Heidegger and the Poetics of Time

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Heidegger’s engagement with the poet Friedrich Hölderlin often dwells on the issue of temporality. In his Beiträge zur Philosophie, Heidegger calls Hölderlin “the one who poetized the furthest ahead” and contrasts him with his contemporaries, Fichte, Schelling, and Hegel, who attempted to understand all of history in absolute terms (GA 94: 204/143). Similarly, in Heidegger’s 1934–35 Freiburg lecture course on Hölderlin’s hymns “Germania” and “The Rhine,” he calls Hölderlin the “most futural thinker [zukünftigster Denker]” (GA 39: 5/5). For Heidegger, Hölderlin is the furthest ahead of thinkers—a poet who opens new possibilities for the present. The Beiträge raise the question, “To what extent does the poet Hölderlin, who has already gone ahead of us, become now our necessity, in his most unique poetic experience and work?” (GA 94: 353/247). The futural saying of Hölderlin’s poetry makes him necessary for us now, and in this sense he belongs to the present time, a “destitute time.” Yet Hölderlin also speaks to us from the past. At the time Heidegger wrote the Beiträge, the poet had been dead for nearly a century, and his poetry was fairly obscure during his own time. It is for this reason Heidegger states that we must wrest Hölderlin’s poetry “from being buried” by the past (GA 94: 204/142–43). Heidegger thus frames the poet in the intersection of past, present, and future. Yet Hölderlin’s relevance for Heidegger’s thinking of temporality goes deeper than these formulations. Namely, Heidegger describes Hölderlin as being able to poetize time.

The purpose of this paper is to examine what it means to poetize time and situate this poetic temporality in the context of Heidegger’s thinking of time. In doing so, I will attempt to show that thinking about time is essentially a poetic task, and one that Hölderlin understands as...
his poetic vocation. To unravel this poetics of time, I will first lay out Heidegger’s thinking of time in relation to Husserl’s concept of internal time consciousness — and Derrida’s critique of it — to explain the strange interface between presence and non-presence that characterizes temporality (section I). Whereas Husserl’s concept of time is musical, I will suggest that Heidegger’s is essentially poetic. I will then address Heidegger’s poetic time in relation to the Es gibt, i.e. the sending of time from a groundless and indeterminate source (section II). Both these elements, the interplay of presence and non-presence (I) and the sending of time (II), are central to Hölderlin poetry. Lastly, I will address how Hölderlin poetizes in order to describe the sense of poetic time that resounds in his use of language (III). In doing so, I hope to unearth why Heidegger found this poet to be so necessary for his thought.

I. THE CHALLENGE OF THINKING TIME

First we must consider the challenge of thinking time. The common sense notion of time, which Heidegger calls “vulgar time” and I will call the “naïve concept of time,” envisions temporality as a constant stream of now-moments, or “a succession of nows that come into being and pass away” (GA 2: 558–559/SZ 423). This sense of time seems self-evident but falls apart as soon as we question it further. With the naïve concept of time, only the present is real. The past is dead, no longer actual, and becomes a mere memory. The future is at worst a mere imaginary projection into the unknown and at best a possibility that has not yet been realized, but either way is not actual and thus also not real. Each now becomes a singular moment. As a result, it is not clear how the present relates to past or future if neither is real. By making only the present real, this concept of time undermines temporality as the interrelation of past, present, and future. Moreover, insisting on this stream of nows is thoroughly contradictory because it must be understood as uninterrupted and without gaps, which makes the timeline infinitely divisible like a geometrical line (GA 2: 559/SZ 423). Yet if time is an infinitely divisible line, then the “now” has no duration, so how can a stream of now-moments have any continuity? The now
clearly cannot be just now. Heidegger explains, “Every last now, as a now, is always already a right-away that is no longer, thus it is time in the sense of the no-longer-now, of the past. Every first now is always a just-now-not-yet, thus it is time in the sense of the not-yet-now, the ‘future’” (GA 2: 560/SZ 424). Questioning this naïve concept of time shows its contradictions – i.e. the now is never just now – and leads us to Husserl’s thinking of time.

