

Heidegger's Epicureanism: Death, Dwelling and *Ataraxia*

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ABSTRACT: Heidegger and Epicurus seem to be separated by a great divide. Where Epicurus seeks *ataraxia* by minimizing anxiety and our concern with death, Heidegger describes how anxiety and death are factored into authentic living. But looks can be deceiving. A close study of Heidegger's critique of *das Man* reveals a distinctly Epicurean line of thinking. His account of curiosity, in particular, parallels Epicurus's own criticism of normal life as being mired in unnatural/empty desires due to an unconscious fear of death. Despite this similarity, Heidegger's interest in ontological anxiety, i.e., homelessness, contrasts deeply with Epicurus's goal of mental tranquility. Yet this difference is overcome, in part, in Heidegger's turn to peaceful dwelling as an expression of authentic Being-in-the-world. Indeed, Heidegger's account of the fourfold as the essence of dwelling can be seen as an Epicurean four-part cure to suffering (*tetrapharmakos*), bringing Heidegger into dialogue with the tradition of philosophical therapy.

KEYWORDS: anxiety, *ataraxia*, death, dwelling, fourfold, therapy

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More should be said about the relationship between Epicurus and Heidegger than what can be found in either Heidegger's own writings or the secondary literature about Heidegger or Epicurus. Heidegger mentions him rarely and mostly in passing.¹ The same happens in the secondary literature. I do not know of a single extended account of their possible convergence.² I would like to remedy this absence in the following essay.

The focus of this study stems from my interest in bringing Heidegger into dialogue with the philosophical therapeutic tradition, particularly the Epicurean view of therapy. Philosophical therapy finds its roots in classical Greek, Hellenistic and Roman thinkers. The core idea linking these various views is that philosophy is a way of life or spiritual exercise that brings out our true being.³ Bringing Heidegger into dialogue with this tradition is needed because his own focus on recovering a proper grasp of Being demands that a person is himself or herself open to Being. The (Epicurean) therapy implied in Heidegger's view relates to how such an openness is nurtured.

This essay begins with a study of Epicurus's famous account of death, the right understanding of which leads to his main goal of *ataraxia*. We will see how well Epicurus's position not only relates to Heidegger's account in *Being and Time* – where their views of death are closer than what is commonly understood – but also how it helps bring to light Heidegger's later account of therapeutic transformation through dwelling (*Wohnen*). Indeed, a distinctly Epicurean way of life is suggested within Heidegger's own critique of modernity. Even if Epicurus's account of *ataraxia* does contrast with Heidegger's description of anxiety in *Being and Time*, it also offers an important parallel to what Heidegger will ultimately take as deeply relational living. Both thinkers base their understandings of these transformative experiences (*ataraxia* and dwelling) on a proper disposition toward nature or *physis* – a disposition that is attuned to the reality of death as much as it is to the magnetically affective presence of beings in the world.

I. ON THE SUPPOSED DISAGREEMENT BETWEEN EPICURUS AND HEIDEGGER

Whenever I come across a discussion of Epicurus and Heidegger, the author usually focuses on the seeming difference between their concerns with death. Mark Wrathall, for example, uses Epicurus's famous quotation as a way to set him apart from Heidegger. Wrathall says,

Epicurus...argued that death, "that most frightful of evils...is nothing to us, seeing that when we exist death is not present, and when present we do not exist." As a consequence, Epicurus believed that it was incoherent to have anything but a stance of indifference towards our own deaths. For Heidegger, by contrast, death is "not nothing to us," but our ownmost possibility. And for Heidegger, anxiety in the face of death is the right way to respond to it.⁴

I maintain that this rather common contrast is not entirely correct.⁵ As I show, Epicurus does not suggest that we should be indifferent toward death. His point is that we should have a correct attitude toward death, which brings him rather close to Heidegger's focus on death as our ownmost possibility. Death shapes our attitude toward life, so we cannot be indifferent to it. Yet Wrathall's point about anxiety is a point of contrast to Epicurus – at least in Heidegger's early work. Even here, however, the contrast to Epicurus is not so black and white.

A. EPICURUS ON DEATH AND THE CRAVING FOR IMMORTALITY

Epicurus's philosophy is explicitly and fundamentally therapeutic.⁶ He goes so far as to say that even the studies of physics and meteorology should be subordinated to human well-being. In a statement that could be (partly) advanced by Husserl or Heidegger, Epicurus says: "For we must not conduct scientific investigation by means of empty assumptions and arbitrary principle, but follow the lead of phenomena: for our life has not now any place for irrational belief and groundless

imaginings, but we must live free from trouble.”⁷ Human well-being (brought about through proper reason or wisdom) is the ground by which all other studies should be measured.⁸

What is also distinctive about Epicurus’s account of the good life is that it is, theoretically, open to anyone and at any time. Happiness or fulfillment, in a word, can be now. Epicurus’s view is in sharp contrast to Aristotle’s theory of well-being, which is both based on a cumulative development of virtue and elitist. However, even if happiness could be now, the fact is that most people live in misery – a misery that is, by and large, self-generated. Epicurus’s philosophy is geared toward showing people the way to a healthy life – free from both mental anxiety or *ataraxia* and physical pain or *aponia*.⁹ And the key to finding such mental/physical tranquility lies in the reduction of life’s complexity. In short, “The most unalloyed source of protection...is in fact the immunity which results from a quiet life and the retirement from the world” (SEP, 36). This claim is at the heart of Epicurus’s famous proverb “Live in hiding” (*lathe biōsas*).

Even if Epicurus is technically a hedonist, this emphasis on minimalism seems, in many respects, the opposite of what a typical hedonist would advocate as the goal of life. Indeed, Epicurus is so radical in his view that he implores his followers to avoid all the refined trappings of a cultured society. Paradoxically, this is what makes Epicurus’s life philosophy so difficult to engage.¹⁰ Most of us are so mired in the so-called “goods” of society that we cannot imagine living without them. We are so deeply afraid of losing the refinements of life that the simple life appears as terrifying. So, even if the good life can be now, in reality, most of us are so addicted to destructive things that there is a long road ahead to healthy living.

Achieving a healthy state or *ataraxia* demands a change in habits. The goal is to establish a constant, peaceful attitude toward the world and maintain it throughout the pursuit of long- and short-term goals. We have to, in other words, establish a firm foundation in the “freedom from disturbance and suffering” (i.e., *ataraxia*) so that our pursuit of distant goals is not how we determine our well-being. If future goals

are not met, the firm foundation of *ataraxia* allows us to dismiss these losses as meaningless. But how do we establish this firm foundation?

