Sein und Zeit §18:

A Paraphrastic Translation

Thomas Sheehan

Sein und Zeit §18, a key section of Division One, is entitled Bewandtnis und Bedeutsamkeit; die Weltlichkeit der Welt. The title accurately summarizes the argument of the whole section, namely, that examining Bewandtnis will reveal that die Weltlichkeit der Welt consists in Bedeutsamkeit. That is:

1. **Bewandtnis**: The structural relation that obtains between tools and tasks, i.e., between the useful and what it is used for;

2. **Weltlichkeit**: shows that the essential structure of the everyday worlds of praxis that we are and sustain

3. **Bedeutsamkeit**: is meaningfulness, understood as meaning-giving. It lets the useful have its meaning, that is, what and how it currently is for us.

But while the bare-bones outline of the argument may be clear, some of the key terms used in Sein und Zeit §18 pose knotty problems for translation, particularly but not exclusively Bewandtnis and bewenden lassen.

In the first stage of the argument, Heidegger offers two co-equal names for the structural relation between tools and tasks: Verweisung and Bewandtnis. Verweisung might be rendered as “referral” or even “referredness,” in the sense that tool-X is referred to task-Y. But what about Bewandtnis? In an effort to spell out what he means by that term,
Heidegger offers four consecutive sentences (GA 2: 112.11–15/sz 84.2–6) that present significant problems for translators. (I have supplied the bracketed words.)

1. Es hat mit ihm [X, the tool] bei etwas [Y, the task] sein Bewenden.
2. Der Seinscharakter des Zuhandenen ist die Bewandtnis.
3. In Bewandtnis liegt: bewenden lassen mit etwas [= X, i.e., the tool] bei etwas [= Y, i.e., the task].

The difficulty of this passage may be illustrated by the wide-ranging set of terms that translators have employed to interpret these sentences.\(^1\)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Sz</th>
<th>Bewandtnis</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Es hat mit X bei Y sein Bewenden.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>bewenden lassen mit X bei Y</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>M-R</th>
<th>involvement</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>With X there is an involvement in Y.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>to let X be involved in Y</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>S-S</th>
<th>relevance</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>X is relevant together with Y.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>to let X be together with Y</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Martineau</th>
<th>tournure</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Avec X, il retourne de Y.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>laisser retourner de Y avec X</td>
<td></td>
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Vezin</th>
<th>conjointure</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Il ha, joint à X, de se conjoindre après Y.(^2)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>laisser X se joindre après Y</td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Gaos</th>
<th>conformidad</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Uno se conforma con X en Y.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>conformarse con X en Y</td>
<td></td>
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</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rivera</th>
<th>condición respectiva(^3)</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Pasa con X que tiene su cumplimento en Y.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>dejar que X quede vuelto hacia Y</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
What is at stake in the terms *bewenden lassen mit... bei...* and *Bewandtnis* is a means-to-end relation, the connection of X-as-the-means to Y-as-the-end. In a lecture course in 1926, Heidegger had already connected *Bewandtnis* with Aristotelian δύναμις in the sense of “the ability-to, the appropriateness for, suitability,” and in interpreting §18 in GA 24 (the course he gave just months after publishing *sz*), he glossed *Bewandtnis* in terms of the um-zu relation of means employed to achieve an end. Hence, Macquarrie and Robinson’s all-too-general translation of *Bewandtnis* as the “involvement” of X with Y, and Stambaugh and Schmidt’s even thinner rendering it as the “relevance” of X to Y, need to be specified and clarified in terms of a means-to-end relation.

What follows is part of a larger work-in-progress that aims at a paragraph-by-paragraph condensation and paraphrastic translation of *sz*. The goal is to make the arguments of the book more accessible to students, both undergraduate and graduate, without compromising the book’s nuanced complexity. Throughout some five decades of teaching the text, I’ve noted that for students who do not read German the two current English translations – their vocabulary, syntax, and rhetoric – present needless obstacles to simply *discovering* the arguments of the book, not to mention evaluating their coherence and judging their worth.
The text that follows, like the whole work-in-progress, is very much a pedagogical project: the target audience is students. And yet I have found that, for myself, the process of poring over sz sentence by sentence, paragraph by paragraph, and working out as accurate a paraphrase as possible, has taught me a lot that I didn’t know or had overlooked even after years spent with the text. I submit this excerpt to my colleagues for any criticisms, comments, or improvements they might want to share, so that, looking forward, I can decide whether the results are worth the grind.