Husserl describes the structure of time as a continual interplay between past, present, and future. Instead of a constant stream of now-moments, time is like a melody. To hear a melody, a note cannot be a singular instant or I would never be able to detect the movement from one note to another. To hear melody, I must hear this note in relation to the previous one, but I do not need to use my memory to recall the prior note. Similarly, I anticipate future notes in a melody. Music continually plays with our anticipations or we would not be able to detect patterns, like scales or the resolving of a dissonance. In this sense, the tonal moment cannot be an isolated now. How would we even isolate this “now” of the tone – is it a millisecond, a nanosecond, when the finger first touches the string, or when the string vibrates in response? We cannot divide time this way.

Instead, Husserl explains the nature of the present in terms of retentions (the just-past) and protentions (the almost-future). Husserl states that a “now-phase is conceivable only as the limit of a continuity of retentions.”¹ A retention is a moment that has just passed – not a memory that needs to be recalled from the past – and so it remains tied to the now-apprehension. This means the now is not an isolated moment but instead a limit that Husserl describes as “the head attached to the comet’s tail of retentions.”² The now-apprehension also anticipates the future that is just about to happen, which Husserl calls “protention.” Instead of a stream of isolated now moments, the present must bring together past and future.

Compare Figure 1, the naïve concept of time as stream of now-moments with Figure 2, Husserl’s internal time consciousness. In Figure 1, now-moments lack duration and it is unclear how they form a continuum. The past is dead. The future is an imaginary projection. Only the present is real. In Figure 2, the line A, B, C, and D represents the
**FIGURE 1.** Naïve concept of time as stream of now-moments.

![Figure 1](image1)

- A, B, C, D: succession of present
- B* C* D* E*: protentions
- A' : retention of A
- A'': retention of retention of A
- A''': retention of retention of retention of A
- A'–A''': describes A sinking into the past

D retains C', B'', and A''' and anticipates E.

**FIGURE 2.** Husserl’s internal time consciousness
(an edited and expanded version of his diagrams).
succession of the present, or primal impressions. From point A to point B, A becomes a retention rather than a primal impression. When B is the primal impression, A is a retention and C is a protention. Moving to C, B becomes a retention, and A becomes a retention of the retention of A. With each successive moment, A retains its previous retention and thus fades away into the past.

Husserl's account of time, however, overlooks the problem of the now-moment. Even though the now-moment is not isolated in his account, he still has to treat it as a limit. How do we talk about a primal impression, except as a limit? Derrida discusses the implications of this limit in *Speech and Phenomena*. As Derrida notes, in *Ideas I* Husserl privileges the present insofar as every experience “is an experience according to the mode of ‘being present’… as being certain and present.”³ Derrida states that this sense of presence, or *self-presence*, “must be produced in the present taken as a now.”⁴ But in Husserl’s internal time consciousness lectures there is no “now” in this sense. Since the “now” is a comet with a tail of retentions and protentions, there is no certain and present now. Rather, the now always includes, by necessity, a not-now. As Derrida points out:

> As soon as we admit this continuity of the now and the not-now, perception and nonperception, in the zone of primordiality common to primordial impression and primordial retention, we admit the other into the self-identity of the *Augenblick*; nonpresence and nonevidence are admitted into the blink of the instant. There is a duration to the blink, and it closes the eye. This alterity is in fact the condition for presence, presentation, and thus for *Vorstellung* in general…⁵

In other words, presence necessarily involves nonpresence and otherness – which means there is no pure presence. *Différance* is at the center of the now-moment. Thus while Husserl’s musical sense of time challenges the naïve notion of time, he fails to recognize its meaning for presence. Presence remains mysterious, not clear or certain, by
necessity. Understanding time is a task that must recognize the radical non-presence of the present, or the concealment that always remains, which is an essential task for poiesis. This appears to be Heidegger’s sense of time after the Kehre.

