

Truth and Unconcealedness

Graeme Nicholson

Readers of Heidegger are familiar with his way of expounding truth as unconcealedness, prompted by his study of the Greek word ἀλήθεια which he translates as *Unverborgenheit*. The best known treatment is in *Being and Time* §44 (GA 2: 282–305/SZ 212–30), but it is also to be found in earlier lectures, e.g., *Plato's "Sophist"* (GA 19), and later texts, notably “On the Essence of Truth,” written between 1930 and 1949 (GA 9: 175–99/136–54). All these treatments have been well expounded in the secondary literature.¹ But in some later writings, often with Parmenides as a point of reference, Heidegger seems to have changed his mind, opening up a rift between ἀλήθεια, on the one hand (which he continues to understand as unconcealedness), and truth, on the other hand. The most prominent text of this nature is “The End of Philosophy and the Task of Thinking” written in 1964.² My study will focus on the second half of the “Task of Thinking,” where Heidegger offers an exegesis of Fragment 1 of Parmenides, lines 28–30. Here he says among other things that Ἀλήθεια should not be translated “truth.” Since Heidegger also makes self-critical references here back to some of his own earlier work, it is not surprising that this has been taken as a full-scale

recantation of what he had advocated earlier. I believe, however, that a close scrutiny of the text will show it to be something less than that.

Cristina Lafont has argued that in the “Task of Thinking” Heidegger had completely retracted his earlier view of truth.⁵ Her book is not only a challenge to Heidegger – it is also helpful to English-speaking readers in informing us about some of the different receptions that the “Task of Thinking” has received in German-language commentary.⁴ Nevertheless, my scrutiny of the “Task of Thinking” has led me to a different conclusion from hers. I hope to show that Heidegger treats several different variants of truth. No one of them coincides with *Ἀλήθεια* or unconcealedness – yet it is the source and condition for them all. In what way, then, is any version of truth related to *Ἀλήθεια*? That is the question proposed here for our thinking to address. In the second part of this essay, Heidegger is guiding the reader into the kind of “thinking” that can pay heed to unconcealedness. He has already offered, in the first part, an appraisal of “philosophy,” particularly in its current state. So the present correlation of truth and unconcealedness is pre-figured in the guiding correlation of philosophy and thinking. I shall discuss that briefly in the Conclusion.⁵

I. THE PARMENIDES INTERPRETATION

We shall be joining the “Task of Thinking” in the middle of its second part to establish two points of central importance:

- (a) In this text, the reference to *Ἀλήθεια* is only to Parmenides’ use of the term – it is not intended to encompass every use of the word in ancient Greek; quite the contrary, as we shall see.
- (b) When Heidegger denies that *Ἀλήθεια* means truth, he always qualifies the latter term: *if* truth is understood as *X* or *Y*, *then* *Ἀλήθεια* does not mean truth.

A. THE INCOMPARABLE *Ἀλήθεια*

Heidegger quotes Parmenides, Fragment I, lines 28–30, which I cite in the Stambaugh-Krell translation (GA 14: 83/BW 444):

...but you should learn all:
 the untrembling heart of unconcealment,
 well-rounded,

and also the opinions of mortals who lack the ability to
 trust what is unconcealed.⁶

Heidegger introduces these words of Parmenides to show that at the very beginning of philosophy something was named that permitted all the later versions of philosophy, even while it retreated from their grasp: Ἀλήθεια, unconcealedness. Every philosophy had its own theme or concern (its *Sache*), but no philosophy could bring its *Sache* into view unless the *Sache* made its appearance within a medium, or forum, or opening, that Heidegger calls here a clearing, a *Lichtung*.⁷ He demonstrates this in the cases of Hegel and Husserl, though they only illustrate a condition that holds for all philosophy. And this clearing or *Lichtung* is precisely what Parmenides at the very start had called Ἀλήθεια. Heidegger proposes now to make this a theme, or concern (*Sache*), for a new post-philosophical thinking – thus the title of the essay, contrasting an exhausted philosophy with a thinking that has this special task.