Epicurus bases his therapeutic philosophy on the *tetrapharmakos* or four-part cure. His therapy is rooted in the claim that there are four main causes of unnecessary suffering – the elimination of which will lead to a life of peace. Concisely stated, Epicurus says:

For indeed who...is a better man than he who holds reverent opinions concerning the gods, and is at all times free from fear of death, and has reasoned out the end ordained by nature? He understands that the limit of good things is easy to fulfil and easy to attain, whereas the course of ills is either short in time or slight in pain. (SEP, 32–33)

From this passage (and others like it) the four-part cure has been summarized as:

1. God should not concern us.
2. Death is not to be feared.
3. What is good is easy to obtain.
4. What is bad (or painful) is easily avoided.¹¹

In what follows, I would like to explain more precisely what Epicurus means by not fearing death. His point is not that we should be indifferent to it. What we need is a proper attitude toward it, since an improper attitude toward death causes unnecessary fear and anxiety. To this end, I will highlight how 1) the fear of God and 3) fear of the simple life are interwoven into 2) Epicurus's famous criticism of fearing death.¹² In a longer passage than the one used by Wrathall above, Epicurus says:

Become accustomed to the belief that death is nothing to us. For all good and evil consists in sensation, but death is deprivation of sensation. And therefore a right understanding that death is nothing to us makes

the mortality of life enjoyable, not because it adds to it an infinite span of time, but because it takes away the craving for immortality. (SEP, 30)

Now, if we approach only the first part of Epicurus's view about death (the "deprivation of sensation"), then a rather clear contrast to Heidegger is present. Heidegger is focused on how we deal with our being as a Being-toward-death (*Sein zum Tode*). However, if we emphasize the latter point ("the craving for immortality") we see how it ties, not only to the other aspects of the *tetrapharmakos*, but to Heidegger as well. Let us explore the former before the latter.

Epicurus's attitude toward death can be taken as based on the removal of the "craving for immortality."¹⁵ At one level, this view is derived from his metaphysics. Given his materialism, at death there is nothing that survives, making any hope for immortality irrational. Tying this to the first point of the *tetrapharmakos*, at least one worry about death is dispelled. Namely, if there is a God, nothing anyone does in this life could possibly affect the way God deals with us in the afterlife. Since there is no personal immortality, no one has to fear God's wrath.¹⁴

Now, Epicurus's philosophy is never purely theoretical. His view is significantly informed by the actual causes of misery – one of which is the personal and social tensions that diverse religions/cults create in the world.¹⁵ So Epicurus's practical suggestion is to withdraw from any participation in religious practices and let nature itself be our guide. Since we all live within nature, it should guide us, not some mystical other-world. Thus, dispelling the fear of God (#1 of the *tetrapharmakos*) is linked to dispelling fear of death by eliminating the "craving for immortality," which happens not only by abstract argumentation but by disengaging ourselves from religious practice altogether.¹⁶ But how does the elimination of the "craving for immortality" also relate to the third part of the *tetrapharmakos*?

For Epicurus, the fear of death is a deep affliction in the human psyche, which is linked to more than religious belief. It is an unconscious fear that realizes itself in the fascination people develop with luxurious pleasures, political conquest, and fame.¹⁷ All of these endeavors

are destructive for Epicurus in that they defy the third part of the four-part cure: what is good is easy to get in life. But they are also tied to the problem of “craving immortality.”

Epicurus highlights that what humans really need is not hard to acquire or, negatively, that much of human anxiety is caused by needing pleasures that are either unnecessary or unnatural, i.e., empty (SEP, 37). The unnecessary pleasures are dangerous because if we become addicted to them, then our lives become dependent on them. We will have to work harder to afford the unnecessary pleasures and we will become mentally unstable in their absence. Here, Epicurus warns against the reliance on luxuries, such as fine clothes, houses, and lavish meals.

Regarding the unnatural pleasures, these are purely artificial creations and serve no natural or necessary need. Epicurus has in mind, again, the dangerous passion for religion but includes also the desires for political power and fame. Politics and popularity suffer from the same defect: no individual controls these arenas and the desires are constantly frustrated due to the impermanence of these realms.¹⁸ One's very freedom to find peace is violated in these endeavors since the object of the pursuit is constantly out of one's control. And these desires defy nature because they are completely social artifacts. Epicurus drives a wedge between nature and culture.

Now, it seems fairly obvious how the desires for political power and fame correlate to the desire for immortality. The notion of *kleos* or glory is a part of the Homeric system from which Epicurus is distancing himself.¹⁹ But how does the pursuit of luxurious pleasures relate to the desire for immortality?

On the one hand, seeking pleasure and avoiding pain are not directly related to a desire for immortality. For Epicurus, as a hedonist, pleasure and pain are the main clues for living the good life. But people do lose themselves in a miserable pursuit of complex pleasures, wasting their lives because they falsely believe they need them and pretend they have all the time in the world to chase after them. In this way, the slavish pursuit of unnecessary pleasures is linked to a false belief in immortal time. So, a correct attitude toward our mortality is needed

to break the bad habit of seeking unnecessary pleasures as means to open us to the importance of the now. For Epicurus, there is no time to waste. We should seek *ataraxia* now!

Before we turn to a comparison with Heidegger, a final point must be made about *ataraxia*. As we eliminate the sources of anxiety by dispelling false belief in the need for certain things (unnecessary and unnatural goods), we learn to live within the scope of both natural and necessary pleasures. This distinction seems more analytic than real, since the goal of the simple life is to take pleasure in the contemplative realization that what we need is already there for us to use for the sake of promoting the good life. Water, sleep, simple shelter, readily available food sources, friendly conversations, etc., are all examples of both necessary and natural goods.²⁰ We need them to live; yet, when we appreciate them as the grounds of the good life then they are understood to be the very sources of happiness. The so-called simple pleasures are now seen as the most exalted goods in life.

Again, recall that the goal for Epicurus is to enjoy the simple life. In a rather compelling passage, he says,

For it is to obtain this end that we always act, namely, to avoid pain and fear. And when this is once secured for us, all the tempest of the soul is dispersed, since the living creature has not to wander as though in search of something that is missing...For it is then that we have need of pleasure, when we feel pain owing to the absence of pleasure; but when we do not feel pain, we no longer need pleasure. (SEP, 31)

This passage highlights exactly why it is so hard to classify Epicurus as a hedonist. What type of state is this that is neither painful nor pleasurable? Are we in a state of nothingness? No. What Epicurus has in mind goes back to the importance of maintaining a peaceful state of mind even in the pursuit of distant goals. We are no longer frustrated by a need for distant pleasures – which put us in motion due to a painful lack – because we have minimized our needs to what is easily available.