II. THE KEHRE AND THE RADICAL NON-PRESENCE OF THE PRESENT

In contrast to Husserl, Heidegger’s discussions of time – especially in his lectures on Hölderlin’s poetry – present a more radical reworking of temporality, one that is poetic rather than musical. It may seem at first that Heidegger’s Being and Time merely adopts Husserl’s interweaving of past, present, and future and applies it to Dasein, who is stretched between birth and death. But Being and Time should not be understood in a Husserlian framework because (1) Heidegger does not locate temporality in consciousness, and (2) Being and Time emphasizes the futural in a way that goes far beyond Husserl’s notion of protention. Husserl’s internal time consciousness replicates some of the qualities of the naïve concept of time, the flow from past to present to future, whereas Heidegger sees time as coming from the future, not the past. For Heidegger, “The future is not later than the having-been, and the having-been is not earlier than the present. Temporality temporalizes itself as a future that makes present, in the process of having-been” (GA 2: 465/SZ 350). The future is the origin of time, the source from which the present is made present as a past process, the future perfect tense, the will have been that enfolds all dimensions of temporality.

Moreover, Being and Time already anticipates one of Heidegger’s most radical moves in the thinking of time, the Kehre, which was supposed to happen in the infamous missing section “Time and Being.” Being and Time is incomplete and, more importantly, is only a preparation for the fundamental ontology that he hoped would work out “the central range of problems of all ontology as rooted in the phenomenon of time” (GA 2: 25/SZ 18). The unpublished section of Being and Time, “Time and Being,” was meant to develop this fundamental ontology of time through a reversal (Kehre) that would explicate being from the standpoint of time; however, Heidegger claimed that he could not
publish it due to his inability to articulate these ideas in any intelligible way. The end of the second division anticipates this reversal from *Being and Time* to “Time and Being,” the move to fundamental ontology, which Heidegger describes in a marginal note as an “overcoming of the horizon as such. The return into the source. The presencing out of this source.” We can gather more about this reversal from Heidegger’s later writings, which emphasize the withdrawal of this source of presencing.

In “A Letter on ‘Humanism’” (1946) Heidegger emphasizes the reversal as arriving “at the locality of that dimension out of which *Being and Time* is experienced, that is to say, experienced in the fundamental experience of the oblivion of being” (GA 9: 328/250). The turn after the preliminary analyses of Dasein directs us toward a more fundamental experience of being, one of oblivion – or as Heidegger later notes, an experience of withdrawal. Withdrawal is neither presence nor absence, but the trace of what was present as it returns to its origin from whence it was sent. As Richardson notes, the *Kehre* is distinguished from Heidegger’s earlier explanations of time by the “mittence of Being,” the *sending* of being. This sending becomes clearer in Heidegger’s eventual writing and publishing of “Time and Being” (1962), where he discusses time in terms of *Es gibt* (there is, or literally translated it gives). In “Time and Being,” Heidegger explains that *Es gibt* is the only way we can speak about the essence of being and time. *Es gibt* is the groundless ground of both being and time because it is the most fundamental idea that we can have. We can say “there is being” and “there is time” – even if we can say nothing more. *Es gibt* sets a limit for thought, since what is given comes from a nameless and identity-less “it.” It gives, but we have no sense of what this *it* is. Heidegger explains that the “*it*” in “it gives” is completely undetermined – it is not an object or a subject (GA 14: 22–23/17–18). What is given comes from a source that we cannot discern. Time and being are characterized by a giving or a sending – they are gifts from an unknown and undetermined source (GA 14: 10/6). There is no determinate origin of time and being. Time has a hidden source that makes what is present deeply ambiguous. The *Es of Es gibt* is a radical non-presence that underlies all presence.
To think time in this way, Heidegger turns to Hölderlin, a poet who recognizes this very sense of time: namely, *time as it is sent* which makes the “now” a strange interweaving of presence and non-presence.\textsuperscript{12} It is in Heidegger’s engagement with Hölderlin that he develops a “poetic time” that can overcome the naïve concept of time.

**III. Hölderlin and the Task of Poetizing Time**

Since this paper is far too brief to do justice to the many ways Heidegger addresses Hölderlin’s poetizing of time, especially insofar as temporality is thematic in many of his lecture courses and essays on the poet, I will have to summarize only a few of these very rich and suggestive passages. I will focus on two aspects of Hölderlin’s poetic time: (A) the poetic ‘now’ as ambiguous and mysterious, and (B) the rhythm of his poetry insofar as it reflects the relational dynamics of temporality.

