

# Heidegger's Legacy?

*Peter Trawny*

Imagine no possessions, I wonder if you can.

John Lennon

The 20th century has shown that the history of philosophy can no longer be separated from world or universal history. Where Hegel still could offer two separate lecture courses on these topics (the *History of Philosophy* and the *Philosophy of World History*), for contemporary philosophy it only can be asserted that history extends into the thinking of philosophers and that their philosophies attempt to respond to the questions posed by history.

During the 19th century, philosophers took in historical events like the French Revolution, Napoleon, the Paris Commune, the Franco-Prussian War, and so forth, and yet they nevertheless produced their texts in a more or less autonomous way. But the first two decades of (European) philosophy in the 20th century already came to stand in the shadow of World War I. The subsequent decades of totalitarianism – including its mass murders, and most especially the Shoah – concerned every endeavor in thinking almost without exception. (Even Ludwig Wittgenstein responded to the catastrophes of the 20th century, despite the fact that analytic philosophy has generally demonstrated an immunity to its events.)

In this respect, we could become aware of the problem of whether and how philosophy itself still guarantees the independence of the continuity of its reception beyond history, and whether – and how – a “tradition” of philosophy is still possible outside the impacts of history. I want to directly reformulate this question: Does it still make sense to speak of a “heritage,” a “legacy” of philosophy, and here more specifically of the “legacy” of the philosophy of Martin Heidegger?

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At the outset, it can be said that Heidegger himself speaks of the notion of a “heritage” (*Erbe*) in reference to the “legacy” of authentic Dasein in the all-too-famous §74 of *Being and Time*, where heritage is without a doubt demanded by philosophical Dasein (GA 2: 507/SZ 383). (And philosophical Dasein is necessarily in itself authentic Dasein, though authentic Dasein is not inevitably philosophical). Derrida has taken up this discourse; however, it remains incumbent on us to continue thinking it.

The question of the “heritage” or “legacy” of Heidegger’s thinking can be understood in several different ways. It could operate historically and investigate when and where this philosophy has left traces in the work of other philosophers (and not only other philosophers but also, for instance, the work of artists and poets). In this respect, I might express an interest in the “history of the reception” or “history of the effects” (*Rezeptions- or Wirkungsgeschichte*) of Heidegger’s philosophy. I certainly could discover a tremendous number of documents on and in which I could find Heidegger’s stamp. Even today I can discern Heidegger’s influence in the philosophical projects of Alain Badiou (whom the internet ranks as the second most important philosopher writing today), and in Quentin Meillassoux, who is Badiou’s student.<sup>1</sup>

But this type of historical approach to Heidegger’s “legacy” would miss the genuine philosophical problem. This problem is whether today, during a time of the extreme dissipation of philosophical discourse together with its integration in the technical-economic-scientific apparatus, there can still be something like a “legacy” of philosophical thought. If I take this problem into account, totally different questions come to the fore and another perspective opens itself.

Certainly, it is possible to enumerate thoughts, philosophical debts, concepts, and so on, derived from Heidegger’s thinking, which give us the opportunity to continue on with his thinking. I do not want to shirk from this task. A inventory of thoughts that, if one wanted to think productively along with Heidegger and present that as his “legacy,” can indeed be found. But this will not address the deeper problem of what a philosophical “legacy” is; on the contrary, it will show what that problem actually is.

Thus, I will initially offer an inventory of that “legacy.” I will mention ten elements of Heidegger’s thought, just to demonstrate which of his ideas have historical impact and will likely continue to have such impact. Then I will try to destabilize this same presentation by recourse to Heidegger’s own thematization of a “heritage” in *Being and Time*. And in conclusion, I will critique this very thematization with some thoughts drawn mainly from the *Black Notebooks*. The intention of my reflections is to show why philosophy today must accept the loss of its own discourse about the notion of a “heritage.”