SOME RUBRICS

1. Among the interpretations and translations I propose for sz section 18 are:
   - *Bewandtnis* a means-to-end relation
   - *Dasein* ex-sistence (here usually translated as “we” or “us”)
   - *existential* structural (i.e., regarding a structure of ex-sistence)
   - *existentiell* personal (i.e., of or pertaining to a personal element of ex-sistence)
   - *existieren* ex-sist (when it refers to Dasein)
   - *In-der-Welt-sein* engagement-with-meaning
   - *Sinn* intelligibility
   - *der Sinn von Sein* how being is intelligible
   - *Umsicht* practical foresight (τέχνη)
   - *vorhanden* just there
   - *Vorhandenheit* just-there-ness
   - *Welt* the world of meaning; the meaning-giving world
   - *zuhanden* useful
   - *das Zuhandene* something useful; a tool

2. In keeping with Friedrich-Wilhelm von Herrmann’s commentary on *Sein und Zeit*, I number the paragraphs of §18.
3. Before each paragraph, at the right-hand margin I indicate the corresponding page numbers and the paragraphs in Gesamtausgabe vol. 2 (GA 2), Sein und Zeit (SZ), Macquarrie-Robinson (M-R), and Stambaugh-Schmidt (S-S). Example:

GA 2: 111b | SZ 83b | M-R 114c | S-S 81c.

The numbers refer to the pages in the four texts. The letters indicate the paragraphs on the page, counting from the very top of the page, even if the first line of a given page begins in the middle of a paragraph. Thus, the example above refers to:


OUTLINE OF SEIN UND ZEIT SECTION 18

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Review of §§15 and 16 ¶ 1
The task of §18

THE MEANS-TO-END RELATION

TOOLS, TASKS, AND FINAL PURPOSE ¶ 2
Ontological referredness vs. ontic appropriateness

WE ARE THE FINAL PURPOSE OF ALL SUCH TASKS ¶ 3
Referredness is for the sake of the final purpose: ourselves.
The concatenation
The whole ensemble of means-end relations
The final purpose
Preliminary conclusion

LETTING SOMETHING BE A MEANS TO AN END ¶ 4
Two levels of such letting:
ONTIC
ONTLOGICAL

Regarding the “a priori perfect” ¶ 5
Two levels of prior familiarity: ¶ 6
With the practical context of the useful ¶ 6
With our engagement-with-meaning ¶ 7

THE ESSENTIAL STRUCTURE OF THE WORLD OF MEANING

THE ESSENTIAL STRUCTURE OF THE WORLD OF MEANING ¶ 8

Preparing the question ¶ 8
By way of review ¶ 8
A new question ¶ 8
Our structural aheadness ¶ 9
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Coda: This is the basis of fundamental ontology ¶ 9

Answering the question ¶ 10
Introduction ¶ 10
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The relations that constitute meaningfulness ¶ 11
Meaningfulness as the essence of the world ¶ 11
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Meanings, words, language ¶ 12
Summation ¶ 13

AN OBJECTION AND A RESPONSE ¶ 14
The objection ¶ 14
The response ¶ 14
Keeping distinct the categorial and existential ¶ 14
Mathematical functionalization of concepts ¶ 14
Flattens out meaningfulness ¶ 14
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TRANSITION ¶ 16
§18. THE MEANS-TO-ENDS RELATION, AND MEANINGFULNESS AS THE STRUCTURE OF THE WORLD

INTRODUCTION

GA 2: 111b | SZ 83b | M-R 114c | S-S 81c

1. Review of §§15 and 16. We encounter useful things within a specific world of practical meaning, such that their being, which is *usefulness*, has an ontological relation to that world and to the essence of world in general. Whenever we encounter something useful, the meaning-giving world has always already been opened up. We may not be thematically aware of that fact, but the world of meaning can “light up” for us when we deal with it in certain ways.

The task of §18. We have said that the useful gets its usefulness from the world of meaning. But how exactly does that world of meaning let us encounter something as useful? We’ve shown that whenever we encounter something within the world of meaning, the thing is already intelligible, such that our practical foresight – i.e., *τέχνη* as calculative rationality – can deal with the thing in terms of its being. But what do we mean by this “prior” intelligibility of the useful? and how is this prior intelligibility a structural feature of the world of meaning? In short, what problems does that world pose for us?

