

Heidegger, Machination, and
the Jewish Question:
The Problem of the Gift

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INTRODUCTION

I recall my first sustained exposure to the so-called “Heidegger Affair.” I was a DAAD *Stipendiat* in Bochum, listening to the radio when a report came through about Heidegger’s Nazi affiliation. The reporter was inspired by the new release of the Farías book.¹ The commentator had not only lambasted Heidegger, but also Foucault and Derrida. How could Foucault, a radical leftist, challenging power relations, truth, and knowledge in radical ways – how could he read Heidegger? How could Derrida, the advocate of *difference/différance*, have taken so much inspiration from this Nazi? What does this mean for *their and our* thinking? What does this mean for their and our *thinking*?

The overall point was that the Heidegger-waters were toxic, and if one draws philosophical sustenance from these waters in any way, then the reader, too, will be poisoned. It is best, then, to avoid any contact lest we also become contaminated, even against our better selves. It also seemed to be imperative now to have no truck with any thinkers who had also drunk from those waters, be this thinker a Foucault, a Derrida, a Levinas, or a de Beauvoir.

When the Farías book was first released, I recall thinking: “Should we reduce the meaning of a work to the life of the person? If the skeletons in one’s closet are exposed, does it render his or her work suspect?”

Is *Sein und Zeit* inherently ‘Nazi’? Is it anti-Jewish? And even if this were true, are we really so insecure in ourselves that we think reading a work will contaminate us or our own thought? Could Jews become anti-Jewish by studying Heidegger? Even if Heidegger were a Nazi, does it mean that his writings are fascist, National Socialistic, or even anti-Semitic?”

Not everyone was as naïve as this reporter. To the credit of certain philosophers in Germany at the time – at least where I was situated – those like Bernhard Waldenfels, Otto Pöggeler, Elmar Holenstein, and in Wuppertal, Klaus Held – they did not go the route of such reductionism.² Pöggeler unveiled his lectures on the then unpublished *Beiträge*, and Held taught a seminar on *Langeweile* and tried to rethink Heidegger’s philosophy of *Grundstimmungen* or fundamental moods in this context.³ A bit later in Paris, I witnessed an effluence of books and discussions on Heidegger (François Lyotard, Jacques Derrida, Françoise Dastur – just to name a few), and in 1989–90, École Normale hosted a special open seminar on the *Beiträge*, inviting a variety of speakers.

If the 1960s saw a first wave of reaction to this Heidegger Affair, and if the late 1980s witnessed a second wave, indeed, a virtual tidal wave of responses, then Heidegger’s *Schwarze Hefte* or the *Black Notebooks* are stirring waters that had regained their calm, agitating a third wave of reactions to the Heidegger Affair.⁴ In a recent article in *Die Zeit*, the headline read: “Heideggers *Schwarze Hefte*: Das vergiftete Erbe” (“Heidegger’s *Black Notebooks*: The Contaminated Legacy”).⁵ This new “wave” carries slightly different currents, because on Peter Trawny’s view, whereas the former two tides disclosed Heidegger’s association with Hitler and National Socialism, the *Black Notebooks* reveal Heidegger’s reprehensible anti-Semitism.⁶

Nevertheless, as before, the questions rear their heads again: Can one study Heidegger and not be contaminated by his works? Do Heidegger’s convictions repudiate his work as philosophy? Can one study Heidegger without confronting his (political) past? Or again: Do these past and current revelations such as we see in the *Black Notebooks* have anything to do with his philosophy?

We all might wonder how such a gifted thinker like Heidegger could have supported the Hitler regime, how he could have nourished the hope that National Socialism might establish his philosophical convictions in the political sphere, or even more specifically, how he could have believed that a conflict existed in any form between “the best blood of the best” of Germany’s own people and “world Jewry.”⁷ We wonder this in part because we admire Heidegger, in part because we take him as exemplary, and in part because we think that, of all people or at least of all thinkers, he should know better, he should think better. Without going the way of apologetics by asserting that the “thinking” we need to think is not even upon us yet in order to make sense of these avowals, we can still maintain that it is not only too easy, but both ingenuous and misleading for us to point the finger at Heidegger, while supposing that we are somehow absolved from or not complicit in the general problem of evil.

My effort then is not to condemn Heidegger along these lines, or to engage in a kind of apology, now in the context of the *Schwarze Hefte*. However, I do want to take up Heidegger’s association of *Machenschaft* or “machination” with the Jews as the touchstone for my reflections, and examine this issue within the context of giving and the gift. I do this, first, by briefly underscoring Heidegger’s assertions on machination in relation to the “Jewish problem,” second, by examining his explication of giving and the gift in the context of overcoming metaphysics and calculative thinking, and finally, by making some critical reflections on individuation within the context of giving and the gift.

I. MACHINATION AND THE JEWS

However brief his flirtation with National Socialism, Heidegger’s attraction to it was related to what he perceived as a problem in the contemporary human condition. While his own National Socialism was not aligned with Hitler’s regime, this was not because he was critical of Hitler and National Socialism per se, but because the latter had not remained true to itself; instead, it had itself become swept up

in the expansive technological power dominating the modern age that he called *Machenschaft* or “machination,” a power that he thought National Socialism would somehow be able to transcend in the political realm.

Machination (and what Heidegger will *mutatis mutandis* later term *Gestell* or “enframing”) is expressive of the omnipresent rational, technical-scientific, and quantitative managerial control of all reality, and the reduction of Beyng-historical (*seynsgeschichtliche*) truth to efficacious problem-solving. For Heidegger, it is not just a question of control or power, but the power of planning, of manipulation, of the holding sway of an insidious style of technological measure, perpetuated through a will to calculate and to quantify, a leveling-out of everything qualitative and distinctive, which in its complexity becomes expressive of nihilism and metaphysics. Machination affects Dasein (Heidegger’s modal term for the human being), by robbing the “Beyng-historical truth” of Beyng (*Seyn*) from the human being, rendering the latter world-poor, and ordering Dasein into the category of beings as a whole; however, machination is also perpetrated by the human being. As a consequence, we become the unwitting “tools” of the defeat of our own humanity. Human beings are not the makers of machination, but carry out machination as entangled in it, as the “last” expression of metaphysics. In the appearance of machination, human culture has reached its extreme, but it also thereby signals the possibility of a new beginning.