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Heidegger’s “legacy” may be represented as an inventory of problems in the following way:

1. The heart of Heidegger’s philosophy is the “question of the meaning of being.” This “meaning” is found in the notions of “time” and “timeliness” or “temporality” (*Zeitlichkeit*). Even if Heidegger later claims that the “meaning of being” is the “truth of being,” this “truth” is understood as a specific “timeliness,” namely as an “event of appropriation” or *Ereignis*. The two inverted titles *Being and Time* and “Time and Being” can be interpreted as *the* bookends of Heidegger’s thinking.
2. From the “question of the meaning of being” stems the idea of the “ontological difference” between “beings and being.” In the subsequent course of Heidegger’s thinking, this “difference” is then understood as *Austrag* and as the “*Unter-Schied* of world and thing.” Perhaps here we could speak of “difference as such.” This “difference between beings and being” is the most crucial for Heidegger’s philosophy; every important decision in his philosophy refers to it.
3. Heidegger frequently claims that the “meaning of being” is the “truth of being.” In connection with the above mentioned “difference between beings and being,” “truth” is interpreted as “unconcealment” (*Unverborgenheit*, ἀλήθεια). In this relation between “releasement” and “concealment,” emphasis is placed

on the latter term. "Being" is the "phenomenon" that does *not* "show" itself.

4. In considering the relation of "being" and "time," it becomes apparent that both relata of the relation – as well as this relation itself – are (very probably) finite. This finitude indicates the very problem of "history," which in turn becomes the "history of being." The idea of the "history of Being" seems to include the risk of an absolutizing of "history" that opposes itself to the idea of its "finitude." As a result, everything is subjected to what Heidegger terms the "destiny of Being" (*Geschick des Seins*); everything appears tautologically according to the formula "it is what it is, and it has to be what it has to be."
5. This thought brings to mind three more elements of Heidegger's thinking. Much as in Hegel's thinking, there is in Heidegger's a non-empirical concept of "experience" (*Erfahrung*). This, too, is related to the "ontological difference." We not only experience the givenness of "beings" but also the withdrawal/concealment of "being," or of the above suggested "difference as such." This kind of "experience" – Heidegger designates it as "pain" (*Schmerz*) – is the only indication that there is something like a withdrawal occurring.
6. In this sense, Heidegger is also able to speak of an "experience of thinking." If we understand the motto of the *Gesamtausgabe* – "Ways, not works" – as the clue that philosophical thinking is a still open "experience" of these "ways," then Heidegger's thinking may be represented and interpreted as performative. (And it is perhaps even more performative than Platonic or Nietzschean thinking.) From this point of view, the performance of Heidegger's philosophizing could be considered as a "praxis" that does *not* exhaust itself in its presentation as a text but reveals itself in its illumination of a way.
7. The "logic" of Heidegger's thinking is thus not oriented to "argument." When all "showing" and "appearing" is unfolded by way of a "destiny of being," the "argument" *and* the idea that

thinking is more or less a consequence of “arguments” stand in relationship to this “destiny.” For Heidegger, λόγον διδόναι, or “giving an account,” is an epiphenomenon of the “history of being.”

8. Therefore, the rational discourse of metaphysics cannot arrive at the “question of the meaning of being.” This discourse is based on the decision that either “being” can be grasped in a “concept” (*Begriff*), or it has to be delivered intuitively as “mysticism” (or proto-religion). From the point of view of Heidegger’s thinking, metaphysical discourse is not actually able to speak about “being.” Thus the language of philosophy has to abandon this discourse, and can perhaps find in poetry a resource for a different discourse. Part of this shift is also that thinking that Heidegger describes as “mythology of the event of appropriation.” (This is the problem of narrativity.)
9. From all this comes the anti-scientific character of Heidegger’s thinking. “Science” in its modern sense is based on the reality of atomic mass. Access to this reality is based on “method” (whether as mathematics, the empirical experiment, or quantifying processes) and bars access to “being as such” (“difference,” “unconcealment,” “withdrawal”). This holds true of “academic philosophy”: such a (scientific) institution cannot have an authentic access to Heidegger’s step toward poetry.
10. With modernity the discourse of “science” (i.e., “argument,” “method”) became the *one and only* generally accepted discourse concerning false or verifiable propositions. For Heidegger this is – as I addressed earlier – an epiphenomenon of the “history of being,” i.e. the current epoch of “enframing” or *Ge-stell*. At the end of the “history of being,” the world in its totality is *gestellt* by this “enframing.” Our current time stabilizes – or even petrifies – itself in the total immanence of technology. Heidegger at first responds to this situation with a pathos of “decision” (either the total decline into “machination” or the alternative “other beginning”); then with an enigmatic contextualizing of

“enframing” and the “event of appropriation”; and finally with his later discourse of “serenity” (*Gelassenheit*) as a liberation from “decision.”