THE MEANS-TO-END RELATION

TOOLS, TASKS, AND THE FINAL PURPOSE

GA 2: 111c | SZ 83c | M-R 114d | S-S 82b

2. Tools are referred to tasks. We have said that the structure of a tool consists in its referredness to a task. But how does the world of meaning let us understand the being of a tool as referredness? And why is it that the first things we encounter are the useful?

Ontological referredness vs. ontic appropriateness. A tool’s referredness to a task – its usefulness, serviceability, and so on – is determined and
concretized by the job to be done, what I have called the tool’s Wozu or Wofür, the “what-it’s-for.” However, a hammer’s usefulness for hammering, and a sign’s usefulness for indicating directions, are not ontic properties of the hammer or the sign, “built-in,” as it were. In fact, usefulness and serviceability are not properties at all, if by “property” we mean an underlying ontological constituent of something.

At best, a tool is “appropriate” or not for the task [e.g., this hammer may be appropriate because of its weight], but this is only an ontic factor. The so-called “properties” of the tool are really only elements bound up with this ontic appropriateness (not unlike the way an unusable tool’s just-there-ness is bound up with its usefulness). The tool’s reference to a specific task – its serviceability and usefulness – is not identical with its ontic appropriateness [e.g., its weight] but rather is an ontological matter. The reference to a task comes first, and in terms of that we decide whether or not a tool is appropriate.

What does it mean to say a tool has the character of “referredness to a task”? It means we understand the thing, in its very way of being, as referred to a goal. It is referred as means-X to end-Y. The being of something useful is its Bewandtnis, its relation as a means to an end. Such a means-end relation entails that X has been allowed to be related to Y. This means-to-end relation is what I mean by a tool’s “referredness.”

WE ARE THE FINAL PURPOSE OF ALL SUCH TASKS

3. Referredness is for the sake of the final purpose: ourselves. The means-to-end relatedness is the being of the useful tool, i.e., that as which the tool is already intelligible from the start. The useful always has such a relatedness. But in saying that it is already related as a means to an end, I am not making an ontic statement but rather giving an ontological determination of the being of the tool.

The concatenation. The end to which this tool is a means is what the tool can serve for; what it can be employed to do. But such an end can, in turn, be the means to yet a further end in a kind of concatenation:
for example, this hammer is a means to hammer in nails, which is a means to fasten boards together, which is a means to providing shelter against the elements. But all of this is for the sake of some final purpose, a possibility of ourselves (which in this case is our need for shelter).

The whole ensemble of means-to-end relations. The kind of means-to-end relation that a particular tool might have is prescribed by the whole set of such relations [die Bewandtnisganzheit]. Whether it be in a carpenter shop, on a farm, or in an iPhone factory, the whole set of means-to-end relations is “prior” with regard to the means-to-end relation of any single tool.

The final purpose. But the whole ensemble is referred to an ultimate purpose that has no further relatedness to an end beyond itself. The ensemble is ultimately referred to us, and we are not a means to any further end. Rather, our very way of being is engagement-with-meaning, which is what I mean by saying that the structure of our ex-sistence is “worldliness.” As such, we have no further referredness to a possible goal beyond ourselves. We are the ultimate goal, the final purpose [of the concatenation of referrals]. This final purpose is intrinsic to our very way of being as ex-sistence, ever concerned, as we always are, about our ex-sistence.

Preliminary conclusion. We have argued that the structure of means-to-ends relations ultimately refers ahead to ex-sistence as the final, authentic, and singular purpose of it all. We will not pursue the matter any further at this point but instead will explain what it means to let something serve as a means to an end. That will let us determine the structure of the world and then formulate some further problems relating to it.
LETTING SOMETHING BE A MEANS TO AN END

GA 2: 113B  |  SZ 84C  |  M-R 117B  |  S-S 83B

4. *Two levels of such letting.* Letting something be a means to an end can have either an ontic or an ontological sense.

As an ontic term, “letting something be a means to an end” simply means letting an already existing thing be useful by *using* it. [For example, I “let” a rock serve as a hammer by *using* it as a hammer].

