

# Redescribing the *Zuhanden-Vorhanden* Relation

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This article stems from a larger project, which experiments with a new vocabulary for Heidegger's early phenomenology, particularly in Division I of *Being and Time*.<sup>1</sup> Here I will focus on the *zuhanden-vorhanden* dynamic. What I hope to contribute is the following: 1) a clarification and further articulation of this dynamic, which can draw out elements that are unexplored, muted, or underdeveloped in Heidegger's account, and improve upon some typical readings; and 2) an attempt to show how this dynamic is the essential opening for Heidegger's phenomenology, not only as a starting-point but as a germination that resonates throughout the entire analysis of being-in-the-world. I emphasize that this is *my* hermeneutical project, which may not fully accord with Heidegger's specific interests and intentions (or how some Heidegger scholars read *Being and Time*), but I still believe my account is an apt extension of what his phenomenology opens up.

The preliminary aim of *Being and Time* is to challenge the modern subject-object binary and traditional ontologies that confine being to notions of presence, extant objects, universality, generality, or mere grammatical function. Heidegger begins with everyday involvement in the world, which will build a sense of being that is enacted, meaning-laden, temporal, and finite. Heidegger does not reject notions of objectivity, thing-hood, presence, and such, only their ontological priority, because they emerge out of, and are *derived* from, engaged practices in factual life (GA 2: 198/SZ 149). This reorientation is first accomplished in the *zuhanden-vorhanden* relation – where *Zuhandenheit* is illustrated

by tool use, which is not a reflective transaction between a knowing subject and an external object, but a field-phenomenon of engaged performance. A breakdown or disruption of this practice-field generates the *vorhanden* viewpoint of regarding the tool or environment in the more objective sense of things and properties that call for examination because of the disturbance (GA 2: 102/SZ 76). It is this *vorhanden* perspective that makes possible and animates traditional models of being, but its derived character undermines the sufficiency of such models. The priority of *Zuhandenheit* is such that *Vorhandenheit* is a “veiling” of *Zuhandenheit* (GA 2: 99/SZ 74).

The *zuhanden-vorhanden* dynamic can be read as simply the gateway for overcoming presentism and objectivism, as a starting-point that counter-poses practical usage to theoretical examination, wherein usage opens up different and more original philosophical concepts. While pertinent, such a reading misses a richer account that even Heidegger’s discussion could have done more to articulate, and that can be seen to resound throughout the course of *Being and Time*, with respect to core concepts of meaning, *Mitsein*, care, temporality, finitude, even authenticity. To this end, I offer the following concepts to reorient the *zuhanden-vorhanden* relation: immersion, contravention, and exposition. What is at work here is an attempt to find a vocabulary that evokes the dynamic environmental conditions in the background of this relation, which can broaden analysis beyond an emphasis on practical and theoretical “entities.”

Immersion is not restricted to something like tool use or practical tasks, because it covers any form of pre-reflective engagement that shows itself in factual life (a conversation, for instance, could count). In explicating *Zuhandenheit*, Heidegger talks of “concernful absorption” (*besorgenden Aufgehen*) at GA 2: 95–96/SZ 71–72, among other places – which I take to be central to what *Zuhandenheit* is meant to open up and which is indicated in my concept of immersion. *Zuhandenheit* cannot be captured simply by the notion of “usage” because it is the actual *using* that matters first (GA 2: 93/SZ 69); so, one must consider what it is like to be engaged in using something. When immersed in writing,

I am not attending specifically to the pen, paper, or my hand per se, each of which recedes in favor of the smooth, automatic performance of writing – indeed even the notion of “writing” recedes. Heidegger says that the “authentic” sense of *Zuhandenheit* requires such a recession (*zurückziehen*), even of the notion of *Zuhandenheit* itself, because it is the working activity as such that counts (GA 2: 94/SZ 69). Accordingly, a phenomenological understanding of immersion is not issued by the immersed activity itself, but by an indicative recognition of the *difference* between immersed activity and reflective consideration. In this way, the field-character of being-in-the-world is first given in the preconceptual experience of immersion. Heidegger usually talks of *Zuhandenheit* in terms of “entities” (GA 2: 117/SZ 88), and here tools certainly apply. But his own concept of absorption is something distinct from entities per se. I am trying to draw out implications in Heidegger’s analysis that he could have done more to articulate. *Zuhandenheit* as a *concept* functions in my reading as a “formal indication,” which for Heidegger is drawn from, and points back to, actual performance in life (GA 60: 8–9, 62–63/6–7, 43; GA 29/30: 425/293). As such a concept, it cannot be restricted to entities because it covers an experiential environment (just as the *game* of football is so much more than a football).

