

Gatherings

THE HEIDEGGER CIRCLE ANNUAL

VOLUME 4, 2014

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Gatherings: The Heidegger Circle Annual

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The Paradigm Shifts of Hermeneutic Phenomenology: From Breakthrough to the Meaning-Giving Source

Theodore Kisiel

For the French Heideggerian Jean Beaufret, so revolutionary was the shift from the Husserlian Cogito to the Heideggerian Dasein, from an intentionally oriented consciousness to a historically and so hermeneutically situated ex-sistence, that he compares it to the gestalt switch of a paradigm change that T.S. Kuhn has found in modern scientific revolutions. Beaufret thus likens the transition from Husserl to Heidegger in phenomenology to the development from Newton to Einstein in modern physics. In both instances, the first insight led to the second, but the second insight involves a leap that renders it incommensurable with the first. “To anyone who places himself in intentionality, the experience of ek-stasis is inaccessible, just as relativity physics remains unthinkable from the point of view of Newton, even though Newton already espied the principle that Einstein was destined to develop.”¹

Heidegger makes his revolutionary breakthrough to a hermeneutic phenomenology as early as KNS 1919,² which portrays our world of ordinary experiences as thoroughly charged with meaning: “Living in an enviroing world, it signifies [*bedeutet*] for me everywhere and always, it is all fraught with world, ‘*it’s worlding* [*es weltet*]” (GA 56/57: 73/61), i.e., it’s contextualizing, it’s articulating itself into the meaningful wholes

that we call worlds. Beginning with the course of WS 1919–20, entitled *Basic Problems of Phenomenology*, he observes that these *Bedeutsamkeitszusammenhänge*, contexts of meaningfulness, are not immediately given and available for phenomenological examination, since they operate only tacitly and implicitly as the background of human experience. “Meaningfulness is not experienced as such, expressly and explicitly” and so must be explicated out of its precedent latency so that “we can then first fully understand what it ‘is’ and means to live factually ‘in’ meaningfulness” (GA 61: 93/70). This is the basic task of a hermeneutic phenomenology, its phenomenological re-duction to the tacit level of meaningfulness. This meaningfulness is never and nowhere immediately given, it is at most “appresent” (GA 20: 359–61/260–2), a tangential background presence that has to be brought to givenness and fuller presence by way of the hermeneutic-phenomenological reduction. “The domain of origin of philosophy... can only be made accessible by the attitude of original science [*Urwissenschaft*] – the domain of origin [*Ursprungsgebiet*] is not given to us. We know nothing of it from ‘practical life.’ It is far from us, we must bring it nearer to us *methodologically*” (GA 58: 203/153; also 26–27/22–23). And yet this original domain in its original vitality is what at first is nearest to us. “Something that lies so near to us that we mostly do not even expressly concern ourselves with it. Something from which we have no distance at all even to see it in its ‘at all’; and the distance *to* it is lacking because we are it itself, and we see ourselves only from out of the life itself that we are, that is us (accusative), in its own directions” (GA 58: 29/24). What is constituent of this simple nearness that we are in our intimate life of meaningfulness?

This earliest passage in the Heideggerian opus on the near-far interplay in the basic phenomenon of phenomenology will recur throughout Heidegger’s lifelong *Denkweg*, in discussions of his central topic of *Sein*, *Da-sein*, *das Ereignis*, etc., for example: “Dasein is ontically ‘nearest’ to itself and ontologically farthest; but pre-ontologically it is certainly not a stranger” (GA 2: 22/SZ 16). “Dasein is ontically indeed not only near or even the nearest, we *are* it, each of us, we ourselves. In spite of this or rather because of this, it is ontologically the farthest” (GA 2: 21/SZ 15).

And in the “Letter on ‘Humanism’” (1947): “Being is essentially farther than all beings and is yet nearer to the human being than every being, be it a rock, an animal, an artwork, a machine, be it an angel or God. Being is the nearest. Yet the near remains farthest from the human being” (GA 9: 331/252). In a further discussion of the near-far interplay, the “Letter” then provides a powerful hermeneutic clue of the intimate identification we have with our native language: “As simple, being remains mysterious, the simple nearness of unobtrusive prevailing. The nearness occurs essentially as language itself. . . . But language is the house of being in which the human being ex-sists by dwelling, in that he belongs to the truth of being, guarding it” (GA 9: 333/253-54).

But decades before the emphasis falls on our intimate dwelling in the language of being, it falls upon the vitally intimate and intensive sense of the self that develops in the life each of us has in our respective concrete historical situations. History here is a peculiarly “reflexive” dimension built into life itself; it is not objectified history but rather lived history, which is situated in the spontaneous experiencing OF experience, the streaming return of experiencing life upon already experienced life. “The empowering experience of experience that takes itself along is the understanding intuition, the *hermeneutic intuition*, the originary phenomenological back-and-forth formation of re-cepts and pre-cepts from which all theoretical objectification, indeed all transcendent positing, falls out” (GA 56/57: 117/99).⁵ “History is here not understood as historical science but as living co-experiencing, as life’s being familiar with itself and its fullness” (GA 58: 252/190). This is the intimate experience of my “having” myself. “Having myself is no staring at an object, no fixed determination, but rather the living process of winning and losing familiarity with concrete lived life itself. As a process it is not a dwelling upon an object but an inclination, originating from life experiences, toward new, living, proximate horizons, it is an originating and inclination in which I, in living, *am intelligible to myself*, even if what is experienced presents the most difficult puzzle of my existence. The intelligible context is life itself and therein I have my self” (GA 58: 165/126).

This intelligible context in which I have myself constitutes a sphere of self-sufficiency (*Selbstgenügsamkeit*) that sustains my life of meaning in all of the tasks and demands that life poses to itself and resolves for itself without having to leave this sphere of meaning. “Life always addresses and answers itself in its own language. Structurally, life does not need to spin out of itself in order to maintain itself in its meaning. Its structure suffices unto itself, even to somehow overcome again and again its imperfections, its insufficiencies, in all possible forms and contingencies and conditions – this is what the sense of ‘self-sufficiency’ means. It refers to a *structural character* of life that it puts upon itself: *that it itself is an ‘in itself.’* It bears within itself structurally (which pervades every how and what in their innermost content) the availabilities necessitated by itself as possibilities of fulfillment of the tendencies growing out of itself” (GA 58: 42/34). The phenomenological re-duction that overtly demarcates this self-sufficient sphere of intelligibility in which we meaningfully live brings to light the complex of tacit relations with our worlds and ourselves that each of us spontaneously develops in response to our particular cares and concerns (GA 58: 250/188).

The very terms of this early “hermeneutics of facticity” are drawn from Wilhelm Dilthey’s philosophy of life. Heidegger takes his point of departure from Dilthey’s simple insight that human *life itself*, precisely in this holistic and *reflexive* self-reference, already demonstrates the capacity to understand *itself* as a whole (*Zusammenhang*). This self-referential and holistic character indigenous to human life itself is the basis and justification of Dilthey’s lifetime project, in an oft-cited phrase, purely and simply “to understand life *from out of itself*.” In his quest for a critique of historical reason, Dilthey gradually renounces the elevated reason of Kant’s detached transcendental ego, “in whose veins flows no real blood,” and calls instead for a return to the “this-side” of life, to the full facticity of *unhintergehbare life itself*, “behind which thought cannot go,” the vital original reality given to human beings to live before they come to think about it, an irreducible ultimate and irrevocable givenness that human beings cannot but live in and are

bound to live out. It is the phenomenological return “to the things themselves,” in this case, back to the transcendental fact of life itself. Starting from the ineradicable givenness of the facticity of life, the phenomenologist must now enter into this life in order to understand it from out of *itself, in its own terms*.

But it is Hans-Georg Gadamer, freely paraphrasing Dilthey, who has given us the most succinct and telling formulation of Dilthey’s hermeneutic insight: “Das Leben selbst legt sich aus. Es hat selbst hermeneutische Struktur.”⁴ “Life itself lays itself out, explicates itself, interprets itself, articulates itself. Life itself has a hermeneutic structure.” Accordingly, a “hermeneutics OF facticity” must be regarded as a double genitive. That is to say, the facticity of life experience, on the basis of the matter-of-fact understanding of what it means to live and to be that develops from simply living a human life, already spontaneously articulates and contextures itself, repeatedly unfolding into the manifold of vitally concrete and meaningful relations (beginning with I-myself-being-embodied-in-the-world-with-others-among-things) which constitute the fabric of human cares and concerns that we call our historical life-world. Accordingly, any overtly phenomenological hermeneutics OF facticity, in its overt expository interpretation of the multifaceted concerns of the human situation, is initially but an explicit recapitulation of an implicit pan-hermeneutic process already operative in historical life itself. Factic life experience, facticity, is *through and through hermeneutical* (*understandable, intelligible, meaningful*), a meaningful whole thoroughly pervaded by the discursivity of speech (*Rede*). Put genetically, from childhood on, as we are acculturated into our native language, we have been embarked on a meaning-full voyage of discovery and interjected into the various contexts of meaningfulness in which we live, meaningful wholes called “worlds.” Heidegger’s formulae for the pan-hermeneutic character of human life typically focus on the milieu of meaning in which we are indigenously immersed: “*Life is what it is only as a concrete meaning-laden gestalt*” (GA 58: 148/114); “I myself” am a context of meaningfulness in which I myself live” (GA 58: 248/187); “I, in living, *am intelligible to myself...*

The intelligible context is life itself and therein I have my self” (GA 58: 165/126). “In factic life we always live in meaningful contexts that have a self-sufficient measure, i.e., they speak to themselves in their own language” (GA 58: 250/188); “meaningfulness [is] the reality-character of factic life” (GA 58: 104/83), its very being. The thoroughly hermeneutic character of human life is emphatically conveyed by Heidegger’s properly hermeneutical translation of Aristotle’s definition of the human being as *zōon logon echon*, not in the traditional manner as the “rational animal” but rather as the living being possessive of, and possessed by speech, of which the loquacious Greeks were his prime example. Dilthey’s central triad of *Erlebnis-Verstehen-Ausdruck* (living experience-understanding-expression) in *Sein und Zeit* becomes the triad of basic existentials that constitute our being-in and being-here, *Befindlichkeit-Verstehen-Rede* (situated disposition-understanding-the discursivity of speech).

Heidegger’s own compact definition of the meaning of meaning continues to accentuate the all-pervasive character of our hermeneutic situation: “Sinn ist das durch Vorhabe, Vorsicht und Vorgriff strukturierte Woraufhin des Entwurfs, aus dem her etwas als etwas verständlich wird” (GA 2: 201/SZ 151). “Meaning, [pre]structured by prepossession, preview, and preconception, is the toward-which of the projection by which something becomes intelligible as something.” This definition can be distinguished into the pre-structure of understanding and the as-structure of interpretation, as Heidegger does (GA 2: 201/SZ 151), or it can be more existentially distinguished into a contextual and a telic vector of sense. Richard Polt puts this distinction quite nicely in terms of the unique historical situation in which each of us finds ourselves: “Each of us is thrown into a concrete heritage, inhabits a meaningful world, and projects possible ways to act in terms of some ultimate ‘for-the-sake-of-which’ – a possibility that provides the *raison d’être* for one’s choices and in terms of which one’s meaningful world is structured.”⁵ That is why meaning is an existential of Dasein and not a property belonging to entities. “Hence only Dasein can be meaningful or meaningless” (GA 2: 201/SZ 151). It

is this essential connection of man and meaning that leads Thomas Sheehan to call the human being “pan-hermeneutical,” for only the human being is essentially in need of and in search of meaning, ever striving to make sense.⁶ Humans are pan-hermeneutical because they cannot *not* make sense of everything.

From the start, we already *know how* to live as human beings, and this pre-understanding of the ways of being is repeatedly elaborated and cultivated in our various forays into the enviroing world of things and the communal world of being-with-others, both of which intercalate and come to a head in a most concentrated and focused form in the most comprehensive of meaningful contexts, the self-world of our very own being-in-the-world. This *tacit* dimension of pre-predicative understanding on the level of life and being moreover revolutionizes our sense of both *knowledge* and *truth*. For the tradition that runs from Parmenides to Husserl, the basic mode of knowing is the total transparency of illuminative seeing, intuition, which in temporal terms means a making-present. In the context of a hermeneutics of facticity, by contrast, the basic mode of knowing is interpretive exposition out of a background of pre-understanding that by and large remains tacit, latent, withdrawn, absent and, at most, only appresent, a tangential and background presence that shades off into the shadows of being’s concealment (GA 20: 359/260).⁷ The shift in basic cognitive mode from intuition to interpretive exposition⁸ correspondingly shifts the process of truth from a saying-seeing identification to a chiar-oscuro disclosing and uncovering of dimensions that may well tend to remain concealed, like life for Dilthey and being for Heidegger, which nevertheless must be brought to language, at least an apropos chiar-oscuro language. At any rate, note the proximity of a hermeneutics of facticity to one of Heidegger’s most celebrated “theses,” namely, that Dasein IS disclosiveness, the locus of originary truth as the unconcealment of being. The *hermeneutic situation of factic life itself*, unfolding itself against the background context of the enviroing world of tool usage and procurement of products, the interpersonal world of social usage and communal custom in being-with-others, and the self-world

of striving-to-be and coming to terms with oneself in one's unique and proper being, *is the proximate disclosive arena of originary truth as unconcealment.*

In his book tellingly entitled *Husserl, Heidegger, and the Space of Meaning*, Steven Crowell takes issue with the sharp break between Husserl and Heidegger in the latter's movement toward his hermeneutic phenomenology, which would also involve a radical shift in basic cognitive mode from intuition to interpretive exposition out of a background of tacit understanding. Speaking against such a radical shift is Heidegger's appeal in KNS 1919 to the hybrid notion of a "hermeneutic intuition," suggesting an amalgamation of phenomenological reflection and interpretation operating in unity.⁹ That Heidegger even entertains intuition and so reflection in a hermeneutic context is unusual since in KNS 1919 he had already taken to heart Paul Natorp's objections against Husserl's phenomenology of attaining intuitive access to the immediacy of life experience by way of a reflective approach, since reflection exercises an analytically dissective and dissolving effect upon the life stream. Reflection acts as a theoretical intrusion that interrupts the stream and cuts it off, in effect stilling the stream of life, such that life experiences are no longer lived but looked at. But Crowell counters by noting that Husserl's reflective intuitive description is not objective theory but simply a methodological version of clarification.¹⁰ He also notes that Heidegger diligently avoids the term *Reflexion* to describe his method but instead uses the term *Besinnung*, which Crowell translates as "reflection."¹¹

But Heidegger himself clearly uses *Be-sinnung* with its full hermeneutical possibilities in mind, as "being mindful of meaning," and not as reflection.

I can in factic experiencing, in the context of expectation, in the full web of motivation, live unreflectively and still experience meaning mindfully, and thereby be thoughtful [*unreflektiert lebend, doch besinnlich erfahren, dabei nachdenklich sein*]. I can recall what is experienced in memory and indeed, by way of remem-

bering, factually undergo the very flavor of the experience again. What is experienced can weigh on me, occupy me, or I can, in taking interest in the experience, take notice of it, especially bear it in mind; I can “narrate” what is experienced and indeed in its factually vital movements or “pulls.” (GA 58: 111/88)

Taking notice (*Kenntnisnehmen*) is for Heidegger the first step toward expressing experiences in the narrative, dynamically temporal language that befits a hermeneutics of factic life experience.

I can in factic experience *mindfully think over meaning* [*besinnlich nachdenken*], bring what is experienced to my consciousness. I can *report* about it, *converse* about it with another. – *Taking notice* and *giving notice* are particular modifications of factic experience, which however do not fall out of factic life experience; they remain in the style of the experience. What is noticed are not states of facts, but states of meaningfulness [*Bedeutsamkeitsverhalte*]. (GA 58: 218–19/164–65)

This is also Heidegger’s response to Natorp’s second objection against phenomenology’s claim to simply describe what it sees. For such a description, according to Natorp, is circumscription into general concepts and a subsumption under abstractions, a language which objectifies the experiences.

Crowell also notes that Heidegger broadens the notion of “sight” to characterize any access to beings and be-ing, thus an access in general, and situates it under the existential of understanding.¹² But this will turn out not to be in favor of the sight of intuition and free it of its objectifying tendencies. Heidegger rather cites the circumspection (*Umsicht*) of concern and the regard (*Rücksicht*) of solicitude, both of which exhibit holistic tendencies that seek out the overview of contexts so essential to proper interpretation. Then there is the sight of transparency (*Durchsichtigkeit*) that designates the knowledge of the self as a whole in the entirety of its life (GA 2: 195/SZ 146). And intuition?

“By showing how all sight is grounded primarily in understanding, [...] we have deprived pure intuition of its priority, which corresponds noetically to the priority of the present-at-hand in traditional ontology. ‘Intuition’ and ‘thinking’ are both derivatives of understanding, and already rather remote ones. Even the phenomenological ‘intuition of essences’ is grounded in existential understanding” (GA 2: 196/SZ 147).

THE PARADIGM SHIFT TO THE MEANING-GIVING SOURCE

Thomas Sheehan has identified another paradigm shift that takes place at the heart of Heidegger’s hermeneutic phenomenology. In summary, the shift is from the field of meaning exposed by way of the hermeneutical-phenomenological reduction to the meaning-giving source that enables that field of meaning. Whence sense? What makes meaning at all possible? What lets meaningfulness come about at all? In his brief account, Sheehan provides a two-concept answer to this question, one that comes from the very core of *Being and Time* and the other from the core of the later Heidegger. What makes meaning possible at all? The answer: *die Lichtung*, the lighted clearing that opens a realm of intelligibility for the human being. But what then makes the clearing possible? The answer: *das Ereignis*, the properizing event of appropriation that throws us into the unique clearing of intelligibility in which we happen to find ourselves thrown.

A longer and more detailed account¹⁵ follows the development of Heidegger’s thought from his repeated failure to complete the published fragment of *Being and Time*, which prompts a radical change in direction of his thought that is gradually made known through his talks, lecture courses, and writings from the thirties on, most of which were not published until well after the war. Our story begins with the repeated attempts to draft the Third Division of the First Part of *Being and Time*, entitled “Time and Being,” without success. The fulcrum of the story is a reconstituted version of “Time and Being” that Heidegger jotted down, in my estimation, in his “cabin copy” of *Sein und Zeit* in the late thirties, and that sketches out the stages of the reversal into the new direction that the later Heidegger was pursuing (GA 2: 53n):

1. The transcendental difference.
2. Overcoming the horizon as such.
3. The turn around into the source.
4. Meaningful presence out of this source.

1. This recalls the overall title of the First Part of *Being and Time*, which was to conclude with the never-published Third Division entitled “Time and Being”: “The interpretation of Dasein in terms of temporality and the explication of time as the transcendental horizon for the question of Being.”

2. The lecture courses of 1927–30 seek to further elaborate the ecstatic-horizonal unity of temporality, which was begun in § 69c of *Being and Time* in a section entitled “The Temporal Problem of the Transcendence of the World.” Toward the end of this period, the single yet threefold horizon of time is subjected to increasing critique in view of its display of objectifying tendencies.¹⁴ Horizontal temporality will eventually be displaced and re-placed by grounding Dasein in the temporal playing field (*Zeit-Spiel-Raum*), usually simply time-space (*Zeit-Raum*) (GA 65: 18, 234–35).

3 & 4. The talk that Heidegger first delivered in 1962 entitled “Time and Being” most clearly makes the turn into the source and derives meaning and meaningful presence (*Anwesen*) from out of this source. The source, at first identified neutrally as an It, is initially said to let or allow meaningful presence, *Anwesenlassen*. The letting is more originally understood as a giving, such that It gives being, It gives time. The giving is then specified further as It sends being, It extends time, or more precisely, time-space. And the It itself? The It that gives is *das Ereignis*, which “appropriates being and time into their own out of their relationship” (GA 14: 24/19). Moreover, in giving, “the sending source keeps itself back and, thus, withdraws from unconcealment” (GA 14: 27/22). The meaning-giving source itself is self-concealing and remains insuperably concealed, the ultimate facticity beyond which we can go no further.

ENDNOTES

- 1 Jean Beaufret, *Dialogue avec Heidegger*, Vol. 3: *Approche de Heidegger* (Paris: Minuit, 1974), 117.
- 2 Theodore Kisiel, "Das Kriegsnotsemester 1919: Heideggers Durchbruch zur hermeneutischen Phänomenologie," *Philosophisches Jahrbuch* 99 (1992): 105–122.
- 3 The second, corrected and expanded edition of GA 56/57 gives us a simpler rendition of these points: "Phenomenological intuition as the experience of experience, the understanding of life, is hermeneutical intuition (making intelligible, giving meaning). The immanent historicity of life as such constitutes hermeneutical intuition" (GA 56/57: 219/187).
- 4 Hans-Georg Gadamer, *Wahrheit und Methode: Grundzüge einer philosophischen Hermeneutik* (Tübingen: J.C.B. Mohr, 1965), 213; *Truth and Method*, second, revised edition, translated by Joel Weinsheimer and Donald G. Marshall (New York: Continuum, 1994), 226. I am indebted to Eric Nelson for identifying the original source of this oft-cited line, sometimes mistakenly attributed directly to Dilthey himself.
- 5 Richard Polt, "Heidegger in the 1930s: Who are We?" in François Raffoul and Eric S. Nelson (eds.), *The Bloomsbury Companion to Heidegger* (London: Bloomsbury, 2013), 40.
- 6 Thomas Sheehan, "The Turn: All Three of Them," in *The Bloomsbury Companion to Heidegger*, 33.
- 7 "Auslegung ist die Grundform alles Erkennens" (GA 20: 359/260). What interpretive exposition is said to expose in this everyday context is the "appresentation of meaningfulness by way of bringing out into relief the referential correlations accessible at the time" (GA 20: 359/260).
- 8 Cf. Theodore Kisiel, "From Intuition to Understanding: On Heidegger's Transposition of Husserl's Phenomenology," in Kisiel, *Heidegger's Way of Thought: Critical and Interpretative Signposts* (London/New York: Continuum, 2002): 174–86.

- 9 Steven Galt Crowell, *Husserl, Heidegger, and the Space of Meaning: Paths Toward Transcendental Phenomenology* (Evanston: Northwestern, 2001), 134.
- 10 Ibid., Chapter 6: Heidegger's Phenomenological Decade, 115–28.
- 11 Ibid., 284.
- 12 Ibid., note 13, 283.
- 13 Cf. Thomas Sheehan, "The Turn," Bret W. Davis (ed.), *Martin Heidegger: Key Concepts* (Durham: Acumen, 2010): 82–101. The "brief account" above is distilled from one of his unpublished papers.
- 14 Theodore Kisiel, "The Demise of *Being and Time*: 1927–1930," Richard Polt (ed.), *Heidegger's "Being and Time": Critical Essays* (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 2005): 189–214, esp. 206–7.

Questioning and the Divine in Heidegger's *Beiträge*

Musa Duman

From early on, Heidegger had a profound interest in the phenomenology of religious life. However, the question of god takes center stage pre-eminently in his *Beiträge zur Philosophie*.¹ Forming the background to this text are lectures on Nietzsche and Hölderlin that Heidegger was delivering at the time of its composition. Nietzsche represents the experience that the theological god is dead; metaphysics has culminated in nihilism. Hölderlin calls for a restoration of the Greek sense of the divine, which means restoring beings to their primordial, i.e., “divine” sense. And the key idea that dominates the *Beiträge* is that for “the restoring [*Wiederbringen*] of beings” we need the last god whose occurrence (*Wesung*) belongs to “the extreme venture of the truth of beyng” (GA 65: 411). Arguably, the most enigmatic issue pervading the whole book is this notion of the last god located in the context of the experiences registered by Nietzsche (“God is dead”) and Hölderlin (“flight of the gods”). In a special sense, the *Beiträge* aims at arousing an “engagement and claim to an advent of the god...[and] to the experience of the flight of gods” (GA 65: 61). Here, the tone of thinking is fundamentally futural. There is the pervasive conviction that today in the modern age we have lost all sense of the divine to such a degree that any talk of god in reference to the present and past standards of the Western tradition is condemned to be devoid of real content. It is essential that we come to the awareness that we live in an age of complete godlessness. Coming to this awareness may, at least, stimulate a genuine sense of questioning

concerning god (and gods), which is what Heidegger wants to firmly maintain throughout the *Beiträge*.

As a first observation, one may well wonder whether the question of god makes any sense once it is accepted that God is dead. Clearly, there is a difference between a god which stands as a question and a god that is no longer taken seriously by questioning. For Heidegger, thinking gains its power from the sort of questioning it attempts to carry out, from the fundamental questions before which it stands. Questioning opens a space of original possibilities for the movement of thinking by turning it into an authentic engagement. In the *Beiträge* it appears that the question of god is the key dimension of the question of being.² This was especially so in view of Nietzsche's assertion: "God is dead." As we will discuss in the course of this paper, Heidegger circumvents the Nietzschean experience by holding that the metaphysical god is dead; "with the death of this god all theisms wither away" (GA 65: 411). Yet precisely upon this ground, a waiting-preparation for a divine god can be enacted from questioning in relation to being. The death of God, accordingly, did not render the question of god something empty or futile, but rather brought an added emergency and radicality to it. The death of God prepares the ground, through questioning, for the coming of a "new" god, "wholly other over against past gods, especially over against the Christian god" (GA 65: 403). The question of being is the field on which Heidegger proposes to prepare for this coming. In his late years, as is well-known, this found expression in the remark, "only a god can still save us." The *Beiträge* provides us important clues regarding how the question of being and the question of god are intimately linked in Heidegger's thought. Accordingly, in the present paper we shall explore such connections with a special emphasis on the function of questioning.

The *Beiträge*, as Heidegger views it, attempts at thinking being from out of itself and no longer in terms of the essential ontological structures that constitute human being. Heidegger employs the obsolete word *Seyn* ("beyng") to refer to the essential origin of being. Besides, as distinct from the fundamental ontology of *Being and Time*, the sort

of thinking which is at work in the *Beiträge* is called “being-historical thinking” (*seinsgeschichtliches Denken*). Heidegger ties being to *Ereignis*; *Sein* has an event character.³ An entity is, but being happens, or holds sway, or takes place (*west*). In other words, being is only as *Ereignis*. This implies that being as *Ereignis* is only in relation to man. This refers us to *Being and Time* where he argues that *Sein* is dependent on Dasein; without Dasein entities will be, but not being itself, which is the meaning dimension of beings disclosed in and through Dasein’s engagement with beings. In this light, it seemed reasonable to search into the transcendental structure of Dasein to clarify the sense of being given to Dasein in its most fundamental form. Dasein contains the ultimate answer for the sense of being as buried in itself, which needs to be uncovered through a careful phenomenological “questioning.” This was actually, one might argue, another version of the Kantian project, only given an ontological or phenomenological twist. Important is the fact that Heidegger, who wants to overcome all dependence on consciousness and subjectivity, grounds his analysis on a discovery of the universal structures of human being as existence. Now what we see in the *Beiträge* is that this picture is somewhat revised. *Sein* as *Ereignis* is an original historical happening which gives the arising historical world its intelligibility and mood. *Sein* happens (*ereignet*) in the manner of Da-sein, which is not human being but the historical and temporal site into which the human being is to leap in order to appropriate and enact his “own” essence, to come to his “own.” In short, Heidegger historicizes being through and through.⁴ There is, therefore, no cross-historical position to interpret the meaning of being and likewise one cannot speak of being as an addendum to beings “that simultaneously appears as the *a priori* of beings” (GA 65: 458); in any thinking that is oriented to explore the being of beings as something inherent in Dasein, being already happens historically in advance. What is at issue is this happening (*Wesung*), which comes before and determines all disclosure of beings; beings show up in this or that sense only in a historical world. Heidegger’s question now is: how does being essentially happen? Thus, he is no longer pursuing a transcendental inquiry. In a

sense, Heidegger erases the last vestiges of Husserlian phenomenology from his way of thinking.

