to calculate history, and longs for a 'balance  
sheet.' [...] World Jewry, spurred on by the emigrants who have  
been let out of Germany, is intangible everywhere and, as much  
as it develops its power, never has to take part in warlike activi-  
ties, whereas the only thing left for us is to sacrifice the best blood  
of the best of our own people."
- 35 Emmanuel Faye, *Heidegger: The Introduction of Nazism Into  
Philosophy in Light of the Unpublished Seminars of 1933–1935*,  
trans. Michael B. Smith (New Haven: Yale University Press,  
2009); Richard Wolin, *Heidegger's Children: Hannah Arendt,  
Karl Löwith, Hans Jonas, and Herbert Marcuse* (Princeton: Princ-  
eton University Press, 2001). For Wolin's response to the *Black  
Notebooks*, see Richard Wolin, "National Socialism, World Jewry  
and the History of Being: Heidegger's *Black Notebooks*," *Jewish  
Review of Books*, Summer 2014, [http://jewishreviewofbooks.com/  
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- 36 Jacques Derrida, "Derrida's Response to Catherine Malabou," in  
*Augustine and Postmodernism: Confessions and Circumfession*, ed.  
John D. Caputo and Michael J. Scanlon (Bloomington: Indiana  
University Press, 2005), 139.
- 37 Jacques Derrida, *The Beast and the Sovereign*, Vol. II, trans. Geof-  
frey Bennington (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2011).
- 38 John Updike, Review of *The Defense*, by Vladimir Nabokov, *New  
Republic*, September, 26 1964, 15.
- 39 Lisa Guenther, *Solitary Confinement: Social Death and Its After-  
lives* (Minneapolis: Minnesota Press, 2013); Marianne Constable,  
*Just Silences: the Limits and Possibilities of Modern Law* (Princ-  
eton: Princeton University Press, 2005).

## ELECTRONIC CONTENT

### A Reception History of the *Black Notebooks*

*Andrzej Serafin*

- December 5, 2013 [Nicolas Weill in Le Monde Blogs: La preuve du nazisme par le "Cahier noir" ?](#)
- December 7, 2013 [Alain Finkelkraut's Repliques with Hadrien France-Lanord and Christian Sommer in Radio France: Du bon usage de Martin Heidegger](#)
- December 7, 2013 [Eric Aeschimann in Nouvel Observateur: Cahiers noirs : vers une nouvelle affaire Heidegger](#)
- December 8, 2013 [Séminaire de La Règle du Jeu: Heidegger, une pensée brûlante with Sylviane Agacinski, Philippe Arjakovsky, Hadrien France Lanord](#)
- December 13, 2013 [Nicolas Weill in Le Monde des Livres: Martin Heidegger, titan et maître toujours inquiétant](#)
- December 13, 2013 [Jürg Altweg in Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung: Ein Debakel für Frankreichs Philosophie](#)

- December 18, 2013 Interview with [Günter Figal](#) in [Deutschlandradio Kultur](#):  
"Überlegungen zum Judentum, die eindeutig antisemitisch sind"
- December 18, 2013 [Antonio Gnoli](#) in [La Repubblica](#):  
[Heidegger, l'ultimo segreto: i diari neri contro gli ebrei](#)
- December 20, 2014 [Nicolas Weill](#) in [Le Monde Blogs](#):  
[L'affaire Heidegger \(suite\), vue d'Allemagne](#)
- December 27, 2013 [Peter Trawny](#) in [Die Zeit](#): [Eine neue Dimension](#)
- December 27, 2013 [Thomas Assheuer](#) in [Die Zeit](#): [Er spricht vom Rasseprinzip](#)
- December 27, 2013 [Emmanuel Faye](#) in [Die Zeit](#): [Die Krönung der Gesamtausgabe](#)
- December 27, 2013 [Jürgen Kaube](#) in [Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung](#): [Sein und "Zeit"](#)
- January 3, 2014 [Georg Diez](#) in [Der Spiegel](#): [Der Kritiker: Heidegger ein Nazi? Meister Proper!](#)
- January 6, 2014 [Uwe Justus Wenzel](#) in [Neue Zürcher Zeitung](#): [Heideggers «Schwarze Hefte»: Philosophisch verbrämter Antisemitismus](#)
- January 7, 2014 [Anne-Catherine Simon](#) in [Die Presse](#):  
[War Heidegger ein "seinsgeschichtlicher Antisemit"?](#)
- January 17, 2014 [Peter Trawny](#) in [SWR2](#): [Die Heidegger-Affäre](#)
- January 18, 2014 [François Fédier](#) im Gespräch mit [Georg Blume](#): [Er ist der falsche Verdächtige](#)
- January 18, 2014 [Séminaire de Gérard Guest](#) [Heidegger — contre vents et marées. Faire face à l'ouverture des "Carnets noirs" de Heidegger](#)

- January 20, 2014 [Peter Trawny](#) in [Le Monde: Heidegger et l'antisémitisme](#)
- January 22, 2014 [Alexander Cammann](#) in [Die Zeit: Vermisstes Werk von Heidegger aufgetaucht](#)
- January 23, 2014 Interview with [Silvio Vietta](#) in [Deutschlandradio Kultur: Antisemitismus-Debatte um Martin Heidegger](#)
- January 26, 2014 Interview with [Emmanuel Faye](#) in [Liberation: L'antisémitisme des «Cahiers noirs», point final de l'œuvre de Heidegger ?](#)
- January 28, 2014 [Nicolas Weill](#) in [Le Monde Blogs: Du nouveau sur Heidegger et les « Cahiers noirs »](#)
- January 29, 2014 [Emmanuel Faye](#) in [Le Monde: Heidegger: Sa vision du monde est clairement antisémite](#)
- January 30, 2014 [Silvio Vietta](#) interviewed by [Die Zeit: Eine grundlegende Entwurzelung](#) (commentary by [Alexander Cammann](#) and [Adam Soboczynski: Es ist wieder da](#))
- February 20, 2014 [Jürgen Kaube](#) in [Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung: Der Deutsche nur kann das Sein neu sagen](#)
- February 20, 2014 [Thorsten Jantschek](#) in [Deutschlandradio Kultur: Des Meisterdenkers Sudelbücher. Debatte um Heideggers "Schwarze Hefte"](#)
- February 20, 2014 Interview with [Peter Trawny](#) in [Deutschlandradio Kultur: "Bestimmte Passagen sind antisemitisch"](#)
- February 20, 2014 Interview with [Carsten Schröder](#) in