How does Heidegger’s assessment of machination play into the problem of racism, anti-Semitism, or the Jewish question? On the one hand, it is difficult to accuse Heidegger of racism, or in particular, of anti-Semitism because for him the language of racism is itself already expressive of machination and its drive to render everything calculable, manipulable, and interchangeable. Indeed, such an organic biologism actually leads human beings (especially the German people) astray from their Beyng-historical mission (GA 96: 31, 213).

In fact, to my count, Heidegger “only” mentions the Jews in one form or another a little more than a dozen times in the 1200+ pages that

make up the first three volumes of *Black Notebooks*, and these references are consolidated in the second and third volumes (GA 95 and GA 96). The disparaging references to the “Bolsheviks” and “Christianity” are far more numerous. But, as Heidegger himself observes in a different context, we should not succumb to machination’s temptation of the quantitative, and think that just because the references are fewer in number that they are therefore less significant.

It is indeed disconcerting that when Heidegger references certain figures of Jewish heritage, he mentions them disparagingly precisely in the context of their race, linking it to spiritual flaws. For example, he mentions his former teacher, Edmund Husserl (Jewish by birth, but who converted to Protestantism), in the context of the putative increase of the power of Jewry, empty rationality, the aptitude to calculate, and the lack of ability to penetrate the realm of essential decisive resoluteness (GA 96: 46); he cites the “Jew ‘Freud’” in the context of psychoanalysis, which reduces everything to life and instinct and whose thought is pure nihilism (GA 96: 218); and when discussing a Soviet diplomat as an example of the “underhandedness” of Bolshevik politics, he names the “Jew Litvinov” (GA 96: 242).⁸

Heidegger stereotypically associates the Jews with the propensity for calculating and profiteering, and therefore ascribes machination, and the alienation of *Beyng*, to the Jews and to Judaism. Furthermore, unlike the Germans, who are rooted in soil and history, the Jews are homeless (evoking the typecast of “the wandering Jew”); unlike the Germans, Judaism suffers from a so-called uprootedness, being putatively bound to nothing, and therefore having a propensity to make everything serviceable or at its disposal.⁹ In short, the Jews are not only caught up in and susceptible to the intoxicating matrix of machination (like everyone else), but they are also cast as the privileged conveyors of machination, who facilitate the domination of modern technology over human beings and nature, draining themselves and everyone else of their *Beyng*-historical “existence” and of their “humanity.”

Put differently, Jews were not for Heidegger a political or a racial problem, but a “metaphysical” problem because the Jews (among others

of their ilk) are the symptomatic conveyors of the withdrawal, forgetfulness, or the abandonment of Being. Heidegger reflects: “The question concerning the role of *world Jewry* is not a racial one, but rather the metaphysical one concerning the type of humanity that can *straightforwardly and non-bindingly* undertake as a world historical ‘task’ the uprootedness of all beings from Being.”¹⁰ Machination is not the Jews’ fault, but because of Judaism’s apparent similarity in structure, the Jews are presumably particularly adept at the machination’s domination and can especially “prosper” in it.

Thus, it is not a matter of world-domination as the quantitative spread of Jews et al., all over the earth, because machination is itself the “power” of quantitative manipulation and measured extension in which human beings become entangled, and of which they are “thoughtlessly” the executors (GA 96: 6, 25, 30-2, 46-7, 48, 52-3, 111). The true danger is not world Jewry or world Judaism, but the exclusive “success” of machination in the metaphysical sense – what we can call “metaphysical Judaism” – the abandonment of the Being of beings through the forgetfulness of the Being of beings. It cannot be just “world Jewry” that is implicated here as a metaphysical problem; like the latter, England, Americanism, pragmatism, liberalism, Bolshevism, and Christianity are oriented toward and play themselves out in the global unleashing of machination such that they (and we) live uncritically in the abandonment of Being (GA 96: 110-11).¹¹

Machination was expressed in the war as technological prowess, power, and the will to calculate; it had further implications for reducing the earth to a resource under quantitative measure, bringing all beings under our dominion as controllable and at our disposition, as well as reducing human beings to the status of beings deprived of decisive resoluteness. In his sweeping critique of such machination in 1949, Heidegger’s original version of the “Question Concerning Technology” maintained that the motorized food industry is essentially the same as the manufacture of corpses in the gas chambers and the death camps.¹²

Granted, we all like to make connections and to detect structures that animate apparently disparate experiences. Who has not at the

very least been struck by if not impressed with Horkheimer and Adorno's sweeping discernment of "Enlightenment Rationality" operative already in Homer's *Odyssey*, and with having read the domination of nature in Odysseus's act of having plugged the ears of his shipmates and bound himself to the mast while gaining knowledge from the Sirens? But do we not at the same time, at least with Heidegger, witness the loss of individuation and uniqueness of persons (despite his protests to the contrary) when equating the murder of even one person with the motorized food industry? A possible "animal ethics" notwithstanding (where motorized food has evolved into fast food), are there not any moral discriminations to be made? Was Heidegger able to rethink his position when he excerpted this statement from the 1953 version of this work?

While machination is expressed in the radical quantitative indifference and interchangeability of all beings (GA 96: 213), finding its political expression in popular movements like democracy, pluralism, liberalism, Bolshevism, Christianity, mass communication, etc.; while it is also expressive not only of the withdrawal of Being, but of our perilous forgetfulness of the withdrawal, for Heidegger, the extreme position of machination meant that we were (and presumably still are) also on the verge of something else, a new beginning, precisely in the possible recovery of the self-denying withdrawal. The recovery of the latter as openness to the mystery of Beyng, as the overcoming of machination qua metaphysics, should be the harbinger of a new sense of uniqueness that has no essential connection to the leveling-out of all differences in terms of interchangeability, and quantitative and technological control.

The task for Heidegger is to overcome the metaphysics of presence as the uncritical prevailing privilege of this way of Being. The question for us, however, bears on the structure of Heidegger's thought given the problem of overcoming metaphysics, which amounts to overcoming machination, and therefore overcoming world Jewry as the privileged cipher of the latter and of its manifold expressions. The question is not therefore whether or not Heidegger was anti-Semitic or a Nazi, whether we might become contaminated by his writings,

or whether we might be able find in his writings sporadic statements about love. Rather, given these world-historical events, and given his discernment of machination, the concern is whether or not he guides us successfully to the matter of individual uniqueness (that he professes or points to) and to individual and collective responsibility in the face of such uniqueness.