In the four paragraphs after the quotation, Heidegger highlights the imagery of Parmenides' text, all of it invoking the incomparable power of this unconcealedness. First of all, the “untrembling heart” of unconcealedness is not some other factor that lies within it: it *is* the unconcealedness itself, what is most proper to it. (Later, at the very end of the *Four Seminars*, Heidegger will revise this interpretation.) We are thus introduced to all the works that are to be ascribed to unconcealedness.

But I want to call attention to a problem of translation here. Having posed the question what this “untrembling heart” is, Heidegger says:

This phrase refers to nothing other than the unconcealedness itself: it means that place of stillness where everything that unconcealedness has granted is gathered together. It is the clearing, the open.⁸

Everything that is gathered within that place of stillness has been placed there and marked by unconcealedness: it has all been opened up. So now Heidegger goes on: all kinds of thinking (speculative and intuitive) depend upon this open scope. And, for Parmenides, this clearing or unconcealedness also permits presence (being) and the manifestation of what is present. The current English translation, however, reads as if what has been gathered into the place of stillness had brought about the unconcealedness itself.⁹

There is a similar problem in the next paragraph of the translation. For Parmenides, unconcealedness grants the path on which thinking can move as it pursues its one concern: that being is, or that presence comes to presence. But the published translation seems to suggest that the path of thinking is what grants – *gewährt* – the unconcealedness! Heidegger explains further that this unconcealedness is the clearing that first grants being, and thinking, and their presence to one another. This understanding of *gewährt* will be confirmed in Section (b).

B. Ἀλήθεια IS NOT TRUTH

Beginning in the fifth paragraph and running for about two pages (GA 14: 85-7/445-7), Heidegger argues that Ἀλήθεια should be translated not “truth” but “unconcealedness,” and he uses the term “clearing” interchangeably. He makes his point through listing a great variety of ways in which truth could be qualified, which I’ll itemize in order.

(i) *If* we understand truth as the correspondence of knowledge to beings, then Ἀλήθεια, i.e., unconcealedness in the sense of the clearing, may not be equated with it. Heidegger identifies this sense of truth as the “traditional” one (it is associated, e.g., with Aquinas), and he also calls it the “natural” one. Why? Because it is by observing the beings in question (*am Seienden ausgewiesene Übereinstimmung*) that one would confirm the correspondence. But no unconcealedness, no clearing, could be confirmed in such a way – by observing some beings.

Or (ii) one might interpret truth as the certainty of our knowledge of being (*Gewissheit des Wissens vom Sein*), the view that he regularly attributes to Hegel, though it derives from the Cartesian tradition, as

he showed in earlier pages of the present essay. But Ἀλήθεια, i.e., unconcealedness in the sense of the clearing, cannot be equated with this either. He showed in earlier pages that Hegelian philosophy could not think this clearing.

(iii) *But* it is not that Ἀλήθεια is utterly *detached* from those two versions of truth – it grants (*gewährt!*) the possibility of truth in either of those senses. They depend on it in just the way that being and thinking do. We shall be pondering this positive connection.

(iv) Precisely here, in the same paragraph, he adds several other possible interpretations of truth: evidence (with apparent reference to Husserl); verification (which we could take to be a reference to the logical positivists); and every kind of *veritas*. All these, like the other versions, can only prevail within the clearing (*bewegen sich... im Bereich der waltenden Lichtung*). So he has listed four, or perhaps five, versions of truth without interconnecting them, each of them associated with one philosophical system or another, but all of them dependent on Ἀλήθεια.

(v) Next he makes the odd remark: Ἀλήθεια is “not yet truth” (*noch nicht Wahrheit*). This suggests that something further would have to be added to it to bring forth truth. In context, that would be one of the philosophical systems we noted, each bringing about one of the variants of truth. But – Heidegger adds with emphasis – that does *not* mean that Ἀλήθεια is less than truth! As if what was primitive would be improved upon by the complexity of many mediations! No, Ἀλήθεια is more than truth because it yields all those versions of it, and that is because there can be no presence, and therefore no truth, outside the clearing. To understand that will be the task of thinking. It is at this point that Heidegger launches into the first of his self-critical retrospectives, concerning *Being and Time*, but it will be convenient for us to treat the self-criticisms separately below.