As an ontological term, “letting a tool be useful” does not mean bringing the tool into existence by producing it. Rather, it refers to the fact that a thing has *already* been made available as useful and that it is understandable as such. This “prior” fact is ontological: it pertains to the *being* of the tool and how we encounter it. It is the ontological condition that lets us deal with any tool ontically [i.e., actually use it as a means to an end], and that condition obtains regardless of whether or not we actually do use this tool to achieve an end.

(And when I *do* take up something as useful for a task, I don’t just let it remain “as I found it.” Rather, I deal with it, work on it, improve it – even if I eventually break it.)

GA 2: 114B  |  SZ 85B  |  M-R 117C  |  S-S 83C

5. *Regarding the “a priori perfect.”* This ontological sense of “letting something be a means to an end” comes with the very structure of our existence and has to do with what I call “the a priori perfect” [see Appendix]. Within our practical concern, the *end* to be achieved lets us see the *means* that shows up as useful so that we can understand it and can take it up as such. Things do not first of all show up as “just some stuff out there in the world.”

TWO LEVELS OF PRIOR FAMILIARITY

GA 2: 114C  |  SZ 85C  |  M-R 118B  |  S-S 84B

6. *Prior familiarity with the practical context of useful things.* We understand the means-to-end relation (i.e., the being) of something only insofar as we have *already* understood a whole set of such relations.
In understanding a single tool as a means to an end, we have already understood the tool’s relation to the world of meaning — what I call the tool’s “world-character.” The already understood set of means-to-end relations inherently entails an ontological relation to a world of meaning.

To antecedently let anything be related as a means to an end is to understand the useful in terms of the whole set of means-to-ends relations; and this entails that we have already understood that whole set, which is the current world of meaning. But the world of meaning is not a “thing” with the same kind of being as a useful tool. Thus we cannot make sense of that world in the same way we make sense of non-existential things like tools.

**7. Prior familiarity with our engagement-with-meaning.** When we understand something as a means to an end, we do so in light of the whole world of meaning within which the thing is found. But what does it mean to have a “prior familiarity” with that world?

Existence is the act of understanding the being of things. It is likewise both an engagement with the world of meaning and an understanding of that engagement. The useful thing we encounter becomes intelligible in terms of the whole set of means-ends relations. Our prior understanding of that whole set of relations is our understanding of the current world of meaning — the world to which we ourselves always already stand in relation.

**The Essential Structure of the World of Meaning**

**Preparing the Question**

**8. By way of review:** We can refer something as a means to an end only because we are already structurally familiar with letting things be so related. This entails that we already understand a whole ensemble of relations, including the elements of “what-something-is-for” and “the final purpose of something.”
8.1 A new question: But what is the “X” in terms of which we understand ourselves, even if that is usually implicit?

8.2 Our structural aheadness. The fact that we understand the aforementioned ensemble of relations shows that, consciously or not, we ourselves are structurally referred ahead to the purposes and possibilities that we live for, including the possibility of ex-sisting authentically or inauthentically. That is: (i) Our purposes delineate certain tasks to which they are correlative. (2) In turn some things are determined to be suitable means to perform those tasks, and others not. (3) That is, structurally speaking, our ability to have purposes prefigures and is correlative to a whole set of means-to-end relations for achieving our purposes. (4) And this entire means-to-end structure is what lets us encounter anything at all as useful. In short, there’s a structural connection between: a) our ability-to-have purposes, and b) a concatenation of means-to-end relations.

8.3 Conclusion: The essence of the world of meaning. Structurally I am, and understand myself as, living ahead in purposes, and that aheadness-in-purposes is what lets things serve as the means for achieving a goal. That structural connection — between my purposeful aheadness and what things are useful for — is the world of practical meaning. The structure of ex-sistence as final purpose constitutes the essence of the world of meaning.

GA 2: 116b | SZ 86c | M-R 119b | S-S 85b

9. Coda: This is the basis of fundamental ontology. We are already familiar with both (1) the world of meaning in terms of which we understand ourselves, and (2) the relations that make up that world, even if this understanding is not always explicit or theoretical. This familiarity is the basis for working out an explicit ontology of the world of meaning, one that would shoulder the task of interpreting ex-sistence and its possibilities and, further, of asking how being is intelligible at all.
ANSWERING THE QUESTION

10. Introduction. So far we have merely laid out the field within which we can ask about the world of meaning and its structure. But in order to answer that question we first have to explain what it means to refer ourselves to a possibility or a purpose.