II. THE GIFT AND RESPONSIBILITY

I have attempted to grapple with some aspects of Heidegger's notion of individuation in the context of describing religious experience and moral emotions.¹³ My conclusions (restricting them here to *Being and Time*) were that the individualizing at stake concerns Dasein as a *mode* of being in relation to the ontological anonymity of *das Man* (the One). Thus, it concerns retrieving Dasein from its ontological/modal self-disorientation among other modes of being (e.g., being-ready-to-hand, being-present-at-hand), appropriating it *uniquely* as the *there-being* (Dasein) of world-disclosure – it does not bear on the concrete individual. Accordingly, while Heidegger speaks of guilt in both ontic and ontological senses, it cannot bear on the deepest sense of individuation that is both personal and interpersonal.¹⁴ For the purposes of this work, I wish to approach the question of individuation and the related issue of responsibility from another angle, namely, the matter of giving and the gift.

While our unique access to Being in *Being and Time* was through that privileged mode of being called Dasein, the *Black Notebooks* suggest that in order to be taken hold by historical Being (*Seyn*) as freed from machination, that is, in its deepest sense as *Ereignis*, we have to free ourselves of the being-ness and hegemony of beings.¹⁵

Years later in "Time and Being," Heidegger embarks upon this new approach more systematically in attempting to think Being without beings or even without this privileged mode of being, Dasein. He does this in order to evade the sway of machination and not to be misled from the start by reducing Being to a thing that beings have. It is an attempt to think Being outside of the framework or better, outside the

enframing of metaphysics. The problem, as we saw in the *Schwarze Hefte*, is that beings (and all things intelligible in the field of beings) are beset by machination such that Being is in principle unintelligible for thinking; “ordinary” beings and culture render the mystery of Being unapproachable. Recognizing the mystery of Being outside of calculative manipulation is the beginning of a new thinking, the openness to the *Unheimlichkeit* of Beyng.¹⁶ The task, then, is to break with the realm of beings in order to be open to the event of Beyng, to follow the withdrawal of Being from beings by tracing Being to its “own” from *Ereignis*. To approach Being without beings and without regard to metaphysics is to be attentive to the matter of Being and to the *matter* of Time (GA 14: 29/24).¹⁷

In *Hamlet*, Polonius asks the brooding Hamlet, “What is the matter, my Lord?” (implying both “what is wrong?” and “what is the subject matter of your reading?”). And in a rather snarky, sarcastic reply, Hamlet quips, “Between who?”¹⁸ Here, Shakespeare is playing on another sense of the term “matter,” namely, as a conflict or a tension in between. It is precisely this sense of the matter, or in German, *Sache*, to which Heidegger harkens when he characterizes Being and Time as “matters.” Being and Time are matters of thinking; they are not things, not beings. What is at stake is the relation “between” them (a *Sachverhalt*) or that which issues them forth as matters: The relation relates Being and Time and yields (*er-gibt*) Being and Time (GA 14: 9/5). In this way, Heidegger approaches Being and Time not through temporal beings, but through the giving, the letting forth of Being and Time.

While one could use the predicative form, Being “is” or Time “is,” this would point to some particular thing that “is” in being or in time, reducing Being and Time to something before us. This would be misleading with respect to the givenness of Being and Time as matters for thought, as the “matter” that gives thinking and calls for thinking. Thus, Heidegger resorts to the expression *es gibt Sein, es gibt Zeit*: literally, it gives Being, it gives Time (though the colloquial expression in English is “there is” Being, Time, etc., which again would not only

presuppose Being, Time, etc., but would render them accessible as objects potentially at our disposal). In order for this not to be a mere difference in idioms or a theme of ordinary language analysis, it is necessary for Heidegger to turn to the phenomenological experiential dimension of this expression and to describe the “It” and its “giving.” How this *Es gibt* can be experienced and seen concerns the “how” of givenness of Being and of Time, that is, our relation to Being and Time without an appeal to beings (including Dasein).

Heidegger notes that from the very beginning of Western thinking, Being and Time are thought, but not the *Es gibt* that gives the gifts of Being and Time. How is it that we have missed the *Es gibt*? It is because, according to Heidegger, the *Es gibt*, the It gives, withdraws in favor of the gifts which It gives. This retreat opens the space for the gifts to be thought misleadingly and exclusively as Being with regard to beings, conceptualizing Being as the ground of beings, as Time with regard to the present (as the punctual now or as the living present); Being and Time can then become the objects of thought, the possible projects of calculative manipulation at our disposal, in short, the province of machination (GA 4: 12/8). Although (and this can be seen as one of Heidegger’s points) the fact that we could become forgetful of the giving at all such that Being as sending becomes Being as present – the forgetfulness of Being – is testimony to the withdrawal/denial of giving in favor of the gift. There must accordingly be some sense in which machination is also “given.” I revisit this point in my concluding section.

Allow me to continue by noting that this giving that holds back in favor of the discernibility of the gift is qualified in a distinctive way. What is the nuance of this giving for Heidegger? This giving, which does not give itself, but only its gift, this giving that holds itself back is called sending (*Schicken*). In other words, the way of Being as letting-presence, and which in its own way belongs to giving, is a giving as sending and as a making place for. Thus, Heidegger can contend that the sending in the destiny of Being is characterized as a giving in which the sending source keeps itself back and, thus, withdraws from unconcealment

(GA 14: 28/22). Being with regard to the grounding of beings is what is sent, Being is unconcealed (or more dynamically, unconcealing) in the concealing withdrawing of the It gives. It is when Being is disconnected from giving that the “metaphysics of presence” or Western thought only grasps the “gift” of Being as something present or as the “ground” of beings.

Similarly, Time is not present. Here Time itself – as is the case in machination – would lend itself to being managed (“time management”) or saved like something I could possess (“saving time”), or designated as some period in time (“modern times”), or some slice of a day (“tea time”); likewise, Time is not mundane and measurable “clock time” (“what time is it?”). Rather, It gives Time as the temporalizing movement itself that cannot be contained as a moment “in time.” Accordingly, the way of Time as letting-presence, which in its own way belongs to giving, is a giving as extending that opens and conceals space-time (GA 14: 20/16). This is also why, for Heidegger, giving that gives time is determined by denying and withholding nearness: “An extending is itself a giving, the giving of a giving is concealed in genuine Time” (GA 14: 20/16, tm). Belonging to giving as sending, we can also find a keeping or holding back, which is a denial or removal from the living present.