## *Reception History*

- February 22, 2014 [Deutschlandradio Kultur: Aufschluss über Antisemitismus?](#)  
[Werner Witt](#) in [SWR2: Heideggers Antisemitismus](#)
- February 24, 2014 [Heideggers "Schwarze Hefte" discussion in SWR2 with Micha Brumlik, Rainer Marten, Peter Trawny, Eggert Blum](#)
- February 27, 2014 [Polona Balantić, Dean Komel, Peter Trawny in RTV Slovenija: Heidegger "Schwarze Hefte" : pogovor v oddaji Osmi dan](#)
- February 28, 2014 [Peter Strasser in Die Presse: Einer von uns](#)
- March 2014 [Peter Trawny's Heidegger und der Mythos der jüdischen Weltverschwörung \(English translation: Heidegger and the Myth of a Jewish World Conspiracy\)](#)
- March 2014 [Heidegger, le sol, la communauté, la race sous la direction de Emmanuel Faye](#)
- March 4, 2014 [Micha Brumlik in TAZ: Versteckte Gestalten. Heidegger und die Kritik der westlichen Kultur](#)
- March 6, 2014 [Hermann Heidegger in Die Zeit: Er war ein lieber Vater](#)
- March 6, 2014 [Lorenz Jäger in Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung: Ein lieber Vater. Hermann Heidegger erinnert sich](#)
- March 8, 2014 [Markus Gabriel in Die Welt: Der Nazi aus dem Hinterhalt](#)
- March 10, 2014 [Jürgen Kaube in Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung: Hundert Minuten Hüttenzauber](#)
- March 10, 2014 [Rebecca Schuman in Slate: Heidegger's Hitler Problem Is Worse Than We Thought](#)

- March 10, 2014 [Romain Leick in Der Spiegel: Zauber des deutschen Geistes](#)
- March 10, 2014 [Lutz Hachmeister in SWR2: Die posthume Selbstinszenierung des Philosophen](#)
- March 12, 2014 [Klostermann's Buchvorstellung with Jürgen Kaube and Peter Trawny](#)
- March 12, 2014 [Jürgen Kaube in Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung: Die Endschlacht der planetarischen Verbrecherbanden](#)
- March 12, 2014 [Jonathan Rée in The Prospect: In defence of Heidegger](#)
- March 12, 2014 [Lutz Hachmeister in Deutschlandradio Kultur: "Als harten Antisemiten würde ich ihn nicht bezeichnen"](#)
- March 13, 2014 [Philip Oltermann in The Guardian: Heidegger's 'black notebooks' reveal antisemitism at core of his philosophy](#)
- March 13, 2014 [Rüdiger Safranski in SWR Kunscht: Wie antisemitisch war Heidegger?](#)
- March 13, 2014 [Eggert Blum in SWR2: Heideggers Fall: War der Großdenker ein Antisemit?](#)
- March 14, 2014 [Micha Brumlik, Lutz Hachmeister and Peter Trawny in ZDF Aspekte: Sturz einer Ikone: Heidegger als Nazi und Antisemit](#)
- March 15, 2014 [Uwe Justus Wenzel in Neue Zürcher Zeitung: Heideggers Antisemitismus: Das Schwarz der Hefte](#)
- March 16, 2014 [Dirk Pilz in Frankfurter Rundschau: Ein anderer Anfang. Die "Schwarzen Hefte" von Martin Heidegger](#)
- March 16, 2014 [Micha Brumlik in TAZ: Werksausgabe von Martin Heidegger: Sprung in die Irre](#)
- March 18, 2014 [Interview with Peter Trawny in Badische](#)

- March 18, 2014 Zeitung "Eine sehr schmerzhaft  
Bedeutung"
- March 19, 2014 Günter Figal in La Stampa Disgustose e  
terribili quelle frasi del mio Heidegger  
Gert Scobel im Gespräch mit Peter  
Trawny und Rüdiger Safranski in 3sat:  
Der Fall Heidegger: Wie antisemitisch  
war der Meisterdenker?
- March 19, 2014 Domenico Losurdo in The Guardian:  
Heidegger's black notebooks aren't that  
surprising
- March 20, 2014 Ruthard Stäblein in Deutschlandradio  
Kultur: "Schwarze Hefte" mit braunen  
Flecken
- March 21, 2014 Thomas Assheuer in Die Zeit Das  
vergiftete Erbe
- March 21, 2014 Peter Trawny in ORF: Die  
Machenschaften des Martin H.
- March 23, 2014 Edith Fuchs in Acta Philosophia: Review  
of Emmanuel Faye's Heidegger, le sol, la  
communauté, la race
- March 25, 2014 Thomas Meyer in Süddeutsche Zeitung:  
Ein Äußerstes von Verschweigung  
(English translation)
- March 26, 2014 Greg Johnson in Counter-Currents:  
Heidegger's Black Notebooks: The  
Diaries of a Dissident National Socialist
- March 27, 2014 Richard Brody in The New Yorker: Why  
Does It Matter If Heidegger Was Anti-  
Semitic?
- March 28, 2014 Peter Strasser in Die Presse: Sein und  
Unzeit
- March 29, 2014 Séminaire de Gérard Guest Heidegger —  
contre vents et marées (suite). Faire face