If there is a “legacy” of Heidegger’s thinking, then it refers more or less to this incomplete inventory.

But what just took place with the presentation of this inventory? What was its effect? The inventory objectifies not only Heidegger’s thinking, but thinking as such. Heidegger’s thinking appears as a compiling and contextualizing of his main ideas, which can be elucidated with the horizon of the main presuppositions of this thinking. I just did what a Ph.D. student must be able to do — namely, fix a series of given thoughts. Furthermore, I fixed this inventory without any genuine philosophical interest (*inter-esse*) or motivation. Finally, I produced a distillation of ideas within a certain economy, the economy of a “heritage.” I appeared to have an access to thinking by reconstructing the ideas of a “great philosopher.” I appeared as a descendant, a successor, a beneficiary, an heir, even a son. But is the economy of possession and property the real economy of philosophy? With this last question I want to advance to my next question: How is Heidegger’s own discourse of a “heritage” to be understood at all?

Heidegger introduces the concepts of *Erbschaft* and *Erbe* (heritage) in §74 of *Being and Time*. Thus the notion of “heritage” belongs to the context of the “historicality” (*Geschichtlichkeit*) of Dasein in its self-understanding as “resolute.” In such “resoluteness,” Dasein “comes back to itself by disclosing current factual possibilities of authentic existing in terms of heritage” (GA 2: 507/SZ 383). Dasein is able to do this because as “thrown” “resoluteness,” it appropriates its “heritage.” Coming back to its own “thrownness” (*Geworfenheit*) occurs as a “handing down to oneself the possibilities that have come down [Sichüberliefern *überkommener Möglichkeiten*],” which do not necessarily have to be recognized “as having thus come down.” Therefore it may be that from such “handing down” (*Überlieferung*), coming possibilities are disclosed that are actual (they are already valid here and now).

From this then follows one of the more enigmatic formulations from *Being and Time*: “If everything ‘good’ is a heritage, and the character of ‘goodness’ [*Güte*] lies in making authentic existence possible, then the handing down of a heritage constitutes itself in resoluteness.”<sup>2</sup> It is not easy to understand what the nouns “good” and “goodness” actually mean here. Is Heidegger thinking of the Platonic idea of the “good,” but of course in the decidedly un-Platonic sense of a historical “good”? Or could “goodness” be instead a virtue, the virtue that is, for instance, attributed to the “good Lord”? Or should “good” be understood here more in the sense of “suitable” or “fitting”? Then “goodness” would be something like the quality or fitness of beings.

In any case, everything “good” is “heritage”; it comes from “history” and must be “handed down” (*überliefert*). Its significance is “making possible authentic existence.” Yet how? “Authentic existence” includes within it “history” as “destiny” and “fate.” Dasein cannot evade the unavoidable first and last horizon of specific significations, which to say that Dasein cannot escape “history.” Even if Dasein were able to argue against this horizon, such an arguing against would be nothing beyond an already situated, specific response to a set of historical significations. The difference between “authentic” and “inauthentic” Dasein is that “authentic” Dasein performs its response in “resoluteness”; “inauthentic” Dasein does not know what it is doing, because it is completely absorbed in the presence of its actuality.

According to Heidegger, “fateful destiny” can be “disclosed explicitly as bound up with the heritage which has come down to us.” This “handing down to oneself” is “the repetition of the heritage of possibilities”; it is itself “authentic historicity.” As I suggested above, we do not inherit the past but rather the future. And in “authentic historicity” we are not only the inheritors but, still more, the bequeathers.