More importantly, we are attuned to the tranquil presence of what is. There is, for Epicurus, an experience of fullness that arises from simply Being-in-the-world (to use Heidegger's phrase), which sustains us even when we must pursue necessary goods. This fullness is captured by Epicurus when he says, "For a man who lives among immortal blessings is not like... a mortal being" (SEP, 33).

B. HEIDEGGER ON ANXIETY AND THE EVASION OF DEATH

Heidegger's interest in philosophy as a form of therapy or spiritual exercise should not be so surprising given that a main motivation for engaging in the "question of the meaning of Being," in *Being and Time*, is to address a crisis that arises from the forgetfulness of Being. Of course, the ultimate purpose of *Being and Time* is simply too broad a topic to discuss in this essay. Much more narrowly, we can see that Heidegger's ontological inquiry is specifically therapeutic in the way it heightens our responsibility for the meaning of beings in the world. Heidegger directly invokes the therapeutic tradition when he says,

Man's *perfectio* – his transformation into that which he can be in Being-free for his ownmost possibilities (projection) – is 'accomplished' by 'care'. But with equal primordiality 'care' determines what is basically specific in this entity, according to which it has been surrendered to the world of its concern (thrownness). (GA 2: 264/SZ 199)

We will see that there are two dimensions to Heidegger's concern for "transformation."²¹ Both are related to the way we can – from out of a stagnant existence – regain passionate wonder and insight into our relationships with the world. And this is achieved by understanding that we are not just registers of the world order. Much more than this, our way into life can gather the deepest meanings because we are the sources out of which Being is disclosed. Heidegger captures this in his use of the term *Dasein* – a term that highlights the fact that humans are not merely beings among other beings. As *Dasein* (literally "Being

there”) we are more like a site for the revelation of Being, where our questioning of and engagement with beings is a constitutive aspect of the appearance of Being itself.

What is also distinctive about Dasein is that, unlike other beings, we are the beings who question ourselves. “Who am I?” is a distinctively human question. As we seek a response to this question, we do not begin with a solitary, self-sufficient subject (contra Descartes). First and foremost, from a practical level, Dasein is a Being-in-the-world, which means that we are immersed within an environment (*Umwelt*). We discover who we are (our Being or *Sein*) in the context of where we live (our here or *Da*). And a constitutive feature of our life-world is a framework of like-minded others – a *Volk* or people. Who we are is “nobody” in a distinct sense (GA 2: 170–71/SZ 128). As Epicurus might say, we are originally part of the many (*hoi polloi*). Just as this is a problem for Epicurus, it presents itself as a problem for Heidegger as well. This fact can be seen in his description of “inauthenticity” – a mode of Being that is deficient due to a lack of virtue or excellence.²²

Our Being-with-others is a primordial feature of our existence, but also a problem in the way we live. Heidegger raises this dilemma throughout his description of our unreflective Being-with-others. His account of this level of experience is rich in detail. I will move quickly through these details, honing in on the places that clearly link him to Epicurus.

In section 27, “Everyday Being-one’s Self and the ‘They,’” Heidegger explains the problem of our unreflective relationship to our social context through a development of terms: averageness, levelling down, and Being-disburdened. The main point is that as we exist within our social sphere we are directed or dominated by that frame of reference as long as we do not throw it into question. This domination happens in the way that our current context is taken for granted or taken as unquestionably true. When dominated by custom, we not only take what is given and regular (average and levelled down) as reality itself. We also do not attempt to legitimate the world as given. We are, in other words, disburdened of our responsibility for the meaning we attribute to things.

Heidegger develops how this is a problem in the sections on “Idle Talk,” “Curiosity,” and “Ambiguity” (sections 35, 36 and 37, respectively).

With idle talk, Heidegger is describing a mode of discourse between people that is unreflective and unchallenging. “Nothing is not understood” in this frame of mind (GA 2: 229–30/SZ 173). Heidegger uses the examples of “gossip” and “passing the word along” as ways to reveal this level of engagement. But the real problem of our unreflective life is captured in the intimately related section on curiosity.

The average and familiar way of discoursing about things is framed by a distinct restlessness with the world. Curiosity is, for Heidegger, a mode of “not tarrying” with things, being distracted or, most importantly, “not dwelling anywhere” (GA 2: 229/SZ 173).²³ “Curiosity is everywhere and nowhere” (GA 2: 229/SZ 173). And the following passage highlights what such a distracted attitude misses: “Curiosity has nothing to do with observing entities and marveling at them – *thaumazein*. To be amazed to the point of not understanding is something in which it has no interest” (GA 2: 229/SZ 172).²⁴ Following this, in the section on ambiguity, Heidegger expresses how the time of *thaumazein* and the time of idle talk/curiosity are distinct:

When Dasein goes in for something in the reticence of carrying it through or even of genuinely breaking down on it, its time is a different time and, as seen by the public, an essentially slower time than that of idle talk, which ‘lives at a faster rate.’ Idle talk will thus long since have gone on to something else which is currently the very newest thing. (GA 2: 231/SZ 174)

Following this distinction between the slow and fast paced, in section 38 (“Falling and Thrownness”), Heidegger discusses the experiences of temptation, tranquilization, and alienation. Temptation is the force of falling into this unreflective mode of life because it is disburdening (as Heidegger described previously in section 27). But now, he uses the word “tranquility.” In our context, this is intriguing, since *ataraxia* is often translated as a tranquil state of mind. Is Heidegger implicitly criticizing Epicurus? No.

The tranquility Heidegger describes fits more with the medical notion of being tranquilized, given that this way of life is ultimately alienating ourselves from ourselves. “When Dasein [is] tranquilized. . . it drifts along towards an alienation in which its ownmost potentiality-for-Being is hidden from it” (GA 2: 236/SZ 178). What is being hidden, in other words, is our death as well as our transformative rebirth.

At this point in Heidegger’s analysis, he is close to Epicurus. Heidegger’s description of the groundless pursuit of newness resonates perfectly with Epicurus’s concern with the empty/unnatural goods that are available in a corrupt society.²⁵ Heidegger’s interest in *thaumazein* as a slower-paced life also seems to be in league with Epicurus’s turn to the simple life, although this is by no means a necessary way of interpreting Heidegger in *Being and Time*. Actually, what Heidegger is describing is an expert engagement with a world, where we take concentrated time to gain a deep familiarity with a particular field of Being. Here, Heidegger is making the case that through a commitment to a particular way of life (e.g., being / the life of / living as a musician), a person can achieve a level of “virtuosity” that makes the person a constitutive source of disclosure for everyone else.²⁶ In such a way, the expert becomes a model for human achievement as much as a conduit for a particular dimension of Being. This is one of the two levels of personal transformation that has both a cultural and ontological significance. Being a world discloser is the essence of Dasein, so excelling in this ability is good not only for the person but the community as well. What, for example, would music be without an expert’s ability to display to us a way into a world of music?