I find it useful to apply Heidegger’s “ecstatic” understanding of existence to this discussion. In *Being and Time*, specific mention of an ecstatic sense was restricted to the extended character of temporality (GA 2: 435/SZ 329). Yet in later writings, ruminations on the Greek sense of *ekstasis* took a more comprehensive turn. In Greek, *ekstasis* literally means “standing outside” and carries a sense of absorbed captivation. For Heidegger, the ecstatic character of existence came to gather central notions of care, dwelling, and Dasein’s openness to being (GA 9: 373–74/283–84). Dasein is out-standing as an ecstatic standing-in-the-out, which is to say, not the “inside” of an interior consciousness, and not the “outside” as what is external to consciousness, but dwelling *in* what is “outside.” For me, the notion of immersion drawn from *Zuhandenheit* is the first immediate sense of an ecstatic ontology, which in the most everyday examples shows why a subject-object relation falls

short. In immersed writing, I am-in-the-writing, not a “self” cognizing an “object,” but dwelling *in* a meaning-saturated *environment* (see GA 20: 259–60/191).

The notion of meaningful immersion can open up a richer sense of *Zuhandenheit* that Heidegger’s emphasis on tool use tends to conceal. The focal concept of *Zeug*, translated as “equipment” (Macquarrie-Robinson) or “useful things” (Stambaugh), is not sufficient, in my view, to evoke enough of what Heidegger meant by *Zuhandenheit*. In his own discussion of writing, in addition to pen and paper, Heidegger includes the room wherein one writes, and calls it a *Wohnzeug*, translated as “equipment for residing” (Macquarrie-Robinson) or “useful for living” (Stambaugh). Yet the room wherein one writes is much less “useful equipment” than a meaningful habitat. I prefer to focus on the dwelling reference (*Wohnen*), which can apply to the richer sense of immersion I am exploring. *Zeug* can refer to tools, but also things, stuff, and material, which Heidegger wants to associate with what the Greeks called *pragmata* (GA 2: 92/SZ 68) – which, however, is more nominally indicative of an active relation than is *Zeug* (because *pragma* names something done or a deed).

At times Heidegger’s account of *Zuhandenheit* goes well beyond mere tool use and practical tasks. He includes aspects of nature in *Zuhandenheit*, not only as an environment of material for human products, but also the nature which “stirs and strives” and “enthalls us as landscape” (GA 2: 95/SZ 70). Also included is the “public world,” along with roads, bridges, and buildings, with which an envioning nature is implicitly engaged, as weather and terrain, for instance (GA 2: 95/SZ 71). In *Basic Problems of Phenomenology*, *Zuhandenheit* extends to the whole milieu of concerned dealings, including things like house and yard, forest, sun, light, and heat (GA 24: 153/108, 431–45/303–313). It seems to me that engaged immersion better extends to such phenomena as modes of pre-reflective dwelling than does the sense of practical usage that I believe is overemphasized in Heidegger’s discussion of *Zeug* and *Zuhandenheit*. Our ordinary experience of “nature” is not a matter of “natural entities” as distinct from artifacts (a common interpretation

of *Vorhandenheit*) because we first and foremost experience the natural environment (*Umwelt*) as a meaning-laden habitat: weather, seasons, daylight, nightfall, food, resources, recreation, wilderness, and so on. My offering also applies to occasions where Heidegger mentions the *zuhanden* character of language and signs (GA 2: 110, 214, 296/SZ 82, 161, 224). Ecstatic immersion is able to capture what I think is meant here, namely the immediate disclosive power of language, rather than a representational relation. In this respect, the idea of language as a “useful tool” would surely be inappropriate. Here Dasein is immersed in what language calls forth.<sup>2</sup>