We move on to the next point in the “Task of Thinking” (GA 14: 87/447), where attention turns to Greek sources: (vi) The Greeks too had a “natural concept of truth.” We find it in Homer and other authors, where a speaker calls someone’s words ἀληθές, and in this everyday

context it means true qua correct (*richtig*) or reliable (*verlässlich*), two more senses of truth that cannot be equated with unconcealedness. There was no etymological resonance in this use of the word among the Greeks. We must avoid confusion here: now we are being told of a Greek ἀλήθεια that does *not* mean unconcealedness. This might seem to pull us in the opposite direction from the previous points, which separated modern versions of truth from Greek unconcealedness. The present point may remind us of earlier criticisms aimed at Heidegger by classicists who did not accept the translation *Unverborgenheit*. (He gives a brief history of the polemics in his footnote 3 to “Hegel and the Greeks” – see below.) At the present point in the “Task of Thinking”, he is recognizing a pragmatic, non-etymological use of ἀληθές, one that is older than Parmenides and stands in contrast with his goddess’s monumental invocation of unconcealedness. As I said at the beginning, the argument that Ἀλήθεια means unconcealedness and not truth has its application *only* to Parmenides, not to the Greek language as a whole. For that reason, Heidegger spells the word in Parmenides’ text with a capital A but employs a small α for the everyday word. The main point that emerges from the history is that a thinker *can* give a monumental force to a word like Ἀλήθεια that otherwise circulates in discourse in another, everyday sense. Heidegger has pointed out often¹⁰ that this was the case with Plato’s word ἰδέα, too.

(vii) There is a later discussion of Parmenides in Heidegger’s *Four Seminars*, from the 1973 seminar, and especially from the short manuscript that accompanies it, “The Provenance of Thinking.” In the seminar (GA 15: 396/78), Heidegger is quoted as saying that Ἀλήθεια means unconcealedness and “has nothing yet to do with *truth*.” But Heidegger’s own manuscript (from which he was reading aloud in the 1973 seminar) actually says, “Ἀληθείη means, literally translated, unconcealedness. . . Ἀλήθεια does not mean ‘truth’ if what is meant by this is the validity of propositions in the form of statements. . . [it] has nothing yet to do with ‘truth’, but everything to do with the unconcealedness presupposed in every determination of ‘truth’” (GA 15: 403-4/94). This comment reinforces the “Task of Thinking” in allowing that there can be many

determinations of “truth,” that Ἀλήθεια is not one of them (or in his expression, “not yet” one of them), yet is presupposed by all of them. This latter point is also expressed when he says it “has nothing to do with” truth (*noch nichts mit “Wahrheit” zu tun*), an expression, we shall see, that has a quite specific force in Heidegger.

Let us summarize our study up to this point: Heidegger says that we cannot interpret the unconcealedness of Parmenides as truth – *if* by “truth” one means (i) correspondence, (ii) certainty, (iii) evidence, (iv) verification, (v) correctness, (vi) reliability, or (vii) validity. Each one of these versions was affirmed by some philosopher or other. But Heidegger did not clarify what *he* understood by truth. He did not particularly affirm any of those versions, nor did he propose some further version of his own, nor did he appeal to some pure unencumbered intuition of truth free of those versions. We have to conclude that, in Heidegger’s text, truth is not something univocal. It has many variants, and distinctive philosophies embody them and name them.

The question will certainly arise: if all these variants are indeed versions of *truth*, do they stand in some relation to one another? That would prompt a far-flung inquiry, and I shall return to it at the end. But one clarification can be made at this point, touching on two of the variants: (i) correspondence and (v) correctness. The first of these was treated in *Being and Time* §44 as the “traditional” concept of truth: *Übereinstimmung* or *adaequatio*. The “tradition” that Heidegger was assuming in *Being and Time* actually sprang from Medieval times and was represented mainly by Aquinas. It did not originate from the Greeks. *Being and Time* repeats frequently and emphatically that the correspondence theory of truth should not be attributed to Aristotle (e.g., GA 2: 45, 284, 299/SZ 33, 214, 226).¹¹ Turning now to the other variant, (v) correctness (*Richtigkeit*), we have to recognize that it finds no place whatsoever in the scheme of *Being and Time*. It does not belong in that phenomenological discourse; it entered Heidegger’s vocabulary in the 1930s, and it is sufficiently distant from “correspondence” that, in the 1930s, Heidegger could attribute it not only to Plato but to Aristotle too.¹² It is certainly a challenge to understand what

Heidegger intends with this term; we'll discuss it further in the next section; it belongs within a discourse that introduces certain other central terms such as "thinking." But, however we are to understand it, it should not be confused with correspondence, and so should not be attributed to *Being and Time*.