But there is a deeper concern with “authenticity” that sets up a more radical distance from normal life. Heidegger famously introduces *Angst* or anxiety as a mood that offers the chance for the deepest kind of emancipation from the everyday, anonymous mode of existence. At first, when the mood is discussed, Heidegger directly contrasts it with fear. Fear is fear of something; there is an intentional object, whether real or imagined. Anxiety, however, is a mood that has no distinct object confronting us. In anxiety we feel out of balance with the world, but

why we feel in such a way is not clear. Heidegger describes anxiety as a sense of being uncanny or, literally, homeless (*unheimlich*). This homelessness does two things for us. First, it breaks our participation with the world, allowing it to become an object of consideration.²⁷ The whole significance of the world is, so to speak, switched off, leaving Dasein in an existential isolation (GA 2: 250/SZ 188). Second, and intimately related, the familiar world becomes an object of consideration because its taken-for-granted status becomes a question. There is, in other words, a crisis of legitimacy. The ordinary world of concern is held in suspension and the reality of possibility is considered in a more radical way.

In the transition from the first part of *Being and Time* to the second, Heidegger explains the meaning of anxiety. The mood that seemingly comes from nowhere is actually related to primordial time or temporality. As the title of Heidegger's work intimates, his claim is not merely that all beings are in time; rather, temporality is the horizon of Being itself. Humans have a background awareness of this horizon, and anxiety is the mood that bothers us about this fact.

On the negative side, anxiety takes us over because Dasein is aware of itself as a temporal being ending in death. Ours is a dramatic time. We are stunned by the strangeness of our ultimate end because it is not something we can actualize. Our ownmost potentiality can never be an actuality (contra naturalism) and, so, our ownmost reality is, in a way, unreal. Through anxiety, this nothingness disrupts the normal flow of life.

On the positive side, anxiety is a mood that is calling us to take stock of our lives. It is, in other words, the "call of conscience" reminding us that there is only so much time to accomplish anything at all in our life. Anxiety is the mood that does not let us forget that nothing lasts forever and that time is precious. Hence, anxiety is intimately tied to death; but, for Heidegger, anxiety is not to be eliminated for the sake of tranquility. Becoming lost in the everyday world offers a false tranquility as an evasion of the truth of death. So while Heidegger could agree with Epicurus that humans evade death by unreflectively participating in frivolous needs, he appears to be directly contradicting Epicurus's

goal of constant peace or *ataraxia* – a life without anxiety. Indeed, it is the incomprehensibility of my not being that brings me back to the importance of the now – the moment of vision or *Augenblick*. Epicurus lumps together fear and anxiety in the face of death. Heidegger decisively separates them in terms of inauthenticity and authenticity. Fear of death is lost in the world, worried about our demise. Anxiety, on the other hand, makes us responsible for the world by revealing to us the possibility of the impossibility of existing. In this sense, Heidegger links our mortality/anxiety to our careful way of being. I have care (*Sorge*) about the meaning of my existence because I am mortal.

Of course, even Epicurus argues that we should reach *ataraxia* before it is too late. Mortality has to pressure us to live well. So the great divide between them is not so much death, to which we should not be indifferent. The great divide is the status of anxiety. Yet again, the difference is less than it seems to be. When Heidegger describes how we live in the moment of vision, he describes it as a mood of equanimity (*Gleichmut*) or calmness, which is distinct from indifference (*Gleichgültigkeit*), previously described as the medicated tranquility that is lived in the inauthentic curiosity with newness. Heidegger says,

Indifference, which can go along with busying oneself head over heels, must be sharply distinguished from equanimity. This latter mood springs from resoluteness, which, in a moment of *vision*, looks at those Situations which are possible in one's potentiality-for-Being-a-whole as disclosed in our anticipation of death.
(GA 2: 457/SZ 345)

The equanimity of Heidegger's moment of vision shares a family resemblance to the calmness of Epicurus' *ataraxia* – a relationship we shall visit again at the end of the essay.

So what is the fundamental difference between Heidegger and Epicurus? The answer is, again, anxiety – but we have to emphasize its ontological status. In *Being and Time*, anxiety is ontological; it is not the product of false beliefs that can be overcome by a calm appreciation

of natural goods. As such, Heidegger's view of authenticity can never meet with the *ataraxia* of Epicurus. There is, in other words, no way of finding static peace, since humans are caught in the flux between the conformity of average everydayness, dedication to a craft, and authentic homelessness. And this flux is ever present because Dasein is not merely part of the world of its involvement. The distinctive "nature" of Dasein is its being an open possibility – never fulfilled in a world of which it is not merely a part (GA 2: 56–57/SZ 42). Dasein is the source from which the world or "equipmental totality" makes sense. Things in the world make sense through this totality, but not Dasein. Even when expertise is achieved through committed involvement, Dasein is never determined by the sense of wholeness achieved through that expertise. Possibility is never extinguished from our Being-in-the-world. Nevertheless, possibility is not negative because it is the source of the second – higher – transformative experience for Heidegger.

When Dasein resolutely responds to anxiety/death, his or her life-world can be reformed in a more radical way due to the challenge of what is possible. Although we are embedded in our life-world and care for what "they" care for, the liberating truth is that the way things are is not the way things have to be. Death, for Heidegger, is not only about a personal death – death also means the alterability of the life-world that embeds each Dasein in meaningfulness. In this sense, Dasein is given a chance to become a kind of visionary for his or her people. This is what Heidegger refers to as Dasein's "authentic historicality" (GA 2: 511/SZ 386).²⁸ And when responding to such a call, a difficult task faces the person due to the openness of the challenge. We need courage and tenacious perseverance to achieve our highest transformative potential, making Heidegger's view difficult to square with Epicurus's goal of a life in hiding (*lathe biōsas*).²⁹ But as we will see next, Heidegger's later interest in dwelling (*Wohnen*) alters this difference from Epicurus. When dwelling is sought as a way beyond anxiety – a key swerve in Heidegger's thinking – he is brought ever closer to the virtue of *ataraxia*.

II. ANXIETY IN THE MODERN WORLD: THE PROBLEM OF TECHNOLOGY

Heidegger's later philosophy changes the role of anxiety from *Being and Time*. Where that mood served a unique purpose in the mode of authenticity, anxiety becomes demoted in Heidegger's interest in dwelling. Anxiety loses its ontological status and becomes a symptom of our modern nihilistic approach to Being as a whole. I take this to be Heidegger's deepest Epicurean turn. We can follow this by looking at the problem of technology and see the counter-point of dwelling as a way into an ontological home-coming.⁵⁰

In his essay "The Question Concerning Technology," a perspective comes to the fore that is expressed, but not developed, in *Being and Time*. Above we saw Heidegger claim that the problem with curiosity is that it is blind to wonder. As we have seen, Heidegger says, "Curiosity has nothing to do with observing entities and marveling at them – *thaumazein*. To be amazed to the point of not understanding is something in which it has no interest." Of course, what Heidegger means by this sense of wonder is not really explored in *Being and Time*. But he does so in the context of technology.