Against a mere practical reading of *Zuhandenheit*, Heidegger claims that his purpose was not to demonstrate “that the essence of man consists in the fact that he knows how to handle knives and forks or use the tram.” It was meant to open up the “phenomenon of world,” which “requires a very broad and wide-ranging perspective” (GA 29/30: 263/177). Heidegger’s ultimate aim with the concept of *Da-sein* was to render with the *da* a non-subjective, non-objective “openness to being.” This is why he objected to the translation of *da* as “there,” favoring “openness” (to and for *being*), in order to get past any origin in subjectivity or consciousness.<sup>3</sup> Yet from a phenomenological standpoint, the “there” can be apt in expressing how engaged immersion is more *there* in an *environment* than a “psychological” state. In any case, *Zuhandenheit* understood as ecstatic immersion is best able to launch a phenomenology of being-in-the-*world* that is much more than mere practical usage.

Heidegger then moves to show how the *vorhanden* perspective emerges out of *Zuhandenheit* by way of possible breaks (*Brüche*) in the immersed practice, which are first characterized as modes of *Unzuhandenheit* (GA 2: 98/SZ 73), in terms of malfunctions, obstacles, or absences. Here a host of tacit elements and meanings now become “explicit” (*ausdrücklich*) (GA 2: 100/SZ 74). With a broken tool, its “thing-hood” and “properties” now come to attention, as something to regard rather than use. But much more is going on here than simply *zuhanden* and *vorhanden* “entities.” Our disturbance or annoyance at such breaks (GA 2: 100/SZ 74) shows

the intrinsically meaningful character of the immersed practice, that it was planned and purposeful (a robot running into an obstacle would not be annoyed). The movement from *Zuhandenheit* to *Vorhandenheit* not only opens up aspects of the world to our regard, but also Dasein's *being* in terms of its concerns, involvements, and needs that become explicit in disturbances – the towards-which (*wozu*) and for the sake of which (*worum-willen*) implicit in a practice that now come into view (GA 2: 112/SZ 84). In short, it is Dasein's very potentiality-for-being (*Seinkönnen*) that is disclosed in this dynamic, the first pathway for a phenomenological sense of "world" (GA 2: 116/SZ 86).

I offer the concept of "contravention" for what happens in *unzuhanden* conditions – something that "comes" (*venire*) to "counter" a circumstance – because it zeros in on an essential feature of the *zuhanden-vorhanden* dynamic: that some negative element is implicated in disclosiveness, where a *not* opens up "a *positive* phenomenal meaning" (GA 2: 110/SZ 82). As Heidegger says in another text, "everything positive becomes particularly clear when seen from the side of the privative" (GA 24: 439/309). Such a notion, I maintain, extends all the way to the structural relation between being and anxiety in *Being and Time* and "What is Metaphysics?" The concept of contravention gives more focal attention to this element of Heidegger's thought. What contravention and potentiality for being also open up is the central role of temporality in fundamental ontology: an obstacle draws explicit attention to the temporal structure of a "planned purpose" that has been thwarted – which is a figure-eight temporal structure wherein the future, present, and past circulate together as anticipation, attention, and recollection.

I submit the concept of "exposition" to indicate the multifaceted forms of disclosure arising out of contravention in the *zuhanden-vorhanden* dynamic. The word "ex-position" can carry a sense of "positioning" a thing "apart" from the self and the engaged activity, as well as aspects of the thing pertinent to the contravening disturbance. Exposition can also involve the meanings, purposes, and interests disclosed in this process. Here exposition carries its familiar sense of