11. How we make sense of things. In the present context, I am using the verb verstehen to refer to the personal-existential activity of understanding something. (The existential structure of understanding will be discussed in §31.)

The relations that constitute meaningfulness. Understanding something is based on our prior structural familiarity with the relations and references that constitute meaningfulness. We hold these relations in front of us, so to speak, as the structure within which our purposiveness operates and in terms of which we understand ourselves. These relations are what let us make sense of anything at all [be-deuten]. Likewise, our familiarity with these relations lets us make sense of ourselves. In and through these relations we understand our ex-sistence and our engagement-with-meaning as what is ours-to-become.

Meaningfulness as the essence of the world. Our goals (1) generate purposes (2) that give rise to tasks (3) that determine the relation of certain things as means to an end. These relations form an a priori interconnected whole of sense-making (Be-deuten). They are the relations in and through which we structurally understand ourselves as engagement-with-meaning. This whole ensemble whereby we make sense of ourselves and other things is what I call meaningfulness-as-such. It is the structure of the world of meaning, in and as which we ourselves always already ex-sist.
Conclusion. Ontically we are those unique entities who understand meaningfulness-as-such. This accounts for how and why we can make sense of – i.e., understand the being of – the particular things we find to be useful within a practical world of meaning that lets them show up as they are in themselves.

This is what and how we are: our very ex-sistence entails (1) that an ensemble of useful things is always already understood and operative and (2) that we are always already referred to things within that ensemble. Our ex-sistence is intrinsically such a referredness.

12. Meanings, words, language. Our a priori familiarity with meaningfulness-as-such is what makes us able to interpret and understand things in terms of their specific meanings. These in turn are the basis of words and language.

13. Summation. Our ex-sistential structure as engagement-with-meaning is the opening up of meaningfulness-as-such. In turn, this ontic uniqueness of ours makes possible the disclosure and understanding of sets of suitable means for achieving our ends.

AN OBJECTION AND A RESPONSE

14. A possible objection. We have established that both the being of tools (their relatedness as means to an end) and the essence of the world of meaning is a set of relations. But does that mean we have dissolved the “substantial being of things” into nothing but a system of relations? And since relations exist in “thought,” have we dissolved the being of things into “mere thinking”?

15. Response. Our study keeps three things distinct:

a) usefulness as the being of the things we initially meet
b) *just-there-ness* as the being of the things we can encounter and determine by going *through* the useful that we initially meet
c) *ex-sistence* as our kind of being and as the essence of the world of meaning. We are the entities that make it possible for things to be meaningful at all.

The first two are *categorial*, i.e., they pertain to things that do not have ex-sistence. The third is *ex-sistential* and determines our nature as engagement-with-meaning.

Yes, it is possible to understand the referrals that constitute the essence of the world (i.e., meaningfulness-as-such) as a mere “system of relations” – but such a formalization flattens them out and misses their real experiential content. These supposedly “simple” relations and their relata (means-to-end, in-order-to, and the like) in fact constitute *meaningfulness*. Their experienced content resists mathematical functionalization, and they are not just “ideas” posited in “thinking.” Rather, these relations are where practical foresight actually lives and sustains itself. Thus, we do not “volatilize” the “substantial being” of the useful. On the contrary we provide the basis for understanding these things *substantively*, that is, *in themselves*.

Only because things can be encountered as useful can they also be met up with as just “worldly stuff” in the form of “substances.” If one were to take things as “just there,” one *could* determine their “properties” mathematically in “functional concepts.” But such concepts have an ontological application only to things whose being is taken as “substantiality.” Such functional concepts are formalized concepts that apply always and only to “substances.”

**TRANSITION**

16. *Transition.* In the sections that immediately follow we present a polar opposite interpretation of “world,” that of Descartes.
APPENDIX

GA 2: 114, note a:

In this paragraph [GA 2: 114b | SZ 85b | M-R 117c | S-S 83c] we speak of “always already having opened something up.” That refers to the fact that the being of something has always already been freed up so that the thing can be understood.

“Always already” in this ontological sense is called “a priori” in Latin, and πρότερον τῇ φύσει in Greek (Aristotle, Physics, A 1).16 More clearly in Metaphysics E 1, 1025b28–29 it is called τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι, that is:

a) what it (always already) “was” to be this-or-that
b) that which is always priorly operative
c) that which (always) has been
d) the so-called “perfect.”