In this context, the concept of a “heritage” seems to approximate a function otherwise accomplished by the term “tradition” (*Überlieferung*). But a “heritage” does not only make possible a connection with the past, rather it also opens up the future (and explicitly opens it up in relation to the past). In this sense, *Being and Time* makes a distinction

between the notion of a “heritage” and that of a “tradition.” Heidegger explains that “tradition” uproots the “historicality of Dasein” so far that “it confines its interest to the multiformity of possible types, directions, and standpoints of philosophical activity in the most exotic and alien of cultures” (GA 2: 29/SZ 21). It does so in seeking to veil the fact “that it has no ground of its own to stand on [*Bodenlosigkeit*].” The “consequence” of such veiling will be “that Dasein, with all its historiological interests and all its zeal for an interpretation which is philologically ‘objective’ [*sachlich*], no longer understands the most elementary conditions which would alone enable it to go back to the past in a positive manner and make it productively its own.” It is obvious that a “heritage” is never the mere preoccupation with the “multiform” (*vielgestaltig*) past.

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In other words, Heidegger distinguishes “heritage” from “tradition” in a manner analogous to the distinction he draws between “authenticity” and “inauthenticity.” “Tradition” can decline to a lifeless stock of texts and other artefacts while “heritage” in its futural sense remains a possible object of real appropriation. But with this difference, the inner similarity of “heritage” and “tradition” does not disappear. This inner similarity signifies a displacement of the whole discourse – or it could be that my discourse of “heritage” has already been marked by a signification that I did not mention. I am speaking here of the economic *signification* of “legacy” and “heritage.”<sup>5</sup>

With this I want to recall the Roman concept of “private right” as the origin of this entire discourse of “inheritance” and “legacy” (in Latin, *heres, legatum*). “Inheritance” is understood in reference to a “property” (*dominium*) which the bequeather – the *pater familias* but not only him – disposes in his “will” (*testamentum*).<sup>4</sup> As possession and property, the “inheritance” is bequeathed to a specific group of people, who in the course of time come to appropriate a specific quantity of things. This specific quantity of things constitutes a “status,” which not only has a life-sustaining signification, but also a representative one in

the relation of one group to another. Thus “inheritance” underpins the stability of a society differentiated by the representative, that is, more or less powerful signification of property, i.e. of a thing. In this sense, “inheritance” and “heritage” is a thing in which a certain economy (re-)presents itself.

This is the way we have to understand the famous lines from the beginning of Goethe’s *Faust*: “If you would own the things your forebears left you, / you first must earn and merit their possession” (*Was du ererbt von deinen Vätern hast, / Erwirb es, um es zu besitzen*).<sup>5</sup> Faust thinks of the “old implements” (*alte Geräte*) of his father, which until now he did not use. Before he can use them, he must prove that he has reached the dignity of his father. With this he can “acquire” (*erwerben*) them. In a text by Novalis, this point is even more clear. He writes: “Ways to acquire money. 1. By gambling. Lottery. 2. By accidentally finding it. 3. By inheritances.”<sup>6</sup> (Novalis goes on to provide five further ways.) The quantitative signification of “inheritance” finds its most immediate reference, its equivalence, in money. Every “inheritance” is an economic phenomenon, even if it may not be equivalent to money. A quantity of something will be one of its inherent features.

Of course, Heidegger instead thinks of “possibilities” and their “repetition” (*Wieder-holung*). But in “authentic historicity” these “possibilities” are, for Heidegger, obviously specific “possibilities.” One could say that the “heritage” consists in these very “possibilities” that it “hands down” or “delivers over.” This became clear in 1933 when Heidegger perversely thought that National Socialism might be able to take up the Presocratic ἀλήθεια through the interpretation of Hölderlin’s hymns. What the Germans were to inherit was a stable narrative of certain “possibilities.” The last line of Heidegger’s 1934 *Logic* lectures articulates this situation in the following way: The Germans should learn to “preserve what they already possess” – namely, Hölderlin’s poetry (GA 38: 170/142). But nobody ever “possesses” a poem. Did Heidegger reduce the “heritage” to a property, to a *dominium*, that is to say, to “a being”?