This holding back/withdrawing/concealing therefore also designates a peculiar temporal structure of Being as sent. The holding-back, the holding in abeyance, is epochal – as in the Greek *epochē*. The *epochē*/epoch is the holding back – of “It”self for Being and Time. Each of its transformations (epochs) remains destined in this way such that the history of Being means the destiny of Being. Being is unconcealed for thinking with its epochal modifications, with its manifold sendings that in some way take place as history (GA 14: 12-14/8-10).

If Being and Time are unconcealed “gifts,” then we can ask (to remain close to Heidegger’s formulation): What withdraws in the granting as opening of Being-Time, and preserves what remains denied in what has-been? What is withheld in the approaching? In the expression “It gives,” it is the “It” as giving. Heidegger capitalizes the impersonal

“It” in the expression “It gives,” not to determine the “It” as another kind of being, or Being itself – in which case we would have the idea that Being gives Being – but to highlight a peculiar presence of an absence in the It gives Being and It gives Time.

Further, he attempts to gain access to the “It” (which is not a being or a present) by thinking the kind of giving that belongs to it – as noted above: the giving as sending, epochal destiny, as an opening up that reaches out (*lichtendes Reichen*) (GA 14: 21/18–19). To evoke the dynamic character of the It through its kinds of giving, Heidegger qualifies “It” further as *Ereignis*.

Ereignis is often translated as the Event of Appropriation in order to capture the sense both of “eventing,” “occurring,” “happening,” and “belonging,” “appropriating,” “owning.” I supplement this with a different translation that captures the sense of *Ereignis* in these two senses, namely, “taking place.” However, although *Ereignis* is “Taking Place,” it is not only an eventing through which there is a taking or appropriating. Deepening his earlier sense of truth as *a-lētheia* or unconcealing-concealing, and retrieving the kinds of giving detected in Being and Time as noted above (sending/extending), Heidegger hones in on the It gives as *withdrawal*.

Accordingly, as much as *Ereignis* is an appropriating, *Ereignis* withdraws what is most fully its own from boundless unconcealing. Accordingly, “keeping back, denial, withholding – shows something like a self-withdrawing,” what Heidegger terms, in short, *Entzug* or withdrawal (GA 14: 27/22). Being and Time as matters relate (to) each other such that sending and extending are the modes of giving as determined by withdrawal. In the language of appropriation, *Ereignis* can also be said “to expropriate” itself such that expropriation too belongs to *Ereignis* as such. By this expropriation, *Ereignis* does not abandon itself – rather, it preserves what is its own or proper to it such that withdrawal belongs to “It” (GA 14: 28, 19/22–3, 15).

There are two further points upon which I would like to focus, points that concern Heidegger’s descriptions of *Ereignis* presented here. I do this before turning to more critical observations regarding giving and the gift.

First, in Heidegger's description of *Ereignis*, the gift of presence, Being, which is the "property" (*Eigentum*) of *Ereignis* as appropriation or taking place, vanishes in *Ereignis*. Any "as" structure – and all that it implies – any "as" structure that would hold in tension a dynamic unity in difference *disappears* in Heidegger's description of *Ereignis*. Thus, Heidegger tells us that in the expression "Being 'as' *Ereignis*," Being now means simply letting-presence in *Ereignis*; where Time is concerned, "Time 'as' *Ereignis*" now means simply extending-opening in *Ereignis*. We could put it this way in short: *Sein und Zeit ereignend im Ereignis*, or Being and Time taking place in Taking Place. Ultimately, this means "only" *das Ereignis ereignet*, Taking Place takes place: "only" sheer eventing (GA 14: 29/24).

When we become attuned to sheer eventing in this way, we realize that the attempt "to overcome" metaphysics only reinforces metaphysics, so that the proper thinking on this matter – or the proper way to expose oneself to the matter itself, which can be realized in poetry and art, as well as in philosophy – calls thinking simply to cease all overcoming, and to let metaphysics go its own way (GA 14: 30/24).

Second, Being and Time are gifts of giving, where the giving is qualified as sending/extending-opening. Given that "It" withdraws in favor of the gifts; given that "It" gives, given that *Ereignis* withdraws in expropriation as appropriation, given that the "as" structure disappears, what is the "status" of the gifts (if we are allowed to put it this way)? What "*happens*" to the gifts?

Heidegger assures us that while the withdrawal is peculiar to *Ereignis*, while we lose this tension of the "as," the gifts are not expunged from the giving in the withdrawal.¹⁹ The gifts, Heidegger reassures us, are retained in the self-withdrawing sending of giving. Being and Time are properties of *Ereignis* (in the sense of being proper to "It"); they belong to the "It gives"; accordingly, Being and Time, the gifts, disappear in *Ereignis*. Being and Time are appropriated in *Ereignis*: or Being and Time take place in Taking Place as expropriation.

In and of itself, and at least on a certain reading, Heidegger's descriptions may not be seen as problematic. After all, Heidegger is attempting to

evoke the sheer unmotivated event of being released as letting-presence such that the gifts of Being and Time take place in *Ereignis*, in Taking Place. While we can follow Heidegger to the extent that the gifts *take place in* Taking Place; while we might rest assured that the gifts are *retained* in the giving and not forsaken; while we can be reassured that the gifts *belong properly to Ereignis*, it is necessary, on my view, to make the following observation explicit: While the gifts are retained, for Heidegger, they are not retained *as* gifts.

These observations allow us to raise the following questions: If the gifts take place in *Ereignis*, if they are not expunged, does *Ereignis* take place *in* or *as* the gifts? Put still differently: Does the eventful giving accompany the gifts as gifts? However, nowhere in “Time and Being” (in the explication of the retention of the gifts in the giving), nowhere in the comfort that the gifts are not lost, nowhere do we have a further recognition or even hint that the *giving is revealed in and takes Its place in the gifts*, in other words, that *Ereignis* takes place *as* gifts, or is taken up *in* the gifts.

For Heidegger’s part, interestingly, the gifts of Being and Time *do* qualify the happening in *Ereignis* when the “as” disappears. This is to say that *Ereignis, while impersonal, is not neutral* because “It” is not the same upon the delivery of the gifts of Being and Time. The “as” vanishes, but Being and Time retained in *Ereignis* means that *Ereignis* is qualified *according to the gifts*: Being colors *Ereignis* in the way of Being/sending (“Anwesenlassen geschickt im Ereignen”); Time colors *Ereignis* in the way of Time/extending-opening (“Zeit gereicht im Ereignen”). But Heidegger does not go so far as to say that *Ereignis accompanies* Being and is *revealed* in Being *as* Being, that *Ereignis accompanies* Time and is *revealed* in Time, *as* Time.