**A. The Poetic Now**

In *Being and Time*, Heidegger explains that the vulgar, or naïve, sense of time levels the dimensions of temporality in order to reduce it to “datability” and treat it as though it were something we can measure. Yet if time is temporalized from the future and not the past, it is neither datable nor measurable. Heidegger expands on this sense of time in his lecture on Hölderlin’s “The Ister,” where he contrasts poetic time with calculative approaches to time. Heidegger focuses on the first few lines of the poem, “Now come, fire! / Eager are we / To see the day” (*Jetzt komme, Feuer! / Begierig sind wir / Zu schauen den Tag*) (GA 53: 3/2).

The poet calls to the fire, but not in the sense of commanding it. Instead, as Heidegger explains, this is a call for the “coming fire to make visible the day” (GA 53: 6/7). The poet calls to what is looming ahead, what is already on its way. What kind of ‘now’ belongs to this calling? Heidegger describes this ‘now’ as “a star that has suddenly risen and that shines over everything” because of its strong and singular intonation (GA 53: 8/8). This ‘now’ resounds, and moreover, “names the time
of calling of those who are of a calling, a time of the poets” (GA 53: 8/8). For Heidegger, this ‘now’ is a *time that calls upon poets to poetize* — it is a *poetic time*. He asks, “How can poetizing determine a time, lend distinction to a ‘now’?” (GA 53: 8/8). Poetizing, as *dichten* (from the Latin *dictare*) means “to tell something that, prior to this, has not yet been told” (GA 53: 8/8). To poetize is to bring forward a unique beginning, a temporality that “cannot be established in accordance with the calendar” or “dated” (GA 53: 8/8).

This poetic ‘now’ is not a moment of pure presence, nor something we can determine in advance. Heidegger tells us that poetic time is “different in each case, in accordance with the essential nature of the poetry and the poets” (GA 53: 9/8). Each poet poetizes time anew, poetizes as if for the first time. Heidegger sees this sense of a new and singular beginning as being particularly true of Hölderlin’s poetry. For Heidegger, “the ‘Now come’ appears to speak from a present into the future. And yet... it speaks into what has already happened... something has already been decided,” which he describes as an event of appropriation (*Ereignis*) (GA 53: 9/9). The poet calls what has already been decided, what will be made present by the future. The present is fulfilled by the future and past, a relational dynamic that elicits wonder, not calculation.

Heidegger situates Hölderlin as someone who can poetize temporality in an age that only cares to calculate and manage it. As Heidegger explains, “the modern era gives rise to the calculation of flux” (GA 53: 41/49). Time becomes another dimension added to space and, as a dimension, is thoroughly calculable (GA 53: 41/49–50). We measure time for specific ends and uses. Clocks help us to keep track of time and can measure our productivity. Calendars allow for planning. Its calculability imposes an order that is so useful it becomes unquestionable. In the end, this clarity of calculation means that we no longer feel the need to think about time. This calculative approach, however useful it is, treats time as an object (*Gegenstand*) that stands apart from us as subjects. Heidegger does not think we can approach time in this way (GA 53: 45/55). Heidegger explains that this notion does not make sense
as space and time are the conditions that make experience possible. Yet space and time cannot be “merely a subjective representation” or a construct that is proper only to the subject (GA 53: 46/56). We experience space and time in terms of objects. Thus space and time are not simply objects apart from us or subjective constructs that have nothing to do with the world. This issue leads to the significant conclusion that “whatever the case, they are something that cannot be accommodated within the schema of ‘either objective’ – ‘or subjective’” (GA 53: 46/56). The poetic experience of space and time thus must defy the distinction of subject and object and instead opens up a new, more fundamental relation. For this reason, the clarity and success of calculative approaches to time oppose the wandering, reflective way in which that poetry engages with time. Poetry provides a “mediation on the essence of time,” which “accomplishes nothing in terms of improving our apparatus for measuring time” (GA 53: 42/50). Poetry treats time as something mysterious that outruns any effort to subordinate it to our uses.