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Derrida presumably inherited the semantic field of “heritage” and “inheritance” from Heidegger. In considering his corpus, this emerges in his writings on Marx (*Specters of Marx* and “Marx & Sons”). The work of Marx is as such a “heritage,” especially during times in which major historic events such as the fall of the Berlin Wall or the phenomenon of neo-liberalism seem to contradict everything that Marx’s thinking contains. As Derrida puts it, one at first has to consider “the radical and necessary *heterogeneity* of an inheritance.”<sup>7</sup> He continues: A heritage never gathers as if it would be “one with itself.” Its “presumed unity” – if there is one – could only consist in the “*injunction to reaffirm by choosing*.” As a consequence, one has to “filter, sift, criticize”; one has to “sort out several different possibles that inhabit the same injunction.” If the “readability of a legacy were given, natural, transparent, univocal,” then, he writes, “we would never have anything to inherit from it.”

For philosophy – and not only for it, but presumably also for cultural memory in general – the “heritage” must offer the possibility of “critique.” It is always polyvalent, precarious, difficult. Thus, for Derrida, one cannot just be “faithful” to the “heritage.” The relation to the “heritage” is instead a matter of being “faithful-unfaithful,” “unfaithful for being faithful: *with a view to* being faithful and, at the same time, *because* it is or would be faithful.”<sup>8</sup> Being “unfaithful” to the “heritage” means to be “faithful” to the actual signification of the “heritage.” A “heritage” can be “difficult” but it can never be bad, at least not in philosophy (in German we speak of *Erbsünde*, “original” or “inherited” sin). Does this positivity of the “heritage” (the “good”) belong to its economy?

It is true that Derrida also criticizes Marx. And of course, he is not a dogmatic Marxist nor perhaps even a political one. But does he really criticize the notion of “heritage” as such? In one sense he does indeed criticize it. In this regard he speaks of the “*phallogocentric* tendency of this metaphysics,”<sup>9</sup> this “heritage.” He recognizes the longstanding connection between the question of the “heritage” and the question of the “father” and the “son” (*pater familias, filius familias*). Certainly, the “father” is the bequeather as such. In this sense “metaphysics” is a

“heritage” passed down in the name of the “father.” And is there “heritage” beyond “metaphysics”? (Maybe it is typical that where Derrida approaches the economic element of “heritage”/ “inheritance,” he also enters into a critique of the discourse on gender. This move belongs to a new “Left” politics – and one taking place not just in Europe – that privileges gender discourse in relation to social justice discourse. I hope to critique this shift at some future point.)

It is somewhat ironic that Derrida himself activates the discourse of “heritage” in his readings of Marx. Marx calls for the “abolition of all right of inheritance [*Erbrecht*]” in the *Communist Manifesto*, but in a later newspaper article from 1869 argues this point in a more sophisticated way. The “right of inheritance” is only “therefore of social importance, because it passes on to the inheritor the power that the deceased exercised during his lifetime.”<sup>10</sup> According to Marx, this “power” consists in the ability to “transfer the fruits of alien labor to oneself by the support of the bequeather’s property.” The “inheritance” does not on its own “produce this power to transfer the fruits of labor from the pocket of one person into another”; rather, it relates only “to the change of the persons exercising this power.” As Marx comments, “Like every other bourgeois legislation,” the “rights of inheritance are not the cause, but the effect, the legal consequence, of the actual economic organization of society, which is developed on the basis of private property and its means of production.” This allows Marx to claim: “Our overarching goal should be the abolition of those institutions which give to some people during their lifetime the economic power to transfer the fruits of labor of the many to themselves.”<sup>11</sup> The “abolition of the right of inheritance” would in turn be this broader goal.

I admit that this reduction of the “heritage”/“inheritance” discourse to its economic origin is violent in certain respects. But such violence allows some of the hidden features of both Heidegger’s and Derrida’s approaches to emerge. Without “heritage”/“inheritance” our hands would have nothing to receive that is being delivered over. We would have nothing to possess. The impossibility of “heritage”/“inheritance”

would be an expropriation, the abolition of a certain “power” (of transfer) that inscribes itself in “history” as far as that “history” is received in a way that concerns us.

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Shortly after the failed revolution, Heidegger recognized that the model of a “heritage” in which every “good” should be found was not sufficient for understanding “authentic historicity.” The notion of “history” itself became unstable, its economic structure began to change. The “resoluteness” of Dasein – even in its openness for “being” – explained nearly nothing in reference to the events of the 1930s and 40s.