Nevertheless, to conclude this breakdown, Heidegger has made it clear in the "Task of Thinking" that correspondence and certainty proceed from, or are granted by, unconcealedness. In the *Four Seminars* manuscript he stated that unconcealedness is presupposed by *all* the possible variants of truth. So the main question posed for us by *this* text, the "Task of Thinking," is how we are to understand the dependence of each of these versions upon unconcealedness.

II. HEIDEGGER'S SELF-CRITIQUES

The first self-critique, following on point (v) above, is focused on *Being and Time* §44; it had been "immaterial and misleading to call Ἀλήθεια in the sense of the clearing truth." The footnote attached to this remark is subtle, for it attributes a "decisive insight" to *Being and Time*, while also acknowledging that *Being and Time* had "strayed" away from it. The insight that Heidegger intends is expressed in the sentence he quotes here from (GA 2: 291/SZ 219), and I'll re-translate it for emphasis: "The translation [of the word ἀλήθεια] by means of the word 'truth,' and even more our theoretical-conceptual determinations of this expression ['truth'], cover up the meaning of what the Greeks accepted as 'self-evident': the pre-philosophical understanding of ἀλήθεια that lay at the basis of their terminological employments of the term." The insight already attained in *Being and Time* is that the Greeks understood ἀλήθεια pre-philosophically as unconcealedness; their philosophers' writings (he has just been referring to Aristotle and Heraclitus) preserved and reflected this understanding through their terminology; but modern translations and terminology (*Wahrheit*), and especially modern concepts and theories, have covered these matters up. But the 1964 footnote also acknowledges that in that very context of *Being and Time* Heidegger had gone astray himself. Where is this seen? In *Being*

and Time §44, he was defending his own phenomenological account of truth – the statement is true through uncovering beings – and he introduced Greek terminology (GA 2: 290–91/SZ 219) in order to give his own theory an ancient pedigree, as if *Dasein's* uncovering were anticipated in the ancient ἀλήθεια. But in 1964, he concedes that this strategy could only distort the Greek. The ancient idea of unconcealedness as *clearing* was quite foreign to *Being and Time*: where this text spoke of a *Lichtung* (GA 2: 177/SZ 133), it was associated with *Dasein's* own being, being in the world.¹³ There is no reason to think that the ancients attributed the unconcealedness to *Dasein*. Heidegger's self-critique does not consist merely in denying a proposition: that in 1927 he thought truth was unconcealedness, but later did not. Rather, it is a point about an historical mismatch: the Greeks' intuition could not be fitted within the modern program of *Being and Time*: the phenomenology of *Dasein*.

That point is given a further airing in the last pages of the *Heraclitus* seminar from about two years later during the Winter Semester 1966–67 (GA 15: 259–61/H 161–62). Heidegger quotes the same sentence from *Being and Time* (GA 2: 290–91/SZ 219), to show that he had been on the track of thinking ἀλήθεια as ἀλήθεια, which is to say as *clearing* rather than as truth. “Ἀλήθεια as unconcealment had already occupied me, but in the meantime ‘truth’ shoved itself in between.” Of course, it is no surprise that “truth” did that – all the philosophical preoccupations of the early 20th century would have had that effect.

We come to the *second* self-critique, which follows point (vi), on the “natural” sense of ἀληθές among the Greeks. Heidegger cites an argument from “Plato's Doctrine of Truth” that sought to trace a revolution in the Greek concept of truth supposedly carried out by Plato: from the original unconcealedness to correctness, ὀρθότης.¹⁴ But now he argues, on the contrary, that from the very beginning ἀλήθεια “was experienced” only as ὀρθότης, and so “came immediately under the perspective of likeness and adequation.” But in criticizing his own earlier construction of the history, Heidegger *cannot* be imputing the common understanding of ἀληθές to Parmenides as well! That would completely undermine his present argument of 1964! Parmenides stands as a lofty