Of course, one can appreciate Heidegger’s sensitivity here: He is trying to face sheer eventing, and to give heed to that indeterminacy and to that mystery. What occurs, occurs within *Ereignis*, and this insight seems to preclude his saying anything about how *Ereignis* occurs in the gifts. They are appropriated in *Ereignis*, but we can apparently say nothing about *Ereignis* in them. On this understanding,

for Heidegger, the point would be precisely not to take responsibility for the sending or extending-opening, because as Heidegger attempts to evoke it in another work, it is that “enigmatic region where there is nothing for which to be responsible [*wo es nichts zu verantworten gibt*]” (GA 77: 120/78, tm).

The point would rather be *not to obscure the sheer eventing* or sheer “gifting” in whichever way the gift has been delivered over to itself, appropriated in the eventing. The gifts are no-thing. *Ereignis* is no-thing, and our effort, the thinkers’ effort (if it can be called that) is to step-back to a more originary dimension of experience, and *to reflect* (to think and to mirror) *Ereignis* taking place, to let “take place” without intrusion or getting in the way of the giving. Our thinking “task” would therefore reflect non-obtrusively, without memory, without anticipation, “Taking-place” taking-place. Sheer eventing.

III. CRITICAL OBSERVATIONS: THE GIFTS AND RESPONSIBILITY

We have seemingly taken a few steps back, from beings to Being, from Being and Time as gifts to giving, from giving to the “It” as *Ereignis*. According to Heidegger, the gifts are not expurgated, but retained in *Ereignis*; Time and Being take place in Taking Place, disappearing as they send/extend-open. Sheer eventing as sheer destining in this way admits decisively no point or motivation for responsibility.

For Heidegger, the forgetfulness of Being, and machination that is occasioned by the withdrawal, cannot be due simply to a deficit in human existence; rather, in a more primordial manner, “It gives” itself to be forgotten. Original forgetfulness would then be the veiling (*Verhüllung*) of the difference between Being and beings understood as concealment. This veiling “has in turn withdrawn itself from the beginning” such that forgetfulness is not a consequence of mere human thinking (or unthinking), *but must be somehow endemic to the withdrawal itself*. Machination is a sent forgetfulness rooted in the denial of the presencing of Being, as withholding the disclosure of *Ereignis* (GA 11: 59/50).²⁰

But, to play on Heidegger's metaphors, do we not also need a step-forward, completing the step-back? On my view, not only do we have to recognize that the gifts are retained in the giving, as Heidegger recognizes; we also have to acknowledge that *giving accompanies its givenness in and as the gifts*. To put it in Heidegger's terms, we would insist that Time "takes place" as the revelation, as the extending-opening of *Er-ignis*; Being "takes place" as the revelation, as the sending-presence of *Ereignis*. Recognizing this, or going this far, however, would be going too far for the position advocated by Heidegger because it would place his thinking into a radically different structure in a two-fold sense.

First, if the "as" structure were to remain functional, *Ereignis* – in sustaining Being and Time as Being and Time, in sustaining them as gifts – would retain the tension of the revelatory gifts, Being and Time. Second, if this were the case, the sustaining-giving at this level would have to be qualified more radically, expressive of this distinctive structure – not as a sending or extending-opening – but, I suggest, in terms of the emotional sphere of the person, and more specifically as loving, as a unique *Ereignis* of difference, to play on Heidegger's terms. Eventful giving as loving in turn would qualify the impersonal "It" or *Ereignis* now as Lover-Loving Movement, becoming in and through loving; the gifts would be qualified as the "beloveds."

We are not simply replacing terms here (loving for giving, Lover for *Ereignis*, beloveds for gifts). There is a qualitative and decisive difference: Loving, by virtue of its very structure, "*cannot withdraw, deny, or hold back*, such that infinite Loving "must" boundlessly accompany its "free," creative revelation (which is also a self-revelation) as and in the beloved.²¹ (For instance, in the movement of loving, I cannot anticipate an end to loving, e.g., "I will stop loving you in five years," etc.)²² The taking place of that Loving is not merely "Being," or a mode of being (Da-sein), but the "beloved," which is precisely the be-loved as retaining and creatively originating the revelation of loving *as* such. Where human beings are concerned, the loving is qualified personally, such that the Lover is revealed as Person, and the beloveds who love as persons.

Loving holds or sustains the dynamic tension of Lover and beloved in their difference (through the “event of difference,” or rather, personal loving). More specifically, the Lover reveals itself through loving *as* beloved. To be sure, it holds the beloved in loving, but the Lover also *accompanies* the beloved in that revelation. Rather than expropriation or simply appropriation; rather than denying, withholding, holding back, we would understand loving as “necessarily,” infinitely accompanying its own revelation, vigilant in its loving, as letting beloveds become what or, in an inter-Personal and interpersonal nexus, who they are. The individuals are let be . . . but in their uniqueness, without vigilant, overabundant loving somehow reducing them to radical immanence.²⁵

We find such an experience articulated – not in the *paganism* of the ancient Greeks, who for Heidegger already stood within Being and hence did not have or need culture²⁴ – in the Abrahamic mystics: in the Sufi experience of *baqa* or sustaining, in the experience of the sparks of Holiness being contained in every shard of the broken vessels, or in the Name being found in every name, or again where the “Father,” “Mother,” or “Parent” is given as and in the children, uniquely. It comes down to being able to account for individuation, uniqueness in an interpersonal and inter-Personal nexus.

On this understanding, machination would be problematic because of the over-accompanying Loving that is always somehow there, because machination goes against the presence of person, infinite and/or finite. It is not due to the withdrawal of giving or the forgetfulness of Being, but to the violation of loving where infinite Person and finite persons are concerned. The problem of machination is *experienced* most profoundly in this way, in the turning away from persistent Loving. This also means that the revelation of Loving is what is “normal,” and it is machination that is “abnormal” because it takes place within the ongoing vigilance of Loving.²⁵ In short, characterizing the movement as the “withdrawal,” “denial,” “withholding” of *Ereignis*/giving constitutes a profound *misunderstanding* of our belonging-together, a misunderstanding that we can see has dramatic consequences for Heidegger.