- March 30, 2014

[à l'ouverture des "Carnets noirs" de Martin Heidegger, II. Reprendre la parole — soutenir la cause de la pensée](#)  
[Jennifer Schuessler](#) in [New York Times: Heidegger's Notebooks Renew Focus on Anti-Semitism](#)
- April 1, 2014

[Peter Trawny](#) in [SRF: Der Antisemit Martin Heidegger](#)
- April 4, 2014

[Jean-Clet Martin](#) in [Actu Philosophia: Review of Emmanuel Faye's Heidegger, le sol, la communauté, la race](#)
- April 6, 2014

[Alain Badiou's letter on Jean-Clet Martin's review of Emmanuel Faye's Heidegger, le sol, la communauté, la race](#) ([English translation](#))
- April 7, 2014

[Markus Gabriel](#) in [Die Welt: "Wesentliche Bejahung" des Nationalsozialismus](#)
- April 8, 2014

[Rüdiger Safranski](#) in [Neue Osnabrücker Zeitung: Unglaublicher Mangel an Empathie](#)
- April 8, 2014

[A Panel Discussion at Goethe-Institut New York with Babette Babich, Peter Trawny and Roger Berkowitz](#) ([continuation](#))
- April 12, 2014

[Wie soll man Heidegger noch lesen?](#) debate in [Neue Zürcher Zeitung](#) with [Uwe Justus Wenzel](#) ([Das Schwarz der Seele](#)), [Günter Figal](#) ([Nicht alles hat mit allem zu tun](#)) and [Dieter Thomä](#) ([Das Verhängnis des Philosophen](#))
- April 12, 2014

[Piotr Buras](#) in [Gazeta Wyborcza: Czarne myśli geniusza, czyli wydane właśnie zapiski Heideggera](#)



## *Reception History*

- April 12, 2014 [Michael Inwood in The Telegraph: Martin Heidegger: the philosopher who fell for Hitler](#)
- April 14, 2014 [Norbert Seitz in Deutschlandradio Kultur: Kein Ruhmesblatt der Nachkriegspublizistik](#)
- April 22, 2014 [Elke Heidenreich, Stefan Zweifel, Rüdiger Safranski, Julian Schütt in 3Sat Literaturclub: Martin Heidegger: Schwarze Hefte](#)
- April 23, 2014 [Richard Wolin's lecture at City University of New York: National Socialism, World Jewry, and the History of Being \(published in Jewish Review of Books\)](#)
- April 24, 2014 [Thomas Sheehan's lecture at the 12th Annual Meeting of the Nordic Society for Phenomenology: What, after all, was Heidegger about?](#)
- April 28, 2014 [François Rastier in Le Nouvel Observateur: Philosophie et exterminations — en réponse à Alain Badiou](#)
- April 28, 2014 [Joshua Rothman in The New Yorker: Is Heidegger Contaminated by Nazism?](#)
- May 3, 2014 [Roger Berkowitz in The American Interest: Heidegger, Being Human, and Antisemitism](#)
- May 7, 2014 [Walter van Rossum in Deutschlandradio Kultur: Schwer Verdichtetes. Martin Heidegger und seine "Schwarzen Hefte"](#)
- May 8, 2014 [Alex Gruber in Radio Dreyeckland: Martin Heidegger war kein Nationalsozialist, sondern nur ein Opfer seines Telefons](#)

- May 10, 2014 [Timotheus Schneidegger: Was vom gekränkten Nationalontologen bleibt. Eine Nachlese zur Feuilleton-Debatte um Martin Heideggers »Schwarze Hefte«](#)
- May 11, 2014 [Sidonie Kellerer in Le Nouvel Observateur: A quelle "guerre invisible" Heidegger faisait-il référence ?](#)
- May 12, 2014 [Stuart Elden and Babette Babich at Fordham University: A Conversation Freiheit und Geschick conference at Messkirch including a Podiumsgespräch with Babette Babich, Alfred Denker, Ingo Farin, Theodore Kisiel, Holger Zaborowski and a Grußwort von Arnulf Heidegger, who according to the \[report\]\(#\) said: An 12 bis 13 Stellen finden sich solche \[antisemitische\] Äußerungen. Ich war überrascht. Sollte ich mich in meinem Goßvater getäuscht haben? Er hat sich als Rektor nicht gegen jüdische Gelehrte, sondern für diese eingesetzt. Sie \[die Schwarzen Hefte\] sind mehr eine teilweise schwer verständliche, tiefgründige Kritik an der Moderne.](#)
- May 24, 2014 [Séminaire de Gérard Guest Heidegger — contre vents et marées \(suite\). Faire face à l'ouverture des "Carnets noirs" de Martin Heidegger, III. Où conduit la logique de la "contamination"](#)
- May 24, 2014 [Sidonie Kellerer in Sens Public: Envoûtement : Emmanuel Faye et la réaction allemande](#)
- May 29, 2014 [Judith Wolfe in Standpoint: Caught in the Trap of His Own Metaphysics](#)

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- May 29, 2014 [Alfried Schmitz in Deutschlandradio Kultur: Neue Denkwege zu Martin Heidegger](#)
- May 31, 2014 [Michael Fagenblat: in Haaretz, Culture & Literature section: How could an anti-Semitic philosopher be such an influence on Jewish thinkers](#)
- June 20, 2014 [Michael Marder in The New York Times: A Fight for the Right to Read Heidegger](#)
- June 30, 2014 [Silvio Vietta's lecture: Heidegger – Kulturkritik und die jüngste Debatte"](#)
- July 2014 [Donatella Di Cesare in Information Philosophie: Heidegger, das Sein und die Juden](#)
- July 7, 2014 [Нелли Васильевна Мотрошилова in Вопросы философии: Почему опубликование 94–96 томов собрания сочинений М. Хайдеггера стало сенсацией?](#)
- July 15, 2014 [Cezary Wodziński in Gazeta Wyborcza: Nie zabijajcie Heideggera](#)
- September 2014 [Peter Trawny's Irrnisfuge. Heideggers Anarchie \(French translation: \[La Liberté d'errer avec Heidegger\]\(#\); English translation: \[Heidegger's Anarchy\]\(#\)\)](#)
- Sept 5-6, 2014 [Emory University conference Heidegger's Black Notebooks: Philosophy, Politics, Anti-Semitism with Peter Trawny, Bettina Bergo, Robert Bernasconi, Martin Gessmann, Sander Gilman, Peter E. Gordon, Eduardo Mendieta, Richard Polt, Tom Rockmore](#)
- September 6, 2014 [Nature, History, State: 1933-1934 review by \[Charles Bambach\]\(#\) in Notre](#)