mountain peak. Where a “natural” and pragmatic view of ἀλήθεια was circulating in the language, he reached down into the deepest resources of the language to find the name for the event of unconcealedness. (Here we might supplement the analysis, taking into account what Heidegger said in *Being and Time* (GA 2: 290–91/SZ 219): perhaps it was not only Parmenides, but Heraclitus and Aristotle too, who had freed themselves from the commonplace understanding of ἀληθές.) Parmenides might even have an explanation for the general incapacity of humanity to see through correctness into unconcealedness: we read here that Parmenides postulated a hiding, Ἄθη, as dwelling within the heart of unconcealedness (GA 14: 88/44,8). But Heidegger will withdraw that suggestion later in the *Four Seminars* (GA 15: 395/FS 78).

III. AN EARLIER VERSION

Here we may consult “Hegel and the Greeks,” an address from 1958 (GA 9: 255–72/323–36). This text resembles the “Task of Thinking” in its outline. Both begin by surveying the current diminished state of philosophy, apparently submerged in “logistic” and social science. Both turn back then to the heroic age of Hegel (in the “Task of Thinking” supplemented by Husserl), when philosophy had no doubts about its proper concern (*Sache*): the process whereby subjectivity became capable of truth. Both essays conclude by invoking Parmenides, whose Ἀλήθεια determined the course of all subsequent philosophy, without being recognized by it. But “Hegel and the Greeks” also expresses in its conclusion the relationship of several variant forms of truth to the primordial Ἀλήθεια, expressing their relationship more explicitly than does the “Task of Thinking,” and so it is valuable to our present study.

The essay is devoted mainly to explaining how Hegel understood Greek philosophy as forming the initial stage of abstract thinking, focused on *being*, then how he treats the particular philosophers of Greece. As for Parmenides, Hegel stresses the doctrine that All is One, expressed in the identity of being and thought. But precisely at this point, Heidegger initiates his own questioning of Hegel: “With Parmenides, does not Ἀλήθεια, truth, stand over the beginning of the path

of philosophy?” (GA 9: 267/332) Here Heidegger did not hesitate to identify Ἀλήθεια with truth! So this address affords us a good “base point” for a critical approach to the “Task of Thinking” – why does the later text differ over this matter? As we read on in “Hegel and the Greeks,” we do see complexities in the relationship of Ἀλήθεια and truth. First of all, in Hegel: he grasped truth as certainty (*die Gewissheit*) of the self-knowing absolute subject. He did *not* comprehend it as Ἀλήθεια, and indeed his philosophy had no grasp of Ἀλήθεια in any form at all. Yet Heidegger pursues this matter: “Is not precisely certainty in its essence referred to [*angewiesen auf*] Ἀλήθεια . . . granted that we carefully ponder the latter as disclosure [*Entbergung*]?” (GA 9: 267/332) What grounding does Heidegger have for that claim? There are two main points. (a) Given that, for Hegel, being is the first and abstract theme of philosophy, then the very emergence of being can only occur under the regime of unconcealedness: a manifestation and disclosedness of being. (b) If, for Hegel, the completeness of philosophy is the self-reconciliation and self-recognition of spirit, then disclosure or unconcealedness must be at play there at the end, as well as in every intermediate stage of the phenomenology of spirit (GA 9: 267–68/332). Two pages later (GA 9: 270/334), we see an explicit parallel. (a) If Ἀλήθεια is at work in being and its manifestation, then being is referred to (*angewiesen auf*) unconcealedness, and not vice versa, and being has to do with (*hat zu tun mit*) unconcealedness, but not vice versa. (b) If truth, according to its essence, is determined as certainty, or as correctness, and these can only subsist within the domain of unconcealedness, then truth has to do with (*hat zu tun mit*) Ἀλήθεια, but not Ἀλήθεια with truth. This *Zu-tun-haben* is an asymmetrical relationship of dependence.

Moreover, the relationship is described here as a relationship of essence: *das Wesen der Wahrheit* that has come into force both as *Richtigkeit* and as *Gewissheit* can only subsist in the domain of Ἀλήθεια (GA 9: 270/334); that kind of attachment is *why* truth has to do with Ἀλήθεια, but not vice versa. It is astonishing that, a few years later, in the “Task of Thinking,” Heidegger makes no mention of the *essence* of truth, which served to express the connection of truth with unconcealedness in “Hegel and the Greeks.”