One of the consequences is the following. For the Heidegger of the *Black Notebooks*, both the “matter and way” of our philosophizing “is never thinking about ‘others’ – the ‘you’” (and even less so about the “I”), but uniquely about and for the origin of Being.²⁶ For Heidegger, thinking at its most profound core is not about the “others” in the sense of the plural, or about the other, the You, in the sense of singular uniqueness, or about Myself in the dynamic relational or vocational sense, or even about the “I-you” word-pair, as in Martin Buber’s thinking.²⁷

But for the mystics of the Abrahamic “culture,” for whom loving is central, and who also “retreat” and seek the “source” through the experience, God, the Holy, the Origin, or the Godhead is immediately and directly connected to the love of neighbor. It is not possible within this structure to be comforted with or within the origin of Being/Beyng and to be unconcerned with the “You” “the other,” or the I/Myself (where the latter is understood relationally). The so-called “religious” and the “moral” are inextricably and mutually bound and de-limiting, and for essential reasons.

To be sure, there are statements throughout Heidegger’s works suggesting that he is sensitive to the issue of uniqueness or individuation. Indeed, in the *Black Notebooks* he is also wary of succumbing to the intoxicating allure of the quantitative expressed in machination, and therefore of losing the sense of qualitative uniqueness. He gives an example: So that we do not become distracted from our “German” way, we should not assume that the killing of thousands is somehow worse than the killing of one person simply because the former is “more.” The single individual is already the most! This could lead to the danger of supposing that killing fewer is better simply because it is a smaller quantity.²⁸ Fine.

But without an interpersonal basis, how can we adjudicate this very qualitative dimension that Heidegger putatively evokes? According to Heidegger, if we ask “what” the human being is, we presuppose the human being as a human animal, and the implication is that we remain entrapped within machination’s order of the undifferentiated organic, biological sphere such that we treat the human being merely

within metaphysics' anthropologies. But, he asserts, when we ask the "who"-question of the human being, we appropriately situate the human as the in-standing in the Truth of Beyng.²⁹ The question for us is whether such a distinctiveness of a mode of being speaks decisively to the uniqueness of the individual concrete "being."

The problem is that his qualitative distinction is not "personal" and retreats from individuation in the interpersonal sphere to an individuation of the modality of the Da in relation to other modes of being. While machination might result in assuming that murdering many is worse than murdering few because it is "more," how can the mere modal distinction of the "who" of the "Da" of Da-sein take a stand against not only the murder of one, but murdering many *just because* it "amounts to the same thing" as the murder of one?

Heidegger expunged that problematic line that I cited above from "The Question Concerning Technology" (a work, by the way, that was penned after GA 94-97), namely, that the motorized food industry is the same as the production of corpses in the gas chambers. Could this be a sign that he took seriously his distinction between the "what" and the "who"? But what would be the Dasein-modal basis for such an expurgation or even for the prohibition against the murder of even one, which is already "the most"? Within the Jewish tradition, it is said that to save a life is to save a world. But this is based on the uniqueness of the person, e.g., within the context of loving-beloved.

In the face of the Other person, we are in the presence of the absolute uniqueness of this or that person as the Presence of Loving, Personal Loving. For thinkers like Emmanuel Levinas, indeed, the face of the Other is the trace of God, where the Other "teaches" the idea of Infinity; for thinkers like Max Scheler, the personal presence is exemplary of the Holy. This absolute distinctiveness is not "because" of "God" or "the Holy" as if the only value of the other person were the latter. Precisely as "gifts," precisely as having their own integrity that each originates uniquely, persons are uniquely "who" they are, without deriving their value simply from the "Holy" or the "Giving." This is a delicate issue that I develop in another work.³⁰

The point here is that I am immediately and directly responsible for the other person before I could choose to be responsible or not. This is what Levinas calls election, not “sending/extending.” It is not a matter of quibbling over terms, but the meaning that infuses them. An election before I could choose, which obligates me with responsibility and a new kind of freedom as binding me to another; an ante-memorial origin that accompanies His/Her revelation is not a sending/extending whose “origin” withdraws or denies in favor of the gift, and for which there is nothing to be responsible.³¹

If the giving accompanies the revelation in the gift, *as* the gift, then the integrity of the person/loving is given in every personal presence. There is a double demand and a double violation: moral and religious. Rather than withdrawal and forgetfulness, it concerns murder on the one hand, and idolatry, on the other; and they are intertwined.³² The inextricable double violation would at least provoke guilt (for what we have done), shame (for who we have become against who we most deeply are), and the possibility of repentance (turning to our deeper selves with others). Jaspers, accordingly, can describe both a metaphysical guilt that is grounded in a solidarity among all persons such that each person is co-responsible for every wrong and injustice in the world, and likewise a moral guilt in which I am responsible as an individual for all that I do, within a loving struggle between persons in solidarity.³³

Heidegger purposefully distances himself from “*an individuation in the moral-metaphysical sense of the ‘person’*” (my emphasis). Instead, for him, it concerns the retrieval and taking over of the modal character of the Da in the “self” from its ontological anonymity with things and tools, as standing in the clearing.³⁴ But for precisely this reason, in my view, Heidegger is still too far “this side” of specificity to provoke guilt, shame, repentance, and responsibility.³⁵ We lack the direct interpersonal encounter: the face-to-face or the person-to-person in which the other would be revealed and make us in awe, not of the source of Being or as the harbinger of a new beginning, but of the unique other and the unique “Myself” as beloved.

The “occurrence” of six million Jews gassed and tortured could not be an historical happening reducible to an anonymous *Machenschaft*; the mass murders in the gulags, the persecution of gays and lesbians, the institutionalization of racism and slavery is not an eventing for which there is nothing to be responsible, nothing for which to be guilty or shameful, nothing for which to repent. It is not particularly illuminating, to say the least, to assert as Heidegger does that there are slave markets in which the slaves themselves are often the biggest slave handlers – whether this be a veiled reference to our own place in machination, an insensitive or misguided allusion to responsibility, another way of articulating his reprehensible contention (during the Shoah itself) that the Jews are the principle of their own/our own destruction, or a citation of some historical fact.⁵⁶ Without the context and movement of loving, and loving given irreducibly “in” the beloved, there is no responsibility, no shame, no guilt, no repentance; we only have sheer eventing, which can only be historicized.

This may seem unfair to Heidegger. Of course, for Heidegger, to attempt to think such specificity beyond metaphysics is illusory at best, because we are not there yet. Rather than reinforcing it by trying to get beyond it, we have to let metaphysics be. For him, this cannot become a new ground of morality or a basis for religion, etc., in part because the latter are still determined within Western metaphysics. What they would mean concretely beyond Western metaphysics is still open, and thus for him still vague.