- Sept 11-12, 2014 [Dame Philosophical Reviews](#)  
[Heidegger's Black Notebooks: A Conference at City University of New York](#) with [Peter Trawny](#), [Richard Wolin](#), [Thomas Sheehan](#), [Emmanuel Faye](#), [Karsten Harries](#)
- September 13, 2014 [Gregory Fried](#) in [Los Angeles Review of Books: The King Is Dead](#) (responses by [Alexander S. Duff](#), [Jordan Hoffman](#), [Sidonie Kellerer](#), [Andrea Martinez](#), [Gaëtan Pégny](#))
- September 17, 2014 [Peter Trawny's](#) lecture at [Radboud University: Philosophy and Anti-Semitism: The Heidegger Case](#)
- September 24, 2014 [Etienne Pinat](#) in [Actu Philosophia: Review](#)] of [Peter Trawny's](#) [Heidegger et l'antisémitisme](#)
- September 24, 2014 [Nicolas Rousseau](#) in [Actu Philosophia: Review](#)] of [Peter Trawny's](#) [Heidegger et l'antisémitisme](#)
- September 25, 2014 [Jean-Luc Nancy](#) in [Le Monde: L'antisémitisme d'Heidegger n'invalide pas son œuvre](#) (German translation: [Heidegger und wir](#))
- September 25, 2014 [Alain Renaut](#) in [Le Monde: Un grand philosophe, mais indifférent au monde réel](#)
- September 25, 2014 [Jean-Marc Mandosio](#) in [Le Monde: Heidegger ou comment ne pas penser la technique](#)
- September 25, 2014 [Nicolas Truong](#) in [Le Monde: Heidegger, une querelle philosophique](#)
- September 25, 2014 [Thomas Vašek](#) in [Hohe Luft: Ein totalitärer Denker](#)

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- September 26, 2014 [Günter Figal in WDR-5: 125. Geburtstag von Martin Heidegger](#)
- September 29, 2014 [Heidegger's 125th birthday celebration in Messkirch](#)
- October 2014 [Donatella Di Cesare's Heidegger e gli ebrei. I «Quaderni neri»](#)
- October 2, 2014 [Donatella Di Cesare in Corriere della Sera: L'ultimo segreto \(nero\) di Heidegger](#)
- October 9, 2014 [Michael Fagenblat in Journal for Culture and Religious Theory: The Thing that Scares Me Most: Heidegger's Anti-Semitism and the Return to Zion](#)
- October 9, 2014 [Julia A. Ireland in Research in Phenomenology: Naming Φύσις and the "Inner Truth of National Socialism": A New Archival Discover](#)
- October 9, 2014 [Peter E. Gordon in New York Review of Books: Heidegger in Black](#)
- October 10, 2014 [Przegląd Polityczny vol. 126 Czarne zeszyty Martina Heideggera with essays by Cezary Wodziński, Peter Trawny, Thomas Assheuer, Werner Heisenberg, Jacek Gutorow, Karol Kopacki](#)
- October 10, 2014 [Sidonie Kellerer in Modern Intellectual History: Rewording the Past. The Post-war Publication of a 1938 Lecture by Martin Heidegger](#)
- Oct 11-Dec 6, 2014 [Seminario Los cuadernos negros de Martin Heidegger at Universidad de San Buenaventura in Bogotá](#)
- October 12, 2014 [Eggert Blum in SWR4: Schwarze Hefte, geschönte Werke](#)

- October 13-15, 2014 [Heidegger-Levinas Colloque International at École Normale Supérieure](#)
- October 17, 2014 [Adèle Van Reeth's Les Nouveaux chemins de la connaissance: Heidegger et l'antisémitisme: «les cahiers noirs»](#)
- October 29, 2014 [Eggert Blum in Die Zeit: Die Marke Heidegger. Wie die Familie des Philosophen jahrzehntelang versuchte, das Image des umstrittenen Denkers zu kontrollieren und kritische Stimmen klein zu halten](#)
- Oct 30-Nov 1, 2014 [Heidegger und die Juden conference in Wuppertal with Peter Trawny, Jean-Luc Nancy, Nicolas Fernando de Warren, Andrew J. Mitchell, Françoise Dastur, Danielle Cohen-Levinas, Florian Grosser, Donatella Di Cesare, Marcia Cavalcante, Angel Xolocotzi, Christian Sommer, Alain David](#)
- November 7, 2014 [Gregory Fried in Los Angeles Review of Books: Not Dead Yet? A Response to Critics](#)
- November 8, 2014 [Interview with Jürgen Habermas in Le Monde: L'Europe, entre paralysie et distraction](#)
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[Revue Critique](#) n° 811: [Heidegger : la boîte noire des Cahiers](#)
- December 4, 2014 [Włodek Goldkorn](#) in [L'Espresso](#): [Filosofo nero](#)
- December 5, 2014 [Eggert Blum](#) in [Südkurier](#): [Heidegger und der Nationalsozialismus: Erben verwischen antisemitische Spuren](#)
- December 7, 2014 [Guido Ceronetti](#) in [Corriere della Sera](#): [Heidegger antisemita: cancella Spinoza](#)
- December 8, 2014 [Richard Polt](#) and [Gregory Fried](#) in conversation with [Thomas Sheehan](#): [No one can jump over his own shadow](#)
- December 11, 2014 [Gianni Vattimo](#) in [L'Espresso](#): [Heidegger antisemita indispensabile](#)
- December 16, 2014 [Alessandra Iadicco](#) in [La Stampa](#): [Da Lutero a Heidegger le radici filosofiche dell'antisemitismo](#)
- December 17, 2014 [Czy czarna legenda Heideggera?](#)  
symposium at the [Pedagogical University of Kraków](#) with [Bogdan Baran](#), [Jeffrey van Davis](#), [Tadeusz Gadacz](#), [Joachim Piecuch](#), [Andrzej Serafin](#), [Tadeusz Szawiel](#)
- December 19, 2014 [Nicolas Weill](#) in [Le Monde](#): [Heidegger : l'année du naufrage](#)
- January 2015 [Philosophie Magazin](#) Sonderausgabe n°3 [Die Philosophen und der Nationalsozialismus](#) with an essay by [Sidonie Kellerer](#) (Heideggers verborgene Wahrheiten) and an interview with [Jacques Taminiaux](#) (Heidegger war ein autoritärer Denker)