IV. LAFONT'S INTERPRETATION OF "THE TASK OF THINKING"

Lafont proposes a comprehensive reading of Heidegger, especially of *Being and Time*, as an expression of the "linguistic turn," whereby it is each historic language, and not a table of universal a priori concepts, that engages in world-disclosure.¹⁵ But if a language projects a world-interpretation, and we are all immersed in our language, it seems we can never find grounds for assuring ourselves that our projection is revelatory, i.e., true. She takes this to be the impasse fundamental to Heidegger's thought¹⁶: what *Being and Time* means by truth is coincidence between what the language projects and how things actually are; but Heidegger lacks the means to guarantee any such coincidence. I do not propose to follow her full treatment of this problem in the early and later Heidegger. (Her full-scale reading of Heidegger was influenced by the works of Tugendhat.¹⁷ No student of Heidegger can afford to ignore Tugendhat, but he did not publish comments on the "Task of Thinking," and that is the text that concerns us here. It is her reading of "Task of Thinking" that interests me.) At one juncture in her book, she treats "Task of Thinking" as containing Heidegger's own recognition of this general problem that she has identified.¹⁸ For her, Heidegger is led by his new insight to a complete recantation of his earlier views on truth: the unconcealing projections of language are not truth.

Lafont's presentation of *Being and Time* itself, however, is marked by a curious insistence on the term "correctness" (*Richtigkeit*) as a synonym for "truth" (*Wahrheit*). Heidegger's earlier view, she says, was that "unconcealment was the standard of measure for correctness, and therefore also the sufficient condition for truth."¹⁹ This correctness was to be the very coincidence that interests her between the projections of language and the way things actually are. Now she reads Heidegger's first self-critique in the "Task of Thinking" (we treated it above) as acknowledging that his unconcealment cannot account for correctness,²⁰ and that is why it loses all title to be counted as truth. But since, in fact, the term *Richtigkeit* never occurs in *Being and Time*, it is not possible that, at this later date in the "Task of Thinking," Heidegger would be admitting that *Being and Time* had failed in its account of *Richtigkeit!*

The problem is not only that Lafont goes astray in attributing this term to *Being and Time*. Beyond that, her text assumes that the nature of truth itself is already well known to us and is properly expressed as correctness. She repeatedly describes correctness not only as the “traditional” and “natural” but also as the “normative” concept of truth, as if it *had* to be what Heidegger had in mind in his early work, and what anyone could have had in mind.²¹

V. CONCLUSION: PHILOSOPHY AND THINKING

We have seen the array of distinct variants of truth in the text of the “Task of Thinking,” confirming that Heidegger did not hold a simple, univocal theory of truth: diverse variants like correspondence and adaequation, and later, certainty and correctness, all associated with one philosopher or another, all aspiring to express the riddle of Ἀλήθεια. The question we raised earlier, how they can all be related to one another, is actually the huge problem of comprehending the history of truth. Heidegger did not compose such a history, and it stands waiting for scholars to take up. One point that emerges from our survey is that varying concepts of truth are associated with varying projects of philosophy, indeed, dependent on them. Concepts of truth are defined *only* by philosophy – there is no such thing as a “pre-ontological understanding of truth.” What we take for a naïve understanding was constituted by the tradition, especially the modern tradition that stems from Thomas Aquinas. The people’s language has been shaped by metaphysics.

Our governing correlation between truth and unconcealedness has been framed, in Heidegger’s whole essay, by the contrast between philosophy, which has come to its end, and thinking, which is to embark on its new task. If, in Part One, philosophy has been completed, that means that we can expect no more researches of the type of Hegel’s or Husserl’s in the future. It does not mean that there will be no need for us in the future to read the historical Hegel and Husserl. Heidegger is at pains (GA 14: 74/436, 85/446) to stress the dignity of philosophy and its superiority over the thinking that he is proposing. Thinking still has to attend to philosophy. Heidegger never suggests that, historically,

philosophy was devoid of thinking, and “Hegel and the Greeks” was a wonderful demonstration of the activity of thinking practiced by the Greeks and by Hegel. But it seems that Heidegger is proposing to us a thinking *after* philosophy.