articulation, which can apply to everything from the circumstance at hand to interpretation as such and its philosophical function – after all, phenomenology itself is a mode of exposition rather than immersion, and in Heidegger’s terms it is prompted by contravening moods such as anxiety and wonder (especially in the essay “What is Metaphysics?”). In this way, exposition is a richer concept than the entity-emphasis usually attached to *Vorhandenheit*. The word *Vorhandenheit* does serve a specific purpose in highlighting present-centered-thinghood, which has spawned so many ontological assumptions in the tradition – one example being the priority of “pure intuition” (*puren Anschauen*) as the noetic correlate to *Vorhandenheit* (GA 2: 196/SZ 147). However, the way in which exposition attends to focused conditions can capture a broader sense of “reification,” namely attentive frames that mark off not only “things” from practices, but also a “self” from practices, even “properties” from things, “concepts” from “percepts” and so on – and herein arise many of the philosophical traps to which Heidegger continually draws attention. It is not that something like a thing or a percept is rejected – for Heidegger, *zuhanden* engagement and *vorhanden* specification are both real conditions (GA 2: 82–84/SZ 61–62), which simply alternate as an “exchange of presence” (GA 20: 264/194) – but that expositional reification cannot have a primary status in phenomenology. After all, making-a-chair-out-of-wood-for-the-purpose-of-sitting is no less a real phenomenon than any of its expositied parts.

Now I want to elaborate and extend my discussion, partly to supplement Heidegger’s analysis but also to push it further. First is a defense of the priority of immersion over exposition, which is important to show the philosophical cogency of Heidegger’s hermeneutic. Surely objective descriptions and talk of mental states are valid, but attention to pre-reflective practices that do not exhibit a transaction between beliefs and external conditions could move standard models of cognition to suggest unconscious representations or inferences that are intrinsic to the practice, which is surely phenomenologically suspect.<sup>4</sup> Representational and inferential analysis might legitimately be taken as a reconstruction or

reverse engineering of a purposeful practice, but the question concerns whether the terms of such analysis are necessary for, or always operational in, the practice as such. In the case of riding a bike, I do not follow a sequence of intentions guiding the execution of movements.

Yet what about learning new practices or confronting unfamiliar situations? In cases of, say, learning a new language or how to play the piano, there seems to be a clear sense of reflective distance apart from the practice and a kind of division between mental states and external conditions: That word *Welt* is the German word for my word “world”; that note on the page refers to this key that I must remember to hit with this finger, and so forth. This quite rightly involves distinct spaces of expository reflection and objectification (because of the contravening effects of having to learn an unfamiliar practice). Yet even here ecstatic immersion is not canceled out because such learning milieus must bank on other skills and familiarities that make the learning possible: I already understand what words and notation are, how to follow instructions, how to converse, how to use relevant devices such as books and pencils, and so on – a background of immersion that is usually neither noticed nor thematized in the learning environment. Such capacities and many more can be traced all the way back to childhood, when we were first outfitted for engaging the world. In addition, when a new practice has been mastered it becomes a non-reflective and skillful competency, which is to say it becomes the immersion of “second nature,” where one can speak the language or play the piano without rules, reflective distance, bilocation, or analytical dissection. The immersed character of second nature shows that the relationship between immersion and exposition can be *bidirectional*. The reflective posture of learning skills can evolve into new modes of smooth, automatic practice.<sup>5</sup>

It is important to add that immersion and exposition can be exhibited in varying degrees. So, it is not a matter of simply proposing sheer absorption or reflective disengagement alone in mutual exclusion; they can overlap in different proportions. In addition, immersion and exposition are not restricted to practical dealings with the environment.

One can be immersed in thought, in reading, or in conversation. There can even be a kind of reflection *in* an immersed activity (like writing), which is different from expository reflection *about* an activity. Habitual behaviors like walking, talking, getting dressed, and so on, all exhibit forms of immersion. Indeed, most patterns and dealings in life can be experienced in an absorbed manner. One can even be immersed in one's culture, job, or social roles in different ways and degrees. What is central to my account is that immersion is not dependent on a psychological feeling of *fusion* with something; it is simply non-reflexive performance or intimation without directed attention or analysis. Exposition of these forms of immersion can arise from different types of contravention, at times from outside incursions, at other times from internal malfunction or discomfort. In any case, a break with expectations or conduciveness can prompt the exposition of any engaged activity and its significance.