Why did no one follow the “ways” that the thinker was unfolding? Was there truly no time for such a “thinking”? “Perhaps in the year 2327?” Heidegger queries in one of the *Black Notebooks* (GA 96: 196/154). But this was “still an error, nourished by history [*Historie*] and its calculating.” Nevertheless, Heidegger himself during this period begins to speak of “history” (*Geschichte*) in calculated time spans. To cite just a few examples, he does this at the conclusion of *Ponderings VI*, in which he endows a fictitious history (“abyssal German history”) with the names of Hölderlin, Wagner, and Nietzsche, fixing its culmination with the date September 26, 1889 – Heidegger’s own birthday (GA 94: 523/380); or when, in the *Anmerkungen II*, he connects the publication dates of the *Phenomenology of Spirit* (1807) to Marx’s *Capital* (1867), and then to *Being and Time* (1927), as if the sixty-year intervals between these publications would signify something on their own (GA 97: 131).

Immediately after the war Heidegger claims that “The isolation [*Vereinsamung*] of thinking in the future will be so distinct [*eindeutig*] that for this there are no measures from the previous [*Bisherige*]. Who will bear and preserve this isolation for the next three centuries?” (GA 97: 82). In *Anmerkungen I*, in connection with this, Heidegger continues: “Thinking has for the next three centuries found its home on another star” (GA 97: 108). And then in *Anmerkungen II*, he claims it took three centuries for thinking to make a real difference between Descartes and himself, apropos the overcoming of modern times. As he continues, it will take three centuries for the next leap: “A world-historical turn

[*Wendung*]” needs “at least three centuries” (GA 97: 185). We therefore have to face “three centuries” without thinking occurring.

Heidegger continues in this vein when, just six years before his death, he remarks in a famous line from his interview with Richard Wisser: “A future thinker, who is perhaps given the task of taking over this thinking which I have tried to prepare, will have to acknowledge the following words, which Heinrich von Kleist once wrote: ‘I step back in front of one who is not here, and I bow a millennium ahead of him, before his spirit.’”<sup>12</sup> Heidegger quotes this passage from a letter of 1803 that Kleist wrote to his sister Ulrike. For many years, Kleist worked to compose the *Trauerspiel Robert Guiskard*, but failed to finish it, burning nearly everything he had written. It is “foolish,” Kleist writes, “to want to invest one’s forces a longer time for a work [that is] too difficult” for one.<sup>15</sup> It is important to note that Heidegger does not say that he himself wants to “step back” in front of this future thinker. In fact, that future thinker who is to take up the thinking Heidegger prepared is understood “to bow” in front of a still coming thinker. The absence of thinking thus extends now from “three centuries” to a “millennium.”

There are more of these kinds of remarks, which would be misunderstood were I to interpret them as a kind of self-aggrandizing staging. What Heidegger wants to indicate with them must be taken seriously; they make the transition from the theoretical recognition of a “heritage” of “possibilities” for an “authentic existence” to a philosophizing that is itself enacting the problem of “heritage” as such. In this sense, “thinking” is a unique event, and is not to be compared with a scientific attitude, or probably even a “philosophical” one.

What is shown in this enactment is a different relation to the “history of philosophy.” This different relation appears as a different economy, perhaps a “being-historical” economy in distinction to a metaphysical economy. In this economy we have to be aware of the loss of every “heritage.” I want to recall two concepts from the later Heidegger that gesture toward this different economy. The first is the concept of “poverty,” or *Armut*. In the usual sense, “poverty” is a “not-having as a lacking what is needed.” But according to Heidegger, the “essence of poverty” lies in “beyng”: “To be truly poor means that

we are not lacking something, if not the un-needed" (GA 73.1: 878). A "heritage" as articulated in *Being and Time* is based on a "lacking what is needed." The second concept belonging to this different economy is the concept of the "event of expropriation" (*Enteignis*). Thus there is a "legacy [*Vermächtnis*] as event of expropriation" (GA 73.1: 796), or to put this succinctly, as a liberation to non-being (*Befreiung zum Nicht-Seienden*). In reference to this, Heidegger poses the following question: "How would it be – if it were the case that the modes of pain [*die Weisen des Schmerzes*] were the event of expropriation [*Enteignis*]?" (GA 73.1: 799). The "event of appropriation" begins with a parting from "beings," with a parting from their priority, with a parting from possession.