The Greek verb εἶναι has no perfect tense, and so Aristotle expressed the perfect by ἦν εἶναι [“what it was to be this or that thing”]. But this is not something ontically past [or something that has been and still is operative, e.g., your status as a high school graduate]. Rather, it refers to that which is always prior.
When we ask about the being of things, we are referred back to this τὸ τί ἦν εἶναι, i.e., the element that is always prior in the thing. Instead of “a priori perfect” we could also call it the “ontological perfect” or the “transcendental perfect” (cf. Kant’s doctrine of the schematism).

NOTES

1 The translations of Sein und Zeit are abbreviated as follows, with the page numbers corresponding to sz 84:


2 The French here presents its own difficulties. Heidegger’s sentence “Im Bewandtnis liegt…” comes out as: “Dans conjointure il y a : s’en tenir avec quelque chose [= X] à la [= X] laisser se joindre après quelque chose [= Y].” It might be read as: “dealing with something [X] by letting it [i.e., X] be connected with Y.”

3 condition of relation – It is the case with X that it has its complement in Y – to let X remain turned towards Y.

4 A conjoining – X has something [= Y] conjoined with itself – X is allowed and done together with Y (?).

5 Engagement – In X there is an engagement with Y – in X an engagement is allowed [interpreting the adjective verbally] with Y.

6 Completion/fulfillment – X has its completion/fulfillment in Y – the completion/fulfillment of X with Y.

7 Marini (note at p. 1465) bases this choice on the etymology of the Latin opportunus (ob-portunus: literally “before the port”); cf. ventus ob portum veniens: “a favorable wind that pushes [a boat] towards a port.”


writing on). Theodore Kisiel translates *Bewandtnis* in GA 20 both as a tool’s “deployment for” a purpose and as something’s “standing” in relation to someone or something: GA 20: 231.2/171.12; 359.30–31/261.6–7; 428.17–18/310.16. The Chinese translation presents its own problems. For *Bewandtnis* Chen and Wang use 因缘 (*yīn yuán*), two characters both of which, when taken separately as they are here, express the notions of “reason for,” “due to,” and the like. (If taken as a single term—which is not the case here—they express the Buddhist notion of karma.) In a footnote to their translation of sz 84.4–5, Chen and Wang explain that they translate “bewenden lassen mit etwas bei etwas” in terms of letting something have its finality (or “be settled”: 了结, *liăojié*) in something else: 存在与时间, (*Cúnzài yŭ shíjiān*). *Being and Time*, trans. Chen Jiaying and Wang Qingjie (Taipei: Guiguan Tushu, 1990), 98.


12 Heidegger employs Umsicht as an interpretative translation of both of the Aristotelian practical virtues of *ϕρόνησις* and *τέχνη*. These two are cognitive in the practical order and have to do with envisioning and knowing the desired outcome of a practical activity, whether that activity be *πρᾶξις* (regarding human affairs) or *ποίησις* (regarding productive activity). In Latin *ϕρόνησις* comes out as prudentia, a contraction of *pro-videntia* (cf. *pro-videre*): know-how as seeing ahead (pro-) to a desired goal. Likewise, *τέχνη* is practical envisioning and knowing of the εἶδος προαιρετόν, the projected or desired goal of an act of production. Both *ϕρόνησις* and *τέχνη* are a matter of looking ahead and not “looking around” as in “circum-spection.” In §18 the practical foresight in question corresponds to *τέχνη* rather than *ϕρόνησις*.

20

I borrow this practice from William J. Richardson, who employed it in his seminars at Fordham in the 1960s.

15 Heidegger’s marginal note at GA 2: 117.15/SZ 87.31: “Not true. Language is not built on top of words and language. Rather, it is the original unfolding of disclosure as the site of meaning.” That is: “language” understood as λόγος-1 aka ἀλήθεια-1 is the basic characteristic of ex-sistence as the clearing. Such λόγος is the very possibility – and necessity – of making sense of things.

16 Actually, πρότερον τῇ φύσει does not appear in Physics A, 1. (Heidegger may have confused that with σαφέστερα τῇ φύσει at 184a17 and 184a20.) Aristotle discusses πρότερον τῇ φύσει at Posterior Analytics I 2, 71b34–72a4, and most notably at Metaphysics V 11, 1019a1–14, under the rubric of πρότερον κατὰ φύσιν καὶ οὐσίαν.