This sense of the “now” as incalculable and mysterious in its interweaving of future and past is very apparent in Heidegger’s 1944 lecture course on Hölderlin and Nietzsche. In this lecture course, Heidegger describes what is present as a “leap out of the facing approach” between the future (Zukunft) and origin (Herkunft) (GA 50: 146/51). The future (Zukunft) means to come (kommen) to (zu). The origin (Herkunft) means to come (kommen) from (her). Temporality moves to and from the present. As Heidegger explains, “What is present only exists as the alternating transition of what is to come into what was and of what was into what is to come. Therefore, every present moment is an ambiguous ambiguity” (GA 50: 146/51). This ambiguity of the present moment seems profoundly poetic, especially when we consider poiesis as a mode of revealing that preserves concealment. This present for Heidegger is ambiguous. He explains it by noting that “this ambiguity stems directly from what exceeds the present and what exists more so than does the present” (GA 50: 146/51). The present is not real in this sense, but an open for the past and future that exceed it. The “now” is a strange interface between past and future that is filled by what is more than
We see this tension and ambiguity in Hölderlin’s poetry, especially in the gods, who are “nothing other than time” (GA 39: 55/53). The gods are time, a time that has its own measure, a different measure than calculative time. The gods are neither fully present nor fully absent in Hölderlin’s poetry, because they have fled leaving only traces.

Temporality interweaves presence and absence so that they form a necessary relation. The past is not dead, nor the future foreign – both give birth to the present, revealing what is concealed but not making it fully present. This temporality, moreover, is not only present in what Hölderlin’s poetizes but also how he poetizes. His poetry is sensitive to time in every syllable, meter, and dramatic crescendo.

**B. HÖLDERLIN’S RHYTHM AND THE FULLNESS OF TIME**

Wilhelm Dilthey’s essay on Hölderlin (1906/1910) provides one of the first philosophical commentaries on the poet and is especially relevant here since it focuses on the temporal aspects of his poetry. Dilthey’s Hölderlin essay is particularly helpful since he discusses the more formal aspects that Heidegger’s lecture courses purposely omit because they are “readily accessible everywhere” (GA 39: 7/6). According to
Dilthey, “the fullness and melodious flow of Hölderlin’s verses is unsurpassed by any other writer.”\textsuperscript{15} Hölderlin’s poetic voice is marked by a strong rhythm, especially due to his study of Greek and Roman poetry, which inspired his adoption of ancient metrical forms for his hymns and elegies. As Dilthey notes, Hölderlin’s metrical variations produce a sensation as if “carried along as if by waves. By frequently weakening the first stressed syllable of the pentameter, he creates the impression of a crescendo” (sw 5: 377). The cadence of his verses rises and falls, the movement of which is often interrupted suddenly by an exclamation or enjoinder. These interruptions produce a syncopated rhythm, and Hölderlin fragments his poems further through his use of ambiguous modifiers and unfinished phrases. As Alice Kuzniar describes his writing, “Hölderlin interrupts, complicates, and even at times suspends articulated language. He discovers a speech that maintains silence.”\textsuperscript{16}

This rhythmic flow of silences and suspended moments means that the tempo of his poems privileges the \textit{caesura}, a break or interruption.\textsuperscript{17} Breaks in music and poetry are never simply silence, but are pregnant pauses where what came before and what is anticipated can resonate. A caesura emphasizes the relational dynamic between presence and non-presence, i.e. the moment as an open space for the interplay of past and future. Dilthey thus describes Hölderlin’s musicality as a new lyrical form of poetry that “seems to emanate from indiscernible distances only to disappear in them again” (sw 5: 376). For Dilthey, as for Heidegger, Hölderlin’s poetry defies simple presence. His poetry resonates, emanates, and disappears again. Hölderlin’s rhythm thus describes temporality not as an ongoing flow or stream of now-moments, but as an interweaving of past, present, and future.