I began my meditation on the problem of "heritage"/"inheritance" with the remark that no philosophy has ever related to history in the way that philosophers in the 20th century have related to history. In this relation, in this focus, Heidegger underwent the loss of a philosophical "heritage." Philosophy was not just unprepared to bear that century's catastrophes, philosophers – and not only Heidegger – were in fact aware of a withdrawal of possibilities for thinking. Heidegger tried to turn this loss into a gift. But did he succeed? And can we, today, say that history has handed down to us new possibilities for philosophy? My brief overview is that the metaphysical understanding of "heritage" and "legacy" no longer offers any new ways of thinking. And here perhaps Heidegger was right and it will take "three centuries" for a new philosophical question – for a new time of philosophy.

NOTES

- 1 Alain Badiou, *L'être 3 – Figure du retrait* (1986–1987) (Paris: Fayard, 2015). Quentin Meillassoux, *After Finitude: An Essay on the Necessity of Contingency*, trans. Ray Brassier (London: Continuum, 2008).
- 2 See here Friedrich Nietzsche, *Twilight of the Idols*, in *The Anti-Christ, Ecce Homo, Twilight of the Idols, and Other Writings*, ed. Aaron Ridley and Judith Norman, trans. Judith Norman (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 220: “All good things are inherited: anything that is not inherited is imperfect, a beginning . . .” The ellipsis at the end of this phrase is important: the “beginning” is no “heritage.”
- 3 There is basically no real difference between the words *Erbschaft* and *Erbe*. Perhaps one could say that *Erbschaft* is the action, and *Erbe* is the object of the action. Moreover, the German language does not distinguish between “heritage” and “inheritance.” If I, as a German, speak about a cultural “heritage” or about a financial “inheritance,” in both cases I use the word *Erbe*. However, if I were to speak of a spiritual “heritage,” I could use the word *Vermächtnis*. But this word can also possess an economic signification; the verb *vermachen* can also be used in reference to things. It is interesting to note that etymology has established a connection between *Erbe* and *arm* (poor).
- 4 See *De romanum iure: Latine et germanice: De legit, convertit, annotavit, praefatus est Ervinus Scharr* (Zürich and Stuttgart: Aedibus Artemidos, 1960).
- 5 Johann Wolfgang von Goethe, *Faust I*, ed. and trans. Stuart Atkins (Cambridge: Suhrkamp/Insel, 1984), 20, l. 682.
- 6 Novalis, *Schriften: Die Werke Friedrich von Hardenbergs*, ed. Paul Kluckhohn, vol. 3 (Leipzig: Bibliographisches Institut, n.d.), 326.
- 7 Jacques Derrida, *Specters of Marx: The State of the Debt, the Work of Mourning, and the New International*, trans. Peggy Kamuf (New York: Routledge, 1994), 18.

- 8 Jacques Derrida, "Marx & Sons," trans. G.M. Goshgarian, in *Ghostly Demarcations: A Symposium on Jacques Derrida's "Specters of Marx,"* ed. Michael Sprinker (London: Verso, 2008), 219.
- 9 Derrida, "Marx & Sons," 258.
- 10 Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, *The Communist Manifesto*, trans. Samuel Moore, rev. David McLellan (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), 26. Karl Marx, "Bericht des Generalrats über das Erbrecht," in Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels, *Werke*, vol. 16 (Berlin: Dietz, 1962), 367.
- 11 Marx, "Erberecht," 368.
- 12 *Martin Heidegger im Gespräch*, ed. Richard Wisser (Freiburg and Munich: Karl Alber, 1970), 77.
- 13 Heinrich von Kleist, *Sämtliche Werke und Briefe*, vol. 4, ed. Ilse-Marie Barth and Hinrich C. Seeba (Frankfurt am Main: Deutscher Klassiker, 1991), 320.