Grounding (*Gründen*) is one of the key notions of the *Beiträge*. It would seem to be a metaphysical term. “A grounds B” typically means “A as a causal factor is a condition of there being B” or “A is the fundamental logical condition of B.” This is certainly not what Heidegger has in mind. Heidegger uses the word in its non-terminological, everyday German sense; namely, “clearing a space,” “making room,” “preparing ground.” So he asserts the need for grounding “Da-sein as the truth of beyng” through preparedness and ultimately through a leap (GA 65: 26). Leap (*Sprung*) is the condition of all creativity, i.e., of letting something original (*ursprünglich*) come about and take place. Creative knowing, understanding and questioning alone can “most intimately experience the essential happening of the last god”; being creative means preserving and caring for the truth of beyng, i.e., its *lichtende Verbergung*, in the entities (GA 65: 24, 29). Grounding is creatively preparing the ground for the event of beyng, for beyng’s taking place. Therefore, grounding Da-sein as a site of the leap refers to gaining an appropriate sort of preparedness or openness in relation to the truth of beyng. As suggested above, questioning has a distinctive function here: it “awakens and activates history as the site of its decisions” (GA 65: 5). Hence, it underlies and gathers a radical openness in thinking towards beyng and thereby towards authentic possibilities of being to be in-stantiated (hence *Inständigkeit*) in and as Da-sein. Heidegger believes that this questioning arises from and serves for a preparedness for the futural event of beyng, for “crossing” to the other beginning. It can prepare another beginning, for the answer sought for an essential question cannot come from the questioner but from that which is questioned.⁵ Consequently, grounding is preparing the ground for the “happening of beyng” by way of questioning.

In Heidegger’s view, in this thoughtful questioning, history and the ownmost futural possibilities of beyng acquire such a deep intimacy and link that historical time-space becomes a unitary whole (*Fuge*) from which the original sound (*Anklang*) of beyng can be heard as

hinting toward a historical future in a momentary vision. If questioning has an enormous potential, and especially so when it comes to beyng as a question (since it turns thinking into an appropriating openness to that which is put into question, to beyng), the primary requirement then is one of setting the question fully to work. Beyng is the most-question-worthy (*Fragwürdigste*), for only in and through beyng as put into question can a profound preparation for the *Ereignis* (as crossing), for the other beginning, be enacted. Furthermore, inasmuch as questioning is not merely instrumental, but the fundamental attitude of thinking, the other beginning as the arrival of the divine must be a full appropriation of it.

In this connection, the following remark deserves our attention: “Questioners are true believers because they open themselves up to the essence of truth.”⁶ Here, the essence of believing is linked with questioning for it is only in questioning that opening up to what is ownmost is realized. Thus, a belief in god would not be a belief in a set of fixed dogmas, but it must be an attempt to open oneself up to what is ownmost to god, which is truly possible only as questioning. By contrast, one might say, a dogmatic belief – leaving no room for fundamental questioning and urging blind acceptance of certain propositions – closes off a genuine relation to what is believed. The same thing also applies to rational theology, because the ultimate objective here, too, is removing any need for questioning by means of devising proofs about god. All apologetics for god, ironically, face the reverse of what they strive for; they take leave of the essential realm of the Godhead.

The question of god thus stands in sharp opposition to the theological urge to come up with proofs about god. Any attempt at furnishing proofs would be reductionist in this regard; it would reduce the divine to an object of mental mastery, which in turn only signals that the divine has taken flight and is no longer alive in the human life. Hence this god would already be robbed of its divine essence. Heidegger believes that inasmuch as there is a characteristic urge in theology to put god into a rational framework, theology can never speak of god without first alienating itself deeply from the divine. The relationship with the

divine that determines inceptual thinking, namely appropriation as questioning (concerning the complete loss of the divine in the modern world), arises from such a radical immediacy that it can have nothing to do with building proofs so as to capture and secure ultimate knowledge about the divine and thereby procure a complete assurance about things related to it. Rather a relationship with the divine cannot be a matter of assurance and certainty; it concerns the time-space of *beyng*, with *Da-sein* as the site of “need” and “emergency” (*Not*).⁷ *Da-sein* can be opened up authentically, i.e., it can be “grounded” as the event-site of the essential happening of the truth of being, only in and through *Not*, which leaves behind all will and drive for control. This *Not*, however, is not a “distress” to be conceived in modern psychological terms; its source lies instead in the truth of being (GA 65: 45–46). “Question-worthiness of *beyng* compels all creativity into *Not*” (GA 65: 63). This observation is relevant to the assertion: “*beyng* needs human being in order to happen essentially, and the human being belongs to *beyng* so that he might fulfill his ultimate vocation [*Bestimmung*] as *Da-sein*” (GA 65: 251).

This point can also be read in conjunction with Heidegger’s crucial claim that the last god needs being (GA 65: 408). We might say that the divine essence has a crucial intimacy with the way beings “are,” with the way beings make sense to us in the first place. In order for a god to reveal itself in its divine essence to humans, humans first need to attain a purity and simplicity of questioning which grounds the essential happening of *beyng*, making room for the holding sway of *beyng* in its own truth. It is in this holding sway of *beyng* that beings are restored to their primordial sense in which they become question-worthy with reference to *beyng*. Heidegger believes that god can be truly divine only in light of this event of *beyng*. Or, let us say, the last god constitutes its hidden core: “In the happening of the truth of being, in event and as event the last god conceals itself” (GA 65: 24). God needs *beyng* precisely so as to reveal its “hiddenness,” which is solely what can make it divine. This “hiddenness” has implications for the kind of questioning Heidegger has in mind.

In this sense, the question of god relates to the last god as a possibility, that is, the highest possibility that can initiate the other beginning. Crucially, the question of god for Heidegger is tied to the futural possibility of the essential happening of beyng. We can prepare the space for god in its divine essence only through the question of beyng. “Beyng, however, is the emergency [*Not-schaft*] of god, in which he first finds *himself*” (GA 65: 508). The *Not* created by the fact that being has abandoned beings (*Seinsverlassenheit*, or, what amounts to the same, “God is dead”) and that humanity is lingering in the desert of “complete meaninglessness” (GA 69: 223) compels a thinking that arrives at the question of god and likewise at the leap into beyng as the most-question-worthy. It seeks the divine through the question of beyng beyond all present parameters, that is, as an inceptual thinking. One implication of this line of thinking is, as indicated earlier, the belief that any talk of the divine at present is condemned to be empty and alienating, i.e., to be a “theology” (a metaphysics, the general project of “truth of beings” by which the Western tradition is determined as a historical movement of nihilism).⁸

One needs to bracket, therefore, all theological notions and keep silent about god. This might remind us of the final assertion of Wittgenstein’s *Tractatus*, with the only difference that the silence that Heidegger mandates here does not mean saying nothing. He contends instead that saying in its primordial essence is gathered first in silence and issues from there (GA 65: 408). Silence already has language more primordially and more authentically than any talking, a theme with which we are already familiar from *Being and Time*, where authentic talk (*Rede*), as opposed to idle talk (*Gerede*), is presented as reticence (GA 2: 392/SZ 296). Wittgenstein’s point implies that when we keep silent, language no longer functions. For Heidegger, by contrast, it is precisely in such a condition that language functions appropriately, that is, primordially. In both the factual propositions of sciences and everyday speech, metaphysics is fully operative as the historical background of intelligibility, which suggests that a contrast between the factual (or everyday) and the metaphysical language may

not be drawn as straightforwardly as Wittgenstein assumes. Stepping back from metaphysics is retreating to the silence of authentic saying, where questioning concerning the truth of *beyng* takes hold of *Dasein* beyond the domination of public standards. *Dasein* in this stillness of questioning gives ear to the word of *beyng* that prepares the other beginning. The moment, in a sense, penetrates into time (into the everyday) as *beyng*, or as the word of being; hence, the task of all thinking (as questioning) consists in preparing it; that is, it is something futural. The last god is the most extreme and hidden (and therefore defining) possibility of *beyng* which remains an absent and concealed source that determines all forms of metaphysical presence (beingness) as the modes of its absence. Heidegger's later meditations on language revolve around the belief that language plays a key role in the historical domination of metaphysics. The crucial part of the trouble is that metaphysically structured languages deeply preclude the essential functioning of language in relation to *beyng*, which is the moment of silence. In a sense, inauthenticity is metaphysically (i.e., being-historically) rooted. The other beginning then must involve a profound transformation of language. We should meanwhile note that both for earlier and later Heidegger there cannot be such a thing as "authentic dialogue."

Let us explore now in more detail how Heidegger relates *beyng* (as a question) to the (last) god. First, I would suggest that *beyng* is the opening-up of a world, a historical space of meaning which announces the mystery proper to being and beings. World is a deeply unitary space which is the precondition of any possibility of meaning, of any possibility that we can encounter beings, including ourselves. Humans are thrown into a world and they stand in it by way of throwing themselves into a future. We *are* in this historical world, in the midst of beings, always by way of "moods."⁹ Therefore, the disclosedness of being always happens in the form of an attunedness. Heidegger pays much attention to a "fundamental mood" (*Grundstimmung*) in some of his lectures after *Being and Time*.¹⁰ *Grundstimmung* is the way a historical world, as a space of meaningfulness, is disclosed to a historical people (*Volk*)

in a unitary and holistic manner. *Grundstimmung*, then, is crucial for a turning of history, since the other beginning can only come as a change of heart, as a turn in a *Grundstimmung* (GA 65: 20–23). Besides, because it is not up to us humans to effect this global change of mood, Heidegger’s talk of the other beginning as the beginning of the last god (GA 65: 405–17) is not utopian. When it comes to the flight and arrival of the last god, human beings can do nothing (GA 65: 20). As indicated, “only a god can save us.” Again, what we can do is only gain preparedness for this *Ereignis*.

Accordingly, *beyng* is the essential happening of a historical world, and in this sense, it is *Geschehen* as the founding event of a *Geschichte* (GA 65: 494). It is, furthermore, a historical world where the divine hints (*winkt*) to humans, introducing a deep mystery and awe to the heart of life. In a sense, it is the moment this historical world takes place (*west*). Because history is always grounded by a momentous beginning, the present metaphysical world can only be overcome by a new beginning as the *Ereignis* of a turn, that is, by the other beginning of the last god. The historical event that has established the Western tradition is the beginning ventured by the ancient Greeks, what Heidegger calls “the first beginning.” The argument goes that this original happening (ἀλήθεια, i.e., the emerging of “beings as a whole” from concealment, or φύσις, i.e., shining forth of “beings as a whole” that provokes wonder and questioning) has been lost in the Western tradition even though its initial echo (*Anklang*) can be heard here and there (GA 65: 188–91). These observations should remind us of *Being and Time*’s discussion of “tradition” as covering up, and the theme of “inheritance” (GA 2: 27–36, 505–17/SZ 19–27, 382–92). This original happening (*Wesen*) needs to be appropriated as historical action and creativity, as a break from tradition, which can eventuate the original (*das Ursprüngliche*), what is given in the *Ursprung*, as a leap (*Sprung*). Therefore, the other beginning is the re-appropriation of *alētheia* in a more fundamental way and an opening up of an authentic space for history. Only in the ether of genuine history can a supremely divine being show its radiance on things, can it bring the ownmost radiance of beings back. This might

have led Heidegger to the belief that a truly historical people alone, a people venturing the most dangerous but indispensable leap into a post-metaphysical historical future (that is, grounding the truth of being), is capable of having and celebrating the truly divine (GA 65: 113–14, 190–91). But, correlatively, a historical people can be a historical people in finding its god (GA 65: 398–99). This was actually “the historical mission of the German *Volk*” for the spiritual (metaphysical) salvation of the West as Heidegger contends in the *Rectoral Address*. Thus, the paradigm shift (so called *Kehre*), after *Being and Time*, “from the being of the individual Dasein to the Da-sein of be[y]ng,” in Bret Davis’ words,¹¹ does in a sense bring the *Volk* to the foreground as the event-site (*Da*) of being. One virtue of this way of reading Heidegger’s god (the last god) is that it also casts some light on Heidegger’s infamous involvement with National Socialism. It seems almost uncontroversial that Heidegger waits for a new god (or “religion” taken in the broader sense) for the German people, a “waiting” in terms of which he accords Hölderlin a crucial significance, as is fairly apparent even in the very late views expressed by him in the *Der Spiegel* interview.

Thus Heidegger understands his philosophical enterprise as having a preparatory character in relation to the other beginning, in the context of the German spiritual mission which, he believes, consists in giving ear to Hölderlin’s futural poetizing “reaching furthest ahead” (GA 65: 204). Yet is it legitimate to attribute to fundamental thinking solely a preparatory function for the other beginning as a world-historical transformation? Is it acceptable to direct all attempts of thinking to an uncertain futural happening (for which thinking-questioning is to clear the ground) while thereby bracketing the urgency of “the here and the now”? For Heidegger, this is something “necessary” because all frames of reference presently at work in the modern world are determined by metaphysics, that is, by the “abandonment of being.” But if so, how possible is it to undertake a primordial futural thinking (i.e., “inceptual thinking”) through the question of being? Given Heidegger’s radical historicism, is it truly possible to leap ahead into the other beginning, into the fully revolutionary moment of history?

Yet this may justify in part Heidegger's process of confining thinking solely to a preparatory function and referring to a possible god needed to give a new beginning, a different "fundamental mood" (as a different understanding of being) to modern humanity. At any rate, it seems inescapable that for Heidegger "the here and the now" cannot express any true urgency until the present frames of reference are put entirely into question.¹²

Heidegger situates the need for raising the question of beyng against the threat posed by machination and lived-experience. This threat in turn is tied to a danger of losing history. Consider the following:

The *organization* of lived experiences is the highest lived experience in which "they" find themselves together. Beings are merely an occasion for this organizing, and what place is beyng then supposed to occupy? Yet mindfulness [*Besinnung*] now gains a view of the decisive point of history, and knowing becomes attentive to the fact that only by traversing the most extreme decisions can a history still be saved in the face of the gigantic lack of history.

It is therefore futile to search through history, i.e., through its historiological transmission in order to encounter beyng itself as pro-jection [*Entwurf*]. An intimation of this essence of beyng could strike us only if we were already equipped to experience ἀλήθεια as in the first beginning. Yet how far removed are we from that, and how definitively? (GA 65: 450, tm)

The roots of the Western historical world are grounded in the founding-event, ἀλήθεια as a beginning (*Anfang*) which is so crucial that everything belonging to this history becomes essentially intelligible through it. Therefore, in order to penetrate into the historical world as a whole, we need to experience this beginning (i.e., ἀλήθεια) which is buried over in the tradition. This implies that understanding the Western historical world is not only something necessarily philosophical – it is what philosophy essentially is. As he puts in a later text, the

phrase “Western philosophy” is a tautology (GA 11: 9–10/WP 30–31). In the *Beiträge*, questioning had the mission of paving the ground for a new beginning. The challenge here was to free ourselves from “the already established direction of questioning,” because “a manifold leap into the essence of beyng itself had to be ventured, that required in turn a more original insertion into history: the relation to the beginning, the attempt to clarify ἀλήθεια as an essential character of beingness [*Seiendheit*] itself... Thinking became ever more historical [*geschichtlich*]... Beyng itself announced its historical essence” (GA 65: 451). Given that there is no history-free way to approach this historical occurrence (beyng itself) (GA 65: 451), it seems that we need to make a leap, the leap of inventive thinking (*Erdenken*), or of inceptual thinking which can ground Da-sein as the site of the event of beyng, and thus turn it into Da-sein. Heidegger brings questioning and the leap together, and, arguably, questioning (as the question of beyng) appears to be the authentic site of freedom. A further stage of questioning comes as a leap.

This leap, however, is only possible upon a historical ground. The reverse would be a Cartesian position, which presupposes the possibility of “seeing from nowhere,” of independence from history. To say that we are in being is to say that we are in history and we can make sense of things only on that basis. In other words, in the distance *through* which we can see things history occurs. If beyng is the opening-up of a historical world, being (*Sein*) is the established openness (i.e., the holistic space of meaning) as the gift of this event, through which we are humans and through which god manifests its concealment. Thus, beyng establishes an inter-space between god and man, through which man can receive beings and can “stand” amidst beings. “Beyng takes place [*west*] as the between for god and man, but in such a way that this inter-space [*Zwischenraum*] first grants to god and man a place for the possibility of their essential occurrence” (GA 65: 476, tm). *Lichtung* is another name for this inter-space (GA 65: 485).

Sein is a *Zwischenraum*, thus a historical world, which is “immediately” operative in all understanding and thinking and which cannot be reified either as “culture” or as a “worldview.” It cannot be reduced

to a constitution of “ideas” or to a transcendental structure of facts of consciousness. Rather this *Zwischenraum* precedes all reflective relation with beings. Heidegger’s being is a historically established openness that stands in relation to a historical possibility, namely, the essential happening of beyng.¹⁵ This possibility is basically the possibility of the advent of the last god, its “passing-by” as the fundamental moment (*Augenblick*) that sets the stage for a different historical world. Therefore even though being is the already prevailing structure of presence, it is to be thought in terms of a possibility which remains futural: neither being nor beyng can be made sense of in reference to anything present and actual. It is precisely this supreme ontological status accorded to possibility that makes questioning key for our relation to the essential happening of beyng as *Ereignis*. Da-sein becomes the site of questioning where questioning itself is the enactment of the openness to beyng that characterizes Da-sein.

This questioning faces the urgency associated with “the metaphysical diminution of the ‘world’ [which] brings about the erosion of man” (GA 65: 495). Because man stands in the world (in the openness of beings), and man and the world are co-referent, any metaphysical impoverishment of the world means the impoverishment of man. Heidegger also understands this impoverishment as the historical movement of nihilism which marks the Western tradition. Remember that only a ground-breaking event (*Ereignis*) can save humanity from this process of being hollowed-out. To repeat, this event is the momentous advent of the last god as “passing-by,” whereby beyng essentially happens: god “gods” only through (*durchgottet*) *Seyn*. It represents “the ground and abyss of god’s availing of the human being or, conversely, of the availability of the human being for god. But this availability is withstood only in Da-sein” (GA 65: 256). Ground is the *Da*, the openness, the between (*Zwischen*) as the site of strife between earth and world. Accordingly, this ground, as an open space, is not a ground in the metaphysical sense; rather, metaphysically considered, it is *Abgrund*, an abyss, a space altogether lacking the capacity of offering any absolutely firm and stable basis. Expressed otherwise, the abyss is temporality,

the space-time where man resides. Man and god relate to each other as the happening of beyng which is abyssal and to which man *as* man is exposed. But here we do not speak of human being as an “individual” or “person” which somehow involves the metaphysics of subjectivity. Da-sein is the whole communal possibility which is historically thrown and, as such, it is a historical project (*Entwurf*) to which human beings find themselves belonging. In other words, Da-sein is a people (*Volk*) in its historical self-projection, and thus not something objectively present (“society”). We receive the call of the divine not as individuals but as belonging to a community and to a historical world. It is this historical world which today stands in danger of being extinguished due to the domination of rationality (metaphysics). What is imperatively needed is a radically new beginning which can induce silence and awe in us before the mystery (GA 65: 262–63). Accordingly, it is only out of man’s enacting his belongingness to the historical world, only by “being there” at that moment of history that beyng can open up as the between through which god “gods.”

But, as indicated above, the only way Da-sein can be activated in respect of its most authentic possibilities is questioning. Questioning (as the question of beyng) steers man from the ground up and opens for him the highest possibilities of his being; man’s “being there” happens first of all as a site of questioning. This implies that beyng needs questioning, given that it is grounded in Da-sein. But if Da-sein is a communal-historical project tied to a *Volk*, Heidegger’s talk of the other beginning involves a fundamental socio-political dimension. Part of the lure of the Nazi movement for Heidegger was perhaps the fact that he dreamed that it held this kind of promise. This also casts some light on his obsession with “the future ones” (GA 65: 395–401) for the spiritual leadership of this ontologico-political leap; the future ones are the questioners and, what is the same, “the seekers” (GA 65: 398). They stand before the hints of the last god (GA 65: 83). Then the last god demands the openness of questioning. In any event, the emphasis laid on questioning (as a sort of ground) is, in fact, in direct opposition to the metaphysical experience of “grounding” (as certainty and security). The last

god can neither be accorded the function of a metaphysical ground nor be approached in terms of rational grounds we might devise. In fact, when Heidegger says that the last god is “over against all past gods, especially over against the Christian god,” he is arguing that the last god cannot be thought in terms of the sort of metaphysical grounding function that informs the theological perspective (GA 65: 411). Admittedly, the traditional god has a couple of specific functions; it provides security, it grounds certainty (as the absolute being) and it is a creator god. Heidegger writes:

A *metaphysical* consideration must represent god as the highest being, as the first ground and the cause of beings, as the un-conditioned, the infinite, the absolute. All these determinations arise not from what is godly about god but from the essence of beings as such, insofar as this essence, conceived purely and simply in itself as constant presence and objectivity and as what is clearest in representational explanation, is attributed to god as ob-ject. (GA 65: 438)

The above quotation concerning the metaphysical god has some implications about the idea of god as producing and governing the world, and, as such, as the absolute and constant power that grounds the world and all beings. This theological determination of beings as *ens creatum* in the Middle Ages is, to be sure, prepared by Greek ontology modeled on *tekhne*, on *epistēmē poiētikē*.¹⁴ In the medieval ontology, the interpretation of beings as *ens creatum* is underpinned by the doctrine of *analogia entis* which asserts a hierarchy of entities leading up to and grounded in the most-being (as *deus*). Beings *are* not in the same sense as God *is*; there is only an analogical relation between these senses of being. Heidegger believes that the modern technological understanding of being descends from this model as its final expression. Heidegger insists that even though the productionist metaphysics has its roots in Greek metaphysics, it has assumed an authoritative form

with the Judeo-Christian appropriation, leading to the hardening of the forgetfulness of being.

What is at issue here, among other things, is that this creation metaphysics covers up the ties between world and earth, the way in which earth and world stand in relation. Earth and world are tied together by strife (*Streit*) and history occurs in the realm of this strife; Being as *Ereignis* belongs to this strife. If history is to be understood from out of *Ereignis*, what is essential to it, namely earth and world in strife, must be situated at the focus. Da-sein must be experienced as the ground of this strife. By contrast, in the idea of creation, world and earth are isolated from and contrasted to one another as “culture” and “nature.” The natural world, in turn, is objectified as a realm for the assertion of man’s subjective powers (Descartes), a realm standing only as an obstacle to the growth and self-recognition of the subject (Hegel), a realm to be subjugated and transformed (Marx), and ultimately, a realm of technological exploitation and manipulation – a “resource” (*Bestand*). Accordingly, Western history can also be read as man’s growing violence toward and alienation from earth (and to that same extent, man’s growing homelessness).¹⁵

To restore beings to their original (*ursprünglich*) sense, we need to experience them “in the openness of the strife between world and earth” (GA 65: 7), to which man, too, belongs; the earthly (being more originary than the natural) can never be bracketed.

World is “earthly” (earthy), earth is worldly. Earth, because it is related to history, is in one respect *more originary* than nature. World is higher than merely “created” things, because it is *formative of history* and so lies closest to the *Ereignis*. (GA 65: 275)

In a sense, the Cartesian subject-object model is impossible because the background of the so-called “subject” always remains earth. This also contrasts with the dogma that man is created “in the image of God” as a spiritual essence and is categorically separated, in this regard, from all other creation. Pascal would speak of a “corrupt nature.” Man’s ties

to earth are only accidental, and history is construed as a progressive emancipation from these ties. From Plato's *Phaedo* to later Husserl's reflections on a "worldless ego," this dimension of earth is left out.

Likewise, the human world (as eventually a technological world) attempts to establish itself as triumphant over the earth. "Certainty" – which underscores this quest of absolute foundations (from Descartes to modern science) that will "render us masters and possessors of nature"¹⁶ – offers us a key in the representation of natural phenomena and is, in this sense, prerequisite for the mastery and manipulation of beings. Heidegger asks:

What does it mean that Descartes still attempts to justify certainty itself as *lumen naturale* on the basis of the highest among beings as *creatum creatoris*? (GA 65: 337)

God as the supreme being and the creator served as metaphysical bedrock here, and in this sense pushed metaphysics to its ultimate conclusions, to its modern form (i.e., certainty as self-certainty of the subject) as the whole framework of objectifying reason. As Heidegger will later say, metaphysics is an onto-theo-logical project.¹⁷ So, one basic result is what I would call the "banalization of beings"; beings were not able to be exploited wholesale before they were thoroughly banalized, for which theology rendered a crucial service.

Nonetheless, the banality to which the world is reduced by metaphysics leads to a drive to seek enchantment by creating and dealing with machinations.

The unfittingness [*Unmaß*] of mere beings, of non-beings as a whole, and the rarity of being, for which reason the gods are sought *within* beings. If someone seeks and does not find and therefore is compelled into forced machinations, then no freedom for the restrained waiting of an encounter and an intimation... (GA 65: 400, tm).

"The unfittingness of mere beings" (*das Unmaß des nur Seienden*) might also suggest the complete lack of luster among beings, their turning

out to be like “a monstrous pile,” like non-beings. The metaphysical search for the structure of beings, for their “generality” and “universal validity,” ends up forgetting being as such, and thereby losing beings, too; metaphysics can never experience a tree as that tree.¹⁸ This loss of being and beings leads to a search for gods among beings, as if to compensate the loss. Perhaps there is a certain enchantment promised by technology. Heidegger believes that this search is part of mankind’s drive for machinations, part of the emergence of a technological relation to oneself (*Erlebnis*) and to other beings, which “turns everything upside down, exhausts beings in exploitation” (GA 65: 417). How is it possible that we can experience beings *as* beings and that beings can provoke in us “the question-worthiness” of being? How can beings be restored and saved? We alluded above that only divine intervention can revolutionize history, as “the stillest transition into the other beginning” (GA 65: 98), that it alone can save humanity from destruction. We cannot by ourselves overcome this power-driven relation to beings (machination as mastery and exploitation of the earth). That is, we need *a* god’s occurrence in history, even if this occurrence can only be understood only as a “momentary happening,” an occurrence which demands from us our questioning preparedness. Questioning here is tied to becoming open to intimations of the last god.

Heidegger argues that this last god would be a god of intimations and thus would maintain the most intimate relationship with the human essence.

The last god has its *presencing* in hinting. . . The last god is not the *Ereignis* itself, but rather is needy of the *Ereignis* as that to which the one who grounds the “there” belongs. (GA 65: 409, tm)

Ereignis here is the moment in which “the passing-by of the last god” happens. This happening is preserved as the essential experience of the new historical world, that is, as the memory (*Gedächtnis*) in which the new historical world as a space of meaning is anchored. In this historical world, the last god takes place (*weset*) essentially through “hinting,”

through the deep intimacy which hinting involves. This intimacy grounded in the intimations of the last god serves to shelter the truth of beyng (i.e., *lichtende Verbergung*) in beings, and in this sense, is imbued with the care to preserve beings. This preserving of beings restores them to the strife between world and earth, and thus to their mystery. The last god hints through this strife that springs from “the excess of intimacy belonging to beings and beyng” (GA 65: 46). It appears that the other beginning would be a history of this hinting.

Naturally, this intimating god should correspond to a kind of awareness and knowing in the receiving human beings; intimation means making something known by suggesting or gesturing (*intimus*, the innermost). This innermost revelation through intimating and the knowing awareness (*Wissen*)¹⁹ issuing from it finds expression only in the form of silence and holding-back (*Verhaltenheit*) as a retreat from the language of propositions. Thus, Heidegger speaks of the possibility of the knowing awareness of the last god, but it is a possibility tied to the decision, a decision appropriated by the need of beyng; the last god and its knowing awareness are inseparable from *Not*, which necessitates “the most extreme decision about the highest” (GA 65: 406–7). Decision here is not an act of choosing between alternatives done by a free agent pursuing her interests. Heidegger resists this subjective interpretation of decision. Instead, an essential decision is *seynsgeschichtlich*; it appears when subjective concerns (i.e., self as individual) are no longer at play, when one lets the need of beyng be decisive. In other words, it becomes possible when selfhood (*Selbstheit*) leaps into Da-sein, into the historical space of emergency transcending all that is associated with merely individual concerns. This decision must be ventured because what is at stake here is history, that is, our essence as historical beings (GA 65: 508). The first beginning now ends in nihilism and all the ontic decisions that we presently make in this metaphysical-technological world derive from the decision that determined the first beginning. The new founding decision comes as a break from metaphysics, as “the essential happening of the truth of beyng in the form of the last God” (GA 65: 96). It seems that we do not decide but nonetheless participate in this decision.

Questioning is simply the proper form of this participation in the sense that it alone grounds a path of thinking leading to an openness for this decision. The passing-by of the last god signifies the moment of “the most extreme and briefest decision about the highest” (GA 65: 405). The passing-by of the last god as the founding moment of the history will be the ground of the knowing awareness of the last god. “The last god is the beginning of the longest history on the shortest path of that history,” i.e., in its passing-by (GA 65: 414). It is last because it “raises to the highest the essence of the uniqueness of the Godhead” (GA 65: 406). It is in this way that the last god remains surpassing (*Überholende*): it surpasses all representation and calculation (GA 65: 405). Indeed the last god shows itself as “the highest form of refusal” (GA 65: 416). This only means that questioning never overcomes itself, but gets purer and purer in each new step because it grows out of the divine mystery announcing itself by the refusal.

Heidegger suggests that an understanding of the last god is closely tied to an appropriation of our relatedness to death. Thus, he asks: “If we have such a poor grasp even of ‘death’ in its extremity, then how will we ever measure up to the rare intimation of the last god?” (GA 65: 405) This question recalls *Being and Time*’s discussion of death. *Being and Time* argues that we are only *as* mortal movement; without a relatedness to death we could not make sense of things, thus there would be no Dasein. An appropriation of our essential belonging to this movement confers on Dasein “a freedom towards death” (GA 2: 353/SZ 266). This “freedom towards death” underlies a freedom towards “the intimation of the last god” in the *Beiträge*, which is thus the occurrence of the uttermost and ownmost possibility of transcendence in Da-sein. The concept of fissure (*Zerklüftung*) is also relevant to the occurrence of this transcendence in Da-sein.²⁰ Death reveals the fissure, Da-sein’s groundlessness, the abyss in which Da-sein stands (i.e., ek-sistingly). Fissure is experienced in such a way that it lays bare the abyss which conceals itself in all absorption in the present-ness of entities and *a fortiori* in any metaphysical quest for ultimate grounds. This experience is *entsetzlich*; it displaces Dasein from the familiar realm of entities

(determined by metaphysics) into the claim of the unfamiliar by which original historical possibilities for Dasein become manifest. This claim happens as the hint of the last god. Death (as enacted temporality) opens up the shortest pathway (i.e., *Zerklüftung*) to the truth of beyng as “clearing concealment” or as refusal. The time-space of beyng, history, within which man exists is essentially abyssal (GA 65: 282–84). Fissure then should be seen as the disclosure of beyng (through the disclosure of ontological difference) as this time-space in which “occurring essentially. . . are the plummetings of the god and the ascent of the human being as the one grounded in Da-sein.”²¹

It follows that freedom towards death means standing before the fissure and thus standing open to the claim of the unfamiliar. Fissure as “the middle” of the essential occurrence of beyng is something enacted principally in being-towards-death.²² It is in this way “that openness for beyng might be disclosed – fully and out of what is most extreme” (GA 65: 283). So we can think of fissure in relation to “the law of the last god” as “the law of the great individuation in Da-sein, of the solitude of the sacrifice, and of the uniqueness of the choice regarding the shortest and steepest path” (GA 65: 408). In this sense, beyng can be understood only “out of its original essential occurrence in the full fissure” (GA 65: 75). Heidegger also believes that freedom is the gift of this abyssal character of beyng, but metaphysics hinders the authentic enactment of freedom, and, therefore, covers up the original possibilities of freedom because metaphysics is closed to this abyssal character of beyng. This suggests that the metaphysical experience of time (i.e., time as the infinite succession of neutral now points) is irreconcilable with the kind of temporality through which god is (hints) in history, which originates from momentariness arising in the face of death. The last god’s hinting requires that Da-sein is enacted, or grounded, that is, man is there, as moment-site, since the moment is “the time of beyng” (GA 65: 508) as something far more profound than the entire empty eternity of metaphysics. It then requires that we become questioners and seekers vigilant enough to correspond to its time. Being human is, above all, being concerned with the question

of being, the very asking of which is our “Seinsmodus” (GA 2: 10/SZ 7). And in the *Beiträge* questioning becomes the unique enactment of human freedom whose roots lie in our mortal movement. Correspondingly, death and (the last) god are brought into an intimate connection. It is only when we experience this intimacy that being can emerge as an authentic question for us. “And in its silence, as the inception of the word, the god answers” (GA 66: 353/314, tm).

Erices University, Kayseri, Turkey

ENDNOTES

I owe special thanks to Karsten Harries with whom I discussed many of the issues taken up in the present paper. I also should express my gratitude to Richard Polt who made generous comments on an earlier draft of the paper.

- 1 For quotations of this text, I mainly consulted Rojcewicz/Vallega-Neu’s translation: *Contributions to Philosophy (Of The Event)*. In one instance, identified below, I had recourse to Emad/Maly’s translation: *Contributions to Philosophy (From Enowning)*.
- 2 As far as Heidegger is concerned, one can always wonder whether the question of god is dependent on the question of being or the other way around. One may well make the case (though here is no place for that) that the question of being has arisen in his mind first on the basis of the question of god. It seems that, from very early on, Heidegger is keenly interested in the question of god, which is quite understandable given his theological background. As he states in 1953: “Without this theological background I should never have come upon the path of thinking. But origin always comes to meet us from the future” (“A Dialogue on Language,” GA 12: 91/OWL 10). George Kovacs puts it nicely: “The God-question in Heidegger’s philosophy is not a limited or an isolated problem, but in a certain sense, it is the whole of his thought from an important point of view.” George Kovacs, *The Question*

- of God in Heidegger's Phenomenology* (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1990), 22.
- 3 As Heidegger retrospectively states in a marginal note to “Letter on ‘Humanism’”: “For ‘*Ereignis*,’ ‘event of appropriation,’ has been the guiding word of my thinking since 1936” (GA 9: 316na/241nb).
- 4 Heidegger stresses this break from the *ontologische Analytik des Daseins* of *Being and Time* in the *Beiträge* I, §49 clearly enough: “In general: to rethink – in terms of the history of being (but not ‘ontologically’) – the whole essence of the human being as soon as it is grounded in Da-sein” (GA 65: 103).
- 5 GA 65: 437. In his “Postscript to ‘What is Metaphysics?’” (1943), Heidegger suggests that this answer is not a set of assertions, but the development of questioning itself in a more primordial direction (GA 9: 304/232).
- 6 GA 65: 12. See also GA 65, §237 for a similar train of thought.
- 7 *Not* signifies both need and emergency. Richard Rojcewicz and Daniela Vallega-Neu, in their new translation of the *Beiträge*, render it as “plight”, which I find inadequate. In the *Beiträge*, Heidegger raises the question, somewhat rhetorically, whether *Not* is the truth of being (GA 65: 46). Likewise he speaks of “*die Not der Notlosigkeit*” as the highest *Not* (GA 65: 107) which, in turn, refers to *Seinsverlassenheit* (GA 65: 234). Heidegger wants to lead us to the experience of this concealed ontological characteristic (“consummate nihilism”) of the age, which, he suggests, can come only as a shock (*Er-schrecken*), the shock of the *Seinsverlassenheit* that constitutes the basic mood of the other beginning (GA 65: 46).
- 8 See “Das Wesen des Nihilismus” (GA 67: 206–11), “Nietzsche’s Word ‘God Is Dead’” (GA 5: 217–18/163–64), “On the Question of Being” (GA 9: 413–15/313–14).
- 9 See SZ, §29, “Das Da-sein als Befindlichkeit.”
- 10 Notably in GA 29/30, *The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics: World, Finitude, Solitude* (1929/30).
- 11 Bret W. Davis, *Heidegger and the Will: On the Way to Gelassenheit* (Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 2007), 79.

- 12 Even later Heidegger's remark that "here and now and in little things, that we may foster the saving power in its increase" ("The Question Concerning Technology," GA 7: 54/QCT 33) remains questionable, because any sense that things may convey to us is determined, from the outset, by the metaphysical-technological world.
- 13 GA 65: 475: "beyng is possibility, something that is never objectively present and yet is always bestowing and denying itself in refusal through ap-propriation."
- 14 See, for instance, GA 33: 136-48/116-26. Here Heidegger states: "What the Greeks conceived as *epistēmē poiētikē* is of fundamental significance for their own understanding of the world" (GA 33: 137/117).
- 15 In "Building Dwelling Thinking" (GA 7) and "Poetically, Man Dwells" (GA 7), both dating from 1951, Heidegger argues, somewhat dramatically, that modern humanity has grown unable to dwell on the earth thus experienced. Likewise he had identified the *Grundstimmung* of Nietzsche's thought (as the mouthpiece of consummate modern humanity) as homelessness and its *Grunderfahrung* as godlessness and worldlessness (GA 50: 105-127/IP 15-35).
- 16 R. Descartes, *Discourse on Method*, part VI in *The Philosophical Writings of Descartes*, Volume I, translated by John Cottingham, Robert Stoothoff, and Dugald Murdoch (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985), 142-43, tm.
- 17 See "The Onto-Theo-Logical Constitution of Metaphysics" in *Identity and Difference* (GA 11); also "Introduction to 'What Is Metaphysics?': The Way Back Into the Ground of Metaphysics" (1949) in *Pathmarks* (GA 9).
- 18 One should recall here Heidegger's ruminations on thought's (scientific and philosophical) relation to a tree in *What Is Called Thinking?*: "To this day thought has never let the tree stand as it stands" (GA 8: 46/44).
- 19 I follow Emad/Maly's rendering here.

- 20 “The Origin of the Work of Art” makes the same point with the
notion of *Riß*.
- 21 Earlier, in “What is Metaphysics?” (1929), Heidegger describes
Da-sein in a similar way as “being arrested in the nothing”
(*Hineingehaltenheit in das Nichts*) (GA 9: 115/91). But already in
Being and Time Dasein is characterized in terms of “*Grundsein*
einer Nichtigkeit” (GA 2: 376/SZ 283) and of the resulting terror
of groundlessness.
- 22 See GA 65: 280 and GA 65: IV, §160.

Heidegger's Differential Concept of Truth in *Beiträge*

James Bahoh

In *Beiträge zur Philosophie (Vom Ereignis)* (1936–38), Heidegger argues his treatment of the ontological problematic in earlier works like *Sein und Zeit* (1927) is ultimately inadequate.¹ As we will see below, the latter remains determined by the conceptual framework of metaphysics, which he takes to prevent a sufficiently originary account of being. In an effort to rectify this, Heidegger recasts the most fundamental terms of his ontology. “Being,” he argues, must be rethought in terms of “the event” (*das Ereignis*). In other words, being – or rather, beyng (*Seyn*) – is claimed to be evental in nature.² A central task of *Beiträge*, then, is to work out what exactly the evental nature of beyng is.

Heidegger's account of truth (*Wahrheit*) in *Beiträge* is crucial to this project for a number of reasons. Perhaps paramount is that the question of truth provides the primary conceptual pathway by which thought can gain a first, grounded stance within the event. The essence of truth, moreover, constitutes certain essential structures and dynamic operations of the event itself. Indeed, it is through Heidegger's account of truth that he is able to begin developing a properly grounded account of the event, or of beyng *as* event. To these points, he writes, “The precursory question [*Vor-frage*] of truth is simultaneously the basic question [*Grund-frage*] of beyng; and beyng qua event essentially occurs [*west*] as truth” (GA 65: 348). Consequently, the way the essence of truth is understood here directly impacts the way the evental nature of beyng is understood.

In a number of other texts from the early-mid 1930s Heidegger maintains an account of the essence of truth given in terms of the dual, correlative structures of *alētheia* (unconcealment or originary openness) and *lēthē* (originary concealment or withdrawal).⁵ Much available scholarship on *Beiträge* maintains an account of truth in this text understood within this originary *a-lēthic* schema.⁴ In this paper, I argue such an interpretation falls short of the account of truth Heidegger gives in this text. Of course, the structures of *alētheia* and *lēthē* remain crucial. However, by inquiring into the ground whence these very structures are originated, *Beiträge* argues for an account of the essence of truth more primal than the *a-lēthic* schema. *Alētheia* and *lēthē* are grounded in an originary difference or self-differentiation (*Unterschied* or *Entscheidung*), which constitutes an essential aspect of being as event itself. In other words, Heidegger's concept of truth in *Beiträge* is most primally differential, not *a-lēthic*.

To demonstrate this, I will begin by outlining a problem Heidegger identifies in the history of ontology and his own previous efforts at addressing the question of being: that of thinking being within the framework of *Seiendheit* or beingness. In *Beiträge*, he aims to rectify this via a major philosophical shift advancing the independence of being from beings. I will clarify this by attending to the shift of his focal term from *Sein* to *Seyn* and the correlated shift from the *Leitfrage* to the *Grundfrage*. This look at the problem of *Seiendheit* is necessary for making sense of a parallel shift he advances regarding the essence of truth: the essence of truth must be detached from or independent of what is true. This will frame an account of Heidegger's conception of the essence of truth as *die Lichtung für das Sichverbergen* ("the clearing for self-concealing") or *Lichtung des Sichverbergens* ("the clearing of self-concealing") – which I condense as "the clearing for/of self-concealing" – together with a discussion of his conception of difference in this text (GA 65: 348, em; 329). "The clearing for/of self-concealing" is a differential formulation, that is, it articulates the differential dynamic that constitutes the essence of truth. To be clear, *Beiträge* contains no *overt assertion* that the essence of truth is differential in nature. Rather,

this becomes evident by tracking the specifics of Heidegger's treatment of the problematic of truth, which drive thought beyond the *a-lēthic* account into a differential account entailed in its logic and confirmed in his thinking of "the decisional essence [*Entscheidungswesen*] of beyng" (GA 65: 455, em). Additionally, Heidegger's movement during this period toward an account in which a differential operation is at the heart of beyng as event is verified by statements regarding difference in *Das Ereignis*, composed in 1941–42 (GA 71). It seems to me that *Beiträge* is richer in this respect than its author likely recognized. Yet, despite the major development that the differential conception of truth in *Beiträge* constitutes in Heidegger's program, I take this text to lack a satisfactorily *explicit* elaboration of how originary difference originates the *a-lēthic* structures. However, the differential concept of truth is poised to do just that. Thus, I close with a brief proposal as to how Heidegger's concept might be developed in this way.

I. THE PROBLEM OF *SEIENDHEIT* AND THE SHIFTS FROM *SEIN* TO *SEYN* AND FROM THE *LEITFRAGE* TO THE *GRUNDFRAGE*

In *Beiträge*, Heidegger advances a shift in how he understands being with respect to beings. Recall that in *Sein und Zeit*, being was always framed as "the being of beings."⁵ There, Dasein or human existence – a being – can work toward developing an authentic understanding of being by developing an authentic understanding of its own existence. In other words, I can come to understand being on the basis of the relation of being to *a* being – Dasein, my own existence. In *Beiträge*, Heidegger makes a radical shift: he finds it necessary to disassociate being from beings. In other words, being is to be thought independently of any relation to beings: "beyng can no longer be thought on the basis of beings but must be inventively thought from itself" (GA 65: 7). This shift is signified terminologically by rewriting "*Sein*" ("being") in the archaic form "*Seyn*" ("beyng").⁶ "*Sein*" signifies being, understood as codetermined by a relation to beings. Its conceptual successor, "*Seyn*," on the other hand, signifies being as thought independently of any relation to beings.⁷ The following passage crystallizes Heidegger's point

and indicates its implications for the related themes of metaphysics and the ontological difference. I will refer to it as “passage 1” later in this section of the paper:

There is no immediate difference between beyng [*Seyn*] and beings, because there is altogether no immediate relation between them. Even though beings as such oscillate only in the appropriation [*Ereignung*], beyng remains abyssally far from all beings. The attempts to represent both together, already in the very manner of naming them, stem from metaphysics. (GA 65: 477)

As I will try to make clear, I do not understand this independence to mean beyng is transcendent or ultimately discrete from beings. I understand it to mean beyng itself is *not dependent upon* beings or its relations to beings. Beyng is, to borrow a phrase Richard Capobianco uses, “structurally prior” to beings.⁸ Of course, Heidegger deals extensively with codependent or reciprocal relations of being and beings, as we find in accounts of the mutual appropriation of being by human existence and human existence by being in the constitution of a meaningful world. Indeed, much of *Beiträge* is devoted to themes within this register. However, I take this to be a derivative relationship consequent upon the more originary, and independent, operations of beyng as event. Though Heidegger’s accounts of both the primal independence of beyng from beings and consequent relations of reciprocity between the two are quite complex, and I will not treat them fully here, I take his basic logic to be straightforward. It operates at a first order and then a second order level. At the first order level: as a child’s existence is dependent upon the donors of its genetic material, beings are dependent upon beyng. “If beings *are*, then beyng must occur essentially [*wesen*].”⁹ But, as the donors are not dependent upon the child, beyng is not dependent upon beings. The child might cease to exist while the donors remain. This is a one-directional dependence. At the second order level, the donors might indeed become reciprocally determined by the child, but only insofar as they become *mother* or

father. “Mother” or “father” is a secondary determination of the donor that only arises insofar as it enters into a certain correlation with the child and becomes partially defined in terms of that correlation. The primal independence and consequent correlation of beyng and beings is the same: beyng is independent of beings, while beings are dependent upon beyng. It is only insofar as worlds of beings are meaningfully disclosed by Dasein – a consequent structure – that beyng becomes reciprocally determined by beings (namely Dasein). Yet, this remains at a second order level. The one-directional relation of dependence is consequently supplemented with a reciprocal codetermination. The term “*Sein*”/“being” applies in the register of this reciprocal codetermination, while the term “*Seyn*”/“beyng” applies in the more originary register independent of it. Arguing further for this specific logic goes beyond the scope of this paper. I will restrict my commentary here to clarifying what it means in *Beiträge* to suggest beyng must be thought independently of any relation to beings.

The reason for Heidegger’s shift is that thinking being on the basis of its relation to beings forces a determination of the concept of being on the basis of the concept of beings, i.e., the conceptualization of what beings are as beings (*on hēi on*), which Heidegger terms *Seiendheit* (“beingness”).¹⁰ A series of related faults are involved with understanding being in the framework of *Seiendheit*. First, it renders an abstract or generic account of being. Historically, a dominant procedure for deriving *Seiendheit* is the examination of a set of beings with an eye toward what is identical in all of them. In other words, the derivation of an essence by means of abstraction of a universal from a set of particulars, which might be accomplished by a variety of *a priori* or *a posteriori* methods. *Seiendheit*, in such cases, is that which most universally belongs to beings. For Heidegger, the paradigm case is Platonism’s derivation of abstract universals or *ideas*.¹¹ The Aristotelian analogue is found in his account of “*ousia* as the beingness of beings,” which replicates the problem: “despite [Aristotle’s] denial that being has the character of a genus, nevertheless being (as beingness) is always and only meant as the *koinon*, the common and thus what is common to every being” (GA 65: 75). A second problem

is that within the framework of *Seiendheit*, “nothing is said about the inner content of the essence of being.”¹² That is, the characterization of being is donated only from the character of beings, not arrived at on the basis of being itself. In Heidegger’s analysis, thinking being on the basis of beings *prioritizes* beings over being by making the conceptualization of beings as such determinative for the conceptualization of being. Third, moreover, extant conceptions of beings as such are not “innocent.” They are determined within faulty metaphysical, historical and conceptual configurations. Characterizations of being drawn from beings carry this fault. Fourth, moreover, characteristics of beings are characteristics *of beings*, not being. Failing to register this means failing to register the ontological difference between being and beings.¹³

Similarly, we determine being on the basis of a relation to beings, i.e., as *Seiendheit*, when we take being as a condition for beings (GA 65, §268). The problem here is in the application of the very framework of conditionality to being. Concepts of condition must be distinguished from Heidegger’s concepts of ground in *Beiträge*, which constitute an essential register of being itself as event: namely, *Grund der Möglichkeit* (“ground of possibility”) or the more developed ground as *das Sich-verbergen im tragenden Durchragen* (“self-concealing in a protrusion that bears”).¹⁴ This is differentiated into *Er-gründen* (“creative grounding” or “fathoming the ground”) and *das ursprüngliche Gründen des Grundes* (“The original grounding of the ground”) or *gründende Grund* (“grounding ground”) (GA 65: 307). We can set aside the more derivative fathoming the ground for now, which articulates ways alienated human existence grounds itself. Grounding ground, on the other hand, articulates the originary grounding dynamic inherent to being itself as event. Grounding ground is necessary for beings to be, but is not itself to be determined as a condition. Casting something as a condition always means understanding it as a condition *for* something: a condition *for* a being or *for* experience, for instance. The strange consequence Heidegger recognizes, in other words, is that casting something as a condition always subjects it to a co-determination by what it is a condition *for*; insofar as the former is defined in terms of its relation to the

latter. Although we *seem* to have good concepts for conditions that are independent of what is conditioned, his point is that applying the very framework of conditionality to something means understanding it in terms of the relation of condition to conditioned, and vice versa. In this way, thinking being as a condition for beings renders an account in which being is structurally conditioned by beings, not independent of them: “If beyng is understood as a condition in any sense whatever, it is already degraded into something in the service of beings and supervenient to them” (GA 65: 479). In *Beiträge*, on the other hand, grounding ground enables what is grounded on it to be, but is not itself essentially determined by the latter.¹⁵ In other words, it is conceived on the basis of the inherent grounding character of the event, not its relation to what is grounded.¹⁶ How this works can be seen in *Beiträge* §242, where the originary structures or dynamics of ground – *Ab-grund*, *Ur-grund*, and *Un-grund* – are unfolded immanently as part of the originary dynamics of the event, not derived from what is consequent upon them.

It will be worth noting that for Heidegger, “the original grounding of the ground . . . is the essential occurrence of the truth of beyng; truth is a *ground* in the original sense” (GA 65: 307). This, as we will see, means the essential occurrence of the *truth* of beyng must not be thought in terms of any relation to what is consequent upon it (beings), but likewise unfolded immanently as part of the originary dynamics of the event.

These distinctions allow me to clarify a point regarding how I understand the structural priority of beyng and the originary essence of truth in *Beiträge*. It will be helpful to mark my agreement and disagreement with the position on this matter that Capobianco has recently advanced. As he writes: “Heidegger’s mature position, in my formulation of the matter, is that Being is *structurally* prior to and a condition of meaning. That is, only insofar as there is Being is there meaning.”¹⁷ I take him to understand “meaning” here as shorthand for “the meaningful disclosure of a world of beings” or “the disclosure of a world of beings in their meaningful relations with human existence.” I agree that without beyng, meaning or worlds of beings would be

impossible. In contrast to Capobianco's formulation, though, my understanding is that, at least in *Beiträge*, being (as beyng, as *Ereignis*) is structurally prior to, but *not* a condition of meaning or worlds of beings. For, casting this structural priority in terms of conditionality inadvertently reinstates the dependence of beyng upon the latter indicated above. Moreover, the very framework of conditionality remains within the transcendental mode of thinking Heidegger disavows both here and in later works like *Country Path Conversations* (GA 77). In my understanding, to say beyng is structurally prior to meaning is to say beyng is prior on the axis of ground, where "ground" must not be conflated with "condition." This renders a different formulation: in *Beiträge*, beyng is structurally prior, prior on the axis of ground, to meaning or beings.

Metaphysics, in *Beiträge*, is characterized by its essential governance by the orientation to think the beingness of beings: "all metaphysics" is "founded on the leading question [*Leitfrage*]: what are beings?" (cf. Aristotle's *ti to on*) (GA 65: 12). This is complicit in its downfall. "Metaphysics' asks about beingness on the basis of beings (within the inceptual – i.e., definitive – interpretation of *physis*) and necessarily leaves unasked the question of the *truth* of beingness and thus the question of the *truth* of beyng" (GA 65: 297, em). Heidegger's shift to thinking beyng independently of beings aims to recast the problematic of being in a way liberated from metaphysical determination by the problematic of *Seiendheit*. "*Sein*"/"being" then, signifies being as understood within the framework of *Seiendheit*:

Being [*Sein*] is the condition for beings, which are thereby already established in advance as things [*Dinge*] (the objectively present at hand). Being conditions [*be-dingt*] beings either as their cause [*summum ens – dēmiourgos* ('craftsman')] or as the ground of the objectivity of the thing in representation (condition of the possibility of experience or in some way as the 'earlier,' which it is in virtue of its higher constancy and presence, as accords with its generality). (GA 65: 478)

Hence, “*Sein*”/“being” remains metaphysical in its signification. “*Seyn*”/“beyng” does not. Recall the point made in passage 1 above: “The attempts to represent both [beyng and beings] together, already in the very manner of naming them, stem from metaphysics” (GA 65: 477).

Beyng is not “the being of beings.” It is not to be understood on the basis of beings, in any way codetermined by a relation to them as its counterpart. Consequently the *question* of beyng cannot be oriented by the question of the being of beings. The distinction between being and beyng, then, correlates with a distinction between two configurations of the question about being (or beyng): the *Leitfrage* (“guiding question”) and the *Grundfrage* (“basic question”).¹⁸ The *Leitfrage* is governed by the question “about beings as beings (*on hēi on*).” For Heidegger, Aristotle’s *ti to on* (“What are beings?”) renders its “most general form.” Since it has this “approach and directionality,” when it comes to ask about being, it asks “the question of the being of beings.” The meaning of the term “*Sein*”/“being” ultimately remains determined by the framework of the *Leitfrage*. Thus, Heidegger argues that the *Leitfrage* must be supplanted. He does this with the *Grundfrage*, for which “the starting point is not beings, i.e., this or that given being, nor is it beings as such and as a whole.” It is “the question of the essential occurrence [*Wesung*] of beyng” which interrogates “the *openness for essential occurrence* [*Offenheit für Wesung*] as such, i.e., *truth*.” Here, truth “essentially occurs in advance [*Voraus-wesende*]” of (i.e., is structurally prior, prior on the axis of ground to) the determination of (1) beings, (2) the *Leitfrage*, and (3) the historical epoch of metaphysics. In other words, the *Grundfrage* inquires into the ground that enables these grounded structures to be, but not on the basis of any relation of this ground to what is grounded. Rather, it asks about this ground independently of any such relation.¹⁹

The shift from being to its conceptual successor, beyng, also leads to an important shift in how Heidegger understands difference. I will address this briefly here and return to it in section III. In *Sein und Zeit*, the *Seinsfrage* was oriented by the ontological difference or difference between being and beings. In *Beiträge*, the question of beyng cannot be oriented by the ontological difference because in that configuration

being remains codetermined by the differential relation to its counterpart – beings. This shift is not meant to abandon or reject the ontological difference. Rather, he aims to give an account of the ground whence this very difference is possible. As we will see, through the problematic of the essence of truth in *Beiträge*, Heidegger shifts the key differential relationship from one between being and beings to a self-differential operation “internal” to being itself. Recall passage 1 again, this time with respect to the ontological difference: “There is no immediate difference between being and beings, because there is altogether no immediate relation between them. Even though beings as such oscillate only in the appropriation [*Ereignung*], being remains abyssally far from all beings” (GA 65: 477). Importantly, Heidegger is not claiming being has *no* relation to beings, but that being has *no immediate* relation to beings. Being is related to beings only *mediately* through what he calls “the strife of world and earth.”²⁰ These mediate relations are consequent upon being, while being is primally independent of them.

II. THE ORIGINARY GROUNDING OF HEIDEGGER’S A-LETHIC FRAMEWORK: THE ESSENCE OF TRUTH AS THE CLEARING FOR/OFF SELF-CONCEALING

With these programmatic and conceptual transformations in mind, let us return to the question of truth. As a point of emphasis, this is an essentially *ontological* problematic – it pertains directly to the nature of being as event.²¹ It is an epistemological problematic only in derivative forms. As we will see, Heidegger’s move to think being independently from beings has important consequences for his treatment of the problematic of truth.

Recall Heidegger’s strong *a-lēthic* accounts of the essence of truth in the late 1920s and early-mid 1930s. In *Sein und Zeit*, truth and untruth are cast as *alētheia* and *lēthē*, understood as the *Unverborgenheit* (“unhiddenness”/“unconcealment”) or *Entdecktheit* (“uncoveredness”/“discoveredness”) and *Verborgenheit* (“hiddenness”/“concealment”) of beings in a world.²² These are grounded in Dasein’s (human existence’s) *Erschlossenheit* (“disclosedness”) and thus dependent upon it. In *Vom*

Wesen der Wahrheit, the elements of the essence of truth – along with Da-sein – shift to become more originary than human existence.²⁵ That is, human existence is consequent upon them. There, the essence of truth articulates correlated ontological structures or dynamics enabling beings to come to presence, i.e., *to be* (cf. *Seinlassen von Seiendem*) (GA 9: 188/144). These are rethought in terms of: (1) truth as *alētheia*, the *Freiheit* (“freedom”), *Offenheit* (“openness”), or *Lichtung* (“clearing”) through which the movement of unconcealment, disclosure of beings, or origination of a meaningful world are enabled, and (2) untruth as originary *Verbergung/Verborgenheit* (“concealing”/“concealment”) or *verbergenden Entzugs* (“concealing withdrawal”), the ground enabling unconcealment, or the *lēthē* of which *alētheia* is the alpha-privative.²⁴ Truth (*lichtendes Bergen* [“sheltering that clears”]) here, in its most originary sense, is *a-lēthic* (GA 9: 201/153). It is the *alētheia/lēthē* dynamic in which a world of beings or meaning comes to be.

As noted, in *Beiträge*, Heidegger reformulates the essence of truth as *die Lichtung für das Sichverbergen* (“the clearing for self-concealing”) or *Lichtung des Sichverbergens* (“the clearing of self-concealing”), which I condense as “the clearing for/of self-concealing.”²⁵ This is recognizably related to the *a-lēthic* formulation of truth, but in fact articulates a fundamental transformation.

The core discussion of the essence of truth in *Beiträge* opens by posing an alternative formulation of the question of truth as a question “about *the truth of the truth*.”²⁶ Heidegger is well aware this is likely to draw charges of circularity or “vacuity” (GA 65: 327). It escapes because “truth” is used in two different senses, one of which signifies the ground or essence of the other. Heidegger’s distinction between these two aligns his analysis of truth with the shifts discussed above (*Sein-Seyn/Leitfrage-Grundfrage*). “Truth,” here, signifies on the one hand *die Wahrheit selbst* (“truth itself”) and on the other *das Wahre* (“what is true”) (GA 65: 345). By “what is true” Heidegger means the world of disclosed beings or meaning, the domain of the *Da*, or the *Entwurfsbereichs* (“domain of projection”) (GA 65: 327). Truth itself is prior to what is true on the axis of ground and is the essence of truth

or the ground enabling what is true to be or come to presence. In other words, truth itself “is the original [*ursprüngliche*] truth of beyng (event)” (GA 65: 329). The question of *the truth of the truth* inquires into truth itself, not what is true. Thus, we are no longer asking about the domain of projection itself as, for instance, in *Sein und Zeit* where the existential analytic operated within the bounds of the horizon of temporality constituted by Dasein as thrown projection. Rather, “what counts here is *the projection [den Wurf] of the very domain of projection [Entwurfsbereichs]*” (GA 65: 327, em).

For Heidegger, the immediate upshot is that truth – that is, truth itself – is “definitively detached [*abgelöst*] from all beings” (GA 65: 329). Rendered more poetically, “truth is the great disdainer of all that is ‘true’” (GA 65: 331, em). Truth itself is an operation of the event prior to and independent of that which it enables to become manifest. This is a structural priority, a priority on the axis of ground. This independence is, again, one-directional, for the manifestation of what is true is dependent upon truth itself. Conceptually separating these renders the disassociation of beyng from beings in terms of the problematic of truth. And it is evident why Heidegger would want to make this rather striking move: if to think being on the basis of a relation to beings renders an account that remains metaphysical, and truth is an essential dimension or process of beyng itself, then truth itself must be accounted for independently of any relation to beings, lest the account of it remain metaphysical or re-inscribe beyng with metaphysical content.

Let us briefly reconstruct a line of reasoning in the text that supports this detachment. It is drawn primarily from Heidegger’s analysis of *Offenheit* (“openness”) in *Beiträge* §§204–7. He initially situates this in a critique of the confusion of truth with its derivative form, *Richtigkeit* (“correctness”) (GA 65: 327). Correctness operates on the level of a disclosed world of beings or meaning. Schematically, it should be taken as an equiprimordial guise of such a world, rendered in a traditional, representational model of truth. In contrast, on the axis of ground, correctness is consequent upon truth’s essential structure of openness. Since openness is the ground enabling truth as correctness, the latter

always bears inherent reference to the former. Now, if we aim to give an account of openness itself – as part of our account of the essence of truth – it is tempting to do so in terms of its relation to correctness, that is, to understand openness “as a condition” for correctness (GA 65: 328). However, this would replicate the metaphysical folly of the *Leitfrage* and its orientation to *Seiendheit*. Instead, Heidegger recognizes that if openness is an ontological structure antecedent on the axis of ground to correctness, and correctness is produced only consequently upon it, openness is not dependent upon any relation to its consequent. Openness can be cast as a *condition* only when understood on the basis of its relation to correctness. But, this understands it to be conditioned *by* correctness. Rather, openness must be rendered independently. Heidegger begins such an account on the basis of what he calls *das wesentliche Ausmaß* (“the essential extent”) of truth (GA 65: 329). Here, structurally prior, prior on the axis of ground, to the breaching or inception of openness, there is no extended dimension whatsoever. The essential extent of truth is the originary clearing or breaching of a place or an extended dimension, yet undetermined with respect to any finite world.²⁷ And openness is this cleared realm, the “amidst” in which beings come to stand (GA 65: 329). As Heidegger writes: “the essential extent itself determines the ‘place’ (time-space) of openness: the cleared ‘amidst’ of beings” (GA 65: 329). We should note that concealment plays a key role in the origination of the essential extent of openness, which I will address in section III.C. In part, then, truth itself consists in these essential structures and processes, which are the ground enabling the origination of any world of beings (and, thus, correctness), but which are not themselves determined on the basis of any relation to those beings (i.e., not conditioned by beings).

The decisive point is that since truth’s essential structures are the ground enabling the determination of any world of beings, beings are dependent on truth itself but truth itself is not dependent on beings, i.e., what is true. There is, again, a one-directional dependence. Truth itself must be thought as independent or “detached” from any relation to beings. Daniela Vallega-Neu puts the point nicely in the register of

beyng as follows: “there is no immediate relation between be-ing [*Seyn*] as enowning withdrawal and beings, even if a being shelters the truth of be-ing. . . . Why not? Because the essential swaying [*Wesen*] of be-ing occurs in (but not only in) the ‘not’ of beings, because the withdrawal of be-ing is precisely what withdraws in the concealing-sheltering [*verbergen*] of truth.”²⁸

The danger, it seems, is that this independence of truth (and for that matter of beyng) from beings might mean Heidegger reinstates a metaphysical transcendence into his ontology, that is, a vertical arrangement of different levels of reality.²⁹ I don’t think he does. In fact, he argues that the concept of transcendence itself belongs to the configuration of truth as correctness and of beings as objectively present (GA 65, §7, §227). I would like to suggest truth itself is immanent to worlds of beings, while enabling their existence. By “immanent” here, I don’t mean that truth itself is on the same, equiprimordial plane of ground as worlds of beings, which would render Heidegger’s ontology a thoroughly “flat ontology.”³⁰ I mean truth itself (as the truth of the event) is implicated within beings or worlds of beings, without any type of *real* distinction (cf. Descartes) between them and without positing any hierarchy of substantialized planes of reality that would make truth or the event transcendent to this plane. This renders Heidegger’s ontology a “curved” ontology. He nicely allegorizes the immanence of truth’s dimension of openness, for instance, as follows:

The open realm, which conceals itself at the same time that beings come to stand in it . . . , is in fact something like an inner recess [*hohle Mitte*], e.g., that of a jug. Yet it must be recognized that the inner recess is not just a haphazard emptiness which arises purely on account of the surrounding walls and which happens not to be full of “things.” It is just the opposite: the inner recess itself is what determines, shapes, and bears the walling action of the walls and of their surfaces. The walls and surfaces are merely what is radiated out by that original open realm which allows its openness to come into

play by summoning up, round about itself and toward itself, such-and-such walls (the particular form of the vessel). That is how the essential occurrence of the open realm radiates back from and in the embracing walls.
(GA 65: 338–39)

For Heidegger the essence of truth is not dependent upon any relation to beings, while remaining immanent to them. From the standpoint of beings, the openness of truth is an immanent structure through which the singular, finite contours of their being are determined and given the space to be differentiated from one another: “Truth, as the event of what is true, is the abyssal fissure [*abgründige Zerklüftung*] in which beings are divided [*zur Entzweiung kommt*] and must stand in the strife” (GA 65: 331). From a standpoint independent of this relation to beings, the openness of truth is a structure of the essence of truth; that is, a structure of the event as it occurs in and through truth.

What, then, are we to make of the formulation of the essence of truth as *the clearing for/of self-concealing*? To render it, Heidegger follows the question of ground, driving thought into a terrain more originary than that articulated by the *a-lēthic* account. If the major dimensions of the latter are originary openness (unconcealment, disclosedness) and concealment (closedness, withdrawal), which co-determine each other and operate in a dynamic that, while independent of any relation to beings, enables any world of beings to become manifest, the question is: *whence and wherefore concealment and openness*? That is, what is the origin of these two primordial moments of the essential structure of truth? This question marks a major development in Heidegger’s ontology.

It is important to point out that Heidegger poses this question as: “whence and wherefore *concealment* [*Verbergung*] and unconcealment [*Entbergung*]?” (GA 65: 330). Though he uses the term *Entbergung* here, he quickly makes it clear that the question at hand does not take this in the derivative sense of the unconcealment of beings, nor even as the more originary “openness of beings as a whole”; it is to be understood in its essence, as “the openness of self-concealing (being),” that is, the openness of the essence of truth (GA 65: 335). This crucial question

is easily overlooked. It is posed parenthetically in §207 and, though Heidegger returns to the task it poses in a number of places, the question itself is not emphasized prominently in the text elsewhere. However, it is key for making sense of the distinction drawn in *Beiträge* between truth as *alētheia* and truth as clearing for/of self-concealing: as Heidegger writes, “truth as the clearing for self-concealing is...an essentially different projection [*Entwurf*] than is *alētheia*.”³¹ Of central concern, he argues, is that the interpretation of concealment in terms of the *a-lēthic* framework is ultimately insufficient: “*A-lētheia* means un-concealment and the un-concealed itself,” but in that case “concealment itself is experienced only as what is to be *cleared away*, what is to be removed (*a-*)” (GA 65: 350). Arguably, this definition of *alētheia* does not express the richest account of the concept in his work. Yet, the point is that accounting for the structures of truth within the *a-lēthic* framework misses the crucial question: it “does not address concealment itself *and its ground*” (GA 65: 350, em). It consequently fails to rethink these structures within the framework of the *Grundfrage*, that is, on the basis of their immanent ground in the event rather than their role as ground for worlds of beings. Heidegger’s point is not simply that concealment is neglected when we formulate truth as *a-lētheia*, and that we must rectify this neglect. Rather, it is that we must press beyond concealment on the axis of ground, to a ground from out of which concealment and openness are themselves originated. And, casting the essence of truth in terms of the *a-lēthic* framework fails to do this. The difference between the *a-lēthic* account of the essence of truth and the account as clearing for/of self-concealing is established precisely in the moment of asking about the originary ground of concealment and openness (GA 65: 350). It is important to be clear what this does *not* mean: it does not mean Heidegger *disavows* his earlier accounts of truth as *alētheia*, but that the *a-lēthic* framework must be understood as grounded by a more originary essence of truth, the clearing for/of self-concealing.

In *Vom Wesen der Wahrheit*, the withdrawing action of originary concealment both opened up the primal opening (Da-sein – the ground via which beings are disclosed) and refused the possibility of total

disclosure, thus enabling the finite disclosure of a world of beings. In this arrangement concealment is arguably more originary than openness on the axis of ground. Moreover, these were the most primordial ontological structures thinkable – they formed the limit or horizon of thought's ability to articulate the nature of truth, ground, and being.

In *Beiträge*, after disassociating the structures of originary concealment and openness from beings and affirming the consequent necessity of rethinking them, their basic arrangement is reconfigured via the question of the ground whence they are originated. Here, Heidegger rotates them onto an equiprimordial axis with respect to one another, then questions along the axis of ground into the ground enabling the origination of these structures themselves. This is structurally akin to Hegel reframing Kant by arguing the very difference between the phenomenal and noumenal is itself a moment in the absolute.

We gain a sense of how radical this question is by isolating one dimension for a moment and asking: *whence concealment?* (!) What is the genesis or origin of concealment itself? Such a question was unthinkable via the conceptual structure available in *Vom Wesen der Wahrheit* because its problematic horizon was still determined by thinking the essence of truth as that which enables the manifestation of beings. To ask “whence concealment?” is to question into the origination of the most originary ontological structure thinkable prior to this point.

Yet, Heidegger's question is not just about concealment. Concealment and openness are correlative; they always go hand in hand. Concealment is a withdrawal from or refusal of openness and openness is a breaching of concealment. Like the apparent “two sides” of a Möbius strip, they present themselves as irreconcilably conflictual or in strife, yet an *ursprüngliche Innigkeit* (“original intimacy”) must hold for them to correlate at all.³² Otherwise, there would be a real or substantial difference between them preventing any relation whatsoever. Thus, the question, *whence and wherefore concealment and openness?* inquires into the intimacy that itself differentiates and generates these two; the very fabric that distends into them; or the curve that traverses the difference between them. This question asks how these very structures are originated.

The formulation “the clearing for/of self-concealing” is meant to articulate the answer to this question. How, then, are we to understand this such that it grounds and originates concealment and openness? The key, I think, is in Heidegger’s concept of decision or self-differentiation.

III. DIFFERENCE AND DECISION

As mentioned, Heidegger’s account of difference undergoes a major re-configuration in *Beiträge*. Here, we see a concept of originary difference or self-differentiation (*Unterschied* or *Entscheidung*) being developed, which constitutes an essential operation of being as event. We can develop this via two more local tacks: one oriented by the problematic of the “ontological difference” (*ontologischen Differenz*) and the other by the problematic of historical “decision” (*Entscheidung*) (GA 65: 465, 87).

A. THE ONTOLOGICAL DIFFERENCE

The ontological difference is the difference between being and beings so crucial to Heidegger’s earlier work. In *Beiträge*, this is now seen as a transitional concept, to be replaced by an account of the more originary ground enabling that difference to be conceived at all. This is necessary, because the concept of the ontological difference is insufficient for the program of inquiring into the nature of being as event – it remains fundamentally structured by the problematic of the *Leitfrage* and thus carries the inscription of metaphysics. Namely, on the basis of the ontological difference between being and beings: (1) being remains understood in a way codetermined by its counterpart – beings, (2) being is understood as the being *of* beings, and (3) the question of being is thus oriented by the question of the being of beings. In Heidegger’s words: “as necessary as the distinction [between being and beings] is and even if it must be thought in terms of the tradition in order to create a very first horizon for the question of being, it is just as fatal – since it indeed arises precisely from an inquiry into beings as such (beingness).”⁵⁵

Yet the concept of the ontological difference is not simply discarded. Rather, “The question of being, as the basic question [*Grundfrage*],” is

“driven immediately to the question of the *origin* of the ‘ontological difference’” (GA 65: 465). Through this question Heidegger arrives at a more originary conception of difference that operates at the heart of the essence of truth and, in turn, beyng as event. The conceptual difference between being and beings is possible, Heidegger argues, only because beyng is of such a nature that it “*sets itself off in relief* [abhebt] over and against beings” (GA 65: 465). In other words, this *setting itself off in relief* is the mechanism by which beyng is structurally able to crystallize in the conception of the difference between being and beings. Yet, it “can originate only in the *essential occurrence* [Wesung] of beyng” (GA 65: 465). Why, then, is beyng such that it sets itself off in relief over and against beings? In Heidegger’s words, it is because:

Beyng, as the “between” which clears, moves itself into this clearing and therefore, though never recognized or surmised as appropriation [*Ereignung*], is for representational thinking something generally differentiable, and differentiated, as being. This applies already to the way beyng essentially occurs in the first beginning, namely, as *physis*, which comes forth as *alētheia* but which is at once forgotten in favor of beings (ones that are perceivable only as such only in virtue of *alētheia*) and is reinterpreted as a being that *is* most eminently, i.e., as a mode of being and specifically the highest mode. (GA 65: 466)

In other words, because beyng brings itself to determination (in part) in the operation of truth, the possibility is established for thought to account for beyng in terms of that determinate dimension, and to distinguish the former in terms of a co-determinate differential relation with beings. Certainly, one might deny that being, thus differentiated from beings, must be *a being* that *is* most eminently, as Heidegger does in *Sein und Zeit*. Yet, the ontological difference remains structurally determined as *a difference between* two “things.” Framing the problematic of beyng in terms of it captures beyng in this differential relation

with beings. It casts beyng in terms of a difference from beings. But the crucial point Heidegger recognizes is that this difference points to a character of beyng more originary than itself. The ontological mechanism required for determining the ontological difference at all must be prior to that difference. For Heidegger, here, the ontological difference is exhibited as “the merely metaphysically conceived, and thus already misinterpreted, foreground [*Vordergrund*] of a de-cision [*Ent-scheidung*] which is beyng itself” (GA 65: 474). The clearing operation – which we gain access to first as the essence of truth – belongs to the essential occurrence of beyng as event. And clearing operates precisely as a decision or differentiation – which is not a difference between two beings, but difference itself. That is, it is an operation of self-differentiation that originates things that have differences between them, but is not to be understood on the basis of those things or their differences. It is more originary. In part, the heart of beyng as event is self-differentiation. “The event of ap-pro-priation includes the *de-cision*: the fact that freedom, as the abyssal ground, lets arise a need [*Not*] out of which, as the excess of the ground, the gods and humans come forth in their separateness” (GA 65: 470). This originary self-differential operation of the event Heidegger calls the *Entscheidungs-wesen des Seyns* (“*decisional* essence of beyng”) (GA 65: 455).

B. DECISION

Heidegger articulates this self-differentiation or clearing earlier in the text (division 1: Prospect) as the ground of historical “decision” (*Entscheidung*) or “de-cision” (*Ent-scheidung*) (GA 65: 87). Again, decision is meant here in the sense of separating or, as Vallega-Neu describes, “partedness” or “parting.”⁵⁴ As should be clear, it is in no way “a human act,” “choice, resolution, the preferring of one thing and the setting aside of another” (GA 65: 87). Such would fall under “the ‘existentiell’ misinterpretation of ‘decision,’” which is indeed an “existentiell-*anthropological*” misinterpretation; it takes the human being as a subject making this decision, whereas for Heidegger the human being is subject *to* or structured *by* the dimensions of truth generated in

originary decision (GA 65: 87–88, em). It should be noted that, certainly, the notion of decision comes into play heavily in Heidegger's account of history and the role of the human being in establishing another beginning for thought (see *Beiträge* §§45–49). But those issues address consequent structures based on this antecedent, more primal ground: “What is here called de-cision... proceeds to the innermost center of the essence of beyng itself” (GA 65: 88). William McNeill nicely calls this the “event of differentiation.”⁵⁵ Vallega-Neu understands it as “a differencing which occurs within the essential swaying [*Wesen*] of be-ing [*Seyn*].”⁵⁶ Decision should be understood in the current context as this separating, differentiation, or differencing occurring in the essence of truth, that is, the event insofar as it occurs in and through the essence of truth. As Heidegger writes: “de-cision refers to the sundering itself, which separates [*scheidet*] and in separating lets come into play for the first time the ap-propriation [*Er-eignung*] of precisely this sundered *open realm* [*Offenen*] as the clearing for the self-concealing” (GA 65: 88).

Heidegger's movement in this period toward an account with a differential operation at the heart of beyng as event – as we see opened up in *Beiträge* by the problematic of truth – is verified by statements regarding difference in the volume entitled *Das Ereignis*, where he addresses “the difference as self-differentiating (event) [*der Unterschied als das Sichunterscheiden (Ereignis)*]” (GA 71: 122/104).

- “Inasmuch as nothingness is beyng, beyng is essentially the difference [*Unterschied*] as the inceptually concealed and refusing departure [*Ab-schied*]” (GA 71: 124/106).
- “The difference is a matter of the event (the resonating of the turning)” (GA 71: 123/105).
- “The difference... which first allows beings to arise as beings, and separates [*scheidet*] them to themselves, is the ground of all separations [*Scheidungen*] in which beings can first ‘be’ these respective individuals” (GA 71: 125/106, em).
- “Beyng as the difference – essentially occurring as the departure [*Abschied*]” (GA 71: 126/107).

- “The difference, as beyng itself, appropriates [*er-eignet*] the differentiation [*Unterscheidung*] in which at any time obedience is involved” (GA 71: 126/108).
- “The difference [*Unterscheidung*] as the essential occurrence of beyng itself, which differentiates *itself* [*sich unterscheidet*] and in that way lets beings arise in emergence [*Aufgang*]. The differentiation is inceptually the difference [*Die Unterscheidung ist anfänglich der Unterschied*]” (GA 71: 127/108).
- “Without having experienced the truth of beyng as event, we will be unable to know the difference and, thereby, the differentiation” (GA 71: 129/109, em).
- “The difference, in which the differentiation essentially occurs, is the departure as the downgoing of the event into the beginning” (GA 71: 129/109, em).

C. THE ORIGINARY, DIFFERENTIAL GROUNDING OF CONCEALMENT AND OPENNESS

The essence of truth as the clearing for/of self-concealing is differential in this sense. Heidegger stops short, though, of developing a full account of the operations through which this primal difference generates the *a-lēthic* structures. However, I think the resources for doing so are present in the text, even if its author did not recognize this. To emphasize a couple of points from above, I understand this originary difference to be self-differentiation, that is, difference differing from itself. It is not a difference relegated to the role of marking a distinction between two “things.” And, it is in no way dependent upon an identity prior to it, which it would differentiate, as, for instance, in the case of Aristotle’s specific difference, which can be marked only on the basis of the identity of a common genus. Rather, originary difference is the operation of beyng as event by which it self-coagulates or intensifies, distends, and becomes elaborated in distinct structures and dynamics. In terms mentioned in section III.A above, this is the way beyng “moves

itself into the clearing.” “The clearing for/of self-concealing” articulates this differential self-intensification in the terms of the register of truth. In Heidegger’s words: “Inasmuch as truth essentially occurs, *comes to be* [wird], the event becomes [wird] truth. The event eventuates [das Ereignis ereignet], which means nothing else but that it and only it *becomes* truth, becomes that which belongs to the event, so that truth is precisely and essentially the truth of beyng” (GA 65: 349). Openness and concealment are two structures in which the event elaborates itself. It is worth noting that since two key structural aspects of the relation between openness and concealment are their simultaneous strife and intimacy, any account of the origination of these structures should be able to account for these relations in a rigorous way. Though this is not the primary focus of the following account, it can serve as a partial gauge of its success. On the basis of Heidegger’s concepts, let us propose the following genetic account of concealment and openness.

Concealment and openness *are* in their *differentiation* from one another. *As a point is extended into a line, openness is breached and generated as the distention of differentiation differing from itself. As the limits of a line recede, drawing it out, difference refuses to be that which it generates; concealment is this refusal, generated as differentiation differing from itself.*

We can clarify this dynamic by highlighting different aspects of the formulation of the essence of truth as *the clearing for/of self-concealing*. First, the *clearing for/of self-concealing* is this originary differentiation. It is a clearing in the sense of a distancing or a “sundering” (*Auseinandertreten*): as two passing ships clear one another, concealment clears openness and openness clears concealment (GA 65: 88). To be certain, since this sundering originates and grounds the structures of openness and concealment, which in turn ground worlds of beings, it cannot be a sundering of two already established “things,” at any level. Clearing is an operation of self-differentiation prior to and originary of any such things and the differences between them. Clearing is difference differing from itself, such that a sundering of openness and concealment is originated. Yet openness

and concealment remain correlative, for this distancing is itself the breaching open of openness, the breaching of the “essential extent” mentioned earlier. Clearing is the breaching of a space “between” or, rather, a distension that itself constitutes openness and concealment by constituting their difference. In this sense, with respect to concealment, for instance, Heidegger writes: “That a clearing might ground what is self-concealing – that is the meaning of the dictum that truth is primarily clearing-concealing” (GA 65: 342). Here, the clearing for/of self-concealing cannot be one *or* the other, concealment *or* openness. To think the essence of truth is to think into the differentiation that originates concealment *and* openness. This exhibits the fault in the common interpretation that the essence of truth (and in turn of the event) in *Beiträge* is self-concealment.⁵⁷ It is not. Such a mistake misses the critical question: whence and wherefore concealment and openness? Self-concealment is a moment of the evental dynamic. The essence of truth is difference differing from itself, self-distending or self-displacing in the manner of clearing for/of self-concealing.

Second, this dynamic is clearing *for* self-concealing because differentiation both generates concealment and clears it from openness. That is, the differentiation of difference from itself enables concealment – difference’s refusal to be the openness or distention it generates – to occur, while that very operation is also the sundering of concealment from openness. Concealment owes its distinctness from openness to clearing, without which it could not occur at all. Third, this is a clearing *of* self-concealing because concealment itself takes part in generating the clearing of openness. Concealment plays a constitutive role in the originary determination of the structure of openness. That is, without concealment, the differentiation or clearing of concealment from openness could not occur. Openness could be granted no determinateness, no distinctness from concealment, i.e., it could not occur at all. Finally, the clearing for/of self-concealing involves *self*-concealing because it is differentiation itself that withdraws from its own clearing: concealment is the self-refusal enacted by differentiation.

It is important to emphasize that openness and concealment must be originated *simultaneously* by the operation of difference differing from itself. That is, the same operation constitutes the two, by constituting their difference. It cannot be the case that one is logically prior to the other, because each gains structural determination only in its correlation with the other. For the same reason, it also cannot be that they are ultimately discrete. In that case they could have no correlation. Using the imagery from above, that would amount to placing concealment at one end of a line and openness at the other, with the line marking their absolute divorce. Rather, the account of originary difference allows us to understand openness as the distension of difference differing from itself, i.e., in the position of the line itself, and concealment as the self-refusal simultaneously enacted by difference differing from itself, i.e., in the place of the receding limit by which the line is drawn out.

On the basis of this, we can return to the evaluative point mentioned above. As a mark of success, this differential account should be able to ground the simultaneous strife and originary intimacy structurally characterizing the relation between openness and concealment and explain the logic of this relation with conceptual precision. I think it can. That which is in strife must be characterized by a simultaneous intimacy, since without intimacy there could be no relation. Likewise, that which is intimate must be characterized by a simultaneous strife, since it must be distinguished from that to which it is related. The challenge is to provide an account of the simultaneous strife and intimacy of openness and concealment and not simply assert it. Their *intimacy* consists in each being grounded in and originated by precisely the same operation of originary difference: the differentiation of difference from itself. Here, difference differs from itself, simultaneously drawing itself out or breaching open openness and differing from or refusing to be that openness, i.e., originating concealment. Openness and concealment each, though cleaved, are constituted by the same differential operation and bear a structural reference to it. But they are originated by that operation

only insofar as it originates their *difference*. The *strife* of openness and concealment consists in the differentiation of difference from itself, insofar as this originates a clearing or sundering of each from the other whereby each gains structural determination. That is, it is the differentiation of difference from itself by which it simultaneously draws itself out, breaching openness, and refuses itself from that openness, originating concealment. Moreover, openness and concealment each require the contradistinction this establishes from the other in order to occur. Openness is structurally determined by its contrast with concealment, and concealment by its contrast with openness. Their strife lies in this constitutive contradistinction and the differentiation by which it is originated. Yet, this also means the structure of each bears constitutive reference to the other, both at the level of contradistinction and of originary difference. In this relation, intimacy is structurally implied in strife and strife in intimacy. Originary differentiation explains the simultaneous origination of both and their logic.

We can briefly clarify the status of originary difference and its logic by recalling that, in *Beiträge*, the problematic of the essence of truth is directly related to a constellation of themes. I would like to emphasize three here: the problematics of ground, time-space, and, especially, the event, as mentioned above. Truth, ground, and time-space are three key registers in terms of which the evental nature of beyng is worked out in that text.⁵⁸ Each of these three overlaps the others in important ways, but none is reducible to the other two. Rather, Heidegger elaborates an account of the event by articulating it in the terms of these different registers. As I indicated earlier, the problematic of the essence of truth is crucial in *Beiträge* because it is the problematic preliminary to that of beyng as event.⁵⁹ That is, thought first gains a properly grounded stance within the event by way of the problematic of truth. We can now specify that it accomplishes this by opening up access to the logic of originary differentiation articulating both the essence of truth and the structure and dynamics of the “decisional essence of beyng,” i.e., the event. Here, “the clearing for/of self-concealing” articulates originary

differentiation and its logic in the register of truth. It allows us to unfold this in the terms of its problematic: clearing, concealing, openness, etc. And exactly this gives us a foothold in this logic. But differentiation is not indexed solely to the register of truth. The structures and dynamics of time-space and ground are originated by the differential operations of the event, as well. As in that of truth, the accounts of time-space and ground articulate the evental nature of beyng and its differential logic in the terms of their respective registers. Thus, we must not mistake originary difference to be within time or space, since it is originary of time-space. Likewise, it is not consequent upon the structures of ground, because it is originary of those very structures. It would be equally inaccurate to take difference as eternal or as transcendent to the domain of ground. No such dichotomies are at play here, according to which difference could fall on the side of the transcendent. Rather, time-space and the structures of ground arise from the operation of originary differentiation, which is immanent to them and is precisely the mechanism of the event by which it self-intensifies, distends, and becomes elaborated.

IV. CONCLUSION

“The clearing for/of self-concealing” is a differential formulation, that is, it articulates the differential dynamic that constitutes the essence of truth. This is prior on the axis of ground to and originary of the *a-lēthic* structures, concealment and openness. Thus, Heidegger’s account of the essence of truth in *Beiträge* is most primally differential, not *a-lēthic*. Working through the problematic of truth to render this differential account establishes a position for thought in a more originary domain than was previously available for Heidegger. This is made possible, partially, by establishing the independence of the essence of truth from what is true and breaching the metaphysical framework of *Seiendheit* and the *Leitfrage*. That opens the question of the origination of the *a-lēthic* structures. Working through the problematic of truth pursues the *Grundfrage*, stepping back along the axis of ground into the originary dynamic of decision or differentiation, whereby thought grounds

itself in the evental nature of beyng. Heidegger's differential concept of the essence of truth sets up a positive account of beyng as event, operating independently of any relation to beings. Here, the event of differentiation is not just the heart of truth, but an essential aspect of the event of beyng itself. For, according to Heidegger, "this truth of beyng is indeed nothing distinct from beyng but rather is the most proper essence of beyng" (GA 65: 93).

ENDNOTES

- 1 'Beiträge' in this paper refers to *Beiträge zur Philosophie (vom Ereignis)* (GA 65). For the most part, I use the Macquarrie and Robinson translation of *Sein und Zeit*, noting the occasional reference to the Stambaugh translation. However, I replace Macquarrie and Robinson's translation of *Sein* as "Being" with "being" throughout.
- 2 I will differentiate Heidegger's technical terms "Sein"/"being" and "Seyn"/"beyng" in section one of this paper.
- 3 For instance, see: "On the Essence of Truth" in GA 9; *Introduction to Metaphysics* (GA 40); "The Origin of the Work of Art" in GA 5. In this paper I have transliterated all Greek.
- 4 For a general statement of such a position, see Mark A. Wrathall, "Unconcealment," in *A Companion to Heidegger*, ed. Hubert L. Dreyfus and Mark A. Wrathall (Oxford: Blackwell, 2005), 337: "For Heidegger, the essence of truth is always understood in terms of unconcealment."
- 5 GA 2: 8–9/SZ 6, tm: "beings" rather than "entities" for "*Seiendem*."
- 6 It should be noted, though, that Heidegger is not entirely consistent with the use of this convention in *Beiträge*.
- 7 For a later clarification of the sense in which beyng is separated from beings, see the lecture record composed by Dr. Alfred Guzzoni, "Summary of a Seminar on the Lecture 'Time and Being'" (GA 14: 41/33).

- 8 Richard Capobianco, “Coda on Being is (not) meaning,” Heidegger Circle Forum post, August 30, 2013, 8:18 AM, em.
- 9 GA 65: 7. Though this analogy uses a relation of efficient causality, which is a decisively ontic relation, I certainly do not mean to suggest being is a cause of beings. Rather, I mean to illustrate that there is a relation of dependence, where, if being did not “occur essentially,” beings would not be. Thus, I intend this to be a structural analogy, not an example.
- 10 GA 65: 75. For more on Heidegger’s understanding of *Seiendheit*, see Richard Polt, *The Emergency of Being: On Heidegger’s “Contributions to Philosophy”* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2006), 55–56, 63–64.
- 11 See GA 6.2: 227, 310/N4: 194, 206; on Aristotle, Kant, and Nietzsche, GA 6.2: 66/N4: 41.
- 12 GA 6.2: 188/N4: 156.
- 13 While Heidegger critiques the ontological difference in *Beiträge*, attaining the conceptual and methodological position from which that critique can be made is itself dependent upon having previously marked the ontological difference and worked through the ontological problematic it opens up.
- 14 GA 65: 297, 379. Note that in “On the Essence of Truth,” for example, a version of the former appears as “ground of enabling [*Grund der Ermöglich-ung*]” (GA 9: 177na/136na).
- 15 The language of ground prevalent in *Beiträge*, but not several other of his texts, is in no way to be understood in terms of substratum, foundation, principle, or any other metaphysical concept of ground. All grounding operations entail *Ab-grund* or abyssal ground, which both originates and exceeds ground, thus preventing any ground from becoming absolute.
- 16 Ground is also that which is most proper to what is grounded; it bears the gravity of essence. Recall that in “On the Essence of Truth,” “essence” was provisionally understood to mean “ground of enabling” or “ground of the inner possibility” (GA 9: 177na/136na; 186/143).

- 17 Capobianco, “Coda on Being is (not) meaning.”
 18 For this and the rest of the quotations in this paragraph, see GA
 65: 75–76.
- 19 For more on the *Grundfrage* vs. the *Leitfrage* see GA 65 §85, §91,
 and §172.
- 20 GA 65: 477. Again, GA 65: 471: “As a consequence of its solitude,
 beyng essentially occurs in relation to ‘beings’ always only medi-
 ately, through the strife of world and earth.”
- 21 I mean “ontological” here simply as pertaining to the problematic
 of being (or beyng), not the sense of Heidegger’s technical use in
 this text.
- 22 GA 2: 290/SZ 219; see Stambaugh’s translation of *Being and Time*,
 210.
- 23 GA 9: 190/145–46: “Freedom, ek-sistent, disclosive Da-sein, pos-
 sesses the human being – so originarily that only *it* secures for
 humanity that distinctive relatedness to beings as a whole as such
 which first founds all history.”
- 24 GA 9: 188/144, 193/148, 201/154.
- 25 GA 65: 348, em; 329. The connection with beyng is highlighted
 again in the alternative formulation: the essence of truth is “the
 clearing concealment of beyng [*die lictende Verbergung des
 Seyns*]” (GA 65: 380).
- 26 GA 65: 327: “*nach der Wahrheit der Wahrheit.*”
- 27 It would be mistaken to take this to mean truth is originally
infinite. There is no infinite – finite dichotomy at play here, ac-
 cording to which truth could fall on the side opposed to the finite.
 Rather, the originary clearing or breaching of openness arises
 from the differential operation constituting the essence of truth,
 where that differential operation is precisely the mechanism of
 the event’s self-coagulation or intensification, distension, and
 elaboration in the more derivative *a-lēthic* structures of truth.
- 28 Daniela Vallega-Neu, *Heidegger’s “Contributions to Philosophy”*
 (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2003), 112.

- 29 See GA 65, §152. For another short discussion on the non-transcendent nature of *beyng*, see Walter Brogan, “Da-sein and the Leap of Being,” in *Companion to Heidegger's “Contributions to Philosophy,”* eds. Charles E. Scott, Susan M. Schoenbohm, Daniela Vallega-Neu, and Alejandro Vallega (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2001), 176–78.
- 30 Cf. Manuel DeLanda, *Intensive Science and Virtual Philosophy* (London/New York: Continuum, 2002).
- 31 GA 65: 350. For more on this, see GA 65, §226.
- 32 Möbius strips have only one side. GA 65: 345.
- 33 GA 65: 250. Or again, GA 65: 467: “The ‘ontological difference’ is a passageway which becomes unavoidable if the necessity of asking the basic question is to be made visible on the basis of the guiding question.”
- 34 Vallega-Neu, *Heidegger's “Contributions,”* 109.
- 35 William McNeill, “The Time of *Contributions to Philosophy*” in Scott, et. al., eds., *Companion to Heidegger's “Contributions,”* 138.
- 36 Vallega-Neu, *Heidegger's “Contributions,”* 111.
- 37 Another version of the *a-lēthic* interpretation.
- 38 For Heidegger's discussion of ground and time-space in *Beiträge*, see especially 238–42.
- 39 As emphasized above, *how* one understands Heidegger's account of the essence of truth directly impacts how one understands his account of the event. Understanding the essence of truth to be most fundamentally *a-lēthic* leads to an account of the eventual nature of *beyng* in terms of the *a-lēthic* framework. That, however, is not the full picture. As I have argued, Heidegger's account of the essence of truth in *Beiträge* moves to a ground more originary than that of the *a-lēthic* framework. Namely, it moves to an account of originary difference constituting the essence of truth, the dynamics of which originate the *a-lēthic* structures. Thus, the differential account of the essence of truth establishes a more originary account of the eventual nature of *beyng*.

Truth and Unconcealedness

Graeme Nicholson

Readers of Heidegger are familiar with his way of expounding truth as unconcealedness, prompted by his study of the Greek word ἀλήθεια which he translates as *Unverborgenheit*. The best known treatment is in *Being and Time* §44 (GA 2: 282–305/SZ 212–30), but it is also to be found in earlier lectures, e.g., *Plato's "Sophist"* (GA 19), and later texts, notably “On the Essence of Truth,” written between 1930 and 1949 (GA 9: 175–99/136–54). All these treatments have been well expounded in the secondary literature.¹ But in some later writings, often with Parmenides as a point of reference, Heidegger seems to have changed his mind, opening up a rift between ἀλήθεια, on the one hand (which he continues to understand as unconcealedness), and truth, on the other hand. The most prominent text of this nature is “The End of Philosophy and the Task of Thinking” written in 1964.² My study will focus on the second half of the “Task of Thinking,” where Heidegger offers an exegesis of Fragment 1 of Parmenides, lines 28–30. Here he says among other things that Ἀλήθεια should not be translated “truth.” Since Heidegger also makes self-critical references here back to some of his own earlier work, it is not surprising that this has been taken as a full-scale

recantation of what he had advocated earlier. I believe, however, that a close scrutiny of the text will show it to be something less than that.

Cristina Lafont has argued that in the “Task of Thinking” Heidegger had completely retracted his earlier view of truth.⁵ Her book is not only a challenge to Heidegger – it is also helpful to English-speaking readers in informing us about some of the different receptions that the “Task of Thinking” has received in German-language commentary.⁴ Nevertheless, my scrutiny of the “Task of Thinking” has led me to a different conclusion from hers. I hope to show that Heidegger treats several different variants of truth. No one of them coincides with *Ἀλήθεια* or unconcealedness – yet it is the source and condition for them all. In what way, then, is any version of truth related to *Ἀλήθεια*? That is the question proposed here for our thinking to address. In the second part of this essay, Heidegger is guiding the reader into the kind of “thinking” that can pay heed to unconcealedness. He has already offered, in the first part, an appraisal of “philosophy,” particularly in its current state. So the present correlation of truth and unconcealedness is pre-figured in the guiding correlation of philosophy and thinking. I shall discuss that briefly in the Conclusion.⁵

I. THE PARMENIDES INTERPRETATION

We shall be joining the “Task of Thinking” in the middle of its second part to establish two points of central importance:

- (a) In this text, the reference to *Ἀλήθεια* is only to Parmenides’ use of the term – it is not intended to encompass every use of the word in ancient Greek; quite the contrary, as we shall see.
- (b) When Heidegger denies that *Ἀλήθεια* means truth, he always qualifies the latter term: *if* truth is understood as *X* or *Y*, *then* *Ἀλήθεια* does not mean truth.

A. THE INCOMPARABLE *Ἀλήθεια*

Heidegger quotes Parmenides, Fragment I, lines 28–30, which I cite in the Stambaugh-Krell translation (GA 14: 83/BW 444):

...but you should learn all:
 the untrembling heart of unconcealment,
 well-rounded,

and also the opinions of mortals who lack the ability to
 trust what is unconcealed.⁶

Heidegger introduces these words of Parmenides to show that at the very beginning of philosophy something was named that permitted all the later versions of philosophy, even while it retreated from their grasp: Ἀλήθεια, unconcealedness. Every philosophy had its own theme or concern (its *Sache*), but no philosophy could bring its *Sache* into view unless the *Sache* made its appearance within a medium, or forum, or opening, that Heidegger calls here a clearing, a *Lichtung*.⁷ He demonstrates this in the cases of Hegel and Husserl, though they only illustrate a condition that holds for all philosophy. And this clearing or *Lichtung* is precisely what Parmenides at the very start had called Ἀλήθεια. Heidegger proposes now to make this a theme, or concern (*Sache*), for a new post-philosophical thinking – thus the title of the essay, contrasting an exhausted philosophy with a thinking that has this special task.

In the four paragraphs after the quotation, Heidegger highlights the imagery of Parmenides' text, all of it invoking the incomparable power of this unconcealedness. First of all, the “untrembling heart” of unconcealedness is not some other factor that lies within it: it *is* the unconcealedness itself, what is most proper to it. (Later, at the very end of the *Four Seminars*, Heidegger will revise this interpretation.) We are thus introduced to all the works that are to be ascribed to unconcealedness.

But I want to call attention to a problem of translation here. Having posed the question what this “untrembling heart” is, Heidegger says:

This phrase refers to nothing other than the unconcealedness itself: it means that place of stillness where everything that unconcealedness has granted is gathered together. It is the clearing, the open.⁸

Everything that is gathered within that place of stillness has been placed there and marked by unconcealedness: it has all been opened up. So now Heidegger goes on: all kinds of thinking (speculative and intuitive) depend upon this open scope. And, for Parmenides, this clearing or unconcealedness also permits presence (being) and the manifestation of what is present. The current English translation, however, reads as if what has been gathered into the place of stillness had brought about the unconcealedness itself.⁹

There is a similar problem in the next paragraph of the translation. For Parmenides, unconcealedness grants the path on which thinking can move as it pursues its one concern: that being is, or that presence comes to presence. But the published translation seems to suggest that the path of thinking is what grants – *gewährt* – the unconcealedness! Heidegger explains further that this unconcealedness is the clearing that first grants being, and thinking, and their presence to one another. This understanding of *gewährt* will be confirmed in Section (b).

B. Ἀλήθεια IS NOT TRUTH

Beginning in the fifth paragraph and running for about two pages (GA 14: 85-7/445-7), Heidegger argues that Ἀλήθεια should be translated not “truth” but “unconcealedness,” and he uses the term “clearing” interchangeably. He makes his point through listing a great variety of ways in which truth could be qualified, which I’ll itemize in order.

(i) *If* we understand truth as the correspondence of knowledge to beings, then Ἀλήθεια, i.e., unconcealedness in the sense of the clearing, may not be equated with it. Heidegger identifies this sense of truth as the “traditional” one (it is associated, e.g., with Aquinas), and he also calls it the “natural” one. Why? Because it is by observing the beings in question (*am Seienden ausgewiesene Übereinstimmung*) that one would confirm the correspondence. But no unconcealedness, no clearing, could be confirmed in such a way – by observing some beings.

Or (ii) one might interpret truth as the certainty of our knowledge of being (*Gewissheit des Wissens vom Sein*), the view that he regularly attributes to Hegel, though it derives from the Cartesian tradition, as

he showed in earlier pages of the present essay. But Ἀλήθεια, i.e., unconcealedness in the sense of the clearing, cannot be equated with this either. He showed in earlier pages that Hegelian philosophy could not think this clearing.

(iii) *But* it is not that Ἀλήθεια is utterly *detached* from those two versions of truth – it grants (*gewährt!*) the possibility of truth in either of those senses. They depend on it in just the way that being and thinking do. We shall be pondering this positive connection.

(iv) Precisely here, in the same paragraph, he adds several other possible interpretations of truth: evidence (with apparent reference to Husserl); verification (which we could take to be a reference to the logical positivists); and every kind of *veritas*. All these, like the other versions, can only prevail within the clearing (*bewegen sich... im Bereich der waltenden Lichtung*). So he has listed four, or perhaps five, versions of truth without interconnecting them, each of them associated with one philosophical system or another, but all of them dependent on Ἀλήθεια.

(v) Next he makes the odd remark: Ἀλήθεια is “not yet truth” (*noch nicht Wahrheit*). This suggests that something further would have to be added to it to bring forth truth. In context, that would be one of the philosophical systems we noted, each bringing about one of the variants of truth. But – Heidegger adds with emphasis – that does *not* mean that Ἀλήθεια is less than truth! As if what was primitive would be improved upon by the complexity of many mediations! No, Ἀλήθεια is more than truth because it yields all those versions of it, and that is because there can be no presence, and therefore no truth, outside the clearing. To understand that will be the task of thinking. It is at this point that Heidegger launches into the first of his self-critical retrospectives, concerning *Being and Time*, but it will be convenient for us to treat the self-criticisms separately below.

We move on to the next point in the “Task of Thinking” (GA 14: 87/447), where attention turns to Greek sources: (vi) The Greeks too had a “natural concept of truth.” We find it in Homer and other authors, where a speaker calls someone’s words ἀληθές, and in this everyday

context it means true qua correct (*richtig*) or reliable (*verlässlich*), two more senses of truth that cannot be equated with unconcealedness. There was no etymological resonance in this use of the word among the Greeks. We must avoid confusion here: now we are being told of a Greek ἀλήθεια that does *not* mean unconcealedness. This might seem to pull us in the opposite direction from the previous points, which separated modern versions of truth from Greek unconcealedness. The present point may remind us of earlier criticisms aimed at Heidegger by classicists who did not accept the translation *Unverborgenheit*. (He gives a brief history of the polemics in his footnote 3 to “Hegel and the Greeks” – see below.) At the present point in the “Task of Thinking”, he is recognizing a pragmatic, non-etymological use of ἀληθές, one that is older than Parmenides and stands in contrast with his goddess’s monumental invocation of unconcealedness. As I said at the beginning, the argument that Ἀλήθεια means unconcealedness and not truth has its application *only* to Parmenides, not to the Greek language as a whole. For that reason, Heidegger spells the word in Parmenides’ text with a capital A but employs a small α for the everyday word. The main point that emerges from the history is that a thinker *can* give a monumental force to a word like Ἀλήθεια that otherwise circulates in discourse in another, everyday sense. Heidegger has pointed out often¹⁰ that this was the case with Plato’s word ἰδέα, too.

(vii) There is a later discussion of Parmenides in Heidegger’s *Four Seminars*, from the 1973 seminar, and especially from the short manuscript that accompanies it, “The Provenance of Thinking.” In the seminar (GA 15: 396/78), Heidegger is quoted as saying that Ἀλήθεια means unconcealedness and “has nothing yet to do with *truth*.” But Heidegger’s own manuscript (from which he was reading aloud in the 1973 seminar) actually says, “Ἀληθείη means, literally translated, unconcealedness. . . Ἀλήθεια does not mean ‘truth’ if what is meant by this is the validity of propositions in the form of statements. . . [it] has nothing yet to do with ‘truth’, but everything to do with the unconcealedness presupposed in every determination of ‘truth’” (GA 15: 403-4/94). This comment reinforces the “Task of Thinking” in allowing that there can be many

determinations of “truth,” that Ἀλήθεια is not one of them (or in his expression, “not yet” one of them), yet is presupposed by all of them. This latter point is also expressed when he says it “has nothing to do with” truth (*noch nichts mit “Wahrheit” zu tun*), an expression, we shall see, that has a quite specific force in Heidegger.

Let us summarize our study up to this point: Heidegger says that we cannot interpret the unconcealedness of Parmenides as truth – *if* by “truth” one means (i) correspondence, (ii) certainty, (iii) evidence, (iv) verification, (v) correctness, (vi) reliability, or (vii) validity. Each one of these versions was affirmed by some philosopher or other. But Heidegger did not clarify what *he* understood by truth. He did not particularly affirm any of those versions, nor did he propose some further version of his own, nor did he appeal to some pure unencumbered intuition of truth free of those versions. We have to conclude that, in Heidegger’s text, truth is not something univocal. It has many variants, and distinctive philosophies embody them and name them.

The question will certainly arise: if all these variants are indeed versions of *truth*, do they stand in some relation to one another? That would prompt a far-flung inquiry, and I shall return to it at the end. But one clarification can be made at this point, touching on two of the variants: (i) correspondence and (v) correctness. The first of these was treated in *Being and Time* §44 as the “traditional” concept of truth: *Übereinstimmung* or *adaequatio*. The “tradition” that Heidegger was assuming in *Being and Time* actually sprang from Medieval times and was represented mainly by Aquinas. It did not originate from the Greeks. *Being and Time* repeats frequently and emphatically that the correspondence theory of truth should not be attributed to Aristotle (e.g., GA 2: 45, 284, 299/SZ 33, 214, 226).¹¹ Turning now to the other variant, (v) correctness (*Richtigkeit*), we have to recognize that it finds no place whatsoever in the scheme of *Being and Time*. It does not belong in that phenomenological discourse; it entered Heidegger’s vocabulary in the 1930s, and it is sufficiently distant from “correspondence” that, in the 1930s, Heidegger could attribute it not only to Plato but to Aristotle too.¹² It is certainly a challenge to understand what

Heidegger intends with this term; we'll discuss it further in the next section; it belongs within a discourse that introduces certain other central terms such as "thinking." But, however we are to understand it, it should not be confused with correspondence, and so should not be attributed to *Being and Time*.

Nevertheless, to conclude this breakdown, Heidegger has made it clear in the "Task of Thinking" that correspondence and certainty proceed from, or are granted by, unconcealedness. In the *Four Seminars* manuscript he stated that unconcealedness is presupposed by *all* the possible variants of truth. So the main question posed for us by *this* text, the "Task of Thinking," is how we are to understand the dependence of each of these versions upon unconcealedness.

II. HEIDEGGER'S SELF-CRITIQUES

The first self-critique, following on point (v) above, is focused on *Being and Time* §44; it had been "immaterial and misleading to call Ἀλήθεια in the sense of the clearing truth." The footnote attached to this remark is subtle, for it attributes a "decisive insight" to *Being and Time*, while also acknowledging that *Being and Time* had "strayed" away from it. The insight that Heidegger intends is expressed in the sentence he quotes here from (GA 2: 291/SZ 219), and I'll re-translate it for emphasis: "The translation [of the word ἀλήθεια] by means of the word 'truth,' and even more our theoretical-conceptual determinations of this expression ['truth'], cover up the meaning of what the Greeks accepted as 'self-evident': the pre-philosophical understanding of ἀλήθεια that lay at the basis of their terminological employments of the term." The insight already attained in *Being and Time* is that the Greeks understood ἀλήθεια pre-philosophically as unconcealedness; their philosophers' writings (he has just been referring to Aristotle and Heraclitus) preserved and reflected this understanding through their terminology; but modern translations and terminology (*Wahrheit*), and especially modern concepts and theories, have covered these matters up. But the 1964 footnote also acknowledges that in that very context of *Being and Time* Heidegger had gone astray himself. Where is this seen? In *Being*

and Time §44, he was defending his own phenomenological account of truth – the statement is true through uncovering beings – and he introduced Greek terminology (GA 2: 290–91/SZ 219) in order to give his own theory an ancient pedigree, as if *Dasein's* uncovering were anticipated in the ancient ἀλήθεια. But in 1964, he concedes that this strategy could only distort the Greek. The ancient idea of unconcealedness as *clearing* was quite foreign to *Being and Time*: where this text spoke of a *Lichtung* (GA 2: 177/SZ 133), it was associated with *Dasein's* own being, being in the world.¹³ There is no reason to think that the ancients attributed the unconcealedness to *Dasein*. Heidegger's self-critique does not consist merely in denying a proposition: that in 1927 he thought truth was unconcealedness, but later did not. Rather, it is a point about an historical mismatch: the Greeks' intuition could not be fitted within the modern program of *Being and Time*: the phenomenology of *Dasein*.

That point is given a further airing in the last pages of the *Heraclitus* seminar from about two years later during the Winter Semester 1966–67 (GA 15: 259–61/H 161–62). Heidegger quotes the same sentence from *Being and Time* (GA 2: 290–91/SZ 219), to show that he had been on the track of thinking ἀλήθεια as ἀλήθεια, which is to say as *clearing* rather than as truth. “Ἀλήθεια as unconcealment had already occupied me, but in the meantime ‘truth’ shoved itself in between.” Of course, it is no surprise that “truth” did that – all the philosophical preoccupations of the early 20th century would have had that effect.

We come to the *second* self-critique, which follows point (vi), on the “natural” sense of ἀληθές among the Greeks. Heidegger cites an argument from “Plato's Doctrine of Truth” that sought to trace a revolution in the Greek concept of truth supposedly carried out by Plato: from the original unconcealedness to correctness, ὀρθότης.¹⁴ But now he argues, on the contrary, that from the very beginning ἀλήθεια “was experienced” only as ὀρθότης, and so “came immediately under the perspective of likeness and adequation.” But in criticizing his own earlier construction of the history, Heidegger *cannot* be imputing the common understanding of ἀληθές to Parmenides as well! That would completely undermine his present argument of 1964! Parmenides stands as a lofty

mountain peak. Where a “natural” and pragmatic view of ἀλήθεια was circulating in the language, he reached down into the deepest resources of the language to find the name for the event of unconcealedness. (Here we might supplement the analysis, taking into account what Heidegger said in *Being and Time* (GA 2: 290–91/SZ 219): perhaps it was not only Parmenides, but Heraclitus and Aristotle too, who had freed themselves from the commonplace understanding of ἀληθές.) Parmenides might even have an explanation for the general incapacity of humanity to see through correctness into unconcealedness: we read here that Parmenides postulated a hiding, Ἀθήη, as dwelling within the heart of unconcealedness (GA 14: 88/44,8). But Heidegger will withdraw that suggestion later in the *Four Seminars* (GA 15: 395/FS 78).

III. AN EARLIER VERSION

Here we may consult “Hegel and the Greeks,” an address from 1958 (GA 9: 255–72/323–36). This text resembles the “Task of Thinking” in its outline. Both begin by surveying the current diminished state of philosophy, apparently submerged in “logistic” and social science. Both turn back then to the heroic age of Hegel (in the “Task of Thinking” supplemented by Husserl), when philosophy had no doubts about its proper concern (*Sache*): the process whereby subjectivity became capable of truth. Both essays conclude by invoking Parmenides, whose Ἀλήθεια determined the course of all subsequent philosophy, without being recognized by it. But “Hegel and the Greeks” also expresses in its conclusion the relationship of several variant forms of truth to the primordial Ἀλήθεια, expressing their relationship more explicitly than does the “Task of Thinking,” and so it is valuable to our present study.

The essay is devoted mainly to explaining how Hegel understood Greek philosophy as forming the initial stage of abstract thinking, focused on *being*, then how he treats the particular philosophers of Greece. As for Parmenides, Hegel stresses the doctrine that All is One, expressed in the identity of being and thought. But precisely at this point, Heidegger initiates his own questioning of Hegel: “With Parmenides, does not Ἀλήθεια, truth, stand over the beginning of the path

of philosophy?” (GA 9: 267/332) Here Heidegger did not hesitate to identify Ἀλήθεια with truth! So this address affords us a good “base point” for a critical approach to the “Task of Thinking” – why does the later text differ over this matter? As we read on in “Hegel and the Greeks,” we do see complexities in the relationship of Ἀλήθεια and truth. First of all, in Hegel: he grasped truth as certainty (*die Gewissheit*) of the self-knowing absolute subject. He did *not* comprehend it as Ἀλήθεια, and indeed his philosophy had no grasp of Ἀλήθεια in any form at all. Yet Heidegger pursues this matter: “Is not precisely certainty in its essence referred to [*angewiesen auf*] Ἀλήθεια . . . granted that we carefully ponder the latter as disclosure [*Entbergung*]?” (GA 9: 267/332) What grounding does Heidegger have for that claim? There are two main points. (a) Given that, for Hegel, being is the first and abstract theme of philosophy, then the very emergence of being can only occur under the regime of unconcealedness: a manifestation and disclosedness of being. (b) If, for Hegel, the completeness of philosophy is the self-reconciliation and self-recognition of spirit, then disclosure or unconcealedness must be at play there at the end, as well as in every intermediate stage of the phenomenology of spirit (GA 9: 267–68/332). Two pages later (GA 9: 270/334), we see an explicit parallel. (a) If Ἀλήθεια is at work in being and its manifestation, then being is referred to (*angewiesen auf*) unconcealedness, and not vice versa, and being has to do with (*hat zu tun mit*) unconcealedness, but not vice versa. (b) If truth, according to its essence, is determined as certainty, or as correctness, and these can only subsist within the domain of unconcealedness, then truth has to do with (*hat zu tun mit*) Ἀλήθεια, but not Ἀλήθεια with truth. This *Zu-tun-haben* is an asymmetrical relationship of dependence.

Moreover, the relationship is described here as a relationship of essence: *das Wesen der Wahrheit* that has come into force both as *Richtigkeit* and as *Gewissheit* can only subsist in the domain of Ἀλήθεια (GA 9: 270/334); that kind of attachment is *why* truth has to do with Ἀλήθεια, but not vice versa. It is astonishing that, a few years later, in the “Task of Thinking,” Heidegger makes no mention of the *essence* of truth, which served to express the connection of truth with unconcealedness in “Hegel and the Greeks.”

IV. LAFONT'S INTERPRETATION OF "THE TASK OF THINKING"

Lafont proposes a comprehensive reading of Heidegger, especially of *Being and Time*, as an expression of the "linguistic turn," whereby it is each historic language, and not a table of universal a priori concepts, that engages in world-disclosure.¹⁵ But if a language projects a world-interpretation, and we are all immersed in our language, it seems we can never find grounds for assuring ourselves that our projection is revelatory, i.e., true. She takes this to be the impasse fundamental to Heidegger's thought¹⁶: what *Being and Time* means by truth is coincidence between what the language projects and how things actually are; but Heidegger lacks the means to guarantee any such coincidence. I do not propose to follow her full treatment of this problem in the early and later Heidegger. (Her full-scale reading of Heidegger was influenced by the works of Tugendhat.¹⁷ No student of Heidegger can afford to ignore Tugendhat, but he did not publish comments on the "Task of Thinking," and that is the text that concerns us here. It is her reading of "Task of Thinking" that interests me.) At one juncture in her book, she treats "Task of Thinking" as containing Heidegger's own recognition of this general problem that she has identified.¹⁸ For her, Heidegger is led by his new insight to a complete recantation of his earlier views on truth: the unconcealing projections of language are not truth.

Lafont's presentation of *Being and Time* itself, however, is marked by a curious insistence on the term "correctness" (*Richtigkeit*) as a synonym for "truth" (*Wahrheit*). Heidegger's earlier view, she says, was that "unconcealment was the standard of measure for correctness, and therefore also the sufficient condition for truth."¹⁹ This correctness was to be the very coincidence that interests her between the projections of language and the way things actually are. Now she reads Heidegger's first self-critique in the "Task of Thinking" (we treated it above) as acknowledging that his unconcealment cannot account for correctness,²⁰ and that is why it loses all title to be counted as truth. But since, in fact, the term *Richtigkeit* never occurs in *Being and Time*, it is not possible that, at this later date in the "Task of Thinking," Heidegger would be admitting that *Being and Time* had failed in its account of *Richtigkeit!*

The problem is not only that Lafont goes astray in attributing this term to *Being and Time*. Beyond that, her text assumes that the nature of truth itself is already well known to us and is properly expressed as correctness. She repeatedly describes correctness not only as the “traditional” and “natural” but also as the “normative” concept of truth, as if it *had* to be what Heidegger had in mind in his early work, and what anyone could have had in mind.²¹

V. CONCLUSION: PHILOSOPHY AND THINKING

We have seen the array of distinct variants of truth in the text of the “Task of Thinking,” confirming that Heidegger did not hold a simple, univocal theory of truth: diverse variants like correspondence and adaequation, and later, certainty and correctness, all associated with one philosopher or another, all aspiring to express the riddle of Ἀλήθεια. The question we raised earlier, how they can all be related to one another, is actually the huge problem of comprehending the history of truth. Heidegger did not compose such a history, and it stands waiting for scholars to take up. One point that emerges from our survey is that varying concepts of truth are associated with varying projects of philosophy, indeed, dependent on them. Concepts of truth are defined *only* by philosophy – there is no such thing as a “pre-ontological understanding of truth.” What we take for a naïve understanding was constituted by the tradition, especially the modern tradition that stems from Thomas Aquinas. The people’s language has been shaped by metaphysics.

Our governing correlation between truth and unconcealedness has been framed, in Heidegger’s whole essay, by the contrast between philosophy, which has come to its end, and thinking, which is to embark on its new task. If, in Part One, philosophy has been completed, that means that we can expect no more researches of the type of Hegel’s or Husserl’s in the future. It does not mean that there will be no need for us in the future to read the historical Hegel and Husserl. Heidegger is at pains (GA 14: 74/436, 85/446) to stress the dignity of philosophy and its superiority over the thinking that he is proposing. Thinking still has to attend to philosophy. Heidegger never suggests that, historically,

philosophy was devoid of thinking, and “Hegel and the Greeks” was a wonderful demonstration of the activity of thinking practiced by the Greeks and by Hegel. But it seems that Heidegger is proposing to us a thinking *after* philosophy.

What would that be? Heidegger’s own work (and the work of his interpreters) practices thinking in such work as the *Four Seminars*, in the *Contributions to Philosophy* and its successor studies, in the encounter with East Asian thought, in the encounter with poetry, that of Hölderlin and others. The implication of the present study is that all such work of thinking must not lose sight of the philosophers, notably to expound what they have understood by truth, and how such an understanding gives some refraction, however distant, to unconcealedness. And Part One of the “Task of Thinking” reminds us that the current reality of philosophy is found in the social sciences, the natural sciences, and the formal sciences. The truth of science, too, must remain a topic for thinking, to seek out how it expresses unconcealedness.

ENDNOTES

- 1 See Daniel Dahlstrom, *Heidegger’s Concept of Truth* (Cambridge University Press, 2001); F.-W. von Herrmann, *Wahrheit, Freiheit, Geschichte* (Frankfurt: Klostermann, 2002); Mark Wrathall, *Heidegger and Unconcealment* (Cambridge University Press, 2011).
- 2 Martin Heidegger, “The End of Philosophy and the Task of Thinking,” GA 14: 67–90, English trans. Joan Stambaugh, in BW 431–49; hereafter “Task of Thinking.”
- 3 Cristina Lafont, *Heidegger, Language, and World-Disclosure*, translated by Graham Harman (Cambridge University Press, 2000), 109, 114–15.
- 4 Ibid., 115–7.
- 5 Thomas Sheehan provides one overview of Heidegger’s whole thought and shows the place of Ἀλήθεια within it in his article “Astonishing! Things Make Sense,” *Gatherings*, Vol. 1 (2011): 1–25.

- 6 GA 14: 83/BW 444: “...χρεὼ δέ σε πάντα πυθέσθαι
ἡμὲν Ἀληθείης εὐκυκλέος ἀτρεμεῖς ἦτορ
ἡδὲ βροτῶν δόξας, ταῖς οὐκ ἔνι πίστις ἀληθῆς.
Fragment I, 28ff.
- ‘du sollst aber alles erfahren:
sowohl der Unverborgenheit, der gutgerundeten,
nichtzitterndes Herz
als auch der Sterblichen Dafürhalten, dem fehlt das Vertrauen-
können auf Unverborgenes.’”
- 7 Richard Capobianco has an important discussion of this matter in
his *Engaging Heidegger* (University of Toronto Press, 2010), espe-
cially 94–103, showing that *die Lichtung* had become Heidegger’s
Leitmotif in the 1960s.
- 8 GA 14: 83-4/BW 445: “[Das Wort] meint sie selbst [die Unver-
borgenheit] in ihrem Eigensten, meint den Ort der Stille, der in
sich versammelt, was erst Unverborgenheit gewährt. Das ist die
Lichtung des Offenen.”
- 9 BW 445: “...the place of stillness that gathers in itself what first
grants unconcealment.”
- 10 See, for example, “The Question Concerning Technology” (GA 7:
21/BW 325).
- 11 See my paper, “On the Manifold Meaning of Truth in Aristotle,”
in *The Multidimensionality of Hermeneutic Phenomenology*, ed.
Babette Babich & Dimitri Ginev (Heidelberg: Springer, 2014),
227–42.
- 12 See, for example, GA 45: 7–20/8–19.
- 13 This is demonstrated at length in Capobianco, op. cit., 88–101.
- 14 See GA 9: 109–44/155–82. He had proposed this not only in that
essay from 1940, but in a number of lectures on Plato’s *Republic*
offered in the early 1930s; see GA 34, GA 36/37.
- 15 Lafont, *Heidegger, Language, and World-Disclosure*, 24–26.
- 16 See *Heidegger, Language, and World-Disclosure*, 109–114 for one
formulation of this problem.

- 17 Especially Ernst Tugendhat, *Der Wahrheitsbegriff bei Husserl und Heidegger* (Berlin: de Gruyter, 1967).
- 18 Lafont, *Heidegger, Language, and World-Disclosure*, 169–75.
- 19 Ibid., 171.
- 20 Ibid.
- 21 Ibid., 123, 127 (“normative”), 170 (“natural”), 171 (“traditional”).

BOOK REVIEW

John Haugeland's

Dasein Disclosed: John Haugeland's Heidegger

Hans Pedersen

John Haugeland. *Dasein Disclosed: John Haugeland's Heidegger*.
Edited by Joseph Rouse. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2013.
336 pages.

Let me begin by saying a bit about the structure of this volume, which is somewhat unusual. The largest section of the book is an unfinished manuscript that was intended to be a close, detailed interpretation of *Being and Time* and an attempt to work out what the promised, but never delivered, Division III of *Being and Time* would look like. This manuscript, unfortunately, is very much unfinished – it covers most of Division I of *Being and Time*, but goes no further. This unfinished manuscript is bracketed by articles comprising the sum total of Haugeland's work on Heidegger, some previously published, others unpublished versions of presented papers, some outlines of talks, and some not directly related to Heidegger, but which clearly draw on Heidegger to address broader philosophical issues in the philosophy of language or the philosophy of science. The editor of the volume, Joseph Rouse,

Gatherings: The Heidegger Circle Annual 4 (2014): 86–95.

does an excellent job highlighting some of the main themes that appear throughout Haugeland's work in the Editor's Introduction, which gives the reader a framework with which to make sense of the disparate writings included. Rouse also helpfully includes footnotes throughout the volume to point out changes in Haugeland's views from one writing to another to make it easier for the reader to track the development of his thought.

I cannot do justice to all of the issues covered in this book in a short review, and a number of Haugeland's main points are familiar to Heidegger scholars by virtue of their appearing in his own well-known published articles or by being common to much Hubert Dreyfus-inspired work on Heidegger. So, instead of trying for a broad summary of the work, I want to focus on several aspects of Haugeland's reading of Heidegger that I find to be especially distinctive and interesting. The first concerns Haugeland's interpretation of Heidegger's understanding of the being of entities. Haugeland places a good deal of weight on the language involving projection and possibilities in Heidegger's description of understanding as a fundamental existential structure. In Haugeland's words, "Heidegger is perfectly clear about the essential point: understanding...always projects entities onto their possibilities" (196).¹ He goes on to make the connection to the being of entities by claiming, "disclosing the being of entities involves grasping them in terms of a distinction between what is possible and impossible for them" (196) or, put slightly differently, the "being of entities is effectively determined by the relevant modal constraints" (185). Haugeland gives examples of how this could work for various types of entities. Chess pieces are understood in terms of the moves that are possible for them and the moves that are impossible for them (61). To be a rook is to be able to move in straight lines and to not be able to move diagonally. This works for tools as well. To be a hammer is to be something with which it is possible to pound a nail into wood. It is also a running theme for Haugeland to connect this modal understanding of being to scientific practice. The being of, for example, an electron can also be understood in modal

terms as a subatomic particle for which a certain charge is necessary and for which certain movements are possible. This marks one of the most important ways in which Haugeland seeks to bring Heidegger's ontological project closer to that of modern science.

Haugeland's interpretation of the being of entities serves as the foundation for his distinctive interpretation of Division II of *Being and Time*. In his proposal for a Guggenheim fellowship to provide the funding for his work on the unfinished manuscript contained in *Dasein Disclosed*, Haugeland claims that one of the most important aspects of his reading of Heidegger is that he is able to reconcile the seemingly discordant aims of Heidegger's project of fundamental ontology and the more existentialist ideas found in Division II (e.g. anxiety, death, resoluteness) (44). Haugeland maintains that Heidegger's main objective throughout his work is the question of the meaning of being, even when it might not seem like it. Therefore, all of the existentialist themes found in Division II must be read in terms of this fundamental question. In order to show how this might work, Haugeland tends to use the term 'responsibility' as a designation for authentic existence. The preference for 'responsibility' seems to come from the term's potential dual meaning. Haugeland is able to work with the idea that responsibility can be thought of as responsiveness to something, in this case, responsiveness to entities and their being. Of course, responsibility can also be understood as the personal quality of taking ownership of one's actions. This duality allows Haugeland to connect responsibility to both the question of being and the existentialist themes from Division II.

Haugeland differentiates between two different types and levels of responsibility: ontical/routine and existential/resolute/authentic responsibility. Ontical responsibility is concerned with "getting entities right" (200). This is where the connection can be made back to Haugeland's modal conception of the being of entities. "Getting entities right" requires a "*responsiveness* to ostensible impossibilities in the current situation," and furthermore, the "response must be a *refusal to accept* any current apparent impossibility" (200). Haugeland gives the examples of hearing that your child is now at school and at home, thinking

something is a hammer but having it shatter against a nail, and thinking something is carrying electric current but is not generating a magnetic field (200). In all of these cases, one finds something wrong with entities encountered in the sense that one encounters an impossibility associated with the entities. This recognition should generate, at least in a responsible person, an attempt to figure out what is really going on in each of these cases and a refusal to accept that something impossible is happening. We can see why ontical responsibility on Haugeland's view involves both an ontological understanding of the entities one encounters and a personal commitment to react to one's situation in the appropriate way. To be a person is, in part, for it to be impossible to be in two places at once; to be a hammer is, in part, for it to be impossible to shatter against a nail; to be electric current is for it to be impossible not to generate a magnetic field. A responsible person understands these ontologically definitive modal laws and feels a personal need to resolve the seeming impossibility that has been encountered by, for example, checking at home for one's child, making sure that the hammer had not been dipped in liquid nitrogen, or checking the equipment used to measure the magnetic field.

Ontical and existential responsibility share the characteristic of being a refusal to accept encountered impossibility. The difference is that, as discussed above, this refusal for ontical responsibility takes place at the ontic level (e.g. checking measuring instruments), which requires an understanding of the being of the entities encountered, but not a questioning of this being. To put it a bit too simply, existential responsibility responds to encountered impossibility by questioning the understanding of being that has led to the seeming impossibility after attempts to resolve the impossibility at the ontic level have failed. For example, someone exhibiting existential responsibility, when encountering an electric current which does not produce a magnetic field and after checking the measuring equipment and finding nothing wrong, would begin to question whether her understanding of the being of an electric current needs to be revised.

Haugeland then demonstrates how this general notion of existential responsibility can be used to make sense of the key “existentialist” concepts from Division II. Readiness for anxiety is interpreted as a readiness to admit that the normal, public understanding of the being of entities does not make sense (207–8). Similarly, being-toward-death is interpreted as a recognition that all understandings of being can potentially become unworkable and might have to be given up. Haugeland states that authentic responsibility is for Dasein to “take responsibility in this way for the possibility that the understanding of being that it is may not be viable – to take responsibility for it as *essentially vulnerable*” (239). Existential responsibility is seen as authentic, owned existence, because it is our ownmost possibility to raise the question of being. In Haugeland’s words: “*Owned* Dasein, as taking over responsibility for its ontological heritage, no longer takes it for granted. It reawakens the question of being – as its *ownmost* and sometimes *most urgent* question” (215). Furthermore, “it is taking responsibility for the possibilities onto which entities are projected and therewith Dasein’s ability-to-be as an understanding of being” (238). In existential responsibility, we recognize and own up to our role in letting beings be what they are by projecting them onto possibilities. This form of responsibility also requires resoluteness and repeated commitment to resolve apparent encountered impossibilities by resolving misperceptions or errors that make entities seem to contradict our understanding of their being or by holding oneself free for the possibility of taking back one’s operative understanding of being (216–17).

Interestingly, Haugeland takes his reading of the account of authenticity in Division II as a refutation of relativism, but a refutation of relativism that still allows for truth to have a historical character. According to Haugeland, the “challenge of relativism is that the possibilities onto which entities are projected and in terms of which truth and falsehood about them can be distinguished seem historically contingent and ultimately arbitrary” (239). His reading of existential responsibility is able to meet this challenge by maintaining that some understandings of being just are not viable. In other words, contra

relativism, it is not the case that any understanding of being can be projected onto entities encountered in the world. The non-viability of certain understandings of being is demonstrated by the refusal of entities to fit with these understandings. In the language Haugeland uses throughout, we are beholden to the entities themselves and must recognize that we might have to give up an understanding of being that does not fit with them. This removes the arbitrariness from the relativist's conception of things, while still allowing the Heideggerian (and as Haugeland frequently mentions, the Kuhnian) claim that the way in which we understand beings does unfold historically and shifts over time.

It is somewhat unclear how to fairly develop critical remarks on Haugeland's thought. One might be tempted to fault Haugeland for only considering a very narrow slice of Heidegger's work (*Being and Time* is mentioned and cited profusely, *The Basic Problems of Phenomenology* occasionally, but no other work of Heidegger's is given serious consideration), particularly when some of Heidegger's now-published lecture courses from the same era – 1920s to early 1930s – shed considerable light on the issues with which Haugeland is most concerned. Similarly, one might be tempted to criticize Haugeland's relative lack of engagement with recent scholarly work on Heidegger. However, I think both of these lines of criticism would be unfair and misguided. Haugeland's work in some ways mirrors Heidegger's own approach to the history of philosophy – deep, detailed engagement with a few key works of a major thinker, aimed not at achieving a maximally coherent interpretation of the thinker in question after a broad survey of the whole oeuvre or situating one's reading within the constellation of current scholarly views, but rather a profound thinking-through of selected issues that proceeds out of the conceptual space opened up by the thinker under study.

With that in mind, I think it is best to critically assess Haugeland's work not necessarily in terms of whether or not he “gets Heidegger right,” but instead to consider whether Haugeland's engagement with the question of being and associated analysis of human existence works

on its own merits. To that end, I would like to consider more closely Haugeland's modal conception of the being of entities. This view has the virtue of providing an understanding of being that can be seen as undergirding both the ready-to-hand and present-at-hand modes of being discussed by Heidegger in *Being and Time* without seemingly undoing Heidegger's work of undermining the privileged position of the disengaged, theoretical understanding of being. Through the examples Haugeland uses, he makes it clear that the being of a hammer as ready-to-hand is just as much determined by its possible use for a task as the being of an electron is determined by scientific, mathematical laws defining its necessary charge and possible motion. Establishing this common modal basis for understanding the being of the ready-to-hand and present-at-hand seems to be very much in line with Haugeland's (and Heidegger's) interest in finding a unifying, underlying sense of what it means to be.

I do, however, have some worries about this modal understanding of being. The first worry is concerned with the place of this understanding of being within the more general scope of Haugeland's project. Haugeland, in the proposal that effectively serves as a preface for his unfinished manuscript, follows *Being and Time*-era Heidegger in maintaining that the answer to the question of the meaning of being will be found ultimately in an analysis of temporality. Like Heidegger, Haugeland did not follow through on his intended aim to work out the ultimate answer to the question of being in terms of temporality (though, of course, an unfortunate and untimely death is responsible for Haugeland's lack of follow through, as opposed to Heidegger's gradual turning away from this path of inquiry). As he remarks at the end of the notes for a talk on temporality delivered in 2002, his interpretation of Heidegger thus far "has answered only the question of the sense of Dasein's being – not the sense of being *tout court*" (240). Haugeland shows how the being of entities can be understood in the modal terms of possibility and necessity and how Dasein makes possible various understandings of being in modal terms. The connection to temporality seems to be that the fact of our mortality means that we have a finite,

vulnerable existence that makes it possible to understand beings in terms of possibility and impossibility. We understand ourselves as projecting forward into possibilities, and ultimately projecting forward into the possibility of the impossibility of being (i.e. death). On the basis of this understanding of our own being, we can understand entities encountered in the world in terms of what is possible or impossible for them. However, it is unclear how much the sense of finitude Haugeland discusses is strictly temporal finitude. Human existence is obviously temporally finite, but it is also finite in many other ways that do not always seem to be reducible to temporal finitude. As we know, Heidegger gave up focusing on time and temporality in his investigation of the question of being because he came to see these concepts as too narrow and beholden to the metaphysical and scientific traditions. It seems to me that Haugeland too would be better off dropping the attempt to show how this all must boil down to temporality, but this, of course, is hard to say conclusively, as the section of manuscript meant to flesh out this trajectory was never completed.

The second worry is perhaps more substantive. Haugeland's modal conception of being and his conception of responsibility rely heavily on the idea of impossibility and the refusal to accept impossibility. At least at times, Haugeland's conception of impossibility seems tied to the logical principle of non-contradiction (e.g. in the above example of hearing that one's child is simultaneously at home and at school). Of course, there is a long-standing philosophical tradition of treating the principle of non-contradiction as absolutely fundamental, its truth assumed to provide the basis for the possibility of any logical analysis whatsoever. However, there is also a rather strong philosophical undercurrent of questioning or rejecting this principle in the history of philosophy. Heraclitus, Kierkegaard, and current philosophers working on dialethic conceptions of logic immediately come to mind. Most relevantly, Heidegger himself states his case for dismissing or at least limiting the scope of the principle of non-contradiction in various lecture courses.⁵ There are times when a seemingly contradictory statement does seem to best capture the phenomena being discussed.

We might even find an example, used by Haugeland, in Heidegger's description of death as the possibility of the impossibility of being. It seems that there is a *prima facie* contradiction here in asserting that death is both P and not P, but at least among Heidegger scholars, it is generally accepted that Heidegger's formulation is trenchant and captures something important about what it is to be human. Is this the sort of impossibility that we must refuse to accept? This question does not conclusively demonstrate that Haugeland is wrong to place so much weight on the notions of possibility and impossibility when it comes to developing an understanding of being, but it does, in my opinion, make it seem like he should have done more to justify and explain the ontological centrality of these modal concepts and the existential responsibility to resolve any encountered impossibility.

The minor questions I pose here for Haugeland's views do not detract from my enthusiasm for the volume as a whole. It contains the development of a detailed, distinctive, and engaging interpretation and appropriation of some of the central issues of Heidegger's thought and provides an excellent example of a thinker who takes up the question of being with the aid of the framework provided by Heidegger, but who is unafraid to go beyond Heidegger when the subject matter calls for it.

ENDNOTES

- 1 All parenthetical references refer to the book under review.
- 2 The number of different types of responsibility identified by Haugeland and the names he gives to each one shift throughout the various writings included in *Dasein Disclosed*, as this was clearly an idea that he was still in the process of developing. In the article, "Truth and Finitude: Heidegger's Transcendental Existentialism," published in 2000, Haugeland lists three different types of responsibility: ontical, ontological, and existential. However, in the notes for a 2002 talk, "Temporality," he only mentions two types: routine and resolute, which seem to roughly

map onto ontical and existential. Finally, in his article, “Authentic Intentionality,” published in 2002, he discusses authentic responsibility, which seems to roughly match up with resolute and existential responsibility. In my discussion here, I have chosen to leave out consideration of ontological responsibility, as it appears to have dropped out of Haugeland’s thought on the subject, and to treat ‘ontical’ and ‘routine’ as equivalent terms, as well ‘existential,’ ‘resolute,’ and ‘authentic’ as equivalent.

3 See, for example, GA 29/30: 26–29/17–20.

BOOK REVIEW

Scott Campbell's

The Early Heidegger's Philosophy of Life

Natalie Nenadic

Scott M. Campbell. *The Early Heidegger's Philosophy of Life: Facticity, Being, and Language*.
New York: Fordham University Press, 2012.
288 pages.

Scott Campbell's rich and intricate study traces Heidegger's early treatment of the relationship of life and the question of Being, which in *Being and Time* (1927) would crystallize as the concept of Dasein as Being-in-the-world. In this careful analysis of the early lecture courses (and related writings), we have an ampler, more fleshed out "biography of Dasein" (5), whose focus on factual life – human living and speaking – distinguishes Campbell's treatment of this period from other scholarship on it. He presents paths of Heidegger's thinking from a phenomenology of factual life to an ontology of Dasein that traverses a multidisciplinary and diachronic terrain, addressing areas such as science, religion, philosophy, theology, history, and language and eliciting resources from the greats of philosophy's past, here centered on

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Aristotle and Plato, whereby Campbell also gives us indications about what philosophizing in Heidegger's sense entails. This study is a wonderful resource for more deeply engaging and appreciating Heidegger's early philosophical journeying, especially the light it sheds on *Being and Time*, which will lose some of the richness of these earlier expressions of the rapport of life and Being. Furthermore, this book prods us to reflect on the ultimate point of tending to these Heideggerian paths for which such good scholarship is a trusted aid. And that is – by way of the example, guide, and resource of Heidegger's work – to venture beyond this relative terra firma towards the openness of some such journeying of one's own.

The Early Heidegger's Philosophy of Life: Facticity, Being, and Language is divided into four major parts, which address the early lecture courses (as well as letters and manuscripts) chronologically from 1919 to 1925. This division allows Campbell to emphasize significant turns in Heidegger's expressions of what would become the temporally and historically aware self, that self moreover who is the ground from which new philosophical problems of the human condition reveal themselves and summon response. Campbell captures salient moments of these "travels" in each of the sections of the book, which I summarize below with an eye also to their meta-philosophical implications.

The early lecture courses reflect the beginnings of Heidegger's treatment of the contemporary problem that our ways of understanding life conceal those dimensions of experience by which we understand ourselves as living and speaking beings and not simply observers of life, dimensions that for him are "in one way or another the ultimate question of philosophy" (1). He will therefore come up against the absoluteness of scientific epistemology – likewise reflected in philosophies that aspire to a "worldview" – and religious dogma, as they have notably contributed to that concealment.

Campbell addresses these topics in Part I, "Philosophical Vitality (1919–21)," beginning with Heidegger's turn to the realm of lived experience and its continuously changing contexts of meaningful relationships that underlie and spur all scientific (and other) inquiry.

This realm is concealed by the claimed completeness of the findings of science and of absolute philosophical systems, whose domains then become isolated and closed off from life. Campbell draws our attention to developments in Heidegger's search for a way to characterize this ground and for a method capable of retrieving it that does not lose sight of that ground, as science and absolute philosophies typically do. Heidegger will refer to the "historical-I" and to "factual life," understood as a "self-world" comprised of layers of intersecting involvements that echo back and forth in different intensities of concern and are therefore in continuous renewal, which will then become simply "facticity." To "hold" this pre-theoretical yet "graspable" realm (39), he will speak of "taking notice" and communicating the meaningfulness therein, and of phenomenology as the way that philosophy conducts its work of "disclos[ing] and... articul[at]ing [unretrieved layers] of pretheoretical, lived experience" (26).

Campbell considers Heidegger's subsequent treatment of early Christianity in *The Phenomenology of Religious Life* (1920–21) as a further probe of this pretheoretical realm, with attention now to its temporal and historical aspects. In his efforts to delineate this realm, Heidegger turns to history, specifically Paul's letters, where he discovers an instructive original experience of Christian religiosity, which preceded and subsequently became buried beneath religion's later objectification into theological dogma. On Heidegger's interpretation, these early Christians lived with an acute awareness of temporality. In making the momentous decision to accept the word of God, they lived in anticipation of Christ's future return, whose precise timing was unknown. This indeterminacy was reflected in an urgency that infused the concrete activities and directions of their everyday lives and through which care for one's existence was more intensely experienced. To live one's faith in a state of "absolute concern" is, Heidegger says, "authentically to live temporality" (56). From this encounter with original Christian religiosity, facticity becomes furthermore specified as "the intensification of the present in the intensification of its everyday meaningfulness that makes possible an awareness of the self as

both becoming (and, hence, having been) and as anticipating...[which is how] the temporality of facticity comes through" (58). Here too a clearer connection emerges between the psychological states Heidegger variously describes as "absolute concern," "disquiet," "distress," "torment" and a more palpable awareness of temporality.

Part II, "Factual Life (1921–22)," is an extended treatment of the *Phenomenological Interpretations of Aristotle: Initiation into Phenomenological Research*, in which Campbell shows how Heidegger now explicitly connects facticity to the task of philosophy and details the workings of facticity. Heidegger asserts that the "the main point of philosophy" is life in its facticity (82), namely "[h]ow the human being lives in its most concrete life-contexts, . . . contexts [that] must be comprehended in terms of the sense of Being of the human being" (68), which is now more clearly understood as "in the world." Philosophy therefore tends to dimensions of concrete human existence not addressed by established philosophical interpretations and, in doing so, may radically recast those interpretations (63). Returning to methodological considerations broached in earlier lecture courses, Heidegger specifies the need for an approach by which philosophy can hold what it thus uncovers while still preserving life's native indeterminacy and ambiguity, which philosophical systems that claim complete clarity suppress, such that, as a result, they avoid life and relinquish philosophizing.

Here Heidegger has delineated components of philosophizing in his sense – an activity that only few can do – which to some extent overlap with his descriptions of living philosophically. Living philosophically is in theory open to all and, on his interpretation, arguably evinced for example by early Christians. For both, "caring movement" enters a state of heightened awareness of temporality and historicity. Campbell presents the structures of that overlapping movement, shifting his focus from an earlier emphasis on factual life as a source of vital life-experience to factual life's "ruinance," a precursor to "fallenness." Here life loses itself in seemingly limitless distractions, identifying itself with the objects and prevailing interpretations of the world and thinking of itself as without limits. For Campbell, the real meaning

of “ruinance” is this concealment of temporality. However, he does not consider “ruinance” a degradation of life but a determination of it within which hidden positive dimensions of factual life are retrieved. Among those positive dimensions are a new openness to the world, tied to a heightened awareness of life’s temporal-historical constitution, and a rigorous questioning of the interpreted layers with which life identifies itself, where one expression of that questioning is philosophizing. The category of “relucence” within life’s ruinance indicates such hidden dimensions, which thereby somehow glimmer through ruinance. Relucence enables a counter-movement of retrieving such dimensions while the category of “prestructuring” indicates the stabilization of what is thus retrieved into fixed determinations, within which there will then be other hidden yet relucient dimensions for later retrieval and so on. This counter-movement also reveals “kairotic time” as a critical aspect of factual life. It refers to that decisive moment when life’s temporality is grasped and its avoidance of temporality through worldly distractions is illuminated as such, thus opening a path of retrieval and other possibilities for interpreting and living life.

In Part III, “The Hermeneutics of Facticity (1922–23),” Campbell presents Heidegger’s development of the historical component of retrieval, with retrieval here understood mainly in the context of doing philosophy, and specifically Heidegger’s philosophical task of “attempt[ing] to redirect current philosophical and theological traditions toward Dasein’s facticity” (103). According to Heidegger, handed-down concepts from philosophy’s history dominate and limit current thinking and require “dismantling.” Yet relucient within them are indications of another understanding and resources for stabilizing it, which need to be drawn out as part of contemporary philosophy’s work of retrieving concealed dimensions of Dasein’s facticity. Campbell suggests that Heidegger’s own turn to Aristotle in *Phenomenological Interpretations of Aristotle* (and to other past philosophers and texts) reflects this kind of movement of contemporary philosophy vis-à-vis its past, which Heidegger refers to as a phenomenological hermeneutics of facticity. For Heidegger criticizes Aristotle’s understanding of

Being, which governs current philosophy. Yet, in the course of examining the facticity of Aristotle's concepts, he also discovers resources for his own task of retrieving the facticity of Dasein, which, as he earlier noted, is the "main point of philosophy" and his reason for redirecting current philosophical research there to revitalize that research.

Campbell shows how Heidegger elicits clues for this task from Aristotle's concepts of *ousia* and *phronēsis*. *Ousia* has been appropriated over the ages to signify pure beholding that is "unconcerned" with the world and, so, conceals temporality and blocks radical questioning. But Heidegger's factual inquiry retrieves a temporal dimension of *ousia* that the tradition conceals. Furthermore in *phronēsis*, Heidegger sees a kind of retrieval occurring, as *phronēsis* "safe-keep[s]...insight" (109) about what to do in a practical situation, insight that is not fixed but changes according to changing situations and is not free from deception. *Phronēsis* thereby reveals a certain truth about human experience.

This section concludes with analysis of *Ontology: The Hermeneutics of Facticity* (1923), where Campbell demonstrates how factual life and an understanding that its way of being is Being-in-the-world is brought more sharply into focus. Heidegger charts additional structures of facticity drawn from Dasein's concrete, average, everyday ways of existing through which it can achieve access to an understanding of its Being. He is thereby redefining phenomenology and ontology from earlier interpretations, which kept inquiry confined within a specific region of objects, and is instead positing a hermeneutic ontology or "a kind of radical phenomenology" (130) that places factual life into question. Dasein thus has a vigilant self-awareness through which it can achieve better understanding of itself. However, Dasein's "concrete present" is with others as the "they" and in the mode of "curiosity" (126). Although Dasein thereby identifies with objective knowledge and evades life's temporality, it is nevertheless in a "pre-having" of Being by virtue of the meaningfulness of these worldly involvements. For within them are traces of Dasein's temporality and concern for its Being that in certain decisive (kairotic) moments will pierce through as a heightened experience of them.

The lecture courses treated in Part IV, “The Language of Life (1923–25),” reflect Heidegger’s shift from laying out the mechanics of facticity to analyzing the works of Aristotle and Plato from within their own philosophical and historical contexts. As part of the project of redirecting contemporary philosophy to the facticity of Dasein, Heidegger investigates the facticity of historical concepts as sources of insight about the fundamental place of language in revealing the “essential relatedness between being human and living in the world” (76). Campbell begins with the *Introduction to Phenomenological Research* (1923–24) where, in formulating a more radical phenomenology, Heidegger seeks to recover the original experience of the concept’s constituent terms. He concludes that for Aristotle *logos* did not originally mean reason, as has been handed down and rigidified through the ages, but rather speaking and discussing with others in the world. Heidegger interprets the latter as “a kind of speaking that encounters the world and therefore encounters Being” (142). Thus, phenomenology was a matter of letting the world be seen through perceiving something, thus setting it in relief against an original ground, and speaking about it in a move that is not free of deception and concealments. Heidegger thereby challenges governing scientific interpretations of existence that in their certainty suppress all deception, opinion, and other standpoints, and he does so to recover the richness of Dasein instead.

Campbell shows how Heidegger, in his factual treatment of Aristotle’s *Rhetoric* in *Basic Concepts of Aristotelian Philosophy* (1924), then retrieves authentic speaking from the ordinary everyday speaking in Greek life. This retrieval is significant in redirecting contemporary philosophy to Dasein’s facticity as recovery of concealed dimensions of human experience emanates from speaking with others and is first expressed through language. That is, a new concept or understanding of the human condition arises from perception of another realm of experience, which is given voice through the speaking and listening relations we have with others in the world. Indeed, Heidegger considers the *Rhetoric* as “nothing other than the interpretation of Dasein, the

hermeneutic of Dasein itself"; it retrieves speaking from sophistry by recovering a "possibility of existence" latent within Greek life (163, italics in the original). More specifically, this recovery begins in the rhetorical situation between and among people as in the polis. The listener, taken along by the passions (*pathē*) of the speaker, may be brought to an experience of anxiety or uncanniness, that is, a heightened awareness of his profound finitude, which is a moment of decision about who he is and may trigger authentic speaking. As Campbell summarizes, "When Dasein is struck with the uncanniness of its own nothingness, it searches out conversation...because it is trying to come to terms with who it is..." (173). Of course Aristotle does not more fully delineate this dynamic. Indeed if he did, then Heidegger's turn to Aristotle would be more exclusively scholarly and not principally about "thinking with him" as a way of making Heidegger's own original contributions to philosophy. The point of this turn to Aristotle is, Campbell suggests, to draw out what is latent or unthought in Aristotle's thought as part of the process of doing new philosophy of the present day.

Heidegger's search for clues in the past for his work of drawing out the speaking dimension of contemporary philosophy's vocation also takes him to a factual treatment of Plato's "*Sophist*" (1925). Although Heidegger's relation to Plato is often thought to be one of simply dismissing him as the father of metaphysics, Campbell shows a more complex posture that recognizes and elicits positive aspects of Plato's dialectic for Heidegger's contemporary purposes. Because dialectic is ultimately about arriving at a pure beholding (*noein*) of the Ideas, Heidegger's task of retrieval here must first pass through his factual interrogation of Aristotle's notion of *logos* as speaking, which Heidegger considers to be an Aristotelian radicalization of Platonic dialectic. Dialectic's most basic expression as dialogue or speaking with others then becomes more perspicuous. Dialectic sets something in relief against a background of deception or non-being, in a process that is moreover in some capacity concerned with human existence or care of the souls of the interlocutors. As with Heidegger's factual encounter with Aristotle's concepts, here too he recognizes where he can follow Plato's dialectic and where

he cannot. For the task of philosophy as Heidegger is now specifying it is “not to pass through *logos* to *noein*” and away from life “but rather to accept the original facticity of *logos* and discern truth from within those deceptions and concealments that are immanent within the factual human situation” (194).

Campbell presents a very deftly and carefully woven story of the steps of Heidegger’s early philosophical journeying towards concepts for which he would later become well known but whose paths there are not so known. As a scholarly contribution to this less treated area of Heidegger’s work, *The Early Heidegger’s Philosophy of Life* is a rich, needed, and impressive achievement. It offers a much ampler understanding of *Being and Time*. It also aims to intervene in scholarship concerning the ambiguity that Heidegger ascribes to factual life, where it is both a source of vitality as well as a source of fallenness. Campbell argues that scholars tend to interpret this ambiguity as too sharp an opposition. Factual life is then construed as either overwhelmingly fallen or able to achieve sustained authenticity that can eliminate life’s ambiguity instead of appreciating, as Campbell emphasizes, that the two are never entirely separated, with authenticity “*passing through*” the distortions of ruinance without ever being completely free of them (216, italics in the original).

There is more to Campbell’s book, though, than its contribution to filling in a part of the larger “encyclopedia” of Heidegger’s body of work and scholarship on it, which is significant in its own right. Arguably, the greater significance of presenting this richer picture of the *early* paths of Heidegger’s thinking lies in the insights it offers into how a philosopher of this caliber gets on his way. That is, what kinds of questions, directions, and motivations does he pursue in getting started? This is especially important if we understand, with Heidegger, that philosophy’s vocation today has something to do with phenomenologically retrieving a concealed dimension of the human condition from factual life – the concrete, everyday living, listening, and speaking with others – in a task for which philosophy’s history is both a hindrance and a resource.

What is especially exciting about Campbell's study is that he also keeps us within the zone of this kind of reflection. Here scholarship does not become confined to "reporting" on a thinker's paths in a way that can itself become a kind of "fleeing towards the familiar" of other such scholarship, which can then block off radical questioning by finding engagement with Heidegger that escapes such scholarly confines unintelligible. As Campbell variously emphasizes:

Heidegger affirms, *and this is of the utmost importance*, that no epoch should be robbed of the "burden" of having to ask its own questions... "Philosophical research is...something that will never want to...be able to...take away from future times the burden and concern of radical questioning" (105, em).

Campbell's manner of tracing the beginnings of Heidegger's radical questioning is not only practically instructive in terms of what the work of such questioning may entail; it also encourages us to imagine conducting that questioning in a way that may "think with Heidegger" as he did here with Aristotle and Plato.

BOOK REVIEW

Denis McManus'

Heidegger and the Measure of Truth

Joseph Rouse

Denis McManus. *Heidegger and the Measure of Truth: Themes from His Early Philosophy*.
Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012.
256 pages.

Denis McManus's book is less a commentary on Heidegger than an attempt to think through in a fresh way some central themes of Division I of *Being and Time* as they emerged in Heidegger's early lecture courses from 1919 to 1925. In light of Heidegger's methodological emphasis upon formal indication to circumvent the pull toward idle talk, McManus's approach seems especially appropriate for Heidegger's philosophizing. His itinerary is also an informative complement to John Haugeland's posthumously published *Dasein Disclosed*. Haugeland insists upon explicitly rethinking every theme in *Being and Time* in light of the question concerning the sense of being; McManus instead lets the being question come to light indirectly. It emerges through Heidegger's early thoughts about constitution, "original havings," and the *vorgängiger*

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Hinblick and *Woraufhin* that must be already operative in any intentional directedness, as a “measure” presupposed in any determination of truth as correctness.

McManus’s reflections consistently reward thoughtful consideration. I will consider six topics: his initial discussion of Heidegger’s early appropriation and subsequent abandonment of Husserl’s conception of constitution; his extended examination of *Vorhandenheit* and *Zuhandenheit* in *Being and Time*; his critical assessment of Hubert Dreyfus’s influential interpretation of the *Vorhandenheit-Zuhandenheit* relation; McManus’s own reflections on measurement and the “measure” of truth; his reconsideration of Heidegger’s early philosophy of science, guided by his discussions of constitution and “measure”; and his concluding metaphilosophical speculations about the “subject-correlate” of philosophy, with implications for the place of *Being and Time* in Heidegger’s philosophical thinking.

McManus’s opening chapters on constitution, the categories, and Heidegger’s rejection of a “con-formist” conception of intelligibility provide a strong introduction, setting the stage for his subsequent discussion. McManus begins with Heidegger’s early phenomenological recovery of distinctive “subject-correlates” or “original havings” in religious life. Prayer, love of God, and living in “expectation” of the Last Judgment exemplify diverse forms of understanding that are distorted philosophically by an all-encompassing, homogenizing Theoretical Attitude. These considerations guide Heidegger’s challenge to what McManus calls “con-formist” conceptions of intelligibility. Thinking of conformity or non-conformity between objective categories of what there is, and subjective categories that structure thinking, generates realism and idealism as familiar philosophical stances. McManus reads Heidegger’s rejection of both stances as a rejection of their underlying con-formism, and argues that Heidegger abandoned his early talk of “constitution” and “subject- and object-correlates” for its recurrent temptation toward con-formism. McManus also usefully connects Heidegger’s concerns with John McDowell’s Wittgensteinian insistence that a “sideways-on” view of ourselves in the world is illusory and senseless.¹ The result is not an “internal” perspective on intelligibility, but a

rejection of spatial metaphors of “perspectives” as internal or external. These chapters’ themes are not unfamiliar, but McManus’s treatment is deft, cogent, and illuminating.

The contrast between a Theoretical Attitude and diverse “original havings” easily segues into McManus’s initial discussion of *Vorhandenheit*. McManus identifies 36 different characterizations of *Vorhandenheit* in *Being and Time* or prominent commentaries. He initially argues against efforts to systematize these uses coherently, including efforts to identify *Vorhandenheit* as what is revealed in asserting, in the sciences, in a generic Theoretical Attitude, or in relation to *Zuhandenheit*.² Later, McManus proposes a 37th specification of the term as better indicating what Heidegger is getting at, even if not fully accommodating all uses. He argues that Heidegger primarily uses the term diagnostically, tracking a characteristic tendency toward confusion in our thinking (*Seinsvergessenheit*) rather than marking out a coherent ontological domain.

I think McManus is importantly right on both counts, the theoretical incoherence of the manifold invocations of *Vorhandenheit* and their diagnostic coherence. *Vorhandenheit* primarily denotes both the understanding of being predominant in the Western philosophical tradition, and the understanding implicit in everyday as well as philosophical covering over of the being question. Haugeland makes a similar point more briefly,³ but their different formulations are instructive. Haugeland interprets this period in Heidegger as governed by the dimensions of the being question laid out in *Basic Problems of Phenomenology*: ontological difference, articulation of being, regional differentiation of multiple ways of being, and the truth-character of being. He can say succinctly that unlike *Zuhandenheit*, *Vorhandenheit* does not identify a region of being, but only traditional philosophical conceptions of entities as independent of anything else (including any understanding of being or “measure” of truth). McManus’s suggestion that *Vorhandenheit* is a diagnostic category follows naturally from this formulation, as does his rejection of broadly pragmatist interpretations that take *Vorhandenheit* in general as founded on *Zuhandenheit* (for Haugeland, those interpretations amount to a category mistake).

McManus would nevertheless likely resist Haugeland's formulation, for two related reasons. First, he is also suspicious of the coherence of *Zuhandenheit*. Second, McManus implicitly seeks to separate Heidegger's early reflections on *Hinblicke* and measures of truth from the project of fundamental ontology that distinctively marks his *Being and Time* period. I return to both points below in considering McManus's concluding metaphilosophical reflections.

McManus further develops his skepticism about most versions of the "Primacy of Practice Claim" in an extended critical discussion of perhaps its best-known version. Hubert Dreyfus insists, both in his own voice and Heidegger's, that propositional attitudes and conceptual content are only intelligible against a background of non-conceptual coping skills.⁴ Dreyfus treats Heidegger's phenomenological characterization of dealings with equipment as exemplary of these quasi-foundational "coping" skills, although not exclusively so. I also criticize Dreyfus's efforts to found conceptual or theoretical compartments on a distinct "level" of practical coping, and our criticisms substantially overlap even though I do not address Dreyfus on Heidegger.⁵ I will not here sort out parallels and differences in our responses to Dreyfus, but only call attention to an especially interesting aspect of McManus's discussion. Dreyfus's ongoing debate with John McDowell about the scope of conceptual understanding has received extensive discussion (see Schear, *Mind, Reason, and Being-in-the-World*). McManus nevertheless adds a new dimension by tracing their disagreements to Dreyfus's effort to solve, where McDowell would instead dissolve, some familiar philosophical puzzles. On this reading, Dreyfus's appeal to skillful coping as terminating a regress of rules, his aspiration to a philosophical account of intentionality, and his fascination with neural nets to replace traditional approaches to artificial intelligence research surreptitiously presuppose a "sideways-on" conception of the world that both Heidegger and McDowell reject.

In the book's pivotal arguments, McManus connects Heidegger's early reflections on constitution and *Hinblicke* with his discussions of truth in the 1925 *Logic* lectures and throughout the *Being and*

Time period. His extended discussion of measurement indicates how traditional conceptions of truth as correspondence or correctness rest upon a form of understanding that is not “con-formist.” As McManus rightly insists, “the ‘formal’ notion of a ‘constituting’ ‘anticipation’ which provides a ‘measure’ – up to which entities may or may not match – represents an important continuous theme that runs through the young Heidegger’s work” (111). Speaking of truth as correspondence presupposes a grasp of the *way* in which a comportment corresponds to an entity or not, and that understanding is not itself subject to con-formist questions. McManus finds here “a sense for the idea of a non-subjectivist *a priori*... in that we can make no sense of the idea of finding out ‘more’ – through other ‘means’ – about those entities that might subsequently undermine the understanding embodied in these modes of understanding” (121–2). Mastering such a way of possible correspondence provides access to entities: learning *of* them rather than *about* them, in McManus’s succinct formulation.

McManus first uses this development of Heidegger’s early notion of a *vorgängiger Hinblick* to explicate Heidegger’s well-known criticisms of skepticism, and his characterization of Dasein as “in the truth.” His primary deployment, however, is to read differently the sense in which Heidegger takes practice as primary. He first argues that *Zuhandenheit* exemplifies a non-conformist mode of understanding. There can be no intelligible sense in which hammering “fits” hammers, or vice versa. He then turns to measurement practices as disclosing the possibility of conformity or non-conformity in some measurable respect. In mastering a measuring practice (e.g., measuring lengths with a ruler), one is not learning the correct way to measure independently determinable lengths, but learning *of* length. The concept and the practice are inextricable. McManus then defends this “constitutive” role for measuring practices both against objections that measurements can be improved and thereby corrected, and against efforts to diminish the legitimacy of the practices and measures thereby established. These chapters conclude with an informative discussion of “methodological fetishism,” arguing that measurement practices can be rejected as trivial or insignificant, but not as incorrect. McManus notes that further discussion of

such issues requires exposition of *Eigentlichkeit*, which goes beyond the scope of the book (below, I comment further on the project's confinement almost entirely within the scope of issues from Division I).

McManus also reconsiders Heidegger's early views on the sciences throughout these chapters. McManus has the right over-arching orientation on this issue, "to question the notion that Heidegger is, in some way, hostile to the sciences," even while also recognizing Heidegger's conjoined effort "to reveal a way in which scientific practices can obscure as well as illuminate our world" (137). McManus takes two early articles⁶ as recurrent foils for his treatment of Heidegger on science. I would have emphasized common ground there rather than differences (most notably in undermining rather than merely reversing traditional distinctions between theory and practice), but a review is not the place to defend my own earlier work. I instead focus on what McManus illuminates, and what he misses, in Heidegger's early discussions of the sciences. On one point, however, McManus's focus on my own article misses an important point about Heidegger's views, by not noting the companion piece that connects the criticism of *Being and Time* to Heidegger's own revised views in "Die Zeit des Weltbildes."⁷ Heidegger has not been well served by that article's English translations, which are insensitive to its bearing on anglophone philosophy of science. McManus himself does not address Heidegger's later views directly, but the specific continuities and discontinuities in the earlier and later views on science may disrupt the metaphilosophical suggestions he makes at the end of the book.

A strength of McManus's discussion of measurement is that it usefully brings out *how* Heidegger's views undermine both realist and anti-realist philosophies of science. Measuring practices cannot be adequately understood either as providing epistemic access to an independent property of entities, or as constructing or imposing a conceptualization somehow alien to them. Heidegger's typical locutions for this "non-conformist" understanding of scientific disclosure are that scientific research "lets entities be" or "frees them." McManus summarizes this theme by saying that in developing practices of measurement, "we do not learn how to measure characteristics that we previously could

not measure; instead we come to measure characteristics with which we had previously not engaged” (143). Haugeland makes a similar point more perspicuously, however. Commenting on Heidegger’s claim that scientific projection “aims at a setting free of entities ... [such that] they can ‘throw themselves against’ a pure discovering” (GA 2: 480/SZ 363), Haugeland says that in introducing measuring instruments and accepting their “readings” as evidence, “we let [entities out of the darkest of all prisons, the prison of utter obscurity] by bringing them to light (into the clearing); and we enable them to throw themselves against a pure discovery by erecting a pure discovery in their path and accepting what happens as the result of their coming up against it.”⁸ Sellars also offers a useful locution here in saying that such practices and concepts usher these aspects of the world into the space of reasons, thereby enabling us to act toward and reason about them.⁹

In some respects, however, the use of simple measurement practices to exemplify Heidegger’s early use of “measure” understates the breadth and significance of this notion for understanding the sciences. In effect, McManus is still thinking of the relevant *Hinblick* as something like a “subject-correlate,” such as rulers and their appropriate use allowing things to show up with determinate lengths. In experimental science, however, it is not just the instruments and their uses that establish a measure with respect to which judgments can be or not be in accord. The objects of inquiry must also be worked upon; if not sufficiently simplified, purified, isolated, shielded, recombined, or standardized, they are incapable of displaying the determinations scientific understanding makes salient. Experimental systems themselves, and not just the instruments and skills we bring to bear on them, establish the measure by which scientific conceptualizations bear on the world.¹⁰ Often, what was once an object of inquiry or an explanatory model then becomes a tool for posing and exploring new issues. Moreover, those conceptualizations belong together holistically, in ways that belie the apparent autonomy with which rulers let us know of lengths. That is why Heidegger insisted upon the role of a *theoretical* projection of entities in the sciences, and also why Heidegger highlighted the possibility

of crises in the sciences' basic concepts in initially introducing the question of the sense of being.

Several interrelated aspects of scientific disclosure are thereby obscured despite McManus's illuminating treatment. Centrally at issue here is his insistence that measures of truth cannot themselves be held accountable to the entities and properties they uncover.¹¹ McManus is right that traditional conceptions of correspondence or con-formity cannot explicate such accountability (one might say with McManus that "measures" cannot be *false*, while insisting that they might nevertheless conceal rather than disclose). I would argue that at least four aspects of Heidegger's account are central to his "non-conformist" approach to the truth-character of a science's *vorgängiger Hinblick*. First is the regional character of a science's disclosure of entities. A science can only discover entities and properties from "within" an understanding that discloses an interconnected domain of entities and manifestations.¹² Second is the modal character of such disclosure, as opening intelligible *possibilities*. In the anglophone tradition, Nelson Goodman, Wilfrid Sellars and Carl Hempel fundamentally transformed philosophy of science by showing how empirical confirmation, explanation, and other aspects of scientific reasoning required alethic modalities. Heidegger's earlier exploration of that terrain has yet to be adequately explicated, but it is central to his understanding of the sciences. Third is the essential interplay between alethic modalities and mattering, expressed in Heidegger by the equiprimordiality of *Verstehen* and *Befindlichkeit* for any thrown projection. Fourth is Heidegger's recognition that the intelligibility of entities in terms of possibilities that matter depends upon Dasein holding itself and them accountable to what is at issue in those possibilities. That is why Heidegger's discussion of truth in section 44 directly leads into Division II, with its consideration of the possibility of the impossibility of an understanding of being. Only here is Heidegger's initial appeal to scientific crises redeemed, as openness to the ever-impending possibility, in any scientific domain, that there "is" no *Da* there.

The strength of McManus's reflections is nevertheless evident in how these themes still emerge within his discussion, despite his

inclination to reject their greater import in Heidegger. McManus calls explicit attention to Heidegger's 1928–29 claim that any scientific practice “‘stakes out a field’, ‘fixes on and demarcates’ a ‘determinate region’” (173), even though his own discussion does not draw upon this aspect of Heidegger. He recognizes in Wittgensteinian terms that a “measure” opens a “logical space” of possibilities (taking insufficient note of Heidegger's suspicion of appeals to logic for such purposes), even while developing his suspicions about Heidegger's talk of “projection” without noting that it is an essentially modal term (what is projected are possibilities). He similarly has a thoughtful footnote (169n4) concerning his neglect elsewhere of *Befindlichkeit*; his extended discussion of methodological fetishism and the possible triviality of some measures brings out that dimension of the accountability of “measures,” even though he resists its essential interconnectedness with the projection of *intelligible* possibilities. Relatedly, McManus at multiple points rightly recognizes that the issue at hand will ultimately depend upon Heidegger's account of *Eigentlichkeit* (without comparable acknowledgement that death and *Angst* are integral to that dependence), even though he would undoubtedly reject my view that it makes no sense to address Heidegger on truth and “measure” without making the Division II concerns central.

The book concludes with brief reflections on the metaphilosophical significance of its central themes, and their implications for understanding the fate of the *Being and Time* project.¹⁵ McManus rightly poses the problem: “how does one distinguish ‘original havings’? From what point of view can one see the difference between [them]?” He also accurately identifies Heidegger's primary motivation for such distinctions: “the real sin that Heidegger wants to expose in our philosophical confusion is our allowing our thought and talk to descend into indeterminacy” (221), due to “a ‘forgetting’ of ‘the measures’ that we bring to bear” (217). Despite a thoughtful, insightful setting of the issue, however, McManus's treatment in my view underestimates the sophistication of Heidegger's response to these problems. McManus repeatedly overlooks the significance of Heidegger's insistence that the being of

entities is not an entity, whether in equating the question of the unity of the manifold senses of being with a genus-species relationship (211), or in repeatedly conflating Heidegger's treatment of regions of being with the determination of totalities of entities. Relatedly, in defending Heidegger against the objection that theoretical assertions could only reveal entities as *vorhanden*, he retains the presumption that a science of being would consist of assertions. Yet Heidegger himself dismissed as "an absurdity" that "philosophy, as science of being, is supposed to adopt specific attitudes toward and posit specific things about beings" (GA 24: 16/12). The issues McManus here raises about the *Being and Time* project, I would argue, require a recognition of the distinctive pragmatics of fundamental ontology as a theoretically articulated "call into normative engagement with the conditions and possibilities of disclosive engagement in general,"¹⁴ rather than a fallen effort to describe those conditions systematically and thereby to determine them once and for all. For all his considerable depth of insight into why such a project would make no sense for Heidegger, McManus's metaphilosophical reflections may fall prey to his own criticism of Dreyfus for transforming the *Being and Time* project into a sense-less effort to view our involvement in the world "sideways on." His resistance to the possibility of a non-con-formist understanding of the truth-character of being as measure would relatedly neglect Heidegger's call to take responsibility for our involvement in disclosure.

ENDNOTES

- 1 John McDowell, *Mind and World* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1994); "Non-Cognitivism and Rule-Following," in *Mind, Value and Reality* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1998).
- 2 McManus's demonstration of the incoherence of any systematic catalog of those entities whose way of being has been characterized as *vorhanden* undertakes systematically the kind of challenge I posed in a much more limited way to the association between

- science and the disclosure of entities as *vorhanden*: Joseph Rouse, “Science and the Theoretical ‘Discovery’ of the Present-at-Hand,” in D. Ihde and H. Silverman, eds., *Descriptions* (Albany: SUNY Press, 1985), 200–210.
- 3 John Haugeland, *Dasein Disclosed* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2013), 57.
- 4 Hubert Dreyfus, *Being-in-the-World* (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1991).
- 5 Joseph Rouse, “Coping and its Contrasts,” in Mark Wrathall and Jeff Malpas, eds., *Heidegger, Coping, and Cognitive Science* (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2000), 7–28; “What Is Conceptually Articulated Understanding?” in Joseph Shear, ed., *Mind, Reason, and Being-in-the-World: The McDowell-Dreyfus Debate* (New York: Routledge, 2013), 250–71.
- 6 Rouse, “Science and the Theoretical ‘Discovery’ of the Present-at-Hand”; William Blattner, “Decontextualization, Standardization, and Deweyan Science,” *Man and World* 28 (1995): 321–39.
- 7 Joseph Rouse, “Heidegger’s Later Philosophy of Science,” *Southern Journal of Philosophy* 23 (1985): 75–92.
- 8 Haugeland, *Dasein Disclosed*, 173.
- 9 Wilfrid Sellars, *Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1997).
- 10 McManus crucially misses the point of recognizing the local character of scientific disclosure, e.g., the role of specific material practices and experimental or other regulated systems, when he (rightly) dismisses attempts to treat scientific disclosure as “merely local” (152), or as bound up with “local interests” (150). There are certainly science studies scholars (especially prominent in sociology of science in McManus’s vicinity) who would endorse the slide from “local” to “merely local,” but for most work in science studies, as in Heidegger, that inference is mistaken.
- 11 McManus (159n37) approvingly cites Hasok Chang’s “problem of nomic measurement” (*Inventing Temperature* [Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004]), without recognizing that Chang’s point is directly at odds with his own insistence that measurement

practices are not open to correction. The “problem” is *how* to determine the proper “measure” of truth in a scientific field when there can be no direct “con-formity,” not a rejection of the intelligibility of any assessment of “measure.”

- 12 The scare quotes mark my recognition that McManus informatively exposes how spatial metaphors can distort Heidegger’s concerns, although in this respect, McManus should be read in juxtaposition with Jeff Malpas’s reading of Heidegger on spatiality and place in *Heidegger’s Topology* (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2006) and *Heidegger and the Thinking of Place* (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2012).
- 13 These reflections are expanded and defended in Denis McManus, “Ontological Pluralism and the *Being and Time* Project,” *Journal of the History of Philosophy* 51 (2013): 651–73.
- 14 Andrew Blitzer and Mark Lance, “Phenomenology Without Ontology: Heidegger on How to Talk About Being,” invited symposium paper, American Philosophical Association, Eastern Division, Atlanta, GA, 2012.

BOOK REVIEW

Krzysztof Ziarek's
Language After Heidegger

Adam Knowles

Krzysztof Ziarek. *Language after Heidegger*.
Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2013.
243 pages.

Krzysztof Ziarek's *Language after Heidegger* (hereafter *LH*) is an impressive and measured study that traces the transformations in Heidegger's thinking of language as he shifts from thinking *about* language to thinking *through* language in the 1930s. Through a deep attunement to Heidegger's creative employment of the German language in its "terms, concepts, scriptural marks, and even graphs" (68), Ziarek skillfully executes the difficult task of clearly translating and coherently explaining Heidegger's often fleeting and always fragile terminological constellations in his posthumously published *Ereignis* manuscripts, works written, in Ziarek's words, "for the drawer" (72). Ziarek deftly brings out the richness of Heidegger's thinking of language not by ascribing a philosophy of language to Heidegger, but instead by presenting Heidegger's thinking as a practice of reticence enacted through a "poietic experience with language" (25). The focus

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of Ziarek's study is therefore not primarily the texts in which Heidegger speaks most overtly about language. In taking this approach, Ziarek provides a balance to scholarship that analyzes Heidegger's philosophy of language through the texts where he speaks about language, for example, in the well-worn territory of *Being and Time*, the Hölderlin lectures, or *On the Way to Language*. While this hermeneutical decision brings a richness and originality to *LH* through detailed treatments of recent volumes of the *Gesamtausgabe* that have not yet received significant scholarly attention, volumes 71 and 74 most prominent among them, it is also the source of a minor shortcoming in an overall fine study, which dismisses *Being and Time* too abruptly. In what follows I will outline the major contributions of *LH* while raising a number of critical questions that emerge from the work.

LH pursues three main tasks: tracing the transforming role of language in Heidegger's thinking in the saying of the event (primarily in Chapters 1 and 2), applying this thinking to original analyses of contemporary poetry in Chapter 3, and taking Heidegger's "eventual" language as the starting point for an ethics of releasement in Chapter 4. Although it pursues these seemingly disparate tasks, *LH* must also be regarded as a unified whole that above all pursues one central goal: transforming our own relation to language by tracing the course of Heidegger's modified relation to language. Ziarek describes this process as follows: "In this study I elaborate the role that the poietic plays in Heidegger's *own* writing, in his style of thinking, especially how it motivates his use of German with regard to his declared attempt to transform our relation to language" (132). This transformation is not so much announced as it is performed in Ziarek's own practice of writing, thus echoing without merely mimicking one of the central strategies of Heidegger's scriptural practice. In writing of the event, Heidegger holds in reserve any discussion of his "method" of writing, and while it is indeed true that Heidegger does not employ anything like a method in his writing of the event, Ziarek convincingly demonstrates that there is nonetheless a deep continuity to Heidegger's approach to writing of the event.

With the keen eye of a literary scholar, Ziarek gathers together and lays out the consistent set of strategies that Heidegger employs to write his transformed relation to language as the singular saying of the event in what Ziarek repeatedly refers to as the “back draft” of the event. *LH* excels in attaining its own measure as it parses out, delineates and sketches some of the most important strategies that Heidegger employs in his writing, including “the beat outlined by prefixes, hyphens, etymons, and compounds” (25), but also the use of repetition, tautology, and the production of neologisms employed in ever-unfolding permutations that never merely replace, but always augment previous terminological constellations. Ziarek’s admirable achievement is the skill with which he renders the internal functioning of this language comprehensible without reducing Heidegger’s scriptural strategies to a systematic methodology and without sacrificing any of the rigor of Heidegger’s strategies for writing of the event. Hence, if Heidegger’s relation to language in the event manuscripts is remarkable for what it holds in reserve, then Ziarek’s language is likewise remarkable for what it does not say, and this reticence is both a strength and weakness of *LH*.

Chapter 1, “Event/Language,” focuses on the dehumanization (*Entmenschung*) of language as the coming to be of the event while simultaneously tracing how, in the thinking of the event, Heidegger distances himself from the ontological difference and moves toward the differentiated relation to difference expressed through the hyphenated term *Unter-schied*. In his analysis of Heidegger’s tactics of writing, Ziarek focuses on Heidegger’s use of particular prefixes, the distancing separation of hyphenation, and the silent distinction between *Seyn* and *Sein*. In describing how the event transpires as language, Ziarek calls attention to two particular terms linked by a common prefix that emerge repeatedly in Heidegger’s saying of the event in both hyphenated and unhyphenated forms: *Einfalt* and *Einmaligkeit*, the in-fold or one-fold and each-time singularity. In his analysis of these terms, Ziarek is as much interested in what Heidegger seeks to say through these terms as in Heidegger’s operation of saying through the multivalent German

“*ein-*,” for “the conceptual work performed by these crucial terms becomes framed and inflected by the implicit nexus drawn among the textual occurrences of *ein*” (33). The *ein* or unity/inwardness of *Einfalt* and *Einmaligkeit* becomes central for *LH* because, according to Ziarek, the event is “not yet a matter of difference” (34). The event speaks itself in an unfolding “where the prefix ‘un’ does not signify the undoing of the fold but marks instead the event-like, spatiotemporal spread distinctive of the fold” (30). The clearing of the event in its unique unfolding is “both of and for language” (31), and the task of *LH* is situated in the space between these two prepositions. The unfolding or in-folding of the event occurs towards a language that seeks to capture the singularity of the event by measuring up to the sayability of the event. Only this language can be a language *for* the event as a human response to something prior to a human process of signification.

In responding to the event of the speaking of being, Ziarek traces how Heidegger seeks to develop an idiom that measures up to the unfolding of being. We must answer (*antworten*) through what Heidegger calls an *An-wort*, an occasionally hyphenated neologism that Ziarek brilliantly analyzes (58–60). As Ziarek demonstrates, it is here in the *An-wort*, the word spoken towards – or within – the space of event, that language as a human capacity meets language as a prior structuring or scansion of the world. It is with regard to the *An-wort* that it is worth raising the question of whether Heidegger’s conception of *Rede* in *Being and Time*, a work which Ziarek describes, employing his own careful scriptural marks, as characterized by “‘bluster’ and apparent self-assuredness,” is not already thoroughly dehumanized (164). Is it not the case that, when Heidegger speaks of *Rede* as the “the meaningful structuring of the attuned intelligibility of being-in-the-world” and speaks of how “[w]ords accrue to significations” (GA 2: 216, 214/SZ 162, 161), he is referring to a prior being-spoken of language that is already thoroughly *entmensch*? And is it not the case that the silent voice of the call of conscience, which is spoken by nobody as the saying of the nothing, already hints at and indicates aspects of his thinking of language and the event that are not so much left behind in his later work, as they

are brought to their own in an unfolding of what Heidegger cannot yet say in the language of *Being and Time*? These questions primarily point to matters of scope, for *LH* is not concerned with *Being and Time*, but instead with the specific operation of language in the saying of the event. Nonetheless, Ziarek's dismissal of *Being and Time* is symptomatic of a more fundamental tendency that will be discussed in further detail below.

Chapter 2, "Words and Signs," which convincingly demonstrates that Heidegger's later thinking of language is not based on a relation of signifier and signified, is in many ways the most compelling chapter of *LH*. Signs, according to Ziarek, "come into play only when language's event-like saying articulates itself into the spoken or written signs" (78), and Heidegger's account of language is neither "phono- nor grapho-centric but focuses instead on the nonhuman register of the pathways of language" (84). Much like the first chapter, the analysis in "Words and Signs" is also centered around a particular set of distinctions unfolded through Heidegger's choice of words: the distinction between *Worte* and *Wörter*; the two plural forms of *Wort*. The distinction between these two plural forms can once again be mapped onto the twofold nature of language as language of and for the event, for as Ziarek writes, "the word is to be understood as '*the tuning silence*'...and this reticent, self-silencing stillness becomes audible, as it were, only when words, this time understood as linguistic signs, reach their limit and break up, opening onto silence" (86). In the tuning silence *Worte* resonate, words that come to be as the clearing of the event of being, but those words are always already given over to signs, to a structure of difference which represents what is said in the event through *Wörter*; a term that Ziarek considers to be synonymous with the pleonastic compound *Wörterzeichen*.

While these word-symbols function within the Saussurean structure of signifier and signified, Ziarek, with his sights clearly set on Derrida, claims that "Heidegger offers the possibility of evolving an account both distinct and more 'radical' than the one proposed by French post-structuralism and recent Continental thought" (117). Once again, Ziarek carefully marks his claim of radicality with quotation marks,

but he goes on to explain “radical” as meaning the conceptualization of language as beyond the structure of ontological difference and towards the differentiated difference indicated in the *Ereignis* texts and elsewhere by the term *Unter-schied*. In his assessment of Heidegger’s “radicality” vis-à-vis certain early texts by Derrida such as *Margins of Philosophy* and *Of Grammatology* Ziarek is entirely on the mark, but what is somewhat unfortunate is that he does not take into account Derrida’s own differentiated approach to Heidegger and difference in his final seminar, *The Beast and the Sovereign*, Vol. II, published in French in 2010 and in English 2011.¹ In the seminar Derrida begins to explicitly rethink his own earlier deconstructive readings of Heidegger by returning to the relation of difference and language, and he does so by unfolding the terminological constellations that surround *Walten*, a word that Ziarek analyzes in detail in Chapter 4. Once again, this comment is primarily a question of scope and takes little away from Ziarek’s own masterful reading of Heidegger’s thinking of language prior to the structure of difference.

If Chapter 2 is the most compelling in *LH*, then Chapter 3, “Poetry and the Poietic,” is perhaps the most original chapter, for it is in the course of analyses of poems by contemporary US poets Susan Howe and Myung Mi Kim that the reader hears Ziarek’s own voice most strongly. Ziarek’s motivation in these readings is not only to move away from readings of the poets that Heidegger actually did read, a productive field of engagement that has yielded vast scholarly results, but instead to turn to contemporary literature in order to pursue the analysis of language *after* Heidegger. The chapter builds upon a refined study of Heidegger’s “sigetics” that draws heavily on the fragmentary discussions of silence and stillness in *Zum Wesen der Sprache* from volume 74 of the *Gesamtausgabe*, published in 2010. Ziarek rightly points out that “[s]ilence in Heidegger’s thinking about language is not silence in the sense of absence of sound or speech, just as little as it would be the presence or absence of writing,” but instead silence is a matter of “*Stimmen*, that is, as disposition or tuning” (149). A language capable of bringing silence to the word is a power-free (*macht-los*) language that

emerges as *Wörter* in the back draft of the event. Ziarek convincingly analyzes the work of Howe and Kim through this powerless conception of language, but I disagree with his attempt to characterize this power-free language as “feminine” (164).

The crux of my disagreement with this attempt can be situated in a passage which Ziarek himself translates and interprets. Heidegger writes – in Ziarek’s translation of GA 74: 152 – of “*wanting to say something ineffable but not being able to (keeping silent out of inability); leaving something unsayable in its unsayability (keeping silent out of ability)*” (148). While there is much to say about this quote, which is a reformulation and refinement of the Heideggerian refrain that whoever cannot keep speaking likewise cannot keep silent, it seems to simplify the complex relation between power, language and the voice.² What Heidegger’s distinction denies is a critical third form of silence, a silence that is not the silence of those who keep silent out of powerlessness in face of the ineffable, nor of those who choose to keep silent in the face of the ineffable, but of those for whom silence *is not at all a matter of choice*. Describing a power-less silence as “feminine” seems to overlook the extent to which one of the great goals of feminist philosophy has been to restructure the systems of power that have denied the power of speech to the feminine voice by effectively silencing the feminine voice. In other words, this twofold distinction seems to overlook the difference between who have the power to choose not to speak (the power, in a sense, to choose to be powerless) and those for whom being powerless is a matter of force. In short, one could raise the question whether Heidegger’s subtle analyses of silence make room for the power of *silencing*. Ziarek perhaps errs in trying to translate Heidegger into a feminist perspective, yet it also seems that he does not at all need to have Heidegger on board with him in his poetic endeavors. Indeed, it even seems that Ziarek’s analyses would be all the more powerful if they were clearly marked out *against* Heidegger by tracing the extent to which Heidegger – as Luce Irigaray has convincingly demonstrated – stands outside of a feminist perspective.³

Chapter 4, “Language after Metaphysics,” is, by Ziarek’s own admission, the most open-ended of the chapters in *LH*. The project of the chapter is to build upon the power-free relation to language explicated in the prior chapter in order to develop an ethics of releasement rooted in a restored capacity for listening. In the course of the chapter, Ziarek beautifully gathers together the manifold meanings of listening and belonging expressed through Heidegger’s overlapping polyvalent terminology of *gehören*, *hören*, *Ereignis*, *Enteignis*, *Eigentum*. Ziarek describes the importance of these terms as follows: “Without the human capacity to be responsive to the event – a capacity that the event grants or dedicates to humans in the sense that Heidegger calls *Zueignung* – that is, without the human capacity to listen to and bring the word of being into signs, there would be no possibility of ethics” (201). Ziarek develops this ethics of appropriation around the term *das gewaltlose Walten*, the violence-free sway (213) that is, in Heidegger’s words, *machtunbedürftig*, without any use for power (214).

While I agree wholeheartedly with Ziarek’s analysis of *Walten* as the expression of a transformed understanding of power in Heidegger’s work after the focus on struggle in the *Introduction to Metaphysics*, it is nonetheless necessary to draw attention to two issues. Firstly, it is worth taking note of the fact that the language of *Walten* begins to arise in full force prior to the *Ereignis* manuscripts in the 1929 lecture course *The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics* as a translation of *phusis*. This is closely related to the second issue: the tendency of Ziarek’s work posits a trajectory that aims towards Heidegger’s later works such that those later works are presented as *replacing* the earlier works, instead of viewing the later works as refracted by or reflected through the earlier works. Although Ziarek does not explicitly endorse such a strategy, he does tend to privilege the later “gentle” Heidegger of *Gelassenheit*, instead of letting the gentle Heidegger be read through and alongside the Heidegger of *polemos* without the earlier texts being regarded as surpassed or replaced.

Working against this logic of replacement and surpassing, in Chapter 4 Ziarek offers a fascinating hint at an ethics of reading Heidegger

that he does not so much explicitly develop as silently perform. As Ziarek writes in the opening pages of the chapter: “Put plainly, it is important to avoid the mistake of overemphasizing the ‘content’ of Heidegger’s texts, of what is explicitly said and ‘meant’ in them, to the detriment of the insights opened up – and held out to future thinking as possibilities – specifically through the idiomatic working of his language” (176). What this quote hints at, and what I believe Ziarek could have elaborated more fully, are the hermeneutic commitments embedded in this approach and the ways in which those commitments explicitly call into question various strands of Heidegger scholarship. *LH* all too often directs its critique towards vague interlocutors such as “commentators” (213) while referring to unnamed authors who “tend to focus” (49) on something in particular and to aspects of Heidegger that are “still too often overlooked in critical responses to Heidegger” (115). By taking recourse to these anonymous gestures without – to put it somewhat crudely – naming names, *LH* deprives itself of the opportunity to make a more forceful intervention into existing fields of Heidegger scholarship by adopting its own overly gentle stance. Once again, this takes away nothing from the force of Ziarek’s analysis, and I am aware of the extent to which Ziarek may have adopted this stance as his own performance of the very ethics of listening that he lays out, yet *LH* seems to sell short its own possibility for a more “radical” intervention.

As a whole, *LH* is a laudable achievement that opens up many exciting questions for future research. By way of conclusion, I will briefly raise a few of these questions that do not point to lacks in *LH*, but instead seek to highlight the work’s productive openness. What, I ask, is the place of the Greeks in Heidegger’s transformed understanding of language? Does Heidegger not read the Greeks as dwelling within the kind of ethics of silence and releasement that *LH* seeks to recover? And in a related question of *paideia*, what are the pedagogical tactics for teaching and learning an ethics of releasement? Or, to rephrase the question more concretely, what is the relation between the manuscripts written “for the drawer” and Heidegger’s simultaneous activities as a

productive lecturer? Is it not the case that a transformed relation to language also emerges in the Nietzsche lectures of the 1940s? As these questions show, Ziarek's valuable study is just as important for its rich analyses of language as for the open questions and paths for future research it points toward. *LH* is a significant guidepost that sets a course for future research as we seek to come to terms with the being of language and the language of being after Heidegger.

ENDNOTES

- 1 Jacques Derrida, *The Beast and the Sovereign*, Vol. II, trans. Geoffrey Bennington (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2011).
- 2 As Heidegger writes in *Being and Time*: "A mute person has not only not proved that he can keep silent, he even lacks the possibility of proving this" (GA 2: 219/SZ 164-65).
- 3 Luce Irigaray, *The Forgetting of Air in Martin Heidegger*, trans. Mary Beth Mader (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1999).

TEXTS OF HEIDEGGER CITED AND ABBREVIATIONS USED

References to the works of Martin Heidegger are provided parenthetically in the text by the volume of *Gesamtausgabe* (Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1975–, abbreviated “GA”), followed by the German pagination, a slash, and the English pagination of published translations where extant. The relevant translations are listed following the information for the corresponding volume of the *Gesamtausgabe*. In cases where a *Gesamtausgabe* volume is only partially translated, the German pagination of the GA volume and a slash are followed by an abbreviation of the corresponding English translation, as per below, and its pagination. There are only two exceptions to this practice. First, in the case of *Being and Time* (GA 2), no English pagination is provided; instead the *Gesamtausgabe* pagination is followed by “sz,” referring to the single edition, re-issued several times: *Sein und Zeit*, 7th ed. (Tübingen: Max Niemeyer Verlag, 1953), the pagination of which is found in the margins of all three published translations. Second, in the case of the *Contributions to Philosophy* (GA 65), no English pagination is provided since the German pagination is found in the running heads of both published translations. Modifications to published translations are noted by ‘tm’; modifications to emphasis by ‘em.’

FROM THE GESAMTAUSGABE

- GA 2 *Sein und Zeit*. Ed. Friedrich-Wilhelm von Herrmann. 1977. English translations: *Being and Time*. Trans. Joan Stambaugh, rev. Dennis J. Schmidt. Albany: State University of New York Press, 2010. *Being and Time*. Trans. John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson. New York: Harper & Row, 1962.
- GA 5 *Holzwege*. 7th ed. Ed. Friedrich-Wilhelm von Herrmann. 1994. English translation: *Off the Beaten Track*. Ed. and trans. Julian Young and Kenneth Haynes. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002.

- GA 6.2 *Nietzsche II*. Ed. Brigitte Schillbach. 1997.
- GA 8 *Was Heißt Denken?* Ed. Paolo-Ludovika Coriando. 2002. English translation: *What Is Called Thinking?* Trans. Fred D. Wieck and J. Glenn Gray. New York: Harper & Row, 1968.
- GA 9 *Wegmarken*. 3rd ed. Ed. Friedrich-Wilhelm von Herrmann. 1996. English translation: *Pathmarks*. Ed. William McNeill. Various trans. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998.
- GA 11 *Identität und Differenz*. Ed. Friedrich-Wilhelm von Herrmann. 2006. English translation: *Identity and Difference*. Trans. Joan Stambaugh. New York: Harper & Row, 1969.
- GA 12 *Unterwegs zur Sprache*. Ed. Friedrich-Wilhelm von Herrmann. 1985.
- GA 14 *Zur Sache des Denkens*. Ed. Friedrich-Wilhelm von Herrmann. 2007. English translation: *On Time and Being*. Trans. Joan Stambaugh. New York: Harper & Row, 1972.
- GA 15 *Seminare*. Ed. Curd Ochwadt. 1986.
- GA 19 *Platon: Sophistes*. Ed. Ingeborg Schübler. 1992. English translation: *Plato's "Sophist."* Trans. Richard Rojcewicz and André Schuwer. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1997.
- GA 20 *Prolegomena zur Geschichte des Zeitbegriffs*. Ed. Petra Jaeger. 1994. English translation: *History of the Concept of Time: Prolegomena*. Trans. Theodore Kisiel. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1992.
- GA 24 *Die Grundprobleme der Phänomenologie*. 2nd ed. Ed. Friedrich-Wilhelm von Herrmann. 1989. English translation: *The Basic Problems of Phenomenology*. Revised ed. Trans. Albert Hofstadter. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1982.
- GA 29/30 *Die Grundbegriffe der Metaphysik: Welt – Endlichkeit – Einsamkeit*. 2nd ed. Ed. Friedrich-Wilhelm von Herrmann. 1992. English translation: *The Fundamental Concepts of Metaphysics: World, Finitude, Solitude*. Trans. William

- McNeill and Nicholas Walker. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1995.
- GA 33 *Aristoteles, Metaphysik Θ 1-3: Von Wesen und Wirklichkeit der Kraft.* 3rd ed. Ed. Heinrich Hüni. 2006. English translation: *Aristotle's Metaphysics Θ 1-3: On the Essence and Actuality of Force.* Trans. Walter Brogan and Peter Warnek. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1995.
- GA 40 *Einführung in die Metaphysik.* Ed. Petra Jaeger. 1985. English translation: *Introduction to Metaphysics.* Trans. Gregory Fried and Richard Polt. New Haven: Yale University Press, 2000.
- GA 45 *Grundfragen der Philosophie: Ausgewählte "Probleme" der "Logik."* 1992. English translation: *Basic Questions of Philosophy: Selected "Problems" of "Logic."* Trans. Richard Rojcewicz and André Schuwer. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1994.
- GA 50 *Nietzsches Metaphysik. Einleitung in die Philosophie – Denken und Dichten.* 2nd ed. Ed. Petra Jaeger. 1990.
- GA 56/57 *Zur Bestimmung der Philosophie.* 2nd ed. Ed. Bernd Heimbüchel. 1999. English translation: *Towards the Definition of Philosophy.* Trans. Ted Sadler. New York: Continuum, 2008.
- GA 58 *Grundprobleme der Phänomenologie.* Ed. Hans-Helmuth Gander. 1992.
- GA 65 *Beiträge zur Philosophie (Vom Ereignis).* 2nd ed. Ed. Friedrich-Wilhelm von Herrmann. 1994. English translations: *Contributions to Philosophy (Of the Event).* Trans. Richard Rojcewicz and Daniela Vallega-Neu. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2012. *Contributions to Philosophy (From Enowning).* Trans. Parvis Emad and Kenneth Maly. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1999.
- GA 66 *Besinnung.* Ed. Friedrich-Wilhelm von Herrmann. 1997. English translation: *Mindfulness.* Trans. Parvis Emad and Thomas Kalary. New York: Continuum, 2006.

- GA 67 *Metaphysik und Nihilismus*. Ed. Hans-Joachim Friedrich. 1999.
- GA 69 *Die Geschichte des Seyns*. Ed. Peter Trawny. 1998.
- GA 71 *Das Ereignis*. Frankfurt am Main: Klostermann, 2009. English translation: *The Event*. Trans. Richard Rojcewicz. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2013.
- GA 74 *Zum Wesen der Sprache und Zur Frage nach der Kunst*. Ed. Thomas Regehly. 2010.
- GA 77 *Feldweg-Gespräche*. 2nd ed. Ed. Ingeborg Schüßler. 2007. English translation: *Country Path Conversations*. Trans. Bret W. Davis. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2010.

FROM OTHER ENGLISH TRANSLATIONS

- BW *Basic Writings*. Revised edition. Ed. David Farrell Krell. Trans. various. San Francisco: Harper, 1993.
- FS *Four Seminars*. Trans. Andrew Mitchell and François Raffoul. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2003.
- H *Heraclitus Seminar*. Trans. C. H. Seibert. Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1993.
- IP *Introduction to Philosophy: Thinking and Poetizing*. Trans. Phillip Jacques Braunstein. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2011.
- N4 *Nietzsche* vol. 4. Ed. David Farrell Krell. Trans. Joan Stambaugh, David Farrell Krell, and Frank A. Capuzzi. New York: HarperCollins, 1991.
- OWL *On the Way to Language*. Trans. Peter D. Hertz. New York: Harper & Row, 1971.
- QCT *The Question Concerning Technology and Other Essays*. Trans. William Lovitt. New York: Harper & Row, 1977.
- WP *What is Philosophy?* Trans. Jean T. Wilde and William Kluback. New York: Rowman & Littlefield, 2003.