Immersion has a certain phenomenological priority since exposition emerges out of contraventions to ecstatic involvement. Yet exposition is no less real in its world-disclosive function; nor does it carry any deficiency compared to immersion (unless it leads to philosophical alienation from the lived world). Indeed, immersion can involve deficiencies that exposition can repair. As indicated, one can be immersed in one's social and cultural environment – in an unreflective manner that can host a range of impediments to improved or advanced understanding. Thoughtless absorption is a precondition for undue biases, prejudice, and blockage of new possibilities at all levels of personal, social, and cultural life; also for superficial and simplistic beliefs that conceal the richness and complexity of natural or cultural phenomena.

So, immersion, in addition to being phenomenologically basic, is also problematic when it confines, constrains, or diminishes human understanding. Disturbances to immersion, internal or external, can prompt expositional examination and interrogation, which can improve comprehension, redress biases, or open new horizons. It is surely these problematic elements of immersion that spawned the traditional philosophical preference for reflective thinking. Yet a reflective standpoint also generated epistemological models and methods

that phenomenology aims to question and limit. The positive role that exposition plays in opening up what immersion can conceal does not alter the phenomenological priority of factual engagement that much of philosophy has concealed. Yet exposition can reach further than the entity-emphasis prominent in *Vorhandenheit* by articulating what can be concealed in immersion, thereby serving important elements of unconcealment.

My terminology, I believe, continues to be pertinent to significant discussions in *Being and Time* beyond the *zuhanden-vorhanden* relation. In particular, I will deal with *Mitsein* and authenticity. Contrary to individualistic models of selfhood, Heidegger maintains that “Dasein is essentially *Mitsein*” (GA 2: 160–61/SZ 120). Social relations are not tacked on to individuals, but are intrinsic to any Dasein’s existence, both in terms of coexisting in the midst of factual concerns, but also a default sense of *dwelling* with other Daseins (GA 2: 159/SZ 119) *as* mutually caring about and for their being-in-the-world (GA 2: 158, 160/SZ 118,120). In this sense *Mitsein* is existentially different from *zuhanden-vorhanden* relations; its co-caring is designated as *Fürsorge* (GA 2: 162/SZ 121). But analogous to *zuhanden* practices, *Mitsein* relations are not originally a matter of conscious reflection and inferential transactions between separate selves. Indeed, Heidegger reiterates the ecological concept of concerned absorption (*besorgenden Aufgehen*) in his treatment of *Mitsein* (GA 2: 167/SZ 125). Accordingly, in my terms immersion also applies to social relations. The fact that Heidegger deploys concerned absorption for both *zuhanden* and *Mitsein* scenarios supports my aim to focus on immersion as a wider phenomenon beyond practical usage.

The problematic character of immersion mentioned earlier can be located in the question of authenticity and inauthenticity intrinsic to Heidegger’s analysis of *Mitsein*. Moreover, I think this question can also be examined in terms of contravention and exposition. Dasein’s world-environment is initially characterized as fallen and inauthentic, terms that are easily misconstrued if Heidegger’s text is not read carefully. Fallenness and inauthenticity do not indicate any deficient

condition of Dasein that must be transformed or superseded; it is simply the original, everyday immersion in world concerns, which Heidegger calls a primordial and essential condition of Dasein's being (GA 2: 172, 238/SZ 129, 179). Some of the analysis does carry the influence of Kierkegaard's critique of bourgeois conformity, and it gives the impression that authenticity would mean the liberation of the unique individual from common social patterns, which Heidegger terms *das Man*, "the Anyone." Yet we are told that authenticity is not a departure from *das Man* but its modification, and that *das Man* is a "primordial phenomenon" belonging to Dasein's "positive constitution" (GA 2: 172/SZ 129). We can make sense of this if we interpret *das Man* in a less pejorative manner as socialization, as the necessarily common ways in which human beings are initially enculturated into social practices, cognitive patterns, and cultural norms. *Das Man* in another text is called the "common world," Dasein's *first world out of which* it can make its own way (GA 20: 339/246). Authenticity, then, would refer to the *tension* between socialization and individuation, and not a break with the social world as such.