Before we turn to Heidegger's critique of technology, let us go back to *Being and Time*. In that work, a twofold ontology is developed. Objects can be either ready-to-hand (*zuhanden*) or present-at-hand (*vorhanden*).⁵¹ The present-at-hand is a deficient way of accessing the meaning of beings since it is a detached, reductionist point of view. Here, Heidegger has in mind our theoretical attitude toward the world, where things are abstracted from context and viewed as objects for observing subjects. Our relationship to the ready-to-hand, however, refers to how things matter to us in an unreflective or habitual mode of access to the world. For example, a cup on the shelf can be thought to be made up of atoms when viewed as present-at-hand; whereas, as ready-to-hand, the cup is for my morning coffee as I prepare for the coming day. Being, for Heidegger, is given in the day-to-day encounters we have with the world, which is always ontologically prior, richer, and more ambiguous than the scaled-down "reality" given through theory. Yet in his discussion of technology, there is an additional way to conceive of the meaning of the

thing that is distinct from both the ready-to-hand and present-at-hand. This third way is linked to Heidegger's interest in the Greek notions of *physis*, *poiēsis*, and *technē*. Ultimately, our discussion will lead to the meaning of dwelling as dwelling in the presence of things.

Technē is human craftwork, which broadly includes everything brought into appearance by humans (literature, pottery, theories, politics, etc.). The realm of *technē* is, then, a form of *poiēsis* in that such creations are a "bringing forth" of form (GA 7: 12–14/QCT 10–13). But the realm of *physis*, i.e., not humanly created things, is also a form of *poiēsis*. Moreover, it is a "higher" form of "bringing forth" because *physis* produces itself from itself, whereas *technē* is produced from another, namely, humanity (GA 7: 12–13/QCT 10–11). Heidegger's fascination with the (hidden) power of *physis* is precisely the source of his critique of the modern attitude toward things. To understand this attitude, we need to highlight yet another distinction he makes between the ancient and modern senses of technology.

The technological attitude is Heidegger's reworking of his notion of the ready-to-hand in that things are taken as belonging to an equipmental horizon of meaning. Things are used for the sake of something else. When in use, the actual thing is not the focus of attention because of our future-oriented behavior. However, in this technological attitude, there are two ways things can be taken up into an equipmental horizon. In what Heidegger calls the Greek attitude, a thing stands before the subject as a unique object, and the craftsperson uses it because of its uniqueness. A craftsperson, for example, may search for the perfect piece of wood to construct a kitchen utensil.

In the modern sense, on the other hand, the thing is not a whole standing before the craftsperson but an object to be used up completely for the sake of something else. A forest of trees, for example, may be cut down to make space for a new housing development. The point is that in the first attitude there is a reverence for the thing as a whole (even if it is to be used) and, in the second, the thing is seen as only raw matter to be used up.³² And the modern sense is itself perpetuated by the actual technologies that give humans the power to recreate nature in a radical way.³³

Now, the larger concern Heidegger has with the modern attitude is that it is the ever increasing, defining attitude toward the meaning of Being as a whole. This attitude, in other words, is enframing (*Ge-stell*) our entire relationship to ready-to-hand things. As everything is seen as only a resource or standing reserve (*Bestand*), the future use dismisses the present manifestation of things, leaving environmental and human degradations in its wake. Nothing is seen with reverence, and this is the emptiness of the modern life. This attitude is, for Heidegger, the expression of a deep homelessness that becomes the source of anxiety (GA 7: 148, 163–64/PLT 144, 159). So, in his account of the modern world, a loss of spirit (due to nihilism) is now attached both to anxiety, as feeling ungrounded, and to a profound boredom due, as Schopenhauer would say, to the “emptiness of existence.”⁵⁴ Was not the discussion of curiosity and indifference in *Being and Time* already insight into this problem of the modern technological revelation of Being?⁵⁵

This change of attitude about anxiety and homelessness is, I maintain, Heidegger’s Epicurean turn. The link to Epicurus’s third part of the four-part cure is most obvious. The emptiness of unnatural desires is a sign for an inquiry into the deficient nature of such things. So too with Heidegger, who does not side with Schopenhauer’s pessimism but sees it as an opportunity to think about the meaning of Being in a technological age. We have already seen the connection between Heidegger’s early interest in the evasion of death and the Epicurean “craving for immortality,” but now we see a terrifying global crisis at hand. Both thinkers are advocating a change of disposition as a means to *ataraxia* or, for Heidegger, dwelling as “peace” (GA 7: 150–51/PLT 147). But there is an urgency to Heidegger’s appeal, since we are dealing with mass destruction.⁵⁶ So we cannot be indifferent to death, given the global crisis that is on the horizon.

III. FOURFOLD AS TETRAPHARMAKOS

Heidegger’s interest in dwelling has a distinctly ecological flair. In “Building Dwelling Thinking,” he directly appeals to a reverence that goes into cultivation: “Such building only takes care – it tends the

growth that ripens into fruit of its own accord. Building in the sense of preserving and nurturing is not making anything" (GA 7: 149/PLT 145). But as Iain Thomson explains, we should not confuse Heidegger's ecology with naturalism.³⁷ Rather, Heidegger offers us a "transcendental realism" that does not collapse *physis* into a fixed conceptualization, as naturalists tend to do. Being remains inaccessible to human cognition, although we can find our way within it, which is what the notion of dwelling tries to address. How to dwell authentically is now the call to which humans must respond (GA 7: 164/PLT 159). And dwelling is itself discussed through the "fourfold" of earth and sky, divinities and mortals – the four quadrants of our meaningful access to beings. The fourfold is something we need to remember and respond to, since our current technological frame keeps diverting our attention away from it. So, in a way, the fourfold is Heidegger's own *tetrapharmakos*. Each element brings us into a sense of belonging that is currently overshadowed in the modern mode of revealing.³⁸

If we take Heidegger's first two terms (earth and sky) somewhat literally, we bear witness to our natural context – a framework that is diametrically opposed to the technological world. What he has in mind is a deep relationship with what is worthy of awe and inspiration for that which is greater than us, namely, *physis*. "Earth is the serving bearer, blossoming and fruiting, spreading out in rock and water, rising up into plant and animal" (GA 7: 151/PLT 147). Here Heidegger is restating the Epicurean insight that our attitudes are distorted, since we are more fascinated with artifacts than with nature. A Lamborghini, for example, is more of a fascination for us than an ant is, even though we create a car but have no clue as to how to design an ant. Earth, therefore, is not simply all the things around us, but the origin out of which all things come and to which things go. To marvel at it is the proper attitude of wonder – to preserve and nurture it is the active way we can participate in the disclosure of Being.