Yet we can still pose one further question: Does overcoming metaphysics as not trying to overcome metaphysics, does getting beyond machination, mean that we only need a different kind of *thinking*, a thoughtful speaking of the abyss of Beyng (e.g., Hölderlin, as the founder of decisive resoluteness)? Instead, do we not need to draw on the sphere that is most intimate to persons, namely the emotions, which are other than reason and sensibility? Do we not need, more specifically, a deeper kind of loving? As important as they are, our only exemplars cannot be the “thinker” or the “poet,” but the “lover,” or the saint, the *tzaddik*, the friend of God.⁵⁷

Problem of the Gift

The basic problem in Heidegger is that he, philosophically for his own reasons, could not come to terms with uniqueness or singularity or individuation in an appropriate manner. By stark contrast, Viktor Frankl does: “This uniqueness and singleness which distinguishes each individual and gives a meaning to his existence has a bearing on creative work as much as it does on human love. When the impossibility of replacing a person is realized, it allows the responsibility which a man has for his existence and its continuance to appear in all its magnitude.” He continues writing that one who becomes conscious of the responsibility that he or she bears toward a human being will never be able to throw away his or her life, and knowing this “why” of his or her existence, he or she is able to bear almost any “how.”⁵⁸

Let me finally hasten to add that this does not mean that Heidegger’s work is meaningless; it does not mean that it is contaminated; it does not mean that it is fascist. The philosophical difficulties are not just with Heidegger alone. In fact, Heidegger is at least confronting the problem in a profound, reflective way – which is more than what most of us do. We can still sort through those insights that are helpful for us overall. But his “matter and way” are all the more misleading because of his depth. What is called for when confronting the stranglehold of calculating managerial technologies or machination is not a novel paganism of thinking, but a rehabilitation, a reclamation of the emotional sphere of human persons, and in particular, the interpersonal emotions, which give us novel ways of freedom, critique, normativity, and specifically, a deeper sense of person.

NOTES

- 1 Victor Fariás, *Heidegger and Nazism*, trans. Paul Burrell and Gabriel R. Ricci (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1989).
- 2 In Wuppertal, by the way, Peter Trawny, editor of the *Schwarze Hefte*, was also a student at that time.
- 3 Klaus Held, “Fundamental Moods and Heidegger’s Critique of Contemporary Culture,” trans. Anthony J. Steinbock, in *Reading Heidegger: Commemorations*, ed. John Sallis (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1993), 286–303.
- 4 To date, the *Schwarze Hefte* or *Black Notebooks* make up four volumes (GA 94–97).
- 5 Thomas Assheuer, *Die Zeit*, N° 12/2014, March 21, 2014.
- 6 See Peter Trawny, *Heidegger und der Mythos der jüdischen Weltverschwörung*, 3rd ed. (Frankfurt am Main: Klostermann, 2015).
- 7 “Das Weltjudentum, aufgetauchelt durch die aus Deutschland hinausgelassenen Emigranten, ist überall unfaßbar und braucht sich bei aller Machtentfaltung nirgends an kriegerischen Handlungen zu beteiligen, wogegen uns nur bleibt, das beste Blut der Besten des eigenen Volkes zu opfern” (GA 96: 262).
- 8 Maxim Maximovich Litvinov (1876–1951) was a Soviet diplomat, the “People’s Commissar of Foreign Affairs” (1930–1939), and the Soviet Ambassador to the United States (1941–1943). As a Jew, Litvinov was unable to represent the USSR to Hitler, so was sent to the US as an Ambassador, thus for Heidegger putatively contributing to the worldwide proliferation of Judaic machination. (I would like to thank Peter Trawny for this latter observation.)
- 9 “Und vielleicht ‘siegt’ in diesem ‘Kampf’, in dem um die Ziellosigkeit schlechthin gekämpft wird und der daher nur das Zerrbild des ‘Kampfes’ sein kann, die größere Bodenlosigkeit, die an nichts gebunden, alles sich dienstbar macht (das Judentum)” (GA 95: 96–7). See also GA 95: 282 and GA 29/30: 261 ff. But such a characterization of worldlessness also strikes at his conviction that animals are “world poor,” and thus reducing Jews to what he considers the world-poverty of animals.

- 10 “Die Frage nach der Rolle des Weltjudentums ist keine rassische, sondern die metaphysische Frage nach der Art von Menschentümlichkeit, die schlechthin ungebunden die Entwurzelung alles Seienden aus dem Sein als weltgeschichtliche ‘Aufgabe’ übernehmen kann” (GA 96: 243).
- 11 In a critical assessment of “sociology,” Heidegger asks why “Jews and the Catholics” prefer doing sociology (i.e., rather than genuine Beyng-historical thinking). “Ist es Zufall, daß der Nationalsozialismus die ‘Soziologie’ als Name ausgemerzt hat? Warum wurde die Soziologie mit Vorliebe von Juden und Katholiken betrieben?” (GA 95: 161). What is “Catholic,” he writes as an obvious criticism, is absolutely “un-Nordic,” and “completely un-German.” “Das ‘Katholische’ in diesem wesentlichen Sinne ist seiner geschichtlichen Herkunft nach römisch – spanisch – ; ganz und gar un-nordisch und vollends undeutsch” (GA 95: 326).
- 12 “Agriculture is now a mechanized food industry, in essence the same as the production of corpses in the gas chambers and extermination camps, the same as the blockading and starving of countries, the same as the production of hydrogen bombs” (GA 79: 27/27). See Wolfgang Schirmacher, *Technik und Gelassenheit: Zeitkritik nach Heidegger* (Munich: Alber, 1983), 25.
- 13 Anthony J. Steinbock, *Phenomenology and Mysticism: The Verticality of Religious Experience* (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 2007/2009), esp., ch. 6; Anthony J. Steinbock, *Moral Emotions: Reclaiming the Evidence of the Heart* (Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 2014); esp., ch. 3.
- 14 See my *Moral Emotions*, ch. 3.
- 15 “Um vom Seyn als dem *Ereignis* er-eignet zu werden, müssen wir der Seiendheit des Seienden und der Vormacht des Seienden ledig sein” (GA 96: 108).
- 16 “Das Seyn ist aus dem Seienden niemals zu erklären und das Seiende ist auch nie die ‘Wirkung’ des Seyns. Unerklärbar und wirkungslos ist das Seyn – dies zu wissen gehört in den Anfang des Denkens. Aber dieses Wissen bedeutet das Offenhalten der

Unheimlichkeit des Seyns als einer Bestimmung seiner Wahrheit – ; wobei diese Un-heimlichkeit mit der gewöhnlichen – innerhalb des Seienden angetroffenen – nichts gemein hat” (GA 95: 290–91). Also: “Wir müssen aus tieferem Grund über ‘Kultur’ hinauswachsen – in einen wesentlichen Raum.