To reiterate, authenticity is not a rejection of inauthentic fallenness, but its modification (GA 2: 173/SZ 130). What kind of modification? We are told that inauthentic Dasein is not "itself" (GA 2: 233–34/SZ 176). But what is Dasein's authentic "self"? Here Heidegger is working with the familiar philosophical notion of a dimension that is more "true" to the self's being than other dimensions. Yet Dasein's authentic self is not an "entity" or any kind of positive content, but rather the awareness that Dasein's being is permeated by a negative dimension that is sheer "possibility" and finally its utter "impossibility" in death (GA 2: 332–34/SZ 250–51). In other words, inauthenticity involves a concealment of Dasein's radical finitude by way of a fallen immersion in the realm of beings and in common, familiar modes of understanding (see GA 2: 166–67/SZ 125–26). Authenticity therefore can arise out of the central disturbance of anxiety in the face of being-toward-death, which allows an appropriation of what *exceeds* beings and the self's familiarity, security, and control. Such is the radical finitude of being, which for Dasein

involves an awareness of the pervasive possibility of loss and privation, an engagement with the intrinsic incompleteness of existence, which in my terms involves powerful and profound modes of contravention.

The finitude of being is clearly indicated in the twofold unity of care, the “double meaning” of *Sorge* as “caring” and “anxious worry” (GA 2: 264/SZ 199). The meaning of being is intrinsically related to a recession of meaning. The “repulsion” of anxiety is the “thrust” of Dasein’s everyday immersion in beings, so fallenness now gets clarified as *fleeing* the primal force of anxiety (GA 2: 251/SZ 189). Yet fallenness is not a deficiency that anxiety is meant to diagnose, but rather a positive, disclosive condition of meaning that now can be *understood* as a movement structured by absence. In other words, we care about the world *because* we are radically finite. All instances of caring-about, caring-for, and being-careful are what they are by virtue of being linked with a looming negativity. The care structure, therefore, is a “double movement” of meaning in the midst of the contravention of meaning. In this way, being-toward-death is constitutive of the “meaning of life.” It is well understood that a brush with death can sharply open up the value of life in ways quite different from ordinary compartments. As Heidegger puts it, “just as every loss first really allows us to recognize and understand the value of something we possessed before, so too it is precisely death that illuminates the essence of life” (GA 29/30: 387/266). The “nothing” in anxiety and death, then, generates the “throw” that opens up a world of meaning; it is not an empty nothingness but a *power* that “constantly thrusts us back into being,” that lets beings be *as* beings (GA 29/30: 433/299). What is ingenious about Heidegger’s analysis is that an absence of meaning is not the opposite of meaning but a possibility that is intrinsic to the very unfolding of meaning.

In the context of this analysis, authenticity can be understood in two registers: 1) In anxiety Dasein understands its authentic “self” not as some particular being but as the finite throw of care and being-toward-death. If inauthenticity can be characterized as a fleeing towards beings as a *refuge* from anxiety, authentic care amounts to understanding Dasein’s compartment towards beings *as* finite, as possibility rather than

full actuality. In Heidegger's terms, authentic care is being-toward-death, in which Dasein "exists finitely" (GA 2: 436/SZ 329). 2) In a more specific sense, authenticity can allow individual Daseins to discover their own particular and richer modes of care because immersion in inauthentic commonalities and the leveling power of *das Man* have been contravened by anxiety, which opens space for new possibilities of discovery. Generally speaking, authenticity is a "modification" of inauthenticity in the following manner: the recession of meaning permits a more sharpened, care-ful attention to meanings that can be care-lessly weakened by familiarity and comfort. So being-toward-death can bring fresh meaning *to* life out of the stale conditions of everydayness. The primal contravention in anxiety opens space for more pointed self-discovery, which would be a special kind of exposition because immersion in Dasein's first world can block such articulated discovery. In Heidegger's description, such self-discovery amounts to a "clearing-away of concealments and obscurities (*Wegräumen der Verdeckungen und Verdunkelungen*) . . . with which Dasein bars its own way" (GA 2: 172–73/SZ 129). In other words, the immersion-contravention-exposition dynamic is shown in authentic individuation.