Heidegger's interest in the sky lies in the need to reconnect with the seasons of our existence (GA 7: 151/PLT 147). Indeed, sky and earth are correlated in that the seasons relate to the geographic regions in which we live, although from the technological frame, we might as well live

on Mars. In the technological frame, our place beneath the stars – as Earth dwellers – is totally obscured. We need to resist constancy and regularity by immersing ourselves in the seasons as a way to participate actively in our essence as world-disclosers.⁵⁹

Also, rekindling our relationship to the seasons opens us back to our heritage, a community of mortals who are bound by mutual caring, which is smothered in the anonymous work of everyday existence. Resisting a globalizing They-self, we strive to recover our self-identity through a remembrance of our people and how they came to be in this place, under this sky. Here Heidegger's concern for localized communities certainly works with Epicurus's own interest in creating a community of like-minded people in the Garden.⁴⁰ Heidegger even admits that there is an "inner relationship" of his work "to the Black Forest and its people" (GA 13: 11/HMT 28).

What Heidegger means by "divinities" is a difficult phenomenon to capture. Julian Young suggests that it might refer back to *Being and Time's* idea of Dasein's choosing its hero (GA 2: 509/SZ 385), since the gathering of a people happens around the visionaries who speak through them. It is similar to Hegel's interest in world-historical individuals whose work survives in a community's world-spirit. If this is the case, we can be critical of modern heroes in that they are not grounded in profound reverence. Modern heroes are celebrities or sports figures, who offer only a thin insight into what it takes to dwell. Modern heroes are lost in the fast-paced newness of commodity production.

Although Young's interpretation has the value of consistency with the early work, what needs to be emphasized (and which is not lost in Young's account) is Heidegger's more basic point:

Mortals dwell in that they await the divinities as divinities...They wait for intimations of their coming and do not mistake the signs of their absence. They do not make their gods for themselves and do not worship idols. In the very depth of misfortune [*Unheil*] they wait for the weal [*Heil*] that has been withdrawn. (GA 7: 152/PLT 148)

Divinities are absent in the modern world, but its nihilism is not all-consuming for those who recognize the need for respect for that which is greater than them. It is from out of the destitution of the current epoch that a hope for a new beginning arises. A respect for what is holy (*heilig*) may be rekindled through marginal practices available within the modern frame, including (and I would argue most importantly) Epicurean simplicity. Healthy practices (the weal) are called on to replace the sickness (the woe).

Dwelling through the fourfold is, as Young helps us understand, a twofold endeavor: a care for beings in their uniqueness but also a care for the care-givers. The care for the care-givers comes from distinguishing our selfish egos from our greater Self.⁴¹ This distinction evokes Epicurus because, even if he is technically a hedonist, his focus on discovering immediate natural beauty makes the human ego seamlessly at one with the world. Our greater self is acknowledged when we find our passion stemming from Being itself, which is the very opposite of egoism. For both Heidegger and Epicurus, a key way of discovering peace (whether *ataraxia* or dwelling) is to rekindle our gratitude for being given a nurturing plenitude. This gratitude always stems from our mortality, as Epicurus says: "Existence is to be considered, first and foremost, as a pure accident, so that it may then be lived as a completely unique miracle. We must first realize that existence, inevitably, is a one-shot affair, in order to be able to celebrate that in it which is irreplaceable and unique."⁴²

IV. CONCLUSION

Heidegger would most surely criticize Epicurean metaphysics as forgetting the meaning of Being. A reduction of things to atoms as the building blocks of reality is surely abstract from a poetic dwelling in the world. Yet, if we recall from the beginning, Epicurus takes practical concerns as central – so the debate about how the atoms actually operate upon us is not paramount.⁴³ Unlike some atomists who might use this view to dissect nature – taking things as merely "standing reserve" – Epicurus is focused on the wholeness of phenomena. Finding peace is Epicurus's goal. Epicurus gives us solid clues on how to escape the grips

of anxiety, and they relate to Heidegger's sense of dwelling. Epicurus advocates life in the Garden – actually dropping out of normal, i.e., irrational society. This is at the heart of his famous proverb “Live in hiding” (*lathe biōsas*). Heidegger too has his Epicurean fascination with life closer to nature, and it does not seem to me that he ever abandons this vision entirely. Heidegger speaks of a deep solitude when living in the Black Forest – away from the fast-paced life of the city. He says, “Solitude has the peculiar and original power not of isolating us but of projecting our whole existence into the vast nearness of the presence of all things” (GA 13: 11/HMT 28). Nature – or poetic nature – remains the inspiration for turning away from the illusion of mass control and commodification to the enjoyment of what Heidegger calls “little things” (GA 7: 34/QCT 33) – a distinctly Epicurean sentiment that grows from out of the increasing terror of a world out of control. Of course, in the heightened tension of mass destruction, anxiety cannot be forgotten under a reactionary desire for tranquility. We cannot hide in our self-made sanctuary.⁴⁴ Yet the small movements of individuals that display what dwelling is like, such as nurturing a garden, minimizing one's carbon footprint, or simply walking blissfully among the giant sequoias, are necessary openings to show how Being-in-the-world can be different now. Epicurus says something similar when he states that the time of *ataraxia* need not be long-term. To experience it once can be enough to sustain a person through even the toughest events.⁴⁵ Dwelling in the “presence of all things” for even just a moment can open a possible way out of our destitution.