Heidegger too describes the rhythm of Hölderlin’s poetry as a waxing and waning, a presencing that withdraws again, in his discussion of the poem “Germania.” In this lecture, Heidegger discusses how the rhythm (\textit{Schwingungsgefuge}) of Hölderlin’s poem goes beyond the individual meters of each line and acts as a source of expression that reverberates through the entire poem from a primordial origin (\textit{vorausschwingende Ursprung}) (GA 39: 14–15/17). This rhythm, as a movement of waxing
and waning, is also thematic in Heidegger's reading of Hölderlin's hymn “The Ister.” The river flows and in flowing intimates what is coming here before it vanishes into what is hidden. The river appears from primordial depths and then returns. Both the rhythm of the poem and the movement of the river suggest a particular way of understanding time. According to Dilthey, the rhythm and style of Hölderlin’s poetry conveys a moment that is filled with the past and anticipating the future (SW 5: 304). The unfolding of Hölderlin’s lyrical verse continually evokes the past and future, which breaks from the idea of time as simply the present. This dynamic temporality, moreover, seems to be especially palpable in poetry.

Dilthey’s “Fragments for a Poetics” (1907–1908) examines the experience of time in relation to poetry. In these notes, Dilthey recognizes that time cannot simply be a continuum in which we continually advance from past to future – i.e. a linear timeline – because the present would be a mere “cross-section in this stream” which cannot be experienced (SW 5: 225). Instead, “lived experience is not merely something present, but already contains past and future within its consciousness of the present” (SW 5: 225). Given this aspect of the experience of time, Dilthey asks, “How then is the present really experienced?” and answers that

It is the nature of the present to be filled or ful-filled with reality in contrast to the representation of reality and its peculiar modifications either in memory or in the anticipation of reality and the will to realize it… The present as experienceable is not this cross-section, but the continuously advancing being ful-filled with reality in the course of time (SW 5: 225).

The present is not a point that advances along a line from past to future. Rather, the present is the advancing fulfillment of reality that unifies past and future.

Dilthey contrasts Hölderlin’s fullness of time to Goethe’s complete submission to a single moment (SW 5: 370). Whereas Goethe’s poetic
Hölderlin’s poetry reflects the way in which the present is filled with and shaped by the past and future. Hölderlin “always lived in the context of his whole existence. His present feeling was constantly being influenced by what he had suffered and by what might still happen” (SW 5: 370). Dilthey emphasizes Hölderlin’s sense of time in his poetry, which demonstrates that “the past has an efficacy just like the present” (SW 5: 370). Dilthey points to the “existence of the hermit Hyperion” who “is completely saturated by the spirits of what has been” and Empedocles who “feels the pressure of the past so strongly that he can only hope for liberation from it through death” (SW 5: 370). Hölderlin’s poems not only take up Greek myth and bear witness to the past, they also anticipate and envision a future.

For both Heidegger and Dilthey, Hölderlin poetizes the fullness of time and the mysterious gathering of past and future in the present. This gathering is recollection (Andenken), which Hölderlin considers the task of poetry. For Hölderlin the vocation of the poet is to recollect, i.e. to gather what cannot be complete and to understand the unity of this gathering without dissolving difference. Remembrance is not about simply holding onto the past for the present, which would assume time is a simple succession of moments to be collected. Instead, the poet gathers and preserves what has passed and what will come to pass in light of the now, which is incalculable and never the same. Remembrance is a type of calling to presence what it is not present, of wrestling with what is hidden. As Hölderlin tells us in “Remembrance”…

The current sweeps out. But it is the sea
That takes and gives remembrance,
And love no less keeps eyes attentively fixed,
But what is lasting the poets provide.
NOTES


2 Husserl, *Consciousness of Internal Time*, 32.


5 Derrida, *Speech and Phenomena*, 65.

6 Husserl’s concept of protention is much less robust than Heidegger’s concept of the future in *Being and Time*, and Husserl emphasizes retention more than protention which privileges the past over the future, as Hoy notes. See David Couzens Hoy, *The Time of Our Lives* (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2009).