I have suggested that authenticity represents a *tension* between individuation and socialization; it is also a tension between Dasein and its heritage (GA 2: 506–8/SZ 383–84). I have argued in another work that authentic individuation can be understood as the fourfold possibility of *owning, unmasking, innovating, and interrogating* one's culture and heritage. I culled various remarks in *Being and Time* to organize this set of possibilities: 1) One can freely appropriate as one's "own" (*eigen*) a tradition that has been handed down, but no longer simply *as* handed down (GA 2: 507/SZ 383). 2) One can unmask the disguises, superficialities, and other concealments that block a richer and deeper understanding of cultural phenomena (GA 2: 172, 516–17/SZ 129, 391). 3) One can discover or initiate new possibilities that are normally impeded by inauthentic immersion in the commonplace (GA 2: 257–59/SZ 194–95). 4) One can challenge normalization and its tendency to suppress "new inquiry" and "disputation" (GA 2: 225/SZ 169). The individuating elements of

authenticity do not bring a severance from the cultural world because Dasein always remains “situated.” But authenticity is also a situated *openness* in not being reducible to any closed form of actuality – an openness that is the precondition for any change or innovation in the world.<sup>6</sup>

In conclusion, I hope I have been able to show how the vocabulary of immersion, contravention, and exposition – first shown in the *zuhanden-vorhanden* relation – is also constitutive of subsequent and central elements of Heidegger’s phenomenological investigation. What this reinforces is the internal continuity and cohesion of *Being and Time*. Initial investigations pertaining to *Zuhandenheit*, *Vorhandenheit*, everydayness, and inauthenticity, for instance, are not mere preliminary steps or deficient conditions that are left behind in the trajectory toward the ultimate meaning of being. The analysis in *Being and Time* moves, not *from* these conditions *to* some other standpoint, but *through* them to a deepened and more perspicacious disclosure of the meaning of being.

#### NOTES

- 1 Lawrence J. Hatab, *Proto-Phenomenology and the Nature of Language: Dwelling in Speech I* (London: Rowman & Littlefield International, 2017). Parts of the article are drawn from this work.
- 2 See my article “The Point of Language in Heidegger’s Thinking: A Call for the Revival of Formal Indication,” *Gatherings: The Heidegger Circle Annual* 6 (2016): 1–22.
- 3 See William Lovitt on Heidegger’s 1972 letter in this regard to J. Glenn Gray, in *The Question Concerning Technology* (New York: Harper and Row, 1977), xxxv, note 2.

- 4 Jason Stanley argues for the priority of propositional knowledge in cases of practical know-how. He refers to Heidegger's analysis of *Zuhandenheit* as establishing a "practical way of thinking" that can support his account: *Know How* (Oxford University Press, 2011), 124. Heidegger's treatment of practical usage was indeed meant to open up an expanded sense of disclosiveness, but not as a mode of "thinking" or propositional knowledge.
- 5 The notion that immersed capacities and exposition reciprocally come to shape human "intelligence" – in a broad way that precedes refined conceptions of "thought" – can help address conflicting positions even among those who want to overcome theoretical and representational biases in philosophy. A case in point is the debate between Hubert Dreyfus and John McDowell. Both want to emphasize practical engagements with the world. See Joseph K. Shear, ed., *Mind, Reason, and Being-in-the-World: The McDowell-Dreyfus Debate* (New York: Routledge, 2013). Dreyfus offers "mindless" coping, which fits my notion of ecstatic immersion. McDowell insists that such practices can be articulated and must be governed by normative concepts. I have suggested the bi-directional relation between immersion and exposition, where reflective attention can prepare new habits of immersion. The *recession* of reflective exposition shows that "mindless" is misleading. But in performance Dreyfus is right that automatic skills do not need "governance." Though the role of exposition can work in McDowell's favor, his approach seems wedded to a model of concepts that retains the traditional blockage of what phenomenology can offer. For a helpful discussion, see Joseph Rouse, *Articulating the World: Conceptual Understanding and the Scientific Image* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2015), Ch. 2.
- 6 This comes from my *Ethics and Finitude: Heideggerian Contributions to Moral Philosophy* (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2000), 174.