NOTES

- 1 In an index to ancient thinkers named throughout Heidegger's *Gesamtausgabe*, there are merely nine places where "Epicurus" or "Epicureanism" appear: GA 6.1: 272/N2: 52; GA 7: 270/EGT 106; GA 8: 74/69; GA 19: 2/2 (only in the title of a work by P. Natorp); GA 22: 21/17; GA 44: 55/N2: 52 (which is the same as GA 6.1: 272); GA 45: 220/185; GA 54: 35, 40/24, 27; GA 90: 135 (which is the same passage as appears in GA 6.1: 272). See François Jaran and Christophe Perrin, "Concordance Heidegger," *Bulletin heidéggerien*, Vol. 2 (2012): 127. My thanks to Richard Polt for directing me to this index. All of these citations contain passing references to Epicurus's famous phrase *lathe biōsas* (GA 7: 270/EGT 106; GA 54: 35, 40/24, 27) or Nietzsche's mixed view of Epicurus (GA 6.1: 272/N2: 52; GA 8: 74/69), claim that Greek philosophies after Aristotle (including Epicureanism) are no longer originary (GA 45: 220/185) or simply list Epicureanism as part of a tradition (GA 22: 21/17). No sustained development of Epicurus's philosophy is offered. I will draw attention to some of these references in following endnotes.
- 2 Derrida briefly discusses how Epicurus's swerve (*parenklisis*) could relate to Heidegger's fallenness. But his account is more suggestive than developed, and it is not the main focus of his essay. See Jacques Derrida, "My Chances: A Rendezvous with Some Epicurean Stereophonies," in *Psyche: Inventions of the Other*, Vol. 1, trans. Irene Harvey and Avital Ronell (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2007), 344–76.
- 3 Pierre Hadot explains philosophical therapy as a spiritual exercise in the following way: "The philosophical act is not situated merely on the cognitive level, but on that of the self and of being. It is a progress which causes us to be more fully, and makes us better. It is a conversion which turns our entire life upside down, changing the life of the person who goes through it." *Philosophy as a Way of Life*, ed. and trans. Arnold I. Davidson (Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishing, 1995), 83.
- 4 Mark Wrathall, *How to Read Heidegger* (New York/London: W. W. Norton, 2006), 65–70.

- 5 Alan Paskow and Andrew J. Mitchell also contrast Epicurus and Heidegger around similar points. See Alan Paskow, “The Meaning of My Own Death,” *International Philosophical Quarterly* 14:1 (1974): 51–69; Andrew J. Mitchell, *The Fourfold: Reading the Late Heidegger* (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 2015), 224–25.
- 6 See Martha Nussbaum, *The Therapy of Desire: Theory and Practice in Hellenistic Ethics* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994).
- 7 *The Stoic and Epicurean Philosophers: The Complete Extant Writings of Epicurus, Epictetus, Lucretius, Marcus Aurelius*, ed. W. J. Oates, trans. C. Bailey (New York: Random House, 1940), 19. Hereafter citation appears parenthetically in the body of the text as SEP.
- 8 Cf. Nussbaum, *Therapy of Desire*, 121; Richard W. Hibler, *Happiness through Tranquility: The School of Epicurus* (New York/London: University Press of America, 1984), 21. What needs to be emphasized is that as philosophical therapy, Epicurus still advocates wisdom or rational insight as the source of well-being (see Nussbaum, *Therapy of Desire*, 5).
- 9 The relationship between *ataraxia* and *aponia* is complex and beyond the scope of this essay. What I can say is that the distinction is analytical more than real, since Epicurus is operating with a non-dualist theory of the soul/body relationship. In what follows, I will simply refer to *ataraxia*, which is commonly taken to be the main goal of Epicurean ethics.
- 10 For an illuminating study on this issue, see Geert Roskam, *Live Unnoticed (Λάθῃ βιώσας): On the Vicissitudes of an Epicurean Doctrine* (Leiden/Boston: Brill, 2007).
- 11 James Warren, *Facing Death: Epicurus and his Critics* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), 7.
- 12 Number 4 – the fear of pain – is also based on the fear of death, although I will not pursue this link in this essay. The main point is that the fear of pain arises because people (falsely) believe that the pain interferes with attaining a complete life. In other words, pain ruins our life because we will not reach fulfillment before

- death. However, for Epicurus, the complete life is attained in a state of *ataraxia* and pain can be overlooked by attending to this underlying state of peace. Indeed, it is commonly known that Epicurus, especially near the end of his life, suffered from chronic pain, yet it did not detract from his ability to die well.
- 13 This is a broadly Nietzschean interpretation of Epicurus. See: Joseph Vincenzo, "Nietzsche and Epicurus," *Man and World* 27:4 (1994): 383–97; Keith Ansell-Pearson, "True to the Earth: Nietzsche's Epicurean Care of the Self and World," in *Nietzsche's Therapeutic Teaching* (New York: Bloomsbury, 2013), 97–116. In his middle period, Nietzsche expresses a strong admiration for Epicurus's naturalism. However, by the end of his career, Nietzsche thought of him as a decadent type. One notable exception is Nietzsche's description of the *Übermensch* as an "Epicurean God" (GA 8: 74/69).
- 14 I will not be exploring the logic of Epicurus's argument against providence. His basic point is that because the gods are perfect they have no concern for mortal affairs. On Epicurus's argument against providence, see Warren, *Facing Death*; Hibler, *Happiness through Tranquility*.
- 15 On the problem of actually existing religions and cults for Epicurus, see Morgan Rempel, "Nietzsche, Epicurus, and the After Death," *Journal of Nietzsche Studies* 43:2 (2012): 342–54.
- 16 Some disagreement seems to revolve around this point. James Warren contends that Epicurus advocated involvement with existing religions/cults due to the good that arises from contemplating the perfection of the gods. But is it hard to imagine Epicurus endorsing an involvement with the actual rituals of a religion/cult, given his view on the lack of concern the gods have for humans. Hibler points out that Epicurus may have simply enjoyed the festivals that accompany religious practices (*Happiness through Tranquility*, 39–40).
- 17 For "unconscious" see Nussbaum, *Therapy of Desire*, 113.
- 18 As seen from the beginning, Epicurus advocates a life removed from the public eye (*lathe biōsas*). A life of anonymous serenity

- is more secure than one dependent on public appreciation (see Hibler, *Happiness through Tranquility*, 36–41). See note 30 below.
- 19 Epicurus’s disdain for the Homeric system is clearly evident in his overall disdain for the model of education during his time. See Hibler for a clear account of Epicurus’s view of authentic education (*Happiness through Tranquility*, Chapter III: “The Garden School”).
- 20 Of course, such goods can be scarce, which displays a crucial complexity in Epicurus’s view. We must live with some type of social order as means to find readily available goods. On this social necessity, see Emily Austin, “Epicurus and the Politics of Fearing Death,” *Apeiron* 45 (2011): 109–125.
- 21 Iain Thomson offers richly nuanced accounts of Heidegger’s perfectionist-transformative account of education (or *Bildung*) in two important studies: “Heidegger’s Perfectionist Philosophy of Education in *Being and Time*,” *Continental Philosophy Review* 37 (2004): 439–67; *Heidegger on Ontotheology: Technology and the Politics of Education* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005).
- 22 Of course, Heidegger repeatedly says that inauthenticity is not an ethical dilemma; it is one of the two ontological modalities of Dasein. But as we shall see next (and as discussed at length in the secondary literature), it is almost impossible to look past Heidegger’s disparaging remarks about our conformity to a depthless curiosity about the world. This dilemma raises a call for a more committed way into life because we lose sight of the kind of beings we are. This is what triggers a concern with human excellence, virtue or perfection.