8 Heidegger describes cutting this “unintelligible” section from his manuscript of *Being and Time* after visiting Karl Jaspers (GA 49: 40). Richardson explains that the *Kehre* “consists in having found a way to bring-to-expression that in the author’s original experience which sz did not and could not say. In other words, we understand the whole of Heidegger II to be a re-trive of Heidegger I.” See William Richardson, *Through Phenomenology to Thought* (New York: Fordham University Press, 1993), 625.

Richardson describes Heidegger’s thought after the Kehre as “profoundly marked by … the finitude of the mittence of Being.” Richardson, *Through Phenomenology*, 624.

The meaning of *Es gibt* is not only central to “Time and Being,” it is also one of Heidegger’s earliest philosophical concerns. Heidegger’s war emergency lecture course (1919) emphasizes the given as a question: “The ‘there is’ [*es gibt*] stands in question or, more accurately, stands in questioning. It is not asked whether something moves or rests, whether something contradicts itself, whether something works, whether something exists, whether something values, whether something ought to be, but rather whether *there is* something. What does ‘there is’ mean?” (GA 56/57: 67/54). For Heidegger *Es gibt* is a question, the ultimate question, that gestures beyond itself. It does not ask something specific, but asks if there is anything at all – “Is there something?” (GA 56/57: 67/54).


See also Heidegger’s explanation of the moment (*Augenblick*) in his lecture course on Nietzsche’s eternal recurrence of the same: “Whoever stands in the Moment is turned in two ways: for him past and future *run up against* one another” (GA 44: 41/56–57). The moment is the collision of past and future in the present.


by page number. This essay was one of his best-known writings from *Poetry and Lived Experience* and plays a key role in Dilthey’s attempt to create a new model for literary analysis.


Hölderlin’s narrative structure for tragedies also reflects a rhythmic and musical notion of time, which he conveys in his discussion of caesura in his notes on *Oedipus Rex* and *Antigone*. Hölderlin discusses peripety – the tragic climax or turning point of a tragedy that Aristotle defines in his *Poetics* – as a musical caesura, a pause or moment of silence. Dilthey explains, “the development of a tragedy is for him a rhythm, and what we call a caesura in verse appears as the climax or peripeteia in the tragic plot where all that had been presented to the spectator is recapitulated in his consciousness” (SW 5: 362). The tragic moment gathers all parts together, recapitulates them, but does so as a pause. The gathering of the narrative moments in the caesura is an absence – yet this absence resonates with the whole like a rhythm. With rhythm, pauses are as significant as the sounds. In Hölderlin’s tragedies, the caesura is the most significant moment and determines the connections and meaning of the entire narrative structure. The caesura does not only give a structure to the temporal structure of a tragic narrative, it also provides a point where “every subsequent part refers back to a beginning, whereby what is first given is given greater and greater depth” (SW 5: 362). In this way, Hölderlin’s narrative structure also treats temporality as a resonance or rhythmic echo rather than simply a constant stream of pure presence. Dilthey is the first to note the importance of the caesura in Hölderlin’s tragedies. Others have explored the significance of the caesura for rethinking time. Walter Benjamin discusses this in “Goethe’s Elective Affinities,” trans. Stanley Corngold, *Walter Benjamin: Selected Writings 1913–1926*, volume I (Cambridge: Belknap Press, 2004), 297–360. Lacoue-Labarthe thinks Hölderlin’s caesura is a critique of Hegel. See Philippe

18 These fragments are an incomplete attempt to revise The Imagination of the Poet. Interestingly, Heidegger was very dismissive of Dilthey’s poetics, even during his Diltheyan period — and yet Dilthey’s revision of his poetics show that he wanted to rethink temporality in relation to poetry. Dilthey’s posthumously published, incomplete works follow a similar path of thought as Heidegger here. Heidegger, unfortunately, would not have read these fragments or been aware of how closely his sense of poetic time reflects Dilthey’s description here.

19 These notes reflect how Husserl’s time consciousness lectures influenced Dilthey’s philosophy. Yet Dilthey’s explanation of time seems to have more in common with Heidegger’s than Husserl’s. For a comparison of these thinkers concepts of time see David Carr, “The Future Perfect: Temporality and Priority in Husserl, Heidegger, and Dilthey,” Phenomenologica 106 (1987): 197–211.

20 See GA 52.