- January 2015

Circulation of [Friedrich-Wilhelm von Herrmann](#)'s essay: Die Stellung von Martin Heideggers 'Notizbüchern' oder 'Schwarzen Wachstuchheften' in seinem Geamtwerk (French translation by [François Fédier](#): La place des "Carnets de notes" de Martin Heidegger alias "Cahiers noirs" au sein de l'édition intégrale)
- January 2015

[Luca Di Blasi](#) in [Allgemeine Zeitschrift für Philosophie: Außerhalb des Logos. Die Expansion des seinsgeschichtlichen Antisemitismus](#)
- January 9, 2015

Interview with [Günter Figal](#) in [Radio Dreyeckland: "So denkt man nicht, wenn man Philosophie treibt"](#)
- January 15, 2015

[Pascal David](#): [Essai sur Heidegger et le judaïsme : le nom et le nombre](#)
- January 15, 2015

[Eggert Blum](#) in [SWR2: Kritische Forschung nötig Philosoph Günter Figal tritt als Vorsitzender der Martin-Heidegger Gesellschaft zurück](#)
- January 16, 2015

[Werner Witt](#) in [SWR2: Das große Schweigen](#) über den Umgang der Heidegger-Gesellschaft mit dem Rücktritt ihres Vorsitzenden Prof. [Günter Figal](#)
- January 16, 2015

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- January 17, 2015

[François Rastier](#) in [Nouvel Observateur: Antisémitisme : l'heideggérisme après le naufrage](#)
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[Jürg Altwegg](#) in [Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung: Heidegger-Konferenz: Ein](#)



- January 21-22, 2015 [Kongress der Weißwäscher?](#)  
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- January 22, 2015 [Europski glasnik n°19: Martin Heidegger kao »slučaj«: Crne bilježnice](#) with essays by [Herbert Marcuse](#), [Otto Pöggeler](#), [Peter Trawny](#), [Donatella Di Cesare](#), [Holger Zaborowski](#), [Richard Wolin](#), [Žarko Paić](#), [Dean Komel](#), [Richard Rorty](#), [Tom Rockmore](#), [Marc Voinchet](#), [Emmanyol Faye](#), [Günter Figal](#), [Jürgen Kaube](#), [Thomas Assheuer](#), [Adriano Fabris](#), [George Steiner](#)
- January 22, 2015 [Thomas Assheuer](#) in [Die Zeit: Geschockt von Schwarzen Heften. Günter Figal legt den Vorsitz der Heidegger-Gesellschaft nieder](#)
- Jan 22-25, 2015 [Heidegger et "les juifs"](#) Colloque at [Bibliothèque Nationale de France](#) with [Babette Babich](#), [Gérard Bensussan](#), [Agatha Bielik-Robson](#), [Barbara Cassin](#), [Joseph Cohen](#), [Cédric Cohen-Skalli](#), [Pascal David](#), [Daniel Dahlstrom](#), [Luc Dardenne](#), [Michel Deguy](#), [Nicolas de Warren](#), [Donatella di Cesare](#), [Emmanuel Faye](#), [François Fédiér](#), [Alain Finkielkraut](#), [Hadrien France-Lanord](#), [Gérard Guest](#), [Stéphane Habib](#), [Niall Keane](#), [Blandine Kriegel](#), [Hadrien Laroche](#), [Bernard-Henri Lévy](#), [Yann Moix](#), [Jean-Claude Milner](#), [Mahon O'Brien](#), [Maurice Olender](#),

- Christophe Perrin, Jacob Rogozinski, Peter Sloterdijk, Anthony Steinbock, Peter Trawny, Avishag Zafrani, Raphael Zagury-Orly, Stéphane Zagdanski, Yves-Charles Zarka (video, [http://www.dailymotion.com/playlist/x3me6f\\_laregledujeu\\_colloque-heidegger-et-les-juifs/1#video=x2g2rsnrs](http://www.dailymotion.com/playlist/x3me6f_laregledujeu_colloque-heidegger-et-les-juifs/1#video=x2g2rsnrs))
- January 23, 2015 Bettina Schulte's interview with Günter Figal in *Badische Zeitung*: Das Ende des Heideggerianertums
  - January 25, 2015 Emanuele Severino in *Corriere della Sera*: No, non sono la variante di Heidegger
  - January 28, 2015 Gaëlle Cauvin in *La Règle du jeu*: Heidegger et les Juifs : le colloque
  - January 29, 2015 Bernard-Henri Lévy in *The World Post*: Why Read Heidegger?
  - January 29, 2015 Marianne Dautrey and Emmanuel Faye in *Le Monde*: Les heideggériens broient du noir
  - January 30, 2015 Eggert Blum in *SWR2*: Trotz Antisemitismus den Meister verteidigen?
  - February 2015 Jeff Love and Michael Meng in *New German Critique*: The Political Myths of Martin Heidegger
  - February 2, 2015 Jürg Altwegg in *SWR2*: Heidegger-Dämmerung in Frankreich? Die französische Debatte über Heideggers Antisemitismus
  - February 8, 2015 Donatella Di Cesare in *Corriere della Sera*: Heidegger: «Gli ebrei si sono autoannientati» (English translation:

- February 9, 2015 ["Jews Self-destructed"\)](#)  
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- February 10, 2015 [Adriano Fabris](#) in [Avvenire](#): Quell'odiosa "cecità" di Heidegger
- February 10, 2015 [Donatella Di Cesare](#) interviewed by [Hohe Luft Magazin](#): Heidegger-Enthüllung
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- February 13, 2015 [Donatella Di Cesare](#) in [Mimesis Scenari](#): I "Quaderni neri" e l'etica della lettura
- February 16, 2015 [SWR Fernsehen](#): Antisemit und Ehrenbürger. Streit um Martin Heidegger in [Meßkirch](#)
- February 16, 2015 [Donatella Di Cesare](#) in [SWR2](#): Nach Günter Figals Rücktritt
- February 16, 2015 [Benjamin Weinthal](#) in [Jerusalem Post](#): German philosopher blamed Jews for self-destructing in Holocaust
- February 16, 2015 [Jean-Luc Nancy](#) in [Faust Kultur](#): Tatsachen aus Heften
- February 17, 2015 [Michael Inwood](#) in [Los Angeles Review of Books](#): Was Heidegger a Semitic Nomad?
- February 18, 2015 [Peter Trawny](#) in [Hohe Luft](#): Moralische Schuld ist in Heideggers Philosophie nicht möglich
- Feb 20-22, 2015 [Alfred Denker's seminar](#) in [Messkirch](#): Martin Heidegger, Überlegungen II-XV (Schwarze Hefte). Versuch einer Annäherung

- February 23, 2015 [Emmanuel Faye Heidegger profeta del IV Reich](#)
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- February 24, 2015 [Gregor Moser in Südkurier: Weitere Rückzüge bei Martin-Heidegger-Gesellschaft](#)
- February 26, 2015 [Giovanni Reale and Dario Antiseri in L'Avvenire: Heidegger senza senso di colpa](#)
- February 27, 2015 [Angiolo Bandinelli in Il Foglio: Il crematorio di Heidegger](#)
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- February 28, 2015 [Bettina Schulte in Badische Zeitung: Heidegger-Lehrstuhl perdu? Die Uni Freiburg will stattdessen eine Juniorprofessur einrichten](#)
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- March 2015 [Christophe Perrin in Bulletin heideggérien: Schwarze Hefte : des couleurs, des humeurs](#)

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- March 1, 2015 Publication of [Anmerkungen I-V](#) (Schwarze Hefte 1942-1948)
- March 2, 2015 [Richard Wolin](#) in [The Chronicle of Higher Education: Heidegger's Philosophy of Violence](#)
- March 2-3, 2015 [Cristiana Dobner](#) in [L'Osservatore Romano: Un antisemitismo metafisico. I Quaderni neri di Martin Heidegger](#)
- March 3, 2015 [Jürgen Kaube](#) in [Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung: Die Alliierten – schlimmer als Hitler?](#)
- March 3, 2015 [Emmanuel Alloa](#) in [Le Monde: Affaire Heidegger : nouveau scandale en vue](#)
- March 5, 2015 [Sidonie Kellerer](#) in [Hohe Luft: Des Meisters neue Kleider](#)
- March 6, 2015 [Tim Black](#) in [Spiked: Hating modernity, hating the Jews: a reckoning with Heidegger](#)
- March 7, 2015 [Alexander Grau](#) in [Cicero: Heidegger war der braunere Nazi](#)
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- March 11, 2015 [Greta Lührs](#) in [Hohe Luft: "Begeistert von Hitler" – Ein Briefwechsel zwischen Martin und seinem Bruder Fritz Heidegger wird unter Verschluss gehalten](#)
- March 11, 2015 [Werner Witt](#) in [SWR2: Sturz des Denkmals "Heidegger"](#)
- March 11, 2015 [Eggert Blum](#), [Lutz Hachmeister](#), [Axel Honneth](#), [Marion Heinz](#) in [SWR2:](#)

- March 12, 2015 [Denkmalsturz. Was bleibt von Martin Heidegger?](#)  
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[Hommage an Heideggers Denken des Seins](#)
- March 12, 2015 [Emmanuel Faye](#) in [Micromega](#): [Essere e svastica. Heidegger, l'antisemitismo, l'affermazione dell'essenza tedesca, l'auto-annientamento del nemico](#)
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- March 17, 2015 [Bettina Schulte](#) in [Badische Zeitung](#):  
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- March 18, 2015 [Reinhard Mehring](#): [Schwarze Stellen und „grosse Politik“. Zur Umstellung der Heidegger-Kontroverse](#)
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- March 20, 2015 [Arnulf Heidegger](#) in [Südkurier](#): [Rückkehr nach Meßkirch ist denkbar](#)
- March 20, 2015 [Bettina Schulte](#) in [Badische Zeitung](#):  
[Debatte um Heidegger-Lehrstuhl: Ein falsches Signal](#)
- March 21, 2015 [Markus Gabriel](#) in [Die Welt](#): [Wo "Geschick" waltet, darf keine Schuld sein](#)

- March 21, 2015 [Thomas Meyer](#) in [Süddeutsche Zeitung](#): [Denken am Frontverlauf](#)
- March 22, 2015 [Rainer Marten](#) in [Die Zeit](#): [Gralshüter mit letzter Treuebereitschaft](#)
- March 22, 2015 [François Rastier](#) in [alfabeta2](#): [L'heideggerismo, dopo il naufragio](#)
- March 24, 2015 Interview with [Rüdiger Safranski](#): [Religion ohne Gott](#)
- March 24, 2015 Dossier [Heidegger côté noir, encore plus noir...](#) in revue [Cités](#): [Emmanuel Faye](#), [Antisémitisme et extermination: Heidegger, l'Oeuvre intégrale et les Cahiers noirs](#); [Livia Profeti](#), [L'être-jeté dans un monde: le fondement raciste du Dasein](#); [Gaëtan Pégny](#), [L'antisémitisme de Heidegger à la fois reconnu et toujours minoré: remarques sur les effets de la publication des Cahiers noirs](#); [François Rastier](#), [Le rouge et le brun. L'heideggérisme clarifié par les Cahiers noirs](#); [Sidonie Kellerer](#), [Les Cahiers noirs et leur combat contre la «machination» juive](#)
- March 26, 2015 [Hannah Lühmann](#) in [Die Welt](#): [Deutsche Angst vor dem Geist der Schwarzen Hefte](#)
- March 26, 2015 [Adam Soboczyński](#) in [Die Zeit](#): [Was heißt "N.soz"?](#)
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- March 27, 2015 Interview with [Richard Wolin](#) in [Hohe Luft](#): [Heidegger hielt 'Endlösung' für notwendig](#)

- March 28, 2015 [Markus Gabriel in Die Welt: Heideggers widerwärtige Thesen über den Holocaust](#)
- March 28, 2015 [L.J. in Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung: Mehr Schwarz? - Heideggers Verleger fordert Klärung von Herausgeber](#)
- March 30, 2015 [Helmuth Vetter in Anklänge. Nachrichten der Heidegger-Gesellschaft: Stellungnahme des Vorsitzenden der Martin-Heidegger-Gesellschaft](#)
- March 30, 2015 [Antonio Carloti in Corriere della Sera: È ancora polemica sulla Società Heidegger: «Siete provinciali». Le dimissioni della vicepresidente Donatella Di Cesare dopo gli ultimi scontri](#)
- March 30, 2015 [Donatella Di Cesare in Il Libraio: Perché lascio la Heidegger-Gesellschaft](#)
- March 30, 2015 [Interview with Donatella Di Cesare in Confronti: Heidegger anno zero](#)
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- March 31, 2015 [B.Z. in Badische Zeitung: Der zweite Rücktritt. Heidegger-Gesellschaft auch ohne Donatella di Cesare](#)
- March 31, 2015 [Eggert Blum in SWR2: Verschweigen statt kritischer Auseinandersetzung](#)
- April 1, 2015 [Bettina Schulte in Badische Zeitung: Streit um Heidegger-Lehrstuhl: Figal darf weiter lehren](#)
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- April 2, 2015 [Interview with Holger Zaborowski in SWR2: Der Antisemitismus Heideggers: Kritische Auseinandersetzung mit Werk und Denken ist notwendig](#)
- April 2, 2015 [Holger Zaborowski on Christianity in Heidegger's Black Notebooks at the Hermeneutics and Relational Ontology Symposium](#)
- April 4, 2015 [Maurizio Ferraris's interview with Gunter Figal in La Repubblica: "Nei Quaderni di tenebra la maledizione di Heidegger"](#)
- April 4, 2015 [Justus Wenzel in Neue Zürcher Zeitung: Eine Ausgabe letzter Hände](#)
- April 5, 2015 [Maximilian Probst in Die Zeit: Wer kann ihm folgen? Die Uni Freiburg will den Heidegger-Lehrstuhl in eine Juniorprofessur umwandeln](#)
- April 5, 2015 [Micha Brumlik in TAZ: Seine Katastrophe. Martin Heidegger nach dem NS](#)
- April 9, 2015 [Emmanuel Faye, Sidonie Kellerer, François Rastier in: Heidegger und die Vernichtung der Juden](#)
- April 9, 2015 [Adam Soboczyński in Le Monde: Cessez de cacher le nazisme de Heidegger!](#)
- April 17, 2015 [Richard Wolin in Corriere della Sera: Goodbye Heidegger!](#)
- Apr 22-25, 2015 [Internationale Tagung an der Universität Siegen: Philosophie und Politik: Untersuchungen zu Martin Heideggers Schwarzen Heften at Philosophisch-Theologische Hochschule Vallendar](#)

- May 10, 2015 [Francesca Brencio](#) (ed.): [La piet  del pensiero. Heidegger e i Quaderni Neri](#)
- 2015 [Jeff Malpas](#), [Ingo Farin](#) (eds.): [Martin Heidegger's Black Notebooks](#) ([MIT Press](#)).  
[David Farrell Krell](#) in [Research in Phenomenology: Heidegger's Black Notebooks, 1931–1941](#).
- 2015-2018 [Forschungsprojekt Martin Heideggers Schwarze Hefte](#) at [Philosophisch-Theologischen Hochschule Vallendar](#)

## TEXTS OF HEIDEGGER CITED AND ABBREVIATIONS USED

References to the works of Martin Heidegger are provided parenthetically in the text by the volume of *Gesamtausgabe* (Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1975–, abbreviated “GA”), followed by the German pagination, a slash, and the English pagination of published translations where extant. The relevant translations are listed following the information for the corresponding GA volume. There is one exception to this practice. No references to the pages of English translations are provided in the case of *Being and Time* (GA 2); instead the GA pagination is followed by “SZ,” referring to the single edition, re-issued several times: *Sein und Zeit*, 11th ed. (Tübingen: Max Niemeyer Verlag, 1967), since the pagination of SZ is contained in all three of the English translations of *Sein und Zeit*. Modifications to published translations are noted by ‘tm’; modifications to emphasis by ‘em.’

### FROM THE GESAMTAUSGABE

- GA 2      *Sein und Zeit*. Ed. Friedrich-Wilhelm von Herrmann. 1977. English translation: *Being and Time*. Trans. Joan Stambaugh, rev. Dennis J. Schmidt. Albany: State University of New York Press, 2010; trans. John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson. New York: Harper & Row, 1962.
- GA 3      *Kant und das Problem der Metaphysik*. 2nd ed. Ed. Friedrich-Wilhelm von Herrmann. 2010. English translation: *Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics*. 5th ed, enlarged. Trans. Richard Taft. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1997.
- GA 4      *Erläuterungen zu Hölderlins Dichtung*. 2nd ed. Ed. Friedrich-Wilhelm von Herrmann. 1991. English translation: *Elucidations of Hölderlin's Poetry*. Trans. Keith Hoeller. Amherst, NY: Humanity Books, 2000.
- GA 5      *Holzwege*. 7th ed. Ed. Friedrich-Wilhelm von Herrmann. 1994. English translation: *Off the Beaten Track*. Ed. and trans. Julian Young and Kenneth Haynes. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002.

- GA 6.1 *Nietzsche I.* Ed. Brigitte Schillbach. 1996.
- GA 6.2 *Nietzsche II.* Ed. Brigitte Schillbach. 1997.
- GA 9 *Wegmarken.* 3rd ed. Ed. Friedrich-Wilhelm von Herrmann. 1996. English translation: *Pathmarks.* Ed. William McNeill. Various trans. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998.
- GA 11 *Identität und Differenz.* Ed. Friedrich-Wilhelm von Herrmann. 2006. English translation: *Identity and Difference.* Trans. Joan Stambaugh. New York: Harper & Row, 1969.
- GA 12 *Unterwegs zur Sprache.* Ed. Friedrich-Wilhelm von Herrmann. 1985.
- GA 14 *Zur Sache des Denkens.* Ed. Friedrich-Wilhelm von Herrmann. 2007. English translation: *On Time and Being.* Trans. Joan Stambaugh. New York: Harper & Row, 1972.
- GA 15 *Seminare.* Ed. Curd Ochwadt. 1986.
- GA 16 *Reden und andere Zeugnisse eines Lebensweges.* Ed. Hermann Heidegger. 2000.
- GA 18 *Grundbegriffe der aristotelischen Philosophie.* Ed. Mark Michalski. 2002. English translation: *Basic Concepts of Aristotelian Philosophy.* Trans. Robert D. Metcalf and Mark B. Tanzer. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2009.
- GA 29/30 *Die Grundbegriffe der Metaphysik: Welt – Endlichkeit – Einsamkeit.* 2nd ed. Ed. Friedrich-Wilhelm von Herrmann. 1992. English translation: *The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics: World, Finitude, Solitude.* Trans. William McNeill and Nicholas Walker. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1995.
- GA 36/37 *Sein und Wahrheit.* Ed. Hartmut Tietjen. 2001. English translation: *Being and Truth.* Trans. Gregory Fried and Richard Polt. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2010.
- GA 39 *Hölderlins Hymnen “Germanien” und “Der Rhein.”* 2nd ed. Ed. Susanne Ziegler. 1989. English Translation: *Hölderlin’s Hymns “Germania” and “The Rhine.”* Trans. William McNeill and Julia Ireland. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2014.

- GA 40 *Einführung in die Metaphysik*. Ed. Petra Jaeger. 1983. English translation: *Introduction to Metaphysics*. 2nd ed. Trans. Gregory Fried and Richard Polt. New Haven: Yale University Press, 2014.
- GA 50 *Nietzsches Metaphysik. Einleitung in die Philosophie – Denken und Dichten*. 2nd ed. Ed. Petra Jaeger. 1990.
- GA 54 *Parmenides*. 2nd Edition. Ed. Manfred S. Frings. 1992. English translation: *Parmenides*. Trans. André Schuwer and Richard Rojcewicz. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1992.
- GA 65 *Beiträge zur Philosophie (Vom Ereignis)*. 2nd ed. Ed. Friedrich-Wilhelm von Herrmann. 1994. English translation: *Contributions to Philosophy (Of the Event)*. Trans. Richard Rojcewicz and Daniela Vallega-Neu. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2012.
- GA 66 *Besinnung*. Ed. Friedrich-Wilhelm von Herrmann. 1997. English translation: *Mindfulness*. Trans. Parvis Emad and Thomas Kalary. New York: Continuum, 2006.
- GA 69 *Die Geschichte des Seyns*. Ed. Peter Trawny. 1998.
- GA 70 *Über den Anfang*. Ed. Paola-Ludovika Coriando. 2005.
- GA 71 *Das Ereignis*. Frankfurt am Main: Klostermann, 2009. English translation: *The Event*. Trans. Richard Rojcewicz. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2013.
- GA 73.1 *Zum Ereignis-Denken*. Ed. Peter Trawny. 2013.
- GA 77 *Feldweg-Gespräche*. 2nd ed. Ed. Ingeborg Schüßler. 2007. English translation: *Country Path Conversations*. Trans. Bret W. Davis. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2010.
- GA 79 *Bremer und Freiburger Vorträge*. Ed. Petra Jaeger. 1994. English translation: *Bremen and Freiburg Lectures: Insight Into That Which Is and Basic Principles of Thinking*. Trans. Andrew J. Mitchell. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2012.
- GA 86 *Seminare: Hegel – Schelling*. Ed. Peter Trawny. 2011.

- GA 94     *Überlegungen* II–VI (*Schwarze Hefte 1931–1938*). Ed. Peter Trawny. 2014.
- GA 95     *Überlegungen* VII–XI (*Schwarze Hefte 1938–1939*). Ed. Peter Trawny. 2014.
- GA 96     *Überlegungen* XII–XV (*Schwarze Hefte 1939–1941*). Ed. Peter Trawny. 2014.
- GA 97     *Anmerkungen* I–V (*Schwarze Hefte 1942–1948*). Ed. Peter Trawny. 2015.

#### FROM OTHER ENGLISH TRANSLATIONS

- N3         *Nietzsche*, vol. 3: *The Will to Power as Knowledge and as Metaphysics*. Ed. and trans. Joan Stambaugh, David Farrell Krell, and Frank A. Capuzzi. San Francisco: Harper, 1991.
- OWL       *On the Way to Language*. Trans. Peter D. Hertz. New York: Harper & Row, Publishers, 1971.