On Heidegger’s connection to virtue, see Hubert Dreyfus, “Could Anything be more Intelligible than Everyday Intelligibility?” in *Appropriating Heidegger*, ed. James Faulconer and Mark Wrathall (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000), 155–74. In his essay (and elsewhere), Dreyfus invokes the hierarchy of skillful coping, where a novice’s ambiguous relationship

to a context of significance is deepened through engaged levels of familiarity. The highest levels are expertise and, ultimately, mastery, where a master opens an entire culture to a new possible way into being.

- 23 *Aufenthaltslosigkeit* is translated as “never dwelling anywhere.” Later, Heidegger uses *Wohnen* for dwelling.
- 24 I have transliterated the Greek from Heidegger’s text. *Thaumazein* means wondering.
- 25 In German, *neu* (new) is etymologically related to *Neugier* (curiosity). As to the Epicurean connection, this is merely implicit in *Being and Time* because Heidegger is claiming that *das Man* is an ontological modality of *Dasein* and, so, is not an ontical problem of a specific life-world. Nevertheless, given that Heidegger is borrowing heavily from Kierkegaard’s own criticism of “the public” and the ambiguity of “levelling,” it is nearly impossible not to see Heidegger’s description of curiosity about newness as an implicit critique of modern industrial society, where a fascination with commodity production dominates. Indeed, this connection becomes that much clearer in Heidegger’s question concerning technology (discussed below). On the connection between Kierkegaard and Heidegger on this issue, see Harrison Hall, “Love, and Death: Kierkegaard and Heidegger on Authentic and Inauthentic Human Existence,” *Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy* 27:1–4 (1984): 179–97.
- 26 On “virtuosity” see Dreyfus, “Could Anything be more Intelligible than Everyday Intelligibility?” 160–65.
- 27 My world of familiar engagement is no ordinary object of consideration because it cannot be what Heidegger calls present-at-hand (see GA 2: 171/SZ 128). The terms “present-at-hand” and “ready-to-hand” are discussed later in the essay.
- 28 Dreyfus refers to this as “cultural mastery” (“Could Anything be more Intelligible than Everyday Intelligibility?” 167).
- 29 It is worth pointing out that Heidegger’s political scandal in the 1930s is influenced by his own account of authentic transformation of the life-world. As Thomson says, “There can...be little

doubt that the concept of authentic historicity presented in [sec.] 74 of *Being and Time* provides the general philosophical framework in terms of which Heidegger understood his decision to join the National Socialist ‘revolution’ in 1933” (*Heidegger on Ontotheology*, 105). Here, we can highlight Epicurus’s warning that the passionately political life is a trap. He advises us, instead, to “Live in hiding.” Heidegger actually refers to Epicurus’s saying (*lathe biōsas*) three times: see GA 7: 270/106; GA 54: 35/24, 40/27. However, each time he uses the phrase, he is pointing out how to properly translate it in order to capture the originary Greek concern with “concealment.” Heidegger does not discuss Epicurus’s own reason for using the phrase.

- 30 On the transition from anxiety as ontological homelessness to dwelling as ontological homecoming, see Kelly Oliver, *Earth and World: Philosophy after the Apollo Missions* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2015), 136–40; Richard Capobianco, *Engaging Heidegger* (Toronto: Toronto University Press, 2011), 70–86; Julian Young, *Heidegger’s Later Philosophy* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 63–74.
- 31 Actually, it could be a threefold ontology, if we take broken tools as a transition from the ready-to-hand to the present-at-hand. On this distinction, see Michael Wheeler, “Heidegger,” *Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy* (<https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/heidegger>).
- 32 See Young, *Heidegger’s Later Philosophy*, 47–50.
- 33 Heidegger says that the essence of technology is not specific technologies. Nevertheless, so-called “advanced” technologies do the work in the demise of an appreciation of *physis*.
- 34 Schopenhauer’s essay “The Emptiness of Existence” claims that boredom is proof that life has no meaning (<https://ebooks.adelaide.edu.au/s/schopenhauer/arthur/essays/chapter4.html>). I cannot help thinking that Heidegger’s own account of boredom is inspired by Schopenhauer. On the connection between Heidegger and Schopenhauer on boredom and anxiety, see Julian Young, “Schopenhauer, Heidegger, Art, and the Will,” in *Schopenhauer*;

- Philosophy and the Arts*, ed. Dale Jacquette (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 162–80.
- 35 On this ambiguity regarding the ready-to-hand in *Being and Time*, see Hubert Dreyfus, “Heidegger’s History of the Being of Equipment,” in *Heidegger: A Critical Reader*, ed. Hubert Dreyfus and Harrison Hall (Oxford and Cambridge: Blackwell, 1992), 173–85.
- 36 Heidegger is clearly critical of our environmental problems: “To save properly means to set something free into its own essence. To save the earth is more than to exploit it or even wear it out. Saving the earth does not master the earth and does not subjugate it, which is merely one step from boundless spoliation” (GA 7: 152/PLT 148). See Paul Gyllenhammer, “Sartre and Heidegger on Social Deformation and the Anthropocene,” *Sartre Studies International* 24:2 (2018): 25–44.
- 37 See Iain Thomson, “Ontology and Ethics at the Intersection of Phenomenology and Environmental Philosophy,” *Inquiry* 47 (2004): 380–412.
- 38 Young actually develops practical ways to engage the fourfold. He takes inspiration from Heidegger’s discussion of authentic building, but provides other ways that we can care-for earth/sky and divinities/mortals. See Young, *Heidegger’s Later Philosophy*, 105–121.
- 39 It is worth noting that Stephanie Mills, in *Epicurean Simplicity* (Washington, D.C.: Island Press, 2002), structures much of her discussion of Epicurus according to the seasons (Spring, Summer, Autumn, Winter).
- 40 The Garden was Epicurus’s famous school that sat outside the walls of Athens.
- 41 Young, *Heidegger’s Later Philosophy*, 71.
- 42 As cited in Hadot, *Philosophy as a Way of Life*, 115–66.
- 43 For a discussion of Epicurus’s non-reductionist approach to life, see Lisa Wendlandt and Dirk Baltzly, “Knowing Freedom: Epicurean

- Philosophy Beyond Atomism and the Swerve,” *Phronesis* 49:1 (2004): 41–71.
- 44 This is a main criticism of Epicurus we find Heidegger highlighting when he is discussing Nietzsche. See GA 6.1: 272/N2: 52. See also GA 90: 135, where the same passage by Nietzsche is used.
- 45 In his summary of Epicurus’s attitude toward the time of *ataraxia*, Hadot says: “Only once we have become aware of the fact that we have already – in one instant of existence – had everything there was to be had, can we say with equanimity: ‘my life is over’” (*Philosophy as a Way of Life*, 226).