“Kultur – ist ein Gebilde – das nichts mehr zu suchen hat im Da-Sein” (GA 94: 196).

- 17 See Françoise Dastur’s analysis of “Time and Being” in “Time, Event, and Presence in the Late Heidegger” in *Continental Philosophy Review* 47: 3 (2015): 399–421.
- 18 Shakespeare, *Hamlet*, Act 2, Scene, 2, 194–195.
- 19 “As the gift of this It gives, Being belongs to giving. As a gift, Being is not expelled from giving” (GA 14: 10/6). “Always retained in the withdrawing sending, Being is unconcealed for thinking with its epochal abundance of transmutations” (GA 14: 13/9).
- 20 See Arthur R. Luther, “Original Emergence in Heidegger and Nishida,” *Philosophy Today* 26: 4/4 (1982): 345–56.
- 21 See for example, Max Scheler, *Vom Ewigen im Menschen*, *Gesammelte Werke*, Vol. 5, ed. Maria Scheler (Bern: Francke, 1954), 330–32.
- 22 See my *Moral Emotions*, chs. 4 and 7.
- 23 See my *Phenomenology and Mysticism* and “The Problem of Forgetfulness in Michel Henry,” *Continental Philosophy Review*, “The Philosophy of Michel Henry,” ed. Anthony J. Steinbock, 32/3 (1999): 271–302.
- 24 “Die einzige Volk, das keine ‘Kultur’ hatte, weil es noch im Sein stand und ihrer nicht bedurfte, sind die Griechen des 6. vorchristlichen Jahrhunderts. – Jetzt aber trieft Alles von ‘Kultur’” (GA 95: 322). See also GA 95: 325–26 and GA 96: 95, 125.
- 25 For a clarification of the sense of “normal” and “abnormal” here, see Anthony J. Steinbock, *Home and Beyond: Generative Phenomenology after Husserl* (Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 1995), section 3.

- 26 “Im Philosophieren nie an die ‘Anderen’ – an das ‘Du’ denken, aber ebensowenig an das ‘Ich’, einzig an und für den Ursprung des Seins – das gilt von Sache und Weg gleichermaßen” (GA 94: 28).
- 27 Martin Buber, “Ich und Du,” in *Das dialogische Prinzip* (Heidelberg: Lambert Schneider, 1965).
- 29 “Ob die Bolschewiken einen einzigen Menschen ohne Rechtsprechung und Untersuchung und, nur weil er anderer Überzeugung ist, umbringen oder hundertausende, gilt gleichviel. Unsere an das Quantitative gewohnte Zeit meint, hier seien hunderttausend ‘mehr’ als Einer, während doch ein Einziger schon das Meiste ist, was durch keine Zahl eingeholt werden kann. Damit wir die deutsche Haltung nicht verwirren, dürfen wir nicht, auch hier nicht, in den Rausch der Zahlen verfallen.
“Sonst könnte die Gefahr entstehen, daß die Tötung von einigen Wenigen gegenüber vielen Tausenden gar nicht so schlimm gehalten wird und das ‘Untermenschentum’ erst bei einer hinreichend großen Anzahl beginnt” (GA 96: 237).
- 29 “Solange das Wesen des Menschen durch die Tierheit (animalitas) vorbestimmt bleibt, kann immer nur gefragt werden, was der Mensch sei. Nie ist die Frage möglich: wer der Mensch sei? Denn diese Wer-frage ist als Frage schon die ursprünglich andere und einzigartige Antwort auf die Frage nach dem Menschen – dieses Fragen selbst setzt den Menschen in seinem Wesen an als die Inständigkeit in der Wahrheit des Seyns. . . . Erst diese Frage überwindet die neuzeitliche anthropologische Bestimmung des Menschen und mit ihr alle voraufgegangene, christliche hellenistische – jüdische und sokratisch-platonische Anthropologie” (GA 95: 322).
- 30 In *The Beloved: On Vocations and Exemplars in the Verticality of Moral Experience* (in preparation).
- 31 See Emmanuel Levinas, “Being Jewish,” trans. Mary Beth Mader, in *Continental Philosophy Review* (2007) 40: 209–210: “The meaning of election, and of revelation understood as election, is not to be found in the injustice of a preference. It presupposes the

relation of father to children in which each one is everything to the father without excluding the others from this privilege. Thus, Jewish election is not initially lived as pride or particularism. It is the very mystery of personhood. Against every attempt to understand the ego starting from a freedom, in a world without origin, the Jew offers to others, but already lives, the emotional schema of personhood as a son and as elected.

“In a new sense, then, to be created and to be a son is to be free. To exist as a creature is not to be crushed beneath adult responsibility. It is to refer in one’s very facticity to someone who bears existence for you, who bears sin, who can forgive.

“Jewish existence is thus the fulfillment of the human condition as fact, personhood and freedom. And its entire originality consists in breaking with a world that is without origin and simply present.”

- 32 See my *Phenomenology and Mysticism*, esp., chs. 6 and 8.
- 33 Karl Jaspers, *Die Schuldfrage: Ein Beitrag zur deutschen Frage* (Munich: Piper Verlag, 1947/1965). English translation, Karl Jaspers, *The Question of German Guilt*, trans. E. B. Ashton (New York: Fordham University Press, 2000).
- 34 “Da-sein trägt in sich die Notwendigkeit einer Über-eignung an das Selbst des Menschen, die von jeder Subjektivierung (weil überhaupt kein ‘Subjekt’ mehr) ebenso weit entfernt ist, wie von einer Vereinzelung im moralisch-metaphysischen Sinne der ‘Person.’ Die ‘Ver-einzelung’ bestimmt sich aus der Über-nahme der Inständigkeit im Da in das Selbst” (GA 96: 31).
- 35 See my *Moral Emotions*.
- 36 “Es gibt Sklavenmärkte, bei denen die Sklaven selbst oft die größten Händler sind” (GA 95: 455).
- 37 See my *Phenomenology and Mysticism*.
- 38 Viktor E. Frankl, *Man’s Search for Meaning*, trans. Ilse Lasch (Boston: Beacon Press), 79–80.