What would that be? Heidegger’s own work (and the work of his interpreters) practices thinking in such work as the *Four Seminars*, in the *Contributions to Philosophy* and its successor studies, in the encounter with East Asian thought, in the encounter with poetry, that of Hölderlin and others. The implication of the present study is that all such work of thinking must not lose sight of the philosophers, notably to expound what they have understood by truth, and how such an understanding gives some refraction, however distant, to unconcealedness. And Part One of the “Task of Thinking” reminds us that the current reality of philosophy is found in the social sciences, the natural sciences, and the formal sciences. The truth of science, too, must remain a topic for thinking, to seek out how it expresses unconcealedness.

ENDNOTES

- 1 See Daniel Dahlstrom, *Heidegger’s Concept of Truth* (Cambridge University Press, 2001); F.-W. von Herrmann, *Wahrheit, Freiheit, Geschichte* (Frankfurt: Klostermann, 2002); Mark Wrathall, *Heidegger and Unconcealment* (Cambridge University Press, 2011).
- 2 Martin Heidegger, “The End of Philosophy and the Task of Thinking,” GA 14: 67–90, English trans. Joan Stambaugh, in BW 431–49; hereafter “Task of Thinking.”
- 3 Cristina Lafont, *Heidegger, Language, and World-Disclosure*, translated by Graham Harman (Cambridge University Press, 2000), 109, 114–15.
- 4 Ibid., 115–7.
- 5 Thomas Sheehan provides one overview of Heidegger’s whole thought and shows the place of Ἀλήθεια within it in his article “Astonishing! Things Make Sense,” *Gatherings*, Vol. 1 (2011): 1–25.

- 6 GA 14: 83/BW 444: “...χρεὼ δέ σε πάντα πυθέσθαι
 ἡμὲν Ἀληθείης εὐκυκλέος ἀτρεμεῖς ἦτορ
 ἡδὲ βροτῶν δόξας, ταῖς οὐκ ἔνι πίστις ἀληθῆς.
 Fragment I, 28ff.
- ‘du sollst aber alles erfahren:
 sowohl der Unverborgenheit, der gutgerundeten,
 nichtzitterndes Herz
 als auch der Sterblichen Dafürhalten, dem fehlt das Vertrauen-
 können auf Unverborgenes.’”
- 7 Richard Capobianco has an important discussion of this matter in
 his *Engaging Heidegger* (University of Toronto Press, 2010), espe-
 cially 94–103, showing that *die Lichtung* had become Heidegger’s
Leitmotif in the 1960s.
- 8 GA 14: 83-4/BW 445: “[Das Wort] meint sie selbst [die Unver-
 borgenheit] in ihrem Eigensten, meint den Ort der Stille, der in
 sich versammelt, was erst Unverborgenheit gewährt. Das ist die
 Lichtung des Offenen.”
- 9 BW 445: “...the place of stillness that gathers in itself what first
 grants unconcealment.”
- 10 See, for example, “The Question Concerning Technology” (GA 7:
 21/BW 325).
- 11 See my paper, “On the Manifold Meaning of Truth in Aristotle,”
 in *The Multidimensionality of Hermeneutic Phenomenology*, ed.
 Babette Babich & Dimitri Ginev (Heidelberg: Springer, 2014),
 227–42.
- 12 See, for example, GA 45: 7–20/8–19.
- 13 This is demonstrated at length in Capobianco, op. cit., 88–101.
- 14 See GA 9: 109–44/155–82. He had proposed this not only in that
 essay from 1940, but in a number of lectures on Plato’s *Republic*
 offered in the early 1930s; see GA 34, GA 36/37.
- 15 Lafont, *Heidegger, Language, and World-Disclosure*, 24–26.
- 16 See *Heidegger, Language, and World-Disclosure*, 109–114 for one
 formulation of this problem.

- 17 Especially Ernst Tugendhat, *Der Wahrheitsbegriff bei Husserl und Heidegger* (Berlin: de Gruyter, 1967).
- 18 Lafont, *Heidegger, Language, and World-Disclosure*, 169–75.
- 19 Ibid., 171.
- 20 Ibid.
- 21 Ibid., 123, 127 (“normative”), 170 (“natural”), 171 